Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Mon, 18 August 2014 14:27 UTC

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Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 15:27:22 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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On 18/08/14 15:23, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> On 2014-08-18 13:37, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>
>> As a few folks (incl. me:-) said elsewhere...
>>
>> On 18/08/14 12:25, Anders Rundgren wrote:
>>>
>>> More stuff to consider includes the NUMS (Nothing Up My Sleeve) curves
>>> from Microsoft:
>>> http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/nums/
>>
>> If you're interested in which new curves might make sense to use
>> in IETF work, please engage on that topic with the CFRG [1] who
>> are running a process now to tey reach consensus on some curves.
> 
> There are two issues here:
> 
> 1. Creating external representations of Keys, Curves and Algorithms that
>    can be reused by various standards in development or in need of a
> "refresh".
>    This is actually a bit urgent since the using systems are designed
> *now*.

I don't agree. Some of the CFRG discussion may touch on that
so getting ahead of them here would be a bad idea. And CFRG
have set themselves a target of getting back to the TLS WG
before November, so I'd recommend a bit of patience for now,
for this part of the puzzle.

S.

> 
> 2. Recommending algorithms/curves to use is less critical since the
> proponents
>    (which even includes *countries* like Russia/GOST, China/SM3 and
> USG/NIST),
>    have already made their choices.  Internet-scale TLS server
> certificates and
>    DNSSEC are exceptions that indeed need recommendations.
> 
> Anders
> 
> 
>>
>> But let's not try do that in parallel here. When CFRG are done
>> then there will be some bits and pieces of work to be done here
>> perhaps, but not just yet.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> S.
>>
>> [1] https://irtf.org/cfrg
>>
> 
> 
>