Re: [openpgp] Embedded TPK subpacket

"Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org> Mon, 25 March 2019 12:38 UTC

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Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 13:38:45 +0100
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From: "Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org>
To: Vincent Breitmoser <look@my.amazin.horse>
Cc: Justus Winter <justuswinter@gmail.com>, Marcus Brinkmann <marcus.brinkmann=40ruhr-uni-bochum.de@dmarc.ietf.org>, openpgp@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Embedded TPK subpacket
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Hi Vincent,

On Mon, 25 Mar 2019 13:25:52 +0100,
Vincent Breitmoser wrote:
> > My proposal is ment to obsolete the existing mechanisms.  The fact that
> > we now have multiple incompatible mechanisms is a bit sad, and I'm
> > trying to extend OpenPGP so that we can have interoperable
> > implementations again.
> 
> So what your proposal brings to the table is in-band key distribution without
> MUA involvement, but hinges on the use of signed-only mails. Given the rather
> terrible state of signed-only messages, which is likely what caused both
> Autocrypt and PEP to omit support for them, I'm sceptical of this approach's
> potential to do much for the unification of key distribution
> mechanisms.

This is *one* of the things that this proposal can help with.  Note:
in the context of Autocrypt, this could help with "autocrypt gossip";
I don't foresee it replacing autocrypt headers.

> 2) limited usefulness in practice due to
> brittle reliability and non-existent network effect.

I agree that they *currently* have limited usefulness.  But, if
companies started to actually sign their outgoing mail, this could
help combat phishing.  I think we should consider both the future's
potential and today's limitations, and not be driven be either
exclusively.