Re: RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname
"David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> Fri, 30 November 2007 23:52 UTC
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Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 17:36:17 -0500
From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Subject: Re: RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname
References: <tslwss04z9g.fsf@mit.edu> <474FF00E.3080305@cs.tcd.ie>
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Early this year, there was a email thread about a similar topic under the subject line "URN in subjectAltName" (see http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02513.html). I thought the rough consensus in that discussion was against changing the rules for the uniformResourceIdentifier choice in subjectAltName and that if there is a need to include such names in a certificate then a new name form should be defined (in a document other than 3280bis). As for the specific proposal, I have two concerns with the proposed text for the name constraints extension: For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name so a name constraint URI can only match a subjetAltName URI where the scheme-specific-part includes a fully qualified domain name or IP address as the host. If a certificate contains a URI with no host part then that certificate cannot match the permittedSubtrees of a name constraint. If a certificate contains a URI with no host part then that certificate always matches the excludedSubtrees of any URI name constraint. 1) The first sentence states that a match between a constraint and a subject name may occur when the subject name includes an IP address, but the second paragraph only explains how to specify DNS name constraints. If a name constraint uses DNS names to specify a constraint, can that be compared against a subject name that has an IP address? 2) While the rules for dealing with subject names that do not specify a host fail safe, they result in different matching rules (i.e., rules for determining whether a given name falls within a given subtree) depending on whether the comparison is being performed for a name that appears as a permitted or excluded subtree. Dave Stephen Farrell wrote: > Sam Hartman wrote: > >> RFC 3286 does not require that schemes have an authority component. >> For example take a look at RFC 4622. It does support authority >> components, but if I were going to issue a certificate for an XMPP >> identity I would actually expect that which server the end user >> authenticates to would not be important for the whether they were >> reaching a given subject. Other URIs simply don't use authority. >> However the URI in subjectAltName requires the host portion to be >> present, which requires an authority section. >> > > Good catch. > >> I'd like the WG to consider what to do about this. Options include: >> >> * Decide that this name type is not appropriate for URI schemes that tend not to use authorities. >> >> * Relax the rules. >> > > I think relaxing is probably the better approach. > > So that'd mean removing the requirement that the host part be present in > subjectAltName URIs and adding something to NameCosntraints that says > that URIs can only really match when the subjectAltName does in fact > contain a host part. > > That seems to mean that a name constraint with an excludedSubtrees > URI will always match a subjectAltName URI that has no host part > and a name constraint with a permittedSubtrees URI will never > match a subjectAltName URI that has no host part. > > I reckon that that's ok. > > Some proposed edits reflecting that are below. > > > I strongly urge the WG not to take on the task of name constraints for > URIs without authority in this document. > > Absolutely agree. > > Regards, > Stephen. > > Possible Edits: > > ----- > > 4.2.1.6, paragraphs 7 & 8 OLD: > > When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be > stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name > MUST NOT be a relative URL, and it MUST follow the URL syntax and > encoding rules specified in [RFC 3986]. The name MUST include both a > scheme (e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. The > scheme-specific-part MUST include a fully qualified domain name or IP > address as the host. Rules for encoding internationalized resource > identifiers (IRIs) are specified in section 7.4. > > As specified in [RFC 3986], the scheme name is not case-sensitive > (e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part is also not > case-sensitive, but other components of the scheme-specific-part may > be case-sensitive. Rules for comparing URIs are specified in section > 7.4. > > 4.2.1.6, paragraphs 7 & 8 NEW: > > When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be > stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name > MUST NOT be a relative URL, and it MUST follow the URL syntax and > encoding rules specified in [RFC 3986]. The name MUST include both a > scheme (e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. Rules for > encoding internationalized resource identifiers (IRIs) are specified > in section 7.4. > > As specified in [RFC 3986], the scheme name is not case-sensitive > (e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part, if present, > is also not case-sensitive, but other components of the > scheme-specific-part may be case-sensitive. Rules for comparing URIs > are specified in section 7.4. > > ----- > > 4.2.1.10, 6th paragraph, OLD: > > For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name. The > constraint MAY specify a host or a domain. Examples would be > "host.example.com" and ".example.com". When the the constraint > begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one or more subdomains. > That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by both > host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint > ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the > constraint does not begin with a period, it specifies a host. > > 4.2.1.10, 6th paragraph, NEW: > > For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name so > a name constraint URI can only match a subjetAltName URI where the > scheme-specific-part includes a fully qualified domain name or IP > address as the host. If a certificate contains a URI with no host > part then that certificate cannot match the permittedSubtrees of > a name constraint. If a certificate contains a URI with no host > part then that certificate always matches the excludedSubtrees of > any URI name constraint. > > The constraint MAY specify a host or a domain. Examples would be > "host.example.com" and ".example.com". When the the constraint > begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one or more subdomains. > That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by both > host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint > ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the > constraint does not begin with a period, it specifies a host. Received: from proxy.fiberhost.ru (101.92.95.77.fiberhost.ru [77.95.92.101] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lAUMubgP098450 for <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org>; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 15:56:38 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ietf-pjyeiuibzi@flair.com) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 15:56:37 -0700 (MST) Received: from $FROM_NAME $FROM_NAME (10.12.15.18) by proxy.fiberhost.ru (PowerMTA(TM) v3.2r4) id hfp79o96d41j79 for <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org>; Sat, 1 Dec 2007 01:56:39 +0300 Message-Id: <20071201045639.25183.qmail@proxy.fiberhost.ru> To: <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org> Subject: November 72% OFF From: VIAGRA ® Official Site <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Antivirus: avast! 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To send a secure message from your Inbox, log on at <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.pjlxb.com">www.gsdad.com</a></font> </p></td></tr></table></html></style> Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUMakhP097069 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 30 Nov 2007 15:36:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAUMakG1097068; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 15:36:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp.nist.gov (rimp1.nist.gov [129.6.16.226]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUMaikG097061 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 15:36:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from david.cooper@nist.gov) Received: from postmark.nist.gov (emailha2.nist.gov [129.6.16.198]) by smtp.nist.gov (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id lAUMacXH031987 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 17:36:39 -0500 Received: from st26.ncsl.nist.gov (st26.ncsl.nist.gov [129.6.54.72]) by postmark.nist.gov (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id lAUMbBdg027813 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 17:37:12 -0500 Message-ID: <47509061.40402@nist.gov> Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 17:36:17 -0500 From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (X11/20070914) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname References: <tslwss04z9g.fsf@mit.edu> <474FF00E.3080305@cs.tcd.ie> In-Reply-To: <474FF00E.3080305@cs.tcd.ie> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-NIST-MailScanner-Information: X-NIST-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-NIST-MailScanner-From: david.cooper@nist.gov Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Early this year, there was a email thread about a similar topic under the subject line "URN in subjectAltName" (see http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02513.html). I thought the rough consensus in that discussion was against changing the rules for the uniformResourceIdentifier choice in subjectAltName and that if there is a need to include such names in a certificate then a new name form should be defined (in a document other than 3280bis). As for the specific proposal, I have two concerns with the proposed text for the name constraints extension: For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name so a name constraint URI can only match a subjetAltName URI where the scheme-specific-part includes a fully qualified domain name or IP address as the host. If a certificate contains a URI with no host part then that certificate cannot match the permittedSubtrees of a name constraint. If a certificate contains a URI with no host part then that certificate always matches the excludedSubtrees of any URI name constraint. 1) The first sentence states that a match between a constraint and a subject name may occur when the subject name includes an IP address, but the second paragraph only explains how to specify DNS name constraints. If a name constraint uses DNS names to specify a constraint, can that be compared against a subject name that has an IP address? 2) While the rules for dealing with subject names that do not specify a host fail safe, they result in different matching rules (i.e., rules for determining whether a given name falls within a given subtree) depending on whether the comparison is being performed for a name that appears as a permitted or excluded subtree. Dave Stephen Farrell wrote: > Sam Hartman wrote: > >> RFC 3286 does not require that schemes have an authority component. >> For example take a look at RFC 4622. It does support authority >> components, but if I were going to issue a certificate for an XMPP >> identity I would actually expect that which server the end user >> authenticates to would not be important for the whether they were >> reaching a given subject. Other URIs simply don't use authority. >> However the URI in subjectAltName requires the host portion to be >> present, which requires an authority section. >> > > Good catch. > >> I'd like the WG to consider what to do about this. Options include: >> >> * Decide that this name type is not appropriate for URI schemes that tend not to use authorities. >> >> * Relax the rules. >> > > I think relaxing is probably the better approach. > > So that'd mean removing the requirement that the host part be present in > subjectAltName URIs and adding something to NameCosntraints that says > that URIs can only really match when the subjectAltName does in fact > contain a host part. > > That seems to mean that a name constraint with an excludedSubtrees > URI will always match a subjectAltName URI that has no host part > and a name constraint with a permittedSubtrees URI will never > match a subjectAltName URI that has no host part. > > I reckon that that's ok. > > Some proposed edits reflecting that are below. > > > I strongly urge the WG not to take on the task of name constraints for > URIs without authority in this document. > > Absolutely agree. > > Regards, > Stephen. > > Possible Edits: > > ----- > > 4.2.1.6, paragraphs 7 & 8 OLD: > > When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be > stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name > MUST NOT be a relative URL, and it MUST follow the URL syntax and > encoding rules specified in [RFC 3986]. The name MUST include both a > scheme (e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. The > scheme-specific-part MUST include a fully qualified domain name or IP > address as the host. Rules for encoding internationalized resource > identifiers (IRIs) are specified in section 7.4. > > As specified in [RFC 3986], the scheme name is not case-sensitive > (e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part is also not > case-sensitive, but other components of the scheme-specific-part may > be case-sensitive. Rules for comparing URIs are specified in section > 7.4. > > 4.2.1.6, paragraphs 7 & 8 NEW: > > When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be > stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name > MUST NOT be a relative URL, and it MUST follow the URL syntax and > encoding rules specified in [RFC 3986]. The name MUST include both a > scheme (e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. Rules for > encoding internationalized resource identifiers (IRIs) are specified > in section 7.4. > > As specified in [RFC 3986], the scheme name is not case-sensitive > (e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part, if present, > is also not case-sensitive, but other components of the > scheme-specific-part may be case-sensitive. Rules for comparing URIs > are specified in section 7.4. > > ----- > > 4.2.1.10, 6th paragraph, OLD: > > For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name. The > constraint MAY specify a host or a domain. Examples would be > "host.example.com" and ".example.com". When the the constraint > begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one or more subdomains. > That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by both > host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint > ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the > constraint does not begin with a period, it specifies a host. > > 4.2.1.10, 6th paragraph, NEW: > > For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name so > a name constraint URI can only match a subjetAltName URI where the > scheme-specific-part includes a fully qualified domain name or IP > address as the host. If a certificate contains a URI with no host > part then that certificate cannot match the permittedSubtrees of > a name constraint. If a certificate contains a URI with no host > part then that certificate always matches the excludedSubtrees of > any URI name constraint. > > The constraint MAY specify a host or a domain. Examples would be > "host.example.com" and ".example.com". When the the constraint > begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one or more subdomains. > That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by both > host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint > ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the > constraint does not begin with a period, it specifies a host. