Re: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC5280 (7634)

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Mon, 11 September 2023 19:56 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2023 15:55:49 -0400
Cc: David Cooper <david.cooper@nist.gov>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, IETF PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC5280 (7634)
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Wow!  This has been there a long time without anyone noticing.

In checking this out, I see that CRL has the same problem:

CertificateList  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
     tbsCertList          TBSCertList,
     signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
     signature            BIT STRING  }

This errata should be expanded to correct both Certificate and CertificateList in the body.  The appendix is correct.

Russ


> On Sep 8, 2023, at 5:15 PM, RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
> 
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5280,
> "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7634
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Nick Harper <ietf@nharper.org>
> 
> Section: 4.1
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
>   Certificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
>        tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
>        signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
>        signatureValue       BIT STRING  }
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
>   Certificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
>        tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
>        signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
>        signature            BIT STRING  }
> 
> Notes
> -----
> The definition in section 4.1 disagrees with the definition in appendix A.1 (page 116) on whether the name of the field containing the signature is "signatureValue" or "signature". This error appears in RFC 3280 and RFC 2459 as well.
> 
> The versions of X.509 in force when RFCs 2459, 3280, and 5280 were published use neither of those names. (Those versions of X.509 considered a signature to be an encrypted hash and called the field "encrypted".) The current version, ITU-T X.509 (10/2019), defines this field to be "signature" in section 6.2.1. (X.509 defines the Certificate type using a component type of SIGNATURE, which has two fields named "algorithmIdentifier" and "signature".)
> 
> In addition to changing the field name in the definition of the Certificate type in section 4.1, the title and text of subsection 4.1.1.3 should be updated to replace "signatureValue" with "signature".
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC5280 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-11)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
> Publication Date    : May 2008
> Author(s)           : D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG