[OPSEC] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution

tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> Tue, 20 June 2023 06:08 UTC

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From: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 11:38:16 +0530
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Subject: [OPSEC] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution
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Reviewer: Tirumaleswar Reddy
Review result:  Ready with issues

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

The summary of the review is Ready with issues.

[1]
      else (or in addition), the Probe Description URI is
      "https://[2001:db8::dead]/.well-known/probing.txt".  In this case,
      there might be a certificate verification issue.

Comment> It is possible to get a certificate with IP address from a public
CA
(see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8738).

[2]

You may want to consider referring to
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6man-hbh-processing/,
It discusses HBH option processing by intermediate nodes and
recommendations to process new HBH options.

[3]
I suggest discussing the privacy implications that an eavesdropper will be
able to view the PII data in the Probe.

[4]
   As a consequence, the recipient of this information cannot trust it
   without confirmation. If a recipient cannot confirm the information
   or does not wish to do so, it should treat the flows as if there were
   no probe attribution.

Comment> How can the recipient of the probe information validate it is
authentic for confirmation ?

Cheers,
-Tiru