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUKhYP3089746 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 30 Nov 2007 13:43:34 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAUKhYB6089745; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 13:43:34 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from [10.20.30.108] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUKhP3T089731 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 30 Nov 2007 13:43:26 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org) Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p0624080fc376260282a0@[10.20.30.108]> In-Reply-To: <tslabovv6b7.fsf@mit.edu> References: <tslwss04z9g.fsf@mit.edu> <474FF00E.3080305@cs.tcd.ie> <p0624080ac3760b62452f@[10.20.30.108]> <tslabovv6b7.fsf@mit.edu> Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 12:43:24 -0800 To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Subject: Re: RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 3:15 PM -0500 11/30/07, Sam Hartman wrote: > >>>>> "Paul" == Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> writes: > > Paul> Stephen's proposed wording works for me. I think it is daffy > Paul> for a CA to say that a public key identifies a URL that has > Paul> no hostname, but CAs do daffy things sometimes. > >Really? I think a cert for xmpp:hartmans@jis.mit.edu issued by >ca.mit.edu (I forget what subject name that CA actually uses) would be >a perfectly fine cert for me to have. > >I think it would be more useful than >xmpp://mit.edu/hartmans@jis.mit.edu. Note that as far as 3280 and the >URI specs are concerned, the first form (xmpp:hartmans@jis.mit.edu) >has no host name. Whoops, you're clearly right. I had forgotten that we had some mailto-like URLs. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUKFBNE087722 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 30 Nov 2007 13:15:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAUKFBcP087721; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 13:15:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from carter-zimmerman.suchdamage.org (dhcp-18-188-10-61.dyn.mit.edu [18.188.10.61]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUKF963087706 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 13:15:10 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from hartmans@mit.edu) Received: by carter-zimmerman.suchdamage.org (Postfix, from userid 8042) id EF49C4815; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 15:15:08 -0500 (EST) From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname References: <tslwss04z9g.fsf@mit.edu> <474FF00E.3080305@cs.tcd.ie> <p0624080ac3760b62452f@[10.20.30.108]> Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 15:15:08 -0500 In-Reply-To: <p0624080ac3760b62452f@[10.20.30.108]> (Paul Hoffman's message of "Fri, 30 Nov 2007 10:49:07 -0800") Message-ID: <tslabovv6b7.fsf@mit.edu> User-Agent: Gnus/5.110006 (No Gnus v0.6) Emacs/21.4 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> >>>>> "Paul" == Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> writes: Paul> Stephen's proposed wording works for me. I think it is daffy Paul> for a CA to say that a public key identifies a URL that has Paul> no hostname, but CAs do daffy things sometimes. Really? I think a cert for xmpp:hartmans@jis.mit.edu issued by ca.mit.edu (I forget what subject name that CA actually uses) would be a perfectly fine cert for me to have. I think it would be more useful than xmpp://mit.edu/hartmans@jis.mit.edu. Note that as far as 3280 and the URI specs are concerned, the first form (xmpp:hartmans@jis.mit.edu) has no host name. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUInHJ1080044 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 30 Nov 2007 11:49:17 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAUInH0A080043; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 11:49:17 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from [10.20.30.108] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUIn9Bg080021 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 30 Nov 2007 11:49:10 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org) Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p0624080ac3760b62452f@[10.20.30.108]> In-Reply-To: <474FF00E.3080305@cs.tcd.ie> References: <tslwss04z9g.fsf@mit.edu> <474FF00E.3080305@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 10:49:07 -0800 To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Subject: Re: RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen's proposed wording works for me. I think it is daffy for a CA to say that a public key identifies a URL that has no hostname, but CAs do daffy things sometimes. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUGYDEp069379 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 30 Nov 2007 09:34:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAUGYDnB069378; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 09:34:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ns4.neustar.com (ns4.neustar.com [156.154.24.139]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUGYCUX069372 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 09:34:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ietf@ietf.org) Received: from stiedprstage1.ietf.org (stiedprstage1.va.neustar.com [10.31.47.10]) by ns4.neustar.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C56732ACCA; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 16:34:11 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ietf by stiedprstage1.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.43) id 1Iy8od-0007Y7-If; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 11:34:11 -0500 X-test-idtracker: no To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org> From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> Subject: Last Call: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis (Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile) to Proposed Standard Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Message-Id: <E1Iy8od-0007Y7-If@stiedprstage1.ietf.org> Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 11:34:11 -0500 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following document: - 'Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile ' <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-09.txt> as a Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2007-12-14. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. The file can be obtained via http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-09.txt IESG discussion can be tracked via https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=view_id&dTag=13078&rfc_flag=0 Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUBCEWF029162 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 30 Nov 2007 04:12:14 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAUBCEM2029161; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 04:12:14 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from imx2.tcd.ie (imx2.tcd.ie [134.226.1.156]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUBCDEm029154 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 04:12:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie) Received: from Vams.imx2 (imx2.tcd.ie [134.226.1.156]) by imx2.tcd.ie (Postfix) with SMTP id 5A30768033; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 11:12:12 +0000 (GMT) Received: from imx2.tcd.ie ([134.226.1.156]) by imx2.tcd.ie ([134.226.1.156]) with SMTP (gateway) id A034EF4EDE5; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 11:12:12 +0000 Received: from [134.226.36.180] (sfarrell.dsg.cs.tcd.ie [134.226.36.180]) by imx2.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F6CC68033; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 11:12:12 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: <474FF00E.3080305@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 11:12:14 +0000 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.9 (Windows/20071031) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname References: <tslwss04z9g.fsf@mit.edu> In-Reply-To: <tslwss04z9g.fsf@mit.edu> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-AntiVirus-Status: MessageID = A134EF4EDE5 X-AntiVirus-Status: Host: imx2.tcd.ie X-AntiVirus-Status: Action Taken: X-AntiVirus-Status: NONE X-AntiVirus-Status: Checked by TCD Vexira. (version=1.57.6 VDF=9.115.14) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Sam Hartman wrote: > RFC 3286 does not require that schemes have an authority component. > For example take a look at RFC 4622. It does support authority > components, but if I were going to issue a certificate for an XMPP > identity I would actually expect that which server the end user > authenticates to would not be important for the whether they were > reaching a given subject. Other URIs simply don't use authority. > However the URI in subjectAltName requires the host portion to be > present, which requires an authority section. Good catch. > > > I'd like the WG to consider what to do about this. Options include: > > * Decide that this name type is not appropriate for URI schemes that tend not to use authorities. > > * Relax the rules. I think relaxing is probably the better approach. So that'd mean removing the requirement that the host part be present in subjectAltName URIs and adding something to NameCosntraints that says that URIs can only really match when the subjectAltName does in fact contain a host part. That seems to mean that a name constraint with an excludedSubtrees URI will always match a subjectAltName URI that has no host part and a name constraint with a permittedSubtrees URI will never match a subjectAltName URI that has no host part. I reckon that that's ok. Some proposed edits reflecting that are below. > I strongly urge the WG not to take on the task of name constraints for URIs without authority in this document. Absolutely agree. Regards, Stephen. Possible Edits: ----- 4.2.1.6, paragraphs 7 & 8 OLD: When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name MUST NOT be a relative URL, and it MUST follow the URL syntax and encoding rules specified in [RFC 3986]. The name MUST include both a scheme (e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. The scheme-specific-part MUST include a fully qualified domain name or IP address as the host. Rules for encoding internationalized resource identifiers (IRIs) are specified in section 7.4. As specified in [RFC 3986], the scheme name is not case-sensitive (e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part is also not case-sensitive, but other components of the scheme-specific-part may be case-sensitive. Rules for comparing URIs are specified in section 7.4. 4.2.1.6, paragraphs 7 & 8 NEW: When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name MUST NOT be a relative URL, and it MUST follow the URL syntax and encoding rules specified in [RFC 3986]. The name MUST include both a scheme (e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. Rules for encoding internationalized resource identifiers (IRIs) are specified in section 7.4. As specified in [RFC 3986], the scheme name is not case-sensitive (e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part, if present, is also not case-sensitive, but other components of the scheme-specific-part may be case-sensitive. Rules for comparing URIs are specified in section 7.4. ----- 4.2.1.10, 6th paragraph, OLD: For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name. The constraint MAY specify a host or a domain. Examples would be "host.example.com" and ".example.com". When the the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one or more subdomains. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint does not begin with a period, it specifies a host. 4.2.1.10, 6th paragraph, NEW: For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name so a name constraint URI can only match a subjetAltName URI where the scheme-specific-part includes a fully qualified domain name or IP address as the host. If a certificate contains a URI with no host part then that certificate cannot match the permittedSubtrees of a name constraint. If a certificate contains a URI with no host part then that certificate always matches the excludedSubtrees of any URI name constraint. The constraint MAY specify a host or a domain. Examples would be "host.example.com" and ".example.com". When the the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one or more subdomains. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint does not begin with a period, it specifies a host. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUB7dRK028455 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 30 Nov 2007 04:07:39 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAUB7dqL028453; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 04:07:39 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from a.mx.secunet.com (a.mx.secunet.com [213.68.205.161]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAUB7aKv028423 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 04:07:38 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Johannes.Merkle@secunet.com) Received: from localhost (alg3 [127.0.0.1]) by a.mx.secunet.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82A0620C09C; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 12:07:34 +0100 (CET) X-Virus-Scanned: by secunet Received: from mail-srv1.secumail.de (unknown [10.53.40.200]) by a.mx.secunet.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3894620C078; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 12:07:34 +0100 (CET) Received: from [10.208.1.212] ([10.208.1.212]) by mail-srv1.secumail.de with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Fri, 30 Nov 2007 12:07:34 +0100 Message-ID: <474FEEF5.5040800@secunet.com> Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 12:07:33 +0100 From: Johannes Merkle <johannes.merkle@secunet.com> User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.2 (Windows/20050317) X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071121145750.3114833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D32032E20B33B@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071126150153.5DA3133C21@delta.rtfm.com> In-Reply-To: <20071126150153.5DA3133C21@delta.rtfm.com> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.91.0.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-OriginalArrivalTime: 30 Nov 2007 11:07:34.0185 (UTC) FILETIME=[35665990:01C83341] Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Eric, > > I get my first DSA certificate which we'll say is signed by SHA-256. > I never sign with SHA-1. Without some indicator in the certificate, > people can go around impersonating me as long as they can break > SHA-1 and there's nothing I can do about it. That seems not so > OK. To me, this seems to be just one example of a general problem. If certain services accept / deploy weak identification and authentification methods, anybody can impersonate you there. This is the case with ebay accounts and could also happen with CAs deploying poor identification methods. Services / RP accepting MD4 based signatures are just another example. Of course, the hash function downgrade attack abuses a real signature and at first sight, it may seem logical to call for measures in the PKI to prevent that. But I can also understand PKIX being reluctant about including extensions / attributes in certificates (and hence, adding complexity and potential problems) to counter an attack which are leveraged by third parties applying poor security, and which can still occur on a different level. Johannes Merkle Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAU4BKWK002314 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 29 Nov 2007 21:11:20 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAU4BJCk002313; Thu, 29 Nov 2007 21:11:20 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-dub.microsoft.com (smtp-dub.microsoft.com [213.199.138.191]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAU4BHuo002306 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 29 Nov 2007 21:11:18 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stefans@microsoft.com) Received: from DUB-EXHUB-C301.europe.corp.microsoft.com (65.53.213.91) by DUB-EXGWY-E801.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.129.1) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.1.222.3; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 04:11:16 +0000 Received: from EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.221.79]) by DUB-EXHUB-C301.