Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt

Adrian von Bidder <avbidder@fortytwo.ch> Wed, 25 September 2002 09:35 UTC

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Subject: Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt
From: Adrian von Bidder <avbidder@fortytwo.ch>
To: OpenPGP <ietf-openpgp@imc.org>
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References: <Pine.LNX.4.30.QNWS.0209231142100.22100-100000@thetis.deor.org> <B9B54633.9809%jon@callas.org> <20020924103826.D3563@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de> <sjmsmzzmp2l.fsf@kikki.mit.edu>
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On Tue, 2002-09-24 at 16:37, Derek Atkins wrote:
> [...]If the
> attacker controls the keyserver and can remove revocations then
> obviously this doesn't work, but I don't think an attacker can control
> that many data points.

Depending on the attack scenario, it might suffice when one person does
not see a revocation certificate during a limited timeframe (while they
send some vital documents encrypted to the compromised key).

This only requires control of the network connection of one machine for
a specific time. Absolutely feasible.

cheers
-- vbi

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