Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful
Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im> Thu, 24 October 2013 20:01 UTC
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Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 14:01:16 -0600
From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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To: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
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Cc: Salvatore Loreto <salvatore.loreto@ericsson.com>, Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>, "<perpass@ietf.org>" <perpass@ietf.org>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10/24/13 1:43 PM, Ted Hardie wrote: > On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 11:03 AM, Peter Saint-Andre > <stpeter@stpeter.im <mailto:stpeter@stpeter.im>> wrote: > > >>> I think SMTP TLS BCP would be a good idea. I think it should >>> be independent of DANE, because of the status of the DANE >>> document. I would be happy to work on it (and would be happy to >>> collaborate with PSA to discuss similarities and differences). >> >> Great. Let's talk in YVR about how to get that done so its a >> real BCP that gets followed in the wild. If someone else is up >> for helping I guess contact Alexey. > > Before this thread emerged, I suggested the idea of having a chat > about this topic during the AppsArea session on Monday morning > (and BTW there are no SEC area sessions opposite). That might be a > good place to start. > > > Are you thinking of this in terms of MSAs in the RFC 6409 sense, as > well as MTAs? I'm thinking about what Keith Moore posted in draft-moore-email-tls. So yes, MSAs in the RFC 6409 sense (but also covering IMAP and POP). > Though SMTP is used for both, the usefulness of things like DANE is > likely to be different in the different contexts. > > That hints, unfortunately, that there is a strong possibility that > the best current practice may be best specified in relation to a > specific use of a protocol rather than generally to the protocol. So it seems. We all need to up our game, but each of us might need to do so in different ways. Peter - -- Peter Saint-Andre https://stpeter.im/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.19 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJSaXyMAAoJEOoGpJErxa2piAwP/23f/rQ9VpAfJlcsFGLHmwEB haJoQpJ4DJFuH201p+5U4w8YeZyCRaH1qrAv+kVNTBuiZwqQilkKty8FoMAg3cTl NK15NVMWmR78lgNAW0FsPsRvvGmuuZGEdER6IvtytbL1xJue18RuaKWXiA5ZPeub aXwtV9s5Qkj3asXTJexXmZvBwGa1oA1tXJHzrsmHOTZf/72OYo1J5o4hjIRlgK2h jxGXl8mv94flj0ySk6lr4/vbfxNeLHpMDyuXZm2wPGnRQbfFANd0XsuvNa/YGmIy 4nm3cWHxtcRL1nGoD0JI6tb9ekgMzLIVAu0stl5T2/l663ppTW40QqAXLNEpp/Xc UaIOtq9pEy0BKlzaRCqotV1AEgdiu1u7Mygo+r7nqjCA1gJV9evtSUE7ESGkM9y5 NXu0pfdqmPXa8Y3v+DoXZADkCFuz/4Jwgtq0vpGsWW3YMltv5L5SRgH5WYu7T4VI VFXHkt1GpNYqT6x5IygkFswQVsC7Reast2RfYIaohefQ0VljteDZCivJK8VGvh1g ob4bWjhbYcBHPrWD/2GxorUWz6ZXELDGyB+BU7cf8GgYyo+nwGq0enk4X5iGKxCJ Y8begsJ1USF1X4NLQQV/pYk2BK4ZqczYANRR1tAMOEedzNukO1RtNGf9aU9VRPvP uCqJyTfuOkvDsQPKjs6v =QKwx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
- [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful Paul Hoffman
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… John-Mark Gurney
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… Harry Halpin
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… Paul Wouters
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… Ted Hardie
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… ned+perpass
- Re: [perpass] Hasty PRISM proofing considered har… Yaron Sheffer