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.213.91]) with mapi; Fri, 30 Nov 2007 04:11:16 +0000 From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 04:11:07 +0000 Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: AcgwPgz3EhyIY9lRRxCldMBYJtAaWgCxqybQ Message-ID: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D320567D13817@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071121145750.3114833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D32032E20B33B@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071126150153.5DA3133C21@delta.rtfm.com> In-Reply-To: <20071126150153.5DA3133C21@delta.rtfm.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAU4BJun002308 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Eric, > Really? It's pretty commonly discussed in the signature literature. > See: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2020 Yeah, really :) Maybe I should be more clear. AFAIK In order to substitute a message in this way you would need to successfully do a preimage attack on the week hash algorithm. A marginal attack with bit flipping is not enough, is has to be a complete break so you can create a meaningful message substantially different from the original message and make that match a given signed hash value by including some nonce in a syntactically legal manner. Nothing in the article I could find in my quick read tells me how to do that on any generally accepted hash algorithm, and as far as I know we should be pretty safe. We start to move away from hash algorithms as soon as they show cracks against collision resistance. We should definitely have abandoned them before they are completely broken. Or what have I missed? Stefan Santesson Senior Program Manager Windows Security, Standards > -----Original Message----- > From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@networkresonance.com] > Sent: den 26 november 2007 16:02 > To: Stefan Santesson > Cc: Eric Rescorla; ietf-pkix@imc.org; tls@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs > > At Mon, 26 Nov 2007 12:27:23 +0000, > Stefan Santesson wrote: > > > > Eric, > > > > Help me to understand the real security threat here. > > > > So you are concerned that someone can select a totally different > > hash algorithm than intended (H2), instead of using the intended > > hash algorithm (H1) where H1(M) =X and H2(M2) = X. For this to > > work, the relying party needs to both implement and approve the use > > of H2 within its environment, or it would never believe that M2 > > matches X (assuming that H1(M2) <> X). > > > > This is very different from any hash threats I've looked into. > > Really? It's pretty commonly discussed in the signature literature. > See: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2020 > Also, it's the explicit reason why the OID is included in the > PKCS1 RSA signature. > > > likely is it, within the set of hash algorithms the relying party > > has agreed to use (as they are considered good enough), that 2 > > different hash algorithms produces the same output hash (with the > > same length) for 2 different meaningful messages? > > The likelihood is pretty much that an attacker has a working > preimage attack on one accepted algorithm. The difficulty is > this: say we have an expensive preimage attack on SHA-1--expensive > enough that people don't delete it immediately, which I would say > is pretty consistent with people's models so far of how aggressive > they are about aging out algorithms. I note that TLS 1.1. still has > DES-CBC. > > I get my first DSA certificate which we'll say is signed by SHA-256. > I never sign with SHA-1. Without some indicator in the certificate, > people can go around impersonating me as long as they can break > SHA-1 and there's nothing I can do about it. That seems not so > OK. > > -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lATLAptY077676 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 29 Nov 2007 14:10:51 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lATLApn6077675; Thu, 29 Nov 2007 14:10:51 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from carter-zimmerman.suchdamage.org (carter-zimmerman.suchdamage.org [69.25.196.178]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lATLAoS1077668 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 29 Nov 2007 14:10:50 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from hartmans@mit.edu) Received: by carter-zimmerman.suchdamage.org (Postfix, from userid 8042) id 97DE04815; Thu, 29 Nov 2007 16:10:45 -0500 (EST) From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2007 14:39:39 -0500 Message-ID: <tslwss04z9g.fsf@mit.edu> User-Agent: Gnus/5.110006 (No Gnus v0.6) Emacs/21.4 (gnu/linux) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Folks, I seem to have dropped the ball on rfc3280bis. It's my understanding that the comments I raised have been addressed. I do have one comment that I failed to raise earlier. I'm going to raise it now, but I'm going to send the document to IETF last call. Any changes regarding this comment are going to be minor and we can call them out on the ietf list. RFC 3286 does not require that schemes have an authority component. For example take a look at RFC 4622. It does support authority components, but if I were going to issue a certificate for an XMPP identity I would actually expect that which server the end user authenticates to would not be important for the whether they were reaching a given subject. Other URIs simply don't use authority. However the URI in subjectAltName requires the host portion to be present, which requires an authority section. I'd like the WG to consider what to do about this. Options include: * Decide that this name type is not appropriate for URI schemes that tend not to use authorities. * Relax the rules. I strongly urge the WG not to take on the task of name constraints for URIs without authority in this document. 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Jean-Paul Lemaire has gone several exercises, but so far we have ended up with the simple solution also suggested by Steven Legg. =20 We define a new version of DirectoryString that is unbounded. We keep = the old one as it is. This allows other specifications to import it and it allows us to remove the upper bound selectively. Where a fixed upper = bound makes sense, we can keep it. The principle is shown below. If I do not = hear many wild protests, I will start preparing the Communications = Enhancement second PDAM text and get it in for ballot. The ballot has to complete = before our April 2008 meeting.=20 =20 DirectoryString { INTEGER : maxSize } ::=3D CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..maxSize)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..maxSize)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..maxSize)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..maxSize)),=20 uTF8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..maxSize)) } =20 UnBoundDirectoryString ::=3D CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)),=20 uTF8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)) } =20 -- Attribute types -- =20 knowledgeInformation ATTRIBUTE ::=3D { WITH SYNTAX UnboundDirectoryString EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseIgnoreMatch ID id-at-knowledgeInformation } =20 Etc. =20 =20 Erik Andersen Andersen's L-Service Mobile: +45 20 97 14 90 e-mail: <mailto:era@tdcadsl.dk> era@tdcadsl.dk http://www.x500standard.com/ <http://home20.inet.tele.dk/era/me> http://home20.inet.tele.dk/era/me =20 ------=_NextPart_000_0009_01C83105.015ED9D0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <html> <head> <META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; = charset=3Dus-ascii"> <meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 10 (filtered)"> <style> <!-- /* Font Definitions */ @font-face {font-family:Helvetica; panose-1:2 11 6 4 2 2 2 2 2 4;} @font-face {font-family:Times; panose-1:2 2 6 3 5 4 5 2 3 4;} /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {margin:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman";} h3 {margin-top:9.05pt; margin-right:0cm; margin-bottom:6.0pt; margin-left:0cm; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Times;} p.MsoToc4, li.MsoToc4, div.MsoToc4 {margin-top:0cm; margin-right:0cm; margin-bottom:0cm; margin-left:87.9pt; margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:justify; text-indent:-45.35pt; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman";} p.MsoToc5, li.MsoToc5, div.MsoToc5 {margin-top:0cm; margin-right:0cm; margin-bottom:0cm; margin-left:48.0pt; margin-bottom:.0001pt; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman";} a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {color:blue; text-decoration:underline;} a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed {color:purple; text-decoration:underline;} p.ASN1, li.ASN1, div.ASN1 {margin-top:6.8pt; margin-right:0cm; margin-bottom:0cm; margin-left:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; punctuation-wrap:simple; text-autospace:none; font-size:9.0pt; font-family:Helvetica; font-weight:bold;} span.EmailStyle20 {font-family:Arial; color:windowtext;} @page Section1 {size:612.0pt 792.0pt; margin:72.0pt 90.0pt 72.0pt 90.0pt;} div.Section1 {page:Section1;} --> </style> </head> <body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple> <div class=3DSection1> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Hi Folks,</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'> </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>We have been exploring several ways of = removing Upper Bounds from places where Directory String is used. </span></font><font = size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Jean-Paul Lemaire</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'> has gone several = exercises, but so far we have ended up with the simple solution also suggested by = </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Steven Legg</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>.</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'> </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>We define a new version of DirectoryString = that is unbounded. We keep the old one as it is. This allows other = specifications to import it and it allows us to remove the upper bound selectively. Where = a fixed upper bound makes sense, we can keep it. The principle is shown below. = If I do not hear many wild protests, I will start preparing the Communications Enhancement second PDAM text and get it in for ballot. The ballot has to complete before our April 2008 meeting. </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'> </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>DirectoryString { = INTEGER : maxSize } ::=3D CHOICE {</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> = teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..maxSize)),</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> printableString = PrintableString (SIZE (1..maxSize)),</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> = bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..maxSize)),</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> universalString = UniversalString (SIZE (1..maxSize)), </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> = uTF8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..maxSize)) }</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'>UnBoundDirectoryString ::=3D CHOICE {</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> = teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)),</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> printableString = PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)),</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> = bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)),</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> universalString = UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)), </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> = uTF8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)) }</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>-- Attribute types = --</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'>knowledgeInformation ATTRIBUTE ::=3D {</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> WITH SYNTAX &= nbsp; UnboundDirectoryString</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseIgnoreMatch</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> = ID  = ; = id-at-knowledgeInformation }</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'> </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 = face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier = New"'>Etc.</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span = style=3D'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial'> </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'> </span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Erik Andersen</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Andersen's L-Service</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Mobile: +45 20 97 14 90</span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>e-mail: </span></font><span lang=3DEN-GB><a href=3D"mailto:era@tdcadsl.dk"><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>era@tdcadsl.dk</span></font></a></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><a = href=3D"http://www.x500standard.com/">http://www.x500standard.com/</a></s= pan></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><a = href=3D"http://home20.inet.tele.dk/era/me"><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span = style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>http://home20.inet.tele.dk/e= ra/me</span></font></a></span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'> </span></font></p> </div> </body> </html> ------=_NextPart_000_0009_01C83105.015ED9D0-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQKKSCt076231 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 13:20:28 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAQKKSim076230; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 13:20:28 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQKKQN6076224 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 13:20:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil) Received: from Cerberus (cerberus.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.51.8]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id lAQKKQbw010288 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 15:20:26 -0500 (EST) X-AuditID: 90333308-00000f3c000007e0-41-474b2a8a5bc0 Received: from antigone.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.33]) by Cerberus with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 15:20:26 -0500 Received: from EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.21]) by antigone.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 15:20:25 -0500 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 15:20:24 -0500 Message-ID: <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF598908A900A9@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> In-Reply-To: <20071126183559.9327033C21@delta.rtfm.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: AcgwW+k3qeWXBTuqTTS918LjTfjKYgAA6JYg References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com><20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com><6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F202C39470@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com><6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F20383906A@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com><FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF598908A8FFDD@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <20071126183559.9327033C21@delta.rtfm.com> From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tls@ietf.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 26 Nov 2007 20:20:25.0946 (UTC) FILETIME=[C7A863A0:01C83069] X-Brightmail-Tracker: AAAAAA== Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAQKKRN6076225 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> -----Original Message----- > From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@networkresonance.com] > > You seem to be making the implicit assumption that the RP > trusts a CA who signs certificates with a weak digest. > Why need that be the case? It doesn't need to be the case. However, if an RP has an opinion about what is "weak", my assumption is that the RP would trust neither a CA who signs certificates with weak signatures nor another party who signs data with weak signatures. > It's pretty commonly discussed in the signature literature. > See: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2020 > Also, it's the explicit reason why the OID is included in > the PKCS1 RSA signature. Thanks for the pointer - very interesting. Fundamentally, I disagree with Kaliski's premise: "Signer accepts the risk from its own choices [of acceptable algorithms], but needs some way to mitigate the risk due to the verifier's choices." The premise is that the signer *has* some risk (faces some negative consequences) as a result of a verifier choosing to accept a weak signature. If a signer signs an electronic bank check, a forger receives the check, weakens the signature, and increases the amount, and a bank accepts the forged signature, my assumption is that the signer is not liable because the bank accepted an algorithm that is against generally accepted business practices. If Paypal accepted certificates for user authentication over TLS instead of passwords, I'd expect them to advertise "safe because we use SHA-256" the same way they say "safe because we use 128 bit SSL" today. If community standards regarded MD5 signatures to be the risk equivalent of 40 bit encryption, I (as a signer) wouldn't expect to be held responsible if Paypal accepted a forged MD5 signature as coming from me. (This whole discussion has something of an angels-on-pinheads flavor, given that even "weak" SHA-1 signatures are much stronger than the typical user-selected password. But I'll suspend disbelief and assume that signatures are being used in the first place. Note that most of my email is signed, but I turn off signatures for mail to IETF security-area WG lists. How Lewis Carroll is that?) What is a scenario in which "Signer needs to mitigate risk due to verifier accepting a weak signature"? Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQIf0ah067263 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 11:41:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAQIf02f067260; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 11:41:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (news.meritdirect.com [209.213.211.195] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQIf0Gl067250 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 11:41:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9327033C21; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 10:35:59 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 10:35:58 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs In-Reply-To: <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF598908A8FFDD@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F202C39470@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F20383906A@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF598908A8FFDD@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071126183559.9327033C21@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At Mon, 26 Nov 2007 13:36:45 -0500, Kemp, David P. wrote: > > >From: Eric Rescorla > > > > My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA > > certs to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with > > the public key contained in the cert. This prevents hash > > algorithm substitution in signatures formed with that key > > (or rather the private key that corresponds to that key). Do > > you agree with this? > > I do not agree. Assume that a recipient accepts weak hash algorithms > for signatures, and that an attacker wishes to attack a signed object. > If a cert contains the proposed constraint, then the attacker can > just create a new cert without the constraint signed with the weak > algorithm. The only way a certificate constraint would be useful > is if the relying party believed that algorithm X is not broken > (is acceptable) with respect to data signatures but is broken > (is not acceptable) wrt certificate signatures. Why would any > rational RP believe that? You seem to be making the implicit assumption that the RP trusts a CA who signs certificates with a weak digest. Why need that be the case? -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQIb7Gt066969 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 11:37:07 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAQIb7pP066968; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 11:37:07 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQIb6XJ066956 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 11:37:06 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil) Received: from Cerberus (cerberus.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.51.8]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id lAQIb1r7029220 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 13:37:01 -0500 (EST) X-AuditID: 90333308-00000f2c000007e0-4d-474b124d7bb2 Received: from antigone.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.33]) by Cerberus with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 13:37:01 -0500 Received: from EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.21]) by antigone.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 13:37:00 -0500 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 13:36:45 -0500 Message-ID: <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF598908A8FFDD@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> In-Reply-To: <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F20383906A@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: Acgq2OmrK/CPwedORjuYCnyihrUTXgAQSaBAAF1tZzAA7y+UIA== References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com><20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com><6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F202C39470@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F20383906A@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tls@ietf.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 26 Nov 2007 18:37:00.0992 (UTC) FILETIME=[55378C00:01C8305B] X-Brightmail-Tracker: AAAAAA== Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAQIb7XJ066962 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> -----Original Message----- > From: Manger, James H [mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com] > > Key usage (1), key purpose (2) and signature/encryption/transport > algorithm (3) are really three points on a continuum > for giving the certificate holder control over where the > key->name binding (which is the core of their certificate) will be used. > There is no theoretical reason to support controls 1 & 2, but not 3. It is not really a continuum. Key usage constrains the use of a key to support confidentiality or integrity, which are qualitatively different services, not just different thresholds along a single dimension. Confidentiality requires some sort of relationship between sender and recipient (the sender must know the public key of each recipient, and the sender and recipients must share a common algorithm). Integrity is a broadcast mechanism where the sender may know nothing about the universe of potential recipients - a data object is signed, and some recipients will accept the signature algorithm while others will not. All recipients have access to the same data but they make individual, potentially different, decisions on what to do with it. >From: Eric Rescorla > > My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA > certs to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with > the public key contained in the cert. This prevents hash > algorithm substitution in signatures formed with that key > (or rather the private key that corresponds to that key). Do > you agree with this? I do not agree. Assume that a recipient accepts weak hash algorithms for signatures, and that an attacker wishes to attack a signed object. If a cert contains the proposed constraint, then the attacker can just create a new cert without the constraint signed with the weak algorithm. The only way a certificate constraint would be useful is if the relying party believed that algorithm X is not broken (is acceptable) with respect to data signatures but is broken (is not acceptable) wrt certificate signatures. Why would any rational RP believe that? (Before saying that covering a certificate algorithm ID with a weak signature prevents that algid from being modified, perform a thought experiment assuming the recipient accepts a hypothetical DSA-with-CRC32 signature algorithm. If it is possible to compute preimages, why would it not be possible to compute a preimage containing the DSA-with-CRC32 algid? Extending to MD5 and SHA1 is just a matter of required and available resources.) Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQF6tvO046299 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 08:06:55 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAQF6t35046298; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 08:06:55 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (74-95-2-169-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net [74.95.2.169] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQF6rrm046291 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 08:06:53 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5DA3133C21; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 07:01:53 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 07:01:53 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs In-Reply-To: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D32032E20B33B@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071121145750.3114833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D32032E20B33B@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071126150153.5DA3133C21@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At Mon, 26 Nov 2007 12:27:23 +0000, Stefan Santesson wrote: > > Eric, > > Help me to understand the real security threat here. > > So you are concerned that someone can select a totally different > hash algorithm than intended (H2), instead of using the intended > hash algorithm (H1) where H1(M) =X and H2(M2) = X. For this to > work, the relying party needs to both implement and approve the use > of H2 within its environment, or it would never believe that M2 > matches X (assuming that H1(M2) <> X). > > This is very different from any hash threats I've looked into. Really? It's pretty commonly discussed in the signature literature. See: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2020 Also, it's the explicit reason why the OID is included in the PKCS1 RSA signature. > likely is it, within the set of hash algorithms the relying party > has agreed to use (as they are considered good enough), that 2 > different hash algorithms produces the same output hash (with the > same length) for 2 different meaningful messages? The likelihood is pretty much that an attacker has a working preimage attack on one accepted algorithm. The difficulty is this: say we have an expensive preimage attack on SHA-1--expensive enough that people don't delete it immediately, which I would say is pretty consistent with people's models so far of how aggressive they are about aging out algorithms. I note that TLS 1.1. still has DES-CBC. I get my first DSA certificate which we'll say is signed by SHA-256. I never sign with SHA-1. Without some indicator in the certificate, people can go around impersonating me as long as they can break SHA-1 and there's nothing I can do about it. That seems not so OK. -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQCRqOh031200 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 05:27:52 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAQCRqot031199; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 05:27:52 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-dub.microsoft.com (smtp-dub.microsoft.com [213.199.138.191]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQCRomx031193 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 05:27:51 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stefans@microsoft.com) Received: from dub-exhub-c302.europe.corp.microsoft.com (65.53.213.92) by DUB-EXGWY-E801.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.129.1) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.1.222.3; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 12:27:49 +0000 Received: from EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.221.79]) by DUB-EXHUB-C302.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([2002:4135:d55c::4135:d55c]) with mapi; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 12:27:49 +0000 From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 12:27:23 +0000 Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: AcgsT7BNG6z5NU/ETZqOP4ktS7jcHgD1jWzQ Message-ID: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D32032E20B33B@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071121145750.3114833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> In-Reply-To: <20071121145750.3114833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAQCRpmw031194 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Eric, Help me to understand the real security threat here. So you are concerned that someone can select a totally different hash algorithm than intended (H2), instead of using the intended hash algorithm (H1) where H1(M) =X and H2(M2) = X. For this to work, the relying party needs to both implement and approve the use of H2 within its environment, or it would never believe that M2 matches X (assuming that H1(M2) <> X). This is very different from any hash threats I've looked into. How likely is it, within the set of hash algorithms the relying party has agreed to use (as they are considered good enough), that 2 different hash algorithms produces the same output hash (with the same length) for 2 different meaningful messages? What am I missing here? Stefan Santesson Senior Program Manager Windows Security, Standards > -----Original Message----- > From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@networkresonance.com] > Sent: den 21 november 2007 15:58 > We're talking about two different kinds of downgrade here. > The S/MIME anti-downgrade issue is about signature stripping > when multiple signatures are applied. The downgrade issue > I'm concerned about is straight-line forgery: Alice always > signs with digest algorithm H1: she then generates a signature > over some message M where H1(M) = X. The attacker compromises H2 > and forms M' st. H2(M2) = X. He can then craft a new message > apparently signed by Alice. There's no act that Alice can take > involving H1 and her signature algorithm that can prevent this: > it has to be in information available to a verifier who has only > the cert and a candidate signature. > -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQ9VkkX017935 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 02:31:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAQ9Vk2a017934; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 02:31:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail1relay.itmaster.local (host48-104-static.43-193-b.business.telecomitalia.it [193.43.104.48] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAQ9Vh77017896; Mon, 26 Nov 2007 02:31:44 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Adriano.Santoni@actalis.it) Received: from POSTA02.itmaster.local ([193.43.104.10]) by mail1relay.itmaster.local with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 10:31:24 +0100 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: R: R: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 10:31:23 +0100 Message-ID: <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD421D6ECD4@POSTA02.itmaster.local> In-Reply-To: <200711232302.lANN2WUk066548@balder-227.proper.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: R: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Thread-Index: AcguJXpgV1zMMyMPS7OomtFFcupLmgB5qdCA References: <OF0B45CABE.A644003A-ONC1257398.0048F862@frcl.bull.fr><200711202154.lAKLsJm6034999@balder-227.proper.com><FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD421D6EA2D@POSTA02.itmaster.local> <200711232302.lANN2WUk066548@balder-227.proper.com> From: "Santoni Adriano" <Adriano.Santoni@actalis.it> To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <ietf-smime@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 26 Nov 2007 09:31:24.0258 (UTC) FILETIME=[1C9A5C20:01C8300F] X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: SMEX-7.0.0.1345-5.0.1023-15568.003 X-TM-AS-Result: No--22.151800-0.000000-2 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAQ9Vj78017924 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> So you are suggesting that in the TimeStampedData structure: 1) the 'content' field should be a MIME element (and therefore contain a MIME content-type header), 2) the 'mimeType' field should be removed (as a consequence of the previous point). Did I take your right? I would not oppose to this arrangement, if it helped gathering more consensus. My only objection is that it will require a mix of text- and BER-based processing in order to fully open and disassemble a TimeStampedData instance. This is a bit unelegant IMO (but I know it is just normal in the S/MIME field, which I was not specifically addressing btw). Adriano -----Messaggio originale----- Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] Per conto di Russ Housley Inviato: venerdì 23 novembre 2007 20.41 A: Santoni Adriano Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org; ietf-smime@imc.org Oggetto: Re: R: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Santoni: Sorry for not being clear. My comment is directed toward you, but I included the ASN.1 fragment from Denis to highlight my point. Please take a look at RFC 3852. You will see that content types (object identifiers) are used to identify the format of any content. Many have been registered over the years. If you see TimeStampedData as an addition to the CMS, then this same technique needs to be employed. In the CMS, as I said in my earlier message, the id-data object identifier is used when the content is MIME encoded. The MIME type is not carried in the fields of the CMS. Russ At 02:46 AM 11/21/2007, Santoni Adriano wrote: >Russ, > >I am not sure if you were addressing your comment to me or to Denis... > >At any rate, I would like to point out that the syntax I am proposing >implies no MIME encoding at all. The data (like e.g. a patent, an >offer, a contract, an income statement, a device driver, a security >patch, a sensitive database, etc) is bundled in its native form, "as >is". And thus, there is no MIME header to speak of. >That's why I have provided for a 'mimeType' field: as a hint for the >recipient/verifying application to guess what kind of data is carried >within the TimeStampedData block, and what to do with it. > >Adriano > > >-----Messaggio originale----- >Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org >[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] Per conto di Russ Housley >Inviato: martedì 20 novembre 2007 22.53 >A: ietf-pkix@imc.org; ietf-smime@imc.org >Oggetto: Re: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment > > >In S/MIME, the id-data content type is used when the content is MIME >encoded. Then, then MIME header in the content is used to determine >the format of the content. Why does this suggest a different approach? > >Russ > >At 08:16 AM 11/19/2007, Denis Pinkas wrote: > > >Adriano, > > > >Thank you for this new proposal. I skimmed through it. > > > >It is interesting, but I fear that it is targeted to the wrong WG. > >Since this would be an extension of CMS, this work item would rather > >belong to the S-MIME WG. > >For this reason, I copy the S-MIME WG. > > > >In addition, some polishing would be needed. > > > >Rather than long words, you will find hereafter a rewriting of the > >ASN.1 with a few explanatory comments. > > > > TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { > > version [0] Version DEFAULT v1, > > fileName UTF8String, > > mimeType PrintableString, > > fileLocation UTF8String OPTIONAL, > > -- fileLocation is only a hint. > > -- The file may or may not be stored at that location. > > content OCTET STRING, > > temporalEvidences TemporalEvidences } > > > > Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } > > TemporalEvidences ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TemporalEvidence > > > >-- This structure allows multiple levels of temporal evidences. > > > > TemporalEvidence ::= SEQUENCE { > > evidences Evidences, > > certificateLists CertificateLists OPTIONAL > >} > > > > CertificateLists :: = SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertificateList > > > > Evidence ::= CHOICE { > > timeStamps [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken } > > > >-- For each level there can be one or more time-stamps tokens. > > > >-- Before re-time stamping a set of former time-stamp tokens, > >-- the CRLs of the previous level of time-stamps tokens can be > >captured > >-- and inserted in the data structure. > > > >Denis > > > > > > >Hello there, > > > > > >here I am again with my TimeStampedData proposal. > > > > > >I have submitted a new draft (also attached here) that takes into > > account some of the remarks and suggestions received so far. > > > > > >I have made room for additional types of temporal evidence, like > > e.g. RFC 4998, while keeping RFC 3161 as the basis of interoperability. > > > > > >I would like to invite everybody involved in time-stamping and > > archiving e-documents to comment upon it: has it improved? > > something is missing? > > > > > >In particular, please state: > > >- are you interested in this work? > > >- do you agree to adopt it as a new PKIX work item? > > >- are you going to use this format, once it is finished? > > > > > >Is anybody willing to spend a few words on this draft during the > > IETF meeting in Vancouver (as I cannot attend myself) ? > > > > > >And finally, is anybody willing to invest a little time in > > co-authoring this draft with me? > > > > > >Adriano > > >Actalis S.p.A. > > >Milano, ITALY > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >-----Messaggio originale----- > > >Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org > > [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] Per conto di Santoni Adriano > > >Inviato: lunedì 3 settembre 2007 10.42 > > >A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > >Oggetto: R: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > > > > > > >Let me summarize the issues discussed so far: > > > > > >1) allow EvidenceRecord (RFC 4998) in addition to TimeStampToken > > >(RFC > > >3161) > > > > > >In principle, I have no objections as long as we do not complicate > > things too much and do not hamper interoperability. > > > > > >There are at least two possible approaches to accomodate RFC 4998: > > > > > > a) explicitly provide for (one) ER in the TimeStampedData > > syntax, as an alternative to the SET OF TimeStampToken; > > > b) do not mention any specific standard for the "evidence", but > > just mention RFC 3161 and RFC 4998 as two possibilities; > > > > > >In any case, it must be possible for the verifying application to > > easily detect which of the two (or more) kind of "evidence" has been > > used in the TimeStampedData envelope under examination. If we > > restrict the kinds of evidence to the two above, then a extra > > tagging may not be necessary, as an EvidenceRecord is a SEQUENCE, > > while the other choice would be a SET OF. Although unelegant, it > > would work. On the other hand, if we do not want to restrict the > > kinds of evidence to the two above, then of course we should somehow > > add an extra tagging level, because nobody knows at this time what > > syntax a third kind of evidence would conform to. > > > > > >In any case, for the sake of interoperability, strong emphasis > > should be given to RFC 3161 as today this is the most widely > > implemented type of evidence. > > > > > >In conclusion: I agree with allowing RFC 4998 if we do that in a > > way that does not modify the strong emphasis on RFC 3161 and does > > not hamper interoperability (which must be based on supporting RFC > > 3161, even though certain applications may also support RFC 4998). > > > > > >2) filename vs. URI > > > > > >Some remarked that an URI (or URI Reference) would be more > > versatile than a simple filename. That is obviously true, but it > > implies that the 'content' field of TimeStampedData may be empty. > > This is not what I was addressing in my original proposal. It would > > not just require the 'content' field to be declared OPTIONAL: it > > would make interoperability very difficult to achieve unless we > > restrict the URI schemes to a very small subset (e.g. http:, cid:, > > file:, ldap:) of the myriad possibilities. In any case, it would > > require ages of interoperability testing. And it would make life > > much harder for software implementors, without much of a benefit in > > view. I strongly believe in keeping things simple as much as possible. > > > > > >3) multiple contents and RFC 4073 > > > > > >The 'content' field in the TimeStampedData envelope is not > > structured, in my original proposal. It is just an OCTET STRING. > > That allows for any kind of content to be conveyed, even a > > ContentCollection according to RFC 4073. > > > > > >Another remark has been made with reference to RFC 4073: the > > ContentWithAttributes structure, also defined in RFC 4073, could in > > principle be used to bundle some content with the corrisponding > > evidence (the goal of my draft). Although this is true, it would > > require definining some additional OIDs, and mandating the presence > > of certain Attributes tagged by those OIDs. I frankly believe the > > TimeStampedData structure that I am proposing is better, first > > because it is dedicated and second because it "implements the > > ContentInfo interface", so to speak. It is simpler to manage for > > applications already able to parse different kinds of ContentInfo > > envelopes (there are a great many), possibly in a recursive way. > > > > > >Adriano > > > > > > > > >-----Messaggio originale----- > > >Da: Young H Etheridge [mailto:yhe@yhetheridge.org] > > >Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 17.48 > > >A: Santoni Adriano > > >Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > >Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > > > >Adriano, > > > > > >To add to your thought processes: I believe that a URI of > > "file:///private.stuff" addresses your concern for privacy of the > > physical URI. But, allowing URI in the syntax will make less > > private repositories, not necessarily file systems, more universally > > accessible. The intent of the URI in RFC 3986 is to also allow for > > abstractly identifying a resource, not necessarily providing a > > physical resource. In this manner the URI could then be used as an > > object identity in database(s). > > > > > >Take care, > > > > > >yhe > > > > > >Santoni Adriano wrote: > > >> To accomodate for RFC 4998, I would propose the following syntax: > > >> > > >> TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { > > >> version INTEGER { v1(1) }, > > >> fileName UTF8String, > > >> mimeType PrintableString, > > >> content OCTET STRING, > > >> evidence Evidence > > >> } > > >> > > >> Evidence ::= CHOICE { > > >> timeStamps [0] SET (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken, > > >> evidenceRecord [1] EvidenceRecord -- according to RFC 4998 > > >> } > > >> > > >> (I am not sure whether it would be better to use explicit or > > >> implicit > > >> tags...) > > >> > > >> Regarding the idea of having an URI instead of a filename: I'd > > prefer to think over things a little bit more, and maybe collect > more feedback. > > >> > > >> In my mind, I can send a TimeStampedData envelope to business > > partners and/or public agencies via email. If the timestamped > > document is a local one, which I think is a meaningful and realistic > > scenario, then I do not want my company's hostnames and pathnames to > > be included in the envelope so that the recipient can see them. > > >> > > >> Adriano > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -----Messaggio originale----- > > >> Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org > > >> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] > > >> Per conto di Julien Stern > > >> Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 13.43 > > >> A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > >> Oggetto: Re: Draft on TimeStampedData > > >> > > >> > > >> On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 12:06:00PM +0200, Tilo Kienitz wrote: > > >> > > >>> Adriano, > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> After pondering on this and other remarks, I cannot help but > > >>>> agree with Steve. > > >>>> > > >>>> My original and essential goal is that of facilitating > > >>>> interoperability in a currently unregulated field. If we allow > > >>>> for several "degrees of freedom", than interoperability will be > > hampered from the beginning. > > >>>> So I'd better stick to RFC 3161 for now. We could include > > >>>> support for RFC 4998 Evidence Records later on, at the time > > >>>> when they become a widespread reality comparable to RFC 3161 > > >>>> TimeStampTokens (which are widely implemented). > > >>>> > > >>> I would prefer to have both options: RFC 3161 and RFC 4998. For > > >>> our customers evidence records are a widespread reality already. > > >>> A standardized way to put some data and their evidence record > > >>> into a single file would be useful. > > >>> > > >> > > >> I strongly concur with this comment. Allowing the usage of ERS > > as well as simple timestamps would allow the TimestampedData to > > leverage all the work of RFC 4998 regarding timestamps instead of > > reinventing the wheel in the future. > > >> > > >> Regards, > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Julien > > >> > > >> > > >>> Kind regards > > >>> Tilo > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> -----Messaggio originale----- > > >>>> Da: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] > > >>>> Inviato: giovedì 30 agosto 2007 23.05 > > >>>> A: Young H Etheridge > > >>>> Cc: Santoni Adriano; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > >>>> Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > >>>> > > >>>> At 4:33 PM -0400 8/30/07, Young H Etheridge wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>>> ... > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> Agreed, w.r.t. normative vs informative. The above quote from > > >>>>> RFC-4998 merely underscores that this draft should also > > >>>>> suggest, informatively, that the choice of Timestamp should be > > >>>>> one that meets the normative syntax for Timestamp and not > > >>>>> specify that which is in RFC-3161. Nothing gets broken by > > >>>>> being less restrictive and generally more informative to the community-at-large. > > >>>>> > > >>>> I have to disagree with your conclusion. If we require 3161 > > time stamps in an RFC of the sort Adriano proposed, then everyone > > can parse them if they comply with the RFC. If the RFC says "insert > > the time stamp from any standard you want here, and just tell us > > which one you used" then we have a problem. A compliant > > implementation can generate data structures containing time stamps > > that other compliant implementations cannot parse. That's the sort > > of interoperability problem we try to avoid in the IETF. > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> My notion of resilience does not mean "more encompassing" but > > >>>>> that of providing the user community with choice and an > > >>>>> enhanced safeguard against the possibility of the weakening of an algorithm. > > >>>>> > > >>>> Choices can be good, but they can create interoperability > > problems in some cases, like this one. Also, we have algorithm > > agility as a requirement in all of our work, so the second concern > > you cite does not seem to apply here. > > >>>> > > >>>> Steve > > >>>> > > >>> -- > > >>> Tilo Kienitz > > >>> SecCommerce Informationssysteme GmbH Obenhauptstr. 5 D - 22335 > > >>> Hamburg > > >>> Germany http://www.seccommerce.de Received: from aleksandr ([79.120.96.139]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAOMwgKj062951 for <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org>; Sat, 24 Nov 2007 15:58:44 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from gta@bluffcountryoutfitters.com) Received: from [79.120.96.139] by bmx.bluffcountryoutfitters.com.redcondor.net; , 25 Nov 2007 01:58:32 +0300 Date: , 25 Nov 2007 01:58:32 +0300 From: "Janine Stanley" <gta@bluffcountryoutfitters.com> X-Mailer: The Bat! (v3.81.14 Beta) Professional Reply-To: gta@bluffcountryoutfitters.com X-Priority: 3 (Normal) Message-ID: <433763799.14632665935500@bluffcountryoutfitters.com> To: ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org Subject: Check our values below to inquire how much you can save. 