Re: [perpass] blast from the past

Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> Tue, 28 January 2014 23:53 UTC

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Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 12:53:18 +1300
From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
Organization: University of Auckland
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To: "Scott O. Bradner" <sob@sobco.com>
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Cc: perpass <perpass@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [perpass] blast from the past
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On 29/01/2014 12:39, Scott O. Bradner wrote:
> I just remembered that we talked about setting a direction towards protection quite a while ago in RFC 1752
> (the IPv6 recommendation)
> 
>    We feel that an improvement in the basic level of security in the
>    Internet is vital to its continued success.  Users must be able to
>    assume that their exchanges are safe from tampering, diversion and
>    exposure.  Organizations that wish to use the Internet to conduct
>    business must be able to have a high level of confidence in the
>    identity of their correspondents and in the security of their
>    communications.  The goal is to provide strong protection as a matter
>    of course throughout the Internet.
> 
> Scott

I also noticed that we said this in RFC 1958:

   6.2 It is highly desirable that Internet carriers protect the privacy
   and authenticity of all traffic, but this is not a requirement of the
   architecture.  Confidentiality and authentication are the
   responsibility of end users and must be implemented in the protocols
   used by the end users. Endpoints should not depend on the
   confidentiality or integrity of the carriers. Carriers may choose to
   provide some level of protection, but this is secondary to the
   primary responsibility of the end users to protect themselves.

     Brian