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Re: [openpgp] Modelling an abuse-resistant OpenPGP keyserver

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Mon, 15 April 2019 17:35 UTC

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From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: ilf <ilf@zeromail.org>, openpgp@ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <20190412201300.GJ1226@zeromail.org>
References: <87v9zt2y2d.fsf@fifthhorseman.net> <20190412201300.GJ1226@zeromail.org>
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Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:59:38 -0400
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Modelling an abuse-resistant OpenPGP keyserver
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Hi ilf--

thanks for the review and the comments!

On Fri 2019-04-12 22:13:00 +0200, ilf wrote:
> I fixed some minor spelling, grammar and formatting - please excuse the 
> amount of pull requests.

I've only seen a few merge requests, and none of them from "ilf" -- if
you're into the gitlab-style workflow, please make merge requests over
here:

    https://gitlab.com/dkg/draft-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore

Thanks to the folks who have made these requests, though, they're
helping make the document better!

> I wonder about the definition of "certificate discovery" here. Even 
> without UIDs, these keystores could be used for the *retrieval* of 
> specific certificates whose fingerprint (or key ID) is known. This can 
> be the case for signatures (over mails, software or documents) or 
> keylists like in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mccain-keylist

I agree, but this distinction is what the document already tries to make
between certificate *discovery* (lookup by UID or UID substring) and
certificate *update* (lookup by primary key fingerprint).

If that distinction wasn't clear in the reading, i'd welcome text that
improves the clarity.  thanks for pointing it out!

         --dkg

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