RE: [pim] last-hop threats by hosts to PIM (fwd)

Hi,

Thanks for comments James and Beau.  I'll follow up with them 
off-list.  I'll just comment at this point on the generic 
observations:

(It would be interesting to see more input from the WG on what they 
think this would be useful for, if anything :)

On Fri, 7 Jan 2005, James Lingard wrote:
> I'm not sure that this draft makes a useful contribution, given the existing
> Security Considerations section of draft-ietf-pim-sm-v2-new and
> draft-ietf-mboned-mroutesec.  There seems to be very little here that is not
> in one of those two documents.  And although this document does bring
> together the material into one place, I fear that the creation of a third
> document may only confuse matters.

Mmm. The security considerations section of draft-ietf-pim-sm-v2-new 
has gotten better since I last looked at it; I recall that it was 
mostly a guide how to use IPsec with PIM.

draft-ietf-mboned-mroutesec tried to cover only the "off-link" part of 
PIM, i.e., if you would be able to control the DRs and other routers, 
what you could do. (I agree that hosts sending PIM registers is a 
tricky business).  I believe this doc spells out the specific threats 
and attacks a little bit further than what's in the spec, and analyzes 
other mitigation techniques rather than just IPsec.

In hindsight, it might have made sense to put this 
draft-ietf-mboned-mroutesec but that's too late now.

Now, the question still stays, what to do here.  Try to beef up 
draft-ietf-pim-sm-v2's security considerations to include this 
material?  Keep going as is, maybe consider merging later, e.g., when 
PIM-SM is going for DS?  Something else?

> Secondly, I find it hard to understand what assumption you are making about
> the level of PIM knowledge of the reader.  I feel that someone without a
> reasonable knowledge of the protocol would be unable to understand the
> document, yet in several places it attempts to give explanation that would
> be unnecessary to a more knowledgeable reader.  Perhaps an up-front
> statement of assumptions would be useful.

True enough -- I've assumed that the reader is familiar with PIM 
basics, but not necessarily the latest developments of the spec.  For 
example, a reader from security community evaluating PIM.

-- 
Pekka Savola                 "You each name yourselves king, yet the
Netcore Oy                    kingdom bleeds."
Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings

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