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</TABLE> pushing their way towards the tarps where Dora the Explorer unsuccessfully to break the deadlock</br> for several hours as you watch the parade during the day creaky Passenger ship Explorer reported problems near the South Shetland Islands</br> crisp belfry who are free to come </br> adonis cancellate</br> </BODY></HTML> ------------D386E2957DABBB-- ------------8DABB4F219576E0 Content-Type: image/gif; name="header" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: <006901c82f06$ae6a4b10$8b60784f@Q7P5V15> R0lGODlhjgHuAPcAAAAAAIAAAACAAICAAAAAgIAAgACAgICAgMDAwP8AAAD/AP//AAAA//8A/wD/ /////wAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAZgAAmQAAzAAA/wAzAAAzMwAzZgAzmQAzzAAz/wBm AABmMwBmZgBmmQBmzABm/wCZAACZMwCZZgCZmQCZzACZ/wDMAADMMwDMZgDMmQDMzADM/wD/AAD/ MwD/ZgD/mQD/zAD//zMAADMAMzMAZjMAmTMAzDMA/zMzADMzMzMzZjMzmTMzzDMz/zNmADNmMzNm ZjNmmTNmzDNm/zOZADOZMzOZZjOZmTOZzDOZ/zPMADPMMzPMZjPMmTPMzDPM/zP/ADP/MzP/ZjP/ 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by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Iu8pl-0006Rx-5I for ietf-announce@ietf.org; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 10:46:49 -0500 Received: from ns1.neustar.com ([2001:503:c779:1a::9c9a:108a]) by ietf-mx.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Iu8pk-0002gw-Sr for ietf-announce@ietf.org; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 10:46:49 -0500 Received: from stiedprstage1.ietf.org (stiedprstage1.va.neustar.com [10.31.47.10]) by ns1.neustar.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ACAA426E39; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 15:46:48 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ietf by stiedprstage1.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.43) id 1Iu8pk-00036q-J1; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 10:46:48 -0500 X-test-idtracker: no To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org> From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> Message-Id: <E1Iu8pk-00036q-J1@stiedprstage1.ietf.org> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 10:46:48 -0500 X-Spam-Score: -1.4 (-) X-Scan-Signature: 9182cfff02fae4f1b6e9349e01d62f32 Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Last Call: draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis (Certificate Management Messages over CMS) to Proposed Standard X-BeenThere: ietf-announce@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org List-Id: ietf-announce.ietf.org List-Unsubscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce>, <mailto:ietf-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Post: <mailto:ietf-announce@ietf.org> List-Help: <mailto:ietf-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce>, <mailto:ietf-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe> X-AIMC-AUTH: (null) X-AIMC-MAILFROM: ietf-announce-bounces@ietf.org X-AIMC-AUTH: (null) X-AIMC-MAILFROM: iesg-secretary@ietf.org X-Auto-Forward: jaglee@people.com.cn jag@kw.com.cn Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following documents: - 'Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Transport Protocols ' <draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt> as a Proposed Standard - 'CMC Compliance Document ' <draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt> as a Proposed Standard - 'Certificate Management Messages over CMS ' <draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt> as a Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2007-12-03. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. The file can be obtained via http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt IESG discussion can be tracked via https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=view_id&dTag=6869&rfc_flag=0 _______________________________________________ IETF-Announce mailing list IETF-Announce@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lANN2YP3066567 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 23 Nov 2007 16:02:34 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lANN2YCS066565; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 16:02:34 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lANN2WUk066548 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 16:02:33 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Message-Id: <200711232302.lANN2WUk066548@balder-227.proper.com> Received: (qmail 21406 invoked by uid 0); 23 Nov 2007 23:02:24 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (24.131.121.208) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 23 Nov 2007 23:02:24 -0000 X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9 Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2007 14:41:28 -0500 To: "Santoni Adriano" <Adriano.Santoni@actalis.it> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: R: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <ietf-smime@imc.org> In-Reply-To: <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD421D6EA2D@POSTA02.itmaster.lo cal> References: <OF0B45CABE.A644003A-ONC1257398.0048F862@frcl.bull.fr> <200711202154.lAKLsJm6034999@balder-227.proper.com> <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD421D6EA2D@POSTA02.itmaster.local> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Santoni: Sorry for not being clear. My comment is directed toward you, but I included the ASN.1 fragment from Denis to highlight my point. Please take a look at RFC 3852. You will see that content types (object identifiers) are used to identify the format of any content. Many have been registered over the years. If you see TimeStampedData as an addition to the CMS, then this same technique needs to be employed. In the CMS, as I said in my earlier message, the id-data object identifier is used when the content is MIME encoded. The MIME type is not carried in the fields of the CMS. Russ At 02:46 AM 11/21/2007, Santoni Adriano wrote: >Russ, > >I am not sure if you were addressing your comment to me or to Denis... > >At any rate, I would like to point out that the syntax I am >proposing implies no MIME encoding at all. The data (like e.g. a >patent, an offer, a contract, an income statement, a device driver, >a security patch, a sensitive database, etc) is bundled in its >native form, "as is". And thus, there is no MIME header to speak of. >That's why I have provided for a 'mimeType' field: as a hint for the >recipient/verifying application to guess what kind of data is >carried within the TimeStampedData block, and what to do with it. > >Adriano > > >-----Messaggio originale----- >Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org >[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] Per conto di Russ Housley >Inviato: martedì 20 novembre 2007 22.53 >A: ietf-pkix@imc.org; ietf-smime@imc.org >Oggetto: Re: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment > > >In S/MIME, the id-data content type is used when the content is MIME >encoded. Then, then MIME header in the content is used to determine >the format of the content. Why does this suggest a different approach? > >Russ > >At 08:16 AM 11/19/2007, Denis Pinkas wrote: > > >Adriano, > > > >Thank you for this new proposal. I skimmed through it. > > > >It is interesting, but I fear that it is targeted to the wrong WG. > >Since this would be an extension of CMS, this work item would rather > >belong to the S-MIME WG. > >For this reason, I copy the S-MIME WG. > > > >In addition, some polishing would be needed. > > > >Rather than long words, you will find hereafter a rewriting of the > >ASN.1 with a few explanatory comments. > > > > TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { > > version [0] Version DEFAULT v1, > > fileName UTF8String, > > mimeType PrintableString, > > fileLocation UTF8String OPTIONAL, > > -- fileLocation is only a hint. > > -- The file may or may not be stored at that location. > > content OCTET STRING, > > temporalEvidences TemporalEvidences } > > > > Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } > > TemporalEvidences ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TemporalEvidence > > > >-- This structure allows multiple levels of temporal evidences. > > > > TemporalEvidence ::= SEQUENCE { > > evidences Evidences, > > certificateLists CertificateLists OPTIONAL > >} > > > > CertificateLists :: = SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertificateList > > > > Evidence ::= CHOICE { > > timeStamps [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken } > > > >-- For each level there can be one or more time-stamps tokens. > > > >-- Before re-time stamping a set of former time-stamp tokens, > >-- the CRLs of the previous level of time-stamps tokens can be captured > >-- and inserted in the data structure. > > > >Denis > > > > > > >Hello there, > > > > > >here I am again with my TimeStampedData proposal. > > > > > >I have submitted a new draft (also attached here) that takes into > > account some of the remarks and suggestions received so far. > > > > > >I have made room for additional types of temporal evidence, like > > e.g. RFC 4998, while keeping RFC 3161 as the basis of interoperability. > > > > > >I would like to invite everybody involved in time-stamping and > > archiving e-documents to comment upon it: has it improved? > > something is missing? > > > > > >In particular, please state: > > >- are you interested in this work? > > >- do you agree to adopt it as a new PKIX work item? > > >- are you going to use this format, once it is finished? > > > > > >Is anybody willing to spend a few words on this draft during the > > IETF meeting in Vancouver (as I cannot attend myself) ? > > > > > >And finally, is anybody willing to invest a little time in > > co-authoring this draft with me? > > > > > >Adriano > > >Actalis S.p.A. > > >Milano, ITALY > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >-----Messaggio originale----- > > >Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org > > [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] Per conto di Santoni Adriano > > >Inviato: lunedì 3 settembre 2007 10.42 > > >A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > >Oggetto: R: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > > > > > > >Let me summarize the issues discussed so far: > > > > > >1) allow EvidenceRecord (RFC 4998) in addition to TimeStampToken (RFC > > >3161) > > > > > >In principle, I have no objections as long as we do not complicate > > things too much and do not hamper interoperability. > > > > > >There are at least two possible approaches to accomodate RFC 4998: > > > > > > a) explicitly provide for (one) ER in the TimeStampedData > > syntax, as an alternative to the SET OF TimeStampToken; > > > b) do not mention any specific standard for the "evidence", but > > just mention RFC 3161 and RFC 4998 as two possibilities; > > > > > >In any case, it must be possible for the verifying application to > > easily detect which of the two (or more) kind of "evidence" has been > > used in the TimeStampedData envelope under examination. If we restrict > > the kinds of evidence to the two above, then a extra tagging may not > > be necessary, as an EvidenceRecord is a SEQUENCE, while the other > > choice would be a SET OF. Although unelegant, it would work. On the > > other hand, if we do not want to restrict the kinds of evidence to the > > two above, then of course we should somehow add an extra tagging > > level, because nobody knows at this time what syntax a third kind of > > evidence would conform to. > > > > > >In any case, for the sake of interoperability, strong emphasis > > should be given to RFC 3161 as today this is the most widely > > implemented type of evidence. > > > > > >In conclusion: I agree with allowing RFC 4998 if we do that in a > > way that does not modify the strong emphasis on RFC 3161 and does not > > hamper interoperability (which must be based on supporting RFC 3161, > > even though certain applications may also support RFC 4998). > > > > > >2) filename vs. URI > > > > > >Some remarked that an URI (or URI Reference) would be more > > versatile than a simple filename. That is obviously true, but it > > implies that the 'content' field of TimeStampedData may be empty. > > This is not what I was addressing in my original proposal. It would > > not just require the 'content' field to be declared OPTIONAL: it would > > make interoperability very difficult to achieve unless we restrict the > > URI schemes to a very small subset (e.g. http:, cid:, file:, ldap:) of > > the myriad possibilities. In any case, it would require ages of > > interoperability testing. And it would make life much harder for > > software implementors, without much of a benefit in view. I strongly > > believe in keeping things simple as much as possible. > > > > > >3) multiple contents and RFC 4073 > > > > > >The 'content' field in the TimeStampedData envelope is not > > structured, in my original proposal. It is just an OCTET STRING. > > That allows for any kind of content to be conveyed, even a > > ContentCollection according to RFC 4073. > > > > > >Another remark has been made with reference to RFC 4073: the > > ContentWithAttributes structure, also defined in RFC 4073, could in > > principle be used to bundle some content with the corrisponding > > evidence (the goal of my draft). Although this is true, it would > > require definining some additional OIDs, and mandating the presence of > > certain Attributes tagged by those OIDs. I frankly believe the > > TimeStampedData structure that I am proposing is better, first because > > it is dedicated and second because it "implements the ContentInfo > > interface", so to speak. It is simpler to manage for applications > > already able to parse different kinds of ContentInfo envelopes (there > > are a great many), possibly in a recursive way. > > > > > >Adriano > > > > > > > > >-----Messaggio originale----- > > >Da: Young H Etheridge [mailto:yhe@yhetheridge.org] > > >Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 17.48 > > >A: Santoni Adriano > > >Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > >Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > > > >Adriano, > > > > > >To add to your thought processes: I believe that a URI of > > "file:///private.stuff" addresses your concern for privacy of the > > physical URI. But, allowing URI in the syntax will make less private > > repositories, not necessarily file systems, more universally > > accessible. The intent of the URI in RFC 3986 is to also allow for > > abstractly identifying a resource, not necessarily providing a > > physical resource. In this manner the URI could then be used as an > > object identity in database(s). > > > > > >Take care, > > > > > >yhe > > > > > >Santoni Adriano wrote: > > >> To accomodate for RFC 4998, I would propose the following syntax: > > >> > > >> TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { > > >> version INTEGER { v1(1) }, > > >> fileName UTF8String, > > >> mimeType PrintableString, > > >> content OCTET STRING, > > >> evidence Evidence > > >> } > > >> > > >> Evidence ::= CHOICE { > > >> timeStamps [0] SET (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken, > > >> evidenceRecord [1] EvidenceRecord -- according to RFC 4998 } > > >> > > >> (I am not sure whether it would be better to use explicit or > > >> implicit > > >> tags...) > > >> > > >> Regarding the idea of having an URI instead of a filename: I'd > > prefer to think over things a little bit more, and maybe collect > more feedback. > > >> > > >> In my mind, I can send a TimeStampedData envelope to business > > partners and/or public agencies via email. If the timestamped document > > is a local one, which I think is a meaningful and realistic scenario, > > then I do not want my company's hostnames and pathnames to be included > > in the envelope so that the recipient can see them. > > >> > > >> Adriano > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -----Messaggio originale----- > > >> Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org > > >> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] > > >> Per conto di Julien Stern > > >> Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 13.43 > > >> A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > >> Oggetto: Re: Draft on TimeStampedData > > >> > > >> > > >> On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 12:06:00PM +0200, Tilo Kienitz wrote: > > >> > > >>> Adriano, > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> After pondering on this and other remarks, I cannot help but > > >>>> agree with Steve. > > >>>> > > >>>> My original and essential goal is that of facilitating > > >>>> interoperability in a currently unregulated field. If we allow > > >>>> for several "degrees of freedom", than interoperability will be > > hampered from the beginning. > > >>>> So I'd better stick to RFC 3161 for now. We could include support > > >>>> for RFC 4998 Evidence Records later on, at the time when they > > >>>> become a widespread reality comparable to RFC 3161 > > >>>> TimeStampTokens (which are widely