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Re: [Pce] [RTG-DIR] RtgDir review: draft-ietf-pce-pceps-12

"Adrian Farrel" <adrian@olddog.co.uk> Thu, 11 May 2017 18:28 UTC

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Reply-To: adrian@olddog.co.uk
From: Adrian Farrel <adrian@olddog.co.uk>
To: 'Dhruv Dhody' <dhruv.dhody@huawei.com>, 'Dan Frost' <frost@mm.st>, rtg-ads@ietf.org
Cc: rtg-dir@ietf.org, draft-ietf-pce-pceps.all@ietf.org, pce@ietf.org
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Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 19:22:13 +0100
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Subject: Re: [Pce] [RTG-DIR] RtgDir review: draft-ietf-pce-pceps-12
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> > This document proposes to add a STARTTLS mechanism to the PCE protocol.
> > If this basic approach is accepted, then the document is in good shape.
> > It's clear, complete, and straightforward. The question is whether mandating
> > STARTTLS is actually a good idea.
> >
> [Dhruv] Yes, this has been discussed in the WG.
> The individual draft in fact asked for another port no, and during the WG
> adoption process, it was discussed in the WG as well as with security experts,
and
> concluded that we should use STARTTLS.
> As far as I am aware, use of different port for secured version of a protocol
has
> not been followed by IETF for some time now.

Right. Burning additional ports has been frowned upon for a while.

I don't think it is right for a draft to explain why one solution was chosen
over another. The question is: does the chosen solution work?

But Dan is right that any weaknesses need to be highlighted and
addressed/mitigated/warned.

Cheers,
Adrian

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