Re: [pkix] Considerations about the need to resume PKIX work

Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> Thu, 20 July 2017 12:15 UTC

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To: "Dr. Pala" <director@openca.org>, PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <c989a9f9-8079-2fd7-085f-c4dcde10d080@openca.org>
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2017 14:15:21 +0200
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Considerations about the need to resume PKIX work
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Max,

If we stick to the problem with outdated crypto algorithms, the only reasonable solution is updating keys (and software...) when needed.  The latter is worked on in the IETF TEEP WG.

Regarding the state of PKI, none of the PKIX enrollment protocols support MFA or key attestations.  In fact, the entire PKIX WG were *against* such ideas (when raised by me) when EST was on the "drawing board". FIDO alliance products (of course) have this as a core facility.

Anders