implemented). > > >>>> > > >>> I would prefer to have both options: RFC 3161 and RFC 4998. For > > >>> our customers evidence records are a widespread reality already. > > >>> A standardized way to put some data and their evidence record into > > >>> a single file would be useful. > > >>> > > >> > > >> I strongly concur with this comment. Allowing the usage of ERS > > as well as simple timestamps would allow the TimestampedData to > > leverage all the work of RFC 4998 regarding timestamps instead of > > reinventing the wheel in the future. > > >> > > >> Regards, > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Julien > > >> > > >> > > >>> Kind regards > > >>> Tilo > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> -----Messaggio originale----- > > >>>> Da: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] > > >>>> Inviato: giovedì 30 agosto 2007 23.05 > > >>>> A: Young H Etheridge > > >>>> Cc: Santoni Adriano; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > >>>> Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > >>>> > > >>>> At 4:33 PM -0400 8/30/07, Young H Etheridge wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>>> ... > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> Agreed, w.r.t. normative vs informative. The above quote from > > >>>>> RFC-4998 merely underscores that this draft should also suggest, > > >>>>> informatively, that the choice of Timestamp should be one that > > >>>>> meets the normative syntax for Timestamp and not specify that > > >>>>> which is in RFC-3161. Nothing gets broken by being less > > >>>>> restrictive and generally more informative to the community-at-large. > > >>>>> > > >>>> I have to disagree with your conclusion. If we require 3161 > > time stamps in an RFC of the sort Adriano proposed, then everyone can > > parse them if they comply with the RFC. If the RFC says "insert the > > time stamp from any standard you want here, and just tell us which one > > you used" then we have a problem. A compliant implementation can > > generate data structures containing time stamps that other compliant > > implementations cannot parse. That's the sort of interoperability > > problem we try to avoid in the IETF. > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> My notion of resilience does not mean "more encompassing" but > > >>>>> that of providing the user community with choice and an enhanced > > >>>>> safeguard against the possibility of the weakening of an algorithm. > > >>>>> > > >>>> Choices can be good, but they can create interoperability > > problems in some cases, like this one. Also, we have algorithm agility > > as a requirement in all of our work, so the second concern you cite > > does not seem to apply here. > > >>>> > > >>>> Steve > > >>>> > > >>> -- > > >>> Tilo Kienitz > > >>> SecCommerce Informationssysteme GmbH Obenhauptstr. 5 D - 22335 > > >>> Hamburg > > >>> Germany http://www.seccommerce.de Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lANIrk17044272 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 23 Nov 2007 11:53:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lANIrkYU044271; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 11:53:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from moutng.kundenserver.de (moutng.kundenserver.de [212.227.126.186]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lANIriYj044264 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 11:53:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from SRS0=R0k4=QQ=acm.org=bmoeller@srs.kundenserver.de) Received: from tau.invalid (p508EB083.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [80.142.176.131]) by mrelayeu.kundenserver.de (node=mrelayeu0) with ESMTP (Nemesis) id 0MKwh2-1Ivdee0ENX-0002xb; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 19:53:33 +0100 Received: by tau.invalid (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 3F47A1EBF0; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 19:53:31 +0100 (CET) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2007 19:53:30 +0100 From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Cc: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Message-ID: <20071123185330.GA21317@tau.invalid> Mail-Followup-To: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <20071121165258.6F56533C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <F0182FE9-29A3-48F0-A8AA-5BF59A5D7C29@cisco.com> <20071122115333.GA12388@tau.invalid> <p06240802c36c9d3d7c8e@[10.20.30.150]> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <p06240802c36c9d3d7c8e@[10.20.30.150]> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i X-Provags-ID: V01U2FsdGVkX19qqDRMCwQpZJdxMRDp3+NzOvhBvr93NYteb42 gyRCjkMN4rHqPIoWjCc3rJixbWejDEfMDJM5T7PI6jlBdRU9D2 eikCeBcozvic4+AnLBK4ag0RLJM2Nnmsmz/nE8r7wrqS/Wi+jy 6Hw== Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> On Fri, Nov 23, 2007 at 07:20:46AM -0800, Paul Hoffman wrote: > At 12:53 PM +0100 11/22/07, Bodo Moeller wrote: >>On Wed, Nov 21, 2007 at 11:26:53AM -0600, max pritikin wrote: >>> Placing usage instructions in the certificate does not enforce the >>> verifying parties behavior any more than protocol handshakes would. >> It does provide authenticated usage information to the verifying >> parties, though. > Um, so? It is "authenticated" to be from a party that is not the > signer. In most situations, my CA doesn't have the slightest idea > what I am doing, or want to be doing, with my public key. Only if you haven't told the CA what you want to do, by using ExtensionReq and the like. Of course, if you can't trust a CA to achieve a sufficiently close approximation of what you want it do to, then that CA is pretty much worthless. If a CA starts to put other people's keys in certificates naming you as the subject, say, that's pretty bad; if it does not follow your requests regarding relevant certificate options, then that's pretty bad too. >> Consider the following scenario. The SHA-3 competition is now open. >> So one interesting business idea is to take the signature from any >> certificate signed by some high-profile ECDSA or DSA root certificate >> that is far away from expiring, and then to engineer a new hash >> algorithm that appears sound and secure, except that it happens to >> have a particularly interesting pre-image for the hash value from said >> non-root certificate's signature: namely, a preimage that would >> provide you with a certificate of your own with generous >> basicConstraints, simply by reusing the previous signature coming from >> the CA. So you submit this hash function to the SHA-3 competition, >> provide a reference implementation and hope that it ends up in relying >> parties' software. If this plan works out, suddenly you have become a >> high-profile CA yourself -- even though in this particular example >> none of the cryptographic algorithms involved would have to be >> insecure in itself. > Even if there were any "high-profile ECDSA or DSA root certificates", > they would contain the signature algorithm, which includes the hash > used, ecdsa-with-SHA1 or id-dsa-with-sha1, and that is covered by the > signature itself. This is no different than RSA. Actually, it is different from RSA signatures. PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signatures do contain the hash used in unhashed form (i.e. as a literal part of what you get when computing x^e mod n, where x is the signature in question and e, n are the components of the public key). DSA and ECDSA signatures in a certificate, in contrast, involve the algorithm identifer determining the hash function only *as part of the hashed input*. The literal algorithm identifier does not affect the signature verification calculation beyond providing part of the input to the hash function. Bodo Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lANGqDwU033439 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 23 Nov 2007 09:52:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lANGqDHl033438; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 09:52:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lANGqBX7033426 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 09:52:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from denis.pinkas@bull.net) Received: from MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (msga-mcl1.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.20]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id SAA70552 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 18:00:04 +0100 Received: from frcls4013 ([129.182.108.120]) by MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (Lotus Domino Release 5.0.11) with SMTP id 2007112317514108:14732 ; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 17:51:41 +0100 Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2007 17:51:37 +0100 From: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net> To: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Draft response to the liaison from ITU-T SG 17 to IETF on the resolution of DR320 X-mailer: Foxmail 5.0 [-fr-] Mime-Version: 1.0 X-MIMETrack: Itemize by SMTP Server on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11 |July 24, 2002) at 23/11/2007 17:51:41, Serialize by Router on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11 |July 24, 2002) at 23/11/2007 17:51:57, Serialize complete at 23/11/2007 17:51:57 Message-ID: <OF64F97E5A.CF075192-ONC125739C.005C9F6B@frcl.bull.fr> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=====003_Dragon157875718364_=====" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --=====003_Dragon157875718364_===== Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Stephan, Thank you for posting the agenda. I noticed that 3.1 is about DR 320 : Liaison statements received from ITU-T SG17 - 10 min Stefan Santesson (WG co-chair) https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/375/ I have prepared below a draft response to the liaison statement: Draft response to the liaison from ITU-T SG 17 to IETF on the resolution of DR320 See: https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/375/ Neither DNs of entities, nor DNs of CAs, can be unambiguous. Within RFC 3280, every subject DN (whether it is an entity DN or a CA DN) is only unique for the CA that has picked that name. A CA is thus free to choose any DN for naming an entity without the need to find out if that name has already been used by some other CA in the world. There is currently no mechanism in place to prevent conflict, e.g. a list of existing CA names that deployers of new CAs could check for naming conflicts. There is no need to consider putting mechanisms in place to prevent conflict, e.g. a list of existing CA names that deployers of new CAs could check for naming conflicts. The single requirement is the following: within a validation policy or within a signature policy there shall not be two different root CAs (trust anchors) with the same DN. This means that within RFC 3280 an ambiguous name is composed of a sequence of DNs, starting with the DN of a root CA and ending with the DN (or the Subject Alternate Name, if the DN is empty) of the entity. This also means that a DN alone associated with a certificate serial number is unable to uniquely identify a public key certificate. However, if the DN is the DN from a certificate issuer whose certificate has been verified under a given validation policy or signature policy, then that DN can be characterized by a chain of upper CA names and then becomes unique under that validation or signature policy. The liaison statement states: "Things break if two entities identify themselves using the same name". No evidence has been provided by ITU-T SG 17 to demonstrate that this statement is true. If it were, amendments to X.509 would need to be provided to deal with name collisions which are indeed possible, either intentionally or by accident. Denis I have updated what I believe to be the final agenda for Vancouver. We have now an almost full 2 hour program. http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07dec/agenda/pkix.txt Stefan Santesson Senior Program Manager Windows Security, Standards --=====003_Dragon157875718364_===== Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML xmlns:o><HEAD> <META http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> <META content="MSHTML 6.00.2800.1601" name=GENERATOR></HEAD> <BODY> <DIV>Stephan,</DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV>Thank you for posting the agenda.</DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV>I noticed that 3.1 is about DR 320 : </DIV> <DIV> Liaison statements received from ITU-T SG17 - 10 min<BR> Stefan Santesson (WG co-chair)<BR> <A href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/375/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/375/</A><BR></DIV> <DIV>I have prepared below a draft response to the liaison statement:</DIV> <DIV><B><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 13.5pt"></SPAN></B> </DIV> <DIV><B><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 13.5pt">Draft response to the liaison from ITU-T SG 17 to IETF on the resolution of DR320 <o:p></o:p></SPAN></B></DIV> <DIV> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">See: https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/375/<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">Neither DNs of entities, nor DNs of CAs, can be unambiguous.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">Within RFC 3280, every subject DN (whether it is an entity DN or a CA DN) </SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">is only unique for the CA that has picked that name. A CA is thus free to choose any DN </SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">for naming an entity without the need to find out if that name has already been used by </SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">some other CA in the world. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P><PRE><SPAN lang=EN-US style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US">There is currently no mechanism in place to prevent conflict, e.g. a list of existing CA names <BR>that deployers of new CAs could check for naming conflicts. There is no need to consider <BR>putting mechanisms in place to prevent conflict, e.g. a list of existing CA names that deployers <BR>of new CAs could check for naming conflicts.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></PRE> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">The single requirement is the following: within a validation policy or within a signature policy <BR>there shall not be two different root CAs (trust anchors) with the same DN. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">This means that within RFC 3280 an ambiguous name is composed of a sequence of DNs, <BR>starting with the DN of a root CA and ending with the DN (or the Subject Alternate Name, </SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">if the DN is empty) of the entity.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">This also means that a DN alone associated with a certificate serial number is unable to uniquely identify <BR>a public key certificate. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US">However, if the DN is the DN from a certificate issuer whose certificate has been verified under a given <BR>validation policy or signature policy, then that DN can be characterized by a chain of upper CA names and <BR>then becomes unique under that validation or signature policy.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p></o:p></SPAN><SPAN lang=EN-US style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US">The liaison statement states: "Things break if two entities identify themselves using the same name". <BR>No evidence has been provided by ITU-T SG 17 to demonstrate that this statement is true. <BR>If it were, amendments to X.509 would need to be provided to deal with name collisions <BR>which are indeed possible, either intentionally or by accident. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p></o:p></SPAN> </P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US"><o:p>Denis</o:p></SPAN></P></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV> <HR> </DIV> <DIV class=Section1> <P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US>I have updated what I believe to be the final agenda for Vancouver.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US>We have now an almost full 2 hour program.