[OPSAWG] [Errata Verified] RFC9291 (7162)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Fri, 14 October 2022 10:53 UTC

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Subject: [OPSAWG] [Errata Verified] RFC9291 (7162)
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The following errata report has been verified for RFC9291,
"A YANG Network Data Model for Layer 2 VPNs". 

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7162

--------------------------------------
Status: Verified
Type: Editorial

Reported by: Nikolai Malykh <nmalykh@ieee.org>
Date Reported: 2022-10-13
Verified by: Rob Wilton (IESG)

Section: 9

Original Text
-------------
   'ethernet-segments' and 'vpn-services':  An attacker who is able to
      access network nodes can undertake various attacks, such as
      deleting a running L2VPN service, interrupting all the traffic of
      a client.  In addition, an attacker may modify the attributes of a
      running service (e.g., QoS, bandwidth) or an ES, leading to
      malfunctioning of the service and therefore to SLA violations.  In
      addition, an attacker could attempt to create an L2VPN service,
      add a new network access, or intercept/redirect the traffic to a
      non-authorized node.  In addition to using NACM to prevent
      authorized access, such activity can be detected by adequately
      monitoring and tracking network configuration changes.


Corrected Text
--------------
   'ethernet-segments' and 'vpn-services':  An attacker who is able to
      access network nodes can undertake various attacks, such as
      deleting a running L2VPN service, interrupting all the traffic of
      a client.  In addition, an attacker may modify the attributes of a
      running service (e.g., QoS, bandwidth) or an ES, leading to
      malfunctioning of the service and therefore to SLA violations.  In
      addition, an attacker could attempt to create an L2VPN service,
      add a new network access, or intercept/redirect the traffic to a
      non-authorized node.  In addition to using NACM to prevent
      unauthorized access, such activity can be detected by adequately
      monitoring and tracking network configuration changes.


Notes
-----
Typo in last sentence, should be "unauthorized".

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RFC9291 (draft-ietf-opsawg-l2nm-19)
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Title               : A YANG Network Data Model for Layer 2 VPNs
Publication Date    : September 2022
Author(s)           : M. Boucadair, Ed., O. Gonzalez de Dios, Ed., S. Barguil, L. Munoz
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Operations and Management Area Working Group
Area                : Operations and Management
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG