Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes)
"todd glassey" <todd.glassey@worldnet.att.net> Fri, 01 August 2003 02:20 UTC
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From: todd glassey <todd.glassey@worldnet.att.net>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
References: <p05210604bb4eed81d497@[128.89.89.75]>
Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes)
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 17:56:59 -0700
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Stephen this is the fundamental failing of the IESG to not 'slap you silly' for this... But you nor any other WG Chair were empowered to make your WG a fiefdom, so it is not for you to say what is and is not a standard nor is it appropriate for you to make any value judgments as a WG chair as to what the IETF is all about. That is for its members to decide and as a member you get one and only one vote... and as a WG Chair you get NO votes. WG Chairs are there (they exist) as facilitators to make sure that fair and open and the rest of the language about WG's and the IETF's standards process are implemented. Which is to say you as a WG Chair were the implementer of policy not its creator. Oh - as to the comment you made to me about veiled threats - I don't make them. Todd Glassey ----- Original Message ----- From: "Stephen Kent" <kent@bbn.com> To: "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2003 9:01 AM Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) > > Peter, > > We fundamentally disagree about the role of standards. Your > criticisms of the differences between PKIX RFCs and the real world, > also applies to the differences between the base X.509 standards and > the real world, and it is often true of other standards, vs. the real > world. I do not believe that standards should merely codify what > vendors have chosen to implement, especially in cases like this. Let > me explain. > > Some features in some standards are unduly complex and implementors > may choose to not support them as a result. Oft times the desire to > speed a product to market creates additional pressures to drop > certain features in early releases, with the notion that support can > be added later, if necessary. Sometimes an implementor does not > understand a feature and decides that the feature is unimportant, as > a result of the lack of understanding. Sometimes an implementor > disagrees with the standard and choose to implement a feature > differently. > > In principle, in a free market system with knowledgeable buyers, all > of these reasons for deviating from standards can be addressed over > time, either by fixes to the products or by changes to standards. > However, the real world is not so neat. Buyers of PKI technology do > not always think ahead or they may be persuaded, by folks like you, > to work around defects in implementations, i.e., to warp requirements > to fit the available software. Microsoft is a monopolist (as > certified by US courts and the EU) in this space, so the free market > argument does not apply so well either. In the case we are > discussing, some users have expressed a need for this feature, it is > not unduly complex, and thus it ought to remain in the standards. > > Steve > > P.S. If one applied your model to TCP, we should not have checksums > in that protocol. I say this because in the early days or TCP/IP use > in the academic and R&D community, BSD was THE Unix implementation. > Bill Joy (why is it always people named "Bill" who cause these > problems?) decided that the cost of computing the TCP checksum was > high and resulted in diminished throughout, and besides, in the > typical Ethernet LAN context, the CRC caught errors anyway. So, for a > while BSD didn't bother computing the checksum, at least if it could > detect that the peer implementation was another BSD system. DARPA, > who was funding this work, had to bring significant pressure to bear, > to quash this behavior. If we followed your model then during that > window, we would have removed the TCP checksum computation from the > standard, to reflect the reality of the dominant implementation. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h7158fqt037933 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 22:08:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h7158egQ037932 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 22:08:40 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from adacel.com (gunsmoke.adacel.com.au [210.11.130.7]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h7158cqt037926 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 22:08:39 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from steven.legg@adacel.com.au) Received: from nexus.adacel.com (Not Verified[10.32.240.1]) by adacel.com with NetIQ MailMarshal (v5.5.3.16) id <B00011f39f>; Fri, 01 Aug 2003 15:04:35 +1000 Received: (qmail 2535 invoked from network); 1 Aug 2003 05:04:04 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO osmium) (10.32.24.165) by nexus.adacel.com with SMTP; 1 Aug 2003 05:04:04 -0000 Reply-To: <steven.legg@adacel.com.au> From: "Steven Legg" <steven.legg@adacel.com.au> To: "'David Chadwick'" <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk>, "'PKIX'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: LDAPv3 Profile Issue Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2003 15:08:34 +1000 Message-ID: <002001c357ea$f60592b0$a518200a@osmium.mtwav.adacel.com.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2377.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2120.0 In-Reply-To: <3F1C2E37.DC0F2F8D@salford.ac.uk> Importance: Normal Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> David, David Chadwick wrote: > Colleagues > > at the Vienna meeting I stated that the only outstanding > issue with the > LDAPv3 profile was the use of multi-valued RDNs. However, > there is also > the use of the ;binary extension that still has to be addressed and > resolved (unfortunately), since the profile needs to state what PKI > clients should do with ;binary. I thought this was already resolved. Tim Polk previously proposed the following to the list: (1) Upon review of the PKIX-LDAP survey we see a critical mass of PKI clients and LDAP servers that achieve interoperability using LDAPv3 with the ;binary option. As these clients appear to be in the majority, we believe the best approach is to maintain this option for the transfer of X.509 certificates and CRLs. Since this is the behavior documented in RFCs 2251, 2252, and 2256 (as well as the overarching 3377) this will require the least changes to the LDAPv3 specifications as well. (4) The lack of a defined LDAP-specific encoding for Certificate, Certificate List and Certificate Pair syntaxes is a problem, as a small percentage of implementations transfer these attributes without the ;binary option. Rather than be silent, we suggest that the PKIX syntax and schema document state the LDAP-specific encoding used in transfer without the ;binary option but deprecate its use. This LDAP-specific encoding has the same transfer representation as when the attribute is transferred with the ;binary option. As I recall there was no serious dissent. Consensus seems to have been achieved. I wrote draft-legg-ldap-binary-00.txt assuming this was the case. Regards, Steven > > The ;binary issue is holding up the final calls on the LDAPv3 profile, > and the LDAP PKI and PMI schema documents (from Steven Legg > and myself). > Fortunately it does not affect the LDAP attribute extraction schema > profiles that are due to be published as Informational RFCs, but > nevertheless we do need closure on the ;binary issue as soon > as possible > > regards > > David > > -- > ********************************************************* > > Leaders of the world's richest nations meet in Cancun on > September 10th > 2003. Oxfam is presenting them with a petition to make trade fair. Be > sure your voice is heard. Sign the 'Big Noise' petition to make trade > fair at: > > http://www.maketradefair.com/go/join/?p=omf1 > > > ***************************************************************** > > David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD > Professor of Information Systems Security > IS Institute, University of Salford, Salford M5 4WT > Tel: +44 161 295 5351 Fax +44 01484 532930 > Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 > Email: D.W.Chadwick@salford.ac.uk > Home Page: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm > Research Web site: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk > Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm > Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J > PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 > > ***************************************************************** Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h714ETqt036017 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 21:14:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h714ET4H036016 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 21:14:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from adacel.com (gunsmoke.adacel.com.au [210.11.130.7]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h714EQqt036006 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 21:14:27 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from steven.legg@adacel.com.au) Received: from nexus.adacel.com (Not Verified[10.32.240.1]) by adacel.com with NetIQ MailMarshal (v5.5.3.16) id <B00011f28d>; Fri, 01 Aug 2003 14:10:20 +1000 Received: (qmail 28979 invoked from network); 1 Aug 2003 04:09:49 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO osmium) (10.32.24.165) by nexus.adacel.com with SMTP; 1 Aug 2003 04:09:49 -0000 Reply-To: <steven.legg@adacel.com.au> From: "Steven Legg" <steven.legg@adacel.com.au> To: "'David Chadwick'" <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk>, "'PKIX'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Issues in LDAP schema IDs Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2003 14:14:19 +1000 Message-ID: <001e01c357e3$61e70a70$a518200a@osmium.mtwav.adacel.com.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2377.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2120.0 In-Reply-To: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> Importance: Normal Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> David, David Chadwick wrote: > Peter and I have resolved all the issues described at the PKIX meeting > today, apart from one, which is what should be the attribute > type to be > used to hold the X.509 DER encoded attribute. Should it be > the original > attribute type name e.g. userCertificate or a new attribute > whose schema > says it must be single valued. Comments please to the list to help us > resolve this final issue. If the original attribute type name is used in the child entry then a client that uses the X.509 matching rules, or component matching rules, to match certificates in situ will get each certificate twice. Once in a subject's entry and once in a child entry of the subject. If a new attribute type is used then the child entries will not normally be seen by clients directly matching on certificates. Clients not using direct matching have to be configured to search on the extracted attributes. Configuring them to also ask for the new attribute type shouldn't be a serious impediment. Regards, Steven Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h710veqt026255 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 17:57:40 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h710veOr026254 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 17:57:40 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mtiwmhc11.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc11.worldnet.att.net [204.127.131.115]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h710vcqt026241 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 17:57:39 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from todd.glassey@worldnet.att.net) Received: from tsg1 (84.sanjose-05-10rs16rt.ca.dial-access.att.net[12.81.6.84]) by mtiwmhc11.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc11) with SMTP id <20030801005733111004l31le>; Fri, 1 Aug 2003 00:57:34 +0000 Message-ID: <00f201c357c7$dfc95d10$020aff0a@tsg1> From: "todd glassey" <todd.glassey@worldnet.att.net> To: "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "Stephen Kent" <kent@bbn.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <p05210604bb4eed81d497@[128.89.89.75]> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 17:56:59 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen this is the fundamental failing of the IESG to not 'slap you silly' for this... But you nor any other WG Chair were empowered to make your WG a fiefdom, so it is not for you to say what is and is not a standard nor is it appropriate for you to make any value judgments as a WG chair as to what the IETF is all about. That is for its members to decide and as a member you get one and only one vote... and as a WG Chair you get NO votes. WG Chairs are there (they exist) as facilitators to make sure that fair and open and the rest of the language about WG's and the IETF's standards process are implemented. Which is to say you as a WG Chair were the implementer of policy not its creator. Oh - as to the comment you made to me about veiled threats - I don't make them. Todd Glassey ----- Original Message ----- From: "Stephen Kent" <kent@bbn.com> To: "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2003 9:01 AM Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) > > Peter, > > We fundamentally disagree about the role of standards. Your > criticisms of the differences between PKIX RFCs and the real world, > also applies to the differences between the base X.509 standards and > the real world, and it is often true of other standards, vs. the real > world. I do not believe that standards should merely codify what > vendors have chosen to implement, especially in cases like this. Let > me explain. > > Some features in some standards are unduly complex and implementors > may choose to not support them as a result. Oft times the desire to > speed a product to market creates additional pressures to drop > certain features in early releases, with the notion that support can > be added later, if necessary. Sometimes an implementor does not > understand a feature and decides that the feature is unimportant, as > a result of the lack of understanding. Sometimes an implementor > disagrees with the standard and choose to implement a feature > differently. > > In principle, in a free market system with knowledgeable buyers, all > of these reasons for deviating from standards can be addressed over > time, either by fixes to the products or by changes to standards. > However, the real world is not so neat. Buyers of PKI technology do > not always think ahead or they may be persuaded, by folks like you, > to work around defects in implementations, i.e., to warp requirements > to fit the available software. Microsoft is a monopolist (as > certified by US courts and the EU) in this space, so the free market > argument does not apply so well either. In the case we are > discussing, some users have expressed a need for this feature, it is > not unduly complex, and thus it ought to remain in the standards. > > Steve > > P.S. If one applied your model to TCP, we should not have checksums > in that protocol. I say this because in the early days or TCP/IP use > in the academic and R&D community, BSD was THE Unix implementation. > Bill Joy (why is it always people named "Bill" who cause these > problems?) decided that the cost of computing the TCP checksum was > high and resulted in diminished throughout, and besides, in the > typical Ethernet LAN context, the CRC caught errors anyway. So, for a > while BSD didn't bother computing the checksum, at least if it could > detect that the peer implementation was another BSD system. DARPA, > who was funding this work, had to bring significant pressure to bear, > to quash this behavior. If we followed your model then during that > window, we would have removed the TCP checksum computation from the > standard, to reflect the reality of the dominant implementation. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VJ0eqt003236 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 12:00:40 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6VJ0e8I003235 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 12:00:40 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VJ0cqt003229 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 12:00:39 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6VJ0VD9024300; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 15:00:31 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p0521060dbb4f16e6882b@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <200307311852.h6VIqdw26194@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> References: <200307311852.h6VIqdw26194@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 14:59:30 -0400 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Peter, I think you are misinterpreting my position, somewhat :-) We both agree that standards ought not embody undue complexity, features that nobody wants now and will never want, etc. We disagree about where to draw the line re complexity, and about whether a willingness of users to distort their requirements to accommodate implementation limitations is a basis for changing standards. Steve P.S. the good news is that our messages are getting shorter Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VIqrqt002912 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 11:52:53 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6VIqr9R002909 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 11:52:53 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VIqpqt002885 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 11:52:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6VIqdak023755; Fri, 1 Aug 2003 06:52:39 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6VIqdw26194; Fri, 1 Aug 2003 06:52:39 +1200 Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2003 06:52:39 +1200 Message-Id: <200307311852.h6VIqdw26194@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: kent@bbn.com, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: >P.S. If one applied your model to TCP, we should not have checksums in that >protocol. I think that's misrepresenting my position somewhat: My version of TCP would have a simple, straightforward, easy-to-get-right checksum (pretty much the same as what TCP does now), implementation notes and a rationale to guide implementors, and test vectors so people could check that their implementation is correct (see any RFC I've written). The PKIX version of TCP would have eight different checksums with two dozen sets of parameters. Many checksum parameters are optional, but if you leave some of them out then things fail for no apparent reason. Some are mandatory but have no discernable purpose, so people leave them out because it simplifies the implementation. The mechanisms are identified by entries in an LDAP directory indexed with a multi-valued AVA in an RDN. There are five different ways of applying the various checksums (one for each vendor that contributed to the standard), all incompatible and several mutually exclusive. There's no explanation for any of the design features, so implementors have to guess at what they're supposed to do. Everyone guesses differently. There are no test vectors. Nothing interoperates without extended, multi-iteration bakeoffs in which each side tries to match their guesses at what bits of the standard are supposed to mean with the other side's guesses at what bits of the standard are supposed to mean. The best way to make sure things work is to buy everything from the same vendor, and even then things often only work under carefully-controlled lab conditions. Now I'm being facetious there, but the scary thing is that I've described fairly closely a number of PKIX RFCs (not to mention OSI before it). I'll omit RFC names, but anyone with any implementation experience will recognise all of the above in various PKIX standards. So on the one hand the scientist part of me thinks that methodically repeating the failure of the OSI standards-creation process in PKI is a good thing, since it's demonstrating repeatability - OSI wasn't just a one-off thing, we can do it all again with the same result (this is why I have a t-shirt that proclaims "PKI: The OSI of a new generation"). On the other hand the engineering part of me, which just wants to build something that works and is clean and elegant, is less than thrilled with the prospect of PKI ending life as a 2-page historical footnote in networking and security textbooks, as its predecessor for the most part has. Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VG5qqt092587 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 09:05:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6VG5qav092586 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 09:05:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VG5oqt092567 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 09:05:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6VG5VD9012473; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 12:05:32 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210604bb4eed81d497@[128.89.89.75]> Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 12:01:04 -0400 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Peter, We fundamentally disagree about the role of standards. Your criticisms of the differences between PKIX RFCs and the real world, also applies to the differences between the base X.509 standards and the real world, and it is often true of other standards, vs. the real world. I do not believe that standards should merely codify what vendors have chosen to implement, especially in cases like this. Let me explain. Some features in some standards are unduly complex and implementors may choose to not support them as a result. Oft times the desire to speed a product to market creates additional pressures to drop certain features in early releases, with the notion that support can be added later, if necessary. Sometimes an implementor does not understand a feature and decides that the feature is unimportant, as a result of the lack of understanding. Sometimes an implementor disagrees with the standard and choose to implement a feature differently. In principle, in a free market system with knowledgeable buyers, all of these reasons for deviating from standards can be addressed over time, either by fixes to the products or by changes to standards. However, the real world is not so neat. Buyers of PKI technology do not always think ahead or they may be persuaded, by folks like you, to work around defects in implementations, i.e., to warp requirements to fit the available software. Microsoft is a monopolist (as certified by US courts and the EU) in this space, so the free market argument does not apply so well either. In the case we are discussing, some users have expressed a need for this feature, it is not unduly complex, and thus it ought to remain in the standards. Steve P.S. If one applied your model to TCP, we should not have checksums in that protocol. I say this because in the early days or TCP/IP use in the academic and R&D community, BSD was THE Unix implementation. Bill Joy (why is it always people named "Bill" who cause these problems?) decided that the cost of computing the TCP checksum was high and resulted in diminished throughout, and besides, in the typical Ethernet LAN context, the CRC caught errors anyway. So, for a while BSD didn't bother computing the checksum, at least if it could detect that the peer implementation was another BSD system. DARPA, who was funding this work, had to bring significant pressure to bear, to quash this behavior. If we followed your model then during that window, we would have removed the TCP checksum computation from the standard, to reflect the reality of the dominant implementation. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VF21qt089856 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 08:02:01 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6VF21st089855 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 08:02:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from netfin.mellon.com.gr (IDENT:root@netfin.mellon.com.gr [212.251.40.90]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VF1uqt089843 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 08:01:59 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from n.mihalopoulos@mellon.com.gr) Received: from IT030 ([192.168.1.110]) by netfin.mellon.com.gr (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id h6VE4BL25444 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 17:04:11 +0300 From: "Nikolas Mihalopoulos" <n.mihalopoulos@mellon.com.gr> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Issuer field on Certificates Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 18:01:52 +0300 Message-ID: <000001c35774$ad095a40$6e01a8c0@IT030> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2627 Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <!~!UENERkVCMDkAAQACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABgAAAAAAAAARMPfbnbp50SwK3EZjypY2MKAAAAQAAAArQr2PBtywEGdBAWP5VluLgEAAAAA@brutesquadlabs.com> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hello, I am kind of new on this list and I do not know if this has been asked before so bear with me. RFC 3280 discusses the Issuer field on certificate and in particular the DirectoryString type which is defined: The DirectoryString type is defined as a choice of PrintableString, TeletexString, BMPString, UTF8String, and UniversalString. The UTF8String encoding [RFC 2279] is the preferred encoding, and all certificates issued after December 31, 2003 MUST use the UTF8String encoding of DirectoryString (except as noted below). Until that date, conforming CAs MUST choose from the following options when creating a distinguished name, including their own: (a) if the character set is sufficient, the string MAY be represented as a PrintableString; (b) failing (a), if the BMPString character set is sufficient the string MAY be represented as a BMPString; and (c) failing (a) and (b), the string MUST be represented as a UTF8String. If (a) or (b) is satisfied, the CA MAY still choose to represent the string as a UTF8String. ... So if you have a CA which was created using the PrintableString before that date what exactly would happen? Does someone (an application/implementation) have to do something? Is this another Y2K (or Y2.003K ) issue? Or it just depends on your specific character string? Thanks in advance, **************************************** Nikolas Mihalopoulos Security Software Engineer Mellon Technologies 59, Panepistimiou str. 105 64 Athens Greece Tel.: (30) 210 3727700, Fax: (30) 210 3223694 Direct:(30) 210 3727765 Email: n.mihalopoulos@mellon.com.gr Disclaimer This e-mail is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you should not copy it, re-transmit it, use it or disclose its contents, but should return it to the sender immediately and delete the copy from your system. MELLON TECHNOLOGIES SAIC cannot accept any responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of this message as it has been transmitted over a public network. If you suspect that the message may have been intercepted or amended, please call the sender. roaming signature Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VDstqt081331 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 06:54:55 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6VDstn5081330 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 06:54:55 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VDsrqt081323 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 06:54:53 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6VDsFDD001373; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 09:54:16 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210602bb4ecf73ec1a@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <3F28C581.2000506@bull.net> References: <5.2.0.9.2.20030729114853.02d908a8@mail.binhost.com> <5.2.0.9.2.20030729195514.03df5850@mail.binhost.com> <3F277B90.5000100@bull.net> <p05210605bb4d7c0019ee@[128.89.89.75]> <3F28C581.2000506@bull.net> Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 09:53:56 -0400 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 9:30 +0200 7/31/03, Denis Pinkas wrote: >Steve, > >(...) > >>>CAs do NOT archive CRLs today. They do not need to archive CRLs tomorrow. >>>Relying parties (or verifiers) need to capture the CRLs when >>>available (as well as the OCSP responses when doing the first >>>validation). Archiving this information is then their concern. > >>>Denis > >>I think a better characterization here is that CAs are not required >>to archive CRLs based on X.509 or PKIX standards. Various national >>or (in the U.S.) state laws relating to digital signatures may >>impose this requirement, or an organization operating a CA may >>choose to archive CRLs. The statement you made is just a bit too >>strong to be correct :-) > >We are both incorrect. :-) > >CAs usually archive CRLs in order to prove that they behaved >correctly in case of an audit or in case of a dispute with relying >parties. They may use the archives to demonstrate that they behaved >correctly. > >They are not required to provide an on-line service to these >archives, which are very seldomly used. For that reason, we are not >going to define a protocol to access that archived information. > >Denis > >>Steve I think we are now mostly in agreement. Whether a WG defines a protocol for access to these archived CRLs is probably beyond the scope of PKIX's charter, given the IESG's desire for us to wrap up our current work items, so someone else will get to decide whether they want to pursue the matter. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VBCIqt066327 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 04:12:18 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6VBCIBo066326 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 04:12:18 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from cmailm4.svr.pol.co.uk (cmailm4.svr.pol.co.uk [195.92.193.211]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VBCHqt066316 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 04:12:17 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from da@trustis.com) Received: from modem-1468.baboon.dialup.pol.co.uk ([81.78.21.188] helo=PEDIGREE) by cmailm4.svr.pol.co.uk with smtp (Exim 4.14) id 19iBLz-0004nh-Tv; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 12:12:16 +0100 From: "Dean Adams" <da@trustis.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Cc: "Denis Pinkas" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 12:12:16 +0100 Message-ID: <LOBBJBJOMBCACAKEOICKCEDEDNAA.da@trustis.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.6604 (9.0.2911.0) Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <3F28C581.2000506@bull.net> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi Denis, Some comments if I may: > > CAs usually archive CRLs in order to prove that they behaved correctly in > case of an audit or in case of a dispute with relying parties. > They may use > the archives to demonstrate that they behaved correctly. So let me get this straight - The primary use of long term aaccess to historical certificate status information is to protect the CA, not to protect an RP ? ;-) Some of us are also trying to provide a service to users that they actually find useful and helpful. I don't like to be put in the position of effectively telling users "Look - we told you back in the year XXXX that this certificate was revoked - you should have remembered" ;-) > > They are not required to provide an on-line service to these > archives, which > are very seldomly used. For that reason, we are not going to define a > protocol to access that archived information. H'mm - not required - please excuse my ignorance of how such things come about. How do we decide on what is and what is not required? Do we have any market requirements input to the PKIX process? How was it decided that warranty extensions, permanent identifiers, logotypes for instance - were a requirement - yet providing assistance in the long term verification of signatures - was not. I'm not being critical of these other efforts - I'm genuinely curious. Regards Dean Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VAgiqt063908 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 03:42:44 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6VAgioa063907 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 03:42:44 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from cmailm5.svr.pol.co.uk (cmailm5.svr.pol.co.uk [195.92.193.21]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6VAghqt063894 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 03:42:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from da@trustis.com) Received: from modem-1468.baboon.dialup.pol.co.uk ([81.78.21.188] helo=PEDIGREE) by cmailm5.svr.pol.co.uk with smtp (Exim 4.14) id 19iAt8-0005pb-0C; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 11:42:26 +0100 From: "Dean Adams" <da@trustis.com> To: "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 11:42:26 +0100 Message-ID: <LOBBJBJOMBCACAKEOICKOEDCDNAA.da@trustis.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.6604 (9.0.2911.0) Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <OFCCD7250C.ECD80FB0-ON85256D73.005383C6-85256D73.0055C7C6@us.ibm.com> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Tom, Apologies for my delayed response - unfortunately I am working on multiple PKI deployments and only have limited opportunity to keep up with these emails. I appreciate your comments, but I think that I didn't explain myself clearly enough. The "FullHistory CRL" suggestion listed as being a (2) style of approach was meant to contain all certs that have ever been revoked under a particular CA cert. Therefore, no parameters would be necessary - you would be guaranteed to be able to establish if a particular client cert had ever been revoked, and when. Not sure if this suggestion is a winner, since for very large and long term deployments, this CRL could be very large. On the other hand, only RPs that are verifying signatures on docs or transactions after the cert has expired, would need to pull this down. It would never be needed for authentication activities, or for the period when the cert is still valid. Your discussion of parameters being supplied is probably a better approach from a network performance perpective, since it provides a way for the RP client application to be able to specify more tightly what revocation information it is interested in, by perhaps supplying a date as a parameter (as you suggest), or by presenting the client cert being verified and letting the CA determine (by whatever means it decides to use) if the cert had been revoked and when - then communicating that info back to the RP. This is the tyoe of approach I meant to hint at in the list item (1). Unfortunately, any work in this area would seem to require a change to client applications. If we want PKI to be able to service the signing and long term verification of documents and transactions, we need some way of allowing an RP to be able to get certificate status information, for a long time after the certificate expired. I cannot agree with Denis that it is the obligation of each RP to archive such material for possible future use. This is not user friendly, and is in any case impractical for the vast majority of simple consumer-type users who may be required to verify signatures over an extended period and who (even if they did archive CRLs) may not be able to so if they somehow lose the archived CRL (unless we also wanted to impose disaster revovery requiremts on each simple consumer-type user). Lets remeber that the I in PKI is infrastructure - make provide the services that people need to be able to carry on their normal lives without becoming computer wizards. Regards Dean > Dean: > > I don't see how a full history CRL location would work without a > parameter for the effective date. FreshestCRL doesn't need such a > parameter. If we assumed that we want an "archivedCRL" accessMethod in > AIA, how would the accessLocation represent the effective date parameter? > I assume that it's appropriate for such an accessMethod to use HTTP or > HTTPS. > An example of the URL for the actual query (for about now) would > be: > https://www.publicCA.com/archivedCRL?date=200307301530Z > An RP actually using this feature would be able to construct the > query by substituting the effective time into the URL. I also would ask > if we need variants of this for "last CRL not later than" and "first CRL > not before". > > Tom Gindin > > > > > > "Dean Adams" <da@trustis.com> > Sent by: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org > 07/29/2003 04:37 PM > > > To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> > cc: > Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? > > > > > Russ, > Surely, merely finding some way to ensure that a CA > archives CRLs is not > enough. Some way has to be provided to allow client applications to > discover where the appropriate CRL to be checked, can be found. > > Some possible options for consideration: > 1) the first CRL that was published after the > expiry date of the client cert being checked > 2) the location of a fully maintained complete CRL > containing all history with regard to revoked certs > that were issued from a particular CA certificate > > I'm sure there are other options too, but in any case some means of > communicating this info to the client application needs to be defined. > Perhaps some certificate extension similar to "Freshest CRL" that instead > denotes "FullHistory CRL" would be appropriate? That (or something in > Authority Info Access) might provide a solution for (2). Not sure how you > might go about providing a solution for a (1) type of approach, without > getting overly complicated. > > Dean Adams > > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org > [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]On Behalf Of Russ Housley > Sent: 29 July 2003 16:56 > To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? > > > > Peter: > > On one hand I agree, but on another I do not. > > I agree that signatures need to be validated after the certificate > expires. > > The algorithm in RFC 3280 allows the certificate to be validate with > respect to a date other than today. The date that ought to be input > requires a trusted time that the signature was applied. Of course, PKIX > has developed a protocol to provide such a time stamp. > > An archive of the revocation information is not routinely offered by > CAs. How do we make that happen? > > Russ > > At 01:32 AM 7/23/2003 +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: > > >Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: > > > > >I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do not > > >recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: > > > >But those are mostly just hypothetical objections. At the moment we have > two > >inescapabable facts: > > > >1. CAs issue certs based on a 1-year billing cycle, and nothing anyone > says > > will change that. No CA will issue a cert with a 20-year lifetime, > unless > > it's for its own CA certs. > > > >2. Users need to use certs to validate signatures at n times the > CA-ordained > > lifetime. In the abscence of any mechanism to do this, they are > ignoring > > the cert expiry time. In other words, out of necessity, they're > > making the > > following change to RFC 3280: > > > > The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from > > notBefore > > through notAfter, inclusive. When used with signing certificates, > > implementations SHOULD NOT pay any attention to the notAfter date. > > > >Given that this isn't going to change, it would seem that some guidance > for > >users would be useful here. Since neither (1) nor (2) can be altered, > what > >would be needed is a simple extension, found in signing certs, > containing > a > >date to which the cert can still be used for signature-checking beyond > the > >obvious notAfter value. This could be written up as a short one-page > >application note, no more (well, a bit more once you add all the usual > >boilerplate and whatnot). > > > >Now CAs can still decide not to issue certs like that, but (a) they can't > >justify it by claiming it screws up their standard cert cycle because it > >doesn't affect validTo/validFrom, and (b) users at least have some > guidance > as > >to what to do, which is better than the current situation where all they > can > >do is ignore parts of the standard on an ad hoc basis. > > > >Peter. > > > > > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6V9VUqt058276 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 02:31:30 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6V9VUZB058273 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 02:31:30 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from einsteinium.btinternet.com (einsteinium.btinternet.com [194.73.73.147]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6V9VTqt058266 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 02:31:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from dean.scotson@trustis.com) Received: from host217-39-113-87.in-addr.btopenworld.com ([217.39.113.87] helo=deanstecra) by einsteinium.btinternet.com with esmtp (Exim 3.22 #23) id 19i9mM-0006Fr-00 for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 10:31:22 +0100 Reply-To: <dean.scotson@trustis.com> From: "Dean Scotson" <dean.scotson@trustis.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 10:31:16 +0100 Organization: Trustis Ltd Message-ID: <001201c35746$80da8e40$0a00a8c0@deanstecra> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.4510 Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 In-Reply-To: <OFCCD7250C.ECD80FB0-ON85256D73.005383C6-85256D73.0055C7C6@us.ibm.com> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6V9VUqt058269 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi all, New to the discussion, but if the objective is to retrospectively verify that a certificate was not revoked during its validity period (and having since expired it will not be in the latest CRL created), then surely only the last CRL issued during the validity period would need to be referenced ?. i.e. (and this does NOT take into account any CA products current abilities) if I want to check that a certificate was still 'valid' up-to its 'notAfter' date I do not need to know the date, I just send the certificate (or S/N) to the CA as https://www.publicCA.com/status?certificate='serialNumber' By return I would be given the last CRL that this certificate would have been listed as revoked in, if in fact it was revoked during its validity period. (Of course, there is still a window between the last CRL and expiration of a certificate where I could revoke a certificate, but then we are talking CRL's here and not real-time status. And I am also assuming the CA is a good boy and retained records of certificates it has issued...). This discussion appears to revolve around the question "This certificate has now expired, but was it ever revoked?, and can I assume therefore that it was valid at the time of the transaction I am now retrospectively verifying". This seems to imply that: A) I did not check the status at the time of transaction (bad), or B) I have designed a system where I need real-time status but I have not implemented real-time status (also bad). I do not see the direct connection with PKUP, which is where the discussion first began?. My point of view is that a certificate is something you have whereby you can electronically 'sign/authenticate' something. This is a facility that you (currently) have to pay for. This is Authentication. Authorisation is up to the RP to decide, based on whatever information they feel necessary. If the RP decides to accept an expired certificate so-be-it. PKUP would make no difference. Dean. -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Tom Gindin Sent: 30 July 2003 16:37 To: Dean Adams Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Dean: I don't see how a full history CRL location would work without a parameter for the effective date. FreshestCRL doesn't need such a parameter. If we assumed that we want an "archivedCRL" accessMethod in AIA, how would the accessLocation represent the effective date parameter? I assume that it's appropriate for such an accessMethod to use HTTP or HTTPS. An example of the URL for the actual query (for about now) would be: https://www.publicCA.com/archivedCRL?date=200307301530Z An RP actually using this feature would be able to construct the query by substituting the effective time into the URL. I also would ask if we need variants of this for "last CRL not later than" and "first CRL not before". Tom Gindin "Dean Adams" <da@trustis.com> Sent by: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org 07/29/2003 04:37 PM To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> cc: Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Russ, Surely, merely finding some way to ensure that a CA archives CRLs is not enough. Some way has to be provided to allow client applications to discover where the appropriate CRL to be checked, can be found. Some possible options for consideration: 1) the first CRL that was published after the expiry date of the client cert being checked 2) the location of a fully maintained complete CRL containing all history with regard to revoked certs that were issued from a particular CA certificate I'm sure there are other options too, but in any case some means of communicating this info to the client application needs to be defined. Perhaps some certificate extension similar to "Freshest CRL" that instead denotes "FullHistory CRL" would be appropriate? That (or something in Authority Info Access) might provide a solution for (2). Not sure how you might go about providing a solution for a (1) type of approach, without getting overly complicated. Dean Adams -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]On Behalf Of Russ Housley Sent: 29 July 2003 16:56 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Peter: On one hand I agree, but on another I do not. I agree that signatures need to be validated after the certificate expires. The algorithm in RFC 3280 allows the certificate to be validate with respect to a date other than today. The date that ought to be input requires a trusted time that the signature was applied. Of course, PKIX has developed a protocol to provide such a time stamp. An archive of the revocation information is not routinely offered by CAs. How do we make that happen? Russ At 01:32 AM 7/23/2003 +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: >Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: > > >I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do > >not recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: > >But those are mostly just hypothetical objections. At the moment we >have two >inescapabable facts: > >1. CAs issue certs based on a 1-year billing cycle, and nothing anyone says > will change that. No CA will issue a cert with a 20-year lifetime, unless > it's for its own CA certs. > >2. Users need to use certs to validate signatures at n times the CA-ordained > lifetime. In the abscence of any mechanism to do this, they are ignoring > the cert expiry time. In other words, out of necessity, they're > making the > following change to RFC 3280: > > The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from > notBefore > through notAfter, inclusive. When used with signing certificates, > implementations SHOULD NOT pay any attention to the notAfter date. > >Given that this isn't going to change, it would seem that some guidance for >users would be useful here. Since neither (1) nor (2) can be altered, what >would be needed is a simple extension, found in signing certs, >containing a >date to which the cert can still be used for signature-checking beyond the >obvious notAfter value. This could be written up as a short one-page >application note, no more (well, a bit more once you add all the usual >boilerplate and whatnot). > >Now CAs can still decide not to issue certs like that, but (a) they >can't justify it by claiming it screws up their standard cert cycle >because it doesn't affect validTo/validFrom, and (b) users at least >have some guidance as >to what to do, which is better than the current situation where all >they can >do is ignore parts of the standard on an ad hoc basis. > >Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6V7UFqt039904 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 00:30:15 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6V7UFBM039902 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 00:30:15 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6V7UDqt039884 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 00:30:14 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA13038; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 09:35:03 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA26609; Thu, 31 Jul 2003 09:30:35 +0200 Message-ID: <3F28C581.2000506@bull.net> Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 09:30:09 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? References: <5.2.0.9.2.20030729114853.02d908a8@mail.binhost.com> <5.2.0.9.2.20030729195514.03df5850@mail.binhost.com> <3F277B90.5000100@bull.net> <p05210605bb4d7c0019ee@[128.89.89.75]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Steve, (...) >> CAs do NOT archive CRLs today. They do not need to archive CRLs tomorrow. >> Relying parties (or verifiers) need to capture the CRLs when available >> (as well as the OCSP responses when doing the first validation). >> Archiving this information is then their concern. >> Denis > I think a better characterization here is that CAs are not required to > archive CRLs based on X.509 or PKIX standards. Various national or (in > the U.S.) state laws relating to digital signatures may impose this > requirement, or an organization operating a CA may choose to archive > CRLs. The statement you made is just a bit too strong to be correct :-) We are both incorrect. :-) CAs usually archive CRLs in order to prove that they behaved correctly in case of an audit or in case of a dispute with relying parties. They may use the archives to demonstrate that they behaved correctly. They are not required to provide an on-line service to these archives, which are very seldomly used. For that reason, we are not going to define a protocol to access that archived information. Denis > Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6V4CPqt020975 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 21:12:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6V4CPqW020974 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 21:12:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from brutesquadlabs.com (gtec136-m.isomedia.com [207.115.67.136] (may be forged)) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6V4COqt020969 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 21:12:24 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from blake@brutesquadlabs.com) Received: from DEXTER ([192.168.0.5]) by brutesquadlabs.com with ESMTP ; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 21:12:22 -0700 From: "Blake Ramsdell" <blake@brutesquadlabs.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Clarification on XMPP log for certificate types Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 21:12:22 -0700 Message-ID: <!~!UENERkVCMDkAAQACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABgAAAAAAAAARMPfbnbp50SwK3EZjypY2MKAAAAQAAAArQr2PBtywEGdBAWP5VluLgEAAAAA@brutesquadlabs.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2627 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Importance: Normal Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> There are some comments that I've read out of the XMPP log for the WG meeting that I'm trying to understand: Thu Jul 17 09:21:52 2003 >ggm< Interop testing on 3279/3280 Thu Jul 17 09:22:14 2003 >ggm< scope is checking two impls can do cert gen features, and CRLS Thu Jul 17 09:22:21 2003 >ggm< and check path validation alg. features Thu Jul 17 09:23:03 2003 >ggm< ADs happy with this approach. Thu Jul 17 09:24:56 2003 >ggm< general testing: for certs/CRLS is 90% complete. Thu Jul 17 09:25:18 2003 >ggm< Open issues: DSA param inheritence, Diffie-Hellman, EC, and Delta CRLs. not changed much from last mtg Is the point to find two implementations that can *generate* DSA certificates with inherited parameters, Diffie-Hellman certificates, Elliptic Curve certificates and Delta CRLs? I know that the S/MIME examples draft has DSA certificates with inherited parameters, and Diffie Hellman certificates, but I don't know where those were generated (if I had to guess, I would say the S/MIME Freeware Library). Blake -- Blake Ramsdell | Brute Squad Labs | http://www.brutesquadlabs.com Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6V1Beqt012047 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 18:11:40 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6V1Bees012046 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 18:11:40 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp1.pacifier.net (smtp1.pacifier.net [64.255.237.171]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6V1Bdqt012041 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 18:11:39 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jimsch@nwlink.com) Received: from ROMANS (ip237.c132.blk1.bel.nwlink.com [209.20.132.237]) by smtp1.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7FD756FAB5; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 18:11:41 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: <jimsch@exmsft.com> From: "Jim Schaad" <jimsch@nwlink.com> To: <Stefans@microsoft.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 18:12:06 -0700 Message-ID: <003f01c35700$c24da1f0$1400a8c0@augustcellars.local> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2627 Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stefan, 1. Appendix A: 3280, unlike 2459 only has the 1988 ASN.1 syntax. You need to consider removing the 1993 syntax from you document. 2. Appendix A.1: You need to issue and updated module of some type refering to the ASN.1 module from RFC 3280. ASN.1 Issues: 3. Attribute is imported but never referenced. 4. id-at-serialNumber is defined in RFC 3280 ASN.1 module 5. id-at-pseudonym is defined in RFC 3280 ASN.1 module The last two are noted only because you make the statement that you define only those things not in RFC 3280. Jim Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6V0jGqt011466 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 17:45:16 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6V0jG92011465 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 17:45:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp4.pacifier.net (smtp4.pacifier.net [64.255.237.174]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6V0jFqt011460 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 17:45:15 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jimsch@nwlink.com) Received: from ROMANS (ip237.c132.blk1.bel.nwlink.com [209.20.132.237]) by smtp4.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 73D596AB32; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 17:22:15 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: <jimsch@exmsft.com> From: "Jim Schaad" <jimsch@nwlink.com> To: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, "'Steve Bellovin'" <smb@research.att.com> Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 17:45:41 -0700 Message-ID: <003e01c356fd$11ac6050$1400a8c0@augustcellars.local> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2627 Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <3F277823.5050905@bull.net> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Denis, I have just gone through this document and I have some comments that I believe MUST be resolved before the IESG can accept this document. These comments deal with the ASN.1 modules at the end of the document. 1. The module identifer OID used in the 1988 syntax has already been assigned to the OCSP module. 2. You are missing a semi-colon at the end of the imports section 3. You are importing from RFC 2459 not from RFC 3280 3. AttributeType is imported but not referenced. 4. UTF8String is not defined anywhere. 5. There should be text specifing that the 1988 module is normative and the 1993 module is informative. 6. Similar errors exist in the 1993 module, but I don't have a compiler for it so I don't have a complete list. jim > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org > [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas > Sent: Wednesday, July 30, 2003 12:48 AM > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org; Russ Housley; Steve Bellovin > Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt > > > > The IESG has been discussing the draft-ietf-pkix-pi document, > and mentioned > that some information was needed to bring the discussion to closure. > > The document allows the naming authority to be identified in several > different ways. The following chunk of ASN.1 from the > document illustrates > the point: > > PermanentIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { > identifierValue IdentifierValue, > identifierType IdentifierType OPTIONAL, > matchingRule [0] IMPLICIT OBJECT > IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL > } > > IdentifierValue ::= CHOICE { > iA5String IA5String, > uTF8String UTF8String > } > > IdentifierType ::= CHOICE { > registeredOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, > uri IA5String > } > > The pros and cons of OIDs and URIs have been discussed in the > IESG. In practice, they are not used in the same manner. > > Some people are uncomfortable with OIDs. For one thing, there is no > straightforward way of getting to know anything more about > them than the > values of their numbers, which give no hint of the context in > which they > were assigned. > > Some people are uncomfortable with URIs. Their content is > subject to various > interpretations, and people sometimes make unreasonable > guesses based on the > strings embedded in the URI. > > Russ, our security area Director, indicated to the PKIX > mailing list that an update to the Internet-Draft was needed > to resolve the DISCUSS votes. > > After discussions between the co-editors and some other > people, we came to > the conclusion that no change was needed to the core > document, but that an > informative annex was necessary to deal with the topic of > permanent URIs. > > The document draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt is an update where an > annex C has > been added in order to address the concern. > > Denis > > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6UNTTqt007251 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 16:29:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6UNTTRJ007250 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 16:29:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp3.pacifier.net (smtp3.pacifier.net [64.255.237.173]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6UNTSqt007243 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 16:29:28 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jimsch@nwlink.com) Received: from ROMANS (ip237.c132.blk1.bel.nwlink.com [209.20.132.237]) by smtp3.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 259DF6D79A; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 16:29:30 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: <jimsch@exmsft.com> From: "Jim Schaad" <jimsch@nwlink.com> To: "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> Cc: "'pkix'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: SCVP Comment Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 16:29:54 -0700 Message-ID: <003d01c356f2$7bbb4250$1400a8c0@augustcellars.local> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2627 Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Trevor, After going through the large discussions about the correct use of smime-type in the S/MIME working group, I am wondering why you are defining new mime times rather than use the ones from the S/MIME working group? Jim Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6UFbWqt076996 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 08:37:32 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6UFbVNx076995 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 08:37:31 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from e3.ny.us.ibm.com (e3.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.103]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6UFbTqt076988 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 08:37:30 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from tgindin@us.ibm.com) Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.150]) by e3.ny.us.ibm.com (8.12.9/8.12.2) with ESMTP id h6UFbNpW175516; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 11:37:23 -0400 Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01av02.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.216]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.12.9/NCO/VER6.5) with ESMTP id h6UFbKJs139474; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 11:37:22 -0400 To: "Dean Adams" <da@trustis.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 5.0.11 July 24, 2002 From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> Message-ID: <OFCCD7250C.ECD80FB0-ON85256D73.005383C6-85256D73.0055C7C6@us.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 11:37:04 -0400 X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 6.0.1 w/SPRs JHEG5JQ5CD, THTO5KLVS6, JHEG5HMLFK, JCHN5K5PG9|March 27, 2003) at 07/30/2003 11:37:22, Serialize complete at 07/30/2003 11:37:22 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Dean: I don't see how a full history CRL location would work without a parameter for the effective date. FreshestCRL doesn't need such a parameter. If we assumed that we want an "archivedCRL" accessMethod in AIA, how would the accessLocation represent the effective date parameter? I assume that it's appropriate for such an accessMethod to use HTTP or HTTPS. An example of the URL for the actual query (for about now) would be: https://www.publicCA.com/archivedCRL?date=200307301530Z An RP actually using this feature would be able to construct the query by substituting the effective time into the URL. I also would ask if we need variants of this for "last CRL not later than" and "first CRL not before". Tom Gindin "Dean Adams" <da@trustis.com> Sent by: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org 07/29/2003 04:37 PM To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> cc: Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Russ, Surely, merely finding some way to ensure that a CA archives CRLs is not enough. Some way has to be provided to allow client applications to discover where the appropriate CRL to be checked, can be found. Some possible options for consideration: 1) the first CRL that was published after the expiry date of the client cert being checked 2) the location of a fully maintained complete CRL containing all history with regard to revoked certs that were issued from a particular CA certificate I'm sure there are other options too, but in any case some means of communicating this info to the client application needs to be defined. Perhaps some certificate extension similar to "Freshest CRL" that instead denotes "FullHistory CRL" would be appropriate? That (or something in Authority Info Access) might provide a solution for (2). Not sure how you might go about providing a solution for a (1) type of approach, without getting overly complicated. Dean Adams -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]On Behalf Of Russ Housley Sent: 29 July 2003 16:56 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Peter: On one hand I agree, but on another I do not. I agree that signatures need to be validated after the certificate expires. The algorithm in RFC 3280 allows the certificate to be validate with respect to a date other than today. The date that ought to be input requires a trusted time that the signature was applied. Of course, PKIX has developed a protocol to provide such a time stamp. An archive of the revocation information is not routinely offered by CAs. How do we make that happen? Russ At 01:32 AM 7/23/2003 +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: >Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: > > >I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do not > >recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: > >But those are mostly just hypothetical objections. At the moment we have two >inescapabable facts: > >1. CAs issue certs based on a 1-year billing cycle, and nothing anyone says > will change that. No CA will issue a cert with a 20-year lifetime, unless > it's for its own CA certs. > >2. Users need to use certs to validate signatures at n times the CA-ordained > lifetime. In the abscence of any mechanism to do this, they are ignoring > the cert expiry time. In other words, out of necessity, they're > making the > following change to RFC 3280: > > The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from > notBefore > through notAfter, inclusive. When used with signing certificates, > implementations SHOULD NOT pay any attention to the notAfter date. > >Given that this isn't going to change, it would seem that some guidance for >users would be useful here. Since neither (1) nor (2) can be altered, what >would be needed is a simple extension, found in signing certs, containing a >date to which the cert can still be used for signature-checking beyond the >obvious notAfter value. This could be written up as a short one-page >application note, no more (well, a bit more once you add all the usual >boilerplate and whatnot). > >Now CAs can still decide not to issue certs like that, but (a) they can't >justify it by claiming it screws up their standard cert cycle because it >doesn't affect validTo/validFrom, and (b) users at least have some guidance as >to what to do, which is better than the current situation where all they can >do is ignore parts of the standard on an ad hoc basis. > >Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6UE4Iqt068998 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 07:04:18 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6UE4IoV068997 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 07:04:18 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6UE4Hqt068979 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 07:04:17 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6UE3fD9028387; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 10:03:41 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210606bb4d7d4866e2@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <3F277CDB.7090706@bull.net> References: <179AD8AE7850564592F43D22436DEBB40288AC3B@swcem.swcenter.sec.samsung.co.k r> <p0521060abb471c9075b7@[128.89.89.75]> <3F277CDB.7090706@bull.net> Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 10:01:36 -0400 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 10:07 +0200 7/30/03, Denis Pinkas wrote: >Steve, > >(...) > >> The PKUP does operate as you note, but the cert validity period is still >> present, and in the presence of the PKUP extension, this field is >> reinterpreted to state that after the notAfter date, the cert may no >> longer be used to verify any signature, period. > >Hum ! The period is coming too early. :-) > >The interpretation of validity period is independant of the presence >or absence of the PKUP extension. > >After the notAfter date, the cert may no longer be used to perform a >new signature verification, unless such a verification has already >been done before and the time of that verification can be >demonstrated to be before the notAfter date (e.g. using >time-stamping) and the certification path associated to all the >revocation information close to that verification date has also be >captured (and protected against key compromission). > >> That too is part of the reason for not encouraging use of PKUP, >> i.e., the need to reinterpret the cert validity field. > >This is an unrelated reason. > >Denis Denis, When one reads through the set of conditions you describe for interpreting the validity of the validity period, I think I am still comfortable with my informal characterization of the issue. In the absence of PKUP, anyone trying to validate a cert after the cert has expired has to know, by context, that the purpose of the validation is NR, not authentication or authorization for realtime access. This has to be factored into the process, else the validation will always fail after the cert validity period has expired. With PKUP, I believe the intent is that the validity period really becomes a hard stop, i.e., a post facto validation will now fail if the validity period has passed, irrespective of the use of a time stamp. Looking at the text in X.509 and in 3280, none of this is said explicitly, so I admit that I am interpreting what folks who support use of PKUP have said, but the same is true of your description above. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6UDnFqt066833 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 06:49:15 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6UDnFuI066832 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 06:49:15 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6UDnDqt066822 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 06:49:14 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6UDmbD9027296; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 09:48:37 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210605bb4d7c0019ee@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <3F277B90.5000100@bull.net> References: <5.2.0.9.2.20030729114853.02d908a8@mail.binhost.com> <5.2.0.9.2.20030729195514.03df5850@mail.binhost.com> <3F277B90.5000100@bull.net> Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 09:45:10 -0400 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Dean Adams <da@trustis.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 10:02 +0200 7/30/03, Denis Pinkas wrote: >Russ and Dean, > >>Dean: >> >>There are many options. A standard method for CAs to make this >>information available is very desirable. > >No new extension is necessary, nor desirable. > >>Russ >> >>At 09:37 PM 7/29/2003 +0100, Dean Adams wrote: >> >>>Russ, >>>Surely, merely finding some way to ensure that a CA archives CRLs >>>is not enough. Some way has to be provided to allow client > >> applications to discover where the appropriate CRL to be checked, >>> can be found. > >CAs do NOT archive CRLs today. They do not need to archive CRLs tomorrow. >Relying parties (or verifiers) need to capture the CRLs when >available (as well as the OCSP responses when doing the first >validation). Archiving this information is then their concern. > >Denis I think a better characterization here is that CAs are not required to archive CRLs based on X.509 or PKIX standards. Various national or (in the U.S.) state laws relating to digital signatures may impose this requirement, or an organization operating a CA may choose to archive CRLs. The statement you made is just a bit too strong to be correct :-) Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6UBLqqt054386 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 04:21:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6UBLqtr054385 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 04:21:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6UBLnqt054376 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 04:21:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6UBLAak018845; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 23:21:10 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6UBL8S18109; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 23:21:08 +1200 Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 23:21:08 +1200 Message-Id: <200307301121.h6UBL8S18109@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: da@trustis.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, housley@vigilsec.com Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> writes: >CAs do NOT archive CRLs today. They do not need to archive CRLs tomorrow. >Relying parties (or verifiers) need to capture the CRLs when available (as >well as the OCSP responses when doing the first validation). Archiving this >information is then their concern. Hmm, are you saying that every RP will be required to repeatedly contact the CA to obtain an arbitrarily large number of arbitrarily large CRLs and store them for an arbitrarily long amount of time on the off chance that they need one of them in the future? Sounds like another one of these PKI-meets-reality disconnections... Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U9JVqt041546 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 02:19:31 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6U9JUpk041545 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 02:19:30 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [212.234.46.16]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U9JTqt041506 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 02:19:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr) Received: from chandon.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id LAA12884 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 11:19:24 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from chandon.edelweb.fr (chandon.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.162]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.7); Wed, 30 Jul 2003 11:19:24 +0200 (MET DST) Received: (from peter@localhost) by chandon.edelweb.fr (8.11.7+Sun/8.11.7) id h6U9JMt13979 for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 11:19:22 +0200 (MEST) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 11:19:22 +0200 (MEST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Message-Id: <200307300919.h6U9JMt13979@chandon.edelweb.fr> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? X-Sun-Charset: US-ASCII Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> > Dean: > > There are many options. A standard method for CAs to make this information > available is very desirable. > > Russ > "Since we now have streets, everybody should use a car." "Since we now have a door under video surveillance, you need to keep the tapes forever and keep them available fot 100 years." Last year at the ISSE someone said: "Digital signature protect you in space but not in time." IMO the fact that you one has a time parameter as an input for a certificate validation should not be misunderstood as a requirement that all values should be allowed or the information corresponding to that date need to be available, e.g. a CRL corresponding to that period. Isn't creating a digital signature which is not almost immediately presented to some relying or attesting party a profound misunderstanding of cryptographic techniques? Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U97Sqt039878 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 02:07:28 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6U97SMq039877 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 02:07:28 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U97Rqt039872 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 02:07:27 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA24094; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 11:12:19 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA17493; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 11:07:51 +0200 Message-ID: <3F278ACD.6060809@bull.net> Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 11:07:25 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: dostalek@pvt.cz CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? References: <008a01c354ea$1ee43aa0$c8252fc3@pvt.cz> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Libor, (...) Yes. PKUP could be a useful extension for self-signed certificates, *if* the Subject Information Access extension defined in section 4.2.2.2 from RFC 3280 is also used. In that case, the id-ad-caRepository OID SHALL be used to indicate in which repository the CA publishes its certificates. Denis > From my point of view, PKUP could be an useful extention of CA certs. > CA must issue its new cert long time before expiration of its own > certificate (this period is min of max of the time validity of issued EE > certs). > It means: After issuing new CA cert (new-new) the old CA cert (old-old) > is still valid but an appropriate old private key of the CA is not used > henceforth. This private key should be authoritative erased when > the new certificate CA is issued. Lifetime of private key is shorter > than the validity period of the certificate. This lifetime of private > key could be indicated in PKUP. > Today, the lifetime of private key is indicated in the certificate > policy (CP). Unfortunately it is not possible to start procedure > for downloading new CA certs (old-new, new-new and new-old) > automatically because the certificate policy (CP) is a nonstructured > text. In practice, the lifetime of CA private key is not even > published in CP yet. It is published in CPS (RFC-2527) which is not > in case of the majority of CAs public. Therefore it might by useful > to indicate this information in the PKUP. > Libor Dostalek Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U883qt030281 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 01:08:03 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6U883NC030280 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 01:08:03 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U882qt030269 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 01:08:02 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA28440; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 10:12:53 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA17176; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 10:08:22 +0200 Message-ID: <3F277CDB.7090706@bull.net> Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 10:07:55 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? References: <179AD8AE7850564592F43D22436DEBB40288AC3B@swcem.swcenter.sec.samsung.co.k r> <p0521060abb471c9075b7@[128.89.89.75]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Steve, (...) > The PKUP does operate as you note, but the cert validity period is still > present, and in the presence of the PKUP extension, this field is > reinterpreted to state that after the notAfter date, the cert may no > longer be used to verify any signature, period. Hum ! The period is coming too early. :-) The interpretation of validity period is independant of the presence or absence of the PKUP extension. After the notAfter date, the cert may no longer be used to perform a new signature verification, unless such a verification has already been done before and the time of that verification can be demonstrated to be before the notAfter date (e.g. using time-stamping) and the certification path associated to all the revocation information close to that verification date has also be captured (and protected against key compromission). > That too is part of the reason for not encouraging use of PKUP, > i.e., the need to reinterpret the cert validity field. This is an unrelated reason. Denis > Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U87bqt030201 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 01:07:38 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6U87bB2030199 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 01:07:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp11.eresmas.com (smtp11.eresmas.com [62.81.235.111]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U87aqt030182 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 01:07:37 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from diegofv@eresmas.com) Received: from [192.168.105.166] (helo=ma20.eresmas.com) by smtp11.eresmas.com with esmtp (Exim 4.10) id 19hlzf-0007EK-00; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 10:07:31 +0200 From: <diegofv@eresmas.com> To: da@trustis.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-ID: <765327bdb7.7bdb776532@ma20.eresmas.com> Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 08:07:32 GMT X-Mailer: Netscape Webmail MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Language: es Subject: RE: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? X-Accept-Language: es Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Dean, Just one thought of mine > >Some possible options for consideration: >1) the first CRL that was published after the > expiry date of the client cert being checked But when a cert is revoked, it is held in the CRL until the cert reaches the expiry date. Maybe it'd be better by the before CRL to the first Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U82Tqt029402 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 01:02:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6U82TcU029401 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 01:02:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U82Rqt029396 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 01:02:27 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA26306; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 10:07:18 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA17145; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 10:02:51 +0200 Message-ID: <3F277B90.5000100@bull.net> Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 10:02:24 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Dean Adams <da@trustis.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? References: <5.2.0.9.2.20030729114853.02d908a8@mail.binhost.com> <5.2.0.9.2.20030729195514.03df5850@mail.binhost.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Russ and Dean, > Dean: > > There are many options. A standard method for CAs to make this > information available is very desirable. No new extension is necessary, nor desirable. > Russ > > At 09:37 PM 7/29/2003 +0100, Dean Adams wrote: > >> Russ, >> Surely, merely finding some way to ensure that a CA archives >> CRLs is not enough. Some way has to be provided to allow client >> applications to discover where the appropriate CRL to be checked, >> can be found. CAs do NOT archive CRLs today. They do not need to archive CRLs tomorrow. Relying parties (or verifiers) need to capture the CRLs when available (as well as the OCSP responses when doing the first validation). Archiving this information is then their concern. Denis >> Some possible options for consideration: >> 1) the first CRL that was published after the >> expiry date of the client cert being checked >> 2) the location of a fully maintained complete CRL >> containing all history with regard to revoked certs >> that were issued from a particular CA certificate >> >> I'm sure there are other options too, but in any case some means of >> communicating this info to the client application needs to be defined. >> Perhaps some certificate extension similar to "Freshest CRL" that instead >> denotes "FullHistory CRL" would be appropriate? That (or something in >> Authority Info Access) might provide a solution for (2). Not sure how >> you might go about providing a solution for a (1) type of approach, >> without getting overly complicated. >> >> Dean Adams >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org >> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]On Behalf Of Russ Housley >> Sent: 29 July 2003 16:56 >> To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz >> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org >> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? >> >> >> >> Peter: >> >> On one hand I agree, but on another I do not. >> >> I agree that signatures need to be validated after the certificate >> expires. >> >> The algorithm in RFC 3280 allows the certificate to be validate with >> respect to a date other than today. The date that ought to be input >> requires a trusted time that the signature was applied. Of course, PKIX >> has developed a protocol to provide such a time stamp. >> >> An archive of the revocation information is not routinely offered by >> CAs. How do we make that happen? >> >> Russ >> >> At 01:32 AM 7/23/2003 +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: >> >> >Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: >> > >> > >I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do not >> > >recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: >> > >> >But those are mostly just hypothetical objections. At the moment we >> have >> two >> >inescapabable facts: >> > >> >1. CAs issue certs based on a 1-year billing cycle, and nothing >> anyone says >> > will change that. No CA will issue a cert with a 20-year lifetime, >> unless >> > it's for its own CA certs. >> > >> >2. Users need to use certs to validate signatures at n times the >> CA-ordained >> > lifetime. In the abscence of any mechanism to do this, they are >> ignoring >> > the cert expiry time. In other words, out of necessity, they're >> > making the >> > following change to RFC 3280: >> > >> > The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from >> > notBefore >> > through notAfter, inclusive. When used with signing certificates, >> > implementations SHOULD NOT pay any attention to the notAfter date. >> > >> >Given that this isn't going to change, it would seem that some >> guidance for >> >users would be useful here. Since neither (1) nor (2) can be >> altered, what >> >would be needed is a simple extension, found in signing certs, >> containing a >> >date to which the cert can still be used for signature-checking >> beyond the >> >obvious notAfter value. This could be written up as a short one-page >> >application note, no more (well, a bit more once you add all the usual >> >boilerplate and whatnot). >> > >> >Now CAs can still decide not to issue certs like that, but (a) they >> can't >> >justify it by claiming it screws up their standard cert cycle because it >> >doesn't affect validTo/validFrom, and (b) users at least have some >> guidance >> as >> >to what to do, which is better than the current situation where all they >> can >> >do is ignore parts of the standard on an ad hoc basis. >> > >> >Peter. > > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U7mCqt027807 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 00:48:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6U7mCFe027806 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 00:48:12 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6U7m7qt027789 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 00:48:09 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA22080; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 09:52:42 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA17041; Wed, 30 Jul 2003 09:48:13 +0200 Message-ID: <3F277823.5050905@bull.net> Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 09:47:47 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Steve Bellovin <smb@research.att.com> Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt References: <200307291615.MAA27763@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> The IESG has been discussing the draft-ietf-pkix-pi document, and mentioned that some information was needed to bring the discussion to closure. The document allows the naming authority to be identified in several different ways. The following chunk of ASN.1 from the document illustrates the point: PermanentIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { identifierValue IdentifierValue, identifierType IdentifierType OPTIONAL, matchingRule [0] IMPLICIT OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL } IdentifierValue ::= CHOICE { iA5String IA5String, uTF8String UTF8String } IdentifierType ::= CHOICE { registeredOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, uri IA5String } The pros and cons of OIDs and URIs have been discussed in the IESG. In practice, they are not used in the same manner. Some people are uncomfortable with OIDs. For one thing, there is no straightforward way of getting to know anything more about them than the values of their numbers, which give no hint of the context in which they were assigned. Some people are uncomfortable with URIs. Their content is subject to various interpretations, and people sometimes make unreasonable guesses based on the strings embedded in the URI. Russ, our security area Director, indicated to the PKIX mailing list that an update to the Internet-Draft was needed to resolve the DISCUSS votes. After discussions between the co-editors and some other people, we came to the conclusion that no change was needed to the core document, but that an informative annex was necessary to deal with the topic of permanent URIs. The document draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt is an update where an annex C has been added in order to address the concern. Denis Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TNuuqt096225 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 16:56:56 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6TNutNt096224 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 16:56:55 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [207.228.252.5]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6TNusqt096219 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 16:56:54 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Received: (qmail 5068 invoked by uid 0); 29 Jul 2003 23:55:39 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Russ-Laptop.vigilsec.com) (138.88.93.183) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 29 Jul 2003 23:55:39 -0000 Message-Id: <5.2.0.9.2.20030729195514.03df5850@mail.binhost.com> X-Sender: housley@mail.binhost.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.2.0.9 Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 19:56:50 -0400 To: "Dean Adams" <da@trustis.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? In-Reply-To: <LOBBJBJOMBCACAKEOICKKEAMDNAA.da@trustis.com> References: <5.2.0.9.2.20030729114853.02d908a8@mail.binhost.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Dean: There are many options. A standard method for CAs to make this information available is very desirable. Russ At 09:37 PM 7/29/2003 +0100, Dean Adams wrote: >Russ, > Surely, merely finding some way to ensure that a CA archives CRLs > is not >enough. Some way has to be provided to allow client applications to >discover where the appropriate CRL to be checked, can be found. > >Some possible options for consideration: >1) the first CRL that was published after the > expiry date of the client cert being checked >2) the location of a fully maintained complete CRL > containing all history with regard to revoked certs > that were issued from a particular CA certificate > >I'm sure there are other options too, but in any case some means of >communicating this info to the client application needs to be defined. >Perhaps some certificate extension similar to "Freshest CRL" that instead >denotes "FullHistory CRL" would be appropriate? That (or something in >Authority Info Access) might provide a solution for (2). Not sure how you >might go about providing a solution for a (1) type of approach, without >getting overly complicated. > >Dean Adams > >-----Original Message----- >From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org >[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]On Behalf Of Russ Housley >Sent: 29 July 2003 16:56 >To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz >Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org >Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? > > > >Peter: > >On one hand I agree, but on another I do not. > >I agree that signatures need to be validated after the certificate expires. > >The algorithm in RFC 3280 allows the certificate to be validate with >respect to a date other than today. The date that ought to be input >requires a trusted time that the signature was applied. Of course, PKIX >has developed a protocol to provide such a time stamp. > >An archive of the revocation information is not routinely offered by >CAs. How do we make that happen? > >Russ > >At 01:32 AM 7/23/2003 +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: > > >Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: > > > > >I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do not > > >recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: > > > >But those are mostly just hypothetical objections. At the moment we have >two > >inescapabable facts: > > > >1. CAs issue certs based on a 1-year billing cycle, and nothing anyone says > > will change that. No CA will issue a cert with a 20-year lifetime, >unless > > it's for its own CA certs. > > > >2. Users need to use certs to validate signatures at n times the >CA-ordained > > lifetime. In the abscence of any mechanism to do this, they are >ignoring > > the cert expiry time. In other words, out of necessity, they're > > making the > > following change to RFC 3280: > > > > The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from > > notBefore > > through notAfter, inclusive. When used with signing certificates, > > implementations SHOULD NOT pay any attention to the notAfter date. > > > >Given that this isn't going to change, it would seem that some guidance for > >users would be useful here. Since neither (1) nor (2) can be altered, what > >would be needed is a simple extension, found in signing certs, containing a > >date to which the cert can still be used for signature-checking beyond the > >obvious notAfter value. This could be written up as a short one-page > >application note, no more (well, a bit more once you add all the usual > >boilerplate and whatnot). > > > >Now CAs can still decide not to issue certs like that, but (a) they can't > >justify it by claiming it screws up their standard cert cycle because it > >doesn't affect validTo/validFrom, and (b) users at least have some guidance >as > >to what to do, which is better than the current situation where all they >can > >do is ignore parts of the standard on an ad hoc basis. > > > >Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TKb5qt084905 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 13:37:05 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6TKb5PZ084904 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 13:37:05 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from cmailg3.svr.pol.co.uk (cmailg3.svr.pol.co.uk [195.92.195.173]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TKb4qt084896 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 13:37:04 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from da@trustis.com) Received: from modem-3971.lemur.dialup.pol.co.uk ([217.135.143.131] helo=PEDIGREE) by cmailg3.svr.pol.co.uk with smtp (Exim 4.14) id 19hbDS-0000sr-PC for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 21:37:03 +0100 From: "Dean Adams" <da@trustis.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 21:37:02 +0100 Message-ID: <LOBBJBJOMBCACAKEOICKKEAMDNAA.da@trustis.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.6604 (9.0.2911.0) Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <5.2.0.9.2.20030729114853.02d908a8@mail.binhost.com> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Russ, Surely, merely finding some way to ensure that a CA archives CRLs is not enough. Some way has to be provided to allow client applications to discover where the appropriate CRL to be checked, can be found. Some possible options for consideration: 1) the first CRL that was published after the expiry date of the client cert being checked 2) the location of a fully maintained complete CRL containing all history with regard to revoked certs that were issued from a particular CA certificate I'm sure there are other options too, but in any case some means of communicating this info to the client application needs to be defined. Perhaps some certificate extension similar to "Freshest CRL" that instead denotes "FullHistory CRL" would be appropriate? That (or something in Authority Info Access) might provide a solution for (2). Not sure how you might go about providing a solution for a (1) type of approach, without getting overly complicated. Dean Adams -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]On Behalf Of Russ Housley Sent: 29 July 2003 16:56 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Peter: On one hand I agree, but on another I do not. I agree that signatures need to be validated after the certificate expires. The algorithm in RFC 3280 allows the certificate to be validate with respect to a date other than today. The date that ought to be input requires a trusted time that the signature was applied. Of course, PKIX has developed a protocol to provide such a time stamp. An archive of the revocation information is not routinely offered by CAs. How do we make that happen? Russ At 01:32 AM 7/23/2003 +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: >Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: > > >I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do not > >recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: > >But those are mostly just hypothetical objections. At the moment we have two >inescapabable facts: > >1. CAs issue certs based on a 1-year billing cycle, and nothing anyone says > will change that. No CA will issue a cert with a 20-year lifetime, unless > it's for its own CA certs. > >2. Users need to use certs to validate signatures at n times the CA-ordained > lifetime. In the abscence of any mechanism to do this, they are ignoring > the cert expiry time. In other words, out of necessity, they're > making the > following change to RFC 3280: > > The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from > notBefore > through notAfter, inclusive. When used with signing certificates, > implementations SHOULD NOT pay any attention to the notAfter date. > >Given that this isn't going to change, it would seem that some guidance for >users would be useful here. Since neither (1) nor (2) can be altered, what >would be needed is a simple extension, found in signing certs, containing a >date to which the cert can still be used for signature-checking beyond the >obvious notAfter value. This could be written up as a short one-page >application note, no more (well, a bit more once you add all the usual >boilerplate and whatnot). > >Now CAs can still decide not to issue certs like that, but (a) they can't >justify it by claiming it screws up their standard cert cycle because it >doesn't affect validTo/validFrom, and (b) users at least have some guidance as >to what to do, which is better than the current situation where all they can >do is ignore parts of the standard on an ad hoc basis. > >Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TGkLqt071797 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 09:46:21 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6TGkLge071796 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 09:46:21 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [207.228.252.5]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6TGkJqt071791 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 09:46:20 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Received: (qmail 15574 invoked by uid 0); 29 Jul 2003 16:45:03 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Russ-Laptop.vigilsec.com) (141.156.168.207) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 29 Jul 2003 16:45:03 -0000 Message-Id: <5.2.0.9.2.20030729123717.02e00168@mail.binhost.com> X-Sender: housley@mail.binhost.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.2.0.9 Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 12:38:06 -0400 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <200307250902.h6P92b815373@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Where would you want to add this? I want to look at the flow of the section? Russ At 09:02 PM 7/25/2003 +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: >Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> writes: > > The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from notBefore > through notAfter, inclusive. When an RP is validating the signature on a > document which claims to have been signed or produced at a given past time, > the RP SHOULD proceed with the verification of the signature if that > time is > within the validity period even though the time of verification is outside > it. If the RP requires authoritative proof either of the time at which the > document was signed or of the certificate's not having been revoked, it MAY > reject the signature. > >That works for me. Russ, any chance of getting this added to bride-of-3280? > >Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TGFIqt070755 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 09:15:18 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6TGFI1H070754 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 09:15:18 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TGFGqt070749 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 09:15:17 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA27763; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 12:15:11 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307291615.MAA27763@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 12:15:10 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Permanent Identifier Author(s) : D. Pinkas, T. Gindin Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt Pages : 15 Date : 2003-7-29 This document define a new form of name, called permanent identifier, that may be included in the subjectAltName extension of a public key certificate issued to an entity. The permanent identifier is an optional feature that may be used by a CA to indicate that the certificate relates to the same entity even if the name or the affiliation of that entity stored in the subject or another name form in the subjectAltName extension has changed. The subject name, carried in the subject field, is only unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. Also, the new name form can carry a name that is unique for each subject entity certified by a CA. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-29122749.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-pi-07.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-29122749.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TGDoqt070659 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 09:13:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6TGDosJ070657 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 09:13:50 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [207.228.252.5]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6TGDnqt070646 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 09:13:49 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Received: (qmail 13758 invoked by uid 0); 29 Jul 2003 16:12:32 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Russ-Laptop.vigilsec.com) (141.156.164.124) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 29 Jul 2003 16:12:32 -0000 Message-Id: <5.2.0.9.2.20030729114853.02d908a8@mail.binhost.com> X-Sender: housley@mail.binhost.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.2.0.9 Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 11:56:11 -0400 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <200307221332.h6MDWXJ01973@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Peter: On one hand I agree, but on another I do not. I agree that signatures need to be validated after the certificate expires. The algorithm in RFC 3280 allows the certificate to be validate with respect to a date other than today. The date that ought to be input requires a trusted time that the signature was applied. Of course, PKIX has developed a protocol to provide such a time stamp. An archive of the revocation information is not routinely offered by CAs. How do we make that happen? Russ At 01:32 AM 7/23/2003 +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: >Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: > > >I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do not > >recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: > >But those are mostly just hypothetical objections. At the moment we have two >inescapabable facts: > >1. CAs issue certs based on a 1-year billing cycle, and nothing anyone says > will change that. No CA will issue a cert with a 20-year lifetime, unless > it's for its own CA certs. > >2. Users need to use certs to validate signatures at n times the CA-ordained > lifetime. In the abscence of any mechanism to do this, they are ignoring > the cert expiry time. In other words, out of necessity, they're > making the > following change to RFC 3280: > > The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from > notBefore > through notAfter, inclusive. When used with signing certificates, > implementations SHOULD NOT pay any attention to the notAfter date. > >Given that this isn't going to change, it would seem that some guidance for >users would be useful here. Since neither (1) nor (2) can be altered, what >would be needed is a simple extension, found in signing certs, containing a >date to which the cert can still be used for signature-checking beyond the >obvious notAfter value. This could be written up as a short one-page >application note, no more (well, a bit more once you add all the usual >boilerplate and whatnot). > >Now CAs can still decide not to issue certs like that, but (a) they can't >justify it by claiming it screws up their standard cert cycle because it >doesn't affect validTo/validFrom, and (b) users at least have some guidance as >to what to do, which is better than the current situation where all they can >do is ignore parts of the standard on an ad hoc basis. > >Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TDvQqt060981 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 06:57:26 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6TDvQBW060979 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 06:57:26 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from isis.directory.dfn.de (isis.directory.dfn.de [134.2.217.130]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TDvIqt060955 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 06:57:19 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Peter.Gietz@daasi.de) Received: from clara.directory.dfn.de (clara.directory.dfn.de [134.2.217.66]) by isis.directory.dfn.de (8.11.3/8.11.6/SuSE Linux 0.5) with ESMTP id h6TDvH609889; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 15:57:17 +0200 Received: from daasi.de (mercury.directory.dfn.de [134.2.217.50]) (authenticated (0 bits)) by clara.directory.dfn.de (8.11.6/8.11.6/SuSE Linux 0.5) with ESMTP id h6TDv8I32171 (using TLSv1/SSLv3 with cipher RC4-MD5 (128 bits) verified OK); Tue, 29 Jul 2003 15:57:16 +0200 Message-ID: <3F267D34.6060109@daasi.de> Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 15:57:08 +0200 From: Peter Gietz <Peter.Gietz@daasi.de> Organization: DAASI International GmbH User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 X-Accept-Language: de-de, en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk> CC: Antonio Lioy <lioy@polito.it>, Wen-Cheng Wang <wcwang@cht.com.tw>, =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Issues in LDAP schema IDs References: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> <3F16B1A3.5000100@stroeder.com> <003201c34cce$e9070070$4f85900a@wcwang> <3F179DE5.9010704@polito.it> <3F1C04A8.B7481BA1@salford.ac.uk> In-Reply-To: <3F1C04A8.B7481BA1@salford.ac.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed X-Virus-Scanned: by AMaViS-perl11-milter (http://amavis.org/) X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=EMAIL_ATTRIBUTION,IN_REP_TO,QUOTED_EMAIL_TEXT,REFERENCES, REPLY_WITH_QUOTES,USER_AGENT_MOZILLA_UA,X_ACCEPT_LANG version=2.54 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 2.54 (1.174.2.17-2003-05-11-exp) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6TDvJqt060961 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Just to make it clear and prevent misunderstandings: Our schema specifies the storage of each certificate in a separate directory entry. Those entries can be stored either below a person entry or in a certificate only repository 1.) below Person entry: cn=person name (mail=emailadress, etc.) / | \ / | \ cn=cert1 cn=cert2 cn=cert3 2.) below CA cert repository: o=CA Name | | cn=certificate repository / | \ / | \ cn=cert1 cn=cert2 ... cn=cert1008 Hope this helps. Cheers, Peter David Chadwick wrote: > > Antonio Lioy wrote: > > >>So support for multiple certs per each user should be added to the schema. > > > This has always been there. This is not the issue. It is whether the > newly created per certificate entry should use a multivalued attribute > or define a new one. > > regards > > David > > >>Cheers, >> >>Antonio Lioy > > -- _______________________________________________________________________ Peter Gietz (CEO) DAASI International GmbH phone: +49 7071 2970336 Wilhelmstr. 106 Fax: +49 7071 295114 D-72074 Tübingen email: peter.gietz@daasi.de Germany Web: www.daasi.de Directory Applications for Advanced Security and Information Management _______________________________________________________________________ Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TAbqqt044805 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 03:37:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6TAbq3b044804 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 03:37:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6TAboqt044795 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 03:37:51 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA23542; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 12:42:41 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA08123; Tue, 29 Jul 2003 12:38:10 +0200 Message-ID: <3F264E7A.6050200@bull.net> Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 12:37:46 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: asturgeon@spyrus.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-warranty-extn-03.txt References: <DCEJJJFPPENPENMBCAIFMEGFDAAA.asturgeon@spyrus.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Alice, Please see my responses below. Comments on warranty-extn-03.txt (June 2003) 1- On page 2. The text mentions: "A relying party that has a warranty from a CA". Does this mean that a relying party must have a contract with the CA to get advantage of the warranty ? [Alice] No. Does this mean that a relying party will get a warranty without a contract signed with the CA ? [Alice] Yes. Does this extension allow to make the difference between the case of a signed contract and the case of an unsigned contract where the guarantees could be different? [Alice] No. If there are any differences in the T&C pertaining to a contractual arrangement, these differences will be outside of, beyond the scope, and not pertinent to, the warranty offered in the certificate. It applies equally to all relying parties, whether or not a contract has been signed. [Denis] Then say something like: "Whether or not relying parties have signed agreements with CAs, the CA will provide Terms and Conditions for this warranty which relates to its liability." 2 - The difference between the base warranty and the extended warranty is not crystal clear. How can a relying party know whether it can have the benefits of the base warranty or of the extended warranty ? If the extended warranty is present, then the relying party has the benefit of the extended warranty. In short, if it is present, then the relying party knows that the relying party has the benefit of the extended warranty by its presence alone. The syntax shows that the extended warranty MAY be present: Warranty ::= CHOICE { none NULL, -- No warranty provided wData WarrantyData } -- Explicit warranty WarrantyData ::= SEQUENCE { base WarrantyInfo, extended WarrantyInfo OPTIONAL, tcURL TermsAndConditionsURL OPTIONAL } If the tcURL is present, a human being might understand the terms and conditions (if he can understand the local language used), but a computer program will not be able to do so. This means that computers cannot understand the difference. [Alice] The computer does not need to know what is in the T&C. If the tcURL is present, it is optionally for the benefit of the human reader. Perhaps you could suggest some text to clarify this in the I-D if you still think it is needed. [Denis] Then say something like: "Warranty extensions are only aimed for human interpretation and contain data that is inappropriate for computer based verification schemes, the warranty extension MUST NOT be an active component in automated certification path validation." 3 - There is no security on the information placed at the tcURL parameter since no hash of the terms and conditions is being used. These conditions could change overtime and relying parties would not be able to demonstrate that they have changed. [Alice] It seems to me that the time stamp on the certificate would suffice to place the warranty in a point of time at which the specified terms and conditions applied; there is no need for the extension to demonstrate that as this is covered by the certificate itself. This is no different from the paper-based world in that if an insurance policy changes its terms, it cannot do so retroactively to the detriment of clients who have paid for a specific coverage, unless it notified the clients and compensates them accordingly. [Denis] The problem is that the CA could change the policy and the relying party will be unable to demonstrate that the policy has changed. A time-stamp token over the certificate would not help. A time-stamp token over the T&C would help, but the relying party does not necessarily have access to one TSU. The hash approach is much simpler. 4 - Is the "Relying party Agreement" a document to signed by the parties or not ? This should be said. [Alice] Use of the term "Relying Party Agreement" is no different from its normal usage, just as "Certificate Policy" is used in the same context without any change to the meaning from normal usage, as per RFC 2527 and its successor. In other words, defining the terms, either Relying Party Agreement or Certificate Policy is not necessary to the understanding of this extension. [Denis] The term "Relying Party Agreement" is confusing. Use a wording like "Terms and Conditions for Relying parties" which does not imply that there is an agreement signed but that unilaterally the CA provides terms and conditions. Relying parties may like them or not. If they disagree with them, then this is still "Terms and Conditions for Relying parties". 5 - The WarrantyValidityPeriod is insufficient. Usually there is a period to claim for a compensation which must be made X months or Y days after the date of the event which created the damage. It is thus not possible to ask for a warranty during e.g. the whole validity period of the certificate. Another time period parameter is missing. [Alice] This is exactly what the validity period is stating: that the warranty is valid for a specified time, which is either the validity period of the certificate, or another, specified time using the parameters as defined in the I-D. It is presented and offered this way, so there is no need for another validity parameter. If an offeror wanted to specify a time within which claims could be made, then a shorter time period than the validity of the certificate can be used. This is unlike the paper-based world in the sense that insurance policies are normally of long duration, whereas this extension is associated with a certificate that normally has a validity of two-three years. [Denis] The semantics of the warranty validity period is not defined ! There is a need to define more precisely what "the warranty validity period" is. Here is a proposal along my original text. If it does not fit, please propose an alternative: " The warranty validity period is a time period to claim for a compensation which must be made X months or Y days after the date of the event which created the damage. It is unrelated to the certificate validity period." 6 - The wType offers only two types of warranty: aggregated and per transaction. "Aggregated" means that that once the value of the fulfilled claims reaches the maximum warranty amount, then no further claim will be fulfilled. "Per transaction" means that each claim is handled independently but no individual claim can exceed the maximum warranty amount. Each type has its own problems: "Aggregated" is like a race where late claimants will get no compensation at all because they were not "fast enough". It is questionable whether such a race condition will be acceptable. It should be understood that aggregation applies to one warranty and one claimant. This is analogous to the paper-based world. When you are covered by warranty for X product or service, e.g., health insurance, there is often an upper limit (viz. the "value") up to which claims will be met for each claimant; i.e., one insured person. "Per transaction" means that the CA cannot compute the maximum amount of money that it may have to give away. Which insurance company will ever insure a risk for which an upper limit cannot be computed ? [Alice] The T&C, as noted in section 1, as covered by insurance, will specify the maximum. The type of warranty selected depends on the nature of the transactions, the parties to the transactions (e.g., individuals, large institutions, etc.). [Denis] What I am asking for is to allow a combination of both types, which is currently not possible. See below again. None of these schemes is acceptable. Some combination should be allowed: - a maximum amount per transaction, and - a maximum amount per certificate with a maximum time period to claim for a compensation after the date of the event (no race problem implied). 7 - The content of the security consideration should be augmented to indicate the difference between what a computer program can do and a human being can do with this extension. [Alice] I would have thought this to be blindingly obvious. We would, however, be quite willing to consider some proposed words to address this, if you do think it is necessary. [Denis] If my text proposal related to comment 2 is inserted, then this is no more needed. 8 - The document is not mature enough and its added value is still questionable. [Alice] We believe that it is mature. Its value may be questionable to those who do not want to use it, but given that it is (a) proposed as Informational and (b) always non-critical, surely its availability for use is innocuous for those that do not want to use it. For those who do want to use it, and we have heard from quite a number who do, it will be useful and valuable. As in section 1: "When a certificate contains a warranty certificate extension, the extension MUST be non-critical, ..." [Denis] As you can see, we have progressed, but several issues still need to be addressed. Denis Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SNLYqt094751 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 16:21:34 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SNLYTZ094750 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 16:21:34 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from e6.ny.us.ibm.com (e6.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.106]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SNLWqt094730 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 16:21:32 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from tgindin@us.ibm.com) Received: from northrelay04.pok.ibm.com (northrelay04.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.206]) by e6.ny.us.ibm.com (8.12.9/8.12.2) with ESMTP id h6SNLIkh142298; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 19:21:18 -0400 Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01av02.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.216]) by northrelay04.pok.ibm.com (8.12.9/NCO/VER6.5) with ESMTP id h6SNLG0g066500; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 19:21:17 -0400 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Cc: joy.bonny@samsung.com, kent@bbn.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: RE: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 5.0.11 July 24, 2002 From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> Message-ID: <OFFC7241AE.CB21AB74-ON85256D71.00137ABB-85256D71.00804675@us.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 19:21:14 -0400 X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 6.0.1 w/SPRs JHEG5JQ5CD, THTO5KLVS6, JHEG5HMLFK, JCHN5K5PG9|March 27, 2003) at 07/28/2003 19:21:17, Serialize complete at 07/28/2003 19:21:17 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Bonny: I am afraid that I don't understand your point, at all. If the PKUP is present in the signer's certificate and is inside the validity period, the simplest rule for deciding whether the signature time is legitimate for that certificate is: a) If a time is specified in the signed object, that time must be within PKUP and the current time must be within the validity period. b) If no time is specified in the signed object, the current time must be within PKUP. If the PKUP is not present, retrospective validation requires that the rules on validity time be relaxed in roughly the manner I specified in my earlier message. Let me give a simple example: 1 Joe has a credit card which expires on 7/31/2003, with a certificate tied to it and expiring on that same date. 2 Joe buys a music CD over the Internet today (7/27), signing the order with the key corresponding to the certificate in step 1. 3 The CD reaches Joe on 7/31. 4 Joe dislikes several songs on the album, and decides that he shouldn't pay. 5 Joe claims that he didn't order the CD, when his final billing statement comes on 8/3. Now how does the credit card company get the signature and certificate validated on 8/4 or 8/5, or during a court case? Even if the revocation evidence has been preserved in a way similar to sections 4.4-4.6 of the "technr" draft, including time-stamping, the validation needs to be run after the validity period has expired. In this instance, using a PKUP whose end date is the expiration date of the credit card while putting the certificate validity end date a year or more after that would avoid these complexities. In general, using PKUP seems to reduce the need for retrospective validation. AFAIK, that is its main use. Tom Gindin "bonny joy" <dotusadotnet@hotmail.com> Sent by: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org 07/27/2003 08:20 PM To: kent@bbn.com, joy.bonny@samsung.com cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Dear Steve The PKUP does operate as you note, but the cert validity period is still present, and in the presence of the PKUP extension, this field is reinterpreted to state that after the notAfter date, the cert may no longer be used to verify any signature, period. That too is part of the reason for not encouraging use of PKUP, i.e., the need to reinterpret the cert validity field. This is my view The certificate can be used to verify the signature during the certificate validity period irrespective of the PKUP , for this reason certificate validity period should be present The signature should not be generated after or before the PKUP, since the private key validity period is different from the certificate validity period , this field should be present So why does a certificate processing part should get confused by seeing the 2 fields , those 2 fields are meant for different purposes, First check the signature has been created at the valid period ,then check the validity of the certificate. In the case of NR the validity of the certificate is not having any impact ,since the thrust is on PKUP. Regards Bonny _________________________________________________________________ They are beautiful. They are in danger. http://server1.msn.co.in/Slideshow/BeautyoftheBeast/index.asp Our four-legged friends. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SM7bqt089283 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 15:07:37 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SM7bYH089282 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 15:07:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp2.pacifier.net (smtp2.pacifier.net [64.255.237.172]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SM7aqt089271 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 15:07:36 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jimsch@nwlink.com) Received: from ROMANS (ip237.c132.blk1.bel.nwlink.com [209.20.132.237]) by smtp2.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id E70256A8AF; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 15:07:36 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: <jimsch@exmsft.com> From: "Jim Schaad" <jimsch@nwlink.com> To: "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com>, "'pkix'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: WG Last Call draft-ietf-pkix-SCVP-12.txt Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 15:08:01 -0700 Message-ID: <002301c35554$b66b1230$1400a8c0@augustcellars.local> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2627 Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> ASN.1 Module: 1. CertificateList is not imported 2. UTF8String is not defined 3. OCSPResponse is not imported or defined 4. Name is imported but never referenced 5. SubjectPublicKeyInfo is imported but never referenced Nits: Section 1.1: "For a client uses these services" -- "that uses these" Section 1.1: "that are performed during certification path validation" -- "certificate path" Other items: 1. Section 3: References to an SCVPRequest - I assume this should be a CVRequest 2. Section 3: There is an item called a certValRequest - is this a CVRequest? 3. Section 3.2.2: In para 2, there is a parenthetical remark that a server may choose to perform unrequested operations. Is this permitted to affect the result returned to the client? I.e. I ask for a path build, the server does revocation checking and the cert is revoked. Can it say no valid path exists? 4. Section 3.2.3: Does AC checking include the PKC checking of the issuer of the AC? Can I specify a PKC as a trust point for purposes of AC path building? 5. Section 3.2.5: "ask for the servers default validation policy" vs "A global default validation policy" 6. Section 3.2.5.1, last paragraph: Yes, but does it match user@windows.foo.com? This is a much more interesting question that the ones you have listed. 7. Section 3.2.5.1: I want to change from GeneralName to GeneralNames. I want to be able to specify a name validation for e-mail againist both a FROM and SENDER name. I assume that doing two name validation parameters would NOT get me what I want as both would need to pass validation. (i.e. AND not OR) 8. Section 3.2.6: Please add a (small) note dealing with clock skew issues. 9. Section 3.2.6: What if I put now into the validateTime field? How does the server make the determination on historical information? 10. Section 3.2.7: Trust anchor only allows for self-signed certificates? Can I put an invalid certificate in the trust anchor locaiton and have it correctly work (i.e. build my own self-signed certificate to add such items as name constraints)? 11. Section 3.2.8: I don't like the word trusted in this paragraph. I think a better phrase is "considred as valid" Only items in the trust anchor list should be considered as "trusted" 12. Section 3.2.9: Allow for references to CRL's to be placed in the SignedData crl list? 13. Section 3.2.10: Is it possible to change the term recognize so that we don't have the same issues that we do with processing certificates about the difference between recognize and process? 14. Section 3.3: I really don't like having to deal with the fact that the requestor value must not have a zero octet. I finally did find the reason farther down, and would perfer that this be done in the ASN.1 rather than by special processing of the octet string. 15. Section 3.?: Can a ref be to a extant certificate in a differet CertRef field? 16. Section 4: What is an SCVPResponse - no definition, I assume it's a wrapped ContentInfo w/ a CVResponse, but not defined. 17. Section 4: If only signed and unsigned responses, why is there an authenticatedData example below? [Located text that says signed responses are either signed or authenticated, I don't like the blurring between these items as they have different security properties.] 18. Section 4: Why is there a restriction on the number of SignerInfos? If a server has two, why can it not sign with both? How would a server know which certificate to use for signing? 19. Section 4: If authenticated data is used, is this only in response to an authenticated request? How does the server determine what secret is to be used? 20. Section 4: You should permit the inclusion of a CounterSignature attribute in the unsignedAttrs of a response message for later processing after archival. 21. Section 4: Please expand on the following text. I don't understand where this identifier would be used. " The value of the message-digest attribute in the signedAttrs within SignerInfo MAY be used as an identifier of the reponse generated by the SCVP server. " 22. Section 4.2: If I ask for a status of a specific time (validityTime) does this change the value of producedAt? If so this should be reminded. 23. Section 4.3: Please define which items are error vs non-error response codes. 24. Section 4.4: Does the connectionless statement imply that if I use TLS I cannot have two outstanding requests in at a given time? What happens for server timeouts, multiple applications using a single pipe (or impaitent users). 25. Section 4.4: Please provide guidence on which to use requestHash vs fullRequest. 26. Section 4.7.5: Why is ReplyWantBack not using an ANY defined by field rather than an OCTET STRING?. 27. Question: I put an PKC and and AC cert in a request. I put in status-aa-path and status-pkc-path. What is in the result message? 28. Section B.1: Why must the item be DER encoded? Should the CMS ContentInfo type surround the CVRequest structure? 29. Section B: What about the policy messages? jim Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SLToqt087457 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 14:29:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SLTnjq087453 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 14:29:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from melbourne6.fhp.com.au (melbourne6.fhp.com.au [202.53.34.67]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SLTlqt087445 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 14:29:48 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Adrian.McCullagh@freehills.com) Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, kent@bbn.com, michael@stroeder.com, owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org, RWEISER@trustdst.com, trevorf@windows.microsoft.com X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 5.0.10 March 22, 2002 Message-ID: <OF493F7FCC.349A78E4-ON4A256D71.00750058-4A256D71.00756B86@fhp.com.au> From: "Adrian McCullagh" <Adrian.McCullagh@freehills.com> Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 07:22:32 +1000 X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on Melbourne6/FHP/AU(Release 5.0.12 |February 13, 2003) at 29/07/2003 07:31:53 AM MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> -------------------------------------------------------------------- FREEHILLS This email is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not disclose or use the information contained in it. If you have received this email in error, please notify us immediately by return email and delete the document. Freehills is not responsible for any changes made to a document other than those made by Freehills or for the effect of the changes on the document's meaning. Liability is limited by the Solicitors' Limitation of Liability Scheme, approved under the Professional Standards Act 1994 (NSW) -------------------------------------------------------------------- Peter, That isa really good point you make. Maybe there could be a competition formed that will pick some PKIX RFCs and award something to the Vendor whose product complies the most with the selected RFCsand too what extent. Concluding remark: Is it worthwhile really calling it a STANDARD if so few vendors (if any at all) are compliant. Dr. Adrian McCullagh Solicitor Freehills Direct 61 7 3258 6603 Telephone 61 7 3258 6666 Facsimile 61 7 3258 6444 http://www.freehills.com pgut001@cs.auckland. To: kent@bbn.com, trevorf@windows.microsoft.com ac.nz (Peter cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, michael@stroeder.com, Gutmann) RWEISER@trustdst.com Sent by: Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: owner-ietf-pkix@mail draft minutes) .imc.org 28/07/2003 06:25 PM Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: >I appreciate the clarification, but I am appalled by the suggestion that >people should construct ungainly CNs that will be hard for users to parse, or >that LDAP schema should be skewed to accommodate this lack of standards >compliance. PKIX, meet the real world. Actually I'd like to offer a small soapbox here on the out-of-touch-with- reality nature of many PKI-related RFCs, and the deleterious side-effects that this has when the RFC is applied in practice. For example there's an EDI messaging standard that had to do X (and also Y and Z, none of them related to verifying sigs after the cert has expired as per the recent thread), so they went to the appropriate RFCs, picked the way they wanted to do things, and wrote it into their standard. Since security always gets bolted on as an afterthought, the rest of the standard was in use for a year or two before anyone got around to looking at the security parts of it. At that point they discovered that nothing in existence implemented what they required (poor guys, they thought that MUST in the RFC implied that it'd be supported), and no vendor was interested in supporting it [0]. This situation is unfortunately all too common, with users (and in this case the WG chair) discovering that some feature discussed in an RFC as if it were a hard fact exists only in the imagination of the RFC author. What's more problematic is the case of RFC A relying on an imaginary feature of RFC B which in turn relies on an imaginary feature of RFC C. This is why, in stuff I write, I include extensive implementation notes with caveats such as "The standard says MUST X, but in practice no-one does it that way, so be prepared to encounter data which doesn't do X at all". A few years ago I started making a list of features in PKI RFCs, rated from 1-5 in terms of support in implementations, where 1 means "you can rely on it being present" and 5 means "don't bother", the idea being that users could consult it to see whether the feature they wanted was going to be available in the real world. I abandoned it after a while because (a) I didn't think I'd make many friends pointing out how little of what was in the RFCs was actually supported in practice and (b) there was a kind of geometric growth of features as you went further along the scale (i.e. from 1 to 5). So to sum up I really wish PKIX would at least make some attempt to approximate the real world. SSH for example has just had a poll of implementors/implementations to check for how to handle a new feature being added, with the primary goal being existing support for it and compatibility with current implementations. The PKIX approach in contrast seems to be to construct cloud castles, declare the problem solved, and then wonder why nothing does what the RFC says. Peter. [0] Actually I believe that there exists a single experimental/reference implemetation that does it, but I'm not sure who uses it in practice. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SG64qt069682 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 09:06:04 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SG6486069681 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 09:06:04 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from klapautius.it.su.se (as13-3-2.rny.s.bonet.se [217.215.166.49]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SG62qt069670 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 09:06:03 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from leifj@it.su.se) Received: from it.su.se (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by klapautius.it.su.se (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id h6SG2p107724; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 18:02:52 +0200 Message-ID: <3F25492B.7020202@it.su.se> Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 18:02:51 +0200 From: Leif Johansson <leifj@it.su.se> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) References: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <3F238DD8.8040209@it.su.se> <p05210600bb4ad9ed31e9@[128.89.89.75]> <3F2539F5.7070600@it.su.se> <p05210605bb4aec47262b@[128.89.89.75]> <3F25414C.4070405@it.su.se> <p05210607bb4af6d8a021@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <p05210607bb4af6d8a021@[128.89.89.75]> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.76.2.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Kent wrote: > > I won't continue arguing with you about the primacy of LDAP. Either it > will support PKI needs, or something > I agree - let's not beat this particular horse anymore :-) Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SFupqt069263 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:56:51 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SFuoap069262 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:56:50 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SFunqt069256 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:56:49 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6SFuiD9009695; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:56:45 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210607bb4af6d8a021@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <3F25414C.4070405@it.su.se> References: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <3F238DD8.8040209@it.su.se> <p05210600bb4ad9ed31e9@[128.89.89.75]> <3F2539F5.7070600@it.su.se> <p05210605bb4aec47262b@[128.89.89.75]> <3F25414C.4070405@it.su.se> Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:56:53 -0400 To: Leif Johansson <leifj@it.su.se> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 17:29 +0200 7/28/03, Leif Johansson wrote: >Stephen Kent wrote: > >> >>people manage ACLs that use cert DNs as inputs for authorization. >>people examine DNs to make value judgements about names, e.g., in >>received S/MINE e-mail. Thus it is important for DNs to be >>meaningful to people when they perform these functions. > >I know - that is one of the bad side-effects of the current pki naming scheme. This is not a side effect, it is an essential element of any ID-based authorization scheme. >>PKI gave up on ubiquitous directory availability long ago. Many >>apps that use PKI never need use a directory to locate a cert, >>because certs can be passed in the protocols (e.g., IKE & SSL/TLS). >>The same is true for CRLs in IKE. There are apps that benefit >>greatly from directory storage of certs, but if the LDAP won't >>support multi-valued RDNs we'll just have to use other directory >>models. The AIA and SIA extensions to permit this. > >And how many of these directores are deployed today? Are you >building a research project >or are you building something which will actually be used by people >outside of the pkix-wg?? >The bottom line is that directores are widely deployed and pki is >not. If pki is to have any >chance to get integrated with the provisioning systems which *are* >*already* deployed and >used in enterprises today it must work with LDAP. No extensions. No add-ons. I won't continue arguing with you about the primacy of LDAP. Either it will support PKI needs, or something else will be used to the extent that PKI apps require directories. So far, LDAP has not done a great job of supporting PKI requirements, as evidenced by the long running ;binary debate. Your comments are illustrative of a directory-centric mindset that perpetuates these sorts of problems. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SFWTqt067518 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:32:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SFWT4W067517 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:32:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from klapautius.it.su.se (as13-3-2.rny.s.bonet.se [217.215.166.49]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SFWRqt067511 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:32:27 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from leifj@it.su.se) Received: from it.su.se (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by klapautius.it.su.se (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id h6SFTG107698; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 17:29:16 +0200 Message-ID: <3F25414C.4070405@it.su.se> Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 17:29:16 +0200 From: Leif Johansson <leifj@it.su.se> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) References: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <3F238DD8.8040209@it.su.se> <p05210600bb4ad9ed31e9@[128.89.89.75]> <3F2539F5.7070600@it.su.se> <p05210605bb4aec47262b@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <p05210605bb4aec47262b@[128.89.89.75]> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.76.2.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Kent wrote: > > people manage ACLs that use cert DNs as inputs for authorization. > people examine DNs to make value judgements about names, e.g., in > received S/MINE e-mail. Thus it is important for DNs to be meaningful > to people when they perform these functions. I know - that is one of the bad side-effects of the current pki naming scheme. > > PKI gave up on ubiquitous directory availability long ago. Many apps > that use PKI never need use a directory to locate a cert, because > certs can be passed in the protocols (e.g., IKE & SSL/TLS). The same > is true for CRLs in IKE. There are apps that benefit greatly from > directory storage of certs, but if the LDAP won't support multi-valued > RDNs we'll just have to use other directory models. The AIA and SIA > extensions to permit this. And how many of these directores are deployed today? Are you building a research project or are you building something which will actually be used by people outside of the pkix-wg?? The bottom line is that directores are widely deployed and pki is not. If pki is to have any chance to get integrated with the provisioning systems which *are* *already* deployed and used in enterprises today it must work with LDAP. No extensions. No add-ons. > > Steve MVH leifj Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SFGpqt066804 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:16:51 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SFGpKU066802 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:16:51 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SFGoqt066785 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:16:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6SFGkD9007014; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:16:46 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210605bb4aec47262b@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <3F2539F5.7070600@it.su.se> References: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <3F238DD8.8040209@it.su.se> <p05210600bb4ad9ed31e9@[128.89.89.75]> <3F2539F5.7070600@it.su.se> Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:12:44 -0400 To: Leif Johansson <leifj@it.su.se> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 16:57 +0200 7/28/03, Leif Johansson wrote: >Stephen Kent wrote: > >> >>I disagree with your analysis, in almost every detail. The names >>are names, not addresses. I can imagine that from an LDAP >>perspective you think if these names as inputs to locating database >>entries, but this is a rather narrow view for several reasons.Certs >>exist separate from directories, despite the origin of certs as an >>X.500 construct. Moreover, there are many ways to locate directory >>entries, and the DN is but one. Yes, people get confused by names >>vs. addresses, and the topic has been hotly debated for over 25 >>years. I refer you to John Shoc's paper form the later 70s' on >>this topic. > >That is precisely my point but I could have made it clearer. If your >only requirement is uniqueness >then serial is enought. Trouble ensues when you try to use the >identifier for something else (readability). people manage ACLs that use cert DNs as inputs for authorization. people examine DNs to make value judgements about names, e.g., in received S/MINE e-mail. Thus it is important for DNs to be meaningful to people when they perform these functions. > >> >>Speaking from the PKI perspective, LDAP is not the center of the >>universe. Get over it. :-) > >In terms of actual deployments I'd say LDAP is "slightly" more >wide-spread of the two. If >a feature which is in the standard (multivalued rdn's) is not >implemented by leading vendors >it is for all intents and purpouses dead. Relying on it from the >pkix community is clearly not >a good idea if you are looking for interoperability with *existing* >deployed directories. PKI gave up on ubiquitous directory availability long ago. Many apps that use PKI never need use a directory to locate a cert, because certs can be passed in the protocols (e.g., IKE & SSL/TLS). The same is true for CRLs in IKE. There are apps that benefit greatly from directory storage of certs, but if the LDAP won't support multi-valued RDNs we'll just have to use other directory models. The AIA and SIA extensions to permit this. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SF7nqt066258 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:07:49 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SF7n0r066257 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:07:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SF7Yqt066240 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:07:37 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA04791; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:07:30 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307281507.LAA04791@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes-11.txt Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:07:29 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509 certificates Author(s) : S. Santesson, R. Housley, T. Freeman Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes-11.txt Pages : 22 Date : 2003-7-28 This document specifies a certificate extension for including logotypes in public key certificates and attribute certificates. Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@imc.org mailing list. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes-11.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes-11.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes-11.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-28111428.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes-11.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes-11.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-28111428.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SF7lqt066250 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:07:47 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SF7lEl066249 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:07:47 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SF7bqt066241 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:07:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA04806; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:07:34 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307281507.LAA04806@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-sca-00.txt Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:07:34 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Subject Certificate Access Extension Author(s) : D. Chadwick Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-sca-00.txt Pages : 0 Date : 2003-7-28 Currently there is nothing in a certificate to tell a relying party where this certificate, or any other certificate issued to the subject of this certificate, has been published. This document defines an extension that indicates where certificates of the subject may be published. Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@imc.org mailing list. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sca-00.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. 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Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-28111438.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sca-00.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-sca-00.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-28111438.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SF1tqt066107 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:01:55 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SF1tDc066106 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:01:55 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SF1sqt066098 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:01:54 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6SF1oD9005970; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:01:50 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210603bb4ae9fe9d0d@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <006901c3550c$f61fbef0$020aff0a@tsg1> References: <200307280825.h6S8Plc04015@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <006901c3550c$f61fbef0$020aff0a@tsg1> Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 10:58:11 -0400 To: "todd glassey" <todd.glassey@worldnet.att.net> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 6:33 -0700 7/28/03, todd glassey wrote: >Peter - this is why so much of what PKIX did was not appropriate for the >IETF but belonged by pure definition in the IRTF, but then the management >team wouldn't of had the empire they have now to manage... PKIX is then a >fiefdom and has never been anything else. > >So lets ask the management team the really big questions > > 1) How many years has PKIX existed > > 2) How many RFC's has it produced that have made it to Standards >Status > > 3) At what cost and to the expense of how many participants and their >sponsors... > >Maybe its time to do the nasty and make PKIX a financial operations model so >we can really see what is what here. > >Todd Glassey > PKIX, like all other IETF WGs, is a volunteer activity. Nobody is required to participate. Only on ToddLand would a "financial operations model" make any sense for any of the IETF WGs. Talk of being out of touch with reality ... Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SF1Eqt066087 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:01:14 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SF1EhO066086 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:01:14 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from klapautius.it.su.se (as13-3-2.rny.s.bonet.se [217.215.166.49]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SF1Cqt066081 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 08:01:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from leifj@it.su.se) Received: from it.su.se (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by klapautius.it.su.se (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id h6SEvv107675; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 16:57:58 +0200 Message-ID: <3F2539F5.7070600@it.su.se> Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 16:57:57 +0200 From: Leif Johansson <leifj@it.su.se> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) References: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <3F238DD8.8040209@it.su.se> <p05210600bb4ad9ed31e9@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <p05210600bb4ad9ed31e9@[128.89.89.75]> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.76.2.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Kent wrote: > > I disagree with your analysis, in almost every detail. The names are > names, not addresses. I can imagine that from an LDAP perspective you > think if these names as inputs to locating database entries, but this > is a rather narrow view for several reasons.Certs exist separate from > directories, despite the origin of certs as an X.500 construct. > Moreover, there are many ways to locate directory entries, and the DN > is but one. Yes, people get confused by names vs. addresses, and the > topic has been hotly debated for over 25 years. I refer you to John > Shoc's paper form the later 70s' on this topic. That is precisely my point but I could have made it clearer. If your only requirement is uniqueness then serial is enought. Trouble ensues when you try to use the identifier for something else (readability). > > Speaking from the PKI perspective, LDAP is not the center of the > universe. Get over it. :-) In terms of actual deployments I'd say LDAP is "slightly" more wide-spread of the two. If a feature which is in the standard (multivalued rdn's) is not implemented by leading vendors it is for all intents and purpouses dead. Relying on it from the pkix community is clearly not a good idea if you are looking for interoperability with *existing* deployed directories. > > Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SEpqqt065894 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 07:51:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SEpq1T065893 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 07:51:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SEpoqt065887 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 07:51:51 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6SEpjD9005284; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 10:51:46 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210600bb4ad9ed31e9@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <3F238DD8.8040209@it.su.se> References: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <3F238DD8.8040209@it.su.se> Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 10:47:16 -0400 To: Leif Johansson <leifj@it.su.se> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 10:31 +0200 7/27/03, Leif Johansson wrote: >The fundamental problem (imo) is that pki confuses the address with >the name in >the current use of subject and issuer DN. Using multivalued >"terminal" rdns for >EE is as we all know the result of wanting to have a readable >component (the name) >along with a unique component (the "address"). The corresponding >problem has been >cropping up all over the ietf of late (for instance in the recent >discussion on ipv6 >multihoming). > >Speaking from the LDAP community my view is that the use of multivalued rdn's >is as dead as the Dodo. Get over it. > > Cheers Leif I disagree with your analysis, in almost every detail. The names are names, not addresses. I can imagine that from an LDAP perspective you think if these names as inputs to locating database entries, but this is a rather narrow view for several reasons.Certs exist separate from directories, despite the origin of certs as an X.500 construct. Moreover, there are many ways to locate directory entries, and the DN is but one. Yes, people get confused by names vs. addresses, and the topic has been hotly debated for over 25 years. I refer you to John Shoc's paper form the later 70s' on this topic. Speaking from the PKI perspective, LDAP is not the center of the universe. Get over it. :-) Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SDZSqt057716 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 06:35:28 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6SDZS5a057715 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 06:35:28 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mtiwmhc11.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc11.worldnet.att.net [204.127.131.115]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6SDZPqt057710 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 06:35:26 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from todd.glassey@worldnet.att.net) Received: from tsg1 (50.sanjose-01-02rs16rt.ca.dial-access.att.net[12.81.0.50]) by mtiwmhc11.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc11) with SMTP id <20030728133508111008b0rme>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 13:35:10 +0000 Message-ID: <006901c3550c$f61fbef0$020aff0a@tsg1> From: "todd glassey" <todd.glassey@worldnet.att.net> To: "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <kent@bbn.com>, <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <michael@stroeder.com>, <RWEISER@trustdst.com> References: <200307280825.h6S8Plc04015@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 06:33:57 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Peter - this is why so much of what PKIX did was not appropriate for the IETF but belonged by pure definition in the IRTF, but then the management team wouldn't of had the empire they have now to manage... PKIX is then a fiefdom and has never been anything else. So lets ask the management team the really big questions 1) How many years has PKIX existed 2) How many RFC's has it produced that have made it to Standards Status 3) At what cost and to the expense of how many participants and their sponsors... Maybe its time to do the nasty and make PKIX a financial operations model so we can really see what is what here. Todd Glassey ----- Original Message ----- From: "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> To: <kent@bbn.com>; <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; <michael@stroeder.com>; <RWEISER@trustdst.com> Sent: Monday, July 28, 2003 1:25 AM Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) > > Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: > > >I appreciate the clarification, but I am appalled by the suggestion that > >people should construct ungainly CNs that will be hard for users to parse, or > >that LDAP schema should be skewed to accommodate this lack of standards > >compliance. > > PKIX, meet the real world. > > Actually I'd like to offer a small soapbox here on the out-of-touch-with- > reality nature of many PKI-related RFCs, and the deleterious side-effects that > this has when the RFC is applied in practice. For example there's an EDI > messaging standard that had to do X (and also Y and Z, none of them related to > verifying sigs after the cert has expired as per the recent thread), so they > went to the appropriate RFCs, picked the way they wanted to do things, and > wrote it into their standard. Since security always gets bolted on as an > afterthought, the rest of the standard was in use for a year or two before > anyone got around to looking at the security parts of it. At that point they > discovered that nothing in existence implemented what they required (poor > guys, they thought that MUST in the RFC implied that it'd be supported), and > no vendor was interested in supporting it [0]. > > This situation is unfortunately all too common, with users (and in this case > the WG chair) discovering that some feature discussed in an RFC as if it were > a hard fact exists only in the imagination of the RFC author. What's more > problematic is the case of RFC A relying on an imaginary feature of RFC B > which in turn relies on an imaginary feature of RFC C. This is why, in stuff > I write, I include extensive implementation notes with caveats such as "The > standard says MUST X, but in practice no-one does it that way, so be prepared > to encounter data which doesn't do X at all". > > A few years ago I started making a list of features in PKI RFCs, rated from > 1-5 in terms of support in implementations, where 1 means "you can rely on it > being present" and 5 means "don't bother", the idea being that users could > consult it to see whether the feature they wanted was going to be available in > the real world. I abandoned it after a while because (a) I didn't think I'd > make many friends pointing out how little of what was in the RFCs was actually > supported in practice and (b) there was a kind of geometric growth of features > as you went further along the scale (i.e. from 1 to 5). > > So to sum up I really wish PKIX would at least make some attempt to > approximate the real world. SSH for example has just had a poll of > implementors/implementations to check for how to handle a new feature being > added, with the primary goal being existing support for it and compatibility > with current implementations. The PKIX approach in contrast seems to be to > construct cloud castles, declare the problem solved, and then wonder why > nothing does what the RFC says. > > Peter. > > [0] Actually I believe that there exists a single experimental/reference > implemetation that does it, but I'm not sure who uses it in practice. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S9Qnqt038282 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 02:26:49 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6S9Qn7b038280 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 02:26:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp.nextra.cz (smtp.nextra.cz [195.70.130.2]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S9Qlqt038253 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 02:26:48 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from dostalek@pvt.cz) Received: from cbuwdostalek2 (unknown [195.47.37.200]) by smtp.nextra.cz (Postfix) with ESMTP id E12F623A67 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:26:46 +0200 (CEST) From: <dostalek@pvt.cz> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 11:25:01 +0200 Message-ID: <008a01c354ea$1ee43aa0$c8252fc3@pvt.cz> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.4024 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1106 Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <Law12-F97hMOgRGkQ6m0000dec3@hotmail.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> > Dear Steve > > The PKUP does operate as you note, but the cert validity period is still > present, and in the presence of the PKUP extension, this field is > reinterpreted to state that after the notAfter date, the cert may no longer > be used to verify any signature, period. That too is part of the reason for > not encouraging use of PKUP, i.e., the need to reinterpret the cert validity > field. > > Regards Bonny >From my point of view, PKUP could be an useful extention of CA certs. CA must issue its new cert long time before expiration of its own certificate (this period is min of max of the time validity of issued EE certs). It means: After issuing new CA cert (new-new) the old CA cert (old-old) is still valid but an appropriate old private key of the CA is not used henceforth. This private key should be authoritative erased when the new certificate CA is issued. Lifetime of private key is shorter than the validity period of the certificate. This lifetime of private key could be indicated in PKUP. Today, the lifetime of private key is indicated in the certificate policy (CP). Unfortunately it is not possible to start procedure for downloading new CA certs (old-new, new-new and new-old) automatically because the certificate policy (CP) is a nonstructured text. In practice, the lifetime of CA private key is not even published in CP yet. It is published in CPS (RFC-2527) which is not in case of the majority of CAs public. Therefore it might by useful to indicate this information in the PKUP. Libor Dostalek Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S8Q3qt027897 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 01:26:03 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6S8Q3oI027896 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 01:26:03 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S8Q1qt027876 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 01:26:01 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6S8PmV8017245; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 20:25:48 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6S8Plc04015; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 20:25:47 +1200 Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 20:25:47 +1200 Message-Id: <200307280825.h6S8Plc04015@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: kent@bbn.com, trevorf@windows.microsoft.com Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, michael@stroeder.com, RWEISER@trustdst.com Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: >I appreciate the clarification, but I am appalled by the suggestion that >people should construct ungainly CNs that will be hard for users to parse, or >that LDAP schema should be skewed to accommodate this lack of standards >compliance. PKIX, meet the real world. Actually I'd like to offer a small soapbox here on the out-of-touch-with- reality nature of many PKI-related RFCs, and the deleterious side-effects that this has when the RFC is applied in practice. For example there's an EDI messaging standard that had to do X (and also Y and Z, none of them related to verifying sigs after the cert has expired as per the recent thread), so they went to the appropriate RFCs, picked the way they wanted to do things, and wrote it into their standard. Since security always gets bolted on as an afterthought, the rest of the standard was in use for a year or two before anyone got around to looking at the security parts of it. At that point they discovered that nothing in existence implemented what they required (poor guys, they thought that MUST in the RFC implied that it'd be supported), and no vendor was interested in supporting it [0]. This situation is unfortunately all too common, with users (and in this case the WG chair) discovering that some feature discussed in an RFC as if it were a hard fact exists only in the imagination of the RFC author. What's more problematic is the case of RFC A relying on an imaginary feature of RFC B which in turn relies on an imaginary feature of RFC C. This is why, in stuff I write, I include extensive implementation notes with caveats such as "The standard says MUST X, but in practice no-one does it that way, so be prepared to encounter data which doesn't do X at all". A few years ago I started making a list of features in PKI RFCs, rated from 1-5 in terms of support in implementations, where 1 means "you can rely on it being present" and 5 means "don't bother", the idea being that users could consult it to see whether the feature they wanted was going to be available in the real world. I abandoned it after a while because (a) I didn't think I'd make many friends pointing out how little of what was in the RFCs was actually supported in practice and (b) there was a kind of geometric growth of features as you went further along the scale (i.e. from 1 to 5). So to sum up I really wish PKIX would at least make some attempt to approximate the real world. SSH for example has just had a poll of implementors/implementations to check for how to handle a new feature being added, with the primary goal being existing support for it and compatibility with current implementations. The PKIX approach in contrast seems to be to construct cloud castles, declare the problem solved, and then wonder why nothing does what the RFC says. Peter. [0] Actually I believe that there exists a single experimental/reference implemetation that does it, but I'm not sure who uses it in practice. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S7M1qt021112 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 00:22:01 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6S7M0lH021105 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 00:22:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S7Lwqt021065 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 00:21:59 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6S7L1V8016311; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 19:21:01 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6S7L0B03707; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 19:21:00 +1200 Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 19:21:00 +1200 Message-Id: <200307280721.h6S7L0B03707@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: aarsenau@bbn.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> "Al Arsenault" <aarsenau@bbn.com> writes: >This brings up what is to me an interesting question: exactly what service >do you think you're providing with this signature validation long after the >fact, Compliance with legal/contractual requirements. To given another example of this, I know of applications where the PKI software reads old stored CRLs off disk and checks the cert against them before every use because that's what the standard requires. It's complete bollocks, they're just going through the motions for form's sake, but that's what the standard requires, so that's what they do (the standard doesn't say "You must perform a sensible revocation/ validity check", it just says "You must check certs against a CRL", so that's what happens, even if it's one issued a month ago, and the cert has already been checked against it 873 times before). >and why do you think it's important? See above. >I can only think of about three reasons why one would want to do a signature >validation months after an order was signed: > > - as part of a business audit; > - as part of a dispute resolution process (e.g., a non-repudiation issue) > - because one's business processes were REALLLLY slow, and it just takes > that long to process an order. You forgot: - Because the standard/law/trading agreement says you need to do this in order to be compliant. Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S2ePqt002616 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 19:40:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6S2ePX1002615 for ietf-pkix-bks; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 19:40:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from [63.202.92.152] (adsl-63-202-92-152.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net [63.202.92.152]) (authenticated bits=0) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S2eMqu002610; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 19:40:22 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from phoffman@imc.org) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: phoffman@mail.imc.org Message-Id: <p05210608bb4a3d8bb11b@[63.202.92.152]> In-Reply-To: <16164.34587.472000.49821@gargle.gargle.HOWL> References: <16159.3300.836000.963854@gargle.gargle.HOWL> <000001c35329$dead74e0$c5aeadcf@augustcellars.local> <16164.34587.472000.49821@gargle.gargle.HOWL> X-Habeas-SWE-1: winter into spring X-Habeas-SWE-2: brightly anticipated X-Habeas-SWE-3: like Habeas SWE (tm) X-Habeas-SWE-4: Copyright 2002 Habeas (tm) X-Habeas-SWE-5: Sender Warranted Email (SWE) (tm). The sender of this X-Habeas-SWE-6: email in exchange for a license for this Habeas X-Habeas-SWE-7: warrant mark warrants that this is a Habeas Compliant X-Habeas-SWE-8: Message (HCM) and not spam. Please report use of this X-Habeas-SWE-9: mark in spam to <http://www.habeas.com/report>. Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2003 19:40:55 -0700 To: "Von Welch" <welch@mcs.anl.gov>, ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Paul Hoffman / IMC <phoffman@imc.org> Subject: RE: Draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-06.txt Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 9:14 PM -0500 7/27/03, Von Welch wrote: > Given that this document has passed last call and been sent to the >editor, I'm actually not sure what my ability is to make changes at >this point. You can always issue a new Internet Draft. Doing so is free. :-) --Paul Hoffman, Director --Internet Mail Consortium Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S2D9qt000512 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 19:13:09 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6S2D98B000511 for ietf-pkix-bks; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 19:13:09 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mcs.anl.gov (cliff.mcs.anl.gov [140.221.9.17]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S2D7qt000505 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 19:13:07 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from welch@mcs.anl.gov) Received: from VON-TP-T30 (terra.mcs.anl.gov [140.221.11.103]) by mcs.anl.gov (8.11.6/8.9.3) with ESMTP id h6S2Cst189756; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 21:12:55 -0500 X-Mailer: 21.4 (patch 11) "Native Windows TTY Support (Windows)" XEmacs Lucid (via feedmail 10 I); VM 7.07 under 21.4 (patch 11) "Native Windows TTY Support (Windows)" XEmacs Lucid From: "Von Welch" <welch@mcs.anl.gov> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <16164.34587.472000.49821@gargle.gargle.HOWL> Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2003 21:14:51 -0500 To: <jimsch@exmsft.com> Cc: "'pkix'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tuecke@mcs.anl.gov>, "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: RE: Draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-06.txt In-Reply-To: <000001c35329$dead74e0$c5aeadcf@augustcellars.local> References: <16159.3300.836000.963854@gargle.gargle.HOWL> <000001c35329$dead74e0$c5aeadcf@augustcellars.local> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Jim, Given that this document has passed last call and been sent to the editor, I'm actually not sure what my ability is to make changes at this point. You've pointed out one objective error in 4.1.3, which I will certainly try to correct. Your editoral suggestions I take note of and if it is possible to make changes easily will incorporate. You also suggestion some additions I feel we're past the point of making unless the community really feels they are necessary. One response to your comments below. Von Jim Schaad writes (20:56 July 25, 2003): > > > 7. Section 4.2: I have a complete lack of understanding > > for the last > three paragraphs in this section. > > > > These paragraphs are addressing whether or not the {extended} > > key usage extensions of it's issuer apply to it. It's really > > ugly because these extensions are really ugly (they are in > > part restrictions and in part capabilities), I'm not sure how > > to clarify this. > > Item #1. Remove all references to key usage and just leave the extended > key usage. For key usage, this text makes absolutely no sense. > > Item #2. I am not sure that I understand the justification for saying > the if you are independent, then you get to do anything you want, but if > otherwise you are restricted on what you can do. The issue that is being addressed here is that when a proxy is created that inherits some rights from the issuer (i.e., the policyLanguage is not independent) the {extended}keyUsage in the proxy certificate should be constrained by the {extended}keyUsage of its issuer - a proxy issuer shouldn't be able to grant to proxy certificate a right they don't have. It is an independent proxy, in which case our thinking is that it is no longer inheriting any rights from the issuer, so it can be treated as completely distinct. The issuer no longer matters in regards to authorization rights for the proxy, so this means the {extended}keyUsage constrains (which are really authorization) are now free to be anything the issuer wants. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S0Kpqt096077 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 17:20:51 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6S0Kp9o096076 for ietf-pkix-bks; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 17:20:51 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hotmail.com (law12-f97.law12.hotmail.com [64.4.19.97]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6S0Koqt096069 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 17:20:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from dotusadotnet@hotmail.com) Received: from mail pickup service by hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 17:20:48 -0700 Received: from 165.213.1.1 by lw12fd.law12.hotmail.msn.com with HTTP; Mon, 28 Jul 2003 00:20:48 GMT X-Originating-IP: [165.213.1.1] X-Originating-Email: [dotusadotnet@hotmail.com] From: "bonny joy" <dotusadotnet@hotmail.com> To: kent@bbn.com, joy.bonny@samsung.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 00:20:48 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed Message-ID: <Law12-F97hMOgRGkQ6m0000dec3@hotmail.com> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Jul 2003 00:20:48.0656 (UTC) FILETIME=[18590900:01C3549E] Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Dear Steve The PKUP does operate as you note, but the cert validity period is still present, and in the presence of the PKUP extension, this field is reinterpreted to state that after the notAfter date, the cert may no longer be used to verify any signature, period. That too is part of the reason for not encouraging use of PKUP, i.e., the need to reinterpret the cert validity field. This is my view The certificate can be used to verify the signature during the certificate validity period irrespective of the PKUP , for this reason certificate validity period should be present The signature should not be generated after or before the PKUP, since the private key validity period is different from the certificate validity period , this field should be present So why does a certificate processing part should get confused by seeing the 2 fields , those 2 fields are meant for different purposes, First check the signature has been created at the valid period ,then check the validity of the certificate. In the case of NR the validity of the certificate is not having any impact ,since the thrust is on PKUP. Regards Bonny _________________________________________________________________ They are beautiful. They are in danger. http://server1.msn.co.in/Slideshow/BeautyoftheBeast/index.asp Our four-legged friends. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6R8YUqt036981 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 01:34:30 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6R8YUxB036980 for ietf-pkix-bks; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 01:34:30 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from klapautius.it.su.se (as13-3-2.rny.s.bonet.se [217.215.166.49]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6R8YSqt036961 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 01:34:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from leifj@it.su.se) Received: from it.su.se (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by klapautius.it.su.se (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id h6R8VK104134 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 27 Jul 2003 10:31:21 +0200 Message-ID: <3F238DD8.8040209@it.su.se> Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2003 10:31:20 +0200 From: Leif Johansson <leifj@it.su.se> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) References: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> In-Reply-To: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.76.2.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> The fundamental problem (imo) is that pki confuses the address with the name in the current use of subject and issuer DN. Using multivalued "terminal" rdns for EE is as we all know the result of wanting to have a readable component (the name) along with a unique component (the "address"). The corresponding problem has been cropping up all over the ietf of late (for instance in the recent discussion on ipv6 multihoming). Speaking from the LDAP community my view is that the use of multivalued rdn's is as dead as the Dodo. Get over it. Cheers Leif Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6R1hCqt005556 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Sat, 26 Jul 2003 18:43:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6R1hCWN005555 for ietf-pkix-bks; Sat, 26 Jul 2003 18:43:12 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from e5.ny.us.ibm.com (e5.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.105]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6R1h9qt005515 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 26 Jul 2003 18:43:10 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from tgindin@us.ibm.com) Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.150]) by e5.ny.us.ibm.com (8.12.9/8.12.2) with ESMTP id h6R1gm4X159394; Sat, 26 Jul 2003 21:42:49 -0400 Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01av02.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.216]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.12.9/NCO/VER6.5) with ESMTP id h6R1gcNb051774; Sat, 26 Jul 2003 21:42:38 -0400 To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Cc: d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk, ietf-pkix@imc.org, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 5.0.11 July 24, 2002 From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> Message-ID: <OF703B184E.C4283DD3-ON85256D6E.007FDA3F-85256D70.0009610B@us.ibm.com> Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2003 21:42:35 -0400 X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 6.0.1 w/SPRs JHEG5JQ5CD, THTO5KLVS6, JHEG5HMLFK, JCHN5K5PG9|March 27, 2003) at 07/26/2003 21:42:48, Serialize complete at 07/26/2003 21:42:48 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> If this is likely to become official, I think the last sentence needs more work in order to let RP authors know what they should do, as well as what they may. If the RP requires authoritative proof of the time at which the document was signed, it SHOULD reject the signature unless the signature itself is referenced by a time-stamped document signed by a certificate which has not expired, especially a time stamp created by a TSA (see RFC 3161). If the RP requires authoritative proof of the certificate's not having been revoked, it SHOULD NOT consider the absence of an expired certificate from a CRL which would otherwise cover it as evidence that the certificate was not revoked unless the CRL was issued prior to the expiration of the certificate. Tom Gindin Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> 07/25/2003 01:45 PM To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) cc: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS, d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? At 21:02 +1200 7/25/03, Peter Gutmann wrote: >Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> writes: > > The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from notBefore > through notAfter, inclusive. When an RP is validating the signature on a > document which claims to have been signed or produced at a given past time, > the RP SHOULD proceed with the verification of the signature if that time is > within the validity period even though the time of verification is outside > it. If the RP requires authoritative proof either of the time at which the > document was signed or of the certificate's not having been revoked, it MAY > reject the signature. > >That works for me. Russ, any chance of getting this added to bride-of-3280? > >Peter. Peter, Also, when we have SCVP in place, it make explicit provision for asking the "was it valid then" question, which would address this problem. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6Q4flqt008280 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 21:41:47 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6Q4flKM008279 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 21:41:47 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6Q4fjqt008273 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 21:41:45 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6Q4fUs1026253; Sat, 26 Jul 2003 16:41:30 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6Q4dnk20059; Sat, 26 Jul 2003 16:39:49 +1200 Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2003 16:39:49 +1200 Message-Id: <200307260439.h6Q4dnk20059@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: kent@bbn.com, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk, ietf-pkix@imc.org, tgindin@us.ibm.com Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: >Also, when we have SCVP in place, it make explicit provision for asking the >"was it valid then" question, which would address this problem. Right, but as with timestamping the penetration of this is going to be minimal enough that it won't help most people who need to do long-term signature verification, which is why the paragraph would provide useful guidance to those who don't have TSP/SCVP/etc. Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6Q3trqt006675 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 20:55:53 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6Q3trla006674 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 20:55:53 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp2.pacifier.net (smtp2.pacifier.net [64.255.237.172]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6Q3tpqt006667 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 20:55:51 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jimsch@nwlink.com) Received: from ROMANS (ip197.174-173-207.eli-du.nwlink.com [207.173.174.197]) by smtp2.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E83D6B3B1; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 20:55:48 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: <jimsch@exmsft.com> From: "Jim Schaad" <jimsch@nwlink.com> To: "'Von Welch'" <welch@mcs.anl.gov>, <jimsch@exmsft.com> Cc: "'pkix'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tuecke@mcs.anl.gov>, "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: RE: Draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-06.txt Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 20:56:13 -0700 Message-ID: <000001c35329$dead74e0$c5aeadcf@augustcellars.local> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2627 Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <16159.3300.836000.963854@gargle.gargle.HOWL> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Von, Comments below. I was working from what I downloaded before I got on the plane to fly back, so I was a couple of days out of date, but I just reviewed the deltas to the -07 version. I don't see any problems with added or removed text between -06 and -07. > -----Original Message----- > From: Von Welch [mailto:welch@mcs.anl.gov] > Sent: Wednesday, July 23, 2003 3:32 PM > > Jim, > > Comments below. We released version -07 that crossed your > email by the way, but with one exception noted below all your > questions still apply. > > Von > > Jim Schaad writes (16:01 July 23, 2003): > > > > > 3. General: I am still not comfortable that the issuance > of Proxy > Certificates cannot be restricted (or permitted) > by a CA when it issues > an EEC. One method of doing this > would be a non-critical ProxyCertInfo > extension with a > pCPathLengthConstrant of 0 in the EEC. > > I really dislike your suggested method because that would > make the presence of a ProxyCertInfo extension ambiguous - > right now it designates a certificate is a proxy certificate. > *IF* this is something that people think is critical, I > believe another extension should be defined to be placed into > an EEC to prohibit it from issuing proxy certificates. I have no objections to using a different method for dealing with this. I was just trying to come up with a method that made minimal changes to the document as it currently stands. > > > 4. Section 2.6: When creating a new PC, where and how is > the > negotiations on policy language and policy done? > Should this be > documented as a separate step in the text > describing how PCs are > obtained/issued? Does something > need to be done about potentially > asking the relying party > as to what policy it requires to perform some > task? > > Since it is not always possible to even know who all the > relying parties potentially are when a proxy certificate is > issued it's not really possible to negotiate this. Our view > is that the set of polices used in a particular environment > will be established out of band in the environment. I can understand the position that the policyLanguage is going to need to be fixed by the environment. I think that some text could be added here about the fact that generally the ProxyCertExtension would be filled out by the proxy agent and needs to be checked by the PI. It might be useful in the steps to be explicit about which entity performs each step. > > > 5. Section 3.8.2: I find the following text > > > > Note that this > > verification MUST take place regardless of whether or > not the PC > > itself contains a policy, as other PCs in the signing > chain MAY > > contain conditions that MUST be verified. > > > > to be confusing because I always get policyLanguage and policy > > mixed up. I think that all PCs must have policy and so > the statement is > difficult to parse. I don't know that > this can be simplified without > renaming the policy field > in the extension. > > I think this statement is from when polices were optional and > impersonation was implied otherwise. If it causes real > heartburn I believe it can be removed at this point as it > doesn't add anything. Yes, I would like this sentence removed because it is not helpful. > > > The text in item 1) just > > before this refers to policy and should probably refer to > > policyLanguage. > > I don't think this would be correct - as understanding the > policy implies understanding the policy language in which it > is written, so the change doesn't add anything, and a relying > party need to understand not just the language, but the policy itself. How about changing " interpret the policy " to "interpret the proxy policy" in item #1 > > > 7. Section 4.2: I have a complete lack of understanding > for the last > three paragraphs in this section. > > These paragraphs are addressing whether or not the {extended} > key usage extensions of it's issuer apply to it. It's really > ugly because these extensions are really ugly (they are in > part restrictions and in part capabilities), I'm not sure how > to clarify this. Item #1. Remove all references to key usage and just leave the extended key usage. For key usage, this text makes absolutely no sense. Item #2. I am not sure that I understand the justification for saying the if you are independent, then you get to do anything you want, but if otherwise you are restricted on what you can do. > > > > 9. > > > > Is there more that should appear here? I don't see any item #9 based on a fast scan of the document. I think I just missed clearing this out since I did not add a signature to the end of the message either. > > - end comments - > Jim Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PNnEqt096555 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 16:49:14 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6PNnELD096554 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 16:49:14 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail-dub.microsoft.com ([213.199.128.160]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PNnCqt096549 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 16:49:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from stefans@microsoft.com) Received: from dub-imc-01.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.196.35]) by mail-dub.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.5329); Sat, 26 Jul 2003 00:49:13 +0100 Received: from 65.53.196.35 by dub-imc-01.europe.corp.microsoft.com (InterScan E-Mail VirusWall NT); Sat, 26 Jul 2003 00:49:13 +0100 Received: from EUR-MSG-03.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.192.44]) by dub-imc-01.europe.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.5329); Sat, 26 Jul 2003 00:49:13 +0100 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5.6940.0 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2003 00:48:56 +0100 Message-ID: <0C3042E92D8A714783E2C44AB9936E1D359C08@EUR-MSG-03.europe.corp.microsoft.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt Thread-Index: AcNS7IMBdH3O3gUAQj6LkFPIOmkr1QAF3OvA From: "Stefan Santesson" <stefans@microsoft.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 25 Jul 2003 23:49:13.0159 (UTC) FILETIME=[59B7A570:01C35307] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6PNnDqt096550 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> All, As reminder for you who were in Vienna, and as info for those who weren't, here is what is changed from draft 0. 1) postalAddress has been removed from the list of subject naming attributes that must be understood as part of the subjects identity. The reasons are mainly to align with RFC 3280 who doesn't support postalAddress. To my knowledge there are further no use of this attribute in the context of RFC 3039 that would motivate its presence there despite its structure and non-support by RFC 3280. 2) Text concerning key usage has been further clarified. The old RFC 3039 requirement on having NR exclusive when set (SHOULD requirement) was removed in draft 00. Even though that requirement may be reasonable in many cases, there is no context in RFC 3039 where this could be generally stated. The ongoing profiling work in ETSI aims at including this requirement in the ETSI Qualified Certificates profile where there IS a context for its definition. 3) text describing the scope of the qcStatements extension has been updated with a more generic wording. If anyone needs, I can send a comparison document, showing the exact changes. Open issues (except feedback on changes above): Should the removal of postalAddress from the listed attributes (MUST implement) in the subject filed could motivate a version number update in the predefined compliance declaration in the qcStatements extension. I have not done that update because a) I'm not sure it is needed, and b) I'm not sure whether that declaration is even used by anyone. This work is synchronized with the ongoing efforts in ETSI. In order to keep the time table in ETSI (ready by febr 04) I would stress that the ambition is to be ready for WG last call by Minneapolis. So please, those who care about this work, be active now and don't wait until WG last call :-) /Stefan -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Sent: den 25 juli 2003 21:29 Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:Qualified Certificates Profile Author(s) : S. Santesson, M. Nystrom Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt Pages : 35 Date : 2003-7-25 This document forms a certificate profile, based on RFC 3280, for dentity certificates issued to physical persons. The goal of this document is to define a general syntax independent of local legal requirements. The profile is however designed to allow further profiling in order to meet specific local needs. The profile defines specific conventions for certificates that are qualified within a defined legal framework, named Qualified Certificates. The profile does however not define any legal requirements for such Qualified Certificates. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PLWQqt088423 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 14:32:26 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6PLWQsa088422 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 14:32:26 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from asgard.ietf.org (asgard.ietf.org [132.151.6.40]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PLWPqt088417 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 14:32:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from apache@asgard.ietf.org) Received: from apache by asgard.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.14) id 19g9UH-0001uQ-C2; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 16:48:25 -0400 From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> To: IETF-Announce:; Cc: Internet Architecture Board <iab@iab.org>, RFC Editor <rfc-editor@isi.edu>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Document Action: 'Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework' to an Informational RFC Message-Id: <E19g9UH-0001uQ-C2@asgard.ietf.org> Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 16:48:25 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> The IESG has approved the Internet-Draft 'Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework' <draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-new-rfc2527-02.txt> as an Informational RFC. This document is the product of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group. The IESG contact person is Housley, Russ. Thank you, The IESG Secretary Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PJSjqt080698 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 12:28:45 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6PJSjrA080697 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 12:28:45 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PJSiqt080689 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 12:28:44 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA17906; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 15:28:41 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307251928.PAA17906@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-02.txt Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 15:28:41 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : LDAPv3 DN strings for use with PKIs Author(s) : D. Chadwick Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-02.txt Pages : 0 Date : 2003-7-25 RFC 2253 [2] standardises a set of strings that can be used to represent attribute types in LDAP distinguished names. This list is does not cover the full set of attribute types used in the distinguished names of issuers and subjects in public key certificates. This document standardises the strings needed for these additional attribute types. It also defines the Permanent Identifier attribute type which may be used to identify objects. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-02.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-02.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-02.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-25152228.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-02.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-02.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-25152228.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PJSgqt080684 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 12:28:42 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6PJSgqw080683 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 12:28:42 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PJSeqt080673 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 12:28:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA17890; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 15:28:37 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307251928.PAA17890@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 15:28:37 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:Qualified Certificates Profile Author(s) : S. Santesson, M. Nystrom Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt Pages : 35 Date : 2003-7-25 This document forms a certificate profile, based on RFC 3280, for dentity certificates issued to physical persons. The goal of this document is to define a general syntax independent of local legal requirements. The profile is however designed to allow further profiling in order to meet specific local needs. The profile defines specific conventions for certificates that are qualified within a defined legal framework, named Qualified Certificates. The profile does however not define any legal requirements for such Qualified Certificates. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-25152216.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-01.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-25152216.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PHmuqt073701 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:48:56 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6PHmu01073700 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:48:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PHmtqt073694 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:48:55 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6PHmcDB004801; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 13:48:41 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p0521060bbb471d1f9745@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <200307250902.h6P92b815373@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> References: <200307250902.h6P92b815373@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 13:45:54 -0400 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, tgindin@us.ibm.com, d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk, ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 21:02 +1200 7/25/03, Peter Gutmann wrote: >Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> writes: > > The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from notBefore > through notAfter, inclusive. When an RP is validating the signature on a > document which claims to have been signed or produced at a given past time, > the RP SHOULD proceed with the verification of the signature if that time is > within the validity period even though the time of verification is outside > it. If the RP requires authoritative proof either of the time at which the > document was signed or of the certificate's not having been revoked, it MAY > reject the signature. > >That works for me. Russ, any chance of getting this added to bride-of-3280? > >Peter. Peter, Also, when we have SCVP in place, it make explicit provision for asking the "was it valid then" question, which would address this problem. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PHmiqt073692 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:48:44 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6PHmiMq073691 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:48:44 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PHmhqt073679 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:48:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6PHmcD9004801; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 13:48:39 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p0521060abb471c9075b7@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <179AD8AE7850564592F43D22436DEBB40288AC3B@swcem.swcenter.sec.samsung.co.k r> References: <179AD8AE7850564592F43D22436DEBB40288AC3B@swcem.swcenter.sec.samsung.co.k r> Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 13:44:51 -0400 To: bonny <joy.bonny@samsung.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="============_-1152967151==_ma============" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --============_-1152967151==_ma============ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" At 12:25 +0900 7/25/03, bonny wrote: >Dear Steve > > > >The following are my comments for your views > > > >only in the context of post facto evaluation for NR purposes is it > >likely to be applicable > > > >Yeah I agreed to this > > > > > > > >it embodies the notion that we can declare that a signature > >generated with a private key expires at a future date, relative to >NR concerns. this is not a good match for many real world contexts >on which NR is an issue,e.g., my wet signature does not expire >although an agreement may have a limited lifespan. > > > > > > > >With the PKUP field we r assuring that the signatures should only be >created within the validity period of the private key.That doesn't >mean the signatures are not valid after the validity of the period. > > > >So how does PKUP creates the notion , we can declare that a signature > >generated with a private key expires at a future date.It only >suggests that no more signatures cant be generated. > The PKUP does operate as you note, but the cert validity period is still present, and in the presence of the PKUP extension, this field is reinterpreted to state that after the notAfter date, the cert may no longer be used to verify any signature, period. That too is part of the reason for not encouraging use of PKUP, i.e., the need to reinterpret the cert validity field. Steve --============_-1152967151==_ma============ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" <!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN"> <html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 } --></style><title>RE: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated?</title></head><body> <div>At 12:25 +0900 7/25/03, bonny wrote:</div> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1">Dear Steve</font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"> </font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1">The following are my comments for your views</font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"> </font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"><i>only</i></font><i> in the context of post facto evaluation for NR purposes is it</i><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"><i>likely</i></font><i> to be applicable</i><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"> </font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1">Yeah I agreed to this</font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"> </font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"> </font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"> </font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"><i>it</i></font><i> embodies the notion that we can declare that a signature</i><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"><i>generated</i></font><i> with a private key expires at a future date, relative to NR concerns. this is not a good match for many real world contexts on which NR is an issue,e.g., my wet signature does not expire although an agreement may have a limited lifespan.</i><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"> </font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"> </font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"> </font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1">With the PKUP field we r assuring that the signatures should only be created within the validity period of the private key.That doesn't mean the signatures are not valid after the validity of the period.</font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1"> </font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1">So how does PKUP creates the notion , we can declare that a signature</font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Courier New" size="-1">generated</font> with a private key expires at a future date.It only suggests that no more signatures cant be generated.<br> </blockquote> <div><font face="Courier New" size="-1"><br></font></div> <div>The PKUP does operate as you note, but the cert validity period is still present, and in the presence of the PKUP extension, this field is reinterpreted to state that after the notAfter date, the cert may no longer be used to verify any signature, period. That too is part of the reason for not encouraging use of PKUP, i.e., the need to reinterpret the cert validity field.</div> <div><br></div> <div>Steve</div> </body> </html> --============_-1152967151==_ma============-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PHYaqt073221 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:34:37 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6PHYanQ073220 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:34:36 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from imr5.us.db.com (imr5.us.db.com [160.83.65.196]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PHYZqt073215 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:34:36 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from frank.balluffi@db.com) Received: from sdbo1005.db.com by imr5.us.db.com id h6PHYZ8i029432; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 13:34:36 -0400 (EDT) Subject: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt To: ietf-pkix@imc.org X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 5.0.8 June 18, 2001 Message-ID: <OF49EF6F56.960A9E9D-ON85256D6E.00604830@db.com> From: "Frank Balluffi" <frank.balluffi@db.com> Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 13:34:32 -0400 X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on sdbo1005/DBNA/DeuBaInt/DeuBa(Release 5.0.9a |January 7, 2002) at 07/25/2003 01:34:36 PM MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I reviewed draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt and have the following comments, many of which are typos related to earlier draft changes. The following numbering scheme is used: section[/paragraph[/sentence]] general comment: scope of extensions CVRequest's reqExtensions and CVResponse's respExtensions pertain to the entire request and response. A CVRequest has one Query containing queryExtensions. So queryExtensions really pertain to the entire request (not to an individual queriedCerts item), yet a CVResponse may have many certReplyExtensions elements (not certReplyExtensions items), each of which pertains to a CertReply (not the entire response). [Take deep breath.] One might describe this as an impedance mismatch. BTW, this characteristic goes back to early drafts. One possible "solution" would be to add a type named something like CertRequest and move queryExtensions from Query to CertRequest. For example: Query ::= SEQUENCE { queriedCerts SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertRequest, -- Was CertReference. ... revInfos [5] RevocationInfos OPTIONAL -- queryExtensions was moved to CertRequest. } CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { certReference CertReference, certRequestExtensions [1] Extensions OPTIONAL -- Was Query's queryExtensions. } I think I got that right. 1.3/2/3 nit: I would insert "are" before "likely". 3/1 "SCVPRequest" should be "CVRequest". 3/3/1 I think I understand the use of certValRequest, but because it is not defined, it might confuse some readers. For me, the following ContentInfo adds confusion, not clarity: ContentInfo { contentType id-ct-scvp-certValRequest, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.10) content CVRequest } As page 6 shows ContentInfo containing SignedData (or AuthenticatedData) containing EncapsulatedContentInfo containing OCTET STRING containing CVRequest, which is very clear, but a little different. For reference, RFC 2630 says: ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { contentType ContentType, content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType } EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { eContentType ContentType, eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } This comment also applies to section 4. 3.2/2 nit: CertChecks and WantBack defintions (unnecessary level of indirection) Because CertChecks and WantBack only appear one time in the ASN.1 module, why not just put SEQUENCE ... OF ... in Query. This is how Query's queriedCerts is defined. 3.2/2: The body of the document shows Query's valPolicy element as mandatory, yet the ASN.1 module (section 8) shows the element as OPTIONAL. 3.2.1 nit: lots of CHOICEs CertReference's use of three CHOICEs is a lot of work. How about: CertReference ::= CHOICE { cert [1] Certificate, pkcRef [2] ESSCertID, attrCert [3] AttributeCertificate, acRef [4] ESSCertID } RevocationInfo uses this technique for two types of CLRs. 3.2.2/2 clarity I do not understand "Revocation status checking inherently includes ..." Does this mean path validation includes path building, and revocation status checking includes path building and path validation? I believe that revocation status checking is a superset of path validation is a superset of path building. This needs to be "spelled out" very clearly. 3.2.3/1 clarity If I understand this correctly, you might want to add that each wantBack item applies to all queriedCerts items. 3.2.5.1/1/2 typo: "use to" should be "to" or "to use to". 3.2.5.1/2 typo: KeyPurposeID should be KeyPurposeId (note case). 3.2.5.1/3/1: typo: "sting" should be "string". 3.2.5.2/2/1: typo: "Name mismatch" should be "NameMismatch". 3.2.5.2/4: typo: "KeyPurposeID" should be KeyPurposeId". 3.2.5.2/5: typo: "and empty" should be "an empty". 3.2.6/1/3: typo: "the using" should be "the checks using". 3.2.6/2: nit: "expressed Greenwich" should be "expressed in Greenwich". This comment also applies to section 4.2. 3.2.7/3 inclusion of trust anchor in response I am surprised that the certifiation path MUST NOT include the trust anchor. I recognize the efficiency of this, but am concerned about the ability to audit a system using this technique. If a client sends more than one trust anchor in its request, how easy is it for an auditor to determine which trust anchor was used? I would expect the server to send the client a path which includes the trust anchor and for the client to log the "complete" path. Am I missing something? 3.2.10/1/5 typo: "and each of extension" should read "and each extension". 4.3 What is the difference between badSignature and invalidSignature? Status code 12 is not described. The description of status code 23 includes the no-longer-used type RequestSignature. 4.4 The heading "requestReference" should be "requestRef". 4.4.1 Why define HashValue when lots of developers already have implementations of PKCS #1 DigestInfo? 4.4.2/2 typo: "PSRequest" should be "CVRequest". 4.5 typo: The heading "Requestor" should be "requestor". 4.7/2/1 nit: "for each queriedCerts item" might be clearer than "for each Query item". 4.7.5 The heading "replyWantBack" should be "replyWantBacks". This also occurs in the first paragraph. 4.7.6 confusion If a server uses the default validation policy, how can it comply with the following: "The valPolicy value MUST NOT be id-svp-defaultValPolicy." CertReply's valPolicy is mandatory. 4.7.8/1/2 typo: "singleReplyExtensions" should be "certReplyExtensions". 8 The ASN.1 module needs to import CertificateList and OCSPResponse -- I validated it using a compiler. Appendix B nit: Does not include descriptions for validation policies request and response. Frank -- This e-mail may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient (or have received this e-mail in error) please notify the sender immediately and destroy this e-mail. Any unauthorized copying, disclosure or distribution of the material in this e-mail is strictly forbidden. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PHNtqt072908 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:23:55 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6PHNtOl072907 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:23:55 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6PHNsqt072902 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:23:54 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6PHNcD9003067; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 13:23:38 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210605bb471140cee9@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD341851F@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> References: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD341851F@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 13:20:13 -0400 To: "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: <RWEISER@trustdst.com>, Michael =?iso-8859-1?Q?Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 15:02 -0700 7/24/03, Trevor Freeman wrote: >Hi Steve, >First off, I am simply providing feedback as to what people do in >real deployments. So far the deployments I have seen are effective >at meeting the needs of the organisations without braking existing >applications. Personally I am mystified as to how adding an >arbitrary number to a name helps a user. Every time I have seen an >example of such a multi-valued RDN, they look pretty ugly to me. To >be widely adopted, a standard has to be a realistic solution to the >problem at hand. > >Trevor > We obviously have different experiences. For example, the DoD PKI decided to avoid a terminal RDN SET and as a result the CN is of the form "John Smith 123457678901" which qualifies as ugly in my book. An organization typically identifies employees/students/members by name and ID number, which maps naturally to a terminal RDN set of CN + Serial #. I don't understand your comment: "Personally I am mystified as to how adding an arbitrary number to a name helps a user." The issue is that organizations make user names unique by assigning such numbers, and have for decades. Thus if we are to minimize the impact on an organization's existing naming practices, we need to be able to accommodate names that have these two components. For users, the goal is to make the name presented to them as natural as possible. Separating the two components using the appropriate attributes provides an application with opportunities to do this, whereas gluing the two attributes together into the CN makes that very hard, since it may not be easy to determine where the real common name ends and the ID number or equivalent string, starts. So, from my perspective, a terminal RDN SET is precisely a realistic solution to the problem at hand, except for the refusal of at least one major vendor to follow standards and support this solution. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6P9kPqt029478 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 02:46:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6P9kPFY029477 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 02:46:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from fw.chttl.com.tw (gate.chttl.com.tw [202.39.157.254]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6P9kMqt029430 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 02:46:23 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from wcwang@cht.com.tw) Received: from ms7.chttl.com.tw (ms7 [10.144.2.117]) by fw.chttl.com.tw (8.12.9/8.11.6) with ESMTP id h6P9jOe7020340; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 17:45:24 +0800 (CST) Received: (from root@localhost) by ms7.chttl.com.tw (8.12.3/8.12.1) id h6P9kANq003283; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 17:46:10 +0800 Received: from wcwang ([10.144.133.79]) by ms7.chttl.com.tw (8.12.3/8.12.1) with SMTP id h6P9k8XJ003157; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 17:46:09 +0800 Message-ID: <013201c35291$7f8935a0$4f85900a@wcwang> From: "Wen-Cheng Wang" <wcwang@cht.com.tw> To: "Masaki SHIMAOKA" <shimaoka@secom.ne.jp>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <200307031532.LAA16682@ietf.org> <20030722191927.CD43.SHIMAOKA@secom.ne.jp> Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 17:45:35 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-scanner: scanned by Inflex 1.0.10 - (http://pldaniels.com/inflex/) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> > > 1. path building over http > [snip] > IMHO, path building over http may be achieved using cAIssuers > accessMethod in AIA extension, but it only describes single path like > strict hierarchy. Not exactly so, if we let caIssuers accessMethod be a HTTP URI points to a PKCS#7 wrapped certificate list which contains all cross-certificates issued to the issuer of the nominated certificate, there is no problem to traverse the whole cross-certification network. However, AIA-assisted path building only supports forward direction (I mean "from the target certificate to a trusted root" as defined by the draft.). ----- Wen-Cheng Wang Project Researcher Telecommunication Laboratories Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6P933qt023869 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 02:03:03 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6P933HX023868 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 02:03:03 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6P931qt023847 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 02:03:02 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6P92hs1010958; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 21:02:43 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6P92b815373; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 21:02:37 +1200 Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 21:02:37 +1200 Message-Id: <200307250902.h6P92b815373@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, tgindin@us.ibm.com Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk, ietf-pkix@imc.org, kent@bbn.com Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> writes: The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from notBefore through notAfter, inclusive. When an RP is validating the signature on a document which claims to have been signed or produced at a given past time, the RP SHOULD proceed with the verification of the signature if that time is within the validity period even though the time of verification is outside it. If the RP requires authoritative proof either of the time at which the document was signed or of the certificate's not having been revoked, it MAY reject the signature. That works for me. Russ, any chance of getting this added to bride-of-3280? Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6P7g9qt012800 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 00:42:09 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6P7g8ad012799 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 00:42:08 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6P7g6qt012789 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 00:42:07 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6P7g0s1009528; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 19:42:00 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6P7g0014851; Fri, 25 Jul 2003 19:42:00 +1200 Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 19:42:00 +1200 Message-Id: <200307250742.h6P7g0014851@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, michael@stroeder.com, RWEISER@trustdst.com, trevorf@windows.microsoft.com Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> writes: >The scope for applications not doing the right thing in the presence of a >multi-valued RDN is pretty big. Fore example, there is a large body of >applications who extract subsets of data from the DN such as only using the >common name in UI which will ignore subsequent values of the RDN. Yup, that's what I've found too, which is why I sent my earlier "Don't do that, then" response to Michael Stroeder. I haven't exhaustively enumerated all the different behaviours, which app does what, and which version of which app does what, but it ranges from ignoring everything but a small fixed set of DN components (C, O, OU, locality, state, and obviously DN) to accepting most components but not allowing duplicates (e.g. 2 x OU) to accepting dups but not multi-valued AVAs. Then the definition of "accept" varies from reading and discarding (writing it out again removes the value), reading but ignoring (writing retains the value), displaying or not displaying, etc etc etc. This is why, in writeups I've done like "PKI: Not dead just resting" I recommend that for maximum usability people treat DNs as random blobs and don't try and do anything fancy with them. The further you depart from that, the more pain you're in for. >Therefore Microsoft's lack of support for multi-valued RDN with AD is the tip >of the iceberg and anyone insisting on using them will have a lot of >regression testing to perform. Exactly. The range of options runs from the simplest possible DNs (C, O, OU, etc) treated as blobs through to complex DNs, multi-AVA RDNs, etc etc, and then relying on each component to work properly, with a corresponding increase in pain level from 0 to infinity along the same scale. Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OMvkqt080632 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:57:46 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OMvkPA080631 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:57:46 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from bach.digsigtrust.com (host65-54.digsigtrust.com [208.30.65.54]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OMviqt080625 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:57:44 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from RWEISER@trustdst.com) Received: from smtp.digsigtrust.com by smtp1.digsigtrust.com with ESMTP id h6OMvfO15724; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 16:57:41 -0600 (MDT) From: RWEISER@trustdst.com Received: from DL21064 (slip-32-102-122-152.ut.us.prserv.net [32.102.122.152]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp.digsigtrust.com (8.12.6/8.12.6) with ESMTP id h6OMs2I4022659; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 16:54:03 -0600 (MDT) Message-ID: <003301c35236$fb14c5a0$987a6620@DL21064> To: "Stephen Kent" <kent@bbn.com> Cc: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <p05210600bb44d06f5e06@[128.89.89.40]> <3F1FAB4A.3070104@stroeder.com> <008301c35203$8f684260$9409e00a@DL21064> <3F200FBE.60304@stroeder.com> <00d501c35214$e1ae83c0$9409e00a@DL21064> <p05210602bb45fd229e66@[128.89.89.75]> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 16:57:31 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Steve, I was just trying to understand things, It wasn't clear form the minute what was the issue give that I wasn't at the meeting. cheers RFW ----- Original Message ----- From: "Stephen Kent" <kent@bbn.com> To: <RWEISER@trustdst.com> Cc: "Michael Ströder" <michael@stroeder.com>; <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2003 3:17 PM Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs > > At 12:53 -0600 7/24/03, RWEISER@trustdst.com wrote: > >Ah but it is on the directory side of things when we create the directory > >entry the 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709 is a > >multi name attribute. I can either search for Russel F Weiser and get > >multiple entries for Russel F Weiser. Or if I formulation the LDAP search as > >0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709+CN = Russel F > >Weiser > >I will get that exact entry only. > >I am just trying to understand what the discussion was about. > >Several years ago when I was looking at all this I tried to get CAs to > >create DNs that were Mutlivalued RDNs but none of the CAs would do this. So > >I just made the directory do it when we published the certificate into the > >directory. > >This allowed me to perform name uniqueness without searching the directory > >prior to signing a certificate. > >cheers > >RFW > > > > The discussion is not about multiple names for a directory entry, but > multiple attributes within a SET within a DN, especially the terminal > RDN. > > Steve > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OM2Lqt076192 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:02:21 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OM2L8Q076191 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:02:21 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail3.microsoft.com (mail3.microsoft.com [131.107.3.123]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OM2Kqt076185 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:02:20 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from trevorf@windows.microsoft.com) Received: from INET-VRS-03.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.5.27]) by mail3.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:02:17 -0700 Received: from 157.54.8.155 by INET-VRS-03.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (InterScan E-Mail VirusWall NT); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:02:17 -0700 Received: from red-imc-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.9.107]) by inet-hub-04.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:02:16 -0700 Received: from win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.0.39]) by red-imc-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:02:16 -0700 Received: from WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.12.81]) by win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:02:15 -0700 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5.6944.0 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:02:38 -0700 Message-ID: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD341851F@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Thread-Index: AcNSKiSynk/MZ3JPRASCF7+lIkZ47QAAtOwg From: "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> To: "Stephen Kent" <kent@bbn.com> Cc: <RWEISER@trustdst.com>, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 24 Jul 2003 22:02:15.0421 (UTC) FILETIME=[3E08CAD0:01C3522F] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6OM2Kqt076187 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi Steve, First off, I am simply providing feedback as to what people do in real deployments. So far the deployments I have seen are effective at meeting the needs of the organisations without braking existing applications. Personally I am mystified as to how adding an arbitrary number to a name helps a user. Every time I have seen an example of such a multi-valued RDN, they look pretty ugly to me. To be widely adopted, a standard has to be a realistic solution to the problem at hand. Trevor -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2003 2:20 PM To: Trevor Freeman Cc: RWEISER@trustdst.com; Michael Ströder; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) At 13:40 -0700 7/24/03, Trevor Freeman wrote: >Yes there is a difference between a DN with multiple RDNs which is >what you depict and an individual RDN having multiple values. Most >commonly used applications like SSL and SMIME don't use the DN but >used other name types such as DNS or email so the presence of >multi-valued RDNs is benign. > >IE is a case in point where it only processes a single value (the >common name) from the DN and only then if there is no DNS name in >the subject alt name. Therefore I can readily believe in that case, >no problem was found when testing with multi-valued RDN's. > >The scope for applications not doing the right thing in the presence >of a multi-valued RDN is pretty big. Fore example, there is a large >body of applications who extract subsets of data from the DN such as >only using the common name in UI which will ignore subsequent values >of the RDN. Therefore Microsoft's lack of support for multi-valued >RDN with AD is the tip of the iceberg and anyone insisting on using >them will have a lot of regression testing to perform. This is why >typically the more pragmatic solution is to simply append some data >to the sting used for the common name to make the CN unique. > >Trevor > Trevor, I appreciate the clarification, but I am appalled by the suggestion that people should construct ungainly CNs that will be hard for users to parse, or that LDAP schema should be skewed to accommodate this lack of standards compliance. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OLODqt073817 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 14:24:13 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OLOCmt073816 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 14:24:12 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OLOBqt073811 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 14:24:11 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6OLO8D9005737; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 17:24:08 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210603bb45fda9bde1@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD341851B@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> References: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD341851B@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 17:20:12 -0400 To: "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: <RWEISER@trustdst.com>, Michael =?iso-8859-1?Q?Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 13:40 -0700 7/24/03, Trevor Freeman wrote: >Yes there is a difference between a DN with multiple RDNs which is >what you depict and an individual RDN having multiple values. Most >commonly used applications like SSL and SMIME don't use the DN but >used other name types such as DNS or email so the presence of >multi-valued RDNs is benign. > >IE is a case in point where it only processes a single value (the >common name) from the DN and only then if there is no DNS name in >the subject alt name. Therefore I can readily believe in that case, >no problem was found when testing with multi-valued RDN's. > >The scope for applications not doing the right thing in the presence >of a multi-valued RDN is pretty big. Fore example, there is a large >body of applications who extract subsets of data from the DN such as >only using the common name in UI which will ignore subsequent values >of the RDN. Therefore Microsoft's lack of support for multi-valued >RDN with AD is the tip of the iceberg and anyone insisting on using >them will have a lot of regression testing to perform. This is why >typically the more pragmatic solution is to simply append some data >to the sting used for the common name to make the CN unique. > >Trevor > Trevor, I appreciate the clarification, but I am appalled by the suggestion that people should construct ungainly CNs that will be hard for users to parse, or that LDAP schema should be skewed to accommodate this lack of standards compliance. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OLJbqt073697 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 14:19:37 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OLJblL073696 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 14:19:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OLJaqt073690 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 14:19:36 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [128.89.89.75] (dhcp89-089-075.bbn.com [128.89.89.75]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6OLJLDB005416; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 17:19:22 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po2.bbn.com Message-Id: <p05210602bb45fd229e66@[128.89.89.75]> In-Reply-To: <00d501c35214$e1ae83c0$9409e00a@DL21064> References: <p05210600bb44d06f5e06@[128.89.89.40]> <3F1FAB4A.3070104@stroeder.com> <008301c35203$8f684260$9409e00a@DL21064> <3F200FBE.60304@stroeder.com> <00d501c35214$e1ae83c0$9409e00a@DL21064> Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 17:17:20 -0400 To: RWEISER@trustdst.com From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs Cc: Michael =?iso-8859-1?Q?Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 12:53 -0600 7/24/03, RWEISER@trustdst.com wrote: >Ah but it is on the directory side of things when we create the directory >entry the 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709 is a >multi name attribute. I can either search for Russel F Weiser and get >multiple entries for Russel F Weiser. Or if I formulation the LDAP search as >0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709+CN = Russel F >Weiser >I will get that exact entry only. >I am just trying to understand what the discussion was about. >Several years ago when I was looking at all this I tried to get CAs to >create DNs that were Mutlivalued RDNs but none of the CAs would do this. So >I just made the directory do it when we published the certificate into the >directory. >This allowed me to perform name uniqueness without searching the directory >prior to signing a certificate. >cheers >RFW > The discussion is not about multiple names for a directory entry, but multiple attributes within a SET within a DN, especially the terminal RDN. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OKexqt072149 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:40:59 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OKex6G072148 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:40:59 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail2.microsoft.com (mail2.microsoft.com [131.107.3.124]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OKewqt072141 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:40:58 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from trevorf@windows.microsoft.com) Received: from INET-VRS-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.8.110]) by mail2.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:40:54 -0700 Received: from 157.54.8.155 by INET-VRS-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (InterScan E-Mail VirusWall NT); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:40:53 -0700 Received: from red-imc-01.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.9.102]) by inet-hub-04.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:40:19 -0700 Received: from win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.0.39]) by red-imc-01.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:40:12 -0700 Received: from WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.12.81]) by win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:40:06 -0700 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5.6944.0 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:40:28 -0700 Message-ID: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD341851B@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Thread-Index: AcNSD0pI+DlWqC6KReOcJxBURQHrkAAAUyuQ From: "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> To: <RWEISER@trustdst.com>, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 24 Jul 2003 20:40:06.0903 (UTC) FILETIME=[C468A070:01C35223] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6OKewqt072144 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Yes there is a difference between a DN with multiple RDNs which is what you depict and an individual RDN having multiple values. Most commonly used applications like SSL and SMIME don't use the DN but used other name types such as DNS or email so the presence of multi-valued RDNs is benign. IE is a case in point where it only processes a single value (the common name) from the DN and only then if there is no DNS name in the subject alt name. Therefore I can readily believe in that case, no problem was found when testing with multi-valued RDN's. The scope for applications not doing the right thing in the presence of a multi-valued RDN is pretty big. Fore example, there is a large body of applications who extract subsets of data from the DN such as only using the common name in UI which will ignore subsequent values of the RDN. Therefore Microsoft's lack of support for multi-valued RDN with AD is the tip of the iceberg and anyone insisting on using them will have a lot of regression testing to perform. This is why typically the more pragmatic solution is to simply append some data to the sting used for the common name to make the CN unique. Trevor -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of RWEISER@trustdst.com Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2003 9:15 AM To: Michael Ströder; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Stephen Kent, DST has been useing a multivalued RDN in EndEntity certificates for a number of PKIs and since 1999 when we started issuing certificates. We only do this for End Entities not servers. Basically the certificate SubDN looks like the following. 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709,E = rweiser@trustdst.com, CN = Russel F Weiser,O = TrustID personal certificate,C = US We have used this with numerous and integrated with many applications. So is the issue that microsoft Active Directory will not support multivalued RDNs or that there Applications don't ?? I'm just trying to understand the issue more clearly. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Michael Ströder" <michael@stroeder.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2003 3:47 AM Subject: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) > > Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > LDAP Documents: > > [..] > > Biggest issue on the table for the schema document is that > > Microsoft says it will not support multi-valued attributes (e.g., a > > terminal RDN that is a set consisting of a common name and a serial > > number). > > Could someone please elaborate on this? > > One of my customers is planning to use exactly this naming scheme with > multi-valued RDNs in a rather large PKI deployment and so we're scared about > interoperability issues. > > Ciao, Michael. > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OJCWqt066782 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:12:32 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OJCW4c066781 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:12:32 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from jcmwsm02.mwjc.easylink.com (jcmwsm02a.mwjc.easylink.com [165.251.41.49]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OJCUqt066773 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:12:31 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from RWEISER@trustdst.com) Received: from mwsc0229.mw4.mailwatch.com (mwsmout-vip-1.mwjc.easylink.com [165.251.41.105]) by jcmwsm02.mwjc.easylink.com (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6OJCQhI019610 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:12:26 -0400 (EDT) Received: from mail pickup service by mwsc0229.mw4.mailwatch.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 15:12:25 -0400 Received: from mail pickup service by mwsc0229.mw4.mailwatch.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:29:42 -0400 Received: from 204.253.83.39 ([204.253.83.39]) by MWSC0229 with SMTP id 0002001daaca8761-98a4-48da-ac6a-7b868a56cfc2; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:29:41 -0500 Received: from above.proper.com (above.proper.com [208.184.76.39]) by dymwsm15.mailwatch.com (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6OHTfVF010390; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:29:41 -0400 Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OGnfqt058950 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:49:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OGnfL9058949 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:49:41 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from bach.digsigtrust.com (host65-54.digsigtrust.com [208.30.65.54]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OGneqt058943 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:49:40 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from RWEISER@trustdst.com) Received: from smtp.digsigtrust.com by smtp1.digsigtrust.com with ESMTP id h6OGnZO09351; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 10:49:35 -0600 (MDT) From: RWEISER@trustdst.com Received: from DL21064 (host192-35-174-247.digsigtrust.com [192.35.174.247]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp.digsigtrust.com (8.12.6/8.12.6) with ESMTP id h6OGjwI4017894; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 10:45:58 -0600 (MDT) Message-ID: <008301c35203$8f684260$9409e00a@DL21064> To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <p05210600bb44d06f5e06@[128.89.89.40]> <3F1FAB4A.3070104@stroeder.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 10:15:25 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> X-MW-BTID: 090425000020032056298100022 X-MW-CTIME: 1059067781 X-MW-SENDING-MTA: 208.184.76.39 X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by dymwsm15.mailwatch.com id h6OHTfVF010390 HOP-COUNT: 1 X-MAILWATCH-INSTANCEID: 0102001daaca8761-98a4-48da-ac6a-7b868a56cfc2 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 24 Jul 2003 17:29:42.0137 (UTC) FILETIME=[2AB7AE90:01C35209] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6OJCVqt066775 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Kent, DST has been useing a multivalued RDN in EndEntity certificates for a number of PKIs and since 1999 when we started issuing certificates. We only do this for End Entities not servers. Basically the certificate SubDN looks like the following. 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709,E = rweiser@trustdst.com, CN = Russel F Weiser,O = TrustID personal certificate,C = US We have used this with numerous and integrated with many applications. So is the issue that microsoft Active Directory will not support multivalued RDNs or that there Applications don't ?? I'm just trying to understand the issue more clearly. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Michael Ströder" <michael@stroeder.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2003 3:47 AM Subject: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) > > Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > LDAP Documents: > > [..] > > Biggest issue on the table for the schema document is that > > Microsoft says it will not support multi-valued attributes (e.g., a > > terminal RDN that is a set consisting of a common name and a serial > > number). > > Could someone please elaborate on this? > > One of my customers is planning to use exactly this naming scheme with > multi-valued RDNs in a rather large PKI deployment and so we're scared about > interoperability issues. > > Ciao, Michael. > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OIrfqt064644 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:53:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OIrfRG064643 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:53:41 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from bach.digsigtrust.com (host65-54.digsigtrust.com [208.30.65.54]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OIreqt064633 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:53:40 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from RWEISER@trustdst.com) Received: from smtp.digsigtrust.com by smtp1.digsigtrust.com with ESMTP id h6OIraO11663; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:53:36 -0600 (MDT) From: RWEISER@trustdst.com Received: from DL21064 (host192-35-174-247.digsigtrust.com [192.35.174.247]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp.digsigtrust.com (8.12.6/8.12.6) with ESMTP id h6OInwI4019641; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:49:58 -0600 (MDT) Message-ID: <00d501c35214$e1ae83c0$9409e00a@DL21064> To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <p05210600bb44d06f5e06@[128.89.89.40]> <3F1FAB4A.3070104@stroeder.com> <008301c35203$8f684260$9409e00a@DL21064> <3F200FBE.60304@stroeder.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:53:22 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Ah but it is on the directory side of things when we create the directory entry the 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709 is a multi name attribute. I can either search for Russel F Weiser and get multiple entries for Russel F Weiser. Or if I formulation the LDAP search as 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709+CN = Russel F Weiser I will get that exact entry only. I am just trying to understand what the discussion was about. Several years ago when I was looking at all this I tried to get CAs to create DNs that were Mutlivalued RDNs but none of the CAs would do this. So I just made the directory do it when we published the certificate into the directory. This allowed me to perform name uniqueness without searching the directory prior to signing a certificate. cheers RFW ----- Original Message ----- From: "Michael Ströder" <michael@stroeder.com> To: <RWEISER@trustdst.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2003 10:56 AM Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs > > RWEISER@trustdst.com wrote: > > DST has been useing a multivalued RDN in EndEntity certificates for a number > > of PKIs and since 1999 when we started issuing certificates. We only do > > this for End Entities not servers. Basically the certificate SubDN looks > > like the following. > > > > 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709,E = > > rweiser@trustdst.com, CN = Russel F Weiser,O = TrustID personal > > certificate,C = US > > Maybe I'm missing something but this is not a multi-valued RDN. > > An example in RFC2253 string notation would be: > > cn=Michael Stroeder+serialNumber=12345, ... > > Note the '+'. > > Ciao, Michael. > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OIrZqt064635 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:53:35 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OIrZ1h064634 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:53:35 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from bach.digsigtrust.com (host65-54.digsigtrust.com [208.30.65.54]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OIrYqt064626 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:53:34 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from RWEISER@trustdst.com) Received: from smtp.digsigtrust.com by smtp1.digsigtrust.com with ESMTP id h6OIrUO11653; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:53:30 -0600 (MDT) From: RWEISER@trustdst.com Received: from DL21064 (host192-35-174-247.digsigtrust.com [192.35.174.247]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp.digsigtrust.com (8.12.6/8.12.6) with ESMTP id h6OInrI4019637; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:49:53 -0600 (MDT) Message-ID: <00d401c35214$de6488e0$9409e00a@DL21064> To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <p05210600bb44d06f5e06@[128.89.89.40]> <3F1FAB4A.3070104@stroeder.com> <008301c35203$8f684260$9409e00a@DL21064> <3F200FBE.60304@stroeder.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:53:22 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Ah but it is on the directory side of things when we create the directory entry the 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709 is a multi name attribute. I can either search for Russel F Weiser and get multiple entries for Russel F Weiser. Or if I formulation the LDAP search as 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709+CN = Russel F Weiser I will get that exact entry only. I am just trying to understand what the discussion was about. Several years ago when I was looking at all this I tried to get CAs to create DNs that were Mutlivalued RDNs but none of the CAs would do this. So I just made the directory do it when we published the certificate into the directory. This allowed me to perform name uniqueness without searching the directory prior to signing a certificate. cheers RFW ----- Original Message ----- From: "Michael Ströder" <michael@stroeder.com> To: <RWEISER@trustdst.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2003 10:56 AM Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs > > RWEISER@trustdst.com wrote: > > DST has been useing a multivalued RDN in EndEntity certificates for a number > > of PKIs and since 1999 when we started issuing certificates. We only do > > this for End Entities not servers. Basically the certificate SubDN looks > > like the following. > > > > 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709,E = > > rweiser@trustdst.com, CN = Russel F Weiser,O = TrustID personal > > certificate,C = US > > Maybe I'm missing something but this is not a multi-valued RDN. > > An example in RFC2253 string notation would be: > > cn=Michael Stroeder+serialNumber=12345, ... > > Note the '+'. > > Ciao, Michael. > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OGuhqt059113 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:56:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OGuhXU059112 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:56:43 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from nb2.stroeder.com (krl9-d9bb4f5b.pool.mediaWays.net [217.187.79.91]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OGufqt059107 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:56:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from michael@stroeder.com) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F1EBC95B99; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 18:56:31 +0200 (CEST) Received: from stroeder.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2E0322C27; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 18:56:30 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <3F200FBE.60304@stroeder.com> Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 18:56:30 +0200 From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030626 X-Accept-Language: de-de, de, en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: RWEISER@trustdst.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs References: <p05210600bb44d06f5e06@[128.89.89.40]> <3F1FAB4A.3070104@stroeder.com> <008301c35203$8f684260$9409e00a@DL21064> In-Reply-To: <008301c35203$8f684260$9409e00a@DL21064> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.76.3.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: by AMaViS 0.3.12pre8 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> RWEISER@trustdst.com wrote: > DST has been useing a multivalued RDN in EndEntity certificates for a number > of PKIs and since 1999 when we started issuing certificates. We only do > this for End Entities not servers. Basically the certificate SubDN looks > like the following. > > 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709,E = > rweiser@trustdst.com, CN = Russel F Weiser,O = TrustID personal > certificate,C = US Maybe I'm missing something but this is not a multi-valued RDN. An example in RFC2253 string notation would be: cn=Michael Stroeder+serialNumber=12345, ... Note the '+'. Ciao, Michael. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OGnfqt058950 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:49:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OGnfL9058949 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:49:41 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from bach.digsigtrust.com (host65-54.digsigtrust.com [208.30.65.54]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OGneqt058943 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:49:40 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from RWEISER@trustdst.com) Received: from smtp.digsigtrust.com by smtp1.digsigtrust.com with ESMTP id h6OGnZO09351; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 10:49:35 -0600 (MDT) From: RWEISER@trustdst.com Received: from DL21064 (host192-35-174-247.digsigtrust.com [192.35.174.247]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp.digsigtrust.com (8.12.6/8.12.6) with ESMTP id h6OGjwI4017894; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 10:45:58 -0600 (MDT) Message-ID: <008301c35203$8f684260$9409e00a@DL21064> To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <p05210600bb44d06f5e06@[128.89.89.40]> <3F1FAB4A.3070104@stroeder.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 10:15:25 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Kent, DST has been useing a multivalued RDN in EndEntity certificates for a number of PKIs and since 1999 when we started issuing certificates. We only do this for End Entities not servers. Basically the certificate SubDN looks like the following. 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 = D01E473E000000F58FE3DDDC00000709,E = rweiser@trustdst.com, CN = Russel F Weiser,O = TrustID personal certificate,C = US We have used this with numerous and integrated with many applications. So is the issue that microsoft Active Directory will not support multivalued RDNs or that there Applications don't ?? I'm just trying to understand the issue more clearly. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Michael Ströder" <michael@stroeder.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2003 3:47 AM Subject: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) > > Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > LDAP Documents: > > [..] > > Biggest issue on the table for the schema document is that > > Microsoft says it will not support multi-valued attributes (e.g., a > > terminal RDN that is a set consisting of a common name and a serial > > number). > > Could someone please elaborate on this? > > One of my customers is planning to use exactly this naming scheme with > multi-valued RDNs in a rather large PKI deployment and so we're scared about > interoperability issues. > > Ciao, Michael. > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6ODRuqt045005 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 06:27:56 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6ODRu5U045004 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 06:27:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [207.228.252.5]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6ODRtqt044995 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 06:27:55 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Received: (qmail 4282 invoked by uid 0); 24 Jul 2003 13:26:40 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Russ-Laptop.vigilsec.com) (151.200.238.157) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 24 Jul 2003 13:26:40 -0000 Message-Id: <5.2.0.9.2.20030724092019.0406bec8@mail.binhost.com> X-Sender: housley@mail.binhost.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.2.0.9 Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:22:13 -0400 To: "Al Arsenault" <aarsenau@bbn.com> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> In-Reply-To: <010701c3515d$6ead10b0$acf42180@arsenaultd2> References: <200307231524.h6NFOtq26969@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I agree with Al's conclusion. SHOULD NOT is the right wording for RFC 3280 (and its successor). Russ At 05:00 PM 7/23/2003 -0400, Al Arsenault wrote: >I'm certainly open to explanations as to what I'm missing; that is, why it's >important to have this information in the certificate and what you'd do >different because of it. But given that privateKeyUsagePeriod is permitted >in a certificate for those who really want it (it's a SHOULD NOT, not a MUST >NOT unless you want to mark it critical), and I personally don't see any >benefit to it, I'm in favor of leaving the recommendation the way it is in >3280. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6ODCRqt042261 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 06:12:27 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6ODCR1X042260 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 06:12:27 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6ODCQqt042254 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 06:12:26 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [10.1.70.188] (ssh.bbn.com [192.1.50.70]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6ODCAD9020985; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:12:15 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@localhost Message-Id: <p05210604bb458b21b802@[10.1.70.188]> In-Reply-To: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> References: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:12:22 -0400 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 22:43 +1200 7/24/03, Peter Gutmann wrote: >=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> writes: >>Stephen Kent wrote: >>> LDAP Documents: >>> [..] >>> Biggest issue on the table for the schema document is that >>> Microsoft says it will not support multi-valued attributes (e.g., a >>> terminal RDN that is a set consisting of a common name and a serial >>> number). >> >>Could someone please elaborate on this? > >Using multi-valued RDNs is very risky because it breaks a lot of software (not >just Microsoft's stuff). > >Elaborate enough? > >Peter. Last year we tested IE and Netscape clients and they processed multi-valued, terminal RDNs with no problems. It also was not a problem for Apache web servers. I did not test IIS or other servers at the time. Anyway, apparently the concern is not a client side issue for these very (most?) widely deployed products. I think David indicated that he had been told it was a server issue of some sort for MS. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OD9Cqt042114 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 06:09:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OD9C8l042113 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 06:09:12 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OD9Bqt042103 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 06:09:11 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [10.1.70.188] (ssh.bbn.com [192.1.50.70]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6OD8wD9020785; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:08:58 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@localhost Message-Id: <p05210600bb458783df07@[10.1.70.188]> In-Reply-To: <200307241008.h6OA8vo23913@chandon.edelweb.fr> References: <200307241008.h6OA8vo23913@chandon.edelweb.fr> Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:09:22 -0400 To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: draft minutes Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 12:08 +0200 7/24/03, Peter Sylvester wrote: > > >> >> PKIX WG Specifications >> >> Simple Certificate Validation Protocol - Trevor Freeman (Microsoft) >> The current draft of SCVP is in WG Last Call, and is believed to be in >> full compliance with RFC 3379. This presentation discussed changes >> since the previous (version 11) draft. Plan is to progress to WG last >> call very soon. [slides] >> >> > >- Does the last sentence mean IETF last call? No, the text says WG last call, right? >- After having received at least one complaint (from me), > Tim Polk announced in the meeting that a new two weeks > last call period would start after the IETF meeting, the > reason being that both for participants of the meeting and > non participants either the travel time or potential discussions > create some time problems. yes, Tim and I agreed to extend the last call in response to your observation that the overlap with the IETF meeting caused problems. >- Since non participants of the meeting did not hear this, > it seems somewhat logical to me to inform the list BEFORE a new > period starts, so everybody know can know this. I expected > a mail to the list immediately after the meeting, but maybe > the chairmen did as me, and left Wien immediately so > they did not have the chance to send a mail. I failed to mention this in the minutes because I expected we would send the announcement out sooner, and because I wanted to draw people's attention to the extended last call period, not rely on them to dig it out of the minutes. But, we failed to send the message. >- Not even finding this announcement in the draft minutes is > more surprising. see explanation above. > >- But: Even if the draft minutes would have reflected it, already > one week would hae ben gone. > >- Therefore I kindly request the chairmen to announce in a > mail to the list a new beginning of a last call starting > not less than one full working day in all areas of this planet, and the period not covering an IETF meeting. WG last calls begin when we send a message top the list announcing them. We don't pre-announce when a last call will begin, nor does any other WG with which I am familiar. so, to address the concerns Peter noted, let's reset the clock on the PKIX WG last call on SCVP. The last call will end on Friday, August 8th, slightly more than 2 weeks from today. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OCePqt039667 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 05:40:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OCePJi039666 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 05:40:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [212.234.46.16]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OCeJqt039659 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 05:40:20 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr) Received: from chandon.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id OAA13175; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 14:40:18 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from chandon.edelweb.fr (chandon.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.162]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.7); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 14:40:18 +0200 (MET DST) Received: (from peter@localhost) by chandon.edelweb.fr (8.11.7+Sun/8.11.7) id h6OCeFG29327; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 14:40:15 +0200 (MEST) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 14:40:15 +0200 (MEST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Message-Id: <200307241240.h6OCeFG29327@chandon.edelweb.fr> To: aarsenau@bbn.com, diegofv@eresmas.com Subject: RE: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, ietf-pkix@imc.org X-Sun-Charset: US-ASCII Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I am not sure that a relyaing party can always assume that a signing device is not cheating concerning the key usage period, i.e., to determine whether the key has be used before the PKUP end. The certificate validation procedures do not imply in any case that a PKUP is checked, and signature validation procedures are ... where are they? IMO, a useful PKUP is for the signing device as Greg Chodov inidicates to inform the signer at least that ' You signature key is not to be supposed anymore, if you insist signing with it, the relying parties may not be able to validate it before expiration of the cert. ' Whether the signer device allows to sign anyway or not is another question. Without a PKUP, a nice user agent may indcate in a global way: 'You cert is going to expire in n days', but since this information is part of a policy, the delays may be different, ... Peter Digital signatures are for authentication in space, not in time. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OCWcqt039379 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 05:32:38 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OCWcsl039378 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 05:32:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mailbe4.getronics.com (mailbe4.getronics.com [158.67.5.172]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OCWYqt039368 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 05:32:34 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Internet-Drafts@ietf.org) Received: from MAILBE2.getronics.com ([192.58.226.24]) by mailbe4.getronics.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.5329); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:45:12 +0200 Received: from mail pickup service by MAILBE2.getronics.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:45:12 +0200 Received: from asgard.ietf.org ([132.151.6.40]) by MAILBE3.getronics.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.5329); Wed, 23 Jul 2003 22:04:48 +0200 Received: from majordomo by asgard.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.14) id 19fPCc-0004kX-80 for ietf-announce-list@asgard.ietf.org; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:23:06 -0400 Received: from ietf.org ([10.27.2.28]) by asgard.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.14) id 19fP5V-0003eb-HX for all-ietf@asgard.ietf.org; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:15:45 -0400 Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA25468; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:15:41 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307231915.PAA25468@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:15:41 -0400 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 23 Jul 2003 20:04:48.0545 (UTC) FILETIME=[AB5B1910:01C35155] Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Proxy Certificate Profile Author(s) : S. Tuecke et al. Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt Pages : 45 Date : 2003-7-23 This document forms a certificate profile for Proxy Certificates, based on X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates as defined in RFC 3280, for use in the Internet. The term Proxy Certificate is used to describe a certificate that is derived from, and signed by, a normal X.509 Public Key End Entity Certificate or by another Proxy Certificate for the purpose of providing restricted proxying and delegation within a PKI based authentication system. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-23151222.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-23151222.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OCDWqt037713 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 05:13:32 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OCDWHp037712 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 05:13:32 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mx1.magmacom.com (mx1.magmacom.com [206.191.0.217]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OCDVqt037706 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 05:13:32 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from asturgeon@spyrus.com) Received: from mail4.magma.ca (mail4.magma.ca [206.191.0.222]) by mx1.magmacom.com (Magma's Mail Server) with ESMTP id h6OCDSmR023933; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 08:13:28 -0400 Received: from hippolyta (ottawa-dial-64-26-139-254.d-ip.magma.ca [64.26.139.254]) by mail4.magma.ca (Magma's Mail Server) with SMTP id h6OCDH63003265; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 08:13:25 -0400 Reply-To: <asturgeon@spyrus.com> From: "Alice Sturgeon" <asturgeon@spyrus.com> To: "Denis Pinkas" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-warranty-extn-03.txt Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 08:23:56 -0400 Message-ID: <DCEJJJFPPENPENMBCAIFMEGFDAAA.asturgeon@spyrus.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2911.0) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1106 In-Reply-To: <3F0AE0CC.1060105@bull.net> Importance: Normal Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Denis, You pose some provocative questions, as usual. Please see my responses below. Thanks, Alice Sturgeon Chair, Canadian Advisory Committee - Information Technology Security ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 and System Policy Architect & Manager Standards SPYRUS Office: 613-232-2350 Mobile: 613-291-0331 -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas Sent: Tuesday, July 08, 2003 11:19 AM Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-warranty-extn-03.txt > Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Warranty Certificate Extension > Author(s) : D. Linsenbardt, S. Pontius, A. Sturgeon > Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-warranty-extn-03.txt > Pages : 8 > Date : 2003-6-27 Here are my comments on this draft. Comments on warranty-extn-03.txt (June 2003) 1- On page 2. The text mentions: "A relying party that has a warranty from a CA". Does this mean that a relying party must have a contract with the CA to get advantage of the warranty ? No. Does this mean that a relying party will get a warranty without a contract signed with the CA ? Yes. Does this extension allow to make the difference between the case of a signed contract and the case of an unsigned contract where the guarantees could be different? No. If there are any differences in the T&C pertaining to a contractual arrangement, these differences will be outside of, beyond the scope, and not pertinent to, the warranty offered in the certificate. It applies equally to all relying parties, whether or not a contract has been signed. 2 - The difference between the base warranty and the extended warranty is not crystal clear. How can a relying party know whether it can have the benefits of the base warranty or of the extended warranty ? If the extended warranty is present, then the relying party has the benefit of the extended warranty. In short, if it is present, then the relying party knows that the relying party has the benefit of the extended warranty by its presence alone. The syntax shows that the extended warranty MAY be present: Warranty ::= CHOICE { none NULL, -- No warranty provided wData WarrantyData } -- Explicit warranty WarrantyData ::= SEQUENCE { base WarrantyInfo, extended WarrantyInfo OPTIONAL, tcURL TermsAndConditionsURL OPTIONAL } If the tcURL is present, a human being might understand the terms and conditions (if he can understand the local language used), but a computer program will not be able to do so. This means that computers cannot understand the difference. The computer does not need to know what is in the T&C. If the tcURL is present, it is optionally for the benefit of the human reader. Perhaps you could suggest some text to clarify this in the I-D if you still think it is needed. 3 - There is no security on the information placed at the tcURL parameter since no hash of the terms and conditions is being used. These conditions could change overtime and relying parties would not be able to demonstrate that they have changed. It seems to me that the time stamp on the certificate would suffice to place the warranty in a point of time at which the specified terms and conditions applied; there is no need for the extension to demonstrate that as this is covered by the certificate itself. This is no different from the paper-based world in that if an insurance policy changes its terms, it cannot do so retroactively to the detriment of clients who have paid for a specific coverage, unless it notified the clients and compensates them accordingly. 4 - Is the "Relying party Agreement" a document to signed by the parties or not ? This should be said. Use of the term "Relying Party Agreement" is no different from its normal usage, just as "Certificate Policy" is used in the same context without any change to the meaning from normal usage, as per RFC 2527 and its successor. In other words, defining the terms, either Relying Party Agreement or Certificate Policy is not necessary to the understanding of this extension. 5 - The WarrantyValidityPeriod is insufficient. Usually there is a period to claim for a compensation which must be made X months or Y days after the date of the event which created the damage. It is thus not possible to ask for a warranty during e.g. the whole validity period of the certificate. Another time period parameter is missing. This is exactly what the validity period is stating: that the warranty is valid for a specified time, which is either the validity period of the certificate, or another, specified time using the parameters as defined in the I-D. It is presented and offered this way, so there is no need for another validity parameter. If an offeror wanted to specify a time within which claims could be made, then a shorter time period than the validity of the certificate can be used. This is unlike the paper-based world in the sense that insurance policies are normally of long duration, whereas this extension is associated with a certificate that normally has a validity of two-three years. 6 - The wType offers only two types of warranty: aggregated and per transaction. "Aggregated" means that that once the value of the fulfilled claims reaches the maximum warranty amount, then no further claim will be fulfilled. "Per transaction" means that each claim is handled independently but no individual claim can exceed the maximum warranty amount. Each type has its own problems: "Aggregated" is like a race where late claimants will get no compensation at all because they were not "fast enough". It is questionable whether such a race condition will be acceptable. It should be understood that aggregation applies to one warranty and one claimant. This is analogous to the paper-based world. When you are covered by warranty for X product or service, e.g., health insurance, there is often an upper limit (viz. the "value") up to which claims will be met for each claimant; i.e., one insured person. "Per transaction" means that the CA cannot compute the maximum amount of money that it may have to give away. Which insurance company will ever insure a risk for which an upper limit cannot be computed ? The T&C, as noted in section 1, as covered by insurance, will specify the maximum. The type of warranty selected depends on the nature of the transactions, the parties to the transactions (e.g., individuals, large institutions, etc.). None of these schemes is acceptable. Some combination should be allowed: - a maximum amount per transaction, and - a maximum amount per certificate with a maximum time period to claim for a compensation after the date of the event (no race problem implied). 7 - The content of the security consideration should be augmented to indicate the difference between what a computer program can do and a human being can do with this extension. I would have thought this to be blindingly obvious. We would, however, be quite willing to consider some proposed words to address this, if you do think it is necessary. 8 - The document is not mature enough and its added value is still questionable. We believe that it is mature. Its value may be questionable to those who do not want to use it, but given that it is (a) proposed as Informational and (b) always non-critical, surely its availability for use is innocuous for those that do not want to use it. For those who do want to use it, and we have heard from quite a number who do, it will be useful and valuable. As in section 1: "When a certificate contains a warranty certificate extension, the extension MUST be non-critical, ..." Denis Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OBgbqt035689 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 04:42:37 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OBgbXq035688 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 04:42:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OBgZqt035676 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 04:42:35 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6OBgUoY014530; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 23:42:30 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6OBgV106887; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 23:42:31 +1200 Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 23:42:31 +1200 Message-Id: <200307241142.h6OBgV106887@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: michael@stroeder.com, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> >>Elaborate enough? > >Nope. Well, what more do you want to know? Shall I communicate it in the form of an illuminated manuscript? Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OB2Kqt033046 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 04:02:20 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OB2KMo033045 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 04:02:20 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from nb2.stroeder.com (krl9-d9bb4f5b.pool.mediaWays.net [217.187.79.91]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OB2Iqt033019 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 04:02:18 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from michael@stroeder.com) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5BC889D8CA; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:02:14 +0200 (CEST) Received: from stroeder.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A01A020F6D; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:02:13 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <3F1FBCB5.7070806@stroeder.com> Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 13:02:13 +0200 From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030626 X-Accept-Language: de-de, de, en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) References: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> In-Reply-To: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.76.3.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed X-Virus-Scanned: by AMaViS 0.3.12pre8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6OB2Jqt033039 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Peter Gutmann wrote: > Michael_Ströder <michael@stroeder.com> writes: > >>Stephen Kent wrote: >> >>>LDAP Documents: >>>[..] >>>Biggest issue on the table for the schema document is that >>>Microsoft says it will not support multi-valued attributes (e.g., a >>>terminal RDN that is a set consisting of a common name and a serial >>>number). >> >>Could someone please elaborate on this? > > Using multi-valued RDNs is very risky because it breaks a lot of software (not > just Microsoft's stuff). I already know that. > Elaborate enough? Nope. Ciao, Michael. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OAhPqt031454 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 03:43:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OAhPod031453 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 03:43:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OAhNqt031444 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 03:43:24 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6OAhJoY013553; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 22:43:19 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6OAhJk06743; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 22:43:19 +1200 Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 22:43:19 +1200 Message-Id: <200307241043.h6OAhJk06743@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, michael@stroeder.com Subject: Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> writes: >Stephen Kent wrote: >> LDAP Documents: >> [..] >> Biggest issue on the table for the schema document is that >> Microsoft says it will not support multi-valued attributes (e.g., a >> terminal RDN that is a set consisting of a common name and a serial >> number). > >Could someone please elaborate on this? Using multi-valued RDNs is very risky because it breaks a lot of software (not just Microsoft's stuff). Elaborate enough? Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OA9Cqt029212 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 03:09:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6OA9CI4029211 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 03:09:12 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [212.234.46.16]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6OA9Aqt029206 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 03:09:11 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr) Received: from chandon.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id MAA12583; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:08:58 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from chandon.edelweb.fr (chandon.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.162]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.7); Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:08:59 +0200 (MET DST) Received: (from peter@localhost) by chandon.edelweb.fr (8.11.7+Sun/8.11.7) id h6OA8vo23913; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:08:57 +0200 (MEST) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 12:08:57 +0200 (MEST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Message-Id: <200307241008.h6OA8vo23913@chandon.edelweb.fr> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, kent@bbn.com Subject: Re: draft minutes X-Sun-Charset: US-ASCII Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> > > > PKIX WG Specifications > > Simple Certificate Validation Protocol - Trevor Freeman (Microsoft) > The current draft of SCVP is in WG Last Call, and is believed to be in > full compliance with RFC 3379. This presentation discussed changes > since the previous (version 11) draft. Plan is to progress to WG last > call very soon. [slides] > > - Does the last sentence mean IETF last call? - After having received at least one complaint (from me), Tim Polk announced in the meeting that a new two weeks last call period would start after the IETF meeting, the reason being that both for participants of the meeting and non participants either the travel time or potential discussions create some time problems. - Since non participants of the meeting did not hear this, it seems somewhat logical to me to inform the list BEFORE a new period starts, so everybody know can know this. I expected a mail to the list immediately after the meeting, but maybe the chairmen did as me, and left Wien immediately so they did not have the chance to send a mail. - Not even finding this announcement in the draft minutes is more surprising. - But: Even if the draft minutes would have reflected it, already one week would hae ben gone. - Therefore I kindly request the chairmen to announce in a mail to the list a new beginning of a last call starting not less than one full working day in all areas of this planet, and the period not covering an IETF meeting. Thanks for consideration. Peter Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6O9x1qt027378 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 02:59:01 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6O9x1Cq027377 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 02:59:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp11.eresmas.com (smtp11.eresmas.com [62.81.235.111]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6O9x0qt027366 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 02:59:00 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from diegofv@eresmas.com) Received: from [192.168.105.166] (helo=ma20.eresmas.com) by smtp11.eresmas.com with esmtp (Exim 4.10) id 19fcs0-00016R-00; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:58:44 +0200 From: <diegofv@eresmas.com> To: aarsenau@bbn.com Cc: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, ietf-pkix@imc.org Reply-To: "Diego Fernandez" <diegofv@eresmas.com> Message-ID: <3afffb3af52a.3af52a3afffb@ma20.eresmas.com> Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 09:58:45 GMT X-Mailer: Netscape Webmail MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Language: es Subject: RE: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? X-Accept-Language: es Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> >Suppose that the certificate was issued to Bob at Acme Corp. On 30 >November2004, Bob was fired because it was discovered that he had been >misappropriating office supplies. It is suspected that he has >initiated and >signed a number of EDI transactions in connection with his nefarious >scheme. > But the private key can't be used beyond on 30 June 2004. After this time, Bob will have a new cert that will be revoked. >My point is this: from what I can see, usage of the extension really >doesn't buy you anything. In order to accurately assess whether the >transaction was valid at the time of signing, and assess that long >after the >fact, you have to archive so much extra information that I don't see >whatpain is caused by the fact that the certificate has expired by >then. It's >not clear to me what if anything you do differently because you have >information directly tied to the certificate - e.g., it was revoked >monthslater. It doesn't save much in the way of processing to have >any such >information directly tied to the certificate, versus tied to some other >piece of information you had to archive. > I think that 1) The PKUP allows to extent the signature verification by the cert period, because the reason of revocation is discovered later and have an affect on the validity period of the private key. But: 1.1) The reason could be discovered after the cert period 1.2) The gap between the private key notAfter and the cert notAfter have to be related with the lifetime of the signed document. 2) An end entity cert is a signed document issued by a CA with a lifetime. It falls on the 1.2. If the CA cert has the PKUP, the end entity certs issued within the private key CA lifetime would be verified (chain and CRL) within the validity period of the CA cert. Kind regards, Diego Fernandez Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6O9m3qt026743 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 02:48:03 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6O9m3j9026742 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 02:48:03 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from nb2.stroeder.com (krl9-d9bb4f5b.pool.mediaWays.net [217.187.79.91]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6O9m0qt026737 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 02:48:01 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from michael@stroeder.com) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1523F9D8B6 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:47:56 +0200 (CEST) Received: from stroeder.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 507599D89A for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:47:55 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <3F1FAB4A.3070104@stroeder.com> Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:47:54 +0200 From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030626 X-Accept-Language: de-de, de, en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft minutes) References: <p05210600bb44d06f5e06@[128.89.89.40]> In-Reply-To: <p05210600bb44d06f5e06@[128.89.89.40]> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.76.3.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: by AMaViS 0.3.12pre8 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Kent wrote: > > LDAP Documents: > [..] > Biggest issue on the table for the schema document is that > Microsoft says it will not support multi-valued attributes (e.g., a > terminal RDN that is a set consisting of a common name and a serial > number). Could someone please elaborate on this? One of my customers is planning to use exactly this naming scheme with multi-valued RDNs in a rather large PKI deployment and so we're scared about interoperability issues. Ciao, Michael. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6O0g4qt080939 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 17:42:04 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6O0g476080938 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 17:42:04 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6O0g3qt080926 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 17:42:03 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [10.1.70.188] (ssh.bbn.com [192.1.50.70]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6O0fxD9021916 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 20:42:00 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@localhost Message-Id: <p05210600bb44d06f5e06@[128.89.89.40]> Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 19:56:40 -0400 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: draft minutes Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6O0g3qt080934 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Please provide feedback by August 1st. Steve ------- PKIX WG Meeting 7/17/03 Edited by Steve Kent Chairs: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov> The PKIX WG met once during the 57th IETF. A total of approximately 75 individuals participated in the meeting. Agenda review and document status - Tim Polk (NIST) There are about XX WG documents in various stages in the process, some of which fell through the cracks due to process glitches. [slides] WG Focus and Direction - Russ Housley The working group has received direction from the IESG that will limit the types of new specifications accepted as PKIX work products. Thus the WG is not accepting new work items. New WGs will be formed, as needed, to address PKI issues, or individual drafts can be submitted and subject to IETF-wide last call if the work described in them is mature and non-controversial. [no slides] Document Status Review - Tim Polk (NIST) The working group has a fair number of Internet-Drafts in various stages of processing, but since the last meeting considerable progress has been made. Several IDs are in or have recently completed last call. [slides] PKIX WG Specifications Simple Certificate Validation Protocol - Trevor Freeman (Microsoft) The current draft of SCVP is in WG Last Call, and is believed to be in full compliance with RFC 3379. This presentation discussed changes since the previous (version 11) draft. Plan is to progress to WG last call very soon. [slides] RFC 3280 Progression - Tim Polk (NIST) NIST is currently performing the interoperability testing for RFC 3280. This presentation updated the WG on NIST's progress, projected completion date, and issues identified to date. Primary focus is on the RFC 3280 path validation test suite developed jointly by NIST, DigitalNet, and NSA. Discussion of the problem of UTF-8 string matching, which has been addressed in the DNS context (RFC 3454), but is addressed only minimally in 3280. Plan is to stick with the current 3280 spec for progression to DRAFT, but to create a separate document to specify what CAs should do, to ensure that the simple, binary comparison will work in path building. [slides] LDAP Documents: - David Chadwick (Univ of Salford) & Peter Gietz (DAASI) The WG has a suite of LDAP-PKIX drafts forming a comprehensive solution for LDAP based PKI information distribution. New drafts on PKC certificate schema, CRL schema and on Attribute Certificate schema have been published since the 56th IETF. The authors presented the changes in these documents and discussed the timeline for document completion. Biggest issue on the table for the schema document is that Microsoft says it will not support multi-valued attributes (e.g., a terminal RDN that is a set consisting of a common name and a serial number). Direction from WG chairs is to maintain this requirement, and to discuss with MS why they believe this is not a necessary feature. Plan is to proceed to last call immediately after this IETF meeting. Still have to deal with the "; binary" issue for transfer of LDAP data. [slides] Qualified Certificates - Stefan Santesson (Microsoft) This presentation proposed a path for the evolution of the QC document. The intent is to relax some current QC profile constraints (e.g., re setting the NR bit), consistent with activities within ETSI, which uses this document as a basis for EU standards with regard to qualified certificates. Also need to bring this RFC into alignment with RFC 3280. [slides] Certification Path Building - Matt Cooper (Orion Security) This document, intended to become an informational RFC, was written to provide guidance and recommendations to developers building X.509 public-key certification paths within their applications, based on experience gained in several contexts. The document describes different PKI structures, considerations for forward vs. reverse path construction, tree pruning, etc. emphasis on value of disallowing repeated name/key combination in a path. Need to reword the introductory/overview text to make clear that the material presented is advisory, not mandatory, and to acknowledge that overall, we are still in early stages of gaining experience in this area. Also, if this is to be a PKIX document, then need to clarify that some of the "rules" deal with accommodation of non-complaint certificates. [slides] RSA Public Key Algorithms - Jim Schaad (Soaring Hawk) New member of editorial team for this document. Discussed open questions of OID use (encryption vs. signature) and parameters use. New draft will be issued soon. [no slides] Related Specifications The following personal drafts address topics of interest to the PKIX WG, and are presented to highlight the availability of the drafts and encourage input from the WG. Russian Cryptographic Algorithms for PKIX - Grigory Chudov (Crypto-Pro) This personal draft documents the use of Russian national cryptography standards (GOST) in the PKIX context. It was developed within the "Russian Cryptographic Software Compatibility Agreement", and signed by major Russian cryptographic software vendors. This agreement specifies parameters not nailed down in basic Russian Government standards. [slides] Memorandum for multi-domain PKI Interoperability - Masaki SHIMAOKA (SECOM) This personal draft documents known issues and considerations for multi-domain PKI, and provides guidelines for multi-domain PKI interoperability as a best current practice. The scope of this specification is the establishment of trust relationships and interoperability among multiple PKI domains. This specification is a follow on to the JNSA Challenge PKI 2002 and Multi-Domain PKI Test Suite. [slides] Liaison/Related Projects The following specifications will update the WG on related EU activities. European Open Standards for Electronic Signatures: the EESSI - Riccardo Genghini, EESSI Chair (SG&A) The European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative (EESSI) is an industry initiative in Support of the European Directive on Electronic Signatures. This presentation described the status of the ESESI's current and recent work, which has just been published. This presentation was an update to the status report provided at the 56th IETF. [slides] OpenEvidence Project - Peter Sylvester (EdelWeb) The EU IST project OpenEvidence is an Open source project concerning technologies for establishing the long term validity (integrity, time of posting, ) of documents. The presentation addressed the goals and the current status of the implementations. Plan to update RFCs 3161 and 3029 to reflect additional experience gained in this project. [slides] Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NMUHqt073087 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:30:17 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6NMUHDk073085 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:30:17 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mcs.anl.gov (cliff.mcs.anl.gov [140.221.9.17]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NMUFqt073064 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:30:16 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from welch@mcs.anl.gov) Received: from VON-TP-T30 (terra.mcs.anl.gov [140.221.11.103]) by mcs.anl.gov (8.11.6/8.9.3) with ESMTP id h6NMUAt135632; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 17:30:10 -0500 X-Mailer: 21.4 (patch 11) "Native Windows TTY Support (Windows)" XEmacs Lucid (via feedmail 10 I); VM 7.07 under 21.4 (patch 11) "Native Windows TTY Support (Windows)" XEmacs Lucid From: "Von Welch" <welch@mcs.anl.gov> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <16159.3300.836000.963854@gargle.gargle.HOWL> Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 17:32:04 -0500 To: <jimsch@exmsft.com> Cc: "'pkix'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tuecke@mcs.anl.gov>, "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: Draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-06.txt In-Reply-To: <002001c35155$4eaf7ee0$8b40a051@augustcellars.local> References: <002001c35155$4eaf7ee0$8b40a051@augustcellars.local> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Jim, Comments below. We released version -07 that crossed your email by the way, but with one exception noted below all your questions still apply. Von Jim Schaad writes (16:01 July 23, 2003): > > 1. Section 3.3, para 2: I think that the MAY in this paragrah should be > lower case. I do not see these as a protocal statements, but as saying > these are ways that reasonable uniqueness could be obtained for a serial > number. I assume that other methods of doing this are perfectly > allowable. (You mean both MAYs, right?) I think you are right, maybe someone else can confirm. > 2. Section 3.4: Does the subject name need to be "unique" among all > certificates ever issued by a proxy, or just the active certificates? Ever, unless it's reissuance to the same bearer as described in paragraph 3. > 3. General: I am still not comfortable that the issuance of Proxy > Certificates cannot be restricted (or permitted) by a CA when it issues > an EEC. One method of doing this would be a non-critical ProxyCertInfo > extension with a pCPathLengthConstrant of 0 in the EEC. I really dislike your suggested method because that would make the presence of a ProxyCertInfo extension ambiguous - right now it designates a certificate is a proxy certificate. *IF* this is something that people think is critical, I believe another extension should be defined to be placed into an EEC to prohibit it from issuing proxy certificates. > 4. Section 2.6: When creating a new PC, where and how is the > negotiations on policy language and policy done? Should this be > documented as a separate step in the text describing how PCs are > obtained/issued? Does something need to be done about potentially > asking the relying party as to what policy it requires to perform some > task? Since it is not always possible to even know who all the relying parties potentially are when a proxy certificate is issued it's not really possible to negotiate this. Our view is that the set of polices used in a particular environment will be established out of band in the environment. > 5. Section 3.8.2: I find the following text > > Note that this > verification MUST take place regardless of whether or not the PC > itself contains a policy, as other PCs in the signing chain MAY > contain conditions that MUST be verified. > > to be confusing because I always get policyLanguage and policy > mixed up. I think that all PCs must have policy and so the statement is > difficult to parse. I don't know that this can be simplified without > renaming the policy field in the extension. I think this statement is from when polices were optional and impersonation was implied otherwise. If it causes real heartburn I believe it can be removed at this point as it doesn't add anything. > The text in item 1) just > before this refers to policy and should probably refer to > policyLanguage. I don't think this would be correct - as understanding the policy implies understanding the policy language in which it is written, so the change doesn't add anything, and a relying party need to understand not just the language, but the policy itself. > 6. Section 4.1.3 next to last paragraph. Text should be "If steps (a), > (b) or (d) fail,..." Agreed. > 7. Section 4.2: I have a complete lack of understanding for the last > three paragraphs in this section. These paragraphs are addressing whether or not the {extended} key usage extensions of it's issuer apply to it. It's really ugly because these extensions are really ugly (they are in part restrictions and in part capabilities), I'm not sure how to clarify this. > 8. Section 5.1.2: Fix "Section Error! Reference source not found" This was fixed in -07. > 9. > Is there more that should appear here? - end comments - Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NL2Dqt069899 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 14:02:13 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6NL2D8o069898 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 14:02:13 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NL2Cqt069892 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 14:02:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from aarsenau@bbn.com) Received: from arsenaultd2 (col-dhcp33-244-172.bbn.com [128.33.244.172]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with SMTP id h6NL1WD8006094; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 17:01:34 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <010701c3515d$6ead10b0$acf42180@arsenaultd2> From: "Al Arsenault" <aarsenau@bbn.com> To: "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <200307231524.h6NFOtq26969@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 17:00:19 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1106 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1106 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> To: <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>; <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Sent: Wednesday, July 23, 2003 11:24 AM Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? > <snip> > > Incidentally, one amusing/scary side-effect of using certs after they've > expired is that the CA generally no longer bothers issuing CRLs for them > (since they've expired), but they're still being used to validate signatures > beyond the 1-year billing period. As a result, it's impossible to perform > revocation checking on the cert. I guess if you're ignoring the expiry date > you may as well ignore revocation checking as well :-). > > Peter. This brings up what is to me an interesting question: exactly what service do you think you're providing with this signature validation long after the fact, and why do you think it's important? That's a big input into whether or not the privateKeyUsagePeriod extension brings any value. I can only think of about three reasons why one would want to do a signature validation months after an order was signed: - as part of a business audit; - as part of a dispute resolution process (e.g., a non-repudiation issue) - because one's business processes were REALLLLY slow, and it just takes that long to process an order. Consider two scenarios: Scenario 1: A certificate is issued 1-January-2004; it's valid until 30-June-2004; there is no privateKeyUsagePeriod extension Scenario 2: A certificate is issued 1-January-2004; it's valid until 31 December-2004; there is a privateKeyUsagePeriod extension allowing use of the private key for signing from 1-January-2004 through 30-June-2004. Now, suppose that there is an EDI transaction ostensibly signed 30 March 2004; someone attempts to validate this transaction on 30 December 2004. In scenario 1, the certificate has expired. That means that the CA has stopped attesting to the validity of the owner-key mapping on 30 June 2004. There is no current evidence of revocation; i.e., there is no current indication that the owner-key mapping is valid or not. There is, however, a CRL and/or OCSP response indicating whether or not the certificate was revoked on or shortly after 30 March 2004. In scenario 2, the certificate is still valid. Thus, there should be evidence in the system that indicates not only whether the owner-key mapping was valid on 30 March 2004, but also on 30 December 2004. Suppose that the certificate was issued to Bob at Acme Corp. On 30 November 2004, Bob was fired because it was discovered that he had been misappropriating office supplies. It is suspected that he has initiated and signed a number of EDI transactions in connection with his nefarious scheme. (If you want the certificate issued with Acme Corp. itself instead of Bob, that's fine; we can just assume that the private key has somehow been discovered and posted on a prominent web site. In other words, it's compromised.) So, what do you do? If we're in Scenario 2, and you're just processing the transaction on 30 December because your business processes are that slow, then it might make a difference to you. You know that the key is marked compromised; the certificate is revoked. So you don't send the office supplies. If it's scenario 1, you MAY choose to accept the transaction and send the supplies, even though the certificate has long ago expired. There may be a difference in behavior. But in either of the other cases (audit or non-repudiation dispute), does it really make a difference that you had the information from November? You're trying to determine whether accepting the transaction on 30 March was the right thing to do. You have to use the information that was available to you on 30 March (or a few days thereafter) - the CRL or OCSP response from right after that; the transaction itself; any other records. If the key were discovered on 30 November to be compromised, would you really say that the behavior in March should have been different based on whether a privateKeyUsageExtension were used or not? Put another way: the only potential benefit I can see to scenario 2 over scenario 1 is that the CA is in essence stating: "I'll keep track of the status of Acme Corp., the cert owner, for a longer period of time. If evidence arises that Acme Corp. is no longer the rightful, unique holder of the private key associated with that certificate, I'll let you know - even though Acme Corp. has long since ceased using that private key to sign new transactions. What you do differently because of this information is up to you." My point is this: from what I can see, usage of the extension really doesn't buy you anything. In order to accurately assess whether the transaction was valid at the time of signing, and assess that long after the fact, you have to archive so much extra information that I don't see what pain is caused by the fact that the certificate has expired by then. It's not clear to me what if anything you do differently because you have information directly tied to the certificate - e.g., it was revoked months later. It doesn't save much in the way of processing to have any such information directly tied to the certificate, versus tied to some other piece of information you had to archive. I'm certainly open to explanations as to what I'm missing; that is, why it's important to have this information in the certificate and what you'd do different because of it. But given that privateKeyUsagePeriod is permitted in a certificate for those who really want it (it's a SHOULD NOT, not a MUST NOT unless you want to mark it critical), and I personally don't see any benefit to it, I'm in favor of leaving the recommendation the way it is in 3280. Al Arsenault Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NKInqt068208 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:18:49 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6NKInN7068207 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:18:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-3.llnl.gov (smtp-3.llnl.gov [128.115.41.83]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NKImqt068194 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:18:49 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from azb@llnl.gov) Received: from catalyst2b.llnl.gov (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp-3.llnl.gov (8.12.3/8.12.3/LLNL evision: 1.3 $) with ESMTP id h6NKIdWe017656; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:18:39 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <5.0.0.25.2.20030723130241.07745828@poptop.llnl.gov> X-Sender: e048786@poptop.llnl.gov X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.0 Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:18:30 -0700 To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> From: Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: Michael =?iso-8859-1?Q?Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> In-Reply-To: <1be301c3513c$8af27920$0644a8c0@cp.ru> References: <200307221059.h6MAx7k24154@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <3F1D5D12.60805@stroeder.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 09:04 PM 7/23/2003 +0400, Gregory S. Chudov wrote: >What do you do with your credit card, when it expired? >Throw it to the trash can? No, you return it to the bank. Interesting. But this assumes you can safely return the card ("bank" may be 2000 miles away) and here at least I doubt banks would accept the practice. We are simply admonished to destroy the card upon its expiration, usually accomplished by slicing it into pieces. I suppose the numbers could be retrieved, but a lot of folks toss old statements in the trash as well. You really return it to the bank? The point here, though, is that cert-lifes are relatively short precisely because of concerns with continued key security. This makes the certs "act like" private key usage limiters, when they are properly "key-to-owner" binding limiters. In the strictest usage, one might refuse to validate a signature today if today is beyond the cert expiration, even though the document asserts the signature took place earlier (how to know w/o trusted timestamp)? But as Peter points out, this is a real limitation on certificate utility, broached by most. Cheers! ____tony____ Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> Information Operations and Assurance Center Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, CA 94551-9900 Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NK1cqt067278 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:01:38 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6NK1btu067277 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:01:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp3.pacifier.net (smtp3.pacifier.net [64.255.237.173]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NK1bqt067272 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:01:37 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jimsch@nwlink.com) Received: from ROMANS (dialup-171.75.41.190.Dial1.Washington1.Level3.net [171.75.41.190]) by smtp3.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB36F6DA5F; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:01:35 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: <jimsch@exmsft.com> From: "Jim Schaad" <jimsch@nwlink.com> To: "'pkix'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tuecke@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-06.txt Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 16:01:59 -0400 Message-ID: <002001c35155$4eaf7ee0$8b40a051@augustcellars.local> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2627 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Importance: Normal Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> 1. Section 3.3, para 2: I think that the MAY in this paragrah should be lower case. I do not see these as a protocal statements, but as saying these are ways that reasonable uniqueness could be obtained for a serial number. I assume that other methods of doing this are perfectly allowable. 2. Section 3.4: Does the subject name need to be "unique" among all certificates ever issued by a proxy, or just the active certificates? 3. General: I am still not comfortable that the issuance of Proxy Certificates cannot be restricted (or permitted) by a CA when it issues an EEC. One method of doing this would be a non-critical ProxyCertInfo extension with a pCPathLengthConstrant of 0 in the EEC. 4. Section 2.6: When creating a new PC, where and how is the negotiations on policy language and policy done? Should this be documented as a separate step in the text describing how PCs are obtained/issued? Does something need to be done about potentially asking the relying party as to what policy it requires to perform some task? 5. Section 3.8.2: I find the following text Note that this verification MUST take place regardless of whether or not the PC itself contains a policy, as other PCs in the signing chain MAY contain conditions that MUST be verified. to be confusing because I always get policyLanguage and policy mixed up. I think that all PCs must have policy and so the statement is difficult to parse. I don't know that this can be simplified without renaming the policy field in the extension. The text in item 1) just before this refers to policy and should probably refer to policyLanguage. 6. Section 4.1.3 next to last paragraph. Text should be "If steps (a), (b) or (d) fail,..." 7. Section 4.2: I have a complete lack of understanding for the last three paragraphs in this section. 8. Section 5.1.2: Fix "Section Error! Reference source not found" 9. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NJQEqt065440 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:26:14 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6NJQE7m065438 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:26:14 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail2.microsoft.com (mail2.microsoft.com [131.107.3.124]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NJQCqt065420 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:26:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from trevorf@windows.microsoft.com) Received: from INET-VRS-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.8.110]) by mail2.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:26:09 -0700 Received: from 157.54.8.23 by INET-VRS-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (InterScan E-Mail VirusWall NT); Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:26:07 -0700 Received: from red-imc-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.9.107]) by inet-hub-01.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:26:12 -0700 Received: from win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.0.39]) by red-imc-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:25:49 -0700 Received: from WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.12.81]) by win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:26:07 -0700 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5.6944.0 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: WG Last Call: SCVP Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:26:05 -0700 Message-ID: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD341850F@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: WG Last Call: SCVP Thread-Index: AcNNLNmn+2Ggli6JSdKd9958vd1dfgCk9jSA From: "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> To: "Denis Pinkas" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: <wpolk@nist.gov>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 23 Jul 2003 19:26:07.0890 (UTC) FILETIME=[44233F20:01C35150] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6NJQDqt065431 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> See below. -----Original Message----- From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] Sent: Friday, July 18, 2003 6:02 AM To: Trevor Freeman Cc: wpolk@nist.gov; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: WG Last Call: SCVP Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) The following 8 issues have been suppressed since there are agreed: 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19 and 23. There remains 16 issues to be discussed. The original numbering has been kept. 1. Section 1.3 Validation Policies In this section the wording "validation policy" is used but is left undefined: "A validation policy can be used to specify the SCVP configuration." Please define it. [Trevor Freeman] I have added a reference to 3379 to define validation policy. [Denis] Are you going to add a reference to section 7 from RFC 3379 ? [Trevor Freeman] Actually, I now realise that a simple reference is not going to work since the current use of validation policies in SCVP does not cleanly map onto 3379 use of the term. I will redraft SCVP to clean this up. This text is copied below. A validation policy is a set of rules against which the validation of the certificate is performed. A validation policy MAY include several trust anchors. A trust anchor is defined as one public key, a CA name, and a validity time interval; a trust anchor optionally includes additional constraints. The use of a self-signed certificate is one way to specify the public key to be used, the issuer name, and the validity period of the public key. Additional constraints for each trust anchor MAY be defined. These constraints might include a set of certification policy constraints or a set of naming constraints. These constraints MAY also be included in self-signed certificates. Additional conditions that apply to the certificates in the path MAY also be specified in the validation policy. For example, specific values could be provided for the inputs to the certification path validation algorithm in [PKIX-1], such as user-initial-policy-set, initial-policy-mapping-inhibit, initial-explicit-policy, or initial- any-policy-inhibit. Additional conditions that apply to the end-entity certificate MAY also be specified in the validation policy. For example, a specific name form might be required. In order to succeed, one valid certification path (none of the certificates in the path are expired or revoked) MUST be found between an end-entity certificate and a trust anchor and all constraints that apply to the certification path MUST be verified. 2. Section 1.3 Validation Policies. The text says: " The validation policy is determined by private agreement between the client and the server, ...". While this may be one case this is not the single case. Please delete and simply say: "The validation policy MUST be represented as an OBJECT IDENTIFIER and optionally some additional parameters. [Trevor Freeman] I have removed the word private. [Denis] This does not solve my concern. A validation policy may also be determined by a policy issuer, while means that there is no agreement between the client and the server. The client wants to use a given validation policy defined by a policy issuer. If the server supports it, then it is fine. If the server does not support it, then the client looks for another server supporting it. [Trevor Freeman]I will redraft this section and repost. For the first of the sentence I would thus propose: "The validation policy may be determined by the server, or any third party." For the second part of the sentence, we currently have: ", but it MUST be represented as an OBJECT IDENTIFIER." I have proposed: "The validation policy MUST be represented as an OBJECT IDENTIFIER and optionally some additional parameters." So the issue is whether we have or not "and optionally some additional parameters" This seems to be the reason of a disagreement on many of the other points. The validation policy does not only include the processing algorithms but also the values used by the processing algorithms to validate a certificate. The two possibilities, as I see them, are : - the OID of the validation policy tells everything (i.e. both the processing algorithms and all the values to be used by these processing algorithms), - the OID validation policy provides the processing algorithms and some of the values to be used, but some other values may be defined as additional parameters. Please, reconsider my proposal. 3. In section 3, SignedData is defined with unsignedAttrs being not used. As it will be explained later on, unsignedAttrs should be used to carry unsigned certificate values, as well as unsigned revocation information (CRLs in particular) while the references (much shorter) will be signed. This has the major advantage of keeping the size of archived signed responses short. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement in 3379. Correct. However, this is a big advantage in the following case: The RP wants to keep an archive of "YES" answers. If the values are all signed, then the size of the archives will get pretty big since the same CA certificates and CRLs will be duplicated many times in every "YES" answer. If only the references are signed, then the values may be stored elsewhere and only once: the same values will be usable for thousands of validations. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement in 3379. 4. Section 3.2. The text currently says on page 9: " The OPTIONAL valPolicy, trustAnchors, intermediateCerts, and revInfos items provide context for the client request." This sentence should be replaced by the following: "Either the valPolicy item or the trustAnchors item SHALL be used. The intermediateCerts and revInfos items provide certificates or revocation status information which MAY be useful to build the response." [Trevor Freeman] I disagree since the validation policy alone is not enough. 3379 does not require that the validation policy and the parameter used with that policy are represented by a single OID. [Denis] I do not think that you disagree on the second sentence: " The intermediateCerts and revInfos items provide certificates or revocation status information which MAY be useful to build the response." [Trevor Freeman] Wait for the redrafted version You probably disagree on the first sentence. It is in fact incorrect. I would thus propose the following: "Either the valPolicy item alone or both the valPolicy and the trustAnchors items SHALL be used. The rational is explained in issue 2. 5. Section 3.2.3 wantBack More options should be allowed to return: 1) only the references of both the certificates and the associated revocation status information for the path as a signed parameter, [Trevor Freeman] This is covered by a certificate status request. 2) both the references of both the certificates and the associated revocation status information for the path as signed parameter, and the certificate values together with the associated revocation status information as an unsigned attribute (see comment 3) [Trevor Freeman] This is covered by two requests, one for certificate status and one DPD. [Denis] This is not optimum, since this could be done by one request. If this is done in two requests, this may be complicated because there is no assurance that the first DPD request will return the path used by the DPV request. So the client will have to test if the path that is returned is the right one and re-issue a PVD request until it the right one is returned. If you maintain two requests, these additional explanations would be useful. [Trevor Freeman] We are past optimisations. I am only considering critical issues. Note : certificate values or associated revocation status information as a signed parameter are not needed when using the two alternatives above. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement in 3379. The client is at liberty to ignore the signature. [Denis] This relates to issue 2. [Trevor Freeman] Wait for the redrafted version. It is unclear why *only* the "Public key from the certificate" should be returned. Either suppress this option, explain why it is sufficient or return the full certificate. [Trevor Freeman] This reduces the footprint of a simple client. [Denis] Maybe. If we keep it, then add the full certificate as another possibility. [Trevor Freeman] Please clarify. We already support returning the certificate. 6. Section 3.2.5 valPolicy . The text says: " The valPolicy item, defines the validation policy to be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The client can use this instead of specifying other SCVP configuration items such as trustAnchors. The value of this item can be determined by private agreement between the client and the server, but it MUST be represented as an object identifier. The server might want to assign identifiers that indicate that some settings are used in addition to others given in the request. In this way, the validation policy object identifier can be a shorthand for some SCVP options, but not others". Replace the whole with: " The valPolicy item, defines the validation policy to be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The client MUST either use it or use trustAnchors which allows to define relatively simple validation policies". [Trevor Freeman] I have removed the second sentence and the word "private" from the third sentence. [Denis] This does not solve my concern. See issue 2. [Trevor Freeman] I am redrafting this. I would propose the following rephrasing: " The valPolicy item, defines the validation policy to be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The client MUST either use it or use it in combination with trustAnchors. The second option allows to define relatively simple validation policies". [Trevor Freeman] agreed 7. Section 3.2.5 valPolicy . The text says: "All SCVP servers MUST support the default policy". This is fine. However, it is important that the client may know the parameters of the default policy when the default policy has been used by the server. So the default policy SHALL define its parameters. [Trevor Freeman] the default policy has no parameters - it is a set of rules as per 3379. [Denis] As explained in issue 2, a validation policy must at least define one root key, so it is not true to say that it has no parameter. [Trevor Freeman] Not true. Both the default policy and the Name comparison policy do not define a trust root. The trust root must be supplied in the request or the server chooses. In order to be able to use this protocol with Qualified Certificates (as per the European Directive on Electronic Signatures) certPolicies should further be subdivided in two categories: certPolicy for the end-entity certificate and certPolicies for CA certificates (currently CA certificates do not have certPolicies mandated as per the European Directive on Electronic Signatures). It is thus propose to defined three parameters for the default policy: - trustAnchors, - certPolicy for the end-entity certificate, - certPolicies for CA certificates. As mentioned in the text, revocation conditions include any source of revocation available. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement for 3379. The trust anchors are specified in the request or the sever choose. You requirements are accommodated by two requests, one for the end cert, and one for the CA cert or define another algorithm. [Denis] No. This would not solve my concern. The EESSI standards built upon the EU Directive ask for a given CP to be present in the end-entity certificate, but place no such constraint on the CP from the CA certificates. It would however be nice to be able to use the default validation policy in such a case. [Trevor Freeman] My previous answer still stands. Two requests using the default policy meets your request. 8. Section 3.2.5.1 The need and the rational for this section could not be understood: an OID unambiguously identity a validation policy, a "name Validation Policy" or "Validation Policy name" (?) would not add anything. Please explain or delete. [Trevor Freeman] This was asked for at IETF 56 as an example for another validation policy. [Denis] Adding an explanation in the document like "This was asked for at IETF 56" would not be sufficient. [Trevor Freeman] disagree. Its documented on the list along with countless other issues not in RFCs. :-) I still do not understand. Please provide additional explanations in the main body of the document (or delete). 10. Section 4 Validation Response. The text states: " An unsigned response MUST only be generated for an error status". This is contradictory with the preamble where it is said: "SCVP can be used by clients that do much of the certificate processing themselves but simply want an untrusted server to collect information for them." When simply collecting certification paths, responses do not need to be signed. Thus clients should have a way to indicate whether they want signed responses or not. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement in 3379. The client can ignore the signature. [Denis] I disagree. This is a DPD requirement. RFC 3379 states: For the client to be confident that all of the elements from the response originate from the expected DPD server, an authenticated response MAY be required. Signing takes time and resources. Please do not mandate the signing operation. [Trevor Freeman] We are conformant with 3379. The server decides and may return a signed or unsigned response. 14. Section 4.4 requestReference, page 22. The text states: "However, the requestNonce provides a better mechanism for matching requests and responses". This is incorrect. Change into: "While requestRef allows to detect that the request was modified, the requestNonce parameter provides replay protection." [Trevor Freeman] disagree [Denis] You disagree but you do not provide a rational for it. Please explain your position. [Trevor Freeman] I don't think you assertion that the current text is incorrect - is correct. 15. Section 4.4.1 requestHash, page 23. The text states: "However, the requestNonce provides a better mechanism for matching requests andresponses." This is incorrect. Change into: "While requestHash allows to detect that the request was modified, the requestNonce parameter provides replay protection." [Trevor Freeman] disagree [Denis] You disagree but you do not provide a rational for it. Please explain your position. [Trevor Freeman] I don't think you assertion that the current text is incorrect - is correct. 17. Section 4.6 responder, page 23. The text states: "The OPTIONAL responder item is used to identify the server." The rational for this parameter is not clear. In PKIX, the subject item from a certificate allows to identify a server. Since it is unrelated, it is very doubtful to have a value chosen by the client which has only local significance to the SCVP server. Please explain or delete. [Trevor Freeman] This is a requirement of 3379. [Denis] Maybe, but where from ? I would guess that this item is only needed to detect a loop when chaining is being used. If this is the case, please add such explanations and what the client SHALL do with it. If this is not the case, please add the appropriate explanations. [Trevor Freeman] Since you are an author of 3379, I would expect you to be better placed to answer why this is in 3379. 