Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from list
Lucy Lynch <llynch@civil-tongue.net> Tue, 17 September 2013 14:21 UTC
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Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 07:20:40 -0700
From: Lucy Lynch <llynch@civil-tongue.net>
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: perpass <perpass@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from list
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On Tue, 17 Sep 2013, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > Hiya, > > I've gone through the perpass archive to try make a > list of the things that seem to be more doable/stable. > > This is just to make it more manageable for me, the > list has no official status whatsoever. I've not included > things where I'm not clear what might be the outcome. > Even if I include something I may well be wrong that > there'll be a clear outcome. > > Let me know if I've missed stuff (probably) or if you've > any other comments. On or off list, whichever's better. I haven't seen Martin Thompson among the posters and I think there may be some interesting lessons in the geopriv location obfuscation work that was included in his 2011 lying draft - https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-geopriv-lying-00 some of which is now embedded here: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-geopriv-uncertainty-08 not sure how this relates to the other proposals but it should be on the list. I remember a slide set as well from one of the meetings but can't find it in the archive. - Lucy > I do know that some other folks are discussing some > other relevant activities that are not yet published or > weren't mentioned on this list. When/if you want those > added here, just give me the info. and I'll add it. (If > your thing hasn't been discussed on an IETF list or > published in an I-D, I'd rather see that happen first if > you don't mind, for all the normal tedious IPR/Note-well > reasons.) > > I'll sporadically maintain this between now and Vancouver > at [1] (you may prefer to read it at [2], since [1] will > get you browser warnings about my self-signed cert. (*) > > Cheers, > S. > > [1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/perpass.txt > [2] http://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/perpass.txt > > (*) Nothing to do with the topic really but I just noticed > I'd not updated the key pair in 5 years so I made a new one > a few minutes ago since now's a good time before this year's > batch of students arrive. (How they complain about that > tells me a bit about 'em:-) > > > _______________________________________________ > perpass mailing list > perpass@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass >
- [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from list Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from l… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from l… =JeffH
- Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from l… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from l… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from l… Jari Arkko
- Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from l… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from l… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from l… Lucy Lynch
- Re: [perpass] tld strong authentication deploymen… Karl Malbrain
- Re: [perpass] rough list of concrete stuff from l… =JeffH
- Re: [perpass] tld strong authentication deploymen… Simon Josefsson
- Re: [perpass] tld strong authentication deploymen… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [perpass] tld strong authentication deploymen… Karl Malbrain
- Re: [perpass] tld strong authentication deploymen… Simon Josefsson
- Re: [perpass] tld strong authentication deploymen… Paul Wouters
- Re: [perpass] tls strong authentication deploymen… Karl Malbrain