[OPSAWG] Asserting Wireless Network Connections Using DNS Revolvers' Identities

Dan Wing <danwing@gmail.com> Thu, 22 September 2022 17:12 UTC

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From: Dan Wing <danwing@gmail.com>
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Subject: [OPSAWG] Asserting Wireless Network Connections Using DNS Revolvers' Identities
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Secdispatch, opsawg,

Based on earlier comments from Paul Wouters and Tommy Pauly, Tiru and I wrote Asserting Wireless Network Connections Using DNS Revolvers' Identities, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wing-opsawg-authenticating-network-00

Abstract:
   This document describes how a host uses the encrypted DNS server
   identity to reduce an attacker's capabilities if the attacker is
   emulating a wireless network.

We are interested in feedback on points such as

  - considering attack vectors, are TOFU and extension to QR sufficient or should just require SSID to match FQDN of resolver's identity
  - is the mechanism worthwhile enough for clients and WiFi operators considering the amount of protection/assurance versus, say, 802.1X

-Dan and Tiru