Re: [OPSEC] ICMP/ICMPv6 network ingress filtering (Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt)

"Vic Liu" <liuzhiheng@chinamobile.com> Thu, 11 September 2014 03:14 UTC

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From: Vic Liu <liuzhiheng@chinamobile.com>
To: opsec@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 11:15:21 +0800
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Subject: Re: [OPSEC] ICMP/ICMPv6 network ingress filtering (Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt)
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Hi, Fernando

 

I read the document and think it is important work.  In particular, I would
be very glad to see this type of filtering implemented in CPE devices.  Are
you aware if Linux implements this?

 

Section 4 should clarify that this filtering must be performed on icmp error
messages.  Document says 'SHOULD perform ingress filtering on the
Destination Address of the IP packet embedded in the ICMP payload', but this
does not apply to other icmp messages like icmp echo request and reply.

 

 

Vic Liu

Chinamobile

Liuzhiheng@chinamobile.com

 

 

-----Original Message-----

From: OPSEC [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Fernando Gont

Sent: Friday, August 29, 2014 1:44 AM

To: 'opsec@ietf.org'; IPv6 Operations

Subject: [OPSEC] ICMP/ICMPv6 network ingress filtering (Fwd: New Version
Notification for draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt)

 

Folks,

 

Based on the recent discussion we have had about ICMP-based DoS attacks, we
have posted an I-D which describes and suggests that network ingress
filtering be applied on ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 error messages (based on the
addresses of the embedded payload).

 

The I-D is available at:

<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering
-00.txt>

 

Any feedback will be very appreciated.

 

Thanks!

 

Best regards,

Fernando

 

 

 

 

-------- Forwarded Message --------

Subject: New Version Notification for

draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt

Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 10:37:47 -0700

From: internet-drafts@ietf.org <mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org> 

To: Will(Shucheng) Liu <liushucheng@huawei.com
<mailto:liushucheng@huawei.com> >, Jeroen Massar <jeroen@massar.ch
<mailto:jeroen@massar.ch> >, Ray Hunter <v6ops@globis.net
<mailto:v6ops@globis.net> >, Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com
<mailto:fgont@si6networks.com> >, Ray Hunter <v6ops@globis.net
<mailto:v6ops@globis.net> >, Jeroen Massar <jeroen@massar.ch
<mailto:jeroen@massar.ch> >, Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com
<mailto:fgont@si6networks.com> >, Shucheng LIU

(Will) <liushucheng@huawei.com <mailto:liushucheng@huawei.com> >

 

 

A new version of I-D, draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt

has been successfully submitted by Fernando Gont and posted to the IETF
repository.

 

Name:               draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering

Revision:  00

Title:                  Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Attacks which
employ Forged

ICMP/ ICMPv6 Error Messages

Document date:       2014-08-28

Group:               Individual Submission

Pages:               9

URL:

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-
00.txt

Status:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering/

Htmlized:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00

 

 

Abstract:

   Over the years, a number of attack vectors that employ forged ICMP/

   ICMPv6 error messages have been disclosed and exploited in the wild.

   The aforementioned attack vectors do not require that the source

   address of the packets be forged, but do require that the addresses

   of the IP/IPv6 packet embedded in the ICMP/ICMPv6 payload be forged.

   This document discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward

   method for using ingress traffic filtering to mitigate attacks that

   use forged addresses in the IP/IPv6 packet embedded in an ICMP/ICMPv6

   payload.  This advice is in line with the recommendations in BCP38.

 

 

 

 

 

Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

 

The IETF Secretariat

 

 

 

 

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