Re: Signing Untrusted SCVP?

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Fri, 02 April 2004 22:55 UTC

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Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2004 16:45:29 -0500
To: Dave Engberg <dengberg@corestreet.com>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: Signing Untrusted SCVP?
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
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Dave,

I agree that one might not want to invest as much effort and money in 
securing a DPD server as a DPV server. But that does not necessarily 
translate into removing the need for signatures on responses from 
such servers. If responses from a DPD server are spoofed, a client 
may be subject to a form of DoS attack, as it tries to make use of 
bogus certs formed chains intended to maximize the amount of crypto 
processing the client does, before realizing that the chain is bad. 
Or certs might be returned that conflict with certs from some other 
DPD server.  Without signed responses it could be very hard to 
determine what went wrong and what servers ought to be avoided, based 
on bad behavior.

Steve