Re: [perpass] TLS/SSL Key Rotation
Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Wed, 04 September 2013 22:21 UTC
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Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 07:21:09 +0900
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Patrick Pelletier <code@funwithsoftware.org>
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Cc: perpass <perpass@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [perpass] TLS/SSL Key Rotation
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> Yes, I do think PFS ciphersuites are a better way. Although sometimes > I've heard "performance" given as a reason for not enabling PFS. In > that case, frequent key rotation (if the CAs cooperate) would allow > much of the benefit of PFS, at essentially no additional computational > cost. the operational cost, and room for mistakes, should not be discounted. randy
- [perpass] TLS/SSL Key Rotation Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [perpass] TLS/SSL Key Rotation Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] TLS/SSL Key Rotation Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [perpass] TLS/SSL Key Rotation Yoav Nir
- Re: [perpass] TLS/SSL Key Rotation Patrick Pelletier
- Re: [perpass] TLS/SSL Key Rotation Randy Bush