Re: [OPSEC] [v6ops] DoS attacks (ICMPv6-based) resulting from IPv6 EH drops

Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> Tue, 19 August 2014 17:19 UTC

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Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 14:18:42 -0300
From: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
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To: Jeroen Massar <jeroen@massar.ch>, IPv6 Operations <v6ops@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OPSEC] [v6ops] DoS attacks (ICMPv6-based) resulting from IPv6 EH drops
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On 08/19/2014 01:48 PM, Jeroen Massar wrote:
>> Should we include something alng this lines to the countermeasures
>> listed in draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-in-real-world, or were you thinking
>> about something else?
> 
> While it kind-of has a place there, (ipv6-ehs-in-real-world) is a
> "current state of the Internet" regarding this problem, it thus
> introduces the problem.
> 
> Hence, a short, separate document which updates ICMPv4 + ICMPv6
> referencing that draft would be more appropriate IMHO.

Ok, makes sense.



>>> Hence, why it is a good idea to do the same checks for IPv4 too
>>> and why I avoid mentioning what kind of attack it was solving.
>>> It is just good hygiene to check validity of things.
>>
>> FWIW, I had posted this thingy a while ago:
>> <http://www.gont.com.ar/papers/filtering-of-icmp-error-messages.pdf>
>> -- essentially BCP38 on the ICMPv4 payload..
> 
> aka RFC 5927, though only informational even though it went through WG
> review it seems.

It took 7 years to publish... and not because of slacking. It was
insane. :-)

Cheers,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492