[OPSEC] review draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-02

joel jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com> Fri, 15 July 2016 04:54 UTC

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From: joel jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>
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Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 06:53:55 +0200
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Subject: [OPSEC] review draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-02
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Greetings,

I reviewed this probably later then I should have after volunteering to
do so.

The mechanism proposed in

draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering

is akin to a strict mode RPF check for the IP Destination header
contained in an ICMP error message though in practical terms a device
such as a firewall without recourse to a routing table would probably
employ an access list for enforcement.

While similar to other antispoofing measures one can employ to prevent
spoofed traffic with internal source addresses from ingressing a network
it may be technically infeasible to implement in the same mediation
devices e.g. routers or switches, a problem we also noted with icmp6
payload inspection in RFC 7690 section 4.

I'm sympathic generally to this draft, section 5 implementation details
could be rewriten more cleanly to suggest how it is implemented. e.g.

   IF    embedded packet's Destination Address is from within my network
   THEN  forward as appropriate

The destination match is due to a learned route (which assumes some
minimal level of path or routing symmetry  which firewalls tend to
require anyway); or an access list.

Thanks
joel