20. Section 4.7.5 page 28. The text states: "The octet string value for the AC issuer certification path used to verify the certificate in the request, { id-swb 5 }, contains the CertBundle type. The syntax and semantics of the CertBundle type are described in section 3.2.7." As already mentioned, since CertBundle ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKCReference and PKCReference ::= CHOICE { cert [1] Certificate, pkcRef [2] ESSCertID } The client should be able to say in his request whether he wants back cert or pkcRef. If within the signed response he gets pkcRef, then he should be able to say that he wants CertBundle with the option cert as an unsigned attribute. The integrity of this unsigned parameter can easily be checked using the signed pkcRef. [Trevor Freeman] disagree [Denis] See item 3. [Trevor Freeman] See my response to item 3. 21. Section 4.7.6 valPolicy, page 29. The text states: "The valPolicy value MUST NOT be id-svp-defaultValPolicy". If the default policy has been used, then the client MUST be able to know which one it was: the default policy may vary with the time. Change into: "When the valPolicy value is id-svp-defaultValPolicy, then all the parameters from that policy MUST be returned." [Trevor Freeman] Disagree. If the client wants all the parameters used with the validation policy, then they can ask for the request to be included in the response. [Denis] Fine. However, it would be nice to include this explanation in the document. [Trevor Freeman] Agreed. 22. Section 6 Validation Policies Response. The text states: "The response is not signed by the server". It would be nice to include a variant that would allow the response to be signed. [Trevor Freeman] Disagree. [Denis] You disagree but you do not provide a rational for it. Please explain your position. [Trevor Freeman] Actually I have reconsidered this and have changed my position and now will mandate that this will be signed. 24. Addition. At present, PKCReference is defined as: PKCReference ::= CHOICE { cert [1] Certificate, pkcRef [2] ESSCertID } In OCSPv2 a third alternative, i.e. certIdWithSignature has been introduced. It would be interesting to be able to support it. It allows an OCSPserver (and thus an SCVP server) to answer when it does not have access to the value of the certificate (in particular when it *only* uses CRLs in the background), whereas ESSCertID would be useless. certIdWithSignature is a compact way to specify unambiguously a certificate and to allow to verify a certification path. CertIdWithSignature ::= SEQUENCE { issuerandSerialNumber IssuerandSerialNumber, tbsCertificateHash BIT STRING, certSignature CertSignature } IssuerandSerialNumber is defined in [RFC3369] section 10.2.4. tbsCertificateHash contains a hash value computed over the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate field from the certificate using the hash function identified in the signature algorithm from the signature. certSignature contains the signature fields from the certificate. CertSignature ::= SEQUENCE { signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureValue BIT STRING } [Trevor Freeman] Disagree. This is not a requirement in 3379. [Denis] Yes, this is not in RFC 3379 but this comes from an observation made after RFC 3379 was done and when the OCSPv2 draft was written. Please take a closer look at this issue. [Trevor Freeman] disagree. The SCVP server MUST have the certificate to build a response. This is a MUST in 3379. Denis Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NJFhqt063584 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:15:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6NJFhD9063583 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:15:43 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NJFgqt063575 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:15:42 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA25468; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:15:41 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307231915.PAA25468@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:15:41 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Proxy Certificate Profile Author(s) : S. Tuecke et al. Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt Pages : 45 Date : 2003-7-23 This document forms a certificate profile for Proxy Certificates, based on X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates as defined in RFC 3280, for use in the Internet. The term Proxy Certificate is used to describe a certificate that is derived from, and signed by, a normal X.509 Public Key End Entity Certificate or by another Proxy Certificate for the purpose of providing restricted proxying and delegation within a PKI based authentication system. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-23151222.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-07.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-23151222.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NH58qt054545 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 10:05:08 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6NH58Xs054544 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 10:05:08 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mx2.cryptopro.ru (mx2.cryptopro.ru [213.59.158.218]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NH4tqt054529 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 10:04:57 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from chudov@cryptopro.ru) Received: from fandra2k ([192.168.68.6]) by mx2.cryptopro.ru with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.5329); Wed, 23 Jul 2003 21:04:56 +0400 Message-ID: <1be301c3513c$8af27920$0644a8c0@cp.ru> From: "Gregory S. Chudov" <chudov@cryptopro.ru> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Cc: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> References: <200307221059.h6MAx7k24154@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <3F1D5D12.60805@stroeder.com> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 21:04:56 +0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2720.3000 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 23 Jul 2003 17:04:56.0939 (UTC) FILETIME=[8B0EB3B0:01C3513C] Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Michael Ströder wrote: > Personally I see no use of PKUP extension. How long signatures created with > a private key associated with a PKC can be validated should not be specified > in a public-key certificate. The more natural solution to me is to specify > this in the policy and cryptographic protocol used for signing the message. It's NOT about signatures validity. It's about private key policy. Unfortunately, this very useful extension becaume a victim of misinterpretaion of it's purpose. In practice, the private key does have a validity period, which is often shorter than the validity of a corresponding certificate. The key, which is used for too long, has very high probability to become lost, forgotten, compromized in any other way, so this period is normally small - a year or less. While the certificate can last for many years. Without this extension, we can only tell the person not to forget to get a new certificate and dispose of his old private key within given period of time. Using this extension, we can force a person to do this, because this policy is written right there, in his certificate. CA can grant him a certificate with a simple condition: he MUST destroy his public key before it expires. If he forgot about his key, and did not notify CA that the key was destroyed, well, that means the key is potentialy compromised and certificate should be revoked. What do you do with your credit card, when it expired? Throw it to the trash can? No, you return it to the bank. Certificate expiration time is like a bumper for a train. Bumper makes sure the train doesn't do too much damage, if the brakes are broken. But the normal situation is when the train stops normally, never reaching the bumper. PrivateKeyUsagePeriod is like those breaks, it is a normal way to stop using a key when it's time. Good luck, Greg Chudov. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NGwqqt054020 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 09:58:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6NGwqF5054019 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 09:58:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from e5.ny.us.ibm.com (e5.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.105]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NGwoqt053998 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 09:58:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from tgindin@us.ibm.com) Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.150]) by e5.ny.us.ibm.com (8.12.9/8.12.2) with ESMTP id h6NGwZ4X220056; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:58:35 -0400 Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01av02.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.216]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.12.9/NCO/VER6.5) with ESMTP id h6NGwSoc159816; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:58:29 -0400 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) Cc: d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk, ietf-pkix@imc.org, kent@bbn.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 5.0.11 July 24, 2002 From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> Message-ID: <OFAA6AB2DD.90216A55-ON85256D6B.005ACF1E-85256D6C.005D377D@us.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:58:17 -0400 X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 6.0.1 w/SPRs JHEG5JQ5CD, THTO5KLVS6, JHEG5HMLFK, JCHN5K5PG9|March 27, 2003) at 07/23/2003 12:58:33, Serialize complete at 07/23/2003 12:58:33 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Peter, I'd codify what they're doing as follows: The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from notBefore through notAfter, inclusive. When an RP is validating the signature on a document which claims to have been signed or produced at a given past time, the RP SHOULD proceed with the verification of the signature if that time is within the validity period even though the time of verification is outside it. If the RP requires authoritative proof either of the time at which the document was signed or of the certificate's not having been revoked, it MAY reject the signature. Note that TSP deals with only one of the two conditions in the MAY. Tom Gindin I/T Architect - Security IBM Business Consulting Services - Public Sector Phone (301) 803-3460 pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) Sent by: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org 07/22/2003 09:32 AM To: d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk, kent@bbn.com cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: >I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do not >recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: But those are mostly just hypothetical objections. At the moment we have two inescapabable facts: 1. CAs issue certs based on a 1-year billing cycle, and nothing anyone says will change that. No CA will issue a cert with a 20-year lifetime, unless it's for its own CA certs. 2. Users need to use certs to validate signatures at n times the CA-ordained lifetime. In the abscence of any mechanism to do this, they are ignoring the cert expiry time. In other words, out of necessity, they're making the following change to RFC 3280: The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from notBefore through notAfter, inclusive. When used with signing certificates, implementations SHOULD NOT pay any attention to the notAfter date. Given that this isn't going to change, it would seem that some guidance for users would be useful here. Since neither (1) nor (2) can be altered, what would be needed is a simple extension, found in signing certs, containing a date to which the cert can still be used for signature-checking beyond the obvious notAfter value. This could be written up as a short one-page application note, no more (well, a bit more once you add all the usual boilerplate and whatnot). Now CAs can still decide not to issue certs like that, but (a) they can't justify it by claiming it screws up their standard cert cycle because it doesn't affect validTo/validFrom, and (b) users at least have some guidance as to what to do, which is better than the current situation where all they can do is ignore parts of the standard on an ad hoc basis. Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NFPcqt050548 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 08:25:38 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6NFPchW050547 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 08:25:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NFPaqt050537 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 08:25:36 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6NFOuoY031078; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 03:24:56 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6NFOtq26969; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 03:24:55 +1200 Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 03:24:55 +1200 Message-Id: <200307231524.h6NFOtq26969@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> writes: >RFC 3126 provides some guidance : > > If a recipient wants to hold a valid electronic signature he will > have to ensure that he has obtained a valid time stamp for it, before > that key (and any key involved in the validation) is revoked. The > sooner the time-stamp is obtained after the signing time, the better. > >However, since the "sooner is the better", it is not mentioned explicitly >that the time-stamp token MUST be obtained at latest before the end of the >validity period of the certificate (since a CRL does not include the serial >number of a certificate once it has expired) and the CRL (or OCSP response) >close to that time MUST be captured. Right, timestamping (and 3126) would definitely be the proper solution to the problem. Unfortunately though it's little-used (and seems unlikely to be adopted) in the particular area where this type of long-term signature validation needs to occur, which is in EDI transactions (I'm sure it occurs elswhere as well, but when I hear people wanting to use expired certs to verify sigs it's usually in this area). Typically the requirement for these things is that you archive copies of all messages going back to the beginning of time, and have to verify signatures using archived certs at some arbitrary point in the future. This is just an updated form of the "securely archive everything forerever" in interchange agreements. In other words they've taken the rather vague "archive it securely" and made it more concrete as "archive messages in signed form so they can be verified as untampered at a later date", with variations depending on which industry group and/or set of agreements is in effect. So what you have is: - Signed data that must be stored over long periods of time (possibly decades). - Certs with a one-year lifetime (see my earlier posting). - People in need of guidance as to how they can reconcile the two, within the framework that they already have (which unfortunately excludes adding additional external services, at least until the EDI standards and interchange agreements are all renegotiated, although I suspect the main change that will take place at that point is a switch to XML or whatever else is trendy at the time). Let me ask some of the people (at least the ones I can remember) who've brought this up in the past to see what they'd actually need done. Incidentally, one amusing/scary side-effect of using certs after they've expired is that the CA generally no longer bothers issuing CRLs for them (since they've expired), but they're still being used to validate signatures beyond the 1-year billing period. As a result, it's impossible to perform revocation checking on the cert. I guess if you're ignoring the expiry date you may as well ignore revocation checking as well :-). Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NEu7qt049393 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 07:56:07 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6NEu7Ll049392 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 07:56:07 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6NEu4qt049384 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 07:56:05 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6NEtuoY028861; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 02:55:56 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6NEtu926888; Thu, 24 Jul 2003 02:55:56 +1200 Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 02:55:56 +1200 Message-Id: <200307231455.h6NEtu926888@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: michael@stroeder.com, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> writes: >Personally I see no use of PKUP extension. How long signatures created with a >private key associated with a PKC can be validated should not be specified in >a public-key certificate. The more natural solution to me is to specify this >in the policy and cryptographic protocol used for signing the message. That would make it a CMS issue, which doesn't seem right. It's the cert that's expired, not the CMS signature. In other words it doesn't matter what sort of signing attributes you stick in the signature, the problem is that as far as the cert-checking code is concerned, the cert has expired and is therefore no longer allowed to be used. Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6N9Kuqt022421 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 02:20:56 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6N9Ku2j022420 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 02:20:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from nb2.stroeder.com (cxxix.yapay.inka.de [193.197.185.3]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6N9Krqt022412 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 02:20:54 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from michael@stroeder.com) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 51EC029AAA; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:49:39 +0200 (CEST) Received: from stroeder.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4610922C2F; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:49:38 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <3F1D5D12.60805@stroeder.com> Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:49:38 +0200 From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030626 X-Accept-Language: de-de, de, en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? References: <200307221059.h6MAx7k24154@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> In-Reply-To: <200307221059.h6MAx7k24154@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.76.2.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: by AMaViS 0.3.12pre8 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Peter Gutmann wrote: > > Yes, because they want to use the signing key (relatively) short-term, but be > able to verify sigs using the public portion years after the private portion > has been retired/destroyed/lost/whatever. Again I'm astonished to see this discussion here. It shows like other discussed topic how much disagreement is here about very basic topics. Personally I see no use of PKUP extension. How long signatures created with a private key associated with a PKC can be validated should not be specified in a public-key certificate. The more natural solution to me is to specify this in the policy and cryptographic protocol used for signing the message. Ciao, Michael. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6N3C2qt086545 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 20:12:02 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6N3C2DQ086544 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 20:12:02 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from iscan02.secomtrust.net (iscan01.secomtrust.net [61.114.177.102]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6N3Bxqt086534 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 20:12:00 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from shimaoka@secom.ne.jp) Received: (qmail 3544 invoked by alias); 23 Jul 2003 03:11:59 -0000 Delivered-To: alias-map-ietf-pkix@imc.org@MAP Received: (qmail 3536 invoked by alias); 23 Jul 2003 03:11:58 -0000 Received: from localhost (HELO mail.secomtrust.net) (127.0.0.1) by localhost with SMTP; 23 Jul 2003 03:11:58 -0000 Received: (qmail 6367 invoked from network); 23 Jul 2003 03:11:57 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO ?172.30.5.54?) (172.30.5.54) by mail with SMTP; 23 Jul 2003 03:11:57 -0000 Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:11:58 +0900 From: Masaki SHIMAOKA <shimaoka@secom.ne.jp> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt In-Reply-To: <200307031532.LAA16682@ietf.org> References: <200307031532.LAA16682@ietf.org> Message-Id: <20030722191927.CD43.SHIMAOKA@secom.ne.jp> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: Becky! ver. 2.06.02 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Dear Cooper, > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. > This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. > > Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: > Certification Path Building > Author(s) : M. Cooper, Y. Dzambasow > Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt > Pages : 59 > Date : 2003-7-3 This is an excellent trial. Sorry for my delayed comments below. 1. path building over http This text gives an example as path building algorithm based over LDAP. Shall we consider also about a path building algorithm over http? # I know and agree that basically path building is used in the environment which have directory system. IMHO, path building over http may be achieved using cAIssuers accessMethod in AIA extension, but it only describes single path like strict hierarchy. 2. forward direction vs. reverse direction My basic opinion is shown below as hybrid path building. ===== Path building in the forward direction is very useful for tree topology that each node has unique parent. However, when each node has plural parent (e.g., mesh PKI or bi-lateral cross-certified PKI), this method is useful only a bit. First, therefore, a builder SHOULD attempt to build a path in the forward direction till a self-signed certificate (or maybe intermediate certificate issued by plural CAs). Then, the builder MAY attempt to build the remain path either way. 2) Path building by the reverse direction -----------------------------------------> +---------+ +--------------+ +-------------+ | Trusted | | Intermediate | | Self-Signed | | Root |---->| Certificate |----->| Certificate | ^ +---------+ +--------------+ +-------------+ | | | | | v | +----------------+ | 1) Path | Intermediate | | building | Certificate(*) | | by +----------------+ | forward | | direction | | v | +--------------+ | | Target | | | Certificate | +--------------+ (*) Not self-signed certificate. # I know more consideration yet is required for this. ===== And this topic has one problem. Some subordinate CA populate their CA certificate to issuedToThisCA of crossCertificatePair attribute in their own (CA) directory entry. On the other hand, most cross-certified (not subordinate) CA also populates their cross-certificate to same location. When a path builder attempts hybrid building as above, the builder in second step (reverse direction) does not require obtaining the subordinate CA information. In almost (hierarchical) PKI, path building may finish before second step. Only in some complex PKI, path building may need second step. Anyway, this hybrid algorithm is useful for every PKI, I think. 3. Static path vs. Dynamic path Static certification path means that the client is given beforehand all certificates and all revocation information required for path validation. On the other hand, dynamic certification path means that the client at least must obtain some certificates and revocation information required for path validation. Dynamic certification path may use some certificates and revocation information in certificate store or local cache. For a client that cannot build a certification path dynamically, we should consider static certification path, e.g., SSL/TLS handshake. Your I-D describes that how build a certification path, and my 'memo for mPKI' I-D aims to support how to design a certification path. So I hope to review our documents each other frequently. Best Regards, ----- Masaki SHIMAOKA SECOM Trust.net System Engineering Dpt. Tel: +81 422 91 8493 (ext.3551) Fax: +81 422 45 0536 e-mail: shimaoka@secom.ne.jp Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MKP0qt069695 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 13:25:00 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MKP00I069694 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 13:25:00 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp11.eresmas.com (smtp11.eresmas.com [62.81.235.111]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MKOxqt069681 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 13:24:59 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from diegofv@eresmas.com) Received: from [192.168.105.166] (helo=ma20.eresmas.com) by smtp11.eresmas.com with esmtp (Exim 4.10) id 19f3gt-000580-00; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 22:24:55 +0200 From: <diegofv@eresmas.com> To: diegofv@eresmas.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Reply-To: "Diego Fernandez" <diegofv@eresmas.com> Message-ID: <35715935106f.35106f357159@ma20.eresmas.com> Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 20:24:56 GMT X-Mailer: Netscape Webmail MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Language: es Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? X-Accept-Language: es Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Sorry, my latest mail was incomplete. >From my point of view, the PKUP is a strong extension for CA certs. The certs issued by a CA can be verified during the overall CA cert validity time. The CA extensions will show when it will be necessary to renew the CA cert because of the private key, and which is the maximum period of validity time for final certs (notAfter field of a final cert will never be exceeding notAfter CA) Kind regards, Diego. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MJqmqt068680 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 12:52:48 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MJqmQv068679 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 12:52:48 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from osf1.gmu.edu (osf1.gmu.edu [129.174.1.13]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MJqgqt068674 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 12:52:42 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pmhesse@geminisecurity.com) Received: from phessel ([129.174.244.115]) by osf1.gmu.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id PAA172048; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 15:52:38 -0400 (EDT) From: "Peter Hesse" <pmhesse@geminisecurity.com> To: "'Steve Hanna'" <steve.hanna@sun.com> Cc: "'PKIX List'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Matt Cooper'" <mcooper@orionsec.com>, "'Yuriy Dzambasow'" <yuriy@anassoc.com>, "'Susan Joseph'" <susan.joseph@DigitalNet.com>, "'Richard E. Nicholas \(Nicholas, Richard\)'" <Richard.Nicholas@DigitalNet.com> Subject: RE: draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 15:52:17 -0400 Organization: Gemini Security Solutions, Inc. MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <00cb01c3508a$c4f47590$6401a8c0@gemsec.com> X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.4024 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA1; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_00C6_01C35069.39F26180" Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <3F130E75.12748A26@sun.com> X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1106 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_00C6_01C35069.39F26180 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Steve, I have yet more comments inline. I've done my best to split it up but it's getting harder to read, I'm sure! Sorry for not getting back to you sooner, but I was on vacation. -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Steve Hanna Sent: Monday, July 14, 2003 4:12 PM To: Peter Hesse Cc: 'PKIX List'; 'Matt Cooper'; 'Yuriy Dzambasow'; 'Susan Joseph'; Richard E. Nicholas (Nicholas, Richard) Subject: Re: draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Good to hear from you, Peter! Long time no see. Responses inline below. > I'm glad to see more discussions of certificate path building. In a > non-hierarchical PKI where relying parties have different trust > anchors, path building is essential. And it's not easy! > > However, I don't think that we're ready to have an official 'best > practices' document on path building yet. Very few people have > implemented PKIX-compliant path building (only Sun and > Cygnacom/DigitalNet, I think) and there are many areas that are still > unclear. > > <PMH> What is PKIX-compliant path building exactly? I am not aware of > any documents that define this. This is a part of the reason why there > is a need for this document.</PMH> I don't have any objection to defining the term "PKIX- compliant path building". But I don't think you need 59 pages to do that. You could do that in one sentence. <PMH> We can certainly work on the size of the document, although the document is certainly shorter than some PKIX documents and longer than others. </PMH> It's simply the process of building certification paths that are valid according to RFC 3280. <PMH> I think the main problem we have is that the process is not simple, else there would be more robust implementations that claimed PKIX path building capability. (Sun's Java CertPath, CygnaCom/Entrust internal and external libraries, and DigitalNet CML are the only robust implementations I know of.) </PMH> Most of the document describes and recommends specific algorithms for path building. I don't think that we have anything approaching agreement on these algorithms yet. <PMH> The document only discusses two basic algorithms for path building, from the root toward the target, and from the target toward the root. Most of the document is spent discussing optimizations a developer can make to support their path construction, as well as common problems with path development implementations and how they can be avoided. The entirety of the document is just informational and recommendations, it is not by any means prescribing methods. </PMH> Fortunately, there is no need for consensus in this area. I can use one path building algorithm and you can use an entirely different one without affecting interoperability. So I see no need to rush to publish an RFC on this topic. <PMH> You are absolutely correct, that is why we wish to make this an informational RFC and not a part of the standards track. (I now see that there is no mark in the draft of this being in the Informational category, but that is certainly our intention.) </PMH> Nobody has written RFCs on "how to write an OCSP server". As long as you comply with the protocol spec, you'll be able to interoperate just fine. The same should be true with respect to path building. <PMH> I don't think this is a good example, because path building is not a protocol. It is fairly easy to get bits on a wire the way you want. Given the size and complexity of RFC 3280, it is a bit harder to tell someone to go forth and build an implementation that handles all the cases RFC 3280 may throw at them. </PMH> And I even think it may be a fine thing to have an RFC saying "here's how to solve the tricky problem of cert path building", once we have agreement on that. But I don't think we're close to that yet. <PMH> Sections 3-7 of the document attempt to address 'how to solve the tricky problem'. Being an informational RFC, the goal here is not to prescribe a solution but provide tools to developers. After some amount of time (possibly never) the PKIX community may choose to reexamine and prescribe a particular method for path building--but I doubt it. This is not our intention. </PMH> If you have a strong argument for why we *need* an RFC on path building *soon* (even if it's still an active research area), then maybe an Experimental RFC would suffice. <PMH> As I said before, we intend it to be Informational. I don't think Experimental is really the right category, in my view that is more for protocols. </PMH> > The I-D just published presents one early perspective on these > questions, not a consensus. > > <PMH> I disagree that the document provides one early perspective, it > describes many different scenarios and many different ways of dealing > with them.</PMH> I hope we can avoid the need to have many different ways of solving this problem. Otherwise, it will not be possible to have general-purpose mass-market software that will work in all sorts of PKI topologies. I expect that we can come up with some good general-purpose algorithms, but I think it will take some time and some real data showing how different algorithms perform in different environments. <PMH> I'm a little confused by your point here, at first it seemed you were against a prescribed method, and now it seems you're afraid of too many methods. Regardless, this document was intended to demonstrate a series of general purpose optimizations that could be cobbled together to form an algorithm. It's like opening up a toolbox and preparing to repair something. Just because you have all the tools doesn't mean you'll use them all. I expect the end result to be many implementations that may differ slightly but all are more robust than the current state of things. </PMH> > <PMH>This document was developed by five different authors from four > different companies, all of which having varied amounts of experience > building path development algorithms for many different environments, > from pure mesh style (Entrust style?) to strict hierarchy to bridge > ca.</PMH> Did these folks actually work on four or five separate implementations of path building and pull together their ideas? Or did they all work on one or two implementations (maybe successive versions)? <PMH> Well, I asked for it. There are four different implementations of path building represented. The first never made it as a library but was integrated into software written by CygnaCom in the '97-'98 timeframe. CPDL was developed from the ground up but used some of the same optimizations. CML integrated CPDL for a while but now implements its own. And developers of Entrust's internal path-building capability are represented. Not to mention my work with you on JSR55, although that was more about API and less about functionality. The authors will gladly share other curriculum vitae points as necessary :) </PMH> I hate to ask personal questions like that, but you raised the issue and maybe I'm just unaware of these many separate implementations of PKIX-compliant path validation. If so, then I guess I'm just not very well plugged into the path building community and this really does represent a community consensus (although I'm still disturbed by the lack of hard data). But if the authors actually worked on a single project, then I don't think that represents rough consensus within IETF. <PMH> Our experience is certainly broader than that of a single project, not just in the development of path building algorithms but also in their use and tuning. Additionally, as an Informational RFC, I don't necessarily know that this document or our experience needs to form a rough consensus of the entire IETF. > <PMH>The document attempts to discuss many > of the previously encountered problems and decisions based upon those > problems, but does not make any hard and fast rules on which way > future implementations should be developed.</PMH> No, but it contains many recommendations. Just search for "recommend" or "should" in the document. <PMH> We say "recommend" and "should" to avoid making requirements and "must"s. We make clear through the document that it is a best practices guideline. </PMH> And I don't see or know of data to support these recommendations. <PMH> Aside from DPD/DPV where requirements were defined, what other RFCs required the documentation and use of real-world data in their development? Adding this requirement seems unfair. </PMH> > For now, I suggest that people who have implemented path building > publish their insights, results, and ideas either as individual I-Ds > without the intent to become an RFC or as research papers. Then we can > discuss these results and ideas, test them in real-world scenarios, > and arrive at a consensus on what Best Current Practices should be > included in a BCP document on this topic. We might even want to start > an IRTF research group or an informal discussion group to coordinate > this research, sift through the results, and arrive at a solid and > well-supported consensus. This effort will take some time, but I > expect it will produce much better results. > > <PMH> X.509 has existed in one form or another since 1988, and after > 15 years I think we owe the community some amount of tried and true > guidance toward path building. Does this document have all the > answers on what the best way is to build paths? No--but the document > states that very fact repeatedly--different environments will always > lead to different optimizations for that environment. </PMH> While X.509 has been around for many years, non-hierarchical topologies are a fairly recent development. I haven't seen any data comparing how different path building algorithms perform in different non-hierarchical topologies. So I don't think we know enough yet to say which algorithms are best. <PMH> I couldn't agree more. However, I can say that in the different topologies I've worked in, (and having previously worked with/for Entrust and so closely in the Bridge CA demonstrations you know the majority were non-hierarchical) the things we outline in this document are useful! </PMH> The current I-D lists 20 different sorting techniques, but it doesn't provide any hard data about which work better in which topologies. And I suspect there may be other techniques that might be better. I'm not suggesting that you publish an RFC full of graphs showing which technique is best in which environments. That probably belongs in a research paper. The RFC can then point to the research paper. <PMH> Again, I am not sure why there is a need for hard data before publishing some best practices guidelines. We did discuss taking section 3.3 out of the document and referring to it elsewhere, but we could not find similar examples in other RFCs. Nor did we want to be constantly updating that second document :) </PMH> > If it's felt that we really need a BCP on this topic in > short order, then I think it should be restricted to things that we > are fairly sure are good practices (like advising CAs to include name > constraints and AIA in certificates to help path building and advising > path builders to ensure that they handle simple hierarchical PKIs > quickly but still handle complex PKIs properly). > > <PMH> This draft focuses on path building, not best practices for how > authorities should structure things to simplify building. Perhaps > that should be the topic of another I-D. During drafts we discussed > prioritizing different optimizations saying "you definitely should do > A,B,C and probably do D,E,F," etc. However we decided not to because > we wanted to make the developers free to make their own decisions > based upon the environments with which they were working. </PMH> My point was that we should restrict any BCP to things that we (the PKIX working group) can agree (via rough consensus) are actually good practices. <PMH> The I-D was published to create just such a starting point. Now is the time for people to tell us where we're wrong! </PMH> Maybe we should have two BCPs: one on path building techniques and one things CAs can do to make path building easier. At this point, I suspect you could easily distill all of our wisdom in each of those areas into one or two pages. So let's set aside the question of whether they should be separate documents. I'd really like to know why we need to have an RFC on path building now, since it seems to be an internal matter for relying parties with no interoperability implications, except with respect to things that CAs can do to make path building easier. <PMH> Our document has a section on Motivation that I think accurately shows why we need this document, and why we need it now. (Or maybe even a couple years ago.) I guess you and I can argue this all day, but the PKIX WG will have to stand up and be counted on whether there is a need for this RFC. I will honestly tell you that I discussed path building with representatives of two large PKI vendors a few years ago while performing the Bridge CA demonstrations. When I asked why they did not have robust path building capability, their answer was 'because there is no RFC for it'. *That* is one of my prime motivations. </PMH> Thanks, Steve P.S. I'm sorry I can't make it to Vienna this week, since I think we could have a much more productive and relaxed conversation over a few beers. Maybe we can schedule a time to grab a few beers and talk on the phone. Failing that, we can continue discussing this by email. But rest assured that I have complete respect for your work. And I'm most interested in what we can do to increase PKI deployment and usage. If you can convince me that publishing this document is a good way to help in that area, I will be glad to help champion it. But I may offer some suggestions for changes. <PMH> I too was not in Austria and would have happily met up for a few beers to continue this discussion. (I had a good excuse, I was on vacation with my wife and 7 week old daughter!) We definitely want feedback and will be happy to hear any suggestions for the document. I look forward to continued productive conversations on the topic, in person, on the phone, or by email. I hope the end result is a product that the PKIX community will be happy with, and will help other developers to create robust path building implementations. --Peter +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | Peter Hesse pmhesse@geminisecurity.com | | Phone: (703)934-2031 Gemini Security Solutions, Inc. | | ICQ: 1942828 www.geminisecurity.com | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ "Pay no attention to what the critics say; there has never been a statue set up in honor of a critic." --Jean Sibelius ------=_NextPart_000_00C6_01C35069.39F26180 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAQAAoIIF1zCCAokw ggHyoAMCAQICAQAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxKDAmBgNVBAoTH0dlbWlu aSBTZWN1cml0eSBTb2x1dGlvbnMsIEluYy4xIjAgBgNVBAMTGUdTUyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRo b3JpdHkwHhcNMDIwNDI1MjE1NjI3WhcNMDUwMjEyMjE1NjI3WjBbMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEoMCYG A1UEChMfR2VtaW5pIFNlY3VyaXR5IFNvbHV0aW9ucywgSW5jLjEiMCAGA1UEAxMZR1NTIENlcnRp ZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0eTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAtl3UwxhHyP05YqIF kyfkWt8669gO/VKxC51PhJaV+hb9swwtaMVtJ9k8WjfQLt3fZpaNCNKB7V61KHxY1K1JCP67AwBy W4TRuGRwEb+PXu5XdpNs3kxKtunlR4/WPsrrvuMx9/R/Fx9ld3TUqXCJ/JN7Zg68IappkcMy9S3w koECAwEAAaNdMFswHQYDVR0OBBYEFJpr3UY3Hh5dngW5n9h72/GKMy7GMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFJpr 3UY3Hh5dngW5n9h72/GKMy7GMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCwYDVR0PBAQDAgEGMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB BAUAA4GBAHSd4BGG4le+QZBw/6bCq6mGpr4aJAE7UuXEW/I5YXqlQs1CkAzEHV8UnnXgDd0xONTQ CdznbzCBNAE1EoxL14Kdp5I6omEeNulMd/tGAvxdw0qbbSaT9LolqtnPL2RbnI3j0JsQlncN1+l2 Dzx8Ka39NU4Gb/P6qo/PKa5+YRHSMIIDRjCCAq+gAwIBAgIBCzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBbMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzEoMCYGA1UEChMfR2VtaW5pIFNlY3VyaXR5IFNvbHV0aW9ucywgSW5jLjEiMCAG A1UEAxMZR1NTIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0eTAeFw0wMjA4MDUxODIxMTZaFw0wNDA4MDQx ODIxMTZaMIGNMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEnMCUGA1UEChMeR2VtaW5pIFNlY3VyaXR5IFNvbHV0aW9u cyBJbmMuMRQwEgYDVQQLEwtEZXZlbG9wbWVudDEUMBIGA1UEAxMLUGV0ZXIgSGVzc2UxKTAnBgkq hkiG9w0BCQEWGnBtaGVzc2VAZ2VtaW5pc2VjdXJpdHkuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GN ADCBiQKBgQCvREu1eU1kCNW+lz+ZV9xvljBC7O6iESK10wzKPlrgnhL87+V5/joAbnwsXt25NsmP 8MIY6tuRxCbZzZn3bFTyPerhIOENWrA/HVdIP29TXfHL1YZn7bqBRHyjKcNdYS02GCw4gR4Fr5QS SQzy62WbLcaoSG/wnhBqBesLxZMsOwIDAQABo4HmMIHjMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEQYJYIZIAYb4QgEB BAQDAgSwMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIE8DAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUG8pDjEsHMZVS4/sJThNbtamIzEswHwYDVR0j BBgwFoAUmmvdRjceHl2eBbmf2Hvb8YozLsYwJQYDVR0RBB4wHIEacG1oZXNzZUBnZW1pbmlzZWN1 cml0eS5jb20wNwYDVR0fBDAwLjAsoCqgKIYmaHR0cDovL3d3dy5nZW1pbmlzZWN1cml0eS5jb20v cm9vdC5jcmwwFgYDVR0gBA8wDTALBgkrBgEEAe8oAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEABOIVgnmX 5u4gHHRMsIG5H9WAbMqUeqjhGiFMxDjFXoS2Fkk6eVS6wLJZiS54mWrT1NLA9UOcqfvX8pdpp+pw IpCwK9ywIco4mrqRdJ5Ja7vuxiO0e0J236mWdTQqPXWxZCOYumBtLkqoOcDFQYjuM4ZPLKSbFiMs j1OYuQnyz6cxggK0MIICsAIBATBgMFsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSgwJgYDVQQKEx9HZW1pbmkgU2Vj dXJpdHkgU29sdXRpb25zLCBJbmMuMSIwIAYDVQQDExlHU1MgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5 AgELMAkGBSsOAwIaBQCgggGqMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkF MQ8XDTAzMDcyMjE5NTIxN1owIwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMRYEFBcjXPUBFRba6/VrbEfwc/DS+bbYMGcG CSqGSIb3DQEJDzFaMFgwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgFA MAcGBSsOAwIHMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgEoMAcGBSsOAwIaMAoGCCqGSIb3DQIFMG8GCSsGAQQBgjcQ BDFiMGAwWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxKDAmBgNVBAoTH0dlbWluaSBTZWN1cml0eSBTb2x1dGlvbnMs IEluYy4xIjAgBgNVBAMTGUdTUyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkCAQswcQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQ AgsxYqBgMFsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSgwJgYDVQQKEx9HZW1pbmkgU2VjdXJpdHkgU29sdXRpb25z LCBJbmMuMSIwIAYDVQQDExlHU1MgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5AgELMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB AQUABIGAlV1EC4EAhZl9w0EprLgvqcICUFhHIIY2Y99BdX9MhfJFiHB30gioH9hCmyJp7H3JkDUw CPh3vmmddW9DxikhSKteKpDUmfJJ+k4Ocd8GKNsA09g/YhwB9MuCjNpuOwupazbawlP7luTIpWRN 1+lg38BjIQk6ePOxgLBsZXDc/CsAAAAAAAA= ------=_NextPart_000_00C6_01C35069.39F26180-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MFMXqt053674 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 08:22:33 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MFMXTS053673 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 08:22:33 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from cmailm2.svr.pol.co.uk (cmailm2.svr.pol.co.uk [195.92.193.210]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MFMWqt053667 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 08:22:32 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from da@trustis.com) Received: from modem-2159.llama.dialup.pol.co.uk ([217.135.184.111] helo=PEDIGREE) by cmailm2.svr.pol.co.uk with smtp (Exim 4.14) id 19eyyD-00014N-Py for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 16:22:30 +0100 From: "Dean Adams" <da@trustis.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 16:22:28 +0100 Message-ID: <LOBBJBJOMBCACAKEOICKEEHADMAA.da@trustis.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.6604 (9.0.2911.0) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <p05210600bb42d6fe2202@[12.159.173.178]> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi, I strongly agree with Steven's comments made above and for those reasons would agree with deprecating privateKeyUsagePeriod. A simpler scheme, if one agrees with the last point that Steven made, would be to acknowledge that the private key may be used by the subscriber up to the end of the certificate validity for signing authenticating etc., but that Relying Parties may continue to validate signatures for an indefinite period after that period (whether or not that later validation can be used to support a position or claim can only be answered by whatever governing legal/regulatory/policy/TermsAndConditions fremework is in force. Thus only one validity or usage period need be specified and understood by users. Dean Adams Steven Kent wrote: -------------- I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do not recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: - it is generally confusing to folks who already have trouble understanding PKI - only in the context of post facto evaluation for NR purposes is it likely to be applicable - it embodies the notion that we can declare that a signature generated with a private key expires at a future date, relative to NR concerns. this is not a good match for many real world contexts on which NR is an issue, e.g., my wet signature does not expire although an agreement may have a limited lifespan. Steve --------------- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MF9Pqt053065 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 08:09:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MF9PDY053064 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 08:09:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp11.eresmas.com (smtp11.eresmas.com [62.81.235.111]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MF9Oqt053059 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 08:09:24 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from diegofv@eresmas.com) Received: from [192.168.105.166] (helo=ma20.eresmas.com) by smtp11.eresmas.com with esmtp (Exim 4.10) id 19eylW-00072d-00 for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:09:22 +0200 From: <diegofv@eresmas.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Reply-To: "Diego Fernandez" <diegofv@eresmas.com> Message-ID: <33d76533ee41.33ee4133d765@ma20.eresmas.com> Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 15:09:24 GMT X-Mailer: Netscape Webmail MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Language: es Subject: RE: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? X-Accept-Language: es Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> >Given that this isn't going to change, it would seem that some >guidance for >users would be useful here. Since neither (1) nor (2) can be >altered, what >would be needed is a simple extension, found in signing certs, >containing a >date to which the cert can still be used for signature-checking >beyond the >obvious notAfter value. This could be written up as a short one-page >application note, no more (well, a bit more once you add all the usual >boilerplate and whatnot). > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MEl7qt052515 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 07:47:07 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MEl7f3052514 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 07:47:07 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mx2.cryptopro.ru (mx2.cryptopro.ru [213.59.158.218]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MEjnqt052485 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 07:46:56 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from chudov@cryptopro.ru) Received: from fandra2k ([192.168.68.6]) by mx2.cryptopro.ru with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.5329); Tue, 22 Jul 2003 18:43:24 +0400 Message-ID: <1b7901c3505f$9ae2b5d0$0644a8c0@cp.ru> From: "Gregory S. Chudov" <chudov@cryptopro.ru> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Cc: "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> References: <200307221112.h6MBCK624192@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 18:43:24 +0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="koi8-r" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2720.3000 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 22 Jul 2003 14:43:24.0593 (UTC) FILETIME=[9ACFCA10:01C3505F] Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Greetings. David Cooper wrote > It is my understanding that use of this extension was deprecated since, > unless signed messages are timestamped by a trusted time stamping > service, there is no way of determining when a message was signed. Yes, it is true, this extension does not help validating signatures. But it has a different meaning. It expresses the policy, under which this key is used. > >The tendency with X.509 has been to record as much of the policy as possible > >and that is automatically checkable in the cert. So this argues for keeping > >and using the private key usage period > > Exactly. If you've got different validity periods for the public and private > portions of the key, then you really need to state it in the cert, even if > only as an expression of CA policy on the topic. > > Peter. Agree. And it's not only an expression of CA policy, this also gives clients a way to verify that CA (or any other authority) really follows it's own policy. For example, Russian cryptographic practice dictates that the private key MUST be destroyed before it expires. If it is not destroyed, than it's considered compromised, and the corresponding certificate should be revoked. It's sad, that PKIXCMP doesn't define a key destruction announce message. But of course, there's that GeneralMessage, that can be used for that... So, privateKeyUsage states: "I promise to destroy my key before given time. If i don't, consider it compromized." And the peer can verify this, e.g. by fetching key destruction announces, or using some out-of-band mechanism. Good luck, Greg Chudov Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MDcGqt046796 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 06:38:16 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MDcGxb046795 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 06:38:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail.slb.com (nammta01.sugar-land.nam.slb.com [163.188.150.130]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MDcFqt046775 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 06:38:15 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jkazin@slb.com) Received: from conversion-daemon.nammta01.sugar-land.nam.slb.com by nammta01.sugar-land.nam.slb.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 1.14 (built Mar 18 2003)) id <0HIF00E01HF5X1@nammta01.sugar-land.nam.slb.com> for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 13:35:49 +0000 (GMT) Received: from namems01.sugar-land.oilfield.slb.com (namems01.sugar-land.oilfield.slb.com [163.188.150.131]) by nammta01.sugar-land.nam.slb.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 1.14 (built Mar 18 2003)) with ESMTP id <0HIF00JK5HR6N0@nammta01.sugar-land.nam.slb.com> for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 13:35:30 +0000 (GMT) Received: from conversion-daemon.namems01.sugar-land.oilfield.slb.com by namems01.sugar-land.oilfield.slb.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 1.14 (built Mar 18 2003)) id <0HIF00K01HMPP3@namems01.sugar-land.oilfield.slb.com> for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 13:35:29 +0000 (GMT) Received: from SCHLUMBE-OITRVU.slb.com (vpnpool55.houston.sinet.slb.com [163.188.124.55]) by namems01.sugar-land.oilfield.slb.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 1.14 (built Mar 18 2003)) with ESMTP id <0HIF00EYUHR4RX@namems01.sugar-land.oilfield.slb.com> for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 13:35:29 +0000 (GMT) Content-return: prohibited Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 09:35:30 -0400 From: "Joel S. Kazin" <jkazin@slb.com> Subject: Re: Root CA key compromised In-reply-to: <3F1D275F.4080504@i.cz> X-Sender: jkazin@163.188.150.131 To: PKIX List <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Message-id: <5.1.1.1.2.20030722092937.00ae2230@163.188.150.131> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.1.1 Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Look at RFC 2527 or the draft RFC 2527bis for an outline of how the issue is presented in a CP or CPS. At 02:00 PM 7/22/2003 +0200, Lenka Kadlcakova wrote: >Hi all, >I would like to ask for your opinion on what to do when the Root CA key is >compromised. I don't see any clear instruction in RFC 3280. For the case >there has already been a discussion on this, could anyone please give me a >note? > >Thanks a lot for the answer, > >Regards, > >Lenka > Joel S. Kazin CPA, CISA, CISSP Senior Consultant SchlumbergerSema Network and Infrastructure Solutions 194 Wood Avenue South First Floor Iselin, NJ 08830, USA Phone +1 914-769-8780 Mobile +1 914-645-5598 email jkazin@slb.com Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MDWmqt046007 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 06:32:48 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MDWmi1046005 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 06:32:48 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MDWkqt045981 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 06:32:46 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6MDWXoY014528; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 01:32:33 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6MDWXJ01973; Wed, 23 Jul 2003 01:32:33 +1200 Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 01:32:33 +1200 Message-Id: <200307221332.h6MDWXJ01973@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk, kent@bbn.com Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: >I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do not >recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: But those are mostly just hypothetical objections. At the moment we have two inescapabable facts: 1. CAs issue certs based on a 1-year billing cycle, and nothing anyone says will change that. No CA will issue a cert with a 20-year lifetime, unless it's for its own CA certs. 2. Users need to use certs to validate signatures at n times the CA-ordained lifetime. In the abscence of any mechanism to do this, they are ignoring the cert expiry time. In other words, out of necessity, they're making the following change to RFC 3280: The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from notBefore through notAfter, inclusive. When used with signing certificates, implementations SHOULD NOT pay any attention to the notAfter date. Given that this isn't going to change, it would seem that some guidance for users would be useful here. Since neither (1) nor (2) can be altered, what would be needed is a simple extension, found in signing certs, containing a date to which the cert can still be used for signature-checking beyond the obvious notAfter value. This could be written up as a short one-page application note, no more (well, a bit more once you add all the usual boilerplate and whatnot). Now CAs can still decide not to issue certs like that, but (a) they can't justify it by claiming it screws up their standard cert cycle because it doesn't affect validTo/validFrom, and (b) users at least have some guidance as to what to do, which is better than the current situation where all they can do is ignore parts of the standard on an ad hoc basis. Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MC7eqt037352 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 05:07:40 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MC7eZu037351 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 05:07:40 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MC7cqt037332 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 05:07:38 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [12.159.173.178] (ssh.bbn.com [192.1.50.70]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6MC7WD9003031; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 08:07:33 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@localhost Message-Id: <p05210600bb42d6fe2202@[12.159.173.178]> In-Reply-To: <3F1C22E5.BD784873@salford.ac.uk> References: <200307190516.h6J5G2X06190@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <3F1C00A6.2000705@nist.gov> <3F1C22E5.BD784873@salford.ac.uk> Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 08:07:58 -0400 To: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> David, >Peter > >the original idea in X.509 was to allow a certificate expiry date to be >significantly after the private key usage period to allow for signature >verification long after signatures could no longer be created. thus both >times are useful. I don't think one can say that this was the "original" idea, since v1 and v2 certs didn't have PKUP. Rather, PKUP is an extension that was created to allow certs used in support of NR to be validated after the period for private key use had expired. I don't think there is any use for PKUP in contexts where we are dealing with certs for authentication, vs. NR. >David Cooper wrote > >> It is my understanding that use of this extension was deprecated since, >> unless signed messages are timestamped by a trusted time stamping >> service, there is no way of determining when a message was signed. > >this is obviously not true. If I recieve a signed message BEFORE the >private key usage period has expired, I KNOW that the signature is time >valid. I dont need a TSA to tell me that. I can read my watch. I can >then add my own time stamp and signature and stick it in my archives, if >I am so concerned about time. I don't think this is a generally applicable example. In general you will receive the message in a time frame consistent with the notAfter date in the cert, and can make the value judgement you cite above (based on your watch) about whether the cert expired so long ago that the message should be regarde with suspicion, or not. > > Without this ability, the relying party can not verify that the >> signature was created before the end of the private key usage period, if >> the signature is being verified after the end of the private key usage >> period. If relying parties can not make use of the information, then >> there is no reason to include it in the certificate. >> > >This is a illogical leap that has been taken. Just because there is a >very small time period during which a signer can validly use his private >signing key, but the RP cannot receive it and validate it before the >private key usage period expires, is no reason to state that the RP can >not make use of the information. If 1% (or less) of the time is >unusable, it is no reason to discard 99% of the time (or more) that is >usuable. Anyhow, any good PKI would have replaced the user's signing key >long before the private key usage period had expired. I don't understand your argument at all. If we ignore PKUP for the moment, then I think the numbers are reversed, i.e., 99% of the time an RP will receive a cert and find that the current time is within the validity interval. I think the typical case for PKUP arises when we are validating a cert path to establish whether a signature was valid in some past time frame that is significabtly removed from the current time, e.g., months or years later. > > Of course, there is no reason that one can not discontinue use of a >> private key before the expiration of the corresponding certificate even >> if there is no indication in the certificate of when use of the private >> key is supposed to end. Is there any reason that the PKI users you >> mention need to include this information in the certificate? If there >> is a need to verify signatures for up to 7 years after the signature was >> generated, why not just institute a policy that all subscribers must >> rekey 7 years before the expiration of their certificates? > >This is a good point, and a work around for not using the private key >usage period. But like all policy, we can not record it in the cert, or >we can record it in the cert. The tendency with X.509 has been to record >as much of the policy as possible and that is automatically checkable in >the cert. So this argues for keeping and using the private key usage >period I was not an author for 2459 or 3280, but my feeling is that we do not recommend use of PKUP for several reasons: - it is generally confusing to folks who already have trouble understanding PKI - only in the context of post facto evaluation for NR purposes is it likely to be applicable - it embodies the notion that we can declare that a signature generated with a private key expires at a future date, relative to NR concerns. this is not a good match for many real world contexts on which NR is an issue, e.g., my wet signature does not expire although an agreement may have a limited lifespan. Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MC0Sqt036855 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 05:00:28 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MC0Stl036853 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 05:00:28 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from vidle.i.cz (vidle.i.cz [193.179.36.138]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MC0Rqt036838 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 05:00:27 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Lenka.Kadlcakova@i.cz) Received: from ns.i.cz (brana.i.cz [193.179.36.134]) by vidle.i.cz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 879B82F9EF for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 14:00:17 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (localhost.i.cz [127.0.0.1]) by ns.i.cz (Postfix) with SMTP id E21EE5C7A for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 14:00:16 +0200 (CEST) X-AV-Checked: Tue Jul 22 14:00:17 2003 ns.i.cz Received: from i.cz (kadlcakova.i.cz [192.168.18.80]) by ns.i.cz (Postfix) with ESMTP id B09D95C6C for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 14:00:16 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <3F1D275F.4080504@i.cz> Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 14:00:31 +0200 From: Lenka Kadlcakova <Lenka.Kadlcakova@i.cz> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.3b) Gecko/20030210 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, cs MIME-Version: 1.0 To: PKIX List <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Root CA key compromised Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-2; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6MC0Rqt036849 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi all, I would like to ask for your opinion on what to do when the Root CA key is compromised. I don't see any clear instruction in RFC 3280. For the case there has already been a discussion on this, could anyone please give me a note? Thanks a lot for the answer, Regards, Lenka Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MBCQqt033670 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 04:12:26 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MBCQ63033669 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 04:12:26 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MBCOqt033648 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 04:12:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6MBCJoY012256; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 23:12:20 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6MBCK624192; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 23:12:20 +1200 Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 23:12:20 +1200 Message-Id: <200307221112.h6MBCK624192@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk, david.cooper@nist.gov Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk> writes: >the original idea in X.509 was to allow a certificate expiry date to be >significantly after the private key usage period to allow for signature >verification long after signatures could no longer be created. thus both >times are useful. Right, and I think that's a most useful thing to have and have been... well, maybe not encouraging people to use it but certainly letting them know that it's there if they need it. The problem is that because of the wording in 2459/3280, users are scared off using it, so if a very useful feature like PKUP is deprecated then there should be some good reason for it. If there's no reason, and obviously there's user demand for having it (and the alternative that is being used, ignoring cert expiry dates, is horrible) then the current SHOULD NOT should really be changed to SHOULD, or at least removed. Could it be that the perceived problems with PKUP is that it works in reverse? That is, the validity says the cert is valid for time X, and then PKUP comes along and says that in some cases it isn't, when what you really need is two validities, one which indicates the period over which the cert can be used in general and the second which says that after the main validity expires it can still be used in a limited manner. Obviously for signing certs the main validity would be "sign + verify", and then the restricted-validity would be "verify-only", a bit like time-limited trials of software. >The tendency with X.509 has been to record as much of the policy as possible >and that is automatically checkable in the cert. So this argues for keeping >and using the private key usage period Exactly. If you've got different validity periods for the public and private portions of the key, then you really need to state it in the cert, even if only as an expression of CA policy on the topic. Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MAxFqt032933 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 03:59:15 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6MAxFRC032932 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 03:59:15 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6MAxDqt032925 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 03:59:14 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6MAx8oY012035; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 22:59:08 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6MAx7k24154; Tue, 22 Jul 2003 22:59:07 +1200 Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 22:59:07 +1200 Message-Id: <200307221059.h6MAx7k24154@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: david.cooper@nist.gov, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> writes: >It is my understanding that use of this extension was deprecated since, >unless signed messages are timestamped by a trusted time stamping service, >there is no way of determining when a message was signed. But the same thing applies to the overall cert validity time (as opposed to just the PKUP) as well. This doesn't seem like a very valid reason. >Is there any reason that the PKI users you mention need to include this >information in the certificate? Yes, because they want to use the signing key (relatively) short-term, but be able to verify sigs using the public portion years after the private portion has been retired/destroyed/lost/whatever. >If there is a need to verify signatures for up to 7 years after the signature >was generated, why not just institute a policy that all subscribers must >rekey 7 years before the expiration of their certificates? Because it's unlikely that the CAs are going to modify their 1-year billing- cycle-driven renewal process to handle long-term signing over 10- or 20-year periods (and conversely I can't imagine users going through the hassle and expense of re-certifying a bunch of keys year in year out just so someone else can verify their sigs). In any event the users don't want to keep the keys around forever, they want to use the private keys for x amount of time but still allow verification of the sigs generated with the keys 5x or 10x or 20x later. Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6M1j1qt083472 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 18:45:01 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6M1j1np083471 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 18:45:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from pmamtsi1.mtl.bceemergis.com (smtp1.emergis.com [192.139.197.95]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6M1ixqt083463 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 18:44:59 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Daniel.Montpetit@emergis.com) Received: from MTL-GW-02.bceemergis.com by pmamtsi1.mtl.bceemergis.com (8.11.7+Sun/8.11.3) with ESMTP id h6M1iad18285; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 21:44:36 -0400 (EDT) Received: by MTL-GW-02 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) id <NTZQVCW8>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 21:44:36 -0400 Message-ID: <7A423A16C9083341A1240FF22BF71D8402A645DF@MTL-MAIL-03> From: "Montpetit, Daniel" <Daniel.Montpetit@emergis.com> To: "'David Chadwick'" <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk>, "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> Cc: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2003 21:44:35 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C34FF2.CE302ED0" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand this format, some or all of this message may not be legible. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34FF2.CE302ED0 Content-Type: text/plain PKIX does not disallow (strongly) the privateKeyUsagePeriod extension. SHOULD NOT is used so the inclusion is only "not recommended" but allowed. The strong words (MUST NOT) apply to the criticality. I agree with David A. Cooper that a timestamp is (most of the time) required. Assuming you want to include some watch reading when validating signatures and that your relying party agreement allows it ;-). Further assuming both a notBefore and notAfter value are present: You can reject signatures generated before the notBefore is reached using your watch. The timestamp requirement is obvious in situations where the usage period is over and you rely on a still valid verification key. Reading your watch won't help. The timestamp is required DURING the usage period because the signature might have been generated BEFORE the usage period started. Assuming only a notBefore value is present: The timestamp requirement applies once the notBefore time is reached. Assuming only a notAfter value is present: The timestamp requirement is only essential after the private key expires In the book "planning for PKI" Russ Housley and/or Tim Polk state that since TSA's are not readily available, the extension has little utility. All of the above implies that the privateKeyUsagePeriod extension is for use by the RP. The extension could have some utility to (well behaved) private key holders by specifying when they can use the key. RFC 3280 states: The private key associated with the certificate SHOULD NOT be used to sign objects before or after the times specified by the two components, respectively. Notwithstanding the use of SHOULD NOT instead of MUST NOT, (well behaved) private key holders are the best placed to comply with this requirement. Daniel Montpetit -----Original Message----- From: David Chadwick [mailto:d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk] Sent: Monday, July 21, 2003 13:29 To: David A. Cooper Cc: Peter Gutmann; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? "David A. Cooper" wrote: > > Peter Gutmann wrote: > > >PKIX disallows (strongly) this extension, but without giving any reason for > >it: > > > > This extension SHOULD NOT be used within the Internet PKI. CAs conforming > > to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates that include a critical > > private key usage period extension. > > > >I've now run into several PKI users (including fairly large ones like > >government departments and large corporations) who resort to ignoring the cert > >expiry date in order to get around this restriction, since they have a > >requirement to validate signatures long after use of the private key has been Peter the original idea in X.509 was to allow a certificate expiry date to be significantly after the private key usage period to allow for signature verification long after signatures could no longer be created. thus both times are useful. David Cooper wrote > It is my understanding that use of this extension was deprecated since, > unless signed messages are timestamped by a trusted time stamping > service, there is no way of determining when a message was signed. this is obviously not true. If I recieve a signed message BEFORE the private key usage period has expired, I KNOW that the signature is time valid. I dont need a TSA to tell me that. I can read my watch. I can then add my own time stamp and signature and stick it in my archives, if I am so concerned about time. > Without this ability, the relying party can not verify that the > signature was created before the end of the private key usage period, if > the signature is being verified after the end of the private key usage > period. If relying parties can not make use of the information, then > there is no reason to include it in the certificate. > This is a illogical leap that has been taken. Just because there is a very small time period during which a signer can validly use his private signing key, but the RP cannot receive it and validate it before the private key usage period expires, is no reason to state that the RP can not make use of the information. If 1% (or less) of the time is unusable, it is no reason to discard 99% of the time (or more) that is usuable. Anyhow, any good PKI would have replaced the user's signing key long before the private key usage period had expired. > Of course, there is no reason that one can not discontinue use of a > private key before the expiration of the corresponding certificate even > if there is no indication in the certificate of when use of the private > key is supposed to end. Is there any reason that the PKI users you > mention need to include this information in the certificate? If there > is a need to verify signatures for up to 7 years after the signature was > generated, why not just institute a policy that all subscribers must > rekey 7 years before the expiration of their certificates? This is a good point, and a work around for not using the private key usage period. But like all policy, we can not record it in the cert, or we can record it in the cert. The tendency with X.509 has been to record as much of the policy as possible and that is automatically checkable in the cert. So this argues for keeping and using the private key usage period David > Why does the > private key usage period need to be specified in the certificate (except > perhaps indirectly by mentioning it in the certificate policy)? > > Dave -- ********************************************************* Leaders of the world's richest nations meet in Cancun on September 10th 2003. Oxfam is presenting them with a petition to make trade fair. Be sure your voice is heard. Sign the 'Big Noise' petition to make trade fair at: http://www.maketradefair.com/go/join/?p=omf1 ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security IS Institute, University of Salford, Salford M5 4WT Tel: +44 161 295 5351 Fax +44 01484 532930 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick@salford.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm Research Web site: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 ***************************************************************** ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34FF2.CE302ED0 Content-Type: text/html Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 PCFET0NUWVBFIEhUTUwgUFVCTElDICItLy9XM0MvL0RURCBIVE1MIDMuMi8vRU4iPg0KPEhUTUw+ DQo8SEVBRD4NCjxNRVRBIEhUVFAtRVFVSVY9IkNvbnRlbnQtVHlwZSIgQ09OVEVOVD0idGV4dC9o dG1sOyBjaGFyc2V0PVVTLUFTQ0lJIj4NCjxNRVRBIE5BTUU9IkdlbmVyYXRvciIgQ09OVEVOVD0i TVMgRXhjaGFuZ2UgU2VydmVyIHZlcnNpb24gNS41LjI2NTQuODkiPg0KPFRJVExFPlJFOiBXaHkg aXMgcHJpdmF0ZUtleVVzYWdlUGVyaW9kIGRlcHJlY2F0ZWQ/PC9USVRMRT4NCjwvSEVBRD4NCjxC 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(rhea.salford.ac.uk [146.87.255.99]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6LIHhqt059778 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 11:17:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk) Received: (qmail 56598 invoked by alias); 21 Jul 2003 18:17:44 -0000 Received: (qmail 56592 invoked from network); 21 Jul 2003 18:17:44 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO salford.ac.uk) (146.87.80.150) by rhea.salford.ac.uk with SMTP; 21 Jul 2003 18:17:44 -0000 Message-ID: <3F1C2E37.DC0F2F8D@salford.ac.uk> Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2003 19:17:27 +0100 From: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk> Organization: University of Salford X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.76 [en] (Windows NT 5.0; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: LDAPv3 Profile Issue Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------840EE16934A6EEF45064928A" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------840EE16934A6EEF45064928A Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Colleagues at the Vienna meeting I stated that the only outstanding issue with the LDAPv3 profile was the use of multi-valued RDNs. However, there is also the use of the ;binary extension that still has to be addressed and resolved (unfortunately), since the profile needs to state what PKI clients should do with ;binary. The ;binary issue is holding up the final calls on the LDAPv3 profile, and the LDAP PKI and PMI schema documents (from Steven Legg and myself). Fortunately it does not affect the LDAP attribute extraction schema profiles that are due to be published as Informational RFCs, but nevertheless we do need closure on the ;binary issue as soon as possible regards David -- ********************************************************* Leaders of the world's richest nations meet in Cancun on September 10th 2003. Oxfam is presenting them with a petition to make trade fair. Be sure your voice is heard. Sign the 'Big Noise' petition to make trade fair at: http://www.maketradefair.com/go/join/?p=omf1 ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security IS Institute, University of Salford, Salford M5 4WT Tel: +44 161 295 5351 Fax +44 01484 532930 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick@salford.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm Research Web site: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 ***************************************************************** --------------840EE16934A6EEF45064928A Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="d.w.chadwick.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for David Chadwick Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="d.w.chadwick.vcf" begin:vcard n:Chadwick;David tel;cell:+44 77 96 44 7184 tel;fax:+44 1484 532930 tel;home:+44 1484 352238 tel;work:+44 161 295 5351 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm org:University of Salford;IS Institute version:2.1 email;internet:d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk title:Professor of Information Security adr;quoted-printable:;;The Crescent=0D=0A;Salford;Greater Manchester;M5 4WT;England note;quoted-printable:Research Projects: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk.......................=0D=0A=0D=0AUnderstanding X.500: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/X500.htm .......................=0D=0A=0D=0AX.500/LDAP Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm...................=0D=0A=0D=0AEntrust key validation string: CJ94-LKWD-BSXB ...........=0D=0A=0D=0APGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 x-mozilla-cpt:;-4856 fn:David Chadwick end:vcard --------------840EE16934A6EEF45064928A-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6LI8Zqt058509 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 11:08:35 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6LI8Z2a058508 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 11:08:35 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from sottmxssm.entrust.com (sottmxssm.entrust.com [216.191.252.10]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6LI8Xqt058489 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 11:08:34 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com) Received: from sottguard01.entrust.com (sottguard01.entrust.com [10.4.61.249]) by sottmxssm.entrust.com (Switch-2.2.6/Switch-2.2.4) with SMTP id V6LI14CN18700 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 14:04:48 -0400 Received: (qmail 25646 invoked by uid 64014); 21 Jul 2003 18:02:22 -0000 Received: from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com by sottguard01.entrust.com with AmikaGuardian-Server-1.1.2 (Processed in 0.421604 secs); 21 Jul 2003 18:02:22 -0000 Received: from sottmxs01.entrust.com (10.4.61.7) by sottguard01.entrust.com with SMTP; 21 Jul 2003 18:02:22 -0000 Received: by sottmxs01.entrust.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) id <PLM10AT1>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 14:08:24 -0400 Message-ID: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC3B9@sottmxs04.entrust.com> From: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com> To: "'David Chadwick'" <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk>, "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> Cc: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2003 14:08:21 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) Content-Type: text/plain Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Just want to voice agreement and support for David Chadwick's views on this :-) -----Original Message----- From: David Chadwick [mailto:d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk] Sent: Monday, July 21, 2003 1:29 PM To: David A. Cooper Cc: Peter Gutmann; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? "David A. Cooper" wrote: > > Peter Gutmann wrote: > > >PKIX disallows (strongly) this extension, but without giving any reason for > >it: > > > > This extension SHOULD NOT be used within the Internet PKI. CAs conforming > > to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates that include a critical > > private key usage period extension. > > > >I've now run into several PKI users (including fairly large ones like > >government departments and large corporations) who resort to ignoring the cert > >expiry date in order to get around this restriction, since they have a > >requirement to validate signatures long after use of the private key has been Peter the original idea in X.509 was to allow a certificate expiry date to be significantly after the private key usage period to allow for signature verification long after signatures could no longer be created. thus both times are useful. David Cooper wrote > It is my understanding that use of this extension was deprecated since, > unless signed messages are timestamped by a trusted time stamping > service, there is no way of determining when a message was signed. this is obviously not true. If I recieve a signed message BEFORE the private key usage period has expired, I KNOW that the signature is time valid. I dont need a TSA to tell me that. I can read my watch. I can then add my own time stamp and signature and stick it in my archives, if I am so concerned about time. > Without this ability, the relying party can not verify that the > signature was created before the end of the private key usage period, if > the signature is being verified after the end of the private key usage > period. If relying parties can not make use of the information, then > there is no reason to include it in the certificate. > This is a illogical leap that has been taken. Just because there is a very small time period during which a signer can validly use his private signing key, but the RP cannot receive it and validate it before the private key usage period expires, is no reason to state that the RP can not make use of the information. If 1% (or less) of the time is unusable, it is no reason to discard 99% of the time (or more) that is usuable. Anyhow, any good PKI would have replaced the user's signing key long before the private key usage period had expired. > Of course, there is no reason that one can not discontinue use of a > private key before the expiration of the corresponding certificate even > if there is no indication in the certificate of when use of the private > key is supposed to end. Is there any reason that the PKI users you > mention need to include this information in the certificate? If there > is a need to verify signatures for up to 7 years after the signature was > generated, why not just institute a policy that all subscribers must > rekey 7 years before the expiration of their certificates? This is a good point, and a work around for not using the private key usage period. But like all policy, we can not record it in the cert, or we can record it in the cert. The tendency with X.509 has been to record as much of the policy as possible and that is automatically checkable in the cert. So this argues for keeping and using the private key usage period David > Why does the > private key usage period need to be specified in the certificate (except > perhaps indirectly by mentioning it in the certificate policy)? > > Dave -- ********************************************************* Leaders of the world's richest nations meet in Cancun on September 10th 2003. Oxfam is presenting them with a petition to make trade fair. Be sure your voice is heard. Sign the 'Big Noise' petition to make trade fair at: http://www.maketradefair.com/go/join/?p=omf1 ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security IS Institute, University of Salford, Salford M5 4WT Tel: +44 161 295 5351 Fax +44 01484 532930 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick@salford.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm Research Web site: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 ***************************************************************** Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6LHioqt056267 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 10:44:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6LHin40056266 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 10:44:50 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from pan.salford.ac.uk (pan.salford.ac.uk [146.87.255.104]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6LHimqt056261 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 10:44:48 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk) Received: (qmail 19116 invoked by alias); 21 Jul 2003 17:44:49 -0000 Received: (qmail 19102 invoked from network); 21 Jul 2003 17:44:49 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO salford.ac.uk) (146.87.80.150) by pan.salford.ac.uk with SMTP; 21 Jul 2003 17:44:49 -0000 Message-ID: <3F1C2680.F168DCC8@salford.ac.uk> Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2003 18:44:32 +0100 From: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk> Organization: University of Salford X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.76 [en] (Windows NT 5.0; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Internet Drafts <internet-drafts@ietf.org> CC: PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Subject Certificate Access Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------20CF632FF8591B088C697B6D" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------20CF632FF8591B088C697B6D Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Colleagues Please find attached a new ID that publishes in a cert the location of the subject's certs. Strange as it may seem, this feature is currently not part of SIA or AIA. regards David -- ********************************************************* Leaders of the world's richest nations meet in Cancun on September 10th 2003. Oxfam is presenting them with a petition to make trade fair. Be sure your voice is heard. Sign the 'Big Noise' petition to make trade fair at: http://www.maketradefair.com/go/join/?p=omf1 ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security IS Institute, University of Salford, Salford M5 4WT Tel: +44 161 295 5351 Fax +44 01484 532930 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick@salford.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm Research Web site: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 ***************************************************************** --------------20CF632FF8591B088C697B6D Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; name="draft-ietf-pkix-chadwick-sca-00.txt" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline; filename="draft-ietf-pkix-chadwick-sca-00.txt" PKIX Working Group David Chadwick INTERNET-DRAFT University of Salford Expires 22 January 2004 22 July 2003 Subject Certificate Access Extension <draft-ietf-chadwick-pkix-sca-00.txt> Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026 [RFC2026]. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. Abstract Currently there is nothing in a certificate to tell a relying party where this certificate, or any other certificate issued to the subject of this certificate, has been published. This document defines an extension that indicates where certificates of the subject may be published. Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@imc.org mailing list. Conventions used in this document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 1. Introduction The PKIX Certificate and CRL profile [RFC3280] defines the Authority Information Access and Subject Information Access extensions that are used to indicate how to access information and services for the issuer and subject of the certificate in which these extensions appear. However they do not tell the certificate user where they may find this or any other certificates that have been issued to the subject of this certificate. Subject Information Access says where to find information provided BY the subject, but not information ABOUT the subject. Authority Information Access says where to find information about superior CAs, but not where to find certificates issued by this CA. This document defines an extension that indicates the location of where certificates of a subject may be published. Subjects may typically be issued with several certificates by the same (or different) CAs, often with the differences being indicated in the Key Usage or Extended Key Usage fields. A relying party may be in possession of one certificate of a subject, but may need access to a different certificate. For example, a relying party may have been sent the digital signature certificate of a subject along with an S/MIME message and may now want the key encipherment certificate of the subject so that they can send an encrypted message back to the subject. The Subject Certificate Access extension defines one way for a CA to publish in a certificate information describing where the certificates issued to this subject by this CA (or any other CA) may be found. 2. Subject Certificate Access Extension This extension lists the locations where additional certificates, belonging to the subject of the certificate in which this extension exists, may be found. Each location comprises the name of the CA issuing the certificate to the subject, plus the access location used by that CA. The formal ASN.1 definition for this extension is: id-pe-subjectCertAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe tbd } SubjectCertAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertLocation CertLocation ::= SEQUENCE { Issuer [0] GeneralName OPTIONAL, accessLocation [1] GeneralName } The issuer component of CertLocation provides the general name of the CA issuing one or more certificates to the subject of the certificate in which this extension is present. If the issuer component is missing, then the issuer is the same as the issuer of the current certificate. The accessLocation component of CertLocation provides the location at which one or more certificates may be found for the subject of the certificate in which this extension is present. The accessLocation field is defined as a GeneralName, which can take several forms. Where the information is available via http, ftp, or ldap, accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier [URI]. Where information is available via ldap, the format of the URI MUST be an LDAP URL as specified in RFC 2255 [RFC2255]. The LDAP URL MAY specify a non-leaf node from which to perform a one-level or full subtree Search, or it MAY specify the LDAP DN of the entry holding the subject's certificates. Where the information is available via the Directory Access Protocol (DAP), accessLocation MUST be a directoryName. When the information is available via electronic mail, accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name. The semantics of other accessLocation name forms are not defined. Where a CA publishes certificates in more than one location, multiple instances of CertLocation SHOULD be provided, one per location. Where a subject possesses certificates issued by more than one CA, there MAY be values of CertLocation for each issuing CA. How this information is obtained by the publishing CA is not specified in this document, although one way could be for the subject to provide it within the CertTemplate of a Certificate Request Message [CRMF]. 3. Security Considerations The certificates to be retrieved from publishing servers (ftp, http, ldap, smtp, X.500) is digitally signed and therefore additional integrity services are NOT REQUIRED. The CPS will specify whether the information should be publicly available or not. If publicly available, privacy services will NOT be REQUIRED for retrieval requests. If not publicly available, privacy services MAY be REQUIRED and these can be provided by a TLS ciphersuite. Organizations are NOT REQUIRED to provide external users with access to their publishing servers. 4. IANA Considerations Certificate extensions and attribute certificate extensions are identified by object identifiers (OIDs). The OID for the extension defined in this document was assigned from an arc delegated by the IANA to the PKIX Working Group. No further action by the IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated updates 5. References 5.1 Normative References [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. [URI] T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396, August 1998. [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. [RFC2255] T. Howes, M. Smith. "The LDAP URL Format", RFC 2255, Dec 1997. 5.2 Informative References [RFC3280] R. Housley, W. Polk, W. Ford, and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002. [CRMF] Myers, M., Adams, C., Solo, D., and Kemp, D., "Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format," RFC 2511, March 1999. 6. Author's Address David Chadwick University of Salford The Crescent Salford M5 4WT England Email: d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk --------------20CF632FF8591B088C697B6D Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="d.w.chadwick.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for David Chadwick Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="d.w.chadwick.vcf" begin:vcard n:Chadwick;David tel;cell:+44 77 96 44 7184 tel;fax:+44 1484 532930 tel;home:+44 1484 352238 tel;work:+44 161 295 5351 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm org:University of Salford;IS Institute version:2.1 email;internet:d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk title:Professor of Information Security adr;quoted-printable:;;The Crescent=0D=0A;Salford;Greater Manchester;M5 4WT;England note;quoted-printable:Research Projects: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk.......................=0D=0A=0D=0AUnderstanding X.500: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/X500.htm .......................=0D=0A=0D=0AX.500/LDAP Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm...................=0D=0A=0D=0AEntrust key validation string: CJ94-LKWD-BSXB ...........=0D=0A=0D=0APGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 x-mozilla-cpt:;-4856 fn:David Chadwick end:vcard --------------20CF632FF8591B088C697B6D-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6LHTRqt055844 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 10:29:27 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6LHTRdf055843 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 10:29:27 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from pan.salford.ac.uk (pan.salford.ac.uk [146.87.255.104]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6LHTPqt055836 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 10:29:26 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk) Received: (qmail 12736 invoked by alias); 21 Jul 2003 17:29:26 -0000 Received: (qmail 12716 invoked from network); 21 Jul 2003 17:29:26 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO salford.ac.uk) (146.87.80.150) by pan.salford.ac.uk with SMTP; 21 Jul 2003 17:29:26 -0000 Message-ID: <3F1C22E5.BD784873@salford.ac.uk> Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2003 18:29:09 +0100 From: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk> Organization: University of Salford X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.76 [en] (Windows NT 5.0; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> CC: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? References: <200307190516.h6J5G2X06190@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <3F1C00A6.2000705@nist.gov> Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------0B4261A16AFFE0AC6A81C499" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------0B4261A16AFFE0AC6A81C499 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit "David A. Cooper" wrote: > > Peter Gutmann wrote: > > >PKIX disallows (strongly) this extension, but without giving any reason for > >it: > > > > This extension SHOULD NOT be used within the Internet PKI. CAs conforming > > to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates that include a critical > > private key usage period extension. > > > >I've now run into several PKI users (including fairly large ones like > >government departments and large corporations) who resort to ignoring the cert > >expiry date in order to get around this restriction, since they have a > >requirement to validate signatures long after use of the private key has been Peter the original idea in X.509 was to allow a certificate expiry date to be significantly after the private key usage period to allow for signature verification long after signatures could no longer be created. thus both times are useful. David Cooper wrote > It is my understanding that use of this extension was deprecated since, > unless signed messages are timestamped by a trusted time stamping > service, there is no way of determining when a message was signed. this is obviously not true. If I recieve a signed message BEFORE the private key usage period has expired, I KNOW that the signature is time valid. I dont need a TSA to tell me that. I can read my watch. I can then add my own time stamp and signature and stick it in my archives, if I am so concerned about time. > Without this ability, the relying party can not verify that the > signature was created before the end of the private key usage period, if > the signature is being verified after the end of the private key usage > period. If relying parties can not make use of the information, then > there is no reason to include it in the certificate. > This is a illogical leap that has been taken. Just because there is a very small time period during which a signer can validly use his private signing key, but the RP cannot receive it and validate it before the private key usage period expires, is no reason to state that the RP can not make use of the information. If 1% (or less) of the time is unusable, it is no reason to discard 99% of the time (or more) that is usuable. Anyhow, any good PKI would have replaced the user's signing key long before the private key usage period had expired. > Of course, there is no reason that one can not discontinue use of a > private key before the expiration of the corresponding certificate even > if there is no indication in the certificate of when use of the private > key is supposed to end. Is there any reason that the PKI users you > mention need to include this information in the certificate? If there > is a need to verify signatures for up to 7 years after the signature was > generated, why not just institute a policy that all subscribers must > rekey 7 years before the expiration of their certificates? This is a good point, and a work around for not using the private key usage period. But like all policy, we can not record it in the cert, or we can record it in the cert. The tendency with X.509 has been to record as much of the policy as possible and that is automatically checkable in the cert. So this argues for keeping and using the private key usage period David > Why does the > private key usage period need to be specified in the certificate (except > perhaps indirectly by mentioning it in the certificate policy)? > > Dave -- ********************************************************* Leaders of the world's richest nations meet in Cancun on September 10th 2003. Oxfam is presenting them with a petition to make trade fair. Be sure your voice is heard. Sign the 'Big Noise' petition to make trade fair at: http://www.maketradefair.com/go/join/?p=omf1 ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security IS Institute, University of Salford, Salford M5 4WT Tel: +44 161 295 5351 Fax +44 01484 532930 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick@salford.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm Research Web site: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 ***************************************************************** --------------0B4261A16AFFE0AC6A81C499 Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="d.w.chadwick.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for David Chadwick Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="d.w.chadwick.vcf" begin:vcard n:Chadwick;David tel;cell:+44 77 96 44 7184 tel;fax:+44 1484 532930 tel;home:+44 1484 352238 tel;work:+44 161 295 5351 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm org:University of Salford;IS Institute version:2.1 email;internet:d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk title:Professor of Information Security adr;quoted-printable:;;The Crescent=0D=0A;Salford;Greater Manchester;M5 4WT;England note;quoted-printable:Research Projects: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk.......................=0D=0A=0D=0AUnderstanding X.500: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/X500.htm .......................=0D=0A=0D=0AX.500/LDAP Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm...................=0D=0A=0D=0AEntrust key validation string: CJ94-LKWD-BSXB ...........=0D=0A=0D=0APGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 x-mozilla-cpt:;-4856 fn:David Chadwick end:vcard --------------0B4261A16AFFE0AC6A81C499-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6LFKlqt049046 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 08:20:47 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6LFKlsQ049045 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 08:20:47 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from rhea.salford.ac.uk (rhea.salford.ac.uk [146.87.255.99]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6LFKeqt049025 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 08:20:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk) Received: (qmail 80326 invoked by alias); 21 Jul 2003 15:20:25 -0000 Received: (qmail 80303 invoked from network); 21 Jul 2003 15:20:25 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO salford.ac.uk) (146.87.80.150) by rhea.salford.ac.uk with SMTP; 21 Jul 2003 15:20:25 -0000 Message-ID: <3F1C04A8.B7481BA1@salford.ac.uk> Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2003 16:20:08 +0100 From: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk> Organization: University of Salford X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.76 [en] (Windows NT 5.0; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Antonio Lioy <lioy@polito.it> CC: Wen-Cheng Wang <wcwang@cht.com.tw>, "Michael =?iso-8859-1?Q?Str=F6der?=" <michael@stroeder.com>, PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Issues in LDAP schema IDs References: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> <3F16B1A3.5000100@stroeder.com> <003201c34cce$e9070070$4f85900a@wcwang> <3F179DE5.9010704@polito.it> Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------0661FA61B3AD22819D10C888" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------0661FA61B3AD22819D10C888 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Antonio Lioy wrote: > > So support for multiple certs per each user should be added to the schema. This has always been there. This is not the issue. It is whether the newly created per certificate entry should use a multivalued attribute or define a new one. regards David > > Cheers, > > Antonio Lioy -- ********************************************************* Leaders of the world's richest nations meet in Cancun on September 10th 2003. Oxfam is presenting them with a petition to make trade fair. Be sure your voice is heard. Sign the 'Big Noise' petition to make trade fair at: http://www.maketradefair.com/go/join/?p=omf1 ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security IS Institute, University of Salford, Salford M5 4WT Tel: +44 161 295 5351 Fax +44 01484 532930 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick@salford.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm Research Web site: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 ***************************************************************** --------------0661FA61B3AD22819D10C888 Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="d.w.chadwick.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for David Chadwick Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="d.w.chadwick.vcf" begin:vcard n:Chadwick;David tel;cell:+44 77 96 44 7184 tel;fax:+44 1484 532930 tel;home:+44 1484 352238 tel;work:+44 161 295 5351 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm org:University of Salford;IS Institute version:2.1 email;internet:d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk title:Professor of Information Security adr;quoted-printable:;;The Crescent=0D=0A;Salford;Greater Manchester;M5 4WT;England note;quoted-printable:Research Projects: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk.......................=0D=0A=0D=0AUnderstanding X.500: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/X500.htm .......................=0D=0A=0D=0AX.500/LDAP Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm...................=0D=0A=0D=0AEntrust key validation string: CJ94-LKWD-BSXB ...........=0D=0A=0D=0APGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 x-mozilla-cpt:;-4856 fn:David Chadwick end:vcard --------------0661FA61B3AD22819D10C888-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6LF3gqt047889 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 08:03:42 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6LF3gU5047888 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 08:03:42 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from postmark.nist.gov (pushme.nist.gov [129.6.16.92]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6LF3fqt047883 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 08:03:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from david.cooper@nist.gov) Received: from nist.gov (st26.ncsl.nist.gov [129.6.54.72]) by postmark.nist.gov (8.12.5/8.12.5) with ESMTP id h6LF3Cw1014339; Mon, 21 Jul 2003 11:03:14 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <3F1C00A6.2000705@nist.gov> Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2003 11:03:02 -0400 From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030630 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? References: <200307190516.h6J5G2X06190@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> In-Reply-To: <200307190516.h6J5G2X06190@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Peter Gutmann wrote: >PKIX disallows (strongly) this extension, but without giving any reason for >it: > > This extension SHOULD NOT be used within the Internet PKI. CAs conforming > to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates that include a critical > private key usage period extension. > >I've now run into several PKI users (including fairly large ones like >government departments and large corporations) who resort to ignoring the cert >expiry date in order to get around this restriction, since they have a >requirement to validate signatures long after use of the private key has been >discontinued. Is there any reason for this extension being disallowed (I'm >sure I've asked that before, but don't remember getting a satisfactory reply)? >What are you supposed to do in its absence? > Peter, It is my understanding that use of this extension was deprecated since, unless signed messages are timestamped by a trusted time stamping service, there is no way of determining when a message was signed. Without this ability, the relying party can not verify that the signature was created before the end of the private key usage period, if the signature is being verified after the end of the private key usage period. If relying parties can not make use of the information, then there is no reason to include it in the certificate. Of course, there is no reason that one can not discontinue use of a private key before the expiration of the corresponding certificate even if there is no indication in the certificate of when use of the private key is supposed to end. Is there any reason that the PKI users you mention need to include this information in the certificate? If there is a need to verify signatures for up to 7 years after the signature was generated, why not just institute a policy that all subscribers must rekey 7 years before the expiration of their certificates? Why does the private key usage period need to be specified in the certificate (except perhaps indirectly by mentioning it in the certificate policy)? Dave Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6J5G6qt042148 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 22:16:06 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6J5G6eZ042147 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 22:16:06 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6J5G3qt042142 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 22:16:04 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6J5G1YM017771 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 19 Jul 2003 17:16:01 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6J5G2X06190 for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Sat, 19 Jul 2003 17:16:02 +1200 Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2003 17:16:02 +1200 Message-Id: <200307190516.h6J5G2X06190@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Why is privateKeyUsagePeriod deprecated? Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> PKIX disallows (strongly) this extension, but without giving any reason for it: This extension SHOULD NOT be used within the Internet PKI. CAs conforming to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates that include a critical private key usage period extension. I've now run into several PKI users (including fairly large ones like government departments and large corporations) who resort to ignoring the cert expiry date in order to get around this restriction, since they have a requirement to validate signatures long after use of the private key has been discontinued. Is there any reason for this extension being disallowed (I'm sure I've asked that before, but don't remember getting a satisfactory reply)? What are you supposed to do in its absence? Peter. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6IG3Vqt006435 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 09:03:31 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6IG3U9c006434 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 09:03:30 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail.hackmasters.net (ppp-217-133-8-148.cust-adsl.tiscali.it [217.133.8.148]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6IG3Rqt006428 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 09:03:28 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from madwolf@hackmasters.net) Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mail.hackmasters.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2CA05F354 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 18:18:51 +0200 (CEST) Received: by mail.hackmasters.net (Postfix, from userid 509) id 7AA45FEF4; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 18:18:49 +0200 (CEST) Received: from hackmasters.net (galadriel.hackmasters.net [10.5.122.180]) by mail.hackmasters.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 317A4F354 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 18:18:45 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <3F181C2F.4020406@hackmasters.net> Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2003 18:11:27 +0200 From: Massimiliano Pala <madwolf@hackmasters.net> Organization: OpenCA User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4a) Gecko/20030401 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Issues in LDAP schema IDs References: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> In-Reply-To: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="------------ms040808060403000809070404" X-Virus-Scanned: by AMaViS perl-11 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------ms040808060403000809070404 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit David Chadwick wrote: > Dear All > > Peter and I have resolved all the issues described at the PKIX meeting > today, apart from one, which is what should be the attribute type to be > used to hold the X.509 DER encoded attribute. Should it be the original > attribute type name e.g. userCertificate or a new attribute whose schema > says it must be single valued. Comments please to the list to help us > resolve this final issue. [...] If no issue is expected to arise from the adoption of the old name I am in favour of the userCertificate. -- C'you, Massimiliano Pala --o------------------------------------------------------------------------- Massimiliano Pala [OpenCA Project Manager] madwolf@openca.org Tel.: +39 (0)59 270 094 http://www.openca.org Fax: +39 178 221 8225 http://openca.sourceforge.net Mobile: +39 (0)347 7222 365 --------------ms040808060403000809070404 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAQAAoIIOZjCC By8wggYXoAMCAQICASwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgYoxIjAgBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWE3BraS5j aWNhaWFAdW5pbW8uaXQxJzAlBgNVBAMTHlVuaW1vcmUgRW50ZSBkaSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F6aW9u ZTEuMCwGA1UEChMlVW5pdmVyc2l0YScgZGkgTW9kZW5hIGUgUmVnZ2lvIEVtaWxpYTELMAkG 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AQEBBQAEgYA8ZXmPEbYri7S8x4RwsM1N9jW/8+TuPZW96FZlyPEPKIp0OSzQ/EAVIUBNeKEp RC70qu2YduawUz9nt4D1Fk/V/HAxsJ+4Rn4zQ3540wydReLlPk5rVzqaJEOkIGvrdpZj3I6a O8wktf6iwANTkm7Ax9N6OYCFAXVLEH11yo0hAQAAAAAAAA== --------------ms040808060403000809070404-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6IDhpqt001609 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 06:43:51 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6IDhp9h001608 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 06:43:51 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from fw.cht.com.tw ([202.39.162.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6IDhmqt001601 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 06:43:48 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from wcwang@cht.com.tw) Received: from linuxis.cht.com.tw ([10.1.22.33]) by fw.cht.com.tw (8.12.6/8.12.6) with ESMTP id h6IDcD9J017393; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 21:38:14 +0800 (CST) (envelope-from wcwang@cht.com.tw) Received: from mailgate.cht.com.tw (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by linuxis.cht.com.tw (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id VAA28495; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 21:49:16 +0800 Received: from linux01 (webmail.cht.com.tw [10.1.22.40]) by mailgate.cht.com.tw (8.11.6/8.10.2) with ESMTP id h6IDf2e06574; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 21:41:02 +0800 Message-ID: <24559530.1058535017301.JavaMail.root@10.1.22.7> Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2003 21:30:17 +0800 (CST) From: wcwang <wcwang@cht.com.tw> To: =?Big5?Q?Michael_Str=3Fder?= <michael@stroeder.com> Subject: Re: Issues in LDAP schema IDs Cc: PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_Part_151_12114599.1058535017299" X-Mailer: WebMail/Java v0.7.10, built with JDK 1.4.1, SendMessage plugin v1.8 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> ------=_Part_151_12114599.1058535017299 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Big5" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Michael Stroder wrote: > Antonio Lioy wrote: > >=20 > > Wen-Cheng Wang wrote: > > > >> My concern is a CA may support dual key pairs for a single EE. > > > > So support for multiple certs per each user should be added to the sche= ma. > I'd suggest to read the draft. Hint: Multi-valued attributes are not the= =20 > only way to store multiple certificates per user. Sorry I did not carefully read David's questio. And then when I saw him asking for comments on restricting userCertificate to be single-valued, I gave my concern intuitively. Actually, I had read the three new I-Ds and I know that some people have been working on inventing a new way to store PKCs, ACs and CRLs in LDAP-based repository instead of using traditional attributes such as userCertificate, caCertificate or attributeCertificateAttribute. Well, now I re-give my comment. I think that since it is a new way to to store PKCs, ACs and CRLs, it is fine to define a new single-valued attribute. Redefine the traditional userCertificate caCertificate or attributeCertificateAttribute attributes to be single-valued might be a bad idea. Wen-Cheng Wang ------=_Part_151_12114599.1058535017299-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6ID2Iqt094546 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 06:02:18 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6ID2Hkg094545 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 06:02:17 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6ID2Eqt094531 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 06:02:14 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA23842; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 15:06:52 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA24726; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 15:02:24 +0200 Message-ID: <3F17EFD2.5060106@bull.net> Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2003 15:02:10 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> CC: wpolk@nist.gov, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: WG Last Call: SCVP References: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184F6@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) The following 8 issues have been suppressed since there are agreed: 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19 and 23. There remains 16 issues to be discussed. The original numbering has been kept. 1. Section 1.3 Validation Policies In this section the wording "validation policy" is used but is left undefined: "A validation policy can be used to specify the SCVP configuration." Please define it. [Trevor Freeman] I have added a reference to 3379 to define validation policy. [Denis] Are you going to add a reference to section 7 from RFC 3379 ? This text is copied below. A validation policy is a set of rules against which the validation of the certificate is performed. A validation policy MAY include several trust anchors. A trust anchor is defined as one public key, a CA name, and a validity time interval; a trust anchor optionally includes additional constraints. The use of a self-signed certificate is one way to specify the public key to be used, the issuer name, and the validity period of the public key. Additional constraints for each trust anchor MAY be defined. These constraints might include a set of certification policy constraints or a set of naming constraints. These constraints MAY also be included in self-signed certificates. Additional conditions that apply to the certificates in the path MAY also be specified in the validation policy. For example, specific values could be provided for the inputs to the certification path validation algorithm in [PKIX-1], such as user-initial-policy-set, initial-policy-mapping-inhibit, initial-explicit-policy, or initial- any-policy-inhibit. Additional conditions that apply to the end-entity certificate MAY also be specified in the validation policy. For example, a specific name form might be required. In order to succeed, one valid certification path (none of the certificates in the path are expired or revoked) MUST be found between an end-entity certificate and a trust anchor and all constraints that apply to the certification path MUST be verified. 2. Section 1.3 Validation Policies. The text says: " The validation policy is determined by private agreement between the client and the server, ...". While this may be one case this is not the single case. Please delete and simply say: "The validation policy MUST be represented as an OBJECT IDENTIFIER and optionally some additional parameters. [Trevor Freeman] I have removed the word private. [Denis] This does not solve my concern. A validation policy may also be determined by a policy issuer, while means that there is no agreement between the client and the server. The client wants to use a given validation policy defined by a policy issuer. If the server supports it, then it is fine. If the server does not support it, then the client looks for another server supporting it. For the first of the sentence I would thus propose: "The validation policy may be determined by the server, or any third party." For the second part of the sentence, we currently have: ", but it MUST be represented as an OBJECT IDENTIFIER." I have proposed: "The validation policy MUST be represented as an OBJECT IDENTIFIER and optionally some additional parameters." So the issue is whether we have or not "and optionally some additional parameters" This seems to be the reason of a disagreement on many of the other points. The validation policy does not only include the processing algorithms but also the values used by the processing algorithms to validate a certificate. The two possibilities, as I see them, are : - the OID of the validation policy tells everything (i.e. both the processing algorithms and all the values to be used by these processing algorithms), - the OID validation policy provides the processing algorithms and some of the values to be used, but some other values may be defined as additional parameters. Please, reconsider my proposal. 3. In section 3, SignedData is defined with unsignedAttrs being not used. As it will be explained later on, unsignedAttrs should be used to carry unsigned certificate values, as well as unsigned revocation information (CRLs in particular) while the references (much shorter) will be signed. This has the major advantage of keeping the size of archived signed responses short. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement in 3379. Correct. However, this is a big advantage in the following case: The RP wants to keep an archive of "YES" answers. If the values are all signed, then the size of the archives will get pretty big since the same CA certificates and CRLs will be duplicated many times in every "YES" answer. If only the references are signed, then the values may be stored elsewhere and only once: the same values will be usable for thousands of validations. 4. Section 3.2. The text currently says on page 9: " The OPTIONAL valPolicy, trustAnchors, intermediateCerts, and revInfos items provide context for the client request." This sentence should be replaced by the following: "Either the valPolicy item or the trustAnchors item SHALL be used. The intermediateCerts and revInfos items provide certificates or revocation status information which MAY be useful to build the response." [Trevor Freeman] I disagree since the validation policy alone is not enough. 3379 does not require that the validation policy and the parameter used with that policy are represented by a single OID. [Denis] I do not think that you disagree on the second sentence: " The intermediateCerts and revInfos items provide certificates or revocation status information which MAY be useful to build the response." You probably disagree on the first sentence. It is in fact incorrect. I would thus propose the following: "Either the valPolicy item alone or both the valPolicy and the trustAnchors items SHALL be used. The rational is explained in issue 2. 5. Section 3.2.3 wantBack More options should be allowed to return: 1) only the references of both the certificates and the associated revocation status information for the path as a signed parameter, [Trevor Freeman] This is covered by a certificate status request. 2) both the references of both the certificates and the associated revocation status information for the path as signed parameter, and the certificate values together with the associated revocation status information as an unsigned attribute (see comment 3) [Trevor Freeman] This is covered by two requests, one for certificate status and one DPD. [Denis] This is not optimum, since this could be done by one request. If this is done in two requests, this may be complicated because there is no assurance that the first DPD request will return the path used by the DPV request. So the client will have to test if the path that is returned is the right one and re-issue a PVD request until it the right one is returned. If you maintain two requests, these additional explanations would be useful. Note : certificate values or associated revocation status information as a signed parameter are not needed when using the two alternatives above. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement in 3379. The client is at liberty to ignore the signature. [Denis] This relates to issue 2. It is unclear why *only* the "Public key from the certificate" should be returned. Either suppress this option, explain why it is sufficient or return the full certificate. [Trevor Freeman] This reduces the footprint of a simple client. [Denis] Maybe. If we keep it, then add the full certificate as another possibility. 6. Section 3.2.5 valPolicy . The text says: " The valPolicy item, defines the validation policy to be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The client can use this instead of specifying other SCVP configuration items such as trustAnchors. The value of this item can be determined by private agreement between the client and the server, but it MUST be represented as an object identifier. The server might want to assign identifiers that indicate that some settings are used in addition to others given in the request. In this way, the validation policy object identifier can be a shorthand for some SCVP options, but not others". Replace the whole with: " The valPolicy item, defines the validation policy to be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The client MUST either use it or use trustAnchors which allows to define relatively simple validation policies". [Trevor Freeman] I have removed the second sentence and the word "private" from the third sentence. [Denis] This does not solve my concern. See issue 2. I would propose the following rephrasing: " The valPolicy item, defines the validation policy to be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The client MUST either use it or use it in combination with trustAnchors. The second option allows to define relatively simple validation policies". 7. Section 3.2.5 valPolicy . The text says: "All SCVP servers MUST support the default policy". This is fine. However, it is important that the client may know the parameters of the default policy when the default policy has been used by the server. So the default policy SHALL define its parameters. [Trevor Freeman] the default policy has no parameters - it is a set of rules as per 3379. [Denis] As explained in issue 2, a validation policy must at least define one root key, so it is not true to say that it has no parameter. In order to be able to use this protocol with Qualified Certificates (as per the European Directive on Electronic Signatures) certPolicies should further be subdivided in two categories: certPolicy for the end-entity certificate and certPolicies for CA certificates (currently CA certificates do not have certPolicies mandated as per the European Directive on Electronic Signatures). It is thus propose to defined three parameters for the default policy: - trustAnchors, - certPolicy for the end-entity certificate, - certPolicies for CA certificates. As mentioned in the text, revocation conditions include any source of revocation available. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement for 3379. The trust anchors are specified in the request. You requirements are accommodated by two requests, one for the end cert, and one for the CA cert. [Denis] No. This would not solve my concern. The EESSI standards built upon the EU Directive ask for a given CP to be present in the end-entity certificate, but place no such constraint on the CP from the CA certificates. It would however be nice to be able to use the default validation policy in such a case. 8. Section 3.2.5.1 The need and the rational for this section could not be understood: an OID unambiguously identity a validation policy, a "name Validation Policy" or "Validation Policy name" (?) would not add anything. Please explain or delete. [Trevor Freeman] This was asked for at IETF 56 as an example for another validation policy. [Denis] Adding an explanation in the document like "This was asked for at IETF 56" would not be sufficient. :-) I still do not understand. Please provide additional explanations in the main body of the document (or delete). 10. Section 4 Validation Response. The text states: " An unsigned response MUST only be generated for an error status". This is contradictory with the preamble where it is said: "SCVP can be used by clients that do much of the certificate processing themselves but simply want an untrusted server to collect information for them." When simply collecting certification paths, responses do not need to be signed. Thus clients should have a way to indicate whether they want signed responses or not. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement in 3379. The client can ignore the signature. [Denis] I disagree. This is a DPD requirement. RFC 3379 states: For the client to be confident that all of the elements from the response originate from the expected DPD server, an authenticated response MAY be required. Signing takes time and resources. Please do not mandate the signing operation. 14. Section 4.4 requestReference, page 22. The text states: "However, the requestNonce provides a better mechanism for matching requests and responses". This is incorrect. Change into: "While requestRef allows to detect that the request was modified, the requestNonce parameter provides replay protection." [Trevor Freeman] disagree [Denis] You disagree but you do not provide a rational for it. Please explain your position. 15. Section 4.4.1 requestHash, page 23. The text states: "However, the requestNonce provides a better mechanism for matching requests andresponses." This is incorrect. Change into: "While requestHash allows to detect that the request was modified, the requestNonce parameter provides replay protection." [Trevor Freeman] disagree [Denis] You disagree but you do not provide a rational for it. Please explain your position. 17. Section 4.6 responder, page 23. The text states: "The OPTIONAL responder item is used to identify the server." The rational for this parameter is not clear. In PKIX, the subject item from a certificate allows to identify a server. Since it is unrelated, it is very doubtful to have a value chosen by the client which has only local significance to the SCVP server. Please explain or delete. [Trevor Freeman] This is a requirement of 3379. [Denis] Maybe, but where from ? I would guess that this item is only needed to detect a loop when chaining is being used. If this is the case, please add such explanations and what the client SHALL do with it. If this is not the case, please add the appropriate explanations. 20. Section 4.7.5 page 28. The text states: "The octet string value for the AC issuer certification path used to verify the certificate in the request, { id-swb 5 }, contains the CertBundle type. The syntax and semantics of the CertBundle type are described in section 3.2.7." As already mentioned, since CertBundle ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKCReference and PKCReference ::= CHOICE { cert [1] Certificate, pkcRef [2] ESSCertID } The client should be able to say in his request whether he wants back cert or pkcRef. If within the signed response he gets pkcRef, then he should be able to say that he wants CertBundle with the option cert as an unsigned attribute. The integrity of this unsigned parameter can easily be checked using the signed pkcRef. [Trevor Freeman] disagree [Denis] See item 3. 21. Section 4.7.6 valPolicy, page 29. The text states: "The valPolicy value MUST NOT be id-svp-defaultValPolicy". If the default policy has been used, then the client MUST be able to know which one it was: the default policy may vary with the time. Change into: "When the valPolicy value is id-svp-defaultValPolicy, then all the parameters from that policy MUST be returned." [Trevor Freeman] Disagree. If the client wants all the parameters used with the validation policy, then they can ask for the request to be included in the response. [Denis] Fine. However, it would be nice to include this explanation in the document. 22. Section 6 Validation Policies Response. The text states: "The response is not signed by the server". It would be nice to include a variant that would allow the response to be signed. [Trevor Freeman] Disagree. [Denis] You disagree but you do not provide a rational for it. Please explain your position. 24. Addition. At present, PKCReference is defined as: PKCReference ::= CHOICE { cert [1] Certificate, pkcRef [2] ESSCertID } In OCSPv2 a third alternative, i.e. certIdWithSignature has been introduced. It would be interesting to be able to support it. It allows an OCSPserver (and thus an SCVP server) to answer when it does not have access to the value of the certificate (in particular when it *only* uses CRLs in the background), whereas ESSCertID would be useless. certIdWithSignature is a compact way to specify unambiguously a certificate and to allow to verify a certification path. CertIdWithSignature ::= SEQUENCE { issuerandSerialNumber IssuerandSerialNumber, tbsCertificateHash BIT STRING, certSignature CertSignature } IssuerandSerialNumber is defined in [RFC3369] section 10.2.4. tbsCertificateHash contains a hash value computed over the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate field from the certificate using the hash function identified in the signature algorithm from the signature. certSignature contains the signature fields from the certificate. CertSignature ::= SEQUENCE { signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureValue BIT STRING } [Trevor Freeman] Disagree. This is not a requirement in 3379. [Denis] Yes, this is not in RFC 3379 but this comes from an observation made after RFC 3379 was done and when the OCSPv2 draft was written. Please take a closer look at this issue. Denis Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6I9Lsqt078416 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 02:21:54 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6I9LsDX078415 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 02:21:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from nb2.stroeder.com (krl9-d9bb4d78.pool.mediaWays.net [217.187.77.120]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6I9Lqqt078381 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 02:21:53 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from michael@stroeder.com) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49F742B97C for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 11:21:38 +0200 (CEST) Received: from stroeder.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A9A441E494 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 11:21:37 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <3F17BC21.5030206@stroeder.com> Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2003 11:21:37 +0200 From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030626 X-Accept-Language: de-de, de, en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Issues in LDAP schema IDs References: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> <3F16B1A3.5000100@stroeder.com> <003201c34cce$e9070070$4f85900a@wcwang> <3F179DE5.9010704@polito.it> In-Reply-To: <3F179DE5.9010704@polito.it> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.76.2.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: by AMaViS 0.3.12pre8 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Antonio Lioy wrote: > > Wen-Cheng Wang wrote: > >> My concern is a CA may support dual key pairs for a single EE. > > So support for multiple certs per each user should be added to the schema. I'd suggest to read the draft. Hint: Multi-valued attributes are not the only way to store multiple certificates per user. Ciao, Michael. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6I7CNqt059534 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 00:12:23 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6I7CN5U059532 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 00:12:23 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from polito.it (terra.polito.it [130.192.3.81]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6I7C9qt059486 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 00:12:10 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from lioy@polito.it) Received: from [130.192.1.64] (HELO polito.it) by polito.it (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 4.1b7) with ESMTP-TLS id 9492700; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 09:00:20 +0200 Message-ID: <3F179DE5.9010704@polito.it> Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2003 09:12:37 +0200 From: Antonio Lioy <lioy@polito.it> Organization: Politecnico di Torino User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3) Gecko/20030312 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Wen-Cheng Wang <wcwang@cht.com.tw> CC: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk>, PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Issues in LDAP schema IDs References: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> <3F16B1A3.5000100@stroeder.com> <003201c34cce$e9070070$4f85900a@wcwang> In-Reply-To: <003201c34cce$e9070070$4f85900a@wcwang> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Wen-Cheng Wang wrote: > > My concern is a CA may support dual key pairs for a single EE. One key pair > is for digital signature usage; the other key pair is for encipherment usage. A > CA > may even support triple key pairs for a single EE if non-repudiation usage is to > be > separated from digital signature usage. Therefore, a CA may issues two or three > certificates to an EE at a time. If the attribute is restricted to be single > valued, how > do these certificates be stored in the directory? I can confirm that this is actually happening in Italy, where many legal-value CAs are giving to their customers three certs: - one for non-repudiation - one for authentication - one for encryption So support for multiple certs per each user should be added to the schema. Cheers, Antonio Lioy Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6I1osqt040214 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 18:50:54 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6I1osuv040213 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 18:50:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from fw.chttl.com.tw (gate.chttl.com.tw [202.39.157.254]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6I1ojqt040207 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 18:50:51 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from wcwang@cht.com.tw) Received: from ms5.chttl.com.tw (ms5 [10.144.2.115]) by fw.chttl.com.tw (8.12.9/8.11.6) with ESMTP id h6I1nue7029758; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 09:49:57 +0800 (CST) Received: (from root@localhost) by ms5.chttl.com.tw (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6I1obX16735; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 09:50:37 +0800 Received: from wcwang ([10.144.133.79]) by ms5.chttl.com.tw (8.11.6/8.11.6) with SMTP id h6I1obS16652; Fri, 18 Jul 2003 09:50:37 +0800 Message-ID: <003201c34cce$e9070070$4f85900a@wcwang> From: "Wen-Cheng Wang" <wcwang@cht.com.tw> To: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com>, "David Chadwick" <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk> Cc: "PKIX" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> <3F16B1A3.5000100@stroeder.com> Subject: Re: Issues in LDAP schema IDs Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2003 09:50:03 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-scanner: scanned by Inflex 1.0.10 - (http://pldaniels.com/inflex/) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Michael Ströder Wrote: > > David Chadwick wrote: > > > > Peter and I have resolved all the issues described at the PKIX meeting > > today, apart from one, which is what should be the attribute type to be > > used to hold the X.509 DER encoded attribute. Should it be the original > > attribute type name e.g. userCertificate or a new attribute whose schema > > says it must be single valued. > > I'd strongly argue for back-wards compability with existing clients > => userCertificate > > Off course there should be a directory profiling note stating that there > MUST NOT more than one attribute value to be compliant. The caveat is > off-course that the directory can't enforce the SINGLE-VALUE restriction by > schema definition. > My concern is a CA may support dual key pairs for a single EE. One key pair is for digital signature usage; the other key pair is for encipherment usage. A CA may even support triple key pairs for a single EE if non-repudiation usage is to be separated from digital signature usage. Therefore, a CA may issues two or three certificates to an EE at a time. If the attribute is restricted to be single valued, how do these certificates be stored in the directory? ----- Wen-Cheng Wang Project Researcher Telecommunication Laboratories Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6HEOuqt002066 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 07:24:56 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6HEOu6F002065 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 07:24:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from nb2.stroeder.com (krl9-d9bb4df4.pool.mediaWays.net [217.187.77.244]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6HEOrqt002052 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 07:24:54 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from michael@stroeder.com) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0DC732B8C1; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 16:24:37 +0200 (CEST) Received: from stroeder.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nb2.stroeder.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE7542B88E; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 16:24:35 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <3F16B1A3.5000100@stroeder.com> Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2003 16:24:35 +0200 From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <michael@stroeder.com> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030626 X-Accept-Language: de-de, de, en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk> Cc: PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Issues in LDAP schema IDs References: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> In-Reply-To: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.76.2.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: by AMaViS 0.3.12pre8 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> David Chadwick wrote: > > Peter and I have resolved all the issues described at the PKIX meeting > today, apart from one, which is what should be the attribute type to be > used to hold the X.509 DER encoded attribute. Should it be the original > attribute type name e.g. userCertificate or a new attribute whose schema > says it must be single valued. I'd strongly argue for back-wards compability with existing clients => userCertificate Off course there should be a directory profiling note stating that there MUST NOT more than one attribute value to be compliant. The caveat is off-course that the directory can't enforce the SINGLE-VALUE restriction by schema definition. Ciao, Michael. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6HCxoqt095372 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:59:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6HCxoWT095371 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:59:50 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail1.microsoft.com (mail1.microsoft.com [131.107.3.125]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6HCxmqt095347 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:59:48 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from trevorf@windows.microsoft.com) Received: from mail6.microsoft.com ([157.54.6.196]) by mail1.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:59:44 -0700 Received: from inet-vrs-06.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.6.181]) by mail6.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:59:43 -0700 Received: from 157.54.8.155 by inet-vrs-06.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (InterScan E-Mail VirusWall NT); Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:59:43 -0700 Received: from red-imc-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.9.107]) by inet-hub-04.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:59:42 -0700 Received: from win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.0.39]) by red-imc-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:59:42 -0700 Received: from WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.12.81]) by win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:59:40 -0700 Subject: RE: WG Last Call: SCVP MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:59:42 -0700 Message-ID: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184F6@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> Content-class: urn:content-classes:message X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5.6940.0 X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: WG Last Call: SCVP Thread-Index: AcNKyrBjq5FsaZUdSgiS6ZhZRS8VNwA+elog From: "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> To: "Denis Pinkas" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, <wpolk@nist.gov> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 17 Jul 2003 12:59:40.0183 (UTC) FILETIME=[48B57270:01C34C63] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6HCxmqt095364 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Please see below. Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) As an answer to the last call, please find 24 comments on this document. 1. Section 1.3 Validation Policies In this section the wording "validation policy" is used but is left undefined: "A validation policy can be used to specify the SCVP configuration." Please define it. [Trevor Freeman] I have added a refernce to 3379 to define validation policy. 2. Section 1.3 Validation Policies. The text says: " The validation policy is determined by private agreement between the client and the server, ...". While this may be one case this is not the single case. Please delete and simply say: "The validation policy MUST be represented as an OBJECT IDENTIFIER and optionally some additional parameters. [Trevor Freeman] I have removed the word private. 3. In section 3, SignedData is defined with unsignedAttrs being not used. As it will be explained later on, unsignedAttrs should be used to carry unsigned certificate values, as well as unsigned revocation information (CRLs in particular) while the references (much shorter) will be signed. This has the major advantage of keeping the size of archived signed responses short. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirment in 3379. 4. Section 3.2. The text currently says on page 9: " The OPTIONAL valPolicy, trustAnchors, intermediateCerts, and revInfos items provide context for the client request." This sentence should be replaced by the following: "Either the valPolicy item or the trustAnchors item SHALL be used. The intermediateCerts and revInfos items provide certificates or revocation status information which MAY be useful to build the response." [Trevor Freeman]I disagree since the validation policy alone is not enough. 3379 does not require that the validation policy and the parameter used with that policy are represented by a single OID. 5. Section 3.2.3 wantBack More options should be allowed to return: 1) only the references of both the certificates and the associated revocation status information for the path as a signed parameter, [Trevor Freeman] This is covered by a certificate status request. 2) both the references of both the certificates and the associated revocation status information for the path as signed parameter, and the certificate values together with the associated revocation status information as an unsigned attribute (see comment 3) [Trevor Freeman] This is coved by two requests, one for certificate status and one DPD. Note : certificate values or associated revocation status information as a signed parameter are not needed when using the two alternatives above. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement in 3379. The client is at liberty to ignore the signature. It is unclear why *only* the "Public key from the certificate" should be returned. Either suppress this option, explain why it is sufficient or return the full certificate. [Trevor Freeman] This reduces the footprint of a simple client. 6. Section 3.2.5 valPolicy . The text says: " The valPolicy item, defines the validation policy to be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The client can use this instead of specifying other SCVP configuration items such as trustAnchors. The value of this item can be determined by private agreement between the client and the server, but it MUST be represented as an object identifier. The server might want to assign identifiers that indicate that some settings are used in addition to others given in the request. In this way, the validation policy object identifier can be a shorthand for some SCVP options, but not others". Replace the whole with: " The valPolicy item, defines the validation policy to be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The client MUST either use it or use trustAnchors which allows to define relatively simple validation policies". [Trevor Freeman] I have removed the second sentence and the word "private" from the third sentence. 7. Section 3.2.5 valPolicy . The text says: "All SCVP servers MUST support the default policy". This is fine. However, it is important that the client may know the parameters of the default policy when the default policy has been used by the server. So the default policy SHALL define its parameters. [Trevor Freeman] the default policy has no parameters - it is a set of rules as per 3379. In order to be able to use this protocol with Qualified Certificates (as per the European Directive on Electronic Signatures) certPolicies should further be subdivided in two categories: certPolicy for the end-entity certificate and certPolicies for CA certificates (currently CA certificates do not have certPolicies mandated as per the European Directive on Electronic Signatures). It is thus propose to defined three parameters for the default policy: - trustAnchors, - certPolicy for the end-entity certificate, - certPolicies for CA certificates. As mentioned in the text, revocation conditions include any source of revocation available. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement for 3379. The trust anchors are specified in the request. You requirements are accommodated by two requests, one for the end cert, and one for the CA cert. 8. Section 3.2.5.1 The need and the rational for this section could not be understood: an OID unambiguously identity a validation policy, a "name Validation Policy" or "Validation Policy name" (?) would not add anything. Please explain or delete. [Trevor Freeman] This was asked for at IETF 56 as an example for another validation policy 9. Section 3.3 Requestor. the text states: "The OPTIONAL requestor item is used to identify the requestor." Since there is no identification involved, change into: "The OPTIONAL requestor item is a reference local to the requestor. [Trevor Freeman] agreed 10. Section 4 Validation Response. The text states: " An unsigned response MUST only be generated for an error status". This is contradictory with the preamble where it is said: "SCVP can be used by clients that do much of the certificate processing themselves but simply want an untrusted server to collect information for them." When simply collecting certification paths, responses do not need to be signed. Thus clients should have a way to indicate whether they want signed responses or not. [Trevor Freeman] This is not a requirement in 3379. The client can ignore the signature. 11. Section 4. there is an ASN.1 syntax error. Change signerInfos SET OF SignerInfos } -- Only 1 in SCVP into: signerInfos SET OF SignerInfo } -- Only 1 in SCVP [Trevor Freeman] Agreed typo 12. Section 4, page 20, states: "The inclusion of policies in the SigningCertificate attribute is also OPTIONAL." SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { certs SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID, policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL RFC 2634 states: The sequence of policy information terms identifies those certificate policies that the signer asserts apply to the certificate, and under which the certificate should be relied upon. The added value of policies is doubtful. Replace with : "The policies item in the SigningCertificate attribute SHALL not be present." [Trevor Freeman] agreed 13. Section 4.4 requestReference, page 22. The requestRef allows the SCVP server to identify the request that corresponds to this response, but the client has now way to specify in his request whether he wants a hash of the request or the full CVRequest. This decision should not be at the discretion of the server, but chosen by the client. Please add a parameter to allow the client to make the choice. [Trevor Freeman] agreed. There is now a RequestRefHash value in the query. 14. Section 4.4 requestReference, page 22. The text states:"However, the requestNonce provides a better mechanism for matching requests and responses". This is incorrect. Change into: "While requestRef allows to detect that the request was modified, the requestNonce parameter provides replay protection." [Trevor Freeman] disagree 15. Section 4.4.1 requestHash, page 23. The text states: "However, the requestNonce provides a better mechanism for matching requests and responses." This is incorrect. Change into: "While requestHash allows to detect that the request was modified, the requestNonce parameter provides replay protection." [Trevor Freeman] disagree 16. Section 4.5 Requestor, page 23. The text states: "The OPTIONAL requestor item is used to identify the requestor." This is incorrect. Change into: "The OPTIONAL requestor item is a reference local to the requestor." [Trevor Freeman] agree 17. Section 4.6 responder, page 23. The text states: "The OPTIONAL responder item is used to identify the server." The rational for this parameter is not clear. In PKIX, the subject item from a certificate allows to identify a server. Since it is unrelated, it is very doubtful to have a value chosen by the client which has only local significance to the SCVP server. Please explain or delete. [Trevor Freeman] This is a requirement of 3379. 18. Section 4.7.3 replyValTime, page 26. The text states: "The replyValTime item tells the time at which the information in the CertReply was correct." This is incorrect. Change into: "The replyValTime item tells the time at which the server processed the request." [Trevor Freeman] agree 19. Section 4.7.4 replyChecks, page 26. The text states: "The replyChecks item repeats the object identifier (OID) from the query and an integer". It would be more precise to say: "The replyChecks item repeats the object identifier (OID) from the checks from the query and an integer". [Trevor Freeman] agree 20. Section 4.7.5 page 28. The text states: "The octet string value for the AC issuer certification path used to verify the certificate in the request, { id-swb 5 }, contains the CertBundle type. The syntax and semantics of the CertBundle type are described in section 3.2.7." As already mentioned, since CertBundle ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKCReference and PKCReference ::= CHOICE { cert [1] Certificate, pkcRef [2] ESSCertID } The client should be able to say in his request whether he wants back cert or pkcRef. If within the signed response he gets pkcRef, then he should be able to say that he wants CertBundle with the option cert as an unsigned attribute. The integrity of this unsigned parameter can easily be checked using the signed pkcRef. [Trevor Freeman] disagree 21. Section 4.7.6 valPolicy, page 29. The text states: "The valPolicy value MUST NOT be id-svp-defaultValPolicy". If the default policy has been used, then the client MUST be able to know which one it was: the default policy may vary with the time. Change into: "When the valPolicy value is id-svp-defaultValPolicy, then all the parameters from that policy MUST be returned." [Trevor Freeman] Disagree. If the client wants all the parameters used with the validation policy, then they can ask for the request to be included in the response. 22. Section 6 Validation Policies Response. The text states: "The response is not signed by the server". It would be nice to include a variant that would allow the response to be signed. [Trevor Freeman] Disagree. 23. Section 9. Security Considerations. This section should import more text from RFC 3379 in particular: When no policy reference is present in the DPV request, the DPV client ought to verify that the policy selected by the DPV server is appropriate. The revocation status information is obtained for the validation time. In case of a digital signature, it is not necessarily identical to the time when the private key was used. The validation time ought to be adjusted by the DPV client to compensate for: 1) time for the end-entity to realize that its private key has been or could possibly be compromised, and/or 2) time for the end-entity to report the key compromise, and/or 3) time for the revocation authority to process the revocation request from the end-entity, and/or 4) time for the revocation authority to update and distribute the revocation status information. [Trevor Freeman] agreed 24. Addition. At present, PKCReference is defined as: PKCReference ::= CHOICE { cert [1] Certificate, pkcRef [2] ESSCertID } In OCSPv2 a third alternative, i.e. certIdWithSignature has been introduced. It would be interesting to be able to support it. It allows an OCSP server (and thus an SCVP server) to answer when it does not have access to the value of the certificate (in particular when it *only* uses CRLs in the background), whereas ESSCertID would be useless. certIdWithSignature is a compact way to specify unambiguously a certificate and to allow to verify a certification path. CertIdWithSignature ::= SEQUENCE { issuerandSerialNumber IssuerandSerialNumber, tbsCertificateHash BIT STRING, certSignature CertSignature } IssuerandSerialNumber is defined in [RFC3369] section 10.2.4. tbsCertificateHash contains a hash value computed over the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate field from the certificate using the hash function identified in the signature algorithm from the signature. certSignature contains the signature fields from the certificate. CertSignature ::= SEQUENCE { signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureValue BIT STRING } [Trevor Freeman] Disagree. This is not a requirement in 3379. Denis Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6HCRkqt089771 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:27:46 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6HCRkGo089770 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:27:46 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp.ietf57.telekom.at (smtp.ietf57.telekom.at [81.160.16.8]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6HCRiqt089754 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 05:27:45 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk) Received: from salford.ac.uk (DC-IBM-X30.ietf57.telekom.at [81.160.187.120]) by smtp.ietf57.telekom.at (8.11.7+Sun/8.10.2) with ESMTP id h6HCRQk20485 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 14:27:27 +0200 (MEST) Message-ID: <3F16961E.C99C414D@salford.ac.uk> Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2003 13:27:10 +0100 From: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk> Organization: University of Salford X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.76 [en] (Windows NT 5.0; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Issues in LDAP schema IDs Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------AF932995C5C7561C01CD9A4B" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------AF932995C5C7561C01CD9A4B Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Dear All Peter and I have resolved all the issues described at the PKIX meeting today, apart from one, which is what should be the attribute type to be used to hold the X.509 DER encoded attribute. Should it be the original attribute type name e.g. userCertificate or a new attribute whose schema says it must be single valued. Comments please to the list to help us resolve this final issue. Concerning the resolved issues, the object classes of the newly created child entries will be created with one abstract class for the certificate/CRL (all derived from x509base) plus appropriate structural ocs (as now) and then additional auxiliary object classes to cater for X.509/PKIX profile defined extensions, other PKIX defined extensions like qualified cert extensions etc. New auxiliary object classes and attribute types can be created by people as needed. We will define in the current IDs auxiliary classes and attributes for X.509 standard extensions, and some from the certificate profile (RFC 3280). Other ones, eg. for qualified certs, may make it into these IDs are may not, depending upon our time. We now have a proper oc structure which can be easily and intuitively extended as required. Regards David -- ********************************************************* Leaders of the world's richest nations meet in Cancun on September 10th 2003. Oxfam is presenting them with a petition to make trade fair. Be sure your voice is heard. Sign the 'Big Noise' petition to make trade fair at: http://www.maketradefair.com/go/join/?p=omf1 ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security IS Institute, University of Salford, Salford M5 4WT Tel: +44 161 295 5351 Fax +44 01484 532930 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick@salford.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm Research Web site: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 ***************************************************************** --------------AF932995C5C7561C01CD9A4B Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="d.w.chadwick.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for David Chadwick Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="d.w.chadwick.vcf" begin:vcard n:Chadwick;David tel;cell:+44 77 96 44 7184 tel;fax:+44 1484 532930 tel;home:+44 1484 352238 tel;work:+44 161 295 5351 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/chadwick.htm org:University of Salford;IS Institute version:2.1 email;internet:d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk title:Professor of Information Security adr;quoted-printable:;;The Crescent=0D=0A;Salford;Greater Manchester;M5 4WT;England note;quoted-printable:Research Projects: http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk.......................=0D=0A=0D=0AUnderstanding X.500: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/X500.htm .......................=0D=0A=0D=0AX.500/LDAP Seminars: http://www.salford.ac.uk/its024/seminars.htm...................=0D=0A=0D=0AEntrust key validation string: CJ94-LKWD-BSXB ...........=0D=0A=0D=0APGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 x-mozilla-cpt:;-4856 fn:David Chadwick end:vcard --------------AF932995C5C7561C01CD9A4B-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6H6ujqt051604 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 23:56:45 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6H6ujEj051603 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 23:56:45 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6H6uhqt051573 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 23:56:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [81.160.167.150] (ssh.bbn.com [192.1.50.70]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6H6uaD9008362; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 02:56:37 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@localhost Message-Id: <p05200f05bb3bf307e40c@[81.160.167.150]> In-Reply-To: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F29806EE188E@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.a u> References: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F29806EE188E@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.a u> Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2003 02:57:03 -0400 To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: IP addr: 01: use NULL instead of BOOLEAN for inherit Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Jim, >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt > >I had not fully not appreciated section 2.3 "IP Address Delegation >Extension Certification Path Validation". The IP address delegation >extension acts as both a subject name and a name constraint. It is >marked as CRITICAL due to the latter role. I wonder if combining >these 2 functions in one extensions is the most sensible approach? >[RFC 2050 "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" (section 2.1) >makes a distinction between the allocation of IP addresses and the >assignment of IP addresses.] Perhaps you can distinguish these >cases based on whether or not the certificate is a CA certificate. No, the addresses are NOT subject names. The extension represents an authorization to use the addresses contained therein. >Interestingly, though a name constraint would normally have to be >marked critical (in case someone understands a name but not a name >constraint) we can probably get away without this restriction in >this case. A relying party either: >* recognizes the extension and, hence, processes the constraint that >address ranges must be subsumed by the address ranges in the issuers >certificate; or >* does not recognize the extension and, hence, does not process the >constraints (so the address range may be outside that of the issuer) >but it ignores the address range anyway. >It should be acceptable to ignore a name constraint if you also >ignore any name of the type it is constraining. Perhaps the >difficulty is that the output from a typical certificate path >processing module cannot indicate that only a subset of the subject >names should be considered by the application. You are right that, in a sense, the subsetting requirement imposed on validation of a cert path containing these extensions is analogous to that imposed by name constraints. But, this is an extension designed to represent authorization data, not name data, and thus the name constraints extension is not be appropriate here. >If a certificate includes an IP address in the subjectAltName >extension must it be within the ranges defined by any IP address >delegation extensions in the same certificate or certificates >further up the chain? Either way, this should probably be >explicitly mentioned in section 2.3. >[How about e-mail address or URIs in subjectAltName that use IP addresses?] As I noted above, the addresses here are NOT names, so they have nothing to do with the subject name or subject alt name fields. >In a certificate chain (CACert1->CACert2->CACert3->EECert) does it >matter which certificates have the IP address delegation extension? >For instance, can CACert2 and EECert have the extension but not the >certs before and between them? The model envisioned here requires that all CA certs on the path contain the extension, terminating in an EE cert containing the extension. We couild clarify this in a revision of the doc. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6H2ICqt023576 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 19:18:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6H2ICIa023575 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 19:18:12 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au [202.12.144.17]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6H2I9qt023555 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 19:18:10 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id MAA10501 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 12:17:52 +1000 (EST) Received: from maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au(202.12.142.17) via SMTP by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au, id smtpdehI8o_; Thu Jul 17 12:17:09 2003 Received: (from uucp@localhost) by maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id MAA05077 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 12:17:08 +1000 (EST) Received: from localhost(127.0.0.1), claiming to be "mail.cdn.telstra.com.au" via SMTP by localhost, id smtpd00zWRb; Thu Jul 17 12:16:40 2003 Received: from WSMSG0004.srv.dir.telstra.com (wsmsg0004.srv.dir.telstra.com [192.74.168.133]) by mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) with ESMTP id MAA19360 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 17 Jul 2003 12:16:39 +1000 (EST) content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.0.6249.0 Subject: RE: IP addr: 01: use NULL instead of BOOLEAN for inherit Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2003 12:15:25 +1000 Message-ID: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F29806EE188E@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> Thread-Topic: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt Thread-Index: AcNA9we0XWFLjqzlEdeWHgAIxySt0gABo0SAAr4ZAtA= From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6H2ICqt023571 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt I had not fully not appreciated section 2.3 "IP Address Delegation Extension Certification Path Validation". The IP address delegation extension acts as both a subject name and a name constraint. It is marked as CRITICAL due to the latter role. I wonder if combining these 2 functions in one extensions is the most sensible approach? [RFC 2050 "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" (section 2.1) makes a distinction between the allocation of IP addresses and the assignment of IP addresses.] Perhaps you can distinguish these cases based on whether or not the certificate is a CA certificate. Interestingly, though a name constraint would normally have to be marked critical (in case someone understands a name but not a name constraint) we can probably get away without this restriction in this case. A relying party either: * recognizes the extension and, hence, processes the constraint that address ranges must be subsumed by the address ranges in the issuers certificate; or * does not recognize the extension and, hence, does not process the constraints (so the address range may be outside that of the issuer) but it ignores the address range anyway. It should be acceptable to ignore a name constraint if you also ignore any name of the type it is constraining. Perhaps the difficulty is that the output from a typical certificate path processing module cannot indicate that only a subset of the subject names should be considered by the application. If a certificate includes an IP address in the subjectAltName extension must it be within the ranges defined by any IP address delegation extensions in the same certificate or certificates further up the chain? Either way, this should probably be explicitly mentioned in section 2.3. [How about e-mail address or URIs in subjectAltName that use IP addresses?] In a certificate chain (CACert1->CACert2->CACert3->EECert) does it matter which certificates have the IP address delegation extension? For instance, can CACert2 and EECert have the extension but not the certs before and between them? > ---------- > From: Manger, James H > Sent: Thursday, 3 July 2003 11:26 AM > > 2. > It seems unnecessary to set these extensions to CRITICAL. A relying party is not misled by ignoring these extensions -- it simply learns nothing new about IP address and AS allocations. > > Perhaps making it CRITICAL is supposed to indicate that the certificate is binding a public key to these addresses instead of any other type of name so the subject (and subjectAltName) fields should be ignored. If this is the case, it may be better to formulate the extensions as OTHER-NAME types to be used in the subjectAltName extension (in which case no other names needs to be included). > > Perhaps making it CRITICAL is supposed to indicate that the certificate should only be used in, say, Secure BGP and not for, say, secure e-mail. If this is the case, defining a new purpose identifier for the extendedKeyUsage extension may be more appropriate. > > ---------- > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com] > Sent: Thursday, 17 July 2003 12:45 AM > To: Manger, James H; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > Since the extension imposes constraints on the values of subordinate certificates, it is clear that it must be critical in CA certificates. I suppose that it could be non-critical in end entity certificates, but the certificate user must be able to process the extension in the CA certificates. Not clear there is any value in allowing it to be non-critical only in end entity certificates. > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6GEpLqt084970 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 07:51:21 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6GEpLGV084969 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 07:51:21 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [207.228.252.5]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6GEpKqt084964 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 07:51:20 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Received: (qmail 19761 invoked by uid 0); 16 Jul 2003 14:50:08 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Russ-Laptop.vigilsec.com) (81.160.169.162) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 16 Jul 2003 14:50:08 -0000 Message-Id: <5.2.0.9.2.20030716104146.03f9f908@mail.binhost.com> X-Sender: housley@mail.binhost.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.2.0.9 Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2003 10:44:50 -0400 To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: IP addr: 01: use NULL instead of BOOLEAN for inherit In-Reply-To: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F29806EE187A@ntmsg0131.corpmai l.telstra.com.au> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Since the extension imposes constraints on the values of subordinate certificates, it is clear that it must be critical in CA certificates. I suppose that it could be non-critical in end entity certificates, but the certificate user must be able to process the extension in the CA certificates. Not clear there is any value in allowing it to be non-critical only in end entity certificates. Russ At 11:26 AM 7/3/2003 +1000, Manger, James H wrote: >It seems unnecessary to set these extensions to CRITICAL. A relying party >is not misled by ignoring these extensions -- it simply learns nothing new >about IP address and AS allocations. > >Perhaps making it CRITICAL is supposed to indicate that the certificate is >binding a public key to these addresses instead of any other type of name >so the subject (and subjectAltName) fields should be ignored. If this is >the case, it may be better to formulate the extensions as OTHER-NAME types >to be used in the subjectAltName extension (in which case no other names >needs to be included). > >Perhaps making it CRITICAL is supposed to indicate that the certificate >should only be used in, say, Secure BGP and not for, say, secure >e-mail. If this is the case, defining a new purpose identifier for the >extendedKeyUsage extension may be more appropriate. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6G7miqt043509 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 00:48:44 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6G7migJ043508 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 00:48:44 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from postmark.nist.gov (pushme.nist.gov [129.6.16.92]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6G7mgqt043498 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 00:48:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from wpolk@nist.gov) Received: from calendar.nist.gov (calendar-ether.nist.gov [129.6.16.10]) by postmark.nist.gov (8.12.5/8.12.5) with ESMTP id h6G7lCw1021557; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 03:47:12 -0400 (EDT) Received: from calendar.nist.gov (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by calendar.nist.gov (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6G7lCKH009988; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 03:47:12 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from nobody@localhost) by calendar.nist.gov (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6G7l9RE009987; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 03:47:09 -0400 (EDT) Received: from 81.160.236.34 ( [81.160.236.34]) as user wpolk@email.nist.gov by imp.nist.gov with HTTP; Wed, 16 Jul 2003 03:47:09 -0400 Message-ID: <1058341629.3f1502fd1fcab@imp.nist.gov> Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2003 03:47:09 -0400 From: wpolk@nist.gov To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Cc: kent@bbn.com, housley@vigilsec.com, smb@research.att.com, welch@mcs.anl.gov Subject: Proxy Certificates - WG Last Call Closed MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) 2.3.7-cvs Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Folks, WG Last Call for the Proxy Certificate specification is now closed. The WG review has not generated any new technical issues, demonstrating that working group consensus has been achieved. The editors will be submitting a new draft to resolve editorial issues raised by the chairs. The new draft will identify normative and informative references and has a smaller editorial group. These changes are not normative but will facilitate successful IESG review. The new draft will be forwarded to the ADs when it appears in the Internet Draft repository. Thanks, Tim (and Steve) Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6FIV7qt095267 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 11:31:07 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6FIV77w095266 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 11:31:07 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from host13.websitesource.com (host13.websitesource.com [209.239.35.152]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6FIV6qt095258 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 11:31:07 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from chokhani@orionsec.com) Received: from wchokhani (dpvc-138-88-161-20.res.east.verizon.net [138.88.161.20]) by host13.websitesource.com (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6FIUhVd030042; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 14:31:03 -0400 From: "Santosh Chokhani" <chokhani@orionsec.com> To: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, "'Steve Hanna'" <steve.hanna@sun.com> Cc: "'PKIX List'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Question about Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2003 14:30:27 -0400 Message-ID: <003401c34aff$3f3e4fb0$9900a8c0@hq.orionsec.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.4510 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <3F13F803.2040906@bull.net> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6FIV7qt095261 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Denis: I think Steve Henna is talking about certificate issuer name in the CRL entry extension and the need to match it to the issuer DN of the certificate of interest. -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 8:48 AM To: Steve Hanna Cc: PKIX List Subject: Re: Question about Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension Steve, > The Certificate Issuer CRL entry extension (described in section 5.3.4 > of RFC 3280) is a GeneralNames structure that identifies the > certificate issuer for the CRL entry to which it is attached (and also > to all subsequent entries in that CRL until another Certificate Issuer > CRL entry extension is encountered. > RFC 3280 doesn't say so, but I believe that within a PKIX > (Internet) environment (where each certificate must have a non-empty > X.500 issuer name and issuer alternative names are generally ignored) > this extension MUST always contain at least one X.500 name so that the > relying party can match this name against the issuer name in the > certificate, as described in section 6.3.3 item (j) of RFC 3280. And I > think that text describing this requirement should be added to the > successor to RFC 3280. Does everyone agree with this? Matching a CRL Issuer name against a CA name is not always required, but having one name format would be nice. Would would be the exact phrasing ? > I also wonder whether anyone can think of a reason why this CRL entry > extension should ever contain anything other than a single X.500 name > in a PKIX (Internet) environment. If not, then the requirement can > (and should) be made even more strict, specifying that this extension > MUST contain only a single X.500 name. Please let me know if you have > a reason why this would not be a good idea. What about certificates issued after December 31, 2003 ? RFC 3280 states: The UTF8String encoding [RFC 2279] is the preferred encoding, and all certificates issued after December 31, 2003 MUST use the UTF8String encoding of DirectoryString. Isn't there a reason to have the same name encoded both using printableString and utf8String during some transition period ? Denis > Thanks, > > Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6FD0xqt075179 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 06:00:59 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6FD0xhw075176 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 06:00:59 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from aragorn.bbn.com (aragorn.bbn.com [128.33.0.62]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6FD0vqt075145; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 06:00:58 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from [81.160.154.187] (ssh.bbn.com [192.1.50.70]) by aragorn.bbn.com (8.12.7/8.12.7) with ESMTP id h6FCxwDD029536; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 09:00:07 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@localhost Message-Id: <p05200f04bb39a7534e0a@[81.160.154.187]> In-Reply-To: <000301c34ab3$cb30a4b0$8b40a051@augustcellars.local> References: <000301c34ab3$cb30a4b0$8b40a051@augustcellars.local> Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2003 08:46:24 -0400 To: <jimsch@exmsft.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: Discussing RTCS Cc: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, "'Sean P. Turner'" <turners@ieca.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>, "'pkix'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.28 (www . roaringpenguin . com / mimedefang) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 11:30 +0200 7/15/03, Jim Schaad wrote: >I agree with Denis, this is a certificate validation issue and as such >belongs in the PKIX WG if to be standardized by the IETF. I think that >we can provide a review of the document if requested for it's usage of >CMS, but not it's general suitablity. > >jim > Jim, I agree with you and Denis that this is really a PKIX matter, vs. an S/MIME matter. However, I had several problems with Peter bringing this in as a WG item: - we already have OCSP and OCSPv2 has been worked on - this protocol goes beyond the OCSP semantics to provide delegated cert (not cert path) validation. we have just agreed to adopt SCVP for delegated cert path validation, and I was worried that this overlap would conflict with SCVP - PKIX has been told to not take on new work items Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6FCmAqt073051 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 05:48:10 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6FCmApM073049 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 05:48:10 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6FCm6qt073029 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 05:48:08 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA20026; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 14:52:42 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA07561; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 14:48:15 +0200 Message-ID: <3F13F803.2040906@bull.net> Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2003 14:48:03 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Steve Hanna <steve.hanna@sun.com> CC: PKIX List <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Question about Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension References: <3F0EC7A8.BDF1D6CA@sun.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Steve, > The Certificate Issuer CRL entry extension (described in > section 5.3.4 of RFC 3280) is a GeneralNames structure > that identifies the certificate issuer for the CRL entry > to which it is attached (and also to all subsequent entries > in that CRL until another Certificate Issuer CRL entry > extension is encountered. > RFC 3280 doesn't say so, but I believe that within a PKIX > (Internet) environment (where each certificate must have a > non-empty X.500 issuer name and issuer alternative names are > generally ignored) this extension MUST always contain at > least one X.500 name so that the relying party can match > this name against the issuer name in the certificate, as > described in section 6.3.3 item (j) of RFC 3280. And I think > that text describing this requirement should be added to the > successor to RFC 3280. Does everyone agree with this? Matching a CRL Issuer name against a CA name is not always required, but having one name format would be nice. Would would be the exact phrasing ? > I also wonder whether anyone can think of a reason why this > CRL entry extension should ever contain anything other than > a single X.500 name in a PKIX (Internet) environment. If not, > then the requirement can (and should) be made even more strict, > specifying that this extension MUST contain only a single X.500 > name. Please let me know if you have a reason why this would not > be a good idea. What about certificates issued after December 31, 2003 ? RFC 3280 states: The UTF8String encoding [RFC 2279] is the preferred encoding, and all certificates issued after December 31, 2003 MUST use the UTF8String encoding of DirectoryString. Isn't there a reason to have the same name encoded both using printableString and utf8String during some transition period ? Denis > Thanks, > > Steve Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6FBAGqt064047 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 04:10:16 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6FBAG8Q064046 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 04:10:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6FBADqt064037 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 04:10:14 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA26484; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 13:14:52 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA07065; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 13:10:24 +0200 Message-ID: <3F13E114.3050803@bull.net> Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2003 13:10:12 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: wpolk@nist.gov CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: WG Last Call: SCVP References: <5.1.0.14.2.20030624174958.02559120@email.nist.gov> <1057665519.3f0ab1efeccd1@imp.nist.gov> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> > This message initiates working group Last Call for the Simple Certificate > Validation Protocol. > > Last Call will run for (at least) two weeks. That is, Last Call will not > close before July 22. > > The URL for this Internet-Draft is: > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt > > The -12 draft includes minor enhancements to bring the specification into > full compliance with RFC 3379. > > Thanks, > > Tim Polk Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) As an answer to the last call, please find 24 comments on this document. 1. Section 1.3 Validation Policies In this section the wording "validation policy" is used but is left undefined: "A validation policy can be used to specify the SCVP configuration." Please define it. 2. Section 1.3 Validation Policies. The text says: " The validation policy is determined by private agreement between the client and the server, ...". While this may be one case this is not the single case. Please delete and simply say: "The validation policy MUST be represented as an OBJECT IDENTIFIER and optionally some additional parameters. 3. In section 3, SignedData is defined with unsignedAttrs being not used. As it will be explained later on, unsignedAttrs should be used to carry unsigned certificate values, as well as unsigned revocation information (CRLs in particular) while the references (much shorter) will be signed. This has the major advantage of keeping the size of archived signed responses short. 4. Section 3.2. The text currently says on page 9: " The OPTIONAL valPolicy, trustAnchors, intermediateCerts, and revInfos items provide context for the client request." This sentence should be replaced by the following: "Either the valPolicy item or the trustAnchors item SHALL be used. The intermediateCerts and revInfos items provide certificates or revocation status information which MAY be useful to build the response." 5. Section 3.2.3 wantBack More options should be allowed to return: 1) only the references of both the certificates and the associated revocation status information for the path as a signed parameter, 2) both the references of both the certificates and the associated revocation status information for the path as signed parameter, and the certificate values together with the associated revocation status information as an unsigned attribute (see comment 3) Note : certificate values or associated revocation status information as a signed parameter are not needed when using the two alternatives above. It is unclear why *only* the "Public key from the certificate" should be returned. Either suppress this option, explain why it is sufficient or return the full certificate. 6. Section 3.2.5 valPolicy . The text says: " The valPolicy item, defines the validation policy to be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The client can use this instead of specifying other SCVP configuration items such as trustAnchors. The value of this item can be determined by private agreement between the client and the server, but it MUST be represented as an object identifier. The server might want to assign identifiers that indicate that some settings are used in addition to others given in the request. In this way, the validation policy object identifier can be a shorthand for some SCVP options, but not others". Replace the whole with: " The valPolicy item, defines the validation policy to be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The client MUST either use it or use trustAnchors which allows to define relatively simple validation policies". 7. Section 3.2.5 valPolicy . The text says: "All SCVP servers MUST support the default policy". This is fine. However, it is important that the client may know the parameters of the default policy when the default policy has been used by the server. So the default policy SHALL define its parameters. In order to be able to use this protocol with Qualified Certificates (as per the European Directive on Electronic Signatures) certPolicies should further be subdivided in two categories: certPolicy for the end-entity certificate and certPolicies for CA certificates (currently CA certificates do not have certPolicies mandated as per the European Directive on Electronic Signatures). It is thus propose to defined three parameters for the default policy: - trustAnchors, - certPolicy for the end-entity certificate, - certPolicies for CA certificates. As mentioned in the text, revocation conditions include any source of revocation available. 8. Section 3.2.5.1 The need and the rational for this section could not be understood: an OID unambiguously identity a validation policy, a "name Validation Policy" or "Validation Policy name" (?) would not add anything. Please explain or delete. 9. Section 3.3 Requestor. the text states: "The OPTIONAL requestor item is used to identify the requestor." Since there is no identification involved, change into: "The OPTIONAL requestor item is a reference local to the requestor. 10. Section 4 Validation Response. The text states: " An unsigned response MUST only be generated for an error status". This is contradictory with the preamble where it is said: "SCVP can be used by clients that do much of the certificate processing themselves but simply want an untrusted server to collect information for them." When simply collecting certification paths, responses do not need to be signed. Thus clients should have a way to indicate whether they want signed responses or not. 11. Section 4. there is an ASN.1 syntax error. Change signerInfos SET OF SignerInfos } -- Only 1 in SCVP into: signerInfos SET OF SignerInfo } -- Only 1 in SCVP 12. Section 4, page 20, states: "The inclusion of policies in the SigningCertificate attribute is also OPTIONAL." SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { certs SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID, policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL RFC 2634 states: The sequence of policy information terms identifies those certificate policies that the signer asserts apply to the certificate, and under which the certificate should be relied upon. The added value of policies is doubtful. Replace with : "The policies item in the SigningCertificate attribute SHALL not be present." 13. Section 4.4 requestReference, page 22. The requestRef allows the SCVP server to identify the request that corresponds to this response, but the client has now way to specify in his request whether he wants a hash of the request or the full CVRequest. This decision should not be at the discretion of the server, but chosen by the client. Please add a parameter to allow the client to make the choice. 14. Section 4.4 requestReference, page 22. The text states:"However, the requestNonce provides a better mechanism for matching requests and responses". This is incorrect. Change into: "While requestRef allows to detect that the request was modified, the requestNonce parameter provides replay protection." 15. Section 4.4.1 requestHash, page 23. The text states: "However, the requestNonce provides a better mechanism for matching requests and responses." This is incorrect. Change into: "While requestHash allows to detect that the request was modified, the requestNonce parameter provides replay protection." 16. Section 4.5 Requestor, page 23. The text states: "The OPTIONAL requestor item is used to identify the requestor." This is incorrect. Change into: "The OPTIONAL requestor item is a reference local to the requestor." 17. Section 4.6 responder, page 23. The text states: "The OPTIONAL responder item is used to identify the server." The rational for this parameter is not clear. In PKIX, the subject item from a certificate allows to identify a server. Since it is unrelated, it is very doubtful to have a value chosen by the client which has only local significance to the SCVP server. Please explain or delete. 18. Section 4.7.3 replyValTime, page 26. The text states: "The replyValTime item tells the time at which the information in the CertReply was correct." This is incorrect. Change into: "The replyValTime item tells the time at which the server processed the request." 19. Section 4.7.4 replyChecks, page 26. The text states: "The replyChecks item repeats the object identifier (OID) from the query and an integer". It would be more precise to say: "The replyChecks item repeats the object identifier (OID) from the checks from the query and an integer". 20. Section 4.7.5 page 28. The text states: "The octet string value for the AC issuer certification path used to verify the certificate in the request, { id-swb 5 }, contains the CertBundle type. The syntax and semantics of the CertBundle type are described in section 3.2.7." As already mentioned, since CertBundle ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKCReference and PKCReference ::= CHOICE { cert [1] Certificate, pkcRef [2] ESSCertID } The client should be able to say in his request whether he wants back cert or pkcRef. If within the signed response he gets pkcRef, then he should be able to say that he wants CertBundle with the option cert as an unsigned attribute. The integrity of this unsigned parameter can easily be checked using the signed pkcRef. 21. Section 4.7.6 valPolicy, page 29. The text states: "The valPolicy value MUST NOT be id-svp-defaultValPolicy". If the default policy has been used, then the client MUST be able to know which one it was: the default policy may vary with the time. Change into: "When the valPolicy value is id-svp-defaultValPolicy, then all the parameters from that policy MUST be returned." 22. Section 6 Validation Policies Response. The text states: "The response is not signed by the server". It would be nice to include a variant that would allow the response to be signed. 23. Section 9. Security Considerations. This section should import more text from RFC 3379 in particular: When no policy reference is present in the DPV request, the DPV client ought to verify that the policy selected by the DPV server is appropriate. The revocation status information is obtained for the validation time. In case of a digital signature, it is not necessarily identical to the time when the private key was used. The validation time ought to be adjusted by the DPV client to compensate for: 1) time for the end-entity to realize that its private key has been or could possibly be compromised, and/or 2) time for the end-entity to report the key compromise, and/or 3) time for the revocation authority to process the revocation request from the end-entity, and/or 4) time for the revocation authority to update and distribute the revocation status information. 24. Addition. At present, PKCReference is defined as: PKCReference ::= CHOICE { cert [1] Certificate, pkcRef [2] ESSCertID } In OCSPv2 a third alternative, i.e. certIdWithSignature has been introduced. It would be interesting to be able to support it. It allows an OCSP server (and thus an SCVP server) to answer when it does not have access to the value of the certificate (in particular when it *only* uses CRLs in the background), whereas ESSCertID would be useless. certIdWithSignature is a compact way to specify unambiguously a certificate and to allow to verify a certification path. CertIdWithSignature ::= SEQUENCE { issuerandSerialNumber IssuerandSerialNumber, tbsCertificateHash BIT STRING, certSignature CertSignature } IssuerandSerialNumber is defined in [RFC3369] section 10.2.4. tbsCertificateHash contains a hash value computed over the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate field from the certificate using the hash function identified in the signature algorithm from the signature. certSignature contains the signature fields from the certificate. CertSignature ::= SEQUENCE { signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureValue BIT STRING } Denis Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6FB3Nqt063641 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 04:03:23 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6FB3N0R063640 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 04:03:23 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.151]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6FB3Lqt063633; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 04:03:22 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.33]) by hermes.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6FB2YYM012981; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 23:02:34 +1200 Received: (from pgut001@localhost) by medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (8.11.6/8.11.6) id h6FB2We15157; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 23:02:32 +1200 Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2003 23:02:32 +1200 Message-Id: <200307151102.h6FB2We15157@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, turners@ieca.com Subject: Re: Discussing RTCS Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, ietf-smime@imc.org Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> writes: >This is a topic to be addressed by the PKIX WG, not by the SMIME WG. We already tried that, but you made sure it wouldn't work. For those who aren't on the PKIX list, a short summary: - Denis has some sort of rabid opposition to what RTCS does. I had private mail from another PKIX member to say that RTCS' crime is that it provides a basic yes/no response rather than a CRL-style revoked/not revoked/maybe/ maybe not response. Someone else thought that it was because it made OCSP look bad. I'm not sure what it really is. - The result of this was a series of increasingly hysterical attacks by Denis on RTCS, using every reason he could dream up (see the PKIX list from late last year some time). The highlights were him posting several messages in which he quoted sections of text and claimed the exact opposite of what the text said. In one message I got a quote of him saying something wasn't possible, after which I had another quote of him saying the exact opposite earlier on. You get the idea... the debate wasn't very coherent, or useful, except perhaps for amusement value. - When his hissy fit on the list failed, he tried a private appeal to the WG chair to get it killed. - The only (unfortunate) effect of his fit was that it drove most of the discussion into private mail, because no-one (apart from me apparently :-) wanted to become the target of his attacks. I did, however, get some good feedback, which made it into the new draft. So because of Denis it isn't really possible to have any coherent discussion on the PKIX list. My last message to him on that list was: It's obvious from your messages (and others have commented on this as well) that you've barely read the RTCS draft (if at all), and even then only to pick out bits to complain about. The posting of obviously incorrect claims such as the ones cited above aren't helping your credibility much either. As the next sentence from his current post shows: The advantages of this new protocol versus draft-ietf-pkix-ocspv2-ext-01.txt (Online Certificate Status Protocol, version 2) and the differences should be first explained. he still hasen't actually read the draft. Hint for Denis: The answer to your question is in Section 2, right after the Abstract, which is section 1. I'm now pointing this out for the third (or fourth) time, but I doubt it'll make any difference. So to summarise: Denis has some sort of strong religious objection to RTCS. He will engage in whatever hysterics he thinks necessary to attack it. If anyone wants to see the rest, see the PKIX thread on this (or wait for Denis' next message). Peter (sorry for the sarcasm and whatnot, but I was hoping he'd finalled given up after the last time... it's like listening to a broken record. In the meantime, as ever, I welcome constructive feedback on RTCS). Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6F9UTqt055329 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 02:30:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6F9UT59055327 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 02:30:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp4.pacifier.net (smtp4.pacifier.net [64.255.237.174]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6F9USqt055320; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 02:30:28 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jimsch@nwlink.com) Received: from ROMANS (unknown [81.160.64.139]) by smtp4.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9023D6A9C8; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 02:08:03 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: <jimsch@exmsft.com> From: "Jim Schaad" <jimsch@nwlink.com> To: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, "'Sean P. Turner'" <turners@ieca.com> Cc: <ietf-smime@imc.org>, "'pkix'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Discussing RTCS Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2003 11:30:53 +0200 Message-ID: <000301c34ab3$cb30a4b0$8b40a051@augustcellars.local> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2627 In-Reply-To: <3F13BB30.4030906@bull.net> Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I agree with Denis, this is a certificate validation issue and as such belongs in the PKIX WG if to be standardized by the IETF. I think that we can provide a review of the document if requested for it's usage of CMS, but not it's general suitablity. jim > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org > [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas > Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 10:29 AM > To: Sean P. Turner > Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org; pkix > Subject: Re: Discussing RTCS > > > > Sean, > > > Does anyone have an opinion on bringing this to the working group? > > This is a topic to be addressed by the PKIX WG, not by the SMIME WG. > > The PKIX WG is attempting (but not always succeeding) to > avoid duplication > of protocols for the same topic. > > We all know that it would have been better to use CMS for > building the OCSP > protocol, but this was not the case. > > The advantages of this new protocol versus > draft-ietf-pkix-ocspv2-ext-01.txt > (Online Certificate Status Protocol, version 2) and the > differences should > be first explained. > > Denis > > > > spt > > > > Blake Ramsdell wrote: > > > >>Peter Gutmann has made an individual draft submission for his > >>CMS-based RTCS protocol. A URL to this draft is: > >> > >>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gutmann-cms-rtcs-00.txt > >> > >>He would like to get some review of the CMS parts of this, and it > >>seems reasonable to discuss it here on the IETF-SMIME list > if there is > >>interest. > >> > >>Since this draft is CMS based and potentially adds value to CMS or > >>S/MIME in general, should we consider bringing it into this working > >>group? > >> > >>Comments? > >> > >>Blake > >>-- > >>Blake Ramsdell | Brute Squad Labs | http://www.brutesquadlabs.com > >> > >> > >> > > > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6F9Mfqt054268 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 02:22:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6F9MfZq054267 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 02:22:41 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6F9Mdqt054262 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 02:22:40 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA37892; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 11:27:16 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA06554; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 11:22:47 +0200 Message-ID: <3F13C7DA.8070703@bull.net> Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2003 11:22:34 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Hesse <pmhesse@geminisecurity.com>, "'Matt Cooper'" <mcooper@orionsec.com>, "'Yuriy Dzambasow'" <yuriy@anassoc.com>, "'Susan Joseph'" <susan.joseph@DigitalNet.com>, "Richard E. Nicholas (Nicholas, Richard)" <Richard.Nicholas@DigitalNet.com> CC: Steve Hanna <steve.hanna@sun.com>, "'PKIX List'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt References: <009601c347d6$eed5ac60$6401a8c0@gemsec.com> <3F130E75.12748A26@sun.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Comments on certpathbuild-00.txt The title of the document was promising, but the content is not exactly what would have been expected. The topic should be how to allow interoperability to find out the elements (i.e. both the certificates and the associated revocation status information) needed for to build a certification path either walking downwards or upwards the certification tree. The document should explain how inserting some of the extensions defined in RFC 3280 will allow to build the certification path, irrespective of local conditions (e.g. the user does not have a XX-xxxxxxDirectory where everything needed is stored. :-) ) Some interesting elements are provided starting page 54, in sections 6.2 and 6.3. but this is far from sufficient. There are two solutions to this problem, either walking downwards or upwards the certification tree. A. Walking downwards the certification tree. Each trust point SHOULD include in the self-signed certificate the way to find out where the CA has placed the CA certificates that it issues. This SHALL be done using the Subject Information Access extension defined in section 4.2.2.2 from RFC 3280. The id-ad-caRepository OID SHALL be used to indicate in which repository the CA publishes its certificates and CRLs (if issued). Each CA certificate SHOULD also include the Subject Information Access extension defined in section 4.2.2.2. from RFC 3280. This is the preferred method, since anyway trust points MUST be known. B. Walking upwards the certification tree. Each end-entity certificate and each CA certificate SHOULD include the way to find out where the CA is placing the other certificates. This SHALL be done using the Authority Information Access extension defined in section 4.2.2.1 from RFC 3280 : The id-ad-caIssuers OID SHALL be used to list where the CA that has issued the certificate lists CA certificates issued to the CA. This extension SHOULD be included in end-entity certificates and CA certificates. This can only be a complement to the previous method, since anyway trust points MUST be known. When the downwards approach does not succeed (explain in which cases, it may not succeed), then a combination of both methods may succeed. Note: The location of CRLs is not specified in this extension. That information is provided by the cRLDistributionPoints extension. C. Revocation checking For revocation checking each end-entity and CA certificate SHALL either include : a) a cRLDistributionPoints extension, or b) Subject Information access extension that includes the id-ad-ocsp OID to indicate the location of servers using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC 2560]. Other comments. 1. The difference between a CA-certificate and a cross-certificate is still very hazy since what means a "realm" is either left undefined or is said to be "dependant upon local policy". It is thus impossible to have standard rules with such an approach. Introducing naming constraints between subject and issuer names might be more appropriate; however, the real question is the following: Is it really important to make the difference if both: - the pointers to CA repositories are present, and - these repositories entries are correctly filled-in ? 2. There is, as usual, some confusion between cross certification (which is, by definition, unilateral) and mutual cross certification (see section 13.2). Figure 3 does not make sense unless the trust points are indicated. 3. The case of validating a certificate in the past after a CA key rollover (using the new root key) should be addressed. 4. An interesting case to discuss would be the encoding of the issuer name before and after December 31, 2003 since all certificates issued after December 31, 2003 MUST use the UTF8String encoding of DirectoryString (except as noted). The case of "name rollover" certificates to support an orderly migration to UTF8String encoding should be explained . 5. The document is far too long. Denis Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6F8Suqt045017 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 01:28:56 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6F8SuEo045015 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 01:28:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6F8Shqt044980; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 01:28:44 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA37988; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 10:33:13 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA06126; Tue, 15 Jul 2003 10:28:44 +0200 Message-ID: <3F13BB30.4030906@bull.net> Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2003 10:28:32 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Sean P. Turner" <turners@ieca.com> CC: ietf-smime@imc.org, pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Discussing RTCS References: <!~!UENERkVCMDkAAQACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABgAAAAAAAAARMPfbnbp50SwK3EZjypY2MKAAAAQAAAAW78oSlo46k69IkJ+uWj+gQEAAAAA@brutesquadlabs.com> <3F1283C0.50402@ieca.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Sean, > Does anyone have an opinion on bringing this to the working group? This is a topic to be addressed by the PKIX WG, not by the SMIME WG. The PKIX WG is attempting (but not always succeeding) to avoid duplication of protocols for the same topic. We all know that it would have been better to use CMS for building the OCSP protocol, but this was not the case. The advantages of this new protocol versus draft-ietf-pkix-ocspv2-ext-01.txt (Online Certificate Status Protocol, version 2) and the differences should be first explained. Denis > spt > > Blake Ramsdell wrote: > >>Peter Gutmann has made an individual draft submission for his CMS-based >>RTCS protocol. A URL to this draft is: >> >>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gutmann-cms-rtcs-00.txt >> >>He would like to get some review of the CMS parts of this, and it seems >>reasonable to discuss it here on the IETF-SMIME list if there is >>interest. >> >>Since this draft is CMS based and potentially adds value to CMS or >>S/MIME in general, should we consider bringing it into this working >>group? >> >>Comments? >> >>Blake >>-- >>Blake Ramsdell | Brute Squad Labs | http://www.brutesquadlabs.com >> >> >> > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EKUuqt000724 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:30:56 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6EKUuJo000723 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:30:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail3.microsoft.com (mail3.microsoft.com [131.107.3.123]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EKUsqt000710 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:30:54 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from rmh@windows.microsoft.com) Received: from mail5.microsoft.com ([157.54.6.156]) by mail3.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:30:51 -0700 Received: from inet-vrs-05.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.6.157]) by mail5.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:30:50 -0700 Received: from 157.54.8.23 by inet-vrs-05.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (InterScan E-Mail VirusWall NT); Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:30:50 -0700 Received: from red-imc-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.9.107]) by inet-hub-01.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:30:50 -0700 Received: from win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.0.39]) by red-imc-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:30:50 -0700 Received: from WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.12.82]) by win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:30:46 -0700 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5.6940.0 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: Creating client certificate in IE browser using xenroll.dll Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:30:46 -0700 Message-ID: <DDE1793D7266AD488BB4F5E8D38EACB801CA850D@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: Creating client certificate in IE browser using xenroll.dll Thread-Index: AcNJnc/6Psi5G4HsTF6leTu9eQmSGAAbuIhwAA6DjHA= From: "Ryan M. Hurst" <rmh@windows.microsoft.com> To: "Sreenivasa Baddam" <sbaddam@registrypro.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 14 Jul 2003 20:30:46.0705 (UTC) FILETIME=[CE5FB210:01C34A46] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6EKUsqt000716 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Take a look at ICEnroll/ICEnroll2/ICEnroll4 on MSDN they implement the interfaces you want. Ryan M. Hurst Program Manager Windows Trusted Platform Infrastructure Microsoft Corporation -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Sreenivasa Baddam Sent: Monday, July 14, 2003 6:36 AM To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Creating client certificate in IE browser using xenroll.dll > Hi All, > I am trying to generate a public key in the client using IE browser with the active-x control xenroll.dll using the following code got from the link http://www.pseudonym.org/ssl/ssl_cook.html (a good one). The link used certenroll.dll but since new versions of IE are using xenroll.dll, I changed in the code from certenroll to xenroll. But still I am not able to generate it. The error I am getting is:'Object doesn't support this property or method'. The reason I judged is that 'GenerateKeyPair' method signature is not the right one. > I searched in the internet as well as the microsoft dev site but couldn't able to get the right solution. Anyone out there faced this kind of problem or any suggestions as to how to get the method signatures in a dll file would be greatly appreciated. > > Thanks, > Sreeni > > Here is the whole code, you can run it on your own machine too & see it. > ############################ > <HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Client Certificate Request</TITLE></HEAD><BODY> > > <!-- Use the Microsoft ActiveX control to generate the certificate --> > <OBJECT CLASSID="clsid:33BEC9E0-F78F-11cf-B782-00C04FD7BF43" CODEBASE=xenroll.dll ID=certHelper> > </OBJECT> > > <!-- JavaScript or Visual Basic will work. --> > <SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> > <!--- > > // this is from JavaScript: The Definitive Guide, since > // Microsoft implementation of Math.random() is broken > // > function random() { > random.seed = (random.seed*random.a + random.c) % random.m; > return random.seed/random.m; > } > random.m = 714025; random.a = 4096; random.c = 150889; > random.seed = (new Date()).getTime()%random.m; > > function GenReq () > { > var sessionId = "a_unique_session_id"; > var reqHardware = 0; > var szName = ""; > var szPurpose = "ClientAuth"; > var doAcceptanceUINow = 0; > var doAcceptanceUILater = 0; > var doOnline = 1; > var keySpec = 1; > > szName = ""; > > if (document.GenReqForm.commonName.value == "") > { > alert("No Common Name"); > return false; > } > else > szName = "CN=" + document.GenReqForm.commonName.value; > > if (document.GenReqForm.countryName.value == "") > { > alert("No Country"); > return false; > } > else > szName = szName + "; C=" + document.GenReqForm.countryName.value; > > if (document.GenReqForm.stateOrProvinceName.value == "") > { > alert("No State or Province"); > return false; > } > else > szName = szName + "; S=" + document.GenReqForm.stateOrProvinceName.value; > > if (document.GenReqForm.localityName.value == "") > { > alert("No City"); > return false; > } > else > szName = szName + "; L=" + document.GenReqForm.localityName.value; > > if (document.GenReqForm.organizationName.value == "") > { > alert("No Organization"); > return false; > } > else > szName = szName + "; O=" + document.GenReqForm.organizationName.value; > > if (document.GenReqForm.organizationalUnitName.value == "") > { > alert("No Organizational Unit"); > return false; > } > else > szName = szName + "; OU=" + document.GenReqForm.organizationalUnitName.value; > > /* make session id unique */ > sessionId = "xx" + Math.round(random() * 1000); > alert('sz10='+sz10); > sz10 = certHelper.GenerateKeyPair(sessionId, reqHardware, szName, > 0, szPurpose, doAcceptanceUINow, > doOnline, keySpec, "", "", 1); > > /* > * > * The condition sz10 being empty occurs on any condition in which the > * credential was not successfully generated. In particular, it occurs > * when the operation was cancelled by the user, as well as additional > * errors. A cancel is distinguished from other unsuccessful > * generations by an empty sz10 and an error value of zero.> > * > */ > > if (sz10 != "") > { > document.GenReqForm.reqEntry.value = sz10; > document.GenReqForm.sessionId.value = sessionId; > } else { > alert("Key Pair Generation failed"); > return false; > } > } > > //---> > </SCRIPT> > > <CENTER><H3>Generate key pair and client certificate request</H3></CENTER> > > <FORM METHOD=POST ACTION="http://www.pseudonym.org/cgi-bin/ms_key.pl" NAME="GenReqForm" onSubmit="GenReq()"> > <TABLE> > <TR><TD>Common Name:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="commonName" VALUE="Client Certificate" SIZE=64> > > </TD></TR><TR><TD>Country:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="countryName" VALUE="US" SIZE=2> > > </TD></TR><TR><TD>State or Province:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="stateOrProvinceName" VALUE="MA"> > > </TD></TR><TR><TD>City:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="localityName" VALUE="Cambridge"> > > </TD></TR><TR><TD>Organization:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="organizationName" VALUE="The Open Group"> > > </TD></TR><TR><TD>Organizational Unit:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="organizationalUnitName" VALUE="Research Institute"> > > </TD></TR></TABLE> > > <INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME="sessionId"> > <INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME="reqEntry"> > > <INPUT TYPE="SUBMIT" name="SUBMIT"> > </FORM> > > </BODY></HTML> > > > > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EKEwqt099420 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:14:58 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6EKEwCo099419 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:14:58 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from nwkea-mail-1.sun.com (nwkea-mail-1.sun.com [192.18.42.13]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EKEuqt099414 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:14:56 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from steve.hanna@sun.com) Received: from sydney.East.Sun.COM ([129.148.9.16]) by nwkea-mail-1.sun.com (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6EKEjeR023230; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 13:14:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sun.com (dhcp-ubur02-75-161 [129.148.75.161]) by sydney.East.Sun.COM (8.11.7+Sun/8.11.7/ENSMAIL,v2.2) with ESMTP id h6EKEis17248; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 16:14:44 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <3F130E75.12748A26@sun.com> Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2003 16:11:33 -0400 From: Steve Hanna <steve.hanna@sun.com> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.79 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Hesse <pmhesse@geminisecurity.com> CC: "'PKIX List'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Matt Cooper'" <mcooper@orionsec.com>, "'Yuriy Dzambasow'" <yuriy@anassoc.com>, "'Susan Joseph'" <susan.joseph@digitalnet.com>, "Richard E. Nicholas (Nicholas, Richard)" <Richard.Nicholas@digitalnet.com> Subject: Re: draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt References: <009601c347d6$eed5ac60$6401a8c0@gemsec.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="------------ms20BF47E1AC85BB6C8B4F4F07" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------ms20BF47E1AC85BB6C8B4F4F07 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Good to hear from you, Peter! Long time no see. Responses inline below. > I'm glad to see more discussions of certificate path building. > In a non-hierarchical PKI where relying parties have different > trust anchors, path building is essential. And it's not easy! > > However, I don't think that we're ready to have an official > 'best practices' document on path building yet. > Very few people have implemented PKIX-compliant path building > (only Sun and Cygnacom/DigitalNet, I think) and there are many > areas that are still unclear. > > <PMH> What is PKIX-compliant path building exactly? I am not > aware of any documents that define this. This is a part of the > reason why there is a need for this document.</PMH> I don't have any objection to defining the term "PKIX-compliant path building". But I don't think you need 59 pages to do that. You could do that in one sentence. It's simply the process of building certification paths that are valid according to RFC 3280. Most of the document describes and recommends specific algorithms for path building. I don't think that we have anything approaching agreement on these algorithms yet. Fortunately, there is no need for consensus in this area. I can use one path building algorithm and you can use an entirely different one without affecting interoperability. So I see no need to rush to publish an RFC on this topic. Nobody has written RFCs on "how to write an OCSP server". As long as you comply with the protocol spec, you'll be able to interoperate just fine. The same should be true with respect to path building. And I even think it may be a fine thing to have an RFC saying "here's how to solve the tricky problem of cert path building", once we have agreement on that. But I don't think we're close to that yet. If you have a strong argument for why we *need* an RFC on path building *soon* (even if it's still an active research area), then maybe an Experimental RFC would suffice. > The I-D just published presents one early perspective on these > questions, not a consensus. > > <PMH> I disagree that the document provides one early perspective, > it describes many different scenarios and many different ways of > dealing with them.</PMH> I hope we can avoid the need to have many different ways of solving this problem. Otherwise, it will not be possible to have general-purpose mass-market software that will work in all sorts of PKI topologies. I expect that we can come up with some good general-purpose algorithms, but I think it will take some time and some real data showing how different algorithms perform in different environments. > <PMH>This document was developed by five different authors from > four different companies, all of which having varied amounts of > experience building path development algorithms for many different > environments, from pure mesh style (Entrust style?) to strict > hierarchy to bridge ca.</PMH> Did these folks actually work on four or five separate implementations of path building and pull together their ideas? Or did they all work on one or two implementations (maybe successive versions)? I hate to ask personal questions like that, but you raised the issue and maybe I'm just unaware of these many separate implementations of PKIX-compliant path validation. If so, then I guess I'm just not very well plugged into the path building community and this really does represent a community consensus (although I'm still disturbed by the lack of hard data). But if the authors actually worked on a single project, then I don't think that represents rough consensus within IETF. > <PMH>The document attempts to discuss many > of the previously encountered problems and decisions based upon > those problems, but does not make any hard and fast rules on > which way future implementations should be developed.</PMH> No, but it contains many recommendations. Just search for "recommend" or "should" in the document. And I don't see or know of data to support these recommendations. > For now, I suggest that people who have implemented path building > publish their insights, results, and ideas either as individual I-Ds > without the intent to become an RFC or as research papers. Then we can > discuss these results and ideas, test them in real-world scenarios, and > arrive at a consensus on what Best Current Practices should be included > in a BCP document on this topic. We might even want to start an IRTF > research group or an informal discussion group to coordinate this > research, sift through the results, and arrive at a solid and > well-supported consensus. This effort will take some time, but I expect > it will produce much better results. > > <PMH> X.509 has existed in one form or another since 1988, and after 15 > years I think we owe the community some amount of tried and true > guidance toward path building. Does this document have all the answers > on what the best way is to build paths? No--but the document states that > very fact repeatedly--different environments will always lead to > different optimizations for that environment. </PMH> While X.509 has been around for many years, non-hierarchical topologies are a fairly recent development. I haven't seen any data comparing how different path building algorithms perform in different non-hierarchical topologies. So I don't think we know enough yet to say which algorithms are best. The current I-D lists 20 different sorting techniques, but it doesn't provide any hard data about which work better in which topologies. And I suspect there may be other techniques that might be better. I'm not suggesting that you publish an RFC full of graphs showing which technique is best in which environments. That probably belongs in a research paper. The RFC can then point to the research paper. > If it's felt that we really need a BCP on this topic in > short order, then I think it should be restricted to things that we are > fairly sure are good practices (like advising CAs to include name > constraints and AIA in certificates to help path building and advising > path builders to ensure that they handle simple hierarchical PKIs > quickly but still handle complex PKIs properly). > > <PMH> This draft focuses on path building, not best practices for how > authorities should structure things to simplify building. Perhaps that > should be the topic of another I-D. During drafts we discussed > prioritizing different optimizations saying "you definitely should do > A,B,C and probably do D,E,F," etc. However we decided not to because we > wanted to make the developers free to make their own decisions based > upon the environments with which they were working. </PMH> My point was that we should restrict any BCP to things that we (the PKIX working group) can agree (via rough consensus) are actually good practices. Maybe we should have two BCPs: one on path building techniques and one things CAs can do to make path building easier. At this point, I suspect you could easily distill all of our wisdom in each of those areas into one or two pages. So let's set aside the question of whether they should be separate documents. I'd really like to know why we need to have an RFC on path building now, since it seems to be an internal matter for relying parties with no interoperability implications, except with respect to things that CAs can do to make path building easier. Thanks, Steve P.S. I'm sorry I can't make it to Vienna this week, since I think we could have a much more productive and relaxed conversation over a few beers. Maybe we can schedule a time to grab a few beers and talk on the phone. Failing that, we can continue discussing this by email. But rest assured that I have complete respect for your work. And I'm most interested in what we can do to increase PKI deployment and usage. If you can convince me that publishing this document is a good way to help in that area, I will be glad to help champion it. 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Mon, 14 Jul 2003 08:29:38 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6EFTcs5082059 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 08:29:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from hotmail.com (bay7-dav27.bay7.hotmail.com [64.4.10.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EFTaqt082049 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 08:29:36 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from sesameus@hotmail.com) Received: from mail pickup service by hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 08:18:23 -0700 Received: from 192.35.232.241 by bay7-dav27.bay7.hotmail.com with DAV; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 15:18:22 +0000 X-Originating-IP: [192.35.232.241] X-Originating-Email: [sesameus@hotmail.com] From: "cindy" <sesameus@hotmail.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <3EF0902C.2CE6EEF5@sit.fraunhofer.de> Subject: Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2003 10:14:51 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; 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Mon, 14 Jul 2003 08:15:02 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com) Received: from sottguard01.entrust.com (sottguard01.entrust.com [10.4.61.249]) by sottmxssm.entrust.com (Switch-2.2.6/Switch-2.2.4) with SMTP id V6EF0BOW03840 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 11:11:24 -0400 Received: (qmail 12463 invoked by uid 64014); 14 Jul 2003 15:09:17 -0000 Received: from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com by sottguard01.entrust.com with AmikaGuardian-Server-1.1.2 (Processed in 0.364946 secs); 14 Jul 2003 15:09:17 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO SOTTMXS01.entrust.com) (10.4.61.7) by sottguard01.entrust.com with SMTP; 14 Jul 2003 15:09:16 -0000 Received: by sottmxs01.entrust.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) id <3S6Z3HS4>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 11:14:56 -0400 Message-ID: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC365@sottmxs04.entrust.com> From: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com> To: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>, "Hoyt Kesterson (E-mail)" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2003 11:14:53 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C34A1A.AD476BD0" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand this format, some or all of this message may not be legible. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34A1A.AD476BD0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" I've been looking at defect reports recently anyway, so I'll draft one to add warning for this as well and submit it to Hoyt. Sharon -----Original Message----- From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com] Sent: Monday, July 14, 2003 10:50 AM To: Sharon Boeyen; Hoyt Kesterson (E-mail) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? That is always the problem with quoting a few paragraphs from a document. But, in this case, the implementors could use an extra warning. Mishandling this extension would be very bad! Russ At 10:33 AM 7/14/2003 -0400, Sharon Boeyen wrote: I agree Russ - the text I quoted said "assume that identified certificates are revoked" and without understanding and processing the certificateIssuer extension one would not know what the "identified" certificates were because you need the combination of issuer name and serial number. The text for that extension says it can't be ignored, but I wonder if some additional text should also be put in both places to make that clearer. What do you & others think? Sharon -----Original Message----- From: Russ Housley [ mailto:housley@vigilsec.com <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com> ] Sent: Sunday, July 13, 2003 10:31 AM To: Sharon Boeyen Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Sharon: The Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension seems to be an exception, which is the reason that I thought it had to be a critical extension. If certificate using software were to use the CRL issuer distinguished name and the serial number associated with such an entry, then the software would consider the wrong certificate to be revoked. Russ At 10:58 AM 7/11/2003 -0400, Sharon Boeyen wrote: While on this topic of critical extensions and rejections - I want to be sure everyone realizes that the handling is different for CRLs. If the certificate of interest is listed as revoked on a CRL it is as a minimum considered revoked regardless of the presence of unrecognized critical extensions. Here is the relevant text from clause 7.3 of X.509: NOTE 4 - When an implementation processing a certificate revocation list does not recognize a critical extension in the crlEntryExtensions field, it shall assume that, at a minimum, the identified certificate has been revoked and is no longer valid and perform additional actions concerning that revoked certificate as dictated by local policy. When an implementation does not recognize a critical extension in the crlExtensions field, it shall assume that identified certificates have been revoked and are no longer valid. However in the latter case, since the list may not be complete, certificates that have not been identified as being revoked cannot be assumed to be valid. In this case local policy shall dictate the action to be taken. In any case local policy may dictate actions in addition to and/or stronger than those stated in this Specification. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34A1A.AD476BD0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> <META content="MSHTML 6.00.2800.1170" name=GENERATOR></HEAD> <BODY> <DIV><SPAN class=323591515-14072003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>I've been looking at defect reports recently anyway, so I'll draft one to add warning for this as well and submit it to Hoyt.</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=323591515-14072003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=323591515-14072003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Sharon</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> <DIV class=OutlookMessageHeader dir=ltr align=left><FONT face=Tahoma size=2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]<BR><B>Sent:</B> Monday, July 14, 2003 10:50 AM<BR><B>To:</B> Sharon Boeyen; Hoyt Kesterson (E-mail)<BR><B>Cc:</B> ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>That is always the problem with quoting a few paragraphs from a document. But, in this case, the implementors could use an extra warning. Mishandling this extension would be very bad!<BR><BR>Russ<BR><BR>At 10:33 AM 7/14/2003 -0400, Sharon Boeyen wrote:<BR> <BLOCKQUOTE class=cite cite="" type="cite"><FONT face=arial color=#0000ff size=2>I agree Russ - the text I quoted said "assume that identified certificates are revoked" and without understanding and processing the certificateIssuer extension one would not know what the "identified" certificates were because you need the combination of issuer name and serial number. The text for that extension says it can't be ignored, but I wonder if some additional text should also be put in both places to make that clearer. What do you & others think? </FONT><BR> <BR><FONT face=arial color=#0000ff size=2>Sharon</FONT><BR> <DL> <DD><FONT face=tahoma size=2>-----Original Message-----<BR> <DD>From:</B> Russ Housley [<A href="mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" eudora="autourl">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</A>]<BR> <DD>Sent:</B> Sunday, July 13, 2003 10:31 AM<BR> <DD>To:</B> Sharon Boeyen<BR> <DD>Cc:</B> ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR> <DD>Subject:</B> RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?<BR><BR></FONT> <DD>Sharon:<BR><BR> <DD>The Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension seems to be an exception, which is the reason that I thought it had to be a critical extension. If certificate using software were to use the CRL issuer distinguished name and the serial number associated with such an entry, then the software would consider the wrong certificate to be revoked.<BR><BR> <DD>Russ<BR><BR><BR> <DD>At 10:58 AM 7/11/2003 -0400, Sharon Boeyen wrote:<BR> <BLOCKQUOTE class=cite cite="" type="cite"> <DD><FONT face=arial color=#0000ff size=2>While on this topic of critical extensions and rejections - I want to be sure everyone realizes that the handling is different for CRLs. If the certificate of interest is listed as revoked on a CRL it is as a minimum considered revoked regardless of the presence of unrecognized critical extensions. Here is the relevant text from clause 7.3 of X.509:</FONT><BR> <DD><BR><FONT face=arial color=#0000ff size=2><BR></FONT> <DD><FONT face="Times New Roman, Times" size=2>NOTE 4 - When an implementation processing a certificate revocation list does not recognize a critical extension in the </FONT><FONT face=arial size=2>crlEntryExtensions</B></FONT><FONT face="Times New Roman, Times" size=2> field, it shall assume that, at a minimum, the identified certificate has been revoked and is no longer valid and perform additional actions concerning that revoked certificate as dictated by local policy. When an implementation does not recognize a critical extension in the </FONT><FONT face=arial size=2>crlExtensions</B></FONT><FONT face="Times New Roman, Times" size=2> field, it shall assume that identified certificates have been revoked and are no longer valid. However in the latter case, since the list may not be complete, certificates that have not been identified as being revoked cannot be assumed to be valid. In this case local policy shall dictate the action to be taken. In any case local policy may dictate actions in addition to and/or stronger than those stated in this Specification.</FONT></DD></BLOCKQUOTE></DD></DL></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML> ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34A1A.AD476BD0-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EEpTqt079099 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 07:51:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6EEpTOE079098 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 07:51:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [207.228.252.5]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6EEpSqt079093 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 07:51:28 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Received: (qmail 29824 invoked by uid 0); 14 Jul 2003 14:50:17 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Russ-Laptop.vigilsec.com) (81.160.208.93) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 14 Jul 2003 14:50:17 -0000 Message-Id: <5.2.0.9.2.20030714104912.04098340@mail.binhost.com> X-Sender: housley@mail.binhost.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.2.0.9 Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2003 10:50:24 -0400 To: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>, "Hoyt Kesterson (E-mail)" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC361@sottmxs04.entrust .com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> <html> <body> That is always the problem with quoting a few paragraphs from a document. But, in this case, the implementors could use an extra warning. Mishandling this extension would be very bad!<br><br> Russ<br><br> At 10:33 AM 7/14/2003 -0400, Sharon Boeyen wrote:<br> <blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite><font face=3D"arial" size=3D2 colo= r=3D"#0000FF">I agree Russ - the text I quoted said "assume that identified certificates are revoked" and without understanding and processing the certificateIssuer extension one would not know what the "identified" certificates were because you need the combination of issuer name and serial number. The text for that extension says it can't be ignored, but I wonder if some additional text should also be put in both places to make that clearer. What do you & others think? </font><br> <br> <font face=3D"arial" size=3D2 color=3D"#0000FF">Sharon</font><br> <dl> <dd><font face=3D"tahoma" size=3D2>-----Original Message-----<br> <dd>From:</b> Russ Housley [<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com"= eudora=3D"autourl">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>]<br> <dd>Sent:</b> Sunday, July 13, 2003 10:31 AM<br> <dd>To:</b> Sharon Boeyen<br> <dd>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br> <dd>Subject:</b> RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?<br><br> </font> <dd>Sharon:<br><br> <dd>The Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension seems to be an exception, which is the reason that I thought it had to be a critical extension. If certificate using software were to use the CRL issuer distinguished name and the serial number associated with such an entry, then the software would consider the wrong certificate to be revoked.<br><br> <dd>Russ<br><br> <br> <dd>At 10:58 AM 7/11/2003 -0400, Sharon Boeyen wrote:<br> <blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite> <dd><font face=3D"arial" size=3D2 color=3D"#0000FF">While on this topic of critical extensions and rejections - I want to be sure everyone realizes that the handling is different for CRLs. If the certificate of interest is listed as revoked on a CRL it is as a minimum considered revoked regardless of the presence of unrecognized critical extensions. Here is the relevant text from clause 7.3 of X.509:</font><br> <dd> <br> <font face=3D"arial" size=3D2 color=3D"#0000FF"><br> </font> <dd><font face=3D"Times New Roman, Times" size=3D2>NOTE 4 - When an implementation processing a certificate revocation list does not recognize a critical extension in the </font><font face=3D"arial" size=3D2>crlEntryExtensions</b></font><font= face=3D"Times New Roman, Times" size=3D2> field, it shall assume that, at a minimum, the identified certificate has been revoked and is no longer valid and perform additional actions concerning that revoked certificate as dictated by local policy. When an implementation does not recognize a critical extension in the </font><font face=3D"arial" size=3D2>crlExtensions</b></font><font= face=3D"Times New Roman, Times" size=3D2> field, it shall assume that identified certificates have been revoked and are no longer valid. However in the latter case, since the list may not be complete, certificates that have not been identified as being revoked cannot be assumed to be valid. In this case local policy shall dictate the action to be taken. In any case local policy may dictate actions in addition to and/or stronger than those stated in this Specification.</font></blockquote> </dl></blockquote></body> </html> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EEbEqt078550 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 07:37:14 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6EEbE88078549 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 07:37:14 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from sottmxssm.entrust.com (sottmxssm.entrust.com [216.191.252.10]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EEbCqt078539 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 07:37:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com) Received: from sottguard01.entrust.com (sottguard01.entrust.com [10.4.61.249]) by sottmxssm.entrust.com (Switch-2.2.6/Switch-2.2.4) with SMTP id V6EE0XYW31298 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 10:33:34 -0400 Received: (qmail 5403 invoked by uid 64014); 14 Jul 2003 14:31:27 -0000 Received: from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com by sottguard01.entrust.com with AmikaGuardian-Server-1.1.2 (Processed in 0.322577 secs); 14 Jul 2003 14:31:27 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO SOTTMXS01.entrust.com) (10.4.61.7) by 10.4.61.249 with SMTP; 14 Jul 2003 14:31:27 -0000 Received: by sottmxs01.entrust.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) id <3S6Z3G38>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 10:37:07 -0400 Message-ID: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC362@sottmxs04.entrust.com> From: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com> To: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, Steve Hanna <steve.hanna@sun.com>, PKIX List <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Question about Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2003 10:37:06 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) Content-Type: text/plain Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I agree with this as well. -----Original Message----- From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com] Sent: Sunday, July 13, 2003 10:42 AM To: Steve Hanna; PKIX List Subject: Re: Question about Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension Steve: >The Certificate Issuer CRL entry extension (described in >section 5.3.4 of RFC 3280) is a GeneralNames structure >that identifies the certificate issuer for the CRL entry >to which it is attached (and also to all subsequent entries >in that CRL until another Certificate Issuer CRL entry >extension is encountered. > >RFC 3280 doesn't say so, but I believe that within a PKIX >(Internet) environment (where each certificate must have a >non-empty X.500 issuer name and issuer alternative names are >generally ignored) this extension MUST always contain at >least one X.500 name so that the relying party can match >this name against the issuer name in the certificate, as >described in section 6.3.3 item (j) of RFC 3280. And I think >that text describing this requirement should be added to the >successor to RFC 3280. Does everyone agree with this? I agree. In fact, I see no value in including any other name forms. >I also wonder whether anyone can think of a reason why this >CRL entry extension should ever contain anything other than >a single X.500 name in a PKIX (Internet) environment. If not, >then the requirement can (and should) be made even more strict, >specifying that this extension MUST contain only a single X.500 >name. Please let me know if you have a reason why this would not >be a good idea. I would like to see this changed in son of RFC 3208 (Grandson of RFC 2459). Russ Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EEXpqt078439 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 07:33:51 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6EEXphC078438 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 07:33:51 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from sottmxssm.entrust.com (sottmxssm.entrust.com [216.191.252.10]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EEXoqt078427 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 07:33:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com) Received: from sottguard01.entrust.com ([10.4.61.249]) by sottmxssm.entrust.com (Switch-2.2.6/Switch-2.2.4) with SMTP id V6EE0UBW30854 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 10:30:11 -0400 Received: (qmail 4781 invoked by uid 64014); 14 Jul 2003 14:27:59 -0000 Received: from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com by sottguard01.entrust.com with AmikaGuardian-Server-1.1.2 (Processed in 0.434517 secs); 14 Jul 2003 14:27:59 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO SOTTMXS01.entrust.com) (10.4.61.7) by 10.4.61.249 with SMTP; 14 Jul 2003 14:27:59 -0000 Received: by sottmxs01.entrust.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) id <3S6Z3GLW>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 10:33:39 -0400 Message-ID: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC361@sottmxs04.entrust.com> From: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com> To: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, "Hoyt Kesterson (E-mail)" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2003 10:33:38 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C34A14.EA3C5650" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand this format, some or all of this message may not be legible. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34A14.EA3C5650 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" I agree Russ - the text I quoted said "assume that identified certificates are revoked" and without understanding and processing the certificateIssuer extension one would not know what the "identified" certificates were because you need the combination of issuer name and serial number. The text for that extension says it can't be ignored, but I wonder if some additional text should also be put in both places to make that clearer. What do you & others think? Sharon -----Original Message----- From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com] Sent: Sunday, July 13, 2003 10:31 AM To: Sharon Boeyen Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Sharon: The Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension seems to be an exception, which is the reason that I thought it had to be a critical extension. If certificate using software were to use the CRL issuer distinguished name and the serial number associated with such an entry, then the software would consider the wrong certificate to be revoked. Russ At 10:58 AM 7/11/2003 -0400, Sharon Boeyen wrote: While on this topic of critical extensions and rejections - I want to be sure everyone realizes that the handling is different for CRLs. If the certificate of interest is listed as revoked on a CRL it is as a minimum considered revoked regardless of the presence of unrecognized critical extensions. Here is the relevant text from clause 7.3 of X.509: NOTE 4 - When an implementation processing a certificate revocation list does not recognize a critical extension in the crlEntryExtensions field, it shall assume that, at a minimum, the identified certificate has been revoked and is no longer valid and perform additional actions concerning that revoked certificate as dictated by local policy. When an implementation does not recognize a critical extension in the crlExtensions field, it shall assume that identified certificates have been revoked and are no longer valid. However in the latter case, since the list may not be complete, certificates that have not been identified as being revoked cannot be assumed to be valid. In this case local policy shall dictate the action to be taken. In any case local policy may dictate actions in addition to and/or stronger than those stated in this Specification. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34A14.EA3C5650 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> <META content="MSHTML 6.00.2800.1170" name=GENERATOR></HEAD> <BODY> <DIV><SPAN class=963303214-14072003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>I agree Russ - the text I quoted said "assume that identified certificates are revoked" and without understanding and processing the certificateIssuer extension one would not know what the "identified" certificates were because you need the combination of issuer name and serial number. The text for that extension says it can't be ignored, but I wonder if some additional text should also be put in both places to make that clearer. What do you & others think? </FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=963303214-14072003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=963303214-14072003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Sharon</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> <DIV class=OutlookMessageHeader dir=ltr align=left><FONT face=Tahoma size=2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]<BR><B>Sent:</B> Sunday, July 13, 2003 10:31 AM<BR><B>To:</B> Sharon Boeyen<BR><B>Cc:</B> ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>Sharon:<BR><BR>The Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension seems to be an exception, which is the reason that I thought it had to be a critical extension. If certificate using software were to use the CRL issuer distinguished name and the serial number associated with such an entry, then the software would consider the wrong certificate to be revoked.<BR><BR>Russ<BR><BR><BR>At 10:58 AM 7/11/2003 -0400, Sharon Boeyen wrote:<BR> <BLOCKQUOTE class=cite cite="" type="cite"><FONT face=arial color=#0000ff size=2>While on this topic of critical extensions and rejections - I want to be sure everyone realizes that the handling is different for CRLs. If the certificate of interest is listed as revoked on a CRL it is as a minimum considered revoked regardless of the presence of unrecognized critical extensions. Here is the relevant text from clause 7.3 of X.509:</FONT><BR> <BR><FONT face=arial color=#0000ff size=2><BR></FONT><FONT face="Times New Roman, Times" size=2>NOTE 4 - When an implementation processing a certificate revocation list does not recognize a critical extension in the </FONT><FONT face=arial size=2><B>crlEntryExtensions</B></FONT><FONT face="Times New Roman, Times" size=2> field, it shall assume that, at a minimum, the identified certificate has been revoked and is no longer valid and perform additional actions concerning that revoked certificate as dictated by local policy. When an implementation does not recognize a critical extension in the </FONT><FONT face=arial size=2><B>crlExtensions</B></FONT><FONT face="Times New Roman, Times" size=2> field, it shall assume that identified certificates have been revoked and are no longer valid. However in the latter case, since the list may not be complete, certificates that have not been identified as being revoked cannot be assumed to be valid. In this case local policy shall dictate the action to be taken. In any case local policy may dictate actions in addition to and/or stronger than those stated in this Specification.</FONT></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML> ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34A14.EA3C5650-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EDZhqt076892 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 06:35:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6EDZhP7076891 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 06:35:43 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from anaheim.nestegg.net (anaheim.nestegg.net [209.249.40.9]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6EDZgqt076886 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 06:35:42 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from sbaddam@registrypro.com) Received: from viruskiller.lanlogic.net (viruskiller.lanlogic.net [209.249.40.3]) by anaheim.nestegg.net (8.12.8/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6EDZN3h003929 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 06:35:40 -0700 Received: from EH6.hosted.lanlogic.net ([209.249.43.7]) by viruskiller.lanlogic.net (NAVGW 2.5.2.12) with SMTP id M2003071406375525795 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 06:37:55 -0700 content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: Creating client certificate in IE browser using xenroll.dll X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.0.6249.0 Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2003 06:35:42 -0700 Message-ID: <007B32A75970EC4FAB4BEDE2F5A89AA101056AE9@eh6.hosted.lanlogic.net> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: Creating client certificate in IE browser using xenroll.dll Thread-Index: AcNJnc/6Psi5G4HsTF6leTu9eQmSGAAbuIhw From: "Sreenivasa Baddam" <sbaddam@registrypro.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h6EDZgqt076887 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> > Hi All, > I am trying to generate a public key in the client using IE browser with the active-x control xenroll.dll using the following code got from the link http://www.pseudonym.org/ssl/ssl_cook.html (a good one). The link used certenroll.dll but since new versions of IE are using xenroll.dll, I changed in the code from certenroll to xenroll. But still I am not able to generate it. The error I am getting is:'Object doesn't support this property or method'. The reason I judged is that 'GenerateKeyPair' method signature is not the right one. > I searched in the internet as well as the microsoft dev site but couldn't able to get the right solution. Anyone out there faced this kind of problem or any suggestions as to how to get the method signatures in a dll file would be greatly appreciated. > > Thanks, > Sreeni > > Here is the whole code, you can run it on your own machine too & see it. > ############################ > <HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Client Certificate Request</TITLE></HEAD><BODY> > > <!-- Use the Microsoft ActiveX control to generate the certificate --> > <OBJECT CLASSID="clsid:33BEC9E0-F78F-11cf-B782-00C04FD7BF43" CODEBASE=xenroll.dll ID=certHelper> > </OBJECT> > > <!-- JavaScript or Visual Basic will work. --> > <SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> > <!--- > > // this is from JavaScript: The Definitive Guide, since > // Microsoft implementation of Math.random() is broken > // > function random() { > random.seed = (random.seed*random.a + random.c) % random.m; > return random.seed/random.m; > } > random.m = 714025; random.a = 4096; random.c = 150889; > random.seed = (new Date()).getTime()%random.m; > > function GenReq () > { > var sessionId = "a_unique_session_id"; > var reqHardware = 0; > var szName = ""; > var szPurpose = "ClientAuth"; > var doAcceptanceUINow = 0; > var doAcceptanceUILater = 0; > var doOnline = 1; > var keySpec = 1; > > szName = ""; > > if (document.GenReqForm.commonName.value == "") > { > alert("No Common Name"); > return false; > } > else > szName = "CN=" + document.GenReqForm.commonName.value; > > if (document.GenReqForm.countryName.value == "") > { > alert("No Country"); > return false; > } > else > szName = szName + "; C=" + document.GenReqForm.countryName.value; > > if (document.GenReqForm.stateOrProvinceName.value == "") > { > alert("No State or Province"); > return false; > } > else > szName = szName + "; S=" + document.GenReqForm.stateOrProvinceName.value; > > if (document.GenReqForm.localityName.value == "") > { > alert("No City"); > return false; > } > else > szName = szName + "; L=" + document.GenReqForm.localityName.value; > > if (document.GenReqForm.organizationName.value == "") > { > alert("No Organization"); > return false; > } > else > szName = szName + "; O=" + document.GenReqForm.organizationName.value; > > if (document.GenReqForm.organizationalUnitName.value == "") > { > alert("No Organizational Unit"); > return false; > } > else > szName = szName + "; OU=" + document.GenReqForm.organizationalUnitName.value; > > /* make session id unique */ > sessionId = "xx" + Math.round(random() * 1000); > alert('sz10='+sz10); > sz10 = certHelper.GenerateKeyPair(sessionId, reqHardware, szName, > 0, szPurpose, doAcceptanceUINow, > doOnline, keySpec, "", "", 1); > > /* > * > * The condition sz10 being empty occurs on any condition in which the > * credential was not successfully generated. In particular, it occurs > * when the operation was cancelled by the user, as well as additional > * errors. A cancel is distinguished from other unsuccessful > * generations by an empty sz10 and an error value of zero.> > * > */ > > if (sz10 != "") > { > document.GenReqForm.reqEntry.value = sz10; > document.GenReqForm.sessionId.value = sessionId; > } else { > alert("Key Pair Generation failed"); > return false; > } > } > > //---> > </SCRIPT> > > <CENTER><H3>Generate key pair and client certificate request</H3></CENTER> > > <FORM METHOD=POST ACTION="http://www.pseudonym.org/cgi-bin/ms_key.pl" NAME="GenReqForm" onSubmit="GenReq()"> > <TABLE> > <TR><TD>Common Name:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="commonName" VALUE="Client Certificate" SIZE=64> > > </TD></TR><TR><TD>Country:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="countryName" VALUE="US" SIZE=2> > > </TD></TR><TR><TD>State or Province:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="stateOrProvinceName" VALUE="MA"> > > </TD></TR><TR><TD>City:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="localityName" VALUE="Cambridge"> > > </TD></TR><TR><TD>Organization:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="organizationName" VALUE="The Open Group"> > > </TD></TR><TR><TD>Organizational Unit:</TD><TD> > <INPUT TYPE=TEXT NAME="organizationalUnitName" VALUE="Research Institute"> > > </TD></TR></TABLE> > > <INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME="sessionId"> > <INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME="reqEntry"> > > <INPUT TYPE="SUBMIT" name="SUBMIT"> > </FORM> > > </BODY></HTML> > > > > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6E87Tqt042474 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 01:07:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6E87Tit042473 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 01:07:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [207.228.252.5]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6E87Jqt042467 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 14 Jul 2003 01:07:20 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Received: (qmail 15196 invoked by uid 0); 14 Jul 2003 08:06:08 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Russ-Laptop.vigilsec.com) (81.160.208.93) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 14 Jul 2003 08:06:08 -0000 Message-Id: <5.2.0.9.2.20030714040416.040c7bd8@mail.binhost.com> X-Sender: housley@mail.binhost.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.2.0.9 Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2003 04:07:15 -0400 To: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie, ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: SEND WG trying to make use of RFC 3281 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I thought that people on this list would like to know that the SEND WG to trying to make use of Attribute Certificates. Russ Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6DEfnqt086111 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Sun, 13 Jul 2003 07:41:49 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6DEfnc5086110 for ietf-pkix-bks; Sun, 13 Jul 2003 07:41:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [207.228.252.5]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6DEfmqt086105 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 13 Jul 2003 07:41:48 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Received: (qmail 14850 invoked by uid 0); 13 Jul 2003 14:40:38 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Russ-Laptop.vigilsec.com) (81.160.208.93) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 13 Jul 2003 14:40:38 -0000 Message-Id: <5.2.0.9.2.20030713103814.03d0a760@mail.binhost.com> X-Sender: housley@mail.binhost.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.2.0.9 Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2003 10:41:42 -0400 To: Steve Hanna <steve.hanna@sun.com>, PKIX List <ietf-pkix@imc.org> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: Question about Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Steve: >The Certificate Issuer CRL entry extension (described in >section 5.3.4 of RFC 3280) is a GeneralNames structure >that identifies the certificate issuer for the CRL entry >to which it is attached (and also to all subsequent entries >in that CRL until another Certificate Issuer CRL entry >extension is encountered. > >RFC 3280 doesn't say so, but I believe that within a PKIX >(Internet) environment (where each certificate must have a >non-empty X.500 issuer name and issuer alternative names are >generally ignored) this extension MUST always contain at >least one X.500 name so that the relying party can match >this name against the issuer name in the certificate, as >described in section 6.3.3 item (j) of RFC 3280. And I think >that text describing this requirement should be added to the >successor to RFC 3280. Does everyone agree with this? I agree. In fact, I see no value in including any other name forms. >I also wonder whether anyone can think of a reason why this >CRL entry extension should ever contain anything other than >a single X.500 name in a PKIX (Internet) environment. If not, >then the requirement can (and should) be made even more strict, >specifying that this extension MUST contain only a single X.500 >name. Please let me know if you have a reason why this would not >be a good idea. I would like to see this changed in son of RFC 3208 (Grandson of RFC 2459). Russ Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6DEVPqt085629 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Sun, 13 Jul 2003 07:31:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6DEVPYl085628 for ietf-pkix-bks; Sun, 13 Jul 2003 07:31:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [207.228.252.5]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6DEVNqt085621 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 13 Jul 2003 07:31:24 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Received: (qmail 14175 invoked by uid 0); 13 Jul 2003 14:30:13 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Russ-Laptop.vigilsec.com) (81.160.208.93) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 13 Jul 2003 14:30:13 -0000 Message-Id: <5.2.0.9.2.20030713102641.03d11138@mail.binhost.com> X-Sender: housley@mail.binhost.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.2.0.9 Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2003 10:31:18 -0400 To: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC354@sottmxs04.entrust .com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> <html> <body> Sharon:<br><br> The Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension seems to be an exception, which is the reason that I thought it had to be a critical extension. If certificate using software were to use the CRL issuer distinguished name and the serial number associated with such an entry, then the software would consider the wrong certificate to be revoked.<br><br> Russ<br><br> <br> At 10:58 AM 7/11/2003 -0400, Sharon Boeyen wrote:<br> <blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite><font face=3D"arial" size=3D2 colo= r=3D"#0000FF">While on this topic of critical extensions and rejections - I want to be sure everyone realizes that the handling is different for CRLs. If the certificate of interest is listed as revoked on a CRL it is as a minimum considered revoked regardless of the presence of unrecognized critical extensions. Here is the relevant text from clause 7.3 of X.509:</font><br> <br> <font face=3D"arial" size=3D2 color=3D"#0000FF"><br> </font><font face=3D"Times New Roman, Times" size=3D2>NOTE 4 =96 When an implementation processing a certificate revocation list does not recognize a critical extension in the </font><font face=3D"arial" size=3D2><b>crlEntryExtensions</b></font><font= face=3D"Times New Roman, Times" size=3D2> field, it shall assume that, at a minimum, the identified certificate has been revoked and is no longer valid and perform additional actions concerning that revoked certificate as dictated by local policy. When an implementation does not recognize a critical extension in the </font><font face=3D"arial" size=3D2><b>crlExtensions</b></font><font= face=3D"Times New Roman, Times" size=3D2> field, it shall assume that identified certificates have been revoked and are no longer valid. However in the latter case, since the list may not be complete, certificates that have not been identified as being revoked cannot be assumed to be valid. In this case local policy shall dictate the action to be taken. In any case local policy may dictate actions in addition to and/or stronger than those stated in this Specification.</font></blockquote></body> </html> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BK0lqt017784 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 13:00:47 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BK0lsV017783 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 13:00:47 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mpls-qmqp-04.inet.qwest.net (mpls-qmqp-04.inet.qwest.net [63.231.195.115]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6BK0jqt017774 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 13:00:46 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from hoytkesterson@earthlink.net) Received: (qmail 34932 invoked by uid 0); 11 Jul 2003 20:00:47 -0000 Received: from mpls-pop-08.inet.qwest.net (63.231.195.8) by mpls-qmqp-04.inet.qwest.net with QMQP; 11 Jul 2003 20:00:47 -0000 Received: from vdsl-130-13-127-251.phnx.uswest.net (HELO ?192.168.2.7?) (130.13.127.251) by mpls-pop-08.inet.qwest.net with SMTP; 11 Jul 2003 20:00:47 -0000 Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 12:44:29 -0700 Message-Id: <a0521060dbb34c0a00420@[192.168.2.7]> From: "Hoyt L. Kesterson II" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: hoytkesterson@earthlink.net@mail.earthlink.net In-Reply-To: <00d601c347c2$21763b90$0600a8c0@IdentrusVA1> References: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC34C@sottmxs04.entrust.com> <00d601c347c2$21763b90$0600a8c0@IdentrusVA1> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> <!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN"> <html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 } --></style><title>Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?</title></head><body> <div>wahaj</div> <div><br></div> <div>if by "may not process it" you mean "you don't have to implement support" then you are correct. if you mean "arbitrarily decide not to process it" even though the implementation supports it, then you are not in alignment with the standard. - please reference text that i quoted from the standard.</div> <div><br></div> <div>item 1 is not harsh. if one assumes that a ca has decided that the information in the extension shall be considered to determine if the certificate is appropriate, then one should be able to handle the extension - by handle i mean process according to the procedures defined in the standard and, if appropriate, constrained by a certificate use profile such as pkix.</div> <div><br></div> <div>i suggest you look at the additional paragraphs i mentioned in my email (and may be present in sharon's email). it points out that injudicious flagging of extensions as critical may limit users. however, if the ca has decided that the processing of an extension is necessary for correct operation, i can't see why the ca would want to widen the number of potential users to include those who will not use the certificate as the ca intended.</div> <div><br></div> <div> hoyt</div> <div><br></div> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">After all the discussion, what I have understood is:</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">1) If extension is marked as Critical, application MUST process it. If an application can't process it, REJECT the chain altogether</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">2) If extension is NOT marked as Critical, you may not process it</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">Process mean: To read the extension, its values and check it according to some defined rules.</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">Don't you think option 1 is a bit harsh. Lets consider an example, if I have certificate from my CA, having SubjectAltName marked as critical ( why marked as critical ? cuz I use an application from the same CA, which process SubjectAltName). If lets say I want to use the same certificate in a scenario e.g. Buying books from XYZ.com who have implemented SSL with Client Side Authentication. If XYZ.com don't process SubjectAltName and according to RFC 3280 they reject my certificate, I can't use their service !!. This ask for another cert may be from another CA.</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">Best Regards,</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">Wahaj</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite> <br> <blockquote>----- Original Message -----</blockquote> <blockquote><b>From:</b> <a href="mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com">Sharon Boeyen</a></blockquote> <blockquote><b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net">'Hoyt L. Kesterson II'</a> ; <a href="mailto:ietf-pkix@imc.org">ietf-pkix@imc.org</a></blockquote> <blockquote><b>Sent:</b> Friday, July 11, 2003 5:43 PM</blockquote> <blockquote><b>Subject:</b> RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?</blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1" color="#0000FF">I have no objection to eliminating "recognizes" from the text if it is felt necessary, but I also want to point out the text that is only a little bit further down in clause 8</font></blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1" color="#0000FF">of X.509:</font></blockquote> <blockquote> <br> <font size="-1"></font></blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1">A validation engine has two possible actions to take with respect to an extension:</font><br> <font size="-1"></font></blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1">i) it can ignore the extension and accept the certificate (all other things being equal);</font><br> <font size="-1"></font></blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1">ii) it can process the extension and accept or reject the certificate depending on the content of the extension and the conditions under which processing is occuring (e.g. the current values of the path processing variables).</font><br> <font size="-1"></font></blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1">Some extensions can only be marked critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension, processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension rejects the certificate.</font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1">Some extensions can only be marked non-critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension accepts the certificate (unless factors other than this extension cause it to be rejected).</font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1">Some extensions can be marked critical or non-critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension, regardless of the criticality flag. A validation engine that does not understand the extension accepts the certificate if the extension is marked non-critical (unless factors other than this extension cause it to be rejected) and rejects the certificate if the extension is marked critical.</font></blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote> <br> </blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1">While I suppose it could be argued that "understands" is not much better than "recognizes", I think the final paragraph is clearer about what a validation engine is required to do.</font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote> <br> </blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1">I think that when we changed all this text the last time, there were some voices that opposed eliminating "recognizes" from the text because that is the only term that was used in the 3rd edition. Perhaps there is no longer support for that position. Note that these changes were a result of defect report 244 against the 3rd edition text (resolution published in TC 2 for 3rd edition and integrated into 4th edition text).</font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Arial" size="-1">Sharon</font><br> </blockquote> <blockquote> <br> </blockquote> <blockquote> <br> <blockquote><font face="Tahoma" size="-1">-----Original Message-----<br> <b>From:</b> Hoyt L. Kesterson II [mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net]<br> <b>Sent:</b> Thursday, July 10, 2003 8:47 PM<br> <b>To:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br> <b>Subject:</b> Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?</font><br> <font face="Tahoma" size="-1"></font></blockquote> <blockquote>valid point. i don't see much value to considering "recognizes" as meaning i've heard about the extension but have no ability to process it. this possibly should be addressed in two places</blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote> 1) ietf agreed terminology for stating the capabilities of an implementation</blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote> 2) a clean-up of both ietf and iso/itu standard terminology. somewhere i had some additional text that i considered that stated that the implementation processed the extension according to the rules specified in the standard (old osi conformance lingo)</blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote> hoyt</blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote><br> <blockquote type="cite" cite>Hoyt,<br> <br> I think the "dispute" is over the term "recognizes". Hypothetically, an implementation may not have the code to "process" a given extension, but might claim to have the code to "recognize" the extension (and thereby hope to satisfy some extended compliance criteria, if erroneously).<br> <br> If one defines "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to fully process", the dispute disappears. But then, the conjunction "recognizes AND is able to process" (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and plausibly misleading.<br> <br> Cheers! ____tony____<br> <br> <br> At 02:59 PM 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote:<br> <blockquote type="cite" cite>I believe that this sentence<br> <br> <font face="Times New Roman" size="+1"> When a certificate-using implementation<b> recognizes and is able to process</b> an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag.</font><br> <br> means that if an implementation has the code to process an extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate.<br> <br> if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't have to be processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical means that one can choose to process it or not, then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result from such potential arbitrariness.<br> <br> hoyt<br> </blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote> <blockquote> <blockquote> <blockquote>Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov><br> Information Operations and Assurance Center<br> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory<br> Livermore, CA 94551-9900<br> </blockquote> </blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><br> Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature;<br> <x-tab> </x-tab>name="smime.p7s"<br> Content-Disposition: attachment;<br> <x-tab> </x-tab>filename="smime.p7s"<br> <br> Attachment converted: Macintosh HD:smime 2.p7s (????/----) (00057A66)</blockquote> <div><br></div> </body> </html> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BItoqt013724 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 11:55:50 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BItoOL013723 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 11:55:50 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from postmark.nist.gov (pushme.nist.gov [129.6.16.92]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BItmqt013718 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 11:55:48 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from tim.polk@nist.gov) Received: from krdp8.nist.gov (krdp8.ncsl.nist.gov [129.6.54.113]) by postmark.nist.gov (8.12.5/8.12.5) with ESMTP id h6BItXw2018590; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 14:55:33 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <5.1.0.14.2.20030711144816.025712a8@email.nist.gov> X-Sender: wpolk@email.nist.gov X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.1 Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 14:58:55 -0400 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov> Subject: Updated agenda for PKIX, 57th IETF Cc: peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr>, stefan@retrospekt.com, "Riccardo.Genghini" <riccardo.genghini@sng.it> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Folks, I have appended an updated agenda. I think I have everyone this time... Thanks! Tim ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PKIX WG (pkix-wg) THURSDAY, July 17, 2003 0900-1130 ================================= CHAIR: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov> AGENDA: 1. WG Status and Direction 1.1 WG Focus and Direction [ADs] The working group has recieved direction from the IESG that will limit the types of new specifications accepted as PKIX work products. The ADs wil present IESG's expectations for the PKIX WG along with the rationale. (15 min.) 1.2 Document Status Review [Tim Polk (NIST)] The working group has a large number of Internet-Drafts. Many documents are with the ADs or in various stages of WG Last Call. Several others are ready for Last Call. (10 min.) 2. PKIX WG Specifications 2.1 Simple Certificate Validation Protocol Trevor Freeman (MicroSoft) http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt The current draft of SCVP is in WG Last Call, and is believed to be in full compliance with RFC 3379. This presentation will identify the changes since the -11 draft. (10 min.) 2.2 RFC 3280 Progression Tim Polk (NIST) NIST is currently performing the interoperability testing for RFC 3280. This presentation will update the WG on NIST's progress, projected completion date, and issues identified to date. Primary focus will be the RFC 3280 path validation test suite developed jointly by NIST, DigitalNet, and NSA. (10 min.) 2.3 LDAP: Schemas, String Values, and more - David Chadwick (Univ of Salford) Peter Gietz (DAASI) The WG has a suite of LDAP-PKIX drafts forming a comprehensive solution for LDAP based PKI information distribution. New drafts on PKC certificate schema, CRL schema and on Attribute Certificate schema have been published since the 56th IETF. The authors will present the changes in these documents and discuss the timeline for document completion. (15 min.) 2.4 Qualified Certificates Stefan Santesson (Retrospekt AB) http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-00.txt This presentation will propose a path for the evolution of the QC document. (10 min.) 2.5 Certification Path Building Matt Cooper (Orion Security) http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt This document was written to provide "best practice" guidance and recommendations to developers building X.509 public-key certification paths within their applications. (10 min.) 3. Related Specifications The following personal drafts address topics of interest to the PKIX WG, and are presented to highlight the availability of the drafts and encourage input from the WG. 3.1 Specifying Russian Cryptographic Algorithms in PKIX Gregory S. Chudov (Crypto-Pro) This personal draft documents the use of Russian national cryptography standards (GOST) in the PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile. It was developed within "Russian Cryptographic Software Compatibility Agreement", and signed by major Russian cryptographic software vendors. (10 min.) 3.2 Memorandum for multi-domain PKI Interoperability Masaki SHIMAOKA (SECOM) This personal draft documents known issues and considerations for multi-domain PKI, and provides guidelines for multi-domain PKI interoperability as a best current practice. The scope of this specification is the establishment of trust relationships and interoperability between mulitple PKI domains. This specification is a follow on to the JNSA Challenge PKI 2002 and Multi-Domain PKI Test Suite. (10 min.) 3.3 Object Oriented PKI (OO-PKI) Anders Rungren (Telia) This personal draft introduces an Object Oriented (OO) X.509 extension. The extension is intended to eliminate the need for application-level, relying party PKI software, to a priori "know" certificate profiles, be manually "configured", or occasionally require "adjustments". The primary goal with the extension is to enable the creation of a wide range of standard information system applications, having built-in relying party PKI support. (10 min.) 4. Liason/Related Projects The following specifications will update the WG on related activities in the EU. 4.1 European Open Standards for Electronic Signatures: the EESSI - Riccardo Genghini, EESSI Chair (SG&A) The European Elctronic Signature Standardization Initiative (EESSI) is an industry initiative in Support of the European Directive on Electronic Signatures. This presentation describes the status of the ESESI's current and recent work. This presentation is an update to the status report provided at the 56th IETF. (10 min.) 4.2 OpenEvidence Project (Peter Sylvester) The EU IST project OpenEvidence is an Open source project concerning technologies for long term validity of documents. The presentation will address the goals and the current status of the implementation. (10 min.) Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BI5Cqt012114 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 11:05:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BI5CjY012113 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 11:05:12 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from osf1.gmu.edu (osf1.gmu.edu [129.174.1.13]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BI5Aqt012108 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 11:05:10 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from pmhesse@geminisecurity.com) Received: from phessel ([129.174.244.115]) by osf1.gmu.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id OAA227183; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 14:05:00 -0400 (EDT) From: "Peter Hesse" <pmhesse@geminisecurity.com> To: "'Steve Hanna'" <steve.hanna@sun.com>, "'PKIX List'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Cc: "'Matt Cooper'" <mcooper@orionsec.com>, "'Yuriy Dzambasow'" <yuriy@anassoc.com>, "'Susan Joseph'" <susan.joseph@digitalnet.com>, "Richard E. Nicholas \(Nicholas, Richard\)" <Richard.Nicholas@digitalnet.com> Subject: RE: draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 14:04:44 -0400 Organization: Gemini Security Solutions, Inc. MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <009601c347d6$eed5ac60$6401a8c0@gemsec.com> X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.4024 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA1; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0091_01C347B5.6109F100" In-Reply-To: <3F0DBEB6.353EA5FA@sun.com> Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1106 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0091_01C347B5.6109F100 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Steve, I have some responses to your message inline, marked with <PMH>... -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Steve Hanna Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 3:30 PM To: PKIX List Subject: Re: draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt I'm glad to see more discussions of certificate path building. In a non-hierarchical PKI where relying parties have different trust anchors, path building is essential. And it's not easy! However, I don't think that we're ready to have an official 'best practices' document on path building yet. Very few people have implemented PKIX-compliant path building (only Sun and Cygnacom/DigitalNet, I think) and there are many areas that are still unclear. <PMH> What is PKIX-compliant path building exactly? I am not aware of any documents that define this. This is a part of the reason why there is a need for this document.</PMH> For instance, is it better to do a Depth First Search with ranking or to rank all candidate certificates? Which ranking heuristics work best in which environments? Is it possible for software to dynamically adapt to the PKI topology without requiring configuration? And what are the performance bottlenecks and best workarounds in real-world deployments? The I-D just published presents one early perspective on these questions, not a consensus. <PMH> I disagree that the document provides one early perspective, it describes many different scenarios and many different ways of dealing with them. This document was developed by five different authors from four different companies, all of which having varied amounts of experience building path development algorithms for many different environments, from pure mesh style (Entrust style?) to strict hierarchy to bridge ca. The document attempts to discuss many of the previously encountered problems and decisions based upon those problems, but does not make any hard and fast rules on which way future implementations should be developed. </PMH> For now, I suggest that people who have implemented path building publish their insights, results, and ideas either as individual I-Ds without the intent to become an RFC or as research papers. Then we can discuss these results and ideas, test them in real-world scenarios, and arrive at a consensus on what Best Current Practices should be included in a BCP document on this topic. We might even want to start an IRTF research group or an informal discussion group to coordinate this research, sift through the results, and arrive at a solid and well-supported consensus. This effort will take some time, but I expect it will produce much better results. <PMH> X.509 has existed in one form or another since 1988, and after 15 years I think we owe the community some amount of tried and true guidance toward path building. Does this document have all the answers on what the best way is to build paths? No--but the document states that very fact repeatedly--different environments will always lead to different optimizations for that environment. </PMH> If it's felt that we really need a BCP on this topic in short order, then I think it should be restricted to things that we are fairly sure are good practices (like advising CAs to include name constraints and AIA in certificates to help path building and advising path builders to ensure that they handle simple hierarchical PKIs quickly but still handle complex PKIs properly). <PMH> This draft focuses on path building, not best practices for how authorities should structure things to simplify building. Perhaps that should be the topic of another I-D. During drafts we discussed prioritizing different optimizations saying "you definitely should do A,B,C and probably do D,E,F," etc. However we decided not to because we wanted to make the developers free to make their own decisions based upon the environments with which they were working. </PMH> Thanks, Steve ---------------- +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | Peter Hesse pmhesse@geminisecurity.com | | Phone: (703)934-2031 Gemini Security Solutions, Inc. | | ICQ: 1942828 www.geminisecurity.com | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ "Pay no attention to what the critics say; there has never been a statue set up in honor of a critic." --Jean Sibelius ------=_NextPart_000_0091_01C347B5.6109F100 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAQAAoIIF1zCCAokw ggHyoAMCAQICAQAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxKDAmBgNVBAoTH0dlbWlu aSBTZWN1cml0eSBTb2x1dGlvbnMsIEluYy4xIjAgBgNVBAMTGUdTUyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRo b3JpdHkwHhcNMDIwNDI1MjE1NjI3WhcNMDUwMjEyMjE1NjI3WjBbMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEoMCYG A1UEChMfR2VtaW5pIFNlY3VyaXR5IFNvbHV0aW9ucywgSW5jLjEiMCAGA1UEAxMZR1NTIENlcnRp ZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0eTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAtl3UwxhHyP05YqIF kyfkWt8669gO/VKxC51PhJaV+hb9swwtaMVtJ9k8WjfQLt3fZpaNCNKB7V61KHxY1K1JCP67AwBy W4TRuGRwEb+PXu5XdpNs3kxKtunlR4/WPsrrvuMx9/R/Fx9ld3TUqXCJ/JN7Zg68IappkcMy9S3w koECAwEAAaNdMFswHQYDVR0OBBYEFJpr3UY3Hh5dngW5n9h72/GKMy7GMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFJpr 3UY3Hh5dngW5n9h72/GKMy7GMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCwYDVR0PBAQDAgEGMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB BAUAA4GBAHSd4BGG4le+QZBw/6bCq6mGpr4aJAE7UuXEW/I5YXqlQs1CkAzEHV8UnnXgDd0xONTQ CdznbzCBNAE1EoxL14Kdp5I6omEeNulMd/tGAvxdw0qbbSaT9LolqtnPL2RbnI3j0JsQlncN1+l2 Dzx8Ka39NU4Gb/P6qo/PKa5+YRHSMIIDRjCCAq+gAwIBAgIBCzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBbMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzEoMCYGA1UEChMfR2VtaW5pIFNlY3VyaXR5IFNvbHV0aW9ucywgSW5jLjEiMCAG A1UEAxMZR1NTIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0eTAeFw0wMjA4MDUxODIxMTZaFw0wNDA4MDQx ODIxMTZaMIGNMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEnMCUGA1UEChMeR2VtaW5pIFNlY3VyaXR5IFNvbHV0aW9u cyBJbmMuMRQwEgYDVQQLEwtEZXZlbG9wbWVudDEUMBIGA1UEAxMLUGV0ZXIgSGVzc2UxKTAnBgkq hkiG9w0BCQEWGnBtaGVzc2VAZ2VtaW5pc2VjdXJpdHkuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GN ADCBiQKBgQCvREu1eU1kCNW+lz+ZV9xvljBC7O6iESK10wzKPlrgnhL87+V5/joAbnwsXt25NsmP 8MIY6tuRxCbZzZn3bFTyPerhIOENWrA/HVdIP29TXfHL1YZn7bqBRHyjKcNdYS02GCw4gR4Fr5QS SQzy62WbLcaoSG/wnhBqBesLxZMsOwIDAQABo4HmMIHjMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEQYJYIZIAYb4QgEB BAQDAgSwMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIE8DAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUG8pDjEsHMZVS4/sJThNbtamIzEswHwYDVR0j BBgwFoAUmmvdRjceHl2eBbmf2Hvb8YozLsYwJQYDVR0RBB4wHIEacG1oZXNzZUBnZW1pbmlzZWN1 cml0eS5jb20wNwYDVR0fBDAwLjAsoCqgKIYmaHR0cDovL3d3dy5nZW1pbmlzZWN1cml0eS5jb20v cm9vdC5jcmwwFgYDVR0gBA8wDTALBgkrBgEEAe8oAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEABOIVgnmX 5u4gHHRMsIG5H9WAbMqUeqjhGiFMxDjFXoS2Fkk6eVS6wLJZiS54mWrT1NLA9UOcqfvX8pdpp+pw IpCwK9ywIco4mrqRdJ5Ja7vuxiO0e0J236mWdTQqPXWxZCOYumBtLkqoOcDFQYjuM4ZPLKSbFiMs j1OYuQnyz6cxggK0MIICsAIBATBgMFsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSgwJgYDVQQKEx9HZW1pbmkgU2Vj dXJpdHkgU29sdXRpb25zLCBJbmMuMSIwIAYDVQQDExlHU1MgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5 AgELMAkGBSsOAwIaBQCgggGqMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkF MQ8XDTAzMDcxMTE4MDQ0M1owIwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMRYEFLnpydFXsAi2LNe2Gagj4CQ4nCVwMGcG CSqGSIb3DQEJDzFaMFgwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgFA MAcGBSsOAwIHMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgEoMAcGBSsOAwIaMAoGCCqGSIb3DQIFMG8GCSsGAQQBgjcQ BDFiMGAwWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxKDAmBgNVBAoTH0dlbWluaSBTZWN1cml0eSBTb2x1dGlvbnMs IEluYy4xIjAgBgNVBAMTGUdTUyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkCAQswcQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQ AgsxYqBgMFsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSgwJgYDVQQKEx9HZW1pbmkgU2VjdXJpdHkgU29sdXRpb25z LCBJbmMuMSIwIAYDVQQDExlHU1MgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5AgELMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB AQUABIGAQSnlHBvjfj3UoGfDqHVWzY/T0olXLoua/T/G2AP01hIvvkQSBhIVTYErlODwpZvdaUtS hYVW5GhJihY217qA+mix+rqOWkh7JxaadrqHOEBsY2LKoiA5z97BHghK0g4dgAMTTCx6QsrIjui9 R7V0UyhLVrhtMqH05GXwd+PzAucAAAAAAAA= ------=_NextPart_000_0091_01C347B5.6109F100-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BGGWqt003654 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 09:16:32 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BGGWKo003653 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 09:16:32 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from host13.websitesource.com (host13.websitesource.com [209.239.35.152]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BGGVqt003647 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 09:16:31 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from chokhani@orionsec.com) Received: from wchokhani (dpvc-138-88-161-20.res.east.verizon.net [138.88.161.20]) by host13.websitesource.com (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6BGGWJ6030429; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 12:16:32 -0400 From: "Santosh Chokhani" <chokhani@orionsec.com> To: "'Steve Hanna'" <steve.hanna@sun.com>, "'PKIX List'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Question about Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 12:16:27 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <009c01c347c7$cad77e10$9900a8c0@hq.orionsec.com> X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.4510 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA1; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0098_01C347A6.409D4DE0" In-Reply-To: <3F0EC7A8.BDF1D6CA@sun.com> Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0098_01C347A6.409D4DE0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I agree with Steve Hanna on both counts. -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Steve Hanna Sent: Friday, July 11, 2003 10:20 AM To: PKIX List Subject: Question about Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension The Certificate Issuer CRL entry extension (described in section 5.3.4 of RFC 3280) is a GeneralNames structure that identifies the certificate issuer for the CRL entry to which it is attached (and also to all subsequent entries in that CRL until another Certificate Issuer CRL entry extension is encountered. RFC 3280 doesn't say so, but I believe that within a PKIX (Internet) environment (where each certificate must have a non-empty X.500 issuer name and issuer alternative names are generally ignored) this extension MUST always contain at least one X.500 name so that the relying party can match this name against the issuer name in the certificate, as described in section 6.3.3 item (j) of RFC 3280. And I think that text describing this requirement should be added to the successor to RFC 3280. Does everyone agree with this? I also wonder whether anyone can think of a reason why this CRL entry extension should ever contain anything other than a single X.500 name in a PKIX (Internet) environment. If not, then the requirement can (and should) be made even more strict, specifying that this extension MUST contain only a single X.500 name. Please let me know if you have a reason why this would not be a good idea. 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4j0+NiO/dB3AwUoJPbPQlEgZb4v+L9JDn4xAXQcxN3k03y3h3JYqUQ1kI3rRPF8MM2NJNGogkSdQ joXComkwqUlhaVTlFYxeu4robf0fZIlS7NuCn9HGbMlniT0nvdh+dQfcHzuN4d0gl7CnxzfQre+F nYfp5dqcjUQYOQUSLSv3M6xTn1t5RxWbC5gdAAAAAAAA ------=_NextPart_000_0098_01C347A6.409D4DE0-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BG8Dqt003386 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 09:08:13 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BG8DAs003384 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 09:08:13 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mpls-qmqp-02.inet.qwest.net (mpls-qmqp-02.inet.qwest.net [63.231.195.113]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6BG8Bqt003371 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 09:08:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from 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(130.13.127.251) by mpls-pop-06.inet.qwest.net with SMTP; 11 Jul 2003 16:08:12 -0000 Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 09:03:20 -0700 Message-Id: <a0521060cbb348d6e0446@[192.168.2.7]> From: "Hoyt L. Kesterson II" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: hoytkesterson@earthlink.net@mail.earthlink.net In-Reply-To: <01a501c347bc$2e057840$020aff0a@tsg1> References: <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184A2@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <5.0.0.25.2.20030710133209.045036d0@poptop.llnl.gov> <a05210608bb339010a1e7@[192.168.2.7]> <01a501c347bc$2e057840$020aff0a@tsg1> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> <!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN"> <html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 } --></style><title>Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?</title></head><body> <div>todd, "shall" is considered, by the language mavens in the standards organization, to be stronger than "must" (see the 2nd meaning in webster).</div> <div><br></div> <div>iso and itu have agreed on a set of language rules. "shall" is used when the making a statement about an action that is compulsory. "may" is used to describe an action that is optional.</div> <div><br></div> <div>note that laws and regulations use "shall"</div> <div><br></div> <div>i must use "shall"</div> <div><br></div> <div> hoyt</div> <div><br></div> <div><br></div> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">Hoyt, this is an instance where the would MUST is appropriate because what you are referring to is a the compliance model for use and nothing less.</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">On a tangent of this, one of the amazing things is that the technical world seems to miss that most implementation's of this high-tech will be SW in nature, and so they will require some form of internal auditing to assure they are in compliance with the standards. In fact it probably would be wise for the IETF to require some 'test component' specification in the standards track to qualify a technology for release as a standard and possibly publish these as a BCP recommendation for validating the PKI environment.</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">Not that it, the IETF, should build the toolkit like what OpenGroup does with their Unix qualification suite, but at least the top level of the functional architecture...</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">Hmmmm. This is also is probably germane to the x509 standards track too.</font></blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">T</font><br> <blockquote>----- Original Message -----</blockquote> <blockquote><b>From:</b> <a href="mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net">Hoyt L. Kesterson II</a></blockquote> <blockquote><b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:ietf-pkix@imc.org">ietf-pkix@imc.org</a></blockquote> <blockquote><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, July 10, 2003 2:59 PM</blockquote> <blockquote><b>Subject:</b> Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?</blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote>I believe that this sentence</blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1"> When a certificate-using implementation<b> recognizes and is able to process</b> an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag.</font></blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote>means that if an implementation has the code to process an extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate.</blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote>if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't have to be processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical means that one can choose to process it or not, then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result from such potential arbitrariness.</blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote> hoyt</blockquote> <blockquote><br></blockquote> <blockquote><br> <blockquote type="cite" cite>At 10:14 PM 7/9/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote:<br> <blockquote type="cite" cite>At 10:31 -0400 7/8/03, David A. Cooper wrote:<br> <br> as we were finishing up the 4th edition sharon boeyen reported to our group that some implementors were using an interesting interpretation of "recognizing an extension". apparently their recognition essentially meant that they recognized the oid and recognized that the extension was defined but did not process it, i.e wrote no code to process the extension as defined in the standard. to counter this specious argument we wrote some additional text for clause 7<br> </blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote> <blockquote> <blockquote><br> [snip]<br> <blockquote type="cite" cite>the 4th edition has this replacement paragraph (as well as additional paragraphs)<br> </blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote> <blockquote> <blockquote><br> [snip]<br> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1">therein. When an implementation processing a certificate does not recognize an extension, if the criticality flag is</font><font face="Arial" size="+1"><b> FALSE</b></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1">, it may ignore that extension. If the criticality flag is</font><font face="Arial" size="+1"><b> TRUE</b></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1">, unrecognized extensions shall cause the structure to be considered invalid, i.e. in a certificate, an unrecognized critical extension would cause validation of a signature using that certificate to fail. When a certificate-using implementation<b> recognizes and is able to process</b> an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. Note that any extension that is flagged non-critical will cause inconsistent behaviour between certificate-using systems that will process the extension and certificate-using systems that do not recognize the extension and will ignore it.</font>"</blockquote> <blockquote><br> note the penultimate sentence.<br> </blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote> <blockquote> <blockquote>Indeed. This clearly implies that non-critical extensions "may or may not" be processed.<br> <br> Moreover, additional confusion is engendered by the phrase<br> <br> "recognizes and is able to process".<br> <br> Perhaps this is a redundant conjunction, but logically it implies that "recognizes" and "is able to process" are distinct conditions (else, why the conjunction?)<br> <br> Thus, for non-critical extensions, one has THREE cases:<br> <br> 1. Does not recognize (may or may not validate certificate, up to implementation)<br> <br> 2. "Recognizes", but cannot process (same result as in 1.)<br> <br> 3. Recognizes and CAN process (MUST process to determine validity.)<br> <br> If the intent is to use the term "recognizes" to mean "can process", then the condition "recognizes and can process" adds to the confusion.<br> <br> Cheers! ____tony____<br> <br> Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov><br> Information Operations and Assurance Center<br> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory<br> Livermore, CA 94551-9900</blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote> <div><br></div> </body> </html> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BFhmqt099753 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:43:48 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BFhmUY099752 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:43:48 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ns.malpani.biz (adsl-63-194-89-166.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net [63.194.89.166]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BFhkqt099742 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:43:46 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from ambarish@malpani.biz) Received: from malpani.biz (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ns.malpani.biz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with SMTP id h6BFhc9A010122; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:43:38 -0700 Received: from 66.224.113.194 (SquirrelMail authenticated user ambarish) by ns.malpani.biz with HTTP; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:43:38 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <29308.66.224.113.194.1057938218.squirrel@ns.malpani.biz> Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:43:38 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? From: "Ambarish Malpani" <ambarish@malpani.biz> To: <levitte@lp.se> In-Reply-To: <20030711.163123.28784997.levitte@lp.se> References: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC34C@sottmxs04.entrust.com> <20030711.163123.28784997.levitte@lp.se> X-Priority: 3 Importance: Normal X-MSMail-Priority: Normal Cc: <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>, <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-Mailer: SquirrelMail (version 1.2.7) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi Richard, Not quite. I think what most folks are saying is that you only say you recognize an extension if you CAN process it. So, in pseudo-C/STL code, it works something like this: int recognize(extension) { return((know(extension.oid) && canProcess(extension.oid)); } dealwithcert(cert) { for(extension=cert.extensions.first(); extension; extension++) { if(recognize(extension)) process(extention); else if(critical(extension)) reject(cert); } return(0); } Wow, this pseudo-C is fun! :-) Ambarish > > Contrary to others, I don't believe the problem lies in the word > "recognises" itself. It's more the whole sentence that seems to be > confusing (and I agree with those who think so). > > To me, the quoted language from X.509 certainly seems to say "if you > recognise this extension, you must process it or invalidate the path, > period", while the quote text from the other document seems to say "if > you recognise this extension and can process it, you must process it". > > In pseudo-C terms, I get it like this: > > X.509: if (recognise(extension)) { > if (can_process(extension)) > process(extension); > else > invalidate(path); > } else if (critical(extension)) { > invalidate(path); > } > > other: if (recognise(extension) && can_process(extension)) { > process(extension); > } else if (critical(extension)) { > invalidate(path); > } > > Makes sense? > > -- > Richard Levitte | http://richard.levitte.org/ | Tunnlandsv. 3 > Levitte Programming | http://www.lp.se/ | S-168 36 Bromma T: > +46-708-26 53 44 | | SWEDEN > "Price, performance, quality... choose the two you like" > > > In message > <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC34C@sottmxs04.entrust.com> on Fri, > 11 Jul 2003 08:43:16 -0400, Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com> > said: > > sharon.boeyen> I have no objection to eliminating "recognizes" from the > text if it is felt sharon.boeyen> necessary, but I also want to point > out the text that is only a little bit sharon.boeyen> further down in > clause 8 > sharon.boeyen> of X.509: > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> A validation engine has two possible actions to take with > respect to an sharon.boeyen> extension:<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = > sharon.boeyen> "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> i) it can ignore the extension and accept the > certificate (all other sharon.boeyen> things being equal); > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> ii) it can process the extension and accept or reject > the certificate sharon.boeyen> depending on the content of the extension > and the conditions under which sharon.boeyen> processing is occuring > (e.g. the current values of the path processing sharon.boeyen> > variables). > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> Some extensions can only be marked critical. In these > cases a validation sharon.boeyen> engine that understands the extension, > processes it and acceptance/rejection sharon.boeyen> of the certificate > is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the sharon.boeyen> > extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension > sharon.boeyen> rejects the certificate. > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> Some extensions can only be marked non-critical. In these > cases a validation sharon.boeyen> engine that understands the extension > processes it and acceptance/rejection sharon.boeyen> of the certificate > is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the sharon.boeyen> > extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension > sharon.boeyen> accepts the certificate (unless factors other than this > extension cause it sharon.boeyen> to be rejected). > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> Some extensions can be marked critical or non-critical. > In these cases a sharon.boeyen> validation engine that understands the > extension processes it and sharon.boeyen> acceptance/rejection of the > certificate is dependent (at least in part) on sharon.boeyen> the > content of the extension, regardless of the criticality flag. A > sharon.boeyen> validation engine that does not understand the extension > accepts the sharon.boeyen> certificate if the extension is marked > non-critical (unless factors other sharon.boeyen> than this extension > cause it to be rejected) and rejects the certificate if sharon.boeyen> > the extension is marked critical. > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> While I suppose it could be argued that "understands" is > not much better sharon.boeyen> than "recognizes", I think the final > paragraph is clearer about what a sharon.boeyen> validation engine is > required to do. > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> I think that when we changed all this text the last time, > there were some sharon.boeyen> voices that opposed eliminating > "recognizes" from the text because that is sharon.boeyen> the only term > that was used in the 3rd edition. Perhaps there is no longer > sharon.boeyen> support for that position. Note that these changes were a > result of defect sharon.boeyen> report 244 against the 3rd edition text > (resolution published in TC 2 for sharon.boeyen> 3rd edition and > integrated into 4th edition text). > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> Sharon > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> -----Original Message----- > sharon.boeyen> From: Hoyt L. Kesterson II > [mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net] sharon.boeyen> Sent: Thursday, July > 10, 2003 8:47 PM > sharon.boeyen> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org > sharon.boeyen> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical > extensions ? sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> valid point. i don't see much value to considering > "recognizes" as meaning sharon.boeyen> i've heard about the extension > but have no ability to process it. this sharon.boeyen> possibly should > be addressed in two places > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> 1) ietf agreed terminology for stating the capabilities > of an sharon.boeyen> implementation > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> 2) a clean-up of both ietf and iso/itu standard > terminology. somewhere i sharon.boeyen> had some additional text that i > considered that stated that the sharon.boeyen> implementation processed > the extension according to the rules specified in sharon.boeyen> the > standard (old osi conformance lingo) > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> hoyt > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> Hoyt, > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> I think the "dispute" is over the term "recognizes". > Hypothetically, an sharon.boeyen> implementation may not have the code > to "process" a given extension, but sharon.boeyen> might claim to have > the code to "recognize" the extension (and thereby hope sharon.boeyen> > to satisfy some extended compliance criteria, if erroneously). > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> If one defines "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to > fully process", the sharon.boeyen> dispute disappears. But then, the > conjunction "recognizes AND is able to sharon.boeyen> process" > (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and plausibly misleading. > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> Cheers! ____tony____ > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> At 02:59 PM 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote: > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> I believe that this sentence > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> When a certificate-using implementation recognizes and > is able to process sharon.boeyen> an extension, then the > certificate-using implementation shall process the sharon.boeyen> > extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> means that if an implementation has the code to process > an extension, it sharon.boeyen> must do so. if it doesn't have the code, > then it will not process an sharon.boeyen> extension because it cannot > process it. if, in that case, that extension is sharon.boeyen> flagged > critical, then it cannot use the certificate. sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> if anyone believe that the text says that an extension > doesn't have to be sharon.boeyen> processed even though there is an > ability to process the extension, i.e. a sharon.boeyen> belief that not > being critical means that one can choose to process it or sharon.boeyen> > not, then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further > sharon.boeyen> clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result from > such potential sharon.boeyen> arbitrariness. > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> hoyt > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> > sharon.boeyen> Information Operations and Assurance Center > sharon.boeyen> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory > sharon.boeyen> Livermore, CA 94551-9900 > sharon.boeyen> > sharon.boeyen> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BFcBqt099528 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:38:11 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BFcAkL099527 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:38:10 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ns3.worldcall.net.pk ([203.81.192.10]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BFbrqt099511 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:38:04 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from wahaj.khan@ascertia.com) Received: from IdentrusVA1 ([203.81.193.89]) by ns3.worldcall.net.pk (8.12.8+Sun/8.12.2) with SMTP id h6BFaGRn022913; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 21:36:17 +0600 (PKST) Message-ID: <00d601c347c2$21763b90$0600a8c0@IdentrusVA1> From: "Wahaj" <wahaj.khan@ascertia.com> To: "Sharon Boeyen" <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC34C@sottmxs04.entrust.com> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 20:35:51 +0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_00D0_01C347EC.05196470"; micalg=SHA1; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1106 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1106 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_00D0_01C347EC.05196470 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_001_00D1_01C347EC.05196470" ------=_NextPart_001_00D1_01C347EC.05196470 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?After all the = discussion, what I have understood is: 1) If extension is marked as Critical, application MUST process it. If = an application can't process it, REJECT the chain altogether 2) If extension is NOT marked as Critical, you may not process it Process mean: To read the extension, its values and check it according = to some defined rules. Don't you think option 1 is a bit harsh. Lets consider an example, if I = have certificate from my CA, having SubjectAltName marked as critical ( = why marked as critical ? cuz I use an application from the same CA, = which process SubjectAltName). If lets say I want to use the same = certificate in a scenario e.g. Buying books from XYZ.com who have = implemented SSL with Client Side Authentication. If XYZ.com don't = process SubjectAltName and according to RFC 3280 they reject my = certificate, I can't use their service !!. This ask for another cert may = be from another CA.=20 Best Regards, Wahaj ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Sharon Boeyen=20 To: 'Hoyt L. Kesterson II' ; ietf-pkix@imc.org=20 Sent: Friday, July 11, 2003 5:43 PM Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? I have no objection to eliminating "recognizes" from the text if it is = felt necessary, but I also want to point out the text that is only a = little bit further down in clause 8 of X.509: A validation engine has two possible actions to take with respect to = an extension: i) it can ignore the extension and accept the certificate (all = other things being equal); ii) it can process the extension and accept or reject the = certificate depending on the content of the extension and the conditions = under which processing is occuring (e.g. the current values of the path = processing variables). Some extensions can only be marked critical. In these cases a = validation engine that understands the extension, processes it and = acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) = on the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not = understand the extension rejects the certificate. Some extensions can only be marked non-critical. In these cases a = validation engine that understands the extension processes it and = acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) = on the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not = understand the extension accepts the certificate (unless factors other = than this extension cause it to be rejected). Some extensions can be marked critical or non-critical. In these cases = a validation engine that understands the extension processes it and = acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) = on the content of the extension, regardless of the criticality flag. A = validation engine that does not understand the extension accepts the = certificate if the extension is marked non-critical (unless factors = other than this extension cause it to be rejected) and rejects the = certificate if the extension is marked critical. While I suppose it could be argued that "understands" is not much = better than "recognizes", I think the final paragraph is clearer about = what a validation engine is required to do.=20 =20 I think that when we changed all this text the last time, there were = some voices that opposed eliminating "recognizes" from the text because = that is the only term that was used in the 3rd edition. Perhaps there is = no longer support for that position. Note that these changes were a = result of defect report 244 against the 3rd edition text (resolution = published in TC 2 for 3rd edition and integrated into 4th edition text). Sharon =20 =20 -----Original Message----- From: Hoyt L. Kesterson II [mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net] Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 8:47 PM To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? valid point. i don't see much value to considering "recognizes" as = meaning i've heard about the extension but have no ability to process = it. this possibly should be addressed in two places 1) ietf agreed terminology for stating the capabilities of an = implementation 2) a clean-up of both ietf and iso/itu standard terminology. = somewhere i had some additional text that i considered that stated that = the implementation processed the extension according to the rules = specified in the standard (old osi conformance lingo) hoyt Hoyt, I think the "dispute" is over the term "recognizes". = Hypothetically, an implementation may not have the code to "process" a = given extension, but might claim to have the code to "recognize" the = extension (and thereby hope to satisfy some extended compliance = criteria, if erroneously). If one defines "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to fully = process", the dispute disappears. But then, the conjunction "recognizes = AND is able to process" (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and = plausibly misleading. Cheers! ____tony____ At 02:59 PM 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote: I believe that this sentence When a certificate-using implementation recognizes and is able = to process an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall = process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. means that if an implementation has the code to process an = extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not = process an extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, = that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate. if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't = have to be processed even though there is an ability to process the = extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical means that one can = choose to process it or not, then i will recommend additional text for = the standard to further clarify the meaning for i can see no useful = result from such potential arbitrariness. hoyt Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> Information Operations and Assurance Center Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, CA 94551-9900 ------=_NextPart_001_00D1_01C347EC.05196470 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML xmlns:o =3D = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"><HEAD><TITLE>Re: What is mean = by recognizing critical extensions ?</TITLE> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; = charset=3Diso-8859-1"> <STYLE type=3Dtext/css>BLOCKQUOTE { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } DL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } UL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } OL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } LI { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } </STYLE> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1106" name=3DGENERATOR></HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>After all the discussion, what I have = understood=20 is:</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>1) If extension is marked as=20 Critical, application MUST process it. If an application can't = process=20 it, REJECT the chain altogether</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>2) If extension is NOT marked as = Critical, you may=20 not process it</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Process mean: To read the extension, = its values and=20 check it according to some defined rules.</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Don't you think option 1 is a bit = harsh. Lets=20 consider an example, if I have certificate from my CA, having = SubjectAltName=20 marked as critical ( why marked as critical ? cuz I use an application = from the=20 same CA, which process SubjectAltName). If lets say I want to use the = same=20 certificate in a scenario e.g. Buying books from XYZ.com who have = implemented=20 SSL with Client Side Authentication. If XYZ.com don't process = SubjectAltName and=20 according to RFC 3280 they reject my certificate, I can't use their = service !!.=20 This ask for another cert may be from another CA. </FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Best Regards,</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Wahaj</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr=20 style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; = BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </DIV> <DIV=20 style=3D"BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: = black"><B>From:</B>=20 <A title=3Dsharon.boeyen@entrust.com=20 href=3D"mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com">Sharon Boeyen</A> </DIV> <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A = title=3Dhoytkesterson@earthlink.net=20 href=3D"mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net">'Hoyt L. Kesterson II'</A> = ; <A=20 title=3Dietf-pkix@imc.org = href=3D"mailto:ietf-pkix@imc.org">ietf-pkix@imc.org</A>=20 </DIV> <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Friday, July 11, 2003 = 5:43 PM</DIV> <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> RE: What is mean by = recognizing=20 critical extensions ?</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial = color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>I=20 have no objection to eliminating "recognizes" from the text if it is = felt=20 necessary, but I also want to point out the text that is only a little = bit=20 further down in clause 8</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial = color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>of=20 X.509:</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT color=3D#0000ff=20 size=3D2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D072031012-11072003><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB><FONT = size=3D2> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 face=3DArial>A validation engine has two possible actions to take with = respect=20 to an extension:<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3Denumlev1 style=3D"MARGIN: 4.3pt 0in 0pt 59.55pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 face=3DArial>i)<SPAN style=3D"mso-tab-count: = 1"> =20 </SPAN>it can ignore the extension and accept the certificate (all = other=20 things being equal);<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3Denumlev1 style=3D"MARGIN: 4.3pt 0in 0pt 59.55pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 face=3DArial>ii)<SPAN style=3D"mso-tab-count: = 1"> =20 </SPAN>it can process the extension and accept or reject the = certificate=20 depending on the content of the extension and the conditions under = which=20 processing is occuring (e.g. the current values of the path processing = variables).<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><FONT = face=3DArial>Some=20 extensions can only be marked critical. In these cases a validation = engine=20 that understands the extension, processes it and acceptance/rejection = of the=20 certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the = extension. A=20 validation engine that does not understand the extension rejects the=20 certificate.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 size=3D2><FONT face=3DArial>Some extensions can only be marked = non-critical. In=20 these cases a validation engine that understands the extension = processes it=20 and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in = part) on=20 the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not = understand the=20 extension accepts the certificate (unless factors other than this = extension=20 cause it to be rejected).<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 face=3DArial size=3D2>Some extensions can be marked critical or = non-critical. In=20 these cases a validation engine that understands the extension = processes it=20 and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in = part) on=20 the content of the extension, regardless of the criticality flag. A = validation=20 engine that does not understand the extension accepts the certificate = if the=20 extension is marked non-critical (unless factors other than this = extension=20 cause it to be rejected) and rejects the certificate if the extension = is=20 marked critical.</FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT></SPAN> </P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>While I suppose = it could be=20 argued that "understands" is not much better than "recognizes", I = think the=20 final paragraph is clearer about what a validation engine is required = to do.=20 </FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial=20 size=3D2></FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN> </P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I think that = when we changed=20 all this text the last time, there were some voices that opposed = eliminating=20 "recognizes" from the text because that is the only term that was used = in the=20 3rd edition. Perhaps there is no longer support for that position. = Note that=20 these changes were a result of defect report 244 against the 3rd = edition text=20 (resolution published in TC 2 for 3rd edition and integrated into 4th = edition=20 text).</FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial=20 size=3D2>Sharon</FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial=20 size=3D2></FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN> </P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT=20 size=3D2></FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN> </P></SPAN></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr style=3D"MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> <DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT = face=3DTahoma=20 size=3D2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> Hoyt L. = Kesterson II=20 [mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net]<BR><B>Sent:</B> Thursday, July = 10, 2003=20 8:47 PM<BR><B>To:</B> ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: What = is mean=20 by recognizing critical extensions ?<BR><BR></FONT></DIV> <DIV>valid point. i don't see much value to considering "recognizes" = as=20 meaning i've heard about the extension but have no ability to = process it.=20 this possibly should be addressed in two places</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV> 1) ietf agreed terminology for stating the capabilities = of an=20 implementation</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV> 2) a clean-up of both ietf and iso/itu standard = terminology.=20 somewhere i had some additional text that i considered that stated = that the=20 implementation processed the extension according to the rules = specified in=20 the standard (old osi conformance lingo)</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV> hoyt</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite">Hoyt,<BR><BR>I think the = "dispute" is over=20 the term "recognizes". Hypothetically, an implementation may = not=20 have the code to "process" a given extension, but might claim to = have the=20 code to "recognize" the extension (and thereby hope to satisfy = some=20 extended compliance criteria, if erroneously).<BR><BR>If one = defines=20 "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to fully process", the = dispute=20 disappears. But then, the conjunction "recognizes AND is = able to=20 process" (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and plausibly=20 misleading.<BR><BR>Cheers! ____tony____<BR><BR><BR>At 02:59 = PM=20 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote:<BR> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite">I believe that this=20 sentence<BR><BR><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" = size=3D+1> When a=20 certificate-using implementation<B> recognizes and is able to=20 process</B> an extension, then the certificate-using = implementation=20 shall process the extension regardless of the value of the = criticality=20 flag.</FONT><BR><BR>means that if an implementation has the code = to=20 process an extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the = code, then=20 it will not process an extension because it cannot process it. = if, in=20 that case, that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot = use the=20 certificate.<BR><BR>if anyone believe that the text says that an = extension doesn't have to be processed even though there is an = ability=20 to process the extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical = means=20 that one can choose to process it or not, then i will recommend=20 additional text for the standard to further clarify the meaning = for i=20 can see no useful result from such potential=20 arbitrariness.<BR><BR> = hoyt<BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite">Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881=20 <azb@llnl.gov><BR>Information Operations and Assurance=20 Center<BR>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory<BR>Livermore, CA=20 94551-9900</BLOCKQUOTE> <DIV><BR></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_001_00D1_01C347EC.05196470-- ------=_NextPart_000_00D0_01C347EC.05196470 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; 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Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:59:06 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BEx6Kn097640 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:59:06 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from sottmxssm.entrust.com (sottmxssm.entrust.com [216.191.252.10]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BEx4qt097627 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:59:04 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com) Received: from sottguard01.entrust.com (sottguard01.entrust.com [10.4.61.249]) by sottmxssm.entrust.com (Switch-2.2.6/Switch-2.2.4) with SMTP id V6BE2JSW18604 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 10:55:28 -0400 Received: (qmail 7185 invoked by uid 64014); 11 Jul 2003 14:53:28 -0000 Received: from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com by sottguard01.entrust.com with AmikaGuardian-Server-1.1.2 (Processed in 0.756027 secs); 11 Jul 2003 14:53:28 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO SOTTMXS01.entrust.com) (10.4.61.7) by sottguard01.entrust.com with SMTP; 11 Jul 2003 14:53:27 -0000 Received: by sottmxs01.entrust.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) id <3S6ZL5TY>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 10:58:58 -0400 Message-ID: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC354@sottmxs04.entrust.com> From: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com> To: "'Hoyt L. Kesterson II'" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 10:58:57 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C347BC.F44E1ED0" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand this format, some or all of this message may not be legible. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C347BC.F44E1ED0 Content-Type: text/plain Oops, Correction, the text I quoted in my earlier message is from clause 7, not clause 8. Here is the relevant text from clause 8. Hoyt I wonder if this is the text you were thinking about? In a certificate or CRL, an extension is flagged as being either critical or non-critical. If an extension is flagged critical and a certificate-using system does not recognize the extension field type or does not implement the semantics of the extension, then that system shall consider the certificate invalid. If an extension is flagged non-critical, a certificate-using system that does not recognize or implement that extension type may process the remainder of the certificate ignoring the extension. If an extension is flagged non-critical, a certificate-using system that does recognize the extension, shall process the extension. Extension type definitions in this Directory Specification indicate if the extension is always critical, always non-critical, or if criticality can be decided by the certificate or CRL issuer. The reason for requiring some extensions to be always non-critical is to allow certificate-using implementations which do not need to use such extensions to omit support for them without jeopardizing the ability to interoperate with all certification authorities. While on this topic of critical extensions and rejections - I want to be sure everyone realizes that the handling is different for CRLs. If the certificate of interest is listed as revoked on a CRL it is as a minimum considered revoked regardless of the presence of unrecognized critical extensions. Here is the relevant text from clause 7.3 of X.509: NOTE 4 - When an implementation processing a certificate revocation list does not recognize a critical extension in the crlEntryExtensions field, it shall assume that, at a minimum, the identified certificate has been revoked and is no longer valid and perform additional actions concerning that revoked certificate as dictated by local policy. When an implementation does not recognize a critical extension in the crlExtensions field, it shall assume that identified certificates have been revoked and are no longer valid. However in the latter case, since the list may not be complete, certificates that have not been identified as being revoked cannot be assumed to be valid. In this case local policy shall dictate the action to be taken. In any case local policy may dictate actions in addition to and/or stronger than those stated in this Specification. I'll stop quoting now (I guess having edited a document does come in handy for some reasons - at least I can generally locate text when it appears in the "not most obvious" places :-) -----Original Message----- From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] Sent: Friday, July 11, 2003 8:43 AM To: 'Hoyt L. Kesterson II'; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? I have no objection to eliminating "recognizes" from the text if it is felt necessary, but I also want to point out the text that is only a little bit further down in clause 8 of X.509: A validation engine has two possible actions to take with respect to an extension: i) it can ignore the extension and accept the certificate (all other things being equal); ii) it can process the extension and accept or reject the certificate depending on the content of the extension and the conditions under which processing is occuring (e.g. the current values of the path processing variables). Some extensions can only be marked critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension, processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension rejects the certificate. Some extensions can only be marked non-critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension accepts the certificate (unless factors other than this extension cause it to be rejected). Some extensions can be marked critical or non-critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension, regardless of the criticality flag. A validation engine that does not understand the extension accepts the certificate if the extension is marked non-critical (unless factors other than this extension cause it to be rejected) and rejects the certificate if the extension is marked critical. While I suppose it could be argued that "understands" is not much better than "recognizes", I think the final paragraph is clearer about what a validation engine is required to do. I think that when we changed all this text the last time, there were some voices that opposed eliminating "recognizes" from the text because that is the only term that was used in the 3rd edition. Perhaps there is no longer support for that position. Note that these changes were a result of defect report 244 against the 3rd edition text (resolution published in TC 2 for 3rd edition and integrated into 4th edition text). Sharon -----Original Message----- From: Hoyt L. Kesterson II [mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net] Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 8:47 PM To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? valid point. i don't see much value to considering "recognizes" as meaning i've heard about the extension but have no ability to process it. this possibly should be addressed in two places 1) ietf agreed terminology for stating the capabilities of an implementation 2) a clean-up of both ietf and iso/itu standard terminology. somewhere i had some additional text that i considered that stated that the implementation processed the extension according to the rules specified in the standard (old osi conformance lingo) hoyt Hoyt, I think the "dispute" is over the term "recognizes". Hypothetically, an implementation may not have the code to "process" a given extension, but might claim to have the code to "recognize" the extension (and thereby hope to satisfy some extended compliance criteria, if erroneously). If one defines "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to fully process", the dispute disappears. But then, the conjunction "recognizes AND is able to process" (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and plausibly misleading. Cheers! ____tony____ At 02:59 PM 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote: I believe that this sentence When a certificate-using implementation recognizes and is able to process an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. means that if an implementation has the code to process an extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate. if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't have to be processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical means that one can choose to process it or not, then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result from such potential arbitrariness. hoyt Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> Information Operations and Assurance Center Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, CA 94551-9900 ------_=_NextPart_001_01C347BC.F44E1ED0 Content-Type: text/html Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML xmlns:o =3D "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"><HEAD> <META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; = charset=3DUS-ASCII"> <TITLE>Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?</TITLE> <STYLE type=3Dtext/css>BLOCKQUOTE { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } DL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } UL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } OL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } LI { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } </STYLE> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1170" name=3DGENERATOR></HEAD> <BODY> <DIV><SPAN class=3D998065114-11072003><FONT face=3DArial = color=3D#0000ff=20 size=3D2> Oops, Correction, the text I quoted in my earlier = message is=20 from clause 7, not clause 8. Here is the relevant text from clause 8. = Hoyt I=20 wonder if this is the text you were thinking about?</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D998065114-11072003> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 size=3D2>In a certificate or CRL, an extension is flagged as being = either critical=20 or non-critical. If an extension is flagged critical and a = certificate-using=20 system does not recognize the extension field type or does not = implement the=20 semantics of the extension, then that system shall consider the = certificate=20 invalid. If an extension is flagged non-critical, a certificate-using = system=20 that does not recognize or implement that extension type may process = the=20 remainder of the certificate ignoring the extension. If an extension is = flagged=20 non-critical, a certificate-using system that does recognize the = extension,=20 shall process the extension. Extension type definitions in this = Directory=20 Specification indicate if the extension is always critical, always = non-critical,=20 or if criticality can be decided by the certificate or CRL issuer. The = reason=20 for requiring some extensions to be always non-critical is to allow=20 certificate-using implementations which do not need to use such = extensions to=20 omit support for them without jeopardizing the ability to interoperate = with all=20 certification authorities.<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D998065114-11072003><FONT face=3DArial = color=3D#0000ff=20 size=3D2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D998065114-11072003><FONT face=3DArial = color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>While=20 on this topic of critical extensions and rejections - I want to be sure = everyone=20 realizes that the handling is different for CRLs. If the = certificate of=20 interest is listed as revoked on a CRL it is as a minimum considered = revoked=20 regardless of the presence of unrecognized critical extensions. Here is = the=20 relevant text from clause 7.3 of X.509:</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D998065114-11072003><FONT face=3DArial = color=3D#0000ff=20 size=3D2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D998065114-11072003><FONT face=3DArial = color=3D#0000ff size=3D2> <P class=3DNote1 style=3D"MARGIN: 3pt 0in 0pt 14.2pt"><FONT = color=3D#000000><SPAN=20 lang=3DEN-GB><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman">NOTE 4 – When an = implementation=20 processing a certificate revocation list does not recognize a critical = extension=20 in the </FONT></SPAN><B style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB=20 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 8pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: = 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New = Roman'">crlEntryExtensions</SPAN></B><SPAN=20 lang=3DEN-GB><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman"> field, it shall assume = that, at a=20 minimum, the identified certificate has been revoked and is no longer = valid and=20 perform additional actions concerning that revoked certificate as = dictated by=20 local policy. When an implementation does not recognize a critical = extension in=20 the </FONT></SPAN><B style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB=20 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 8pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: = 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'">crlExtensions</SPAN></B= ><SPAN=20 lang=3DEN-GB><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman"> field, it shall assume = that identified=20 certificates have been revoked and are no longer valid. However in the = latter=20 case, since the list may not be complete, certificates that have not = been=20 identified as being revoked cannot be assumed to be valid. In this case = local=20 policy shall dictate the action to be taken. In any case local policy = may=20 dictate actions in addition to and/or stronger than those stated in = this=20 Specification.</FONT></SPAN></FONT></P></FONT></SPAN></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr style=3D"MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"><FONT face=3DTahoma> <DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><BR><SPAN=20 class=3D998065114-11072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2>I'll stop=20 quoting now (I guess having edited a document does come in handy for = some=20 reasons - at least I can generally locate text when it appears in the = "not=20 most obvious" places :-)</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT = size=3D2><SPAN=20 class=3D998065114-11072003></SPAN></FONT> </DIV> <DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT = size=3D2><SPAN=20 class=3D998065114-11072003> </SPAN>-----Original=20 Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> Sharon Boeyen=20 [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]<BR><B>Sent:</B> Friday, July 11, = 2003 8:43=20 AM<BR><B>To:</B> 'Hoyt L. Kesterson II'; = ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B>=20 RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions=20 ?<BR><BR></DIV></FONT></FONT> <DIV><SPAN class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial = color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>I=20 have no objection to eliminating "recognizes" from the text if it is = felt=20 necessary, but I also want to point out the text that is only a = little bit=20 further down in clause 8</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial = color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>of=20 X.509:</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT color=3D#0000ff=20 size=3D2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D072031012-11072003><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB><FONT = size=3D2> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 face=3DArial>A validation engine has two possible actions to take = with respect=20 to an extension:<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3Denumlev1 style=3D"MARGIN: 4.3pt 0in 0pt 59.55pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 face=3DArial>i)<SPAN style=3D"mso-tab-count: = 1"> =20 </SPAN>it can ignore the extension and accept the certificate (all = other=20 things being equal);<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3Denumlev1 style=3D"MARGIN: 4.3pt 0in 0pt 59.55pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 face=3DArial>ii)<SPAN style=3D"mso-tab-count: = 1"> =20 </SPAN>it can process the extension and accept or reject the = certificate=20 depending on the content of the extension and the conditions under = which=20 processing is occuring (e.g. the current values of the path = processing=20 variables).<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><FONT = face=3DArial>Some=20 extensions can only be marked critical. In these cases a validation = engine=20 that understands the extension, processes it and acceptance/rejection = of the=20 certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the = extension. A=20 validation engine that does not understand the extension rejects the=20 certificate.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 size=3D2><FONT face=3DArial>Some extensions can only be marked = non-critical. In=20 these cases a validation engine that understands the extension = processes it=20 and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in = part) on=20 the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not = understand the=20 extension accepts the certificate (unless factors other than this = extension=20 cause it to be rejected).<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 face=3DArial size=3D2>Some extensions can be marked critical or = non-critical. In=20 these cases a validation engine that understands the extension = processes it=20 and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in = part) on=20 the content of the extension, regardless of the criticality flag. A = validation=20 engine that does not understand the extension accepts the certificate = if the=20 extension is marked non-critical (unless factors other than this = extension=20 cause it to be rejected) and rejects the certificate if the extension = is=20 marked critical.</FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><FONT=20 face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT></SPAN> </P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>While I = suppose it could be=20 argued that "understands" is not much better than "recognizes", I = think the=20 final paragraph is clearer about what a validation engine is required = to do.=20 </FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial=20 size=3D2></FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN> </P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I think that = when we changed=20 all this text the last time, there were some voices that opposed = eliminating=20 "recognizes" from the text because that is the only term that was = used in the=20 3rd edition. Perhaps there is no longer support for that position. = Note that=20 these changes were a result of defect report 244 against the 3rd = edition text=20 (resolution published in TC 2 for 3rd edition and integrated into 4th = edition=20 text).</FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial=20 size=3D2>Sharon</FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT face=3DArial=20 size=3D2></FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN> </P> <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN = lang=3DEN-GB><o:p><SPAN=20 class=3D072031012-11072003><FONT=20 size=3D2></FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN> </P></SPAN></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr style=3D"MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> <DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT = face=3DTahoma=20 size=3D2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> Hoyt L. = Kesterson II=20 [mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net]<BR><B>Sent:</B> Thursday, July = 10, 2003=20 8:47 PM<BR><B>To:</B> ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: What = is mean=20 by recognizing critical extensions ?<BR><BR></FONT></DIV> <DIV>valid point. i don't see much value to considering = "recognizes" as=20 meaning i've heard about the extension but have no ability to = process it.=20 this possibly should be addressed in two places</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV> 1) ietf agreed terminology for stating the capabilities = of an=20 implementation</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV> 2) a clean-up of both ietf and iso/itu standard = terminology.=20 somewhere i had some additional text that i considered that stated = that the=20 implementation processed the extension according to the rules = specified in=20 the standard (old osi conformance lingo)</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV> hoyt</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite">Hoyt,<BR><BR>I think the = "dispute" is over=20 the term "recognizes". Hypothetically, an implementation = may not=20 have the code to "process" a given extension, but might claim to = have the=20 code to "recognize" the extension (and thereby hope to satisfy = some=20 extended compliance criteria, if erroneously).<BR><BR>If one = defines=20 "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to fully process", the = dispute=20 disappears. But then, the conjunction "recognizes AND is = able to=20 process" (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and plausibly=20 misleading.<BR><BR>Cheers! ____tony____<BR><BR><BR>At 02:59 = PM=20 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote:<BR> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite">I believe that this=20 sentence<BR><BR><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" = size=3D+1> When a=20 certificate-using implementation<B> recognizes and is able to=20 process</B> an extension, then the certificate-using = implementation=20 shall process the extension regardless of the value of the = criticality=20 flag.</FONT><BR><BR>means that if an implementation has the = code to=20 process an extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the = code, then=20 it will not process an extension because it cannot process it. = if, in=20 that case, that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot = use the=20 certificate.<BR><BR>if anyone believe that the text says that = an=20 extension doesn't have to be processed even though there is an = ability=20 to process the extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical = means=20 that one can choose to process it or not, then i will recommend = additional text for the standard to further clarify the meaning = for i=20 can see no useful result from such potential=20 arbitrariness.<BR><BR> = hoyt<BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite">Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881=20 <azb@llnl.gov><BR>Information Operations and Assurance=20 Center<BR>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory<BR>Livermore, CA = 94551-9900</BLOCKQUOTE> <DIV><BR></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML> ------_=_NextPart_001_01C347BC.F44E1ED0-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BErlqt097487 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:53:47 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BErl0h097486 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:53:47 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mtiwmhc11.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc11.worldnet.att.net [204.127.131.115]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BErjqt097479 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:53:45 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from todd.glassey@worldnet.att.net) Received: from tsg1 (105.sanjose-08-09rs16rt.ca.dial-access.att.net[12.81.3.105]) by mtiwmhc11.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc11) with SMTP id <2003071114533811100qg9che>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 14:53:38 +0000 Message-ID: <01a501c347bc$2e057840$020aff0a@tsg1> From: "todd glassey" <todd.glassey@worldnet.att.net> To: "Hoyt L. Kesterson II" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184A2@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <5.0.0.25.2.20030710133209.045036d0@poptop.llnl.gov> <a05210608bb339010a1e7@[192.168.2.7]> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:53:17 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_01A2_01C34781.7D0356F0" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_01A2_01C34781.7D0356F0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?Hoyt, this is an = instance where the would MUST is appropriate because what you are = referring to is a the compliance model for use and nothing less.=20 On a tangent of this, one of the amazing things is that the technical = world seems to miss that most implementation's of this high-tech will be = SW in nature, and so they will require some form of internal auditing to = assure they are in compliance with the standards. In fact it probably = would be wise for the IETF to require some 'test component' = specification in the standards track to qualify a technology for release = as a standard and possibly publish these as a BCP recommendation for = validating the PKI environment.=20 Not that it, the IETF, should build the toolkit like what OpenGroup does = with their Unix qualification suite, but at least the top level of the = functional architecture... Hmmmm. This is also is probably germane to the x509 standards track too. T ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Hoyt L. Kesterson II=20 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org=20 Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 2:59 PM Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? I believe that this sentence When a certificate-using implementation recognizes and is able to = process an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall = process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. means that if an implementation has the code to process an extension, = it must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an = extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension = is flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate. if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't have to = be processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, = i.e. a belief that not being critical means that one can choose to = process it or not, then i will recommend additional text for the = standard to further clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result = from such potential arbitrariness. hoyt At 10:14 PM 7/9/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote: At 10:31 -0400 7/8/03, David A. Cooper wrote: as we were finishing up the 4th edition sharon boeyen reported to = our group that some implementors were using an interesting = interpretation of "recognizing an extension". apparently their = recognition essentially meant that they recognized the oid and = recognized that the extension was defined but did not process it, i.e = wrote no code to process the extension as defined in the standard. to = counter this specious argument we wrote some additional text for clause = 7 [snip] the 4th edition has this replacement paragraph (as well as = additional paragraphs) [snip] therein. When an implementation processing a certificate does not = recognize an extension, if the criticality flag is FALSE, it may ignore = that extension. If the criticality flag is TRUE, unrecognized extensions = shall cause the structure to be considered invalid, i.e. in a = certificate, an unrecognized critical extension would cause validation = of a signature using that certificate to fail. When a certificate-using = implementation recognizes and is able to process an extension, then the = certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless = of the value of the criticality flag. Note that any extension that is = flagged non-critical will cause inconsistent behaviour between = certificate-using systems that will process the extension and = certificate-using systems that do not recognize the extension and will = ignore it." note the penultimate sentence. Indeed. This clearly implies that non-critical extensions "may or = may not" be processed. Moreover, additional confusion is engendered by the phrase "recognizes and is able to process". Perhaps this is a redundant conjunction, but logically it implies = that "recognizes" and "is able to process" are distinct conditions = (else, why the conjunction?) Thus, for non-critical extensions, one has THREE cases: 1. Does not recognize (may or may not validate certificate, up to = implementation) 2. "Recognizes", but cannot process (same result as in 1.) 3. Recognizes and CAN process (MUST process to determine validity.) If the intent is to use the term "recognizes" to mean "can process", = then the condition "recognizes and can process" adds to the confusion. Cheers! ____tony____ Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> Information Operations and Assurance Center Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, CA 94551-9900 ------=_NextPart_000_01A2_01C34781.7D0356F0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions = ?</TITLE> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; = charset=3Diso-8859-1"> <STYLE type=3Dtext/css>BLOCKQUOTE { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } DL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } UL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } OL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } LI { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } </STYLE> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1170" name=3DGENERATOR></HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Hoyt, this is an instance where the = would MUST is=20 appropriate because what you are referring to is a the compliance model = for use=20 and nothing less. </FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>On a tangent of this, one of the = amazing things is=20 that the technical world seems to miss that most implementation's of = this=20 high-tech will be SW in nature, and so they will require some form of = internal=20 auditing to assure they are in compliance with the standards. In fact it = probably would be wise for the IETF to require some 'test component'=20 specification in the standards track to qualify a technology for release = as a=20 standard and possibly publish these as a BCP recommendation for = validating the=20 PKI environment. </FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Not that it, the IETF, should = build the=20 toolkit like what OpenGroup does with their Unix qualification suite, = but at=20 least the top level of the functional architecture...</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Hmmmm. This is also is probably germane = to the x509=20 standards track too.</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>T</FONT></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr=20 style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; = BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </DIV> <DIV=20 style=3D"BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: = black"><B>From:</B>=20 <A title=3Dhoytkesterson@earthlink.net=20 href=3D"mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net">Hoyt L. Kesterson II</A> = </DIV> <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A = title=3Dietf-pkix@imc.org=20 href=3D"mailto:ietf-pkix@imc.org">ietf-pkix@imc.org</A> </DIV> <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Thursday, July 10, 2003 = 2:59=20 PM</DIV> <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> Re: What is mean by = recognizing=20 critical extensions ?</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV>I believe that this sentence</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D+1> When a = certificate-using=20 implementation<B> recognizes and is able to process</B> an extension, = then the=20 certificate-using implementation shall process the extension = regardless of the=20 value of the criticality flag.</FONT></DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV>means that if an implementation has the code to process an = extension, it=20 must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an = extension=20 because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension is = flagged=20 critical, then it cannot use the certificate.</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV>if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't = have to be=20 processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, = i.e. a=20 belief that not being critical means that one can choose to process it = or not,=20 then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further = clarify the=20 meaning for i can see no useful result from such potential=20 arbitrariness.</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV> hoyt</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite">At 10:14 PM 7/9/2003 -0700, Hoyt = L.=20 Kesterson II wrote:<BR> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite">At 10:31 -0400 7/8/03, David A. = Cooper=20 wrote:<BR><BR>as we were finishing up the 4th edition sharon = boeyen=20 reported to our group that some implementors were using an = interesting=20 interpretation of "recognizing an extension". apparently their = recognition=20 essentially meant that they recognized the oid and recognized that = the=20 extension was defined but did not process it, i.e wrote no code to = process=20 the extension as defined in the standard. to counter this specious = argument we wrote some additional text for clause=20 7<BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite"><BR>[snip]<BR> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite">the 4th edition has this = replacement=20 paragraph (as well as additional = paragraphs)<BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite"><BR>[snip]<BR> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite"><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman"=20 size=3D+1>therein. When an implementation processing a certificate = does not=20 recognize an extension, if the criticality flag is</FONT><FONT = face=3DArial=20 size=3D+1><B> FALSE</B></FONT><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" = size=3D+1>, it may=20 ignore that extension. If the criticality flag is</FONT><FONT = face=3DArial=20 size=3D+1><B> TRUE</B></FONT><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" = size=3D+1>,=20 unrecognized extensions shall cause the structure to be considered = invalid, i.e. in a certificate, an unrecognized critical extension = would=20 cause validation of a signature using that certificate to fail. = When a=20 certificate-using implementation<B> recognizes and is able to = process</B>=20 an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall = process the=20 extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. Note = that any=20 extension that is flagged non-critical will cause inconsistent = behaviour=20 between certificate-using systems that will process the extension = and=20 certificate-using systems that do not recognize the extension and = will=20 ignore it.</FONT>"<BR><BR>note the penultimate=20 sentence.<BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE cite=3D"" type=3D"cite">Indeed. This clearly implies = that=20 non-critical extensions "may or may not" be = processed.<BR><BR>Moreover,=20 additional confusion is engendered by the = phrase<BR><BR> =20 "recognizes and is able to process".<BR><BR>Perhaps this is a = redundant=20 conjunction, but logically it implies that "recognizes" and "is able = to=20 process" are distinct conditions (else, why the = conjunction?)<BR><BR>Thus,=20 for non-critical extensions, one has THREE cases:<BR><BR>1. = Does not=20 recognize (may or may not validate certificate, up to=20 implementation)<BR><BR>2. "Recognizes", but cannot process = (same=20 result as in 1.)<BR><BR>3. Recognizes and CAN process (MUST = process to=20 determine validity.)<BR><BR>If the intent is to use the term = "recognizes" to=20 mean "can process", then the condition "recognizes and can process" = adds to=20 the confusion.<BR><BR>Cheers! ____tony____<BR><BR>Tony = Bartoletti=20 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov><BR>Information Operations and = Assurance=20 Center<BR>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory<BR>Livermore, CA=20 94551-9900</BLOCKQUOTE> <DIV><BR></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_000_01A2_01C34781.7D0356F0-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BEXBqt096890 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:33:11 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BEXBeP096889 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:33:11 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from nic.lp.se (nic.lp.se [213.212.3.208]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BEX9qt096883 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:33:09 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from levitte@lp.se) Received: from localhost (127.0.0.1) by nic.lp.se (MX V5.3 VnHj) with ESMTP; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 16:31:26 +0200 Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 16:31:23 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <20030711.163123.28784997.levitte@lp.se> To: sharon.boeyen@entrust.com CC: hoytkesterson@earthlink.net, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? From: Richard Levitte - VMS Whacker <levitte@lp.se> In-Reply-To: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC34C@sottmxs04.entrust.com> References: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC34C@sottmxs04.entrust.com> X-URL: http://www.lp.se/ X-Waved: dead chicken, GNU emacs 21.2.1, Mew version 3.2 X-Mew: See http://www.mew.org/ X-Mailer: Mew version 3.2 on Emacs 21.2 / Mule 5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Contrary to others, I don't believe the problem lies in the word "recognises" itself. It's more the whole sentence that seems to be confusing (and I agree with those who think so). To me, the quoted language from X.509 certainly seems to say "if you recognise this extension, you must process it or invalidate the path, period", while the quote text from the other document seems to say "if you recognise this extension and can process it, you must process it". In pseudo-C terms, I get it like this: X.509: if (recognise(extension)) { if (can_process(extension)) process(extension); else invalidate(path); } else if (critical(extension)) { invalidate(path); } other: if (recognise(extension) && can_process(extension)) { process(extension); } else if (critical(extension)) { invalidate(path); } Makes sense? -- Richard Levitte | http://richard.levitte.org/ | Tunnlandsv. 3 Levitte Programming | http://www.lp.se/ | S-168 36 Bromma T: +46-708-26 53 44 | | SWEDEN "Price, performance, quality... choose the two you like" In message <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC34C@sottmxs04.entrust.com> on Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:43:16 -0400, Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com> said: sharon.boeyen> I have no objection to eliminating "recognizes" from the text if it is felt sharon.boeyen> necessary, but I also want to point out the text that is only a little bit sharon.boeyen> further down in clause 8 sharon.boeyen> of X.509: sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> A validation engine has two possible actions to take with respect to an sharon.boeyen> extension:<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = sharon.boeyen> "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> i) it can ignore the extension and accept the certificate (all other sharon.boeyen> things being equal); sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> ii) it can process the extension and accept or reject the certificate sharon.boeyen> depending on the content of the extension and the conditions under which sharon.boeyen> processing is occuring (e.g. the current values of the path processing sharon.boeyen> variables). sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> Some extensions can only be marked critical. In these cases a validation sharon.boeyen> engine that understands the extension, processes it and acceptance/rejection sharon.boeyen> of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the sharon.boeyen> extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension sharon.boeyen> rejects the certificate. sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> Some extensions can only be marked non-critical. In these cases a validation sharon.boeyen> engine that understands the extension processes it and acceptance/rejection sharon.boeyen> of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the sharon.boeyen> extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension sharon.boeyen> accepts the certificate (unless factors other than this extension cause it sharon.boeyen> to be rejected). sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> Some extensions can be marked critical or non-critical. In these cases a sharon.boeyen> validation engine that understands the extension processes it and sharon.boeyen> acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on sharon.boeyen> the content of the extension, regardless of the criticality flag. A sharon.boeyen> validation engine that does not understand the extension accepts the sharon.boeyen> certificate if the extension is marked non-critical (unless factors other sharon.boeyen> than this extension cause it to be rejected) and rejects the certificate if sharon.boeyen> the extension is marked critical. sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> While I suppose it could be argued that "understands" is not much better sharon.boeyen> than "recognizes", I think the final paragraph is clearer about what a sharon.boeyen> validation engine is required to do. sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> I think that when we changed all this text the last time, there were some sharon.boeyen> voices that opposed eliminating "recognizes" from the text because that is sharon.boeyen> the only term that was used in the 3rd edition. Perhaps there is no longer sharon.boeyen> support for that position. Note that these changes were a result of defect sharon.boeyen> report 244 against the 3rd edition text (resolution published in TC 2 for sharon.boeyen> 3rd edition and integrated into 4th edition text). sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> Sharon sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> -----Original Message----- sharon.boeyen> From: Hoyt L. Kesterson II [mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net] sharon.boeyen> Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 8:47 PM sharon.boeyen> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org sharon.boeyen> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> valid point. i don't see much value to considering "recognizes" as meaning sharon.boeyen> i've heard about the extension but have no ability to process it. this sharon.boeyen> possibly should be addressed in two places sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> 1) ietf agreed terminology for stating the capabilities of an sharon.boeyen> implementation sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> 2) a clean-up of both ietf and iso/itu standard terminology. somewhere i sharon.boeyen> had some additional text that i considered that stated that the sharon.boeyen> implementation processed the extension according to the rules specified in sharon.boeyen> the standard (old osi conformance lingo) sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> hoyt sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> Hoyt, sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> I think the "dispute" is over the term "recognizes". Hypothetically, an sharon.boeyen> implementation may not have the code to "process" a given extension, but sharon.boeyen> might claim to have the code to "recognize" the extension (and thereby hope sharon.boeyen> to satisfy some extended compliance criteria, if erroneously). sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> If one defines "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to fully process", the sharon.boeyen> dispute disappears. But then, the conjunction "recognizes AND is able to sharon.boeyen> process" (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and plausibly misleading. sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> Cheers! ____tony____ sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> At 02:59 PM 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote: sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> I believe that this sentence sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> When a certificate-using implementation recognizes and is able to process sharon.boeyen> an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the sharon.boeyen> extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> means that if an implementation has the code to process an extension, it sharon.boeyen> must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an sharon.boeyen> extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension is sharon.boeyen> flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate. sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't have to be sharon.boeyen> processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, i.e. a sharon.boeyen> belief that not being critical means that one can choose to process it or sharon.boeyen> not, then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further sharon.boeyen> clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result from such potential sharon.boeyen> arbitrariness. sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> hoyt sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> sharon.boeyen> Information Operations and Assurance Center sharon.boeyen> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory sharon.boeyen> Livermore, CA 94551-9900 sharon.boeyen> sharon.boeyen> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BENeqt096403 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:23:40 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BENekw096402 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:23:40 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from nwkea-mail-1.sun.com (nwkea-mail-1.sun.com [192.18.42.13]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BENcqt096392 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:23:38 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from steve.hanna@sun.com) Received: from sydney.East.Sun.COM ([129.148.9.16]) by nwkea-mail-1.sun.com (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6BENYpi004115 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:23:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sun.com (dhcp-ubur02-75-161 [129.148.75.161]) by sydney.East.Sun.COM (8.11.7+Sun/8.11.7/ENSMAIL,v2.2) with ESMTP id h6BENXs08975; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 10:23:33 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <3F0EC7A8.BDF1D6CA@sun.com> Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 10:20:24 -0400 From: Steve Hanna <steve.hanna@sun.com> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.79 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: PKIX List <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Question about Certificate Issuer CRL Entry Extension Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="------------msD3C01BF60385FA55104EDA8B" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------msD3C01BF60385FA55104EDA8B Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit The Certificate Issuer CRL entry extension (described in section 5.3.4 of RFC 3280) is a GeneralNames structure that identifies the certificate issuer for the CRL entry to which it is attached (and also to all subsequent entries in that CRL until another Certificate Issuer CRL entry extension is encountered. RFC 3280 doesn't say so, but I believe that within a PKIX (Internet) environment (where each certificate must have a non-empty X.500 issuer name and issuer alternative names are generally ignored) this extension MUST always contain at least one X.500 name so that the relying party can match this name against the issuer name in the certificate, as described in section 6.3.3 item (j) of RFC 3280. And I think that text describing this requirement should be added to the successor to RFC 3280. Does everyone agree with this? I also wonder whether anyone can think of a reason why this CRL entry extension should ever contain anything other than a single X.500 name in a PKIX (Internet) environment. If not, then the requirement can (and should) be made even more strict, specifying that this extension MUST contain only a single X.500 name. Please let me know if you have a reason why this would not be a good idea. Thanks, Steve --------------msD3C01BF60385FA55104EDA8B Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature MIIIEAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIIATCCB/0CAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCC BeMwggKjMIICDKADAgECAgMKVAgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgZIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUw EwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNhcGUgVG93bjEPMA0GA1UEChMGVGhh d3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEoMCYGA1UEAxMfUGVyc29uYWwg RnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDIwMDAuOC4zMDAeFw0wMzA3MTExMTAxNTFaFw0wNDA3MTAxMTAxNTFa MGgxDjAMBgNVBAQTBUhhbm5hMRUwEwYDVQQqEwxTdGVwaGVuIFJvc3MxGzAZBgNVBAMTElN0 ZXBoZW4gUm9zcyBIYW5uYTEiMCAGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYTc3RldmUuaGFubmFAc3VuLmNvbTCB nzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAoxRk/abMPe7Km2EqpD2FZXzjiBGUHhIdNlIO 9W6mdCQro1xMc+sv+93UuVnIzse+XA67Tqx4g5FdoQ+PI8TQYemYSkTD9GitgU563ypu03UV 86zTJA7u9zVkNv/qL2LRKZ9BXy2Smtet+PUh3nYjMh/ZY7LQxQzmdu1Zunue+yECAwEAAaMw MC4wHgYDVR0RBBcwFYETc3RldmUuaGFubmFAc3VuLmNvbTAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMA0GCSqG SIb3DQEBBAUAA4GBAHbpX0TKiOFu1vxKc3nAOcUHwoci5kinboYrnjWcl37mMXXbBFntaYRM 9LxpGtHdPm7F4pAviKp8bnFzTU46OyUw3kNUAVGDeWYVQC76f0dDZdA313Tn88UZYa+N6O8W bO8wjKA2vg+yx79WXJCFDu+TpsG/28NKPdH42w8LEOVHMIIDODCCAqGgAwIBAgIQZkVyt8x0 9c9jdkWE0C6RATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADCB0TELMAkGA1UEBhMCWkExFTATBgNVBAgTDFdl c3Rlcm4gQ2FwZTESMBAGA1UEBxMJQ2FwZSBUb3duMRowGAYDVQQKExFUaGF3dGUgQ29uc3Vs dGluZzEoMCYGA1UECxMfQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBTZXJ2aWNlcyBEaXZpc2lvbjEkMCIGA1UE AxMbVGhhd3RlIFBlcnNvbmFsIEZyZWVtYWlsIENBMSswKQYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhxwZXJzb25h bC1mcmVlbWFpbEB0aGF3dGUuY29tMB4XDTAwMDgzMDAwMDAwMFoXDTA0MDgyNzIzNTk1OVow gZIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUwEwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNhcGUg VG93bjEPMA0GA1UEChMGVGhhd3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEo MCYGA1UEAxMfUGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDIwMDAuOC4zMDCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEA3jMypmPHCSVFPtJueCdngcXaiBmClw7jRCmKYzUqbXA8+tyu9+50 bzC8M5B/+TRxoKNtmPHDT6Jl2w36S/HW3WGl+YXNVZo1Gp2Sdagnrthy+boC9tewkd4c6avg GAOofENCUFGHgzzwObSbVIoTh/+zm51JZgAtCYnslGvpoWkCAwEAAaNOMEwwKQYDVR0RBCIw IKQeMBwxGjAYBgNVBAMTEVByaXZhdGVMYWJlbDEtMjk3MBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAw CwYDVR0PBAQDAgEGMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAA4GBADGxS0dd+QFx5fVTbF151j2YwCYTYoEi pxL4IpXoG0m3J3sEObr85vIk65H6vewNKjj3UFWobPcNrUwbvAP0teuiR59sogxYjTFCCRFs sBpp0SsSskBdavl50OouJd2K5PzbDR+dAvNa28o89kTqJmmHf0iezqWf54TYyWJirQXGMYIB 9TCCAfECAQEwgZowgZIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUwEwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQ BgNVBAcTCUNhcGUgVG93bjEPMA0GA1UEChMGVGhhd3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0 ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEoMCYGA1UEAxMfUGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDIwMDAuOC4zMAID ClQIMAkGBSsOAwIaBQCggbEwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0B CQUxDxcNMDMwNzExMTQyMDI0WjAjBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxFgQUThor5nQvEbMKYdaQ05zFZt5Q iZQwUgYJKoZIhvcNAQkPMUUwQzAKBggqhkiG9w0DBzAOBggqhkiG9w0DAgICAIAwBwYFKw4D AgcwDQYIKoZIhvcNAwICAUAwDQYIKoZIhvcNAwICASgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEgYAmiwkH 8DngxosvLqxW2NAeNn83ENeV9y7uo29ZwAKVHgtZynt1+lMBsKmUm/YJ6I8oOPu+/qtqZiIJ 3oFaVBY27rh2isiJXyVZpYeelmn/7X27YZ+Id3VyGG+98gouqAqOw/zJMHA42elpgtdR3QXn AXxJvkpcM6rJBSgnehJCcQ== --------------msD3C01BF60385FA55104EDA8B-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BChPqt092490 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 05:43:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BChPJb092489 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 05:43:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from sottmxssm.entrust.com (sottmxssm.entrust.com [216.191.252.10]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BChNqt092484 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 05:43:23 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com) Received: from sottguard01.entrust.com (sottguard01.entrust.com [10.4.61.249]) by sottmxssm.entrust.com (Switch-2.2.6/Switch-2.2.4) with SMTP id V6BC33AW00120 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:39:46 -0400 Received: (qmail 13043 invoked by uid 64014); 11 Jul 2003 12:37:47 -0000 Received: from sharon.boeyen@entrust.com by sottguard01.entrust.com with AmikaGuardian-Server-1.1.2 (Processed in 0.429505 secs); 11 Jul 2003 12:37:47 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO SOTTMXS01.entrust.com) (10.4.61.7) by sottguard01.entrust.com with SMTP; 11 Jul 2003 12:37:46 -0000 Received: by sottmxs01.entrust.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) id <3S6ZLWQB>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:43:17 -0400 Message-ID: <9A4F653B0A375841AC75A8D17712B9C9061AC34C@sottmxs04.entrust.com> From: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com> To: "'Hoyt L. Kesterson II'" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:43:16 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2656.59) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C347A9.FFC39A00" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand this format, some or all of this message may not be legible. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C347A9.FFC39A00 Content-Type: text/plain I have no objection to eliminating "recognizes" from the text if it is felt necessary, but I also want to point out the text that is only a little bit further down in clause 8 of X.509: A validation engine has two possible actions to take with respect to an extension:<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /> i) it can ignore the extension and accept the certificate (all other things being equal); ii) it can process the extension and accept or reject the certificate depending on the content of the extension and the conditions under which processing is occuring (e.g. the current values of the path processing variables). Some extensions can only be marked critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension, processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension rejects the certificate. Some extensions can only be marked non-critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension accepts the certificate (unless factors other than this extension cause it to be rejected). Some extensions can be marked critical or non-critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension, regardless of the criticality flag. A validation engine that does not understand the extension accepts the certificate if the extension is marked non-critical (unless factors other than this extension cause it to be rejected) and rejects the certificate if the extension is marked critical. While I suppose it could be argued that "understands" is not much better than "recognizes", I think the final paragraph is clearer about what a validation engine is required to do. I think that when we changed all this text the last time, there were some voices that opposed eliminating "recognizes" from the text because that is the only term that was used in the 3rd edition. Perhaps there is no longer support for that position. Note that these changes were a result of defect report 244 against the 3rd edition text (resolution published in TC 2 for 3rd edition and integrated into 4th edition text). Sharon -----Original Message----- From: Hoyt L. Kesterson II [mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net] Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 8:47 PM To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? valid point. i don't see much value to considering "recognizes" as meaning i've heard about the extension but have no ability to process it. this possibly should be addressed in two places 1) ietf agreed terminology for stating the capabilities of an implementation 2) a clean-up of both ietf and iso/itu standard terminology. somewhere i had some additional text that i considered that stated that the implementation processed the extension according to the rules specified in the standard (old osi conformance lingo) hoyt Hoyt, I think the "dispute" is over the term "recognizes". Hypothetically, an implementation may not have the code to "process" a given extension, but might claim to have the code to "recognize" the extension (and thereby hope to satisfy some extended compliance criteria, if erroneously). If one defines "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to fully process", the dispute disappears. But then, the conjunction "recognizes AND is able to process" (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and plausibly misleading. Cheers! ____tony____ At 02:59 PM 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote: I believe that this sentence When a certificate-using implementation recognizes and is able to process an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. means that if an implementation has the code to process an extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate. if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't have to be processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical means that one can choose to process it or not, then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result from such potential arbitrariness. hoyt Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> Information Operations and Assurance Center Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, CA 94551-9900 ------_=_NextPart_001_01C347A9.FFC39A00 Content-Type: text/html <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=US-ASCII"> <TITLE>Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?</TITLE> <STYLE type=text/css>BLOCKQUOTE { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } DL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } UL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } OL { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } LI { PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px } </STYLE> <META content="MSHTML 6.00.2800.1170" name=GENERATOR></HEAD> <BODY> <DIV><SPAN class=072031012-11072003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>I have no objection to eliminating "recognizes" from the text if it is felt necessary, but I also want to point out the text that is only a little bit further down in clause 8</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=072031012-11072003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>of X.509:</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=072031012-11072003><FONT color=#0000ff size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=072031012-11072003><SPAN lang=EN-GB><FONT size=2> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><FONT face=Arial>A validation engine has two possible actions to take with respect to an extension:<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=enumlev1 style="MARGIN: 4.3pt 0in 0pt 59.55pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><FONT face=Arial>i)<SPAN style="mso-tab-count: 1"> </SPAN>it can ignore the extension and accept the certificate (all other things being equal);<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=enumlev1 style="MARGIN: 4.3pt 0in 0pt 59.55pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><FONT face=Arial>ii)<SPAN style="mso-tab-count: 1"> </SPAN>it can process the extension and accept or reject the certificate depending on the content of the extension and the conditions under which processing is occuring (e.g. the current values of the path processing variables).<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><FONT face=Arial>Some extensions can only be marked critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension, processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension rejects the certificate.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><FONT size=2><FONT face=Arial>Some extensions can only be marked non-critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension. A validation engine that does not understand the extension accepts the certificate (unless factors other than this extension cause it to be rejected).<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><FONT face=Arial size=2>Some extensions can be marked critical or non-critical. In these cases a validation engine that understands the extension processes it and acceptance/rejection of the certificate is dependent (at least in part) on the content of the extension, regardless of the criticality flag. A validation engine that does not understand the extension accepts the certificate if the extension is marked non-critical (unless factors other than this extension cause it to be rejected) and rejects the certificate if the extension is marked critical.</FONT></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT></SPAN> </P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><o:p><SPAN class=072031012-11072003><FONT face=Arial size=2>While I suppose it could be argued that "understands" is not much better than "recognizes", I think the final paragraph is clearer about what a validation engine is required to do. </FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><o:p><SPAN class=072031012-11072003><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN> </P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><o:p><SPAN class=072031012-11072003><FONT face=Arial size=2>I think that when we changed all this text the last time, there were some voices that opposed eliminating "recognizes" from the text because that is the only term that was used in the 3rd edition. Perhaps there is no longer support for that position. Note that these changes were a result of defect report 244 against the 3rd edition text (resolution published in TC 2 for 3rd edition and integrated into 4th edition text).</FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><o:p><SPAN class=072031012-11072003><FONT face=Arial size=2>Sharon</FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><o:p><SPAN class=072031012-11072003><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN> </P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 6.8pt 0in 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-GB><o:p><SPAN class=072031012-11072003><FONT size=2></FONT></SPAN></o:p></SPAN> </P></SPAN></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> <DIV class=OutlookMessageHeader dir=ltr align=left><FONT face=Tahoma size=2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> Hoyt L. Kesterson II [mailto:hoytkesterson@earthlink.net]<BR><B>Sent:</B> Thursday, July 10, 2003 8:47 PM<BR><B>To:</B> ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?<BR><BR></FONT></DIV> <DIV>valid point. i don't see much value to considering "recognizes" as meaning i've heard about the extension but have no ability to process it. this possibly should be addressed in two places</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV> 1) ietf agreed terminology for stating the capabilities of an implementation</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV> 2) a clean-up of both ietf and iso/itu standard terminology. somewhere i had some additional text that i considered that stated that the implementation processed the extension according to the rules specified in the standard (old osi conformance lingo)</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV> hoyt</DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE cite="" type="cite">Hoyt,<BR><BR>I think the "dispute" is over the term "recognizes". Hypothetically, an implementation may not have the code to "process" a given extension, but might claim to have the code to "recognize" the extension (and thereby hope to satisfy some extended compliance criteria, if erroneously).<BR><BR>If one defines "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to fully process", the dispute disappears. But then, the conjunction "recognizes AND is able to process" (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and plausibly misleading.<BR><BR>Cheers! ____tony____<BR><BR><BR>At 02:59 PM 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote:<BR> <BLOCKQUOTE cite="" type="cite">I believe that this sentence<BR><BR><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=+1> When a certificate-using implementation<B> recognizes and is able to process</B> an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag.</FONT><BR><BR>means that if an implementation has the code to process an extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate.<BR><BR>if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't have to be processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical means that one can choose to process it or not, then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result from such potential arbitrariness.<BR><BR> hoyt<BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE cite="" type="cite">Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov><BR>Information Operations and Assurance Center<BR>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory<BR>Livermore, CA 94551-9900</BLOCKQUOTE> <DIV><BR></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML> ------_=_NextPart_001_01C347A9.FFC39A00-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BC39qt089160 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 05:03:09 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6BC39Ft089159 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 05:03:09 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from brmea-mail-3.sun.com (brmea-mail-3.Sun.COM [192.18.98.34]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6BC38qt089151 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 05:03:08 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from steve.hanna@sun.com) Received: from sydney.East.Sun.COM ([129.148.9.16]) by brmea-mail-3.sun.com (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6BC380C029686; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 06:03:08 -0600 (MDT) Received: from sun.com (dhcp-ubur02-75-161 [129.148.75.161]) by sydney.East.Sun.COM (8.11.7+Sun/8.11.7/ENSMAIL,v2.2) with ESMTP id h6BC37s13061; Fri, 11 Jul 2003 08:03:07 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <3F0EA6BD.521F0DEF@sun.com> Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 07:59:57 -0400 From: Steve Hanna <steve.hanna@sun.com> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.79 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Santosh Chokhani <chokhani@orionsec.com> CC: "'PKIX List'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt References: <006d01c34740$17fde4a0$9900a8c0@hq.orionsec.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="------------ms036ECB52D38380147F10C852" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------ms036ECB52D38380147F10C852 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Santosh Chokhani wrote: > Would some empirical statistics of real-world cross certified > PKI against what the RFC says and what other ways Steve has > in mind help? Yes, real-world statistics will definitely be useful. They will help us determine which path building techniques are most effective. We should also test path builders against real-world PKIs (cross-certified and not). However, I suspect that cross-certified PKIs are still in their infancy. We may need to test against some hypothetical PKIs that represent what future PKIs may look like. I'll note also that while I agree that real-world testing and statistics are essential, I don't think they will result in an instantaneous maturation of our understanding of path building. That will take time and experience. 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(130.13.127.251) by mpls-pop-01.inet.qwest.net with SMTP; 11 Jul 2003 01:00:48 -0000 Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 17:46:38 -0700 Message-Id: <a0521060bbb33b6e4bba1@[192.168.2.7]> From: "Hoyt L. Kesterson II" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: hoytkesterson@earthlink.net@mail.earthlink.net In-Reply-To: <5.0.0.25.2.20030710171006.04538df0@poptop.llnl.gov> References: <5.0.0.25.2.20030710133209.045036d0@poptop.llnl.gov> <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184A2@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <5.0.0.25.2.20030710133209.045036d0@poptop.llnl.gov> <5.0.0.25.2.20030710171006.04538df0@poptop.llnl.gov> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> <!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN"> <html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 } --></style><title>Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?</title></head><body> <div>valid point. i don't see much value to considering "recognizes" as meaning i've heard about the extension but have no ability to process it. this possibly should be addressed in two places</div> <div><br></div> <div> 1) ietf agreed terminology for stating the capabilities of an implementation</div> <div><br></div> <div> 2) a clean-up of both ietf and iso/itu standard terminology. somewhere i had some additional text that i considered that stated that the implementation processed the extension according to the rules specified in the standard (old osi conformance lingo)</div> <div><br></div> <div> hoyt</div> <div><br></div> <div><br></div> <blockquote type="cite" cite>Hoyt,<br> <br> I think the "dispute" is over the term "recognizes". Hypothetically, an implementation may not have the code to "process" a given extension, but might claim to have the code to "recognize" the extension (and thereby hope to satisfy some extended compliance criteria, if erroneously).<br> <br> If one defines "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to fully process", the dispute disappears. But then, the conjunction "recognizes AND is able to process" (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and plausibly misleading.<br> <br> Cheers! ____tony____<br> <br> <br> At 02:59 PM 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote:<br> <blockquote type="cite" cite>I believe that this sentence<br> <br> <font face="Times New Roman" size="+1"> When a certificate-using implementation<b> recognizes and is able to process</b> an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag.</font><br> <br> means that if an implementation has the code to process an extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate.<br> <br> if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't have to be processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical means that one can choose to process it or not, then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result from such potential arbitrariness.<br> <br> hoyt<br> </blockquote> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite>Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov><br> Information Operations and Assurance Center<br> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory<br> Livermore, CA 94551-9900</blockquote> <div><br></div> </body> </html> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6B0IJqt025515 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 17:18:19 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6B0IJDq025514 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 17:18:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-2.llnl.gov (smtp-2.llnl.gov [128.115.250.82]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6B0IIqt025508 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 17:18:18 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from azb@llnl.gov) Received: from catalyst2b.llnl.gov (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp-2.llnl.gov (8.12.3/8.12.3/LLNL evision: 1.3 $) with ESMTP id h6B0IBl3013183; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 17:18:12 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <5.0.0.25.2.20030710171006.04538df0@poptop.llnl.gov> X-Sender: e048786@poptop.llnl.gov X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.0 Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 17:18:33 -0700 To: "Hoyt L. Kesterson II" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net>, ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? In-Reply-To: <a05210608bb339010a1e7@[192.168.2.7]> References: <5.0.0.25.2.20030710133209.045036d0@poptop.llnl.gov> <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184A2@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <5.0.0.25.2.20030710133209.045036d0@poptop.llnl.gov> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> <html> Hoyt,<br> <br> I think the "dispute" is over the term "recognizes". Hypothetically, an implementation may not have the code to "process" a given extension, but might claim to have the code to "recognize" the extension (and thereby hope to satisfy some extended compliance criteria, if erroneously).<br> <br> If one defines "recognizes" IFF "possesses the code to fully process", the dispute disappears. But then, the conjunction "recognizes AND is able to process" (highlighted below) is indeed redundant, and plausibly misleading.<br> <br> Cheers! ____tony____<br> <br> <br> At 02:59 PM 7/10/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote:<br> <blockquote type=cite class=cite cite>I believe that this sentence<br> <br> <font face="Times New Roman, Times" size=4> When a certificate-using implementation<b> recognizes and is able to process</b> an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag.</font><br> <br> means that if an implementation has the code to process an extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate.<br> <br> if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't have to be processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical means that one can choose to process it or not, then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result from such potential arbitrariness.<br> <br> hoyt</blockquote> <x-sigsep><p></x-sigsep> Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> <br> Information Operations and Assurance Center <br> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory <br> Livermore, CA 94551-9900<br> </html> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6B059qt025109 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 17:05:09 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6B059Ac025108 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 17:05:09 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from host13.websitesource.com (host13.websitesource.com [209.239.35.152]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6B058qt025103 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 17:05:08 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from chokhani@orionsec.com) Received: from wchokhani (dpvc-138-88-161-20.res.east.verizon.net [138.88.161.20]) by host13.websitesource.com (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6B059J6028771; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 20:05:09 -0400 From: "Santosh Chokhani" <chokhani@orionsec.com> To: "'Steve Hanna'" <steve.hanna@sun.com>, "'PKIX List'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 20:05:04 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <006d01c34740$17fde4a0$9900a8c0@hq.orionsec.com> X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.4510 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA1; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0069_01C3471E.8D1D3B40" Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <3F0DBEB6.353EA5FA@sun.com> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0069_01C3471E.8D1D3B40 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Steve and Matt: Would some empirical statistics of real-world cross certified PKI against what the RFC says and what other ways Steve has in mind help? -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Steve Hanna Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 3:30 PM To: PKIX List Subject: Re: draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt I'm glad to see more discussions of certificate path building. In a non-hierarchical PKI where relying parties have different trust anchors, path building is essential. And it's not easy! However, I don't think that we're ready to have an official 'best practices' document on path building yet. Very few people have implemented PKIX-compliant path building (only Sun and Cygnacom/DigitalNet, I think) and there are many areas that are still unclear. For instance, is it better to do a Depth First Search with ranking or to rank all candidate certificates? Which ranking heuristics work best in which environments? Is it possible for software to dynamically adapt to the PKI topology without requiring configuration? And what are the performance bottlenecks and best workarounds in real-world deployments? The I-D just published presents one early perspective on these questions, not a consensus. For now, I suggest that people who have implemented path building publish their insights, results, and ideas either as individual I-Ds without the intent to become an RFC or as research papers. Then we can discuss these results and ideas, test them in real-world scenarios, and arrive at a consensus on what Best Current Practices should be included in a BCP document on this topic. We might even want to start an IRTF research group or an informal discussion group to coordinate this research, sift through the results, and arrive at a solid and well-supported consensus. This effort will take some time, but I expect it will produce much better results. If it's felt that we really need a BCP on this topic in short order, then I think it should be restricted to things that we are fairly sure are good practices (like advising CAs to include name constraints and AIA in certificates to help path building and advising path builders to ensure that they handle simple hierarchical PKIs quickly but still handle complex PKIs properly). Thanks, Steve -------- Original Message -------- Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2003 11:32:03 -0400 From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org To: IETF-Announce:; CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certification Path Building Author(s) : M. Cooper, Y. Dzambasow Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Pages : 59 Date : 2003-7-3 This document was written to provide 'best practice' guidance and recommendations to developers building X.509 public-key certification paths within their applications. By following the guidance and recommendations defined in this document, an application developer is more likely to develop a robust X.509 certificate enabled application that can build valid certification paths across a wide range of PKI environments. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. 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wXcjCxbdMbBWVYVZlvZAW7nR4MRGvK9xbgI5LaKYtufYojuFSWEmQO+1PVw1ox0m0bFwTizfsEO3 04Zc6d5V1c4OUlgEIDFvVz9TzVIRHEbClwEKzPpw2xZAVpRUACG1j4sMRhP7gMuuwS8jREeBz7KK OWVtLB2FS/oSOhEDHXzKigpT2+ym5qH7w6PAzL/tHM+dhSvTUcDnHKxeQ80fnBoADYESmekN+OOq YjNt7rGBY7h71niTdUH3/N/rzMCFCMyzkox73GjjLLZGU5NiLFLPC/tyvqIazXyoIM73W7LbrvL2 IRjGd+Z7EiEBpQGaqz9d8mUaNK7MWWX+xfKvAAAAAAAA ------=_NextPart_000_0069_01C3471E.8D1D3B40-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6AM0qqt019772 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 15:00:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6AM0qAe019771 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 15:00:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mpls-qmqp-02.inet.qwest.net (mpls-qmqp-02.inet.qwest.net [63.231.195.113]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6AM0oqt019763 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 15:00:51 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from hoytkesterson@earthlink.net) Received: (qmail 20929 invoked by uid 0); 10 Jul 2003 21:27:56 -0000 Received: from mpls-pop-10.inet.qwest.net (63.231.195.10) by mpls-qmqp-02.inet.qwest.net with QMQP; 10 Jul 2003 21:27:56 -0000 Received: from vdsl-130-13-127-251.phnx.uswest.net (HELO ?192.168.2.7?) (130.13.127.251) by mpls-pop-10.inet.qwest.net with SMTP; 10 Jul 2003 22:00:52 -0000 Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 14:59:26 -0700 Message-Id: <a05210608bb339010a1e7@[192.168.2.7]> From: "Hoyt L. Kesterson II" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: hoytkesterson@earthlink.net@mail.earthlink.net In-Reply-To: <5.0.0.25.2.20030710133209.045036d0@poptop.llnl.gov> References: <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184A2@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <5.0.0.25.2.20030710133209.045036d0@poptop.llnl.gov> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> <!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN"> <html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 } --></style><title>Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?</title></head><body> <div>I believe that this sentence</div> <div><br></div> <div><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1"> When a certificate-using implementation<b> recognizes and is able to process</b> an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag.</font></div> <div><br></div> <div>means that if an implementation has the code to process an extension, it must do so. if it doesn't have the code, then it will not process an extension because it cannot process it. if, in that case, that extension is flagged critical, then it cannot use the certificate.</div> <div><br></div> <div>if anyone believe that the text says that an extension doesn't have to be processed even though there is an ability to process the extension, i.e. a belief that not being critical means that one can choose to process it or not, then i will recommend additional text for the standard to further clarify the meaning for i can see no useful result from such potential arbitrariness.</div> <div><br></div> <div> hoyt</div> <div><br></div> <div><br></div> <blockquote type="cite" cite>At 10:14 PM 7/9/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote:<br> <blockquote type="cite" cite>At 10:31 -0400 7/8/03, David A. Cooper wrote:<br> <br> as we were finishing up the 4th edition sharon boeyen reported to our group that some implementors were using an interesting interpretation of "recognizing an extension". apparently their recognition essentially meant that they recognized the oid and recognized that the extension was defined but did not process it, i.e wrote no code to process the extension as defined in the standard. to counter this specious argument we wrote some additional text for clause 7<br> </blockquote> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><br> [snip]<br> <blockquote type="cite" cite>the 4th edition has this replacement paragraph (as well as additional paragraphs)<br> </blockquote> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><br> [snip]<br> <blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1">therein. When an implementation processing a certificate does not recognize an extension, if the criticality flag is</font><font face="Arial" size="+1"><b> FALSE</b></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1">, it may ignore that extension. If the criticality flag is</font><font face="Arial" size="+1"><b> TRUE</b></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1">, unrecognized extensions shall cause the structure to be considered invalid, i.e. in a certificate, an unrecognized critical extension would cause validation of a signature using that certificate to fail. When a certificate-using implementation<b> recognizes and is able to process</b> an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. Note that any extension that is flagged non-critical will cause inconsistent behaviour between certificate-using systems that will process the extension and certificate-using systems that do not recognize the extension and will ignore it.</font>"<br> <br> note the penultimate sentence.<br> </blockquote> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite>Indeed. This clearly implies that non-critical extensions "may or may not" be processed.<br> <br> Moreover, additional confusion is engendered by the phrase<br> <br> "recognizes and is able to process".<br> <br> Perhaps this is a redundant conjunction, but logically it implies that "recognizes" and "is able to process" are distinct conditions (else, why the conjunction?)<br> <br> Thus, for non-critical extensions, one has THREE cases:<br> <br> 1. Does not recognize (may or may not validate certificate, up to implementation)<br> <br> 2. "Recognizes", but cannot process (same result as in 1.)<br> <br> 3. Recognizes and CAN process (MUST process to determine validity.)<br> <br> If the intent is to use the term "recognizes" to mean "can process", then the condition "recognizes and can process" adds to the confusion.<br> <br> Cheers! ____tony____<br> <br> Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov><br> Information Operations and Assurance Center<br> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory<br> Livermore, CA 94551-9900</blockquote> <div><br></div> </body> </html> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6AKt6qt016305 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 13:55:06 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6AKt5OC016304 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 13:55:05 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-1.llnl.gov (smtp-1.llnl.gov [128.115.250.81]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6AKt5qt016292 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 13:55:05 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from azb@llnl.gov) Received: from catalyst2b.llnl.gov (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp-1.llnl.gov (8.12.3/8.12.3/LLNL evision: 1.6 $) with ESMTP id h6AKt0eQ001605 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 13:55:01 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <5.0.0.25.2.20030710133209.045036d0@poptop.llnl.gov> X-Sender: e048786@poptop.llnl.gov X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.0 Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 13:55:22 -0700 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? In-Reply-To: <a05210601bb329cb000b2@[192.168.2.7]> References: <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184A2@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> <html> At 10:14 PM 7/9/2003 -0700, Hoyt L. Kesterson II wrote:<br> <blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite>At 10:31 -0400 7/8/03, David A. Cooper wrote:<br> <br> as we were finishing up the 4th edition sharon boeyen reported to our group that some implementors were using an interesting interpretation of "recognizing an extension". apparently their recognition essentially meant that they recognized the oid and recognized that the extension was defined but did not process it, i.e wrote no code to process the extension as defined in the standard. to counter this specious argument we wrote some additional text for clause 7<br> </blockquote><br> [snip]<br> <br> <blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite>the 4th edition has this replacement paragraph (as well as additional paragraphs)</blockquote><br> [snip]<br> <br> <blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite><font face=3D"Times New Roman,= Times" size=3D4>therein. When an implementation processing a certificate does not recognize an extension, if the criticality flag is</font><font face=3D"Arial, Helvetica" size=3D4><b> FALSE</b></font><font face=3D"Times New Roman, Times" size=3D4>, it may ignore that extension. If the criticality flag is</font><font face=3D"Arial, Helvetica" size=3D4><b> TRUE</b></font><font face=3D"Times New Roman, Times" size=3D4>, unrecognized extensions shall cause the structure to be considered invalid, i.e. in a certificate, an unrecognized critical extension would cause validation of a signature using that certificate to fail. When a certificate-using implementation <b>recognizes and is able to process</b> an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. Note that any extension that is flagged non-critical will cause inconsistent behaviour between certificate-using systems that will process the extension and certificate-using systems that do not recognize the extension and will ignore it.</font>"<br> <br> note the penultimate sentence.</blockquote> <x-sigsep><p></x-sigsep> Indeed. This clearly implies that non-critical extensions "may or may not" be processed.<br> <br> Moreover, additional confusion is engendered by the phrase<br> <br> "recognizes and is able to process".<br> <br> Perhaps this is a redundant conjunction, but logically it implies that "recognizes" and "is able to process" are distinct conditions (else, why the conjunction?)<br> <br> Thus, for non-critical extensions, one has THREE cases:<br> <br> 1. Does not recognize (may or may not validate certificate, up to implementation)<br> <br> 2. "Recognizes", but cannot process (same result as in 1.)<br> <br> 3. Recognizes and CAN process (MUST process to determine validity.)<br> <br> If the intent is to use the term "recognizes" to mean "can process", then the condition "recognizes and can process" adds to the confusion.<br> <br> Cheers! ____tony____<br> <br> Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> <br> Information Operations and Assurance Center <br> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory <br> Livermore, CA 94551-9900<br> </html> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6AJX8qt013275 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 12:33:08 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6AJX8JH013274 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 12:33:08 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from brmea-mail-2.sun.com (brmea-mail-2.Sun.COM [192.18.98.43]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6AJX6qt013269 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 12:33:07 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from steve.hanna@sun.com) Received: from sydney.East.Sun.COM ([129.148.9.16]) by brmea-mail-2.sun.com (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h6AJX8c8029343 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 13:33:08 -0600 (MDT) Received: from sun.com (dhcp-ubur02-75-161 [129.148.75.161]) by sydney.East.Sun.COM (8.11.7+Sun/8.11.7/ENSMAIL,v2.2) with ESMTP id h6AJX7s00398; Thu, 10 Jul 2003 15:33:07 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <3F0DBEB6.353EA5FA@sun.com> Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 15:29:58 -0400 From: Steve Hanna <steve.hanna@sun.com> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.79 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: PKIX List <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="------------ms4B7902436081545849902AA0" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------ms4B7902436081545849902AA0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------3EB6208E1C918044D629D703" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------3EB6208E1C918044D629D703 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I'm glad to see more discussions of certificate path building. In a non-hierarchical PKI where relying parties have different trust anchors, path building is essential. And it's not easy! However, I don't think that we're ready to have an official 'best practices' document on path building yet. Very few people have implemented PKIX-compliant path building (only Sun and Cygnacom/DigitalNet, I think) and there are many areas that are still unclear. For instance, is it better to do a Depth First Search with ranking or to rank all candidate certificates? Which ranking heuristics work best in which environments? Is it possible for software to dynamically adapt to the PKI topology without requiring configuration? And what are the performance bottlenecks and best workarounds in real-world deployments? The I-D just published presents one early perspective on these questions, not a consensus. For now, I suggest that people who have implemented path building publish their insights, results, and ideas either as individual I-Ds without the intent to become an RFC or as research papers. Then we can discuss these results and ideas, test them in real-world scenarios, and arrive at a consensus on what Best Current Practices should be included in a BCP document on this topic. We might even want to start an IRTF research group or an informal discussion group to coordinate this research, sift through the results, and arrive at a solid and well-supported consensus. This effort will take some time, but I expect it will produce much better results. If it's felt that we really need a BCP on this topic in short order, then I think it should be restricted to things that we are fairly sure are good practices (like advising CAs to include name constraints and AIA in certificates to help path building and advising path builders to ensure that they handle simple hierarchical PKIs quickly but still handle complex PKIs properly). Thanks, Steve -------- Original Message -------- Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2003 11:32:03 -0400 From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org To: IETF-Announce:; CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certification Path Building Author(s) : M. Cooper, Y. Dzambasow Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Pages : 59 Date : 2003-7-3 This document was written to provide 'best practice' guidance and recommendations to developers building X.509 public-key certification paths within their applications. By following the guidance and recommendations defined in this document, an application developer is more likely to develop a robust X.509 certificate enabled application that can build valid certification paths across a wide range of PKI environments. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. 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Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.3.1) Gecko/20030428 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> CC: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: CRL Issuer Name = Subject name from crl signer cert? References: <3EDDF3A8.B6F372AA@trustcenter.de> <3EDE2CBD.8040403@nist.gov> <3EE70720.5090104@bull.net> <3EE73046.5000801@nist.gov> <3EE73B1A.40802@bull.net> In-Reply-To: <3EE73B1A.40802@bull.