Re: [OPSAWG] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-acceptable-urls-11: (with COMMENT)

[Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>]

Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <[e-mail]> wrote:
    > ** Section 3.1 While there is an argument that old firmware was
    > insecure and should be replaced, it is often the case that the upgrade
    > process involves downtime, or can introduce risks due to needed
    > evaluations not having been completed yet.  As an example: moving
    > vehicles (cars, airplanes, etc.) should not perform upgrades while in
    > motion!  It is probably undesirable to perform any upgrade to an
    > airplane outside the service facility.  A vehicle owner may desire only
    > to perform software upgrades when they are at their residence.  Should
    > there be a problem, they could make alternate arrangements for
    > transportation.  This contrasts with an alternative situation where the
    > vehicle is parked at, for instance, a remote cabin, and where an
    > upgrade failure could cause a much greater inconvenience.

    >    The situation for upgrades of medical devices has even more
    > considerations involving regulatory compliance.

    > I’m having trouble understanding the examples provide and the
    > associated analysis. Editorial recommendation: cut all the text after
    > the first sentence.  Otherwise:

If you find it enough to claim that upgrades introduce risks, I don't mind
cutting there.

    > -- What does vehicles, aircraft and medical devices have to do with
    > MUD? Is there existing and planned penetration of MUD in those markets?

There isn't a penetration of MUD in any market yet.

Aircraft have hundreds of non-critical systems (seat-back movie players for instance).

MUD could have prevented the 2015 Jeep attack:
https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/
(The LTE provider(s) would have had to run MUD, and that's really not
crazy.  Someone writing the MUD file would have included incoming telnet in
the acceptlist)

    > -- Per “While there is an argument that old firmware was insecure and
    > should be replaced, it is often the case that the upgrade process
    > involves downtime, or can introduce risks due to needed evaluations not
    > having been completed yet. As an example, moving vehicles ...”

    > Where does the suggestion that moving cyber-physical systems should
    > upgrade their firmware in use come from?

>From many people who think that you have to always run the latest software,
NOW, or else.   I wrote the above a few years ago thinking nobody would be
stupid enough to upgrade while away, but Tesla did exactly that.

    > -- What is the basis for the claim that the regulatory compliance of
    > medical devices is more considerations than say of aircraft?

Different regulatory agency, different rules, different processes.

Many small aircraft use iPads for navigation/maps for instance.
They aren't critical systems, they aren't really regulated.

    > ** Reference

    >    [falsemalware] "False malware alerts cost organizations $1.27M
    > annually, report says", 18 January 2020,
    > <https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/false-
    > malware-alerts-cost-organizations-1-27m-annually-report- says/ and
    > http://go.cyphort.com/Ponemon-Report-Page.html>.

    > Pick a single URL.

okay.  Looks like second URL has died already.

--
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]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        |    IoT architect   [
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