Re: [Perc] Magnus Westerlund's Discuss on draft-ietf-perc-double-10: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Cullen Jennings <fluffy@iii.ca> Fri, 17 May 2019 18:34 UTC

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From: Cullen Jennings <fluffy@iii.ca>
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Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 12:34:20 -0600
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, perc-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-perc-double@ietf.org, suhasietf@gmail.com, perc@ietf.org
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To: Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>
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Subject: Re: [Perc] Magnus Westerlund's Discuss on draft-ietf-perc-double-10: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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> 
> 1. Section 5.1:
> 
> To me it appears that one fundamental security flaw exists in the definition of
> the inner encryption. That is the fact that RTP padding is not included into
> the inner encrypted part. This prevents the application of RTP padding to
> prevent the potential privacy leakage that "Guidelines for the Use of Variable
> Bit Rate Audio with Secure RTP" (RFC 6562) documents. To prevent this type of
> information leakage and other privacy preserving operations based on applying
> RTP padding it would be necessary to include the RTP padding into the inner
> encrypted envelope. Appendix A figure indicates that is the case, but the
> process description in 5.1 is not matching that.
> 

So my read of 5.1 is that does this. Clearly we need to make the text clear that it does that - what part of the 5.1 makes you think the padding is stripped from the  payload ?

Perhaps to make it explicitly clear we should change 

"* Payload: The RTP payload of the original packet”

to be 

"* Payload (including padding) The RTP payload (including passing) of the original packet”