New Encrypted Data Packet?

Jon Callas <jon@callas.org> Mon, 04 April 2005 15:42 UTC

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To: OpenPGP <ietf-openpgp@imc.org>
From: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
Subject: New Encrypted Data Packet?
Date: Mon, 04 Apr 2005 08:27:32 -0700
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When the Mister-Zuccherato attack came out at the beginning of the 
year, one of the suggestions that we had was to re-do the encrypted 
data packet and MDC. It seems that there's not really a lot of 
consensus to fix it, that merely working around the problem seems to be 
adequate? Am I right in that perception? Do we want to upgrade it?

I still think it's a good idea, myself, particularly since if you want 
wide deployment of such a thing for the future getting on it now is a 
good idea. But I would also like to really close out 2440bis, too. 
(However, the two are not mutually exclusive. We could close out 
2440bis and put the upgrades into a followon RFC.)

	Jon