Re: [Pearg] IRTF Chair review of draft-irtf-pearg-censorship-06

["Dr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall" <[e-mail]>]

Thank you, Mallory!

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Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Distinguished Technologist, Internet Society
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________________________________
From: Pearg <[e-mail]> on behalf of Mallory Knodel <[e-mail]>
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2022 12:40:32 PM
To: Colin Perkins <[e-mail]>; [e-mail] <[e-mail]>
Cc: [e-mail] <[e-mail]>; [e-mail] <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: [Pearg] IRTF Chair review of draft-irtf-pearg-censorship-06

Hi Colin and all,

I made some changes in the new version thusly:

On 12/2/22 12:29 PM, Colin Perkins wrote:
> RFC 5743 compliance: The draft does not follow the guidelines in RFC 5743
Fixed.
> There are two places where specific censorship products are mentioned, along with citations of their use (SmartFilter in §3 and §4.2.1, NetSweeper in §4.2.1). Given that the set of such products changes over time, and is likely to become rapidly obsolete, I wonder if the draft might better just list the classes of products and leave the specifics to the cited sources?
Agree-- and since those sections included enough description of those
technologies it was easy to remove them. However I did have to change
the citation for NarusInsight because the former citation (directly to
the EFF blog post about the AT&T lawsuit) didn't mention it. I use the
Wikipedia article about the lawsuit instead, which gives a better
overview of the techniques in question.
> §4.2.3: “Note that TLS 1.3 acts as a security component of QUIC” – do the differences in the way TLS integrates with QUIC affect censorship as described in this draft?

My interpretation of the intention of this sentence is to point out that
various parts of TLS 1.3 are used for blocking, but that each of these
parts then can be used to block QUIC in the same way. So rather than
having a QUIC subsection, they are combined. I checked the subsequent
sections and have confirmed that the subsections where relevant indicate
where QUIC can be blocked or where QUIC cannot be blocked with the same
method given that it is, still, different from TLS.

Additional note! Another major change that I should note here is that
I've now added some text throughout about image hash matching.
Essentially anywhere keyword or URL blocklist is mentioned in a way that
is adjacent to content filtering, I felt it appropriate to note the way
that images and videos can also be detected and actioned with removal.
The very brief text is cited to an excellent description of Apple's
proposed NeuralHash scheme written up by ekr, and can be found under
3.0. Technical prescription and 4.2.4. Instrumenting Content Distributors.

Thanks for the review, Colin,

-Mallory

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Mallory Knodel
CTO, Center for Democracy and Technology
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