Re: [perpass] The problem with scaling authentication...
SM <sm@resistor.net> Mon, 25 November 2013 19:25 UTC
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Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2013 09:42:59 -0800
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
From: SM <sm@resistor.net>
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Cc: perpass@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [perpass] The problem with scaling authentication...
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Hi Richard, At 07:02 25-11-2013, Richard Barnes wrote: >... is that the authorities can make bad decisions. [snip] >Just wanted to observe that authentication woes are not unique to >the Internet and its collection of CAs. Authenticating things on a >global basis is hard. There is a significant number of examples of bad decisions. I'd say that proof of possession was not used as much in the non-Internet world. Regards, -sm