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Denis, I believe that there is some confusion in the meaning of "CRL issuer". A CRL issuer is any entity, including CAs, that issues CRLs. Perhaps the confusion comes from section 3, where the following text appears: CRL issuer: an optional system to which a CA delegates the publication of certificate revocation lists; This is not a definition, however. It is describing the components in Figure 1. CRL issuer is defined as optional because the CRL issuer would not appear as a separate component in the figure if the CA issued its own CRLs. Elsewhere in RFC 3280, it is clear that any entity that issues CRLs is a CRL issuer. Paragraph 3 of section 5 states: "CRL issuers issue CRLs. In general, the CRL issuer is the CA.... Whenever the CRL issuer is not the CA that issued the certificates, the CRL is referred to as an indirect CRL." Denis Pinkas wrote: > David, > > Thank you for this very prompt response. > >> Denis, >> >> I believe that RFC 3280 is quite clear on this issue. If the >> certificate does not include a cRLDistributionPoints extension with >> cRLIssuer present, then the CRL used to determine the certificate's >> status must have the same issuer name as the certificate: >> >> 6.3.3 CRL Processing >> >> For each distribution point (DP) in the certificate CRL >> distribution >> points extension, for each corresponding CRL in the local CRL >> cache, >> while ((reasons_mask is not all-reasons) and (cert_status is >> UNREVOKED)) perform the following: >> >> (a) ... >> >> (b) Verify the issuer and scope of the complete CRL as >> follows >> >> (1) If the DP includes cRLIssuer, then verify that the >> issuer >> field in the complete CRL matches cRLIssuer in the DP >> and that >> the complete CRL contains an issuing distribution point >> extension with the indrectCRL boolean asserted. Otherwise, >> verify that the CRL issuer matches the certificate issuer. >> >> ... >> >> If the revocation status has not been determined, repeat the >> process >> above with any available CRLs not specified in a distribution >> point >> but issued by the certificate issuer. > > > This text only mentions the case of a CRL issued by the CA, not the > case of a CRL issued by a CRL Issuer nominated by the CA. So > implicitly the case of a CRL issuer without a CDP does not exist. > > > For the processing of such a > >> CRL, assume a DP with both the reasons and the cRLIssuer fields >> omitted and a distribution point name of the certificate issuer. >> That is, the sequence of names in fullName is generated from the >> certificate issuer field as well as the certificate issuerAltName >> extension. > > >> So, if the cRLDistributionPoints extension is absent, revocation >> status must be determined as specified in the final paragraph of >> 6.3.3 which states that the CRL issuer and certificate issuer must >> match (this is stated in the first sentence and backed up in the >> second sentence which states that the CRL should be processed as if >> the certificate included a CDP with the cRLIssuer field absent). >> Step (b)(1) states that if the cRLIssuer field is absent, the >> certificate and CRL issuer names must match. > > > Thank you for the clarification. This answers my main question. > > So I understand, when no CDP is being used, that different keys can > still be used for cert signing and CRL signing, as long as the CA name > is the same. > > A minor point: in section 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point we still have: > > The CRL issuer MUST assert the indirectCRL boolean, if the scope of > the CRL includes certificates issued by authorities other than the > CRL issuer. > > Certificates are NOT issued by CRL issuers. Isn't there some typo here ? > > Denis > >> Dave >> >> Denis Pinkas wrote: >> >>> David, >>> >>> It has been a long time since we exchanged e-mails on delta CRLs. :-) >>> >>>> Juergen, >>>> >>>> What you are describing below is an indirect CRL, a CRL that covers >>>> certificates issued different entity. (I know you stated that same >>>> CA issues both the certificates and the CRL, but since the issuer >>>> names are different, they are considered different entities. >>>> Furthermore, there is no way for a relying party to know whether >>>> the certificate issuer and CRL issuer are the same entity). >>>> >>>> Usually, a CRL can not be used to determine the status of a >>>> certificate unless the certificate and CRL both have the same >>>> issuer name. The value of the AKI extension does not matter, as it >>>> is only a hint that can aid in building paths and in selecting the >>>> right CRL. >>>> >>>> In order to allow a relying party to use a CRL to determine the >>>> status of a certificate where the issuer names differ, you need to >>>> do the following: >>>> >>>> 1) Each certificate issued by "CA1" must include a >>>> cRLDistributionPoints extension with a cRLIssuer field that >>>> indicates that "CRL1" is the CRL issuer. >>>> >>>> 2) The CRLs issued by "CRL1" must include an >>>> issuingDistributionPoint extension with the indirectCRL flag set to >>>> TRUE. >>>> >>>> 3) If any of CA1's certificates have been revoked, the >>>> certificateIssuer CRL entry extension must be used within the CRLs >>>> issued by "CRL1" to indicate that list of revoked serial numbers >>>> are of certificates issued by "CA1" (see RFC 3280 for details on >>>> the use of these three extensions). >>> >>> >>> >>> While what is above is true, I wonder that is the *only* case "to >>> allow a relying party to use a CRL to determine the status of a >>> certificate where the issuer names differ". >>> >>> In particular, if CDP are *not* used, then it is still possible to >>> have a CRL issuer. >>> >>> RFC 3280 states: >>> >>> CRL issuer: an optional system to which a CA delegates the >>> publication of certificate revocation lists; >>> >>> CRL issuers issue CRLs. In general, the CRL issuer is the CA. >>> CAs publish CRLs to provide status information about the >>> certificates >>> they issued. However, a CA may delegate this responsibility to >>> another trusted authority. Whenever the CRL issuer is not the CA >>> that issued the certificates, the CRL is referred to as an indirect >>> CRL. >>> >>> The wording may be confusing. A CRL issuer name is a name that is >>> different from the name of the CA. However, since the CA may >>> delegate the publication of the CRLs to a CRL issuer, is it still >>> the CA or a CRL issuer ? I would think the later. >> >> >> A CA may delegate CRL issuing, but must use the cRLIssuer field of >> the cRLDistributionPoints extension to indicate that it has done so. >> >>> Whenever the CRL issuer is not the CA that issued the certificates, >>> the CRL is referred to as an indirect CRL. >>> >>> I wonder whether the wording indirect CRL is fine, since it has a >>> different meaning in section 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point. >>> >>> The CRL issuer MUST assert the indirectCRL boolean, if the scope of >>> the CRL includes certificates issued by authorities other than the >>> CRL issuer. >>> >>> The indirectCRL boolean flag is something that may be present or >>> absent in what is currently called a indirect CRL. A little bit >>> confusing. A change or a clarification would be apropriate. >> >> >> If the indirectCRL flag is absent, then the CRL is not an indirect >> CRL. If the indirectCRL flag is not set to TRUE, then the CRL may >> only covers certificates issued by the CRL issuer. Such a CRL is not >> an indirect CRL. >> >>> >>>> While the rules for issuing and processing indirect CRLs are >>>> specified in RFC 3280, RFC 3280 compliant clients are not required >>>> to be able to process indirect CRLs. >>> >>> >>> >>> Section 6.3 CRL Validation is almost silent on how to determine that >>> the CRL is the right one, in particular when the CRL issuer name is >>> different from the CA name and when no CDP is being used. The only >>> guidance is: >>> >>> " (f) Obtain and validate the certification path for the complete >>> CRL issuer." >>> >>> I would assume that this means find out a certificate issued by the >>> CA which has issued the certificate to be tested and which includes >>> the cRLSign bit 6 in the keyUsage extension. Then, use that >>> certificate to validate CRLs that seem to be originating from that >>> CRL issuer name. >>> >>> It would be useful to include such additional information in a >>> revised version of RFC 3280. >>> >>> Conforming applications are NOT >>> REQUIRED to support processing of delta CRLs, indirect CRLs, or CRLs >>> with a scope other than all certificates issued by one CA. >>> >>> Conforming applications are certainly not required to be able to >>> process the indirectCRL boolean, when CDP are being used. What does >>> mean however mean "not required to processing of indirect CRLs" in >>> case the CA nominates a single CRL issuer ? >>> >>> Denis >>> >>> >>>> Dave >>>> >>>> Juergen Brauckmann wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi. >>>>> >>>>> I have a question regarding the naming scheme for CRLs. Consider the >>>>> following: >>>>> >>>>> EE certificates are issued by a CA, Issuer-DN "CA1". >>>>> The CA uses a CA certificate issued by a root ca: Issuer-DN "Root1", >>>>> Subject-DN "CA1", serialnumber "1". >>>>> The CA issues CRLs, and signs them with a CRL certificate wich was >>>>> also >>>>> issued by a root CA, but with another distinguished name than the >>>>> main >>>>> CA certificate: Issuer-DN "Root1", Subject-DN "CRL1", serialnumber >>>>> "2" >>>>> >>>>> Is an RFC 3280 compliant client supposed to be able to process the >>>>> CRLs >>>>> if the CRL Issuer-DN is set to "CA1" and the CRL contains an >>>>> AuthorityKeyIdentifier pointing to the CRL certificate with >>>>> Subject-DN >>>>> "CRL1"? >>>>> >>>>> Is this scheme, where the issuer name from CRL does not match >>>>> Subject DN >>>>> from CRL signing certificate, covered by step f) from chapter >>>>> 6.3.3 from >>>>> RFC 3280? >>>>> >>>>> "f) Obtain and validate the certification path for the complete CRL >>>>> issuer. If a key usage extension is present in the CRL issuer's >>>>> certificate, verify that the cRLSign bit is set." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> Juergen >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h6A5Xrqt036192 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 22:33:53 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h6A5XrBv036191 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 22:33:53 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mpls-qmqp-03.inet.qwest.net (mpls-qmqp-03.inet.qwest.net [63.231.195.114]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with SMTP id h6A5Xqqt036186 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 22:33:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from hoytkesterson@earthlink.net) Received: (qmail 89155 invoked by uid 0); 10 Jul 2003 05:26:28 -0000 Received: from mpls-pop-07.inet.qwest.net (63.231.195.7) by mpls-qmqp-03.inet.qwest.net with QMQP; 10 Jul 2003 05:26:28 -0000 Received: from vdsl-130-13-127-251.phnx.uswest.net (HELO ?192.168.2.7?) (130.13.127.251) by mpls-pop-07.inet.qwest.net with SMTP; 10 Jul 2003 05:33:55 -0000 Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2003 22:14:15 -0700 Message-Id: <a05210601bb329cb000b2@[192.168.2.7]> From: "Hoyt L. Kesterson II" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: hoytkesterson@earthlink.net@mail.earthlink.net In-Reply-To: <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> References: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184A2@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntde v.microsoft.com> <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> <!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN"> <html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 } --></style><title>Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ?</title></head><body> <div>At 10:31 -0400 7/8/03, David A. Cooper wrote:</div> <div><br></div> <div>as we were finishing up the 4th edition sharon boeyen reported to our group that some implementors were using an interesting interpretation of "recognizing an extension". apparently their recognition essentially meant that they recognized the oid and recognized that the extension was defined but did not process it, i.e wrote no code to process the extension as defined in the standard. to counter this specious argument we wrote some additional text for clause 7</div> <div><br></div> <div>the 3rd edition contains this paragraph</div> <div><br></div> <div><font size="+1">"<font face="Times" color="#000000">The</font><font face="Helvetica" color="#000000"><b> extensions</b></font><font face="Times" color="#000000"> field allows addition of new fields to the structure without modification to the ASN.1 definition. An extension field consists of an extension identifier, a criticality flag, and a canonical encoding of a data value of an ASN.1 type associated with the identified extension. For those extensions where ordering of individual extensions within the SEQUENCE is significant, the specification of those individual extensions shall include the rules for the significance of the order therein. When an implementation processing a certificate does not recognize an extension, if the criticality flag is FALSE, it may ignore that extension. If the criticality flag is TRUE, unrecognized extensions shall cause the structure to be considered invalid, i.e. in a certificate, an unrecognized critical extension would cause validation of a signature using that certificate to fail.</font></font><font size="+1">"</font></div> <div><br></div> <div>the 4th edition has this replacement paragraph (as well as additional paragraphs)</div> <div><br></div> <div><font size="+1">"<font face="Times New Roman" color="#000000">The</font><font face="Arial" color="#000000"><b> extensions</b></font><font face="Times New Roman" color="#000000"> field allows addition of new fields to the structure without modification to the ASN.1 definition. An extension field consists of an extension identifier, a criticality flag, and an encoding of a data value of an ASN.1 type associated with the identified extension. For those extensions where ordering of individual extensions within the</font><font face="Arial" color="#000000"><b> SEQUENCE</b></font><font face="Times New Roman" color="#000000"> is significant, the specification of those individual extensions shall include the rules for the significance of the order therein. When an implementation processing a certificate does not recognize an extension, if the criticality flag is</font><font face="Arial" color="#000000"><b> FALSE</b></font><font face="Times New Roman" color="#000000">, it may ignore that extension. If the criticality flag is</font><font face="Arial" color="#000000"><b> TRUE</b></font><font face="Times New Roman" color="#000000">, unrecognized extensions shall cause the structure to be considered invalid, i.e. in a certificate, an unrecognized critical extension would cause validation of a signature using that certificate to fail. When a certificate-using implementation recognizes and is able to process an extension, then the certificate-using implementation shall process the extension regardless of the value of the criticality flag. Note that any extension that is flagged non-critical will cause inconsistent behaviour between certificate-using systems that will process the extension and certificate-using systems that do not recognize the extension and will ignore it.</font></font><font size="+1">"</font></div> <div><br></div> <div>note the penultimate sentence.</div> <div><br></div> <div>one of the advantages of implementation conformance statements is that they can be used to determined what a product implemented and what it did not. i believe it would be useful for the ietf to define implementation conformance statement pro formas for their standards</div> <div><br></div> <div> hoyt</div> <div><br></div> <blockquote type="cite" cite>Trevor,<br> <br> It was not intention to imply that the criticality flag should be used in deciding whether to process an extension. I agree that if you can process an extension, then you must do so, whether the extension is critical or non-critical.<br> <br> For most extensions (e.g., BasicConstraints, nameConstraints, policyConstraints, keyUsage), the processing requirements are very clearly stated. Processing rules tend to be more vague for extensions in which the processing can only be performed by the user application and not by the path validation library. SubjectAltName is one such example. certificatePolicies is another. The rules for determining the set of policies under which a certificate is valid are well specified, but processing the extension also means ensuring that the certificate is used in accordance with the rules implied by one of the specified policies. For the most part, this can only be accomplished through out-of-band means.</blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite><br> In general, I think that the SubjectAltName extension is only relevant in an end certificate. In an intermediate certificate, the subject field must contain a non-null name and so the SubjectAltName extension, if present, can (and probably should) be non-critical. I think processing subject names means ensuring that one has the right certificate. For intermediate certificates, this is done by comparing the subject field to the issuer field in the next certificate. For the end certificate, this means either determining that the subject name or one of the SubjectAltNames matches the name the application is "expecting" (e.g., finding the sender's e-mail address in the certificate when verifying a signed e-mail message) or using one or more of the subject names to inform the application's user of the certified name so that the user can determine if the identity is correct. If the end certificate contains a null subject name and the application can not process any of the names in the SubjectAltName extension, then there is no way to determine if the identity is correct.<br> <br> I wouldn't know how to process a registeredID either. But, if I received a signed message in which the signer's certificate had a null subject name and a SubjectAltName extension that only included a registeredID, should I accept the certificate? Is it of any use to know that the message was properly signed if the signer's identity has no meaning to me?<br> <br> Dave<br> <br> Trevor Freeman wrote:<br> <blockquote type="cite" cite>David,<br> I think you are giving the impression that the criticality flag is an<br> input into the decision on whether to process an extension - which is it<br> not. If an application understands an extension, it must process the<br> contents of the extension, regardless of criticality. Applications which<br> do not understand the extension may skip processing of an extension<br> marked as non-critical. That said; the definition of what constitutes to<br> process the contents is typically vague. Even in you example - I have no<br> clue what it means to process a registeredID.<br> <br> </blockquote> </blockquote> <div><br></div> </body> </html> Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h69ENkqt098842 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 07:23:46 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h69ENk16098841 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 07:23:46 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h69ENiqt098836; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 07:23:45 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id QAA33082; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 16:28:17 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id QAA07578; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 16:23:47 +0200 Message-ID: <3F0C256D.3090300@bull.net> Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2003 16:23:41 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, S-MIME / IETF <ietf-smime@imc.org> Subject: Policy Requirements for Attribute Authorities Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h69ENkqu098837 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> ETSI is making available a draft document for public comments called: "Policy requirements for certification service providers issuing Attribute Certificates". The document is available at the following URL: http://docbox.etsi.org/ESI/Open/ETSI%20TS%20102_158%20v01.zip This document has been approved by ETSI Technical Committee - Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures for public review. Comments are invited on it, to be submitted to the editor and/or the task leader by 2003.08.24. Editor: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Task leader: Franco Ruggieri <f.ruggieri@FLASHNET.IT> Do not send your comments to the PKIX or to the SMIME mailing list. This will allow the consolidation by 2003.09.07 of a final draft to be approved for publication at TC ESI # 05 in Sophia Antipolis, 23 24 September 2003 as ETSI Technical Specification (TS) 102 158. If you choose to place your comments in-line in the text of the document please return them under the same file name with the addition "&your initials". If you are aware of other public lists whose members might benefit from awareness of this document and have their own views to offer, please feel free to forward the document to them with copy of this message. Regards, Denis Pinkas. Document editor. Franco Ruggieri. Task leader. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h697DFqt055160 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 00:13:15 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h697DFvt055159 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 00:13:15 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-pro.vtx.ch (smtp-pro.vtx.ch [212.147.0.65]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h697DAqt055111 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 00:13:12 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from omueller@zurichcci.ch) Received: from DRGS8HR4Y6Q4IY (unknown [212.147.70.133]) by smtp-pro.vtx.ch (VTX Services) with SMTP id 0440966FD1; Wed, 9 Jul 2003 09:12:46 +0200 (CEST) From: "Otto Mueller" <omueller@zurichcci.ch> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Cc: "Man-Sze Li" <msli@icfocus.co.uk>, "Mueller, Adrian, M-C" <adrian@mueller-consulting.biz> Subject: draft-ietf-pkix-pi-06 Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2003 09:07:32 +0200 Message-ID: <HHEHLFCPDJFIHGKBACINIEANCGAA.omueller@zurichcci.ch> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Dear PKIX WG: Please note that Cyber Identity has now emerged as a very hot topic. Permanent Identifiers in X.509 certificates are an important link in the Cyber Identity system. The Internet draft-ietf-pkix-pi-06 defines very clearly the syntax how to incorporate a unique identifier of some entity into a X.509 certificate. Now, we state that the discussion about this very useful prospective RFC has come into a deadlock. The issues are: - an URI is easily workable but is not considered "permanent enough"; - an OID is really permanent but is not easily workable in applications; We think the assessment - if a specific URI is "permanent enough" and - if an OID is workable in applications should be left - to the certification authority issuing a certificate according to its certificate policy and - to the relying party using some application to extract the permanent identifier. The certification authority is responsible for the content of the certificate i.e. the permanent identifier and the relying party has to decide if they accept the certificate policy related to the certificate. However, they need a clear syntax which is given by the draft-ietf-pkix-pi-06. Therefore, we suggest that the draft should be left as is and be updated by some explanation as outlined above. Regards, Otto and Adrian Mueller Otto Mueller c/o Zurich chamber of commerce phone +41 1 217 40 50 fax +41 1 217 40 51 Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68GLXqt088305 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 09:21:33 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h68GLXaU088303 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 09:21:33 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68GLVqt088291 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 09:21:31 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id SAA36460; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 18:26:04 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id SAA02566; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 18:21:35 +0200 Message-ID: <3F0AEF89.1040809@bull.net> Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2003 18:21:29 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: [Fwd: Re: CRL Issuer Name = Subject name from crl signer cert?] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> David, Since you just sent a message on the PKIX mailing list, I take advantage of this opportunity to forward you an e-mail that I sent on June 11 where apparently I did not received a response. There is a minor comment at the very end of that e-mail. Denis -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: CRL Issuer Name = Subject name from crl signer cert? Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2003 16:22:18 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> CC: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <3EDDF3A8.B6F372AA@trustcenter.de> <3EDE2CBD.8040403@nist.gov> <3EE70720.5090104@bull.net> <3EE73046.5000801@nist.gov> David, Thank you for this very prompt response. > Denis, > > I believe that RFC 3280 is quite clear on this issue. If the > certificate does not include a cRLDistributionPoints extension with > cRLIssuer present, then the CRL used to determine the certificate's > status must have the same issuer name as the certificate: > > 6.3.3 CRL Processing > > For each distribution point (DP) in the certificate CRL distribution > points extension, for each corresponding CRL in the local CRL cache, > while ((reasons_mask is not all-reasons) and (cert_status is > UNREVOKED)) perform the following: > > (a) ... > > (b) Verify the issuer and scope of the complete CRL as follows > > (1) If the DP includes cRLIssuer, then verify that the issuer > field in the complete CRL matches cRLIssuer in the DP and that > the complete CRL contains an issuing distribution point > extension with the indrectCRL boolean asserted. Otherwise, > verify that the CRL issuer matches the certificate issuer. > > ... > > If the revocation status has not been determined, repeat the process > above with any available CRLs not specified in a distribution point > but issued by the certificate issuer. This text only mentions the case of a CRL issued by the CA, not the case of a CRL issued by a CRL Issuer nominated by the CA. So implicitly the case of a CRL issuer without a CDP does not exist. > For the processing of such a > CRL, assume a DP with both the reasons and the cRLIssuer fields > omitted and a distribution point name of the certificate issuer. > That is, the sequence of names in fullName is generated from the > certificate issuer field as well as the certificate issuerAltName > extension. > So, if the cRLDistributionPoints extension is absent, revocation status > must be determined as specified in the final paragraph of 6.3.3 which > states that the CRL issuer and certificate issuer must match (this is > stated in the first sentence and backed up in the second sentence which > states that the CRL should be processed as if the certificate included a > CDP with the cRLIssuer field absent). Step (b)(1) states that if the > cRLIssuer field is absent, the certificate and CRL issuer names must > match. Thank you for the clarification. This answers my main question. So I understand, when no CDP is being used, that different keys can still be used for cert signing and CRL signing, as long as the CA name is the same. A minor point: in section 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point we still have: The CRL issuer MUST assert the indirectCRL boolean, if the scope of the CRL includes certificates issued by authorities other than the CRL issuer. Certificates are NOT issued by the CRL issuer. Isn't there some typo here ? Is the following a more correct statement ? The CRL issuer MUST assert the indirectCRL boolean, if the scope of the CRL includes certificates issued by authorities for which the CRL issuer has not received from a CA the right to revoke. Denis > Dave > > Denis Pinkas wrote: > >> David, >> >> It has been a long time since we exchanged e-mails on delta CRLs. :-) >> >>> Juergen, >>> >>> What you are describing below is an indirect CRL, a CRL that covers >>> certificates issued different entity. (I know you stated that same >>> CA issues both the certificates and the CRL, but since the issuer >>> names are different, they are considered different entities. >>> Furthermore, there is no way for a relying party to know whether the >>> certificate issuer and CRL issuer are the same entity). >>> >>> Usually, a CRL can not be used to determine the status of a >>> certificate unless the certificate and CRL both have the same issuer >>> name. The value of the AKI extension does not matter, as it is only >>> a hint that can aid in building paths and in selecting the right CRL. >>> >>> In order to allow a relying party to use a CRL to determine the >>> status of a certificate where the issuer names differ, you need to do >>> the following: >>> >>> 1) Each certificate issued by "CA1" must include a >>> cRLDistributionPoints extension with a cRLIssuer field that indicates >>> that "CRL1" is the CRL issuer. >>> >>> 2) The CRLs issued by "CRL1" must include an issuingDistributionPoint >>> extension with the indirectCRL flag set to TRUE. >>> >>> 3) If any of CA1's certificates have been revoked, the >>> certificateIssuer CRL entry extension must be used within the CRLs >>> issued by "CRL1" to indicate that list of revoked serial numbers are >>> of certificates issued by "CA1" (see RFC 3280 for details on the use >>> of these three extensions). >> >> >> While what is above is true, I wonder that is the *only* case "to >> allow a relying party to use a CRL to determine the status of a >> certificate where the issuer names differ". >> >> In particular, if CDP are *not* used, then it is still possible to >> have a CRL issuer. >> >> RFC 3280 states: >> >> CRL issuer: an optional system to which a CA delegates the >> publication of certificate revocation lists; >> >> CRL issuers issue CRLs. In general, the CRL issuer is the CA. >> CAs publish CRLs to provide status information about the certificates >> they issued. However, a CA may delegate this responsibility to >> another trusted authority. Whenever the CRL issuer is not the CA >> that issued the certificates, the CRL is referred to as an indirect >> CRL. >> >> The wording may be confusing. A CRL issuer name is a name that is >> different from the name of the CA. However, since the CA may delegate >> the publication of the CRLs to a CRL issuer, is it still the CA or a >> CRL issuer ? I would think the later. > > A CA may delegate CRL issuing, but must use the cRLIssuer field of the > cRLDistributionPoints extension to indicate that it has done so. > >> Whenever the CRL issuer is not the CA that issued the certificates, >> the CRL is referred to as an indirect CRL. >> >> I wonder whether the wording indirect CRL is fine, since it has a >> different meaning in section 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point. >> >> The CRL issuer MUST assert the indirectCRL boolean, if the scope of >> the CRL includes certificates issued by authorities other than the >> CRL issuer. >> >> The indirectCRL boolean flag is something that may be present or >> absent in what is currently called a indirect CRL. A little bit >> confusing. A change or a clarification would be apropriate. > > If the indirectCRL flag is absent, then the CRL is not an indirect CRL. > If the indirectCRL flag is not set to TRUE, then the CRL may only covers > certificates issued by the CRL issuer. Such a CRL is not an indirect CRL. > >> >>> While the rules for issuing and processing indirect CRLs are >>> specified in RFC 3280, RFC 3280 compliant clients are not required to >>> be able to process indirect CRLs. >> >> >> Section 6.3 CRL Validation is almost silent on how to determine that >> the CRL is the right one, in particular when the CRL issuer name is >> different from the CA name and when no CDP is being used. The only >> guidance is: >> >> " (f) Obtain and validate the certification path for the complete CRL >> issuer." >> >> I would assume that this means find out a certificate issued by the CA >> which has issued the certificate to be tested and which includes the >> cRLSign bit 6 in the keyUsage extension. Then, use that certificate to >> validate CRLs that seem to be originating from that CRL issuer name. >> >> It would be useful to include such additional information in a revised >> version of RFC 3280. >> >> Conforming applications are NOT >> REQUIRED to support processing of delta CRLs, indirect CRLs, or CRLs >> with a scope other than all certificates issued by one CA. >> >> Conforming applications are certainly not required to be able to >> process the indirectCRL boolean, when CDP are being used. What does >> mean however mean "not required to processing of indirect CRLs" in >> case the CA nominates a single CRL issuer ? >> >> Denis >> >> >>> Dave >>> >>> Juergen Brauckmann wrote: >>> >>>> Hi. >>>> >>>> I have a question regarding the naming scheme for CRLs. Consider the >>>> following: >>>> >>>> EE certificates are issued by a CA, Issuer-DN "CA1". >>>> The CA uses a CA certificate issued by a root ca: Issuer-DN "Root1", >>>> Subject-DN "CA1", serialnumber "1". >>>> The CA issues CRLs, and signs them with a CRL certificate wich was also >>>> issued by a root CA, but with another distinguished name than the main >>>> CA certificate: Issuer-DN "Root1", Subject-DN "CRL1", serialnumber "2" >>>> >>>> Is an RFC 3280 compliant client supposed to be able to process the CRLs >>>> if the CRL Issuer-DN is set to "CA1" and the CRL contains an >>>> AuthorityKeyIdentifier pointing to the CRL certificate with Subject-DN >>>> "CRL1"? >>>> >>>> Is this scheme, where the issuer name from CRL does not match >>>> Subject DN >>>> from CRL signing certificate, covered by step f) from chapter 6.3.3 >>>> from >>>> RFC 3280? >>>> >>>> "f) Obtain and validate the certification path for the complete CRL >>>> issuer. If a key usage extension is present in the CRL issuer's >>>> certificate, verify that the cRLSign bit is set." >>>> >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> Juergen >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68FIhqt082621 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 08:18:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h68FIhxh082620 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 08:18:43 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [192.90.70.84]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68FIfqt082615 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 08:18:42 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Denis.Pinkas@bull.net) Received: from clbull.frcl.bull.fr (IDENT:root@clbull.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.8.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id RAA05684 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 17:23:13 +0200 Received: from bull.net (frcls4013.frcl.bull.fr [129.182.108.120]) by clbull.frcl.bull.fr (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id RAA02289 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 17:18:42 +0200 Message-ID: <3F0AE0CC.1060105@bull.net> Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2003 17:18:36 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull SA. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-warranty-extn-03.txt References: <200306301153.HAA12503@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. > This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. > Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Warranty > Certificate Extension > Author(s) : D. Linsenbardt, S. Pontius, A. Sturgeon > Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-warranty-extn-03.txt > Pages : 8 > Date : 2003-6-27 Here are my comments on this draft. Comments on warranty-extn-03.txt (June 2003) 1- On page 2. The text mentions: "A relying party that has a warranty from a CA". Does this mean that a relying party must have a contract with the CA to get advantage of the warranty ? Does this mean that a relying party will get a warranty without a contract signed with the CA ? Does this extension allow to make the difference between the case of a signed contract and the case of an unsigned contract where the guarantees could be different ? 2 - The difference between the base warranty and the extended warranty is not crystal clear. How can a relying party know whether it can have the benefits of the base warranty or of the extended warranty ? If the tcURL is present, a human being might understand the terms and conditions (if he can understand the local language used), but a computer program will not be able to do so. This means that computers cannot understand the difference. 3 - There is no security on the information placed at the tcURL parameter since no hash of the terms and conditions is being used. These conditions could change overtime and relying parties would not be able to demonstrate that they have changed. 4 - Is the "Relying party Agreement" a document to signed by the parties or not ? This should be said. 5 - The WarrantyValidityPeriod is insufficient. Usually there is a period to claim for a compensation which must be made X months or Y days after the date of the event which created the damage. It is thus not possible to ask for a warranty during e.g. the whole validity period of the certificate. Another time period parameter is missing. 6 - The wType offers only two types of warranty: aggregated and per transaction. "Aggregated" means that that once the value of the fulfilled claims reaches the maximum warranty amount, then no further claim will be fulfilled. "Per transaction" means that each claim is handled independently but no individual claim can exceed the maximum warranty amount. Each type has its own problems: "Aggregated" is like a race where late claimants will get no compensation at all because they were not "fast enough". It is questionable whether such a race condition will be acceptable. "Per transaction" means that the CA cannot compute the maximum amount of money that it may have to give away. Which insurance company will ever insure a risk for which an upper limit cannot be computed ? None of these schemes is acceptable. Some combination should be allowed: - a maximum amount per transaction, and - a maximum amount per certificate with a maximum time period to claim for a compensation after the date of the event (no race problem implied). 7 - The content of the security consideration should be augmented to indicate the difference between what a computer program can do and a human being can do with this extension. 8 - The document is not mature enough and its added value is still questionable. Denis Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68EWGqt078443 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 07:32:16 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h68EWGAT078442 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 07:32:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from postmark.nist.gov (pushme.nist.gov [129.6.16.92]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68EWEqt078436 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 07:32:14 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from david.cooper@nist.gov) Received: from nist.gov (st26.ncsl.nist.gov [129.6.54.72]) by postmark.nist.gov (8.12.5/8.12.5) with ESMTP id h68EVUPg022899; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 10:31:32 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <3F0AD5A5.8050001@nist.gov> Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2003 10:31:01 -0400 From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.3.1) Gecko/20030428 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> CC: Wahaj <wahaj.khan@ascertia.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? References: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184A2@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> In-Reply-To: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184A2@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Trevor, It was not intention to imply that the criticality flag should be used in deciding whether to process an extension. I agree that if you can process an extension, then you must do so, whether the extension is critical or non-critical. For most extensions (e.g., BasicConstraints, nameConstraints, policyConstraints, keyUsage), the processing requirements are very clearly stated. Processing rules tend to be more vague for extensions in which the processing can only be performed by the user application and not by the path validation library. SubjectAltName is one such example. certificatePolicies is another. The rules for determining the set of policies under which a certificate is valid are well specified, but processing the extension also means ensuring that the certificate is used in accordance with the rules implied by one of the specified policies. For the most part, this can only be accomplished through out-of-band means. In general, I think that the SubjectAltName extension is only relevant in an end certificate. In an intermediate certificate, the subject field must contain a non-null name and so the SubjectAltName extension, if present, can (and probably should) be non-critical. I think processing subject names means ensuring that one has the right certificate. For intermediate certificates, this is done by comparing the subject field to the issuer field in the next certificate. For the end certificate, this means either determining that the subject name or one of the SubjectAltNames matches the name the application is "expecting" (e.g., finding the sender's e-mail address in the certificate when verifying a signed e-mail message) or using one or more of the subject names to inform the application's user of the certified name so that the user can determine if the identity is correct. If the end certificate contains a null subject name and the application can not process any of the names in the SubjectAltName extension, then there is no way to determine if the identity is correct. I wouldn't know how to process a registeredID either. But, if I received a signed message in which the signer's certificate had a null subject name and a SubjectAltName extension that only included a registeredID, should I accept the certificate? Is it of any use to know that the message was properly signed if the signer's identity has no meaning to me? Dave Trevor Freeman wrote: >David, >I think you are giving the impression that the criticality flag is an >input into the decision on whether to process an extension - which is it >not. If an application understands an extension, it must process the >contents of the extension, regardless of criticality. Applications which >do not understand the extension may skip processing of an extension >marked as non-critical. That said; the definition of what constitutes to >process the contents is typically vague. Even in you example - I have no >clue what it means to process a registeredID. > > > Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68CEVqt070626 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 05:14:31 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h68CEVcJ070625 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 05:14:31 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from gghqex1.gfgsi.com (netva01.getronicsgov.com [67.105.229.98]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68CEUqt070620 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 05:14:30 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from Dave.Oshman@DigitalNet.com) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.0.6249.0 content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2003 08:14:27 -0400 Message-ID: <55A694D2F6198C459F2B93D577F599C2562FFA@gghqex1.gfgsi.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Thread-Index: AcNEwirWXOhBe3UVSx+6utCa+dHwSwAhEnkQ From: "Oshman, Dave" <Dave.Oshman@DigitalNet.com> To: "Wahaj" <wahaj.khan@ascertia.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h68CEUqt070621 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Wahaj-- Not sure if anyone has answered this part of your question so here's my attempt. Wahaj wrote: > > In RFC 3280 in certificate extension section it is stated " A > certificate using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters > a critical extension it does not recognize". Now what recognize mean ? > is it to use it (in other words process it) or merely read it and > not processing. I came across three different terms used. Ability to > Recognize, Process or Support. What is exactly meant by them. Are they > same or different ? > Regarding this question which leans toward asking if critical extensions need to be "processed" or only "recognized" along with definitions of the terms. In section 6.1.4 in 3280, it states: (o) Recognize and process any other critical extension present in the certificate. Process any other recognized non-critical extension present in the certificate. So, you do need to "process" all critical extensions. If you recognize any non-critical extensions, you must "process" them as well. Now, the more difficult question is what is meant by "process". I'd say that "processing" is more or less described in sections 4 & 5 where each extension is described. For example, the Key Usage extension defined in 4.2.1.3, if recognized, should be processed to verify that the certificate is being used for the purpose(s) described. E.g. Is the application attempting to provide a non-repudiation service which "protects against the signing entity falsely denying some action, excluding certificate or CRL signing." such as signing off on a purchase order. If so, the non-repudiation bit in the key usage extension must be set or else the usage is invalid. I'd then say that "recognize" means "include processing logic for the extension". I think "support" means a combination of both. Regards, Dave Oshman Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68C2bqt070170 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 05:02:37 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h68C2b1i070169 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 05:02:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from postmark.nist.gov (pushme.nist.gov [129.6.16.92]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68C2Zqt070164 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 05:02:35 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from wpolk@nist.gov) Received: from calendar.nist.gov (calendar-ether.nist.gov [129.6.16.10]) by postmark.nist.gov (8.12.5/8.12.5) with ESMTP id h68C2HPg000455 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 08:02:17 -0400 (EDT) Received: from calendar.nist.gov (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by calendar.nist.gov (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h68C2GKH000674 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 08:02:17 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from nobody@localhost) by calendar.nist.gov (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h68C2G7g000673 for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 08:02:16 -0400 (EDT) Received: from 138.88.233.179 ( [138.88.233.179]) as user wpolk@email.nist.gov by imp.nist.gov with HTTP; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 08:02:16 -0400 Message-ID: <1057665736.3f0ab2c8a154f@imp.nist.gov> Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2003 08:02:16 -0400 From: wpolk@nist.gov To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: draft agenda - 57th IETF MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) 2.3.7-cvs Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Folks, Here is the draft agenda for next week's meeting. Please let me know ASAP if you wanted to be on the agenda but were overlooked. Thanks, Tim Polk ------------------ draft agenda -------------------------------- PKIX WG (pkix-wg) THURSDAY, July 17, 2003 0900-1130 ================================= CHAIR: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov> AGENDA: 1. WG Status and Direction 1.1 WG Focus and Direction [ADs] The working group has recieved direction from the IESG that will limit the types of new specifications accepted as PKIX work products. The ADs wil present IESG's expectations for the PKIX WG along with the rationale. (15 min.) 1.2 Document Status Review [Tim Polk (NIST)] The working group has a large number of Internet-Drafts. Many documents are with the ADs or in various stages of WG Last Call. Several others are ready for Last Call. (15 min.) 2. PKIX WG Specifications 2.1 Simple Certificate Validation Protocol Trevor Freeman (MicroSoft) http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt The current draft of SCVP is in WG Last Call, and is believed to be in full compliance with RFC 3379. This presentation will identify the changes since the -11 draft. (15 min.) 2.2 RFC 3280 Progression Tim Polk (NIST) NIST is currently performing the interoperability testing for RFC 3280. This presentation will update the WG on NIST's progress, projected completion date, and issues identified to date. Primary focus will be the RFC 3280 path validation test suite developed jointly by NIST, DigitalNet, and NSA. (10 min.) 2.3 LDAP: Schemas, String Values, and more - David Chadwick (Univ of Salford) Peter Gietz (DAASI) The WG has a suite of LDAP-PKIX drafts forming a comprehensive solution for LDAP based PKI information distribution. New drafts on PKC certificate schema, CRL schema and on Attribute Certificate schema have been published since the 56th IETF. The authors will present the changes in these documents and discuss the timeline for document completion. (15 min.) 2.4 Certification Path Building Matt Cooper (Orion Security) http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt This document was written to provide "best practice" guidance and recommendations to developers building X.509 public-key certification paths within their applications. (10 min.) 3. Related Specifications The following personal drafts address topics of interest to the PKIX WG, and are presented to highlight the availability of the drafts and encourage input from the WG. 3.1 Specifying Russian Cryptographic Algorithms in PKIX Gregory S. Chudov (Crypto-Pro) This personal draft documents the use of Russian national cryptography standards (GOST) in the PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile. It was developed within "Russian Cryptographic Software Compatibility Agreement", and signed by major Russian cryptographic software vendors. (10 min.) 3.2 Memorandum for multi-domain PKI Interoperability Masaki SHIMAOKA (SECOM) This personal draft documents known issues and considerations for multi-domain PKI, and provides guidelines for multi-domain PKI interoperability as a best current practice. The scope of this specification is the establishment of trust relationships and interoperability between mulitple PKI domains. This specification is a follow on to the JNSA Challenge PKI 2002 and Multi-Domain PKI Test Suite. (10 min.) 3.2 Object Oriented PKI (OO-PKI) Anders Rungren (Telia) This personal draft introduces an Object Oriented (OO) X.509 extension. The extension is intended to eliminate the need for application-level, relying party PKI software, to a priori "know" certificate profiles, be manually "configured", or occasionally require "adjustments". The primary goal with the extension is to enable the creation of a wide range of standard information system applications, having built-in relying party PKI support. (10 min.) Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68Bwwqt070023 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 04:58:58 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h68BwwQS070022 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 04:58:58 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from postmark.nist.gov (pushme.nist.gov [129.6.16.92]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h68Bwuqt070017 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 04:58:56 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from wpolk@nist.gov) Received: from calendar.nist.gov (calendar-ether.nist.gov [129.6.16.10]) by postmark.nist.gov (8.12.5/8.12.5) with ESMTP id h68BwePg028690 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 07:58:40 -0400 (EDT) Received: from calendar.nist.gov (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by calendar.nist.gov (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h68BweKH000557 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 07:58:40 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from nobody@localhost) by calendar.nist.gov (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h68Bwegk000556 for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 07:58:40 -0400 (EDT) Received: from 138.88.233.179 ( [138.88.233.179]) as user wpolk@email.nist.gov by imp.nist.gov with HTTP; Tue, 8 Jul 2003 07:58:39 -0400 Message-ID: <1057665519.3f0ab1efeccd1@imp.nist.gov> Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2003 07:58:39 -0400 From: wpolk@nist.gov To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: WG Last Call: SCVP References: <5.1.0.14.2.20030624174958.02559120@email.nist.gov> In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20030624174958.02559120@email.nist.gov> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) 2.3.7-cvs Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This message initiates working group Last Call for the Simple Certificate Validation Protocol. Last Call will run for (at least) two weeks. That is, Last Call will not close before July 22. The URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt The -12 draft includes minor enhancements to bring the specification into full compliance with RFC 3379. Thanks, Tim Polk Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h67LgTqt093977 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 7 Jul 2003 14:42:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h67LgTMF093976 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 7 Jul 2003 14:42:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail1.microsoft.com (mail1.microsoft.com [131.107.3.125]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h67LgSqt093968 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 7 Jul 2003 14:42:28 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from trevorf@windows.microsoft.com) Received: from inet-vrs-01.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.8.27]) by mail1.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6659); Mon, 7 Jul 2003 14:42:25 -0700 Received: from 157.54.6.197 by inet-vrs-01.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (InterScan E-Mail VirusWall NT); Mon, 07 Jul 2003 14:42:25 -0700 Received: from red-imc-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.9.107]) by INET-HUB-06.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Mon, 7 Jul 2003 14:41:58 -0700 Received: from win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.0.39]) by red-imc-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Mon, 7 Jul 2003 14:41:57 -0700 Received: from WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.12.82]) by win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3788.0); Mon, 7 Jul 2003 14:41:56 -0700 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5.6940.0 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2003 14:41:37 -0700 Message-ID: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD34184A2@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Thread-Index: AcNEyennKgJjLK7dS6mn9JPziYowzgABFpKA From: "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, "Wahaj" <wahaj.khan@ascertia.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 07 Jul 2003 21:41:56.0908 (UTC) FILETIME=[96B8B6C0:01C344D0] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h67LgSqt093970 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> David, I think you are giving the impression that the criticality flag is an input into the decision on whether to process an extension - which is it not. If an application understands an extension, it must process the contents of the extension, regardless of criticality. Applications which do not understand the extension may skip processing of an extension marked as non-critical. That said; the definition of what constitutes to process the contents is typically vague. Even in you example - I have no clue what it means to process a registeredID. Trevor -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of David A. Cooper Sent: Monday, July 07, 2003 12:03 PM To: Wahaj Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Wahaj wrote: > Hi All, > > I need to know if a Certificate has got an extension marked as > critical, should the application process it ( By process I mean > perform some action & not merely recognizing it). So if an application > receives a user certificate having SubjectAltName marked as critical > and that application don't use or process SubjectAltName then should > the application discard or reject the user certificate based on the > fact it won't process it and only recognize it OR should it carry on > with it because it can recognize this extension. If an extension is marked critical, the application must process the extension or reject the certificate. For the SubjectAltName extension, X.509 states: "If the [SubjectAltName] extension is flagged critical, at least one of the name forms that is present shall be recognized and processed, otherwise the certificate shall be considered invalid." > As far as CRL extensions are concerned, it is clearly stated that if > they are marked as Critical they should be processed, if not the CRL > is not valid and is rejected. > > In RFC 3280 in certificate extension section it is stated " A > certificate using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters > a critical extension it does not recognize". Now what recognize mean ? > is it to use it (in other words process it) or merely read it and > not processing. I came across three different terms used. Ability to > Recognize, Process or Support. What is exactly meant by them. Are they > same or different ? > > Also it is stated in RFC 3280 that Basic Constaint MUST be set set as > critical. So should an application reject such CA certificate if Basic > Constraint is present but is not set as critical. Same for other > extensions ? No. This statement is indicating that CAs conforming to RFC 3280 must set the BasicConstraints extension to critical. There is no requirement for clients to only accept certificates issued by RFC 3280 compliant CAs. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h67J48qt084608 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Mon, 7 Jul 2003 12:04:08 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h67J48Sc084607 for ietf-pkix-bks; Mon, 7 Jul 2003 12:04:08 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from postmark.nist.gov (pushme.nist.gov [129.6.16.92]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h67J45qt084593 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 7 Jul 2003 12:04:05 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from david.cooper@nist.gov) Received: from nist.gov (st26.ncsl.nist.gov [129.6.54.72]) by postmark.nist.gov (8.12.5/8.12.5) with ESMTP id h67J3QPg013484; Mon, 7 Jul 2003 15:03:27 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <3F09C3E3.9000003@nist.gov> Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2003 15:02:59 -0400 From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.3.1) Gecko/20030428 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Wahaj <wahaj.khan@ascertia.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? References: <0ccd01c3423d$89338880$0600a8c0@IdentrusVA1> In-Reply-To: <0ccd01c3423d$89338880$0600a8c0@IdentrusVA1> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Wahaj wrote: > Hi All, > > I need to know if a Certificate has got an extension marked as > critical, should the application process it ( By process I mean > perform some action & not merely recognizing it). So if an application > receives a user certificate having SubjectAltName marked as critical > and that application don't use or process SubjectAltName then should > the application discard or reject the user certificate based on the > fact it won't process it and only recognize it OR should it carry on > with it because it can recognize this extension. If an extension is marked critical, the application must process the extension or reject the certificate. For the SubjectAltName extension, X.509 states: "If the [SubjectAltName] extension is flagged critical, at least one of the name forms that is present shall be recognized and processed, otherwise the certificate shall be considered invalid." > As far as CRL extensions are concerned, it is clearly stated that if > they are marked as Critical they should be processed, if not the CRL > is not valid and is rejected. > > In RFC 3280 in certificate extension section it is stated " A > certificate using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters > a critical extension it does not recognize". Now what recognize mean ? > is it to use it (in other words process it) or merely read it and > not processing. I came across three different terms used. Ability to > Recognize, Process or Support. What is exactly meant by them. Are they > same or different ? > > Also it is stated in RFC 3280 that Basic Constaint MUST be set set as > critical. So should an application reject such CA certificate if Basic > Constraint is present but is not set as critical. Same for other > extensions ? No. This statement is indicating that CAs conforming to RFC 3280 must set the BasicConstraints extension to critical. There is no requirement for clients to only accept certificates issued by RFC 3280 compliant CAs. Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h64F5cqt093559 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Fri, 4 Jul 2003 08:05:38 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h64F5cDY093558 for ietf-pkix-bks; Fri, 4 Jul 2003 08:05:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ns3.worldcall.net.pk ([203.81.192.10]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h64F5Tqt093552 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 4 Jul 2003 08:05:34 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from wahaj.khan@ascertia.com) Received: from IdentrusVA1 ([203.81.196.29]) by ns3.worldcall.net.pk (8.12.8+Sun/8.12.2) with SMTP id h64F4bJG000042 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 4 Jul 2003 21:04:38 +0600 (PKST) Message-ID: <0ccd01c3423d$89338880$0600a8c0@IdentrusVA1> From: "Wahaj" <wahaj.khan@ascertia.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: What is mean by recognizing critical extensions ? Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2003 20:04:13 +0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0CC7_01C34267.70A28670"; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA1 X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1106 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1106 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0CC7_01C34267.70A28670 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0CC8_01C34267.70A28670" ------=_NextPart_001_0CC8_01C34267.70A28670 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi All, I need to know if a Certificate has got an extension marked as critical, = should the application process it ( By process I mean perform some = action & not merely recognizing it). So if an application receives a = user certificate having SubjectAltName marked as critical and that = application don't use or process SubjectAltName then should the = application discard or reject the user certificate based on the fact it = won't process it and only recognize it OR should it carry on with it = because it can recognize this extension. As far as CRL extensions are concerned, it is clearly stated that if = they are marked as Critical they should be processed, if not the CRL is = not valid and is rejected.=20 In RFC 3280 in certificate extension section it is stated " A = certificate using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a = critical extension it does not recognize". Now what recognize mean ? is = it to use it (in other words process it) or merely read it and not = processing. I came across three different terms used. Ability to = Recognize, Process or Support. What is exactly meant by them. Are they = same or different ? Also it is stated in RFC 3280 that Basic Constaint MUST be set set as = critical. So should an application reject such CA certificate if Basic = Constraint is present but is not set as critical. Same for other = extensions ? Best Regards, Wahaj ------=_NextPart_001_0CC8_01C34267.70A28670 Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; = charset=3Dwindows-1252"><BASE=20 href=3D"file://F:\Data\Document\General\Ascertia\Ascertia Email = signature\"> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1106" name=3DGENERATOR> <STYLE></STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV>Hi All,</DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV>I need to know if a Certificate has got an extension marked as = critical,=20 should the application process it ( By process I mean perform some = action &=20 not merely recognizing it). So if an application receives a user = certificate=20 having SubjectAltName marked as critical and that application don't use = or=20 process SubjectAltName then should the application discard or reject the = user=20 certificate based on the fact it won't process it and only = recognize=20 it OR should it carry on with it because it can recognize this = extension.</DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV>As far as CRL extensions are concerned, it is clearly stated that = if they=20 are marked as Critical they should be processed, if not the CRL is not = valid and=20 is rejected. </DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV>In RFC 3280 in certificate extension section it is stated " A = certificate=20 using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical = extension=20 it does not recognize". Now what recognize mean ? is it to use it (in = other=20 words process it) or merely read it and not processing. I came = across three=20 different terms used. Ability to Recognize, Process or Support. What is = exactly=20 meant by them. Are they same or different ?</DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV>Also it is stated in RFC 3280 that Basic Constaint MUST be set set = as=20 critical. So should an application reject such CA certificate if = Basic=20 Constraint is present but is not set as critical. Same for other = extensions=20 ?</DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV>Best Regards,</DIV> <DIV> <DIV class=3DSection1> <DIV>Wahaj</DIV> <DIV> </DIV></DIV></DIV></BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_001_0CC8_01C34267.70A28670-- ------=_NextPart_000_0CC7_01C34267.70A28670 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAQAAoIIK3TCCAzEw ggIZoAMCAQICAQIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwOzELMAkGA1UEBhMCR0IxETAPBgNVBAoTCEFzY2Vy dGlhMRkwFwYDVQQDExBBc2NlcnRpYSBSb290IENBMB4XDTAzMDMwNDA4MTI1N1oXDTEyMDczMDEw NDIyOVowYDELMAkGA1UEBhMCR0IxETAPBgNVBAoTCEFzY2VydGlhMSYwJAYDVQQLEx1DbGFzcyAy IENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0eTEWMBQGA1UEAxMNQXNjZXJ0aWEgQ0EgMjCBnzANBgkqhkiG 9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAnRehtg8oWu+jYIkNJVR1ueHs7k8fClUiqUsrjmhuaI6SGjw0eusF FCCnDN2URjk+Un2OFHa3fn0lRFes/rIXvV0aB8pZGp8XJLO6u3pdfKJGnVeBtgBUr/YkXT/APo+z 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(localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h63FWJFK065837 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 08:32:19 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h63FWJMb065836 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 08:32:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h63FW6FK065820 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 08:32:15 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA16656; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 11:31:59 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307031531.LAA16656@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-ldap-crl-schema-01.txt Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2003 11:31:58 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure LDAP Schema for X.509 CRLs Author(s) : D. Chadwick, M. Sahalayev Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-ldap-crl-schema-01.txt Pages : 0 Date : 2003-7-3 This document describes an LDAP schema for X.509 CRLs. Each CRL is broken down into a set of attribute types. These attributes can then be stored in a CRL entry, or set of entries. Object classes are defined for these CRL entries. Each attribute type uses an existing LDAP syntax, so that no new matching rules need to be defined. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ldap-crl-schema-01.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. 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Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-3112227.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ldap-crl-schema-01.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-ldap-crl-schema-01.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-3112227.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h63G3Oqt003018 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 09:03:24 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h63G3Oix003017 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 09:03:24 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ns.malpani.biz (adsl-63-194-89-166.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net [63.194.89.166]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h63G3Kqt002981 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 09:03:20 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from ambarish@malpani.biz) Received: from nt1 (nt1.malpani.biz [192.168.25.13]) by ns.malpani.biz (8.12.9/8.12.9) with SMTP id h63G339A028559; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 09:03:04 -0700 From: "Ambarish Malpani" <ambarish@malpani.biz> To: "Yasir Khan" <yasir.khan@ascertia.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: A question about RFC-2560 (OCSP) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2003 09:04:06 -0700 Message-ID: <BFEMKEKPCAINGFNEOGMEGEMICBAA.ambarish@malpani.biz> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0022_01C34142.0E7966B0" X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2911.0) In-Reply-To: <004a01c33fb8$2e6e9fc0$1000a8c0@ascertia.com.pk> Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0022_01C34142.0E7966B0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hi Yasir, The client needs to "know" that it can trust the signer. This trust can happen in one of 3 ways: 1. The CA signs the response 2. The CA delegates signing authority to a VA to sign the response 3. The client has a separate signing relationship with a VA who does validation for it. In this case the signer is authorized to sign because of a private relationship between the client and the VA. Regards, Ambarish --------------------------------------------------------------------- Ambarish Malpani 650.759.9045 Malpani Consulting Services ambarish@malpani.biz http://www.malpani.biz -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]On Behalf Of Yasir Khan Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2003 3:00 AM To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: A question about RFC-2560 (OCSP) Hi, I have a question about 'Signed Response Acceptance Requirements' in RFC-2560 (OCSP), I am quoting the part of the document related to my question. 3.2 Signed Response Acceptance Requirements Prior to accepting a signed response as valid, OCSP clients SHALL confirm that: 1. The certificate identified in a received response corresponds to that which was identified in the corresponding request; 2. The signature on the response is valid; 3. The identity of the signer matches the intended recipient of the request. 4. The signer is currently authorized to sign the response. 5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to be correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent. 6. When available, the time at or before which newer information will be available about the status of the certificate (nextUpdate) is greater than the current time. Requirement 4 is very ambiguous, there comes many possibilities to satisfy this requirement e.g. a) EKU in signer certificate must contain OCSPSigning b) Signer certificate is not revoked c) Signer certificate is issued by the same CA that issed the target certificate to be checked for revocation d) Issuer of the signer certificate is explicitly trusted I want to know the exact check(s) to satisfy the requiremtent 4. Thanx, Regards, Yasir Khan www.ascertia.com ------=_NextPart_000_0022_01C34142.0E7966B0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; = charset=3Diso-8859-1"> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1170" name=3DGENERATOR> <STYLE></STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2>Hi=20 Yasir,</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2> The client needs to "know" that it can trust = the=20 signer. This trust can happen</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2>in one=20 of 3 ways:</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2>1. The=20 CA signs the response</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2>2. The=20 CA delegates signing authority to a VA to sign the = response</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2>3. The=20 client has a separate signing relationship with a VA who=20 does</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2>validation for it. In this case the signer is authorized to = sign=20 because</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2>of a=20 private relationship between the client and the VA.</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2>Regards,</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2>Ambarish</FONT></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN class=3D614340016-03072003><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <P><FONT=20 size=3D2>----------------------------------------------------------------= -----<BR>Ambarish=20 Malpani = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 650.759.9045<BR>Malpani Consulting=20 Services  = ; = =20 ambarish@malpani.biz  = ; = =20 <A href=3D"http://www.malpani.biz/"=20 target=3D_blank>http://www.malpani.biz</A><BR><BR></FONT></P> <BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr=20 style=3D"PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px = solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> <DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT = face=3DTahoma=20 size=3D2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> = owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org=20 [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]<B>On Behalf Of </B>Yasir=20 Khan<BR><B>Sent:</B> Tuesday, July 01, 2003 3:00 AM<BR><B>To:</B>=20 ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> A question about RFC-2560=20 (OCSP)<BR><BR></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Hi,</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I have a question about <EM>'Signed = Response=20 Acceptance Requirements' </EM>in RFC-2560 (OCSP), I am quoting the = part of the=20 document related to my question. </FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>3.2 Signed = Response=20 Acceptance Requirements</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><BR><FONT = color=3D#0000ff> Prior to=20 accepting a signed response as valid, OCSP clients SHALL confirm=20 that:</FONT></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><BR><FONT = color=3D#0000ff> 1. The=20 certificate identified in a received response corresponds to that = which was=20 identified in the corresponding request;<BR> 2. The = signature on=20 the response is valid;<BR> 3. The identity of the signer = matches=20 the intended recipient of the request.<BR> <FONT = color=3D#ff0000> 4.=20 The signer is currently authorized to sign the=20 response.<BR></FONT> 5. The time at which the status being = indicated is known to be correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently=20 recent.<BR> 6. When available, the time at or before which = newer=20 information will be available about the status of the certificate = (nextUpdate)=20 is greater than the current time.<BR></FONT></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Requirement 4 is very ambiguous, = there comes many=20 possibilities to satisfy this requirement e.g.</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>a) EKU in signer certificate must = contain=20 OCSPSigning</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>b) Signer certificate is not = revoked</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>c) Signer certificate is issued by = the same=20 CA that issed the target certificate to be checked for = revocation</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>d) Issuer of the signer certificate = is explicitly=20 trusted </FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I want to know the exact check(s) to = satisfy the=20 requiremtent 4.</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Thanx,</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Regards,</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Yasir Khan</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><A=20 = href=3D"http://www.ascertia.com">www.ascertia.com</A> </DIV></BLOCKQ= UOTE></FONT></BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_000_0022_01C34142.0E7966B0-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h63FWMFK065850 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 08:32:22 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h63FWMJF065849 for ietf-pkix-bks; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 08:32:22 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h63FWFFK065824 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 08:32:16 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA16698; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 11:32:09 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307031532.LAA16698@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-01.txt Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2003 11:32:08 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : LDAPv3 DN strings for use with PKIs Author(s) : D. Chadwick Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-01.txt Pages : 0 Date : 2003-7-3 RFC 2253 [2] standardises a set of strings that can be used to represent attribute types in LDAP distinguished names. This list is does not cover the full set of attribute types used in the distinguished names of issuers and subjects in public key certificates. This document standardises the strings needed for these additional attribute types. It also defines the Permanent Identifier attribute type which may be used to identify objects. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-01.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. 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This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certification Path Building Author(s) : M. Cooper, Y. Dzambasow Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt Pages : 59 Date : 2003-7-3 This document was written to provide 'best practice' guidance and recommendations to developers building X.509 public-key certification paths within their applications. By following the guidance and recommendations defined in this document, an application developer is more likely to develop a robust X.509 certificate enabled application that can build valid certification paths across a wide range of PKI environments. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. 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Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-3112237.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-00.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-7-3112237.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h631RKFK096303 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 2 Jul 2003 18:27:20 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h631RKov096302 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 2 Jul 2003 18:27:20 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au [202.12.144.17]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h631RIFK096294 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 2 Jul 2003 18:27:19 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id LAA07559 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 11:27:12 +1000 (EST) Received: from maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au(202.12.142.17) via SMTP by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au, id smtpd0pLj5A; Thu Jul 3 11:26:46 2003 Received: (from uucp@localhost) by maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id LAA12164 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 11:26:46 +1000 (EST) Received: from localhost(127.0.0.1), claiming to be "mail.cdn.telstra.com.au" via SMTP by localhost, id smtpd0Zlxdk; Thu Jul 3 11:26:29 2003 Received: from WSMSG0004.srv.dir.telstra.com (wsmsg0004.srv.dir.telstra.com [192.74.168.133]) by mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) with ESMTP id LAA00557 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 3 Jul 2003 11:26:29 +1000 (EST) content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.0.6249.0 Subject: IP addr: 01: use NULL instead of BOOLEAN for inherit Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2003 11:26:07 +1000 Message-ID: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F29806EE187A@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> Thread-Topic: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt Thread-Index: AcNA9we0XWFLjqzlEdeWHgAIxySt0gABo0SA From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by above.proper.com id h631RJFK096297 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> 1. Instead of a BOOLEAN type for which TRUE is required and FALSE is forbidden, simply use a NULL type. Change the type of the inherit fields in IPAddressChoice (2.2.3) and ASIdentifierChoice (3.2.3) to the following: IPAddressChoice ::= CHOICE { inherit NULL, -- Inherit from Issuer addressesOrRanges SEQUENCE OF IPAddressOrRange } ASIdentifierChoice ::= CHOICE { inherit NULL, -- Inherit from Issuer asIdsOrRanges SEQUENCE OF ASIdOrRange } The associated text describing the inherit fields (2.2.3.5 & 3.2.3.3) can be simplified accordingly. 2. It seems unnecessary to set these extensions to CRITICAL. A relying party is not misled by ignoring these extensions -- it simply learns nothing new about IP address and AS allocations. Perhaps making it CRITICAL is supposed to indicate that the certificate is binding a public key to these addresses instead of any other type of name so the subject (and subjectAltName) fields should be ignored. If this is the case, it may be better to formulate the extensions as OTHER-NAME types to be used in the subjectAltName extension (in which case no other names needs to be included). Perhaps making it CRITICAL is supposed to indicate that the certificate should only be used in, say, Secure BGP and not for, say, secure e-mail. If this is the case, defining a new purpose identifier for the extendedKeyUsage extension may be more appropriate. 3. Why does everything have to be sorted? Does it really make it easy or faster for CAs and relying parties? -----Original Message----- From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org [mailto:Internet-Drafts@ietf.org] Sent: Thursday, 3 July 2003 8:10 AM Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: IP addr: 01: draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt Title : X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers Author(s) : C. Lynn et al. Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt Pages : 24 Date : 2003-7-2 This document defines two private X.509 v3 certificate extensions. The first binds a list of IP address blocks, or prefixes, to the subject of a certificate. The second binds a list of Autonomous System Identifiers to the subject of a certificate. These extensions may be used to convey the authorization of the subject to use the IP addresses and Autonomous System identifiers contained in the extensions. http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h62MAMFK088186 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Wed, 2 Jul 2003 15:10:22 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h62MAMMo088185 for ietf-pkix-bks; Wed, 2 Jul 2003 15:10:22 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h62MALFK088179 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 2 Jul 2003 15:10:21 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA23610; Wed, 2 Jul 2003 18:10:19 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307022210.SAA23610@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2003 18:10:18 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers Author(s) : C. Lynn et al. Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt Pages : 24 Date : 2003-7-2 This document defines two private X.509 v3 certificate extensions. The first binds a list of IP address blocks, or prefixes, to the subject of a certificate. The second binds a list of Autonomous System Identifiers to the subject of a certificate. These extensions may be used to convey the authorization of the subject to use the IP addresses and Autonomous System identifiers contained in the extensions. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. 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(172.30.253.111) by mail with SMTP; 2 Jul 2003 14:07:13 -0000 Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2003 23:07:13 +0900 From: Masaki SHIMAOKA <shimaoka@secom.ne.jp> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: I-D: multi-domain PKI Interoperability Cc: mpki@jnsa.org Reply-To: mpki@jnsa.org, shimaoka@secom.ne.jp Message-Id: <20030702230029.2FB3.SHIMAOKA@secom.ne.jp> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: Becky! ver. 2.06.02 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi all, As Ryu said in last IETF meeting, I am writing a Inetenet-Draft for multi-domain PKI interoperability as a best current practice. This fruit is based on several multi-domain PKI interoperability experiments and documents. # This is an individual submission. Here is an abstract of this I-D. Title : Memorandum for multi-domain PKI Interoperability Author(s) : M. Shimaoka Filename : draft-shimaoka-multidomain-pki-00.txt Pages : 16 Date : June 2003 ===== Abstract ===== This memo is used to share the awareness necessary to deployment of multi-domain PKI. Scope of this memo is to establish trust relationship and interoperability between plural PKI domains. Both single-domain PKI and multi-domain PKI are established by the trust relationships between Certification Authorities (CAs). Typical and primitive PKI models are specified as single-domain PKI. Multi- domain PKI established by plural single-domain PKI is categorized as multi-trust point model and single-trust point model. Multi-trust point model is based on trust list model, and single-trust point model is based on cross-certification. ===== Abstract ===== The I-D has already published on IETF repository, but I revised several parts after that. So, please refer the following URLs: http://www.jnsa.org/mpki/ http://www.jnsa.org/mpki/draft-shimaoka-multidomain-pki-00.txt URL above invites you to our activity for multi-domain PKI interoperability framework, as you know as what reported in past IETF meetings. If you are interested in this, please let me know. Thanks in advance for any comments. ----- Masaki SHIMAOKA SECOM Trust.net System Engineering Dpt. Tel: +81 422 91 8493 (ext.3551) Fax: +81 422 45 0536 e-mail: shimaoka@secom.ne.jp Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h61JLXFK079828 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 12:21:33 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h61JLXrZ079827 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 12:21:33 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail2.microsoft.com (mail2.microsoft.com [131.107.3.124]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h61JLWFK079816 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 12:21:32 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from trevorf@windows.microsoft.com) Received: from INET-VRS-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.8.110]) by mail2.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6624); Tue, 1 Jul 2003 12:21:28 -0700 Received: from 157.54.6.150 by INET-VRS-02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (InterScan E-Mail VirusWall NT); Tue, 01 Jul 2003 12:21:28 -0700 Received: from red-imc-01.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.9.102]) by inet-hub-05.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Tue, 1 Jul 2003 12:21:29 -0700 Received: from win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.0.39]) by red-imc-01.redmond.corp.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0); Tue, 1 Jul 2003 12:21:28 -0700 Received: from WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.12.82]) by win-imc-01.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3788.0); Tue, 1 Jul 2003 12:21:27 -0700 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5.6940.0 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------InterScan_NT_MIME_Boundary" Subject: RE: SCVP Questions Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2003 12:20:46 -0700 Message-ID: <340B5AC242DEF44AAFCD6DC102B51CD341847A@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: SCVP Questions Thread-Index: AcM/2rutNpncH9htQaKCnpEUCWz+bwAJLrZQ From: "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@windows.microsoft.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 01 Jul 2003 19:21:27.0971 (UTC) FILETIME=[F8347F30:01C34005] Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------InterScan_NT_MIME_Boundary Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C34005.F98F9F29" ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34005.F98F9F29 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable See below =20 -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Faisal Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2003 5:36 AM To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: SCVP Questions =20 Hi, =20 Following things are not clear to me, can any one please do clear these: 1. If SCVPServer goes for revocation checking of QuriedCertificate and did not find valid revocation information about certificate from local repository and problem to connect ldap with reason that ldap is not responding or temperaly off and same with ocsp too. In this case this should not called as Internal Error, so revocation status should be Unknown for the certificate. [Trevor Freeman] If the ldap connection failed - unknown, if it succeeded but unavailable. In this case SCVPServer has not any valid OCSPResponse or CRL related QuriedCertificate and in WantBack revocation information is required, so how we can handle this case? 2. If SCVPServer recieves a request with one certificate for query and found a CRL in which issuer of the certificate is revoked but query certificate is not revoked in that CRL, what would be the response of the quried certificate, either Revoked or Good or ? [Trevor Freeman] Revoked. The chain you describe would fail the algorithm described in RFC3280 section 6. 3. If queried certificate is expired then what would be the response either Revoked or SCVPServer should process for revocation checking of the certificate? [Trevor Freeman] certPathNotValid Also if on expired certificate SCVPServer should send back status as revoked then what would be the revocation information about Revoked status? because we have not checked any OCSPResponse or CRL for this condition. There are more things but related above, may be your kind replies will do fix those automatically. =20 Thanks in advance for replies. Regards, Faisal Maqsood www.ascertia.com =20 ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34005.F98F9F29 Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <html> <head> <META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; = charset=3Dus-ascii"> <meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 10 (filtered)"> <base href=3D"file:///F:\_BackUp-FM\Email%20Signature\"> <style> <!-- /* Font Definitions */ @font-face {font-family:"MS Mincho"; panose-1:2 2 6 9 4 2 5 8 3 4;} @font-face {font-family:Tahoma; panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;} @font-face {font-family:"\@MS Mincho"; panose-1:2 2 6 9 4 2 5 8 3 4;} /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {margin:0pt; margin-bottom:.0001pt; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman";} a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {color:blue; text-decoration:underline;} a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed {color:blue; text-decoration:underline;} span.emailstyle17 {font-family:Arial; color:navy;} span.EmailStyle18 {font-family:Arial; color:navy;} @page Section1 {size:612.0pt 792.0pt; margin:72.0pt 90.0pt 72.0pt 90.0pt;} div.Section1 {page:Section1;} --> </style> </head> <body bgcolor=3Dwhite lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dblue> <div class=3DSection1> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>See below</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'> </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D2 = face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original = Message-----<br> <b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> = owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <b><span = style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Faisal<br> <b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> </span></font><font = size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span = style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>Tuesday, July 01, 2003</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span = style=3D'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Tahoma'> </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>5:36 = AM</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'><br> <b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br> <b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> SCVP = Questions</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'> </span></font></p> <div> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Hi,</span></font></p> </div> <div> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'> </span></font></p> </div> <div> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'> Following things are not clear to me, can any one please do clear = these:</span></font></p> </div> <p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'margin-left:72.0pt;text-indent:-18.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>1.</span></font><font size=3D1><span style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'> = </span></font>If SCVPServer goes for revocation checking of QuriedCertificate and did not find valid revocation information about certificate from local repository = and problem to connect ldap with reason that ldap is not responding or = temperaly off and same with ocsp too. In this case this should not = called as Internal Error, so revocation status should be Unknown for = the certificate.</p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><b><i><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy = face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy;font-weight:bold; font-style:italic'>[Trevor Freeman] If the ldap connection failed = – unknown, if it succeeded but unavailable.</span></font></i></b></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:72.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><br> In this case SCVPServer has not any valid OCSPResponse or CRL related = QuriedCertificate and in WantBack revocation information is required, so how we can handle = this case?</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'margin-left:72.0pt;text-indent:-18.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>2.</span></font><font size=3D1><span style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'> = </span></font>If SCVPServer recieves a request with one certificate for query and found a CRL in = which issuer of the certificate is revoked but query certificate is not = revoked in that CRL, what would be the response of the quried certificate, either = Revoked or Good or ?</p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><b><i><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy = face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy;font-weight:bold; font-style:italic'>[Trevor Freeman] Revoked. The chain you describe = would fail the algorithm described in RFC3280 section 6.</span></font></i></b></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'margin-left:72.0pt;text-indent:-18.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>3.</span></font><font size=3D1><span style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'> = </span></font>If queried certificate is expired then what would be the response either = Revoked or SCVPServer should process for revocation checking of the = certificate?</p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><b><i><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy = face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy;font-weight:bold; font-style:italic'>[Trevor Freeman] </span></font></i></b><b><font = size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span = style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial; color:navy;font-weight:bold'>certPathNotValid</span></font></b></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:72.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Also if on = expired certificate SCVPServer should send back status as revoked then what = would be the revocation information about Revoked status? because we have not = checked any OCSPResponse or CRL for this condition.</span></font></p> <div> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>There are more = things but related above, may be your kind replies will do fix those = automatically.</span></font></p> </div> <div> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'> </span></font></p> </div> <div> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Thanks in = advance for replies.</span></font></p> </div> <div> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Regards,</span></font></p> </div> <div> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Faisal = Maqsood</span></font></p> </div> <div> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><a href=3D"http://www.ascertia.com">www.ascertia.com</a></span></font></p> </div> <div> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:36.0pt'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'> </span></font></p> </div> </div> </body> </html> ------_=_NextPart_001_01C34005.F98F9F29-- --------------InterScan_NT_MIME_Boundary-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h61FNUFK060043 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 08:23:30 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h61FNUPm060042 for 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ns3.worldcall.net.pk ([203.81.192.10]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h61CccFK051490 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 05:38:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from faisal.maqsood@ascertia.com) Received: from ascertiafm ([203.81.193.60]) by ns3.worldcall.net.pk (8.12.8+Sun/8.12.2) with SMTP id h61CbsJG026793 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 18:37:55 +0600 (PKST) Message-ID: <007f01c33fcd$4e232ec0$1400a8c0@ascertiafm> From: "Faisal" <faisal.maqsood@ascertia.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: SCVP Questions Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2003 17:35:50 +0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA1; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0079_01C33FF7.3692ACC0" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600.0000 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0079_01C33FF7.3692ACC0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_001_007A_01C33FF7.3692ACC0" ------=_NextPart_001_007A_01C33FF7.3692ACC0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi, Following things are not clear to me, can any one please do clear = these: 1.. If SCVPServer goes for revocation checking of QuriedCertificate = and did not find valid revocation information about certificate from = local repository and problem to connect ldap with reason that ldap is = not responding or temperaly off and same with ocsp too. In this case = this should not called as Internal Error, so revocation status should be = Unknown for the certificate. In this case SCVPServer has not any valid OCSPResponse or CRL related = QuriedCertificate and in WantBack revocation information is required, so = how we can handle this case? 2.. If SCVPServer recieves a request with one certificate for query = and found a CRL in which issuer of the certificate is revoked but query = certificate is not revoked in that CRL, what would be the response of = the quried certificate, either Revoked or Good or ? 3.. If queried certificate is expired then what would be the response = either Revoked or SCVPServer should process for revocation checking of = the certificate? Also if on expired certificate SCVPServer should send back status as = revoked then what would be the revocation information about Revoked = status? because we have not checked any OCSPResponse or CRL for this = condition. There are more things but related above, may be your kind replies will = do fix those automatically. Thanks in advance for replies. Regards, Faisal Maqsood www.ascertia.com ------=_NextPart_001_007A_01C33FF7.3692ACC0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; = charset=3Dwindows-1252"><BASE=20 href=3D"file://F:\_BackUp-FM\Email Signature\"> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2600.0" name=3DGENERATOR> <STYLE></STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV>Hi,</DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV> Following things are not clear to me, can any = one please=20 do clear these:</DIV> <OL> <LI>If SCVPServer goes for revocation checking of QuriedCertificate = and did=20 not find valid revocation information about certificate from local = repository=20 and problem to connect ldap with reason that ldap is not = responding=20 or temperaly off and same with ocsp too. In this case = this=20 should not called as Internal Error, so revocation = status should be=20 Unknown for the certificate.<BR>In this case SCVPServer has not any = valid=20 OCSPResponse or CRL related QuriedCertificate and in WantBack = revocation=20 information is required, so how we can handle this case?</LI> <LI>If SCVPServer recieves a request with one certificate for query = and found=20 a CRL in which issuer of the certificate is revoked but query = certificate is=20 not revoked in that CRL, what would be the response of the quried = certificate,=20 either Revoked or Good or ?</LI> <LI>If queried certificate is expired then what would be the response = either=20 Revoked or SCVPServer should process for revocation checking of the=20 certificate?<BR>Also if on expired certificate SCVPServer should send = back=20 status as revoked then what would be the revocation information about = Revoked=20 status? because we have not checked any OCSPResponse or CRL for this=20 condition.</LI></OL> <DIV>There are more things but related above, may be your kind replies = will do=20 fix those automatically.</DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV>Thanks in advance for replies.</DIV> <DIV>Regards,</DIV> <DIV>Faisal Maqsood</DIV> <DIV><A href=3D"http://www.ascertia.com">www.ascertia.com</A></DIV> <DIV> </DIV></BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_001_007A_01C33FF7.3692ACC0-- ------=_NextPart_000_0079_01C33FF7.3692ACC0 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; 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Tue, 1 Jul 2003 04:23:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h61BNaAE046715 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 04:23:36 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h61BNZFK046710 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 04:23:36 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA07283; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 07:23:33 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200307011123.HAA07283@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt Date: Tue, 01 Jul 2003 07:23:33 -0400 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) Author(s) : A. Malpani, R. Housley, T. Freeman Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt Pages : 44 Date : 2003-6-30 SCVP allows a client to offload certificate handling to a server. The server can provide the client with a variety of valuable information about the certificate, such as whether the certificate is valid, a certification path to a trust anchor, and revocation status. SCVP has many purposes, including simplifying client implementations and allowing companies to centralize trust and policy management. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-6-30151523.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2003-6-30151523.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from above.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h61A4QFK034796 for <ietf-pkix-bks@above.proper.com>; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 03:04:26 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h61A4QBC034795 for ietf-pkix-bks; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 03:04:26 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ns3.worldcall.net.pk ([203.81.192.10]) by above.proper.com (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h61A4AFK034675 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 03:04:11 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from yasir.khan@ascertia.com) Received: from ascertia3 (host136.worldcall.net.pk [203.81.195.136] (may be forged)) by ns3.worldcall.net.pk (8.12.8+Sun/8.12.2) with SMTP id h61A3BJG016319 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 1 Jul 2003 16:03:12 +0600 (PKST) Message-ID: <004a01c33fb8$2e6e9fc0$1000a8c0@ascertia.com.pk> Reply-To: "Yasir Khan" <yasir.khan@ascertia.com> From: "Yasir Khan" <yasir.khan@ascertia.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: A question about RFC-2560 (OCSP) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2003 14:59:34 +0500 Organization: Ascertia Limited. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA1; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0040_01C33FE1.6261E480" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4910.0300 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0040_01C33FE1.6261E480 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0041_01C33FE1.6261E480" ------=_NextPart_001_0041_01C33FE1.6261E480 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi, I have a question about 'Signed Response Acceptance Requirements' in = RFC-2560 (OCSP), I am quoting the part of the document related to my = question.=20 3.2 Signed Response Acceptance Requirements Prior to accepting a signed response as valid, OCSP clients SHALL = confirm that: 1. The certificate identified in a received response corresponds to = that which was identified in the corresponding request; 2. The signature on the response is valid; 3. The identity of the signer matches the intended recipient of the = request. 4. The signer is currently authorized to sign the response. 5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to be = correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent. 6. When available, the time at or before which newer information will = be available about the status of the certificate (nextUpdate) is greater = than the current time. Requirement 4 is very ambiguous, there comes many possibilities to = satisfy this requirement e.g. a) EKU in signer certificate must contain OCSPSigning b) Signer certificate is not revoked c) Signer certificate is issued by the same CA that issed the target = certificate to be checked for revocation d) Issuer of the signer certificate is explicitly trusted=20 I want to know the exact check(s) to satisfy the requiremtent 4. Thanx, Regards, Yasir Khan www.ascertia.com=20 ------=_NextPart_001_0041_01C33FE1.6261E480 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1" = http-equiv=3DContent-Type> <META content=3D"MSHTML 5.00.3502.5390" name=3DGENERATOR> <STYLE></STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Hi,</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I have a question about <EM>'Signed = Response=20 Acceptance Requirements' </EM>in RFC-2560 (OCSP), I am quoting the part = of the=20 document related to my question. </FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT color=3D#0000ff face=3DArial size=3D2>3.2 Signed = Response Acceptance=20 Requirements</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><BR><FONT color=3D#0000ff> = Prior to=20 accepting a signed response as valid, OCSP clients SHALL confirm=20 that:</FONT></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><BR><FONT color=3D#0000ff> = 1. The=20 certificate identified in a received response corresponds to that which = was=20 identified in the corresponding request;<BR> 2. The = signature on the=20 response is valid;<BR> 3. The identity of the signer matches = the=20 intended recipient of the request.<BR> <FONT color=3D#ff0000> = 4. The=20 signer is currently authorized to sign the = response.<BR></FONT> 5.=20 The time at which the status being indicated is known to be correct = (thisUpdate)=20 is sufficiently recent.<BR> 6. When available, the time at = or before=20 which newer information will be available about the status of the = certificate=20 (nextUpdate) is greater than the current time.<BR></FONT></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Requirement 4 is very ambiguous, there = comes many=20 possibilities to satisfy this requirement e.g.</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>a) EKU in signer certificate must = contain=20 OCSPSigning</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>b) Signer certificate is not = revoked</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>c) Signer certificate is issued by = the same CA=20 that issed the target certificate to be checked for = revocation</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>d) Issuer of the signer certificate is = explicitly=20 trusted </FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I want to know the exact check(s) to = satisfy the=20 requiremtent 4.</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Thanx,</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Regards,</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Yasir Khan</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><A=20 href=3D"http://www.ascertia.com">www.ascertia.com</A> </DIV></FONT><= /BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_001_0041_01C33FE1.6261E480-- ------=_NextPart_000_0040_01C33FE1.6261E480 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; 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- Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Peter Gutmann
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- RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Stephen Kent
- RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Trevor Freeman
- RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Peter Gutmann
- RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Stephen Kent
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- RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Peter Gutmann
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- Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Stephen Kent
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- Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Leif Johansson
- Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Stephen Kent
- Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Leif Johansson
- RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Adrian McCullagh
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- RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Stephen Kent
- RE: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Peter Gutmann
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- Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… Stephen Kent
- Re: Microsoft and multi-valued RDNs (was: draft m… David Chadwick
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