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></SPAN><SPAN lang=EN-US><A href="http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07dec/agenda/pkix.txt">http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07dec/agenda/pkix.txt</A><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></SPAN><B><SPAN lang=EN-GB style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'">Stefan Santesson</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=EN-GB style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-GB style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'">Senior Program Manager</SPAN><SPAN lang=EN-GB style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=EN-GB style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'">Windows Security, Standards</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=EN-US style="COLOR: #1f497d"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P></DIV> <HR> </BODY></HTML> --=====003_Dragon157875718364_=====-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lANFPjkA026186 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 23 Nov 2007 08:25:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lANFPjUf026185; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 08:25:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-dub.microsoft.com (smtp-dub.microsoft.com [213.199.138.191]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lANFPhxo026179 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 08:25:44 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stefans@microsoft.com) Received: from DUB-EXHUB-C301.europe.corp.microsoft.com (65.53.213.91) by DUB-EXGWY-E801.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.129.1) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.1.222.3; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 15:25:42 +0000 Received: from EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.221.79]) by DUB-EXHUB-C301.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.213.91]) with mapi; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 15:25:42 +0000 From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> To: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2007 15:24:32 +0000 Subject: Agenda posted Thread-Topic: Agenda posted Thread-Index: Acgt5PLPX7bJ/FCOQFaoQNcvTCE7GA== Message-ID: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D32032E20ADCA@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D32032E20ADCAEAEXMSGC332eu_" MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --_000_9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D32032E20ADCAEAEXMSGC332eu_ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I have updated what I believe to be the final agenda for Vancouver. We have now an almost full 2 hour program. http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07dec/agenda/pkix.txt Stefan Santesson Senior Program Manager Windows Security, Standards --_000_9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D32032E20ADCAEAEXMSGC332eu_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr= osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:x=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:excel" xmlns:p=3D"urn:schemas-m= icrosoft-com:office:powerpoint" xmlns:a=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office= :access" xmlns:dt=3D"uuid:C2F41010-65B3-11d1-A29F-00AA00C14882" xmlns:s=3D"= uuid:BDC6E3F0-6DA3-11d1-A2A3-00AA00C14882" xmlns:rs=3D"urn:schemas-microsof= t-com:rowset" xmlns:z=3D"#RowsetSchema" xmlns:b=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-co= m:office:publisher" xmlns:ss=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:spreadshee= t" xmlns:c=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:component:spreadsheet" xmlns= :oa=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:activation" xmlns:html=3D"http://ww= w.w3.org/TR/REC-html40" xmlns:q=3D"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope= /" xmlns:D=3D"DAV:" xmlns:x2=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/excel/2= 003/xml" xmlns:ois=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/ois/" xm= lns:dir=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/directory/" xmlns:d= s=3D"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:dsp=3D"http://schemas.micros= oft.com/sharepoint/dsp" xmlns:udc=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/data/udc"= xmlns:xsd=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:sps=3D"http://schemas= .microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/" xmlns:xsi=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSch= ema-instance" xmlns:udcxf=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/data/udc/xmlfile"= xmlns:wf=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/workflow/" xmlns:= mver=3D"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006" xmlns:= m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns:mrels=3D"http:= //schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships" xmlns:ex12t=3D"htt= p://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types" xmlns:ex12m=3D"http= ://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages" xmlns=3D"http://w= ww.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"> <head> <meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"> <meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 12 (filtered medium)"> <style> <!-- /* Font Definitions */ @font-face {font-family:"Cambria Math"; panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;} @font-face {font-family:Calibri; panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;} /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {margin:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";} a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {mso-style-priority:99; color:blue; text-decoration:underline;} a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed {mso-style-priority:99; color:purple; text-decoration:underline;} span.EmailStyle17 {mso-style-type:personal-compose; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; color:windowtext;} .MsoChpDefault {mso-style-type:export-only;} @page Section1 {size:612.0pt 792.0pt; margin:70.85pt 70.85pt 70.85pt 70.85pt;} div.Section1 {page:Section1;} --> </style> <!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" /> </xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit"> <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" /> </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--> </head> <body lang=3DSV link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple> <div class=3DSection1> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>I have updated what I believe to be= the final agenda for Vancouver.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>We have now an almost full 2 hour p= rogram.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><a href=3D"http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07dec/agenda/pkix.txt">http://www3= .ietf.org/proceedings/07dec/agenda/pkix.txt</a><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f= amily: "Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D= EN-GB style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F49= 7D'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami= ly:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'fon= t-size: 12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span>= </p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f= amily: "Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><= span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p> </div> </body> </html> --_000_9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D32032E20ADCAEAEXMSGC332eu_-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lANFL7eq025856 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 23 Nov 2007 08:21:07 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lANFL74d025855; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 08:21:07 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from [10.20.30.150] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lANFL3pI025848 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 23 Nov 2007 08:21:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org) Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p06240802c36c9d3d7c8e@[10.20.30.150]> In-Reply-To: <20071122115333.GA12388@tau.invalid> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <20071121165258.6F56533C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <F0182FE9-29A3-48F0-A8AA-5BF59A5D7C29@cisco.com> <20071122115333.GA12388@tau.invalid> Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2007 07:20:46 -0800 To: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 12:53 PM +0100 11/22/07, Bodo Moeller wrote: >On Wed, Nov 21, 2007 at 11:26:53AM -0600, max pritikin wrote: > >> Placing usage instructions in the certificate does not enforce the >> verifying parties behavior any more than protocol handshakes would. > >It does provide authenticated usage information to the verifying >parties, though. Um, so? It is "authenticated" to be from a party that is not the signer. In most situations, my CA doesn't have the slightest idea what I am doing, or want to be doing, with my public key. >Without such information, verifying parties cannot >tell if the observed usage in any given handshake should be considered >suspicious (and thus rejected) or is benign. And with such information from my CA, they still have no idea. >Consider the following scenario. The SHA-3 competition is now open. >So one interesting business idea is to take the signature from any >certificate signed by some high-profile ECDSA or DSA root certificate >that is far away from expiring, and then to engineer a new hash >algorithm that appears sound and secure, except that it happens to >have a particularly interesting pre-image for the hash value from said >non-root certificate's signature: namely, a preimage that would >provide you with a certificate of your own with generous >basicConstraints, simply by reusing the previous signature coming from >the CA. So you submit this hash function to the SHA-3 competition, >provide a reference implementation and hope that it ends up in relying >parties' software. If this plan works out, suddenly you have become a >high-profile CA yourself -- even though in this particular example >none of the cryptographic algorithms involved would have to be >insecure in itself. Even if there were any "high-profile ECDSA or DSA root certificates", they would contain the signature algorithm, which includes the hash used, ecdsa-with-SHA1 or id-dsa-with-sha1, and that is covered by the signature itself. This is no different than RSA. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAN9m4Bu098704 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 23 Nov 2007 02:48:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAN9m4DX098703; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 02:48:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from moutng.kundenserver.de (moutng.kundenserver.de [212.227.126.186]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAN9m2ad098694 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 02:48:03 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from SRS0=R0k4=QQ=acm.org=bmoeller@srs.kundenserver.de) Received: from tau.invalid (p508EB083.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [80.142.176.131]) by mrelayeu.kundenserver.de (node=mrelayeu7) with ESMTP (Nemesis) id 0ML2xA-1IvV8j2Fz4-0006OA; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 10:48:02 +0100 Received: by tau.invalid (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 4E6461EBF0; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 10:48:00 +0100 (CET) Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2007 12:53:33 +0100 From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> To: max pritikin <pritikin@cisco.com> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Message-ID: <20071122115333.GA12388@tau.invalid> Mail-Followup-To: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>, max pritikin <pritikin@cisco.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <20071121165258.6F56533C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <F0182FE9-29A3-48F0-A8AA-5BF59A5D7C29@cisco.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <F0182FE9-29A3-48F0-A8AA-5BF59A5D7C29@cisco.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i X-Provags-ID: V01U2FsdGVkX1+UVbq7jxQJPPebbNvgUv+7h02g2qIHWBplBF3 2CYc6NpwsYxDY7UWC+v4fFh6J1x6HrlZmwTI4RAl7EDD/aMwgA D7vOSrHKgrunyEyWeA3hD4JqylCzc3uwdWu3m7GT04UpJgArgD ABQ== Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> On Wed, Nov 21, 2007 at 11:26:53AM -0600, max pritikin wrote: > Placing usage instructions in the certificate does not enforce the > verifying parties behavior any more than protocol handshakes would. It does provide authenticated usage information to the verifying parties, though. Without such information, verifying parties cannot tell if the observed usage in any given handshake should be considered suspicious (and thus rejected) or is benign. > Also it maybe more difficult if the certificate verification > operations are distinct from the protocol hashing operations. Paul's > example of key usage seems to be very topical. > > Long lived device certificates would suffer from this approach. The > certificates on these devices (cable modems, wimax, IEEE 802.1AR, etc > etc etc) are profiled and baked well in advance. Attempting to expand > those profiles to limit the use of the credentials to particular hash > algorithms would be problematic. One the one hand, you wouldn't *have* to use such hash algorithm constraints in long-lived certificates for which you consider it problematic. On the other hand, this is where it is particularly important to specify such constraints. (You don't really need hash constraints to prevent SHA-1 use of your (EC)DSA key that is only meant to be used with SHA-256: Except with tiny probability, none of the signatures that you ever generate using SHA-256 could be interpreted as a SHA-1-based signature, unless the (EC)DSA subgroup you are using is too small.) Consider the following scenario. The SHA-3 competition is now open. So one interesting business idea is to take the signature from any certificate signed by some high-profile ECDSA or DSA root certificate that is far away from expiring, and then to engineer a new hash algorithm that appears sound and secure, except that it happens to have a particularly interesting pre-image for the hash value from said non-root certificate's signature: namely, a preimage that would provide you with a certificate of your own with generous basicConstraints, simply by reusing the previous signature coming from the CA. So you submit this hash function to the SHA-3 competition, provide a reference implementation and hope that it ends up in relying parties' software. If this plan works out, suddenly you have become a high-profile CA yourself -- even though in this particular example none of the cryptographic algorithms involved would have to be insecure in itself. If your are ambitious about security, then to avoid hash algorithm substitution attacks of any kind, generally you'd want to limit the use of any given key beforehand if at all possible. I don't agree that long-lived certificates are a severe obstacle to this. If you want algorithm flexibility for everyday use, then you can introduce an intermediate CA whose certificate is updated sufficiently often, always specifying the appropriate algorithm to use, while the root CA would continue to use the initially chosen hash algorithms for the few certificates that it signs. If there is ever a time where you want to completely exchange the set of allowed algorithms, why not take the extra step and exchange the long-lived certificate as well? Bodo Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAM1M1j3066366 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 18:22:01 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAM1M11X066365; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 18:22:01 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mailipbo.ntcif.telstra.com.au (mailipbo.ntcif.telstra.com.au [202.12.233.29]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAM1Lxk2066340 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 18:22:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com) Received: from unknown (HELO mailai.ntcif.telstra.com.au) ([202.12.162.17]) by mailipbi.ntcif.telstra.com.au with ESMTP; 22 Nov 2007 12:21:56 +1100 Received: from mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mailai.ntcif.telstra.com.au (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04E83FFA1; Thu, 22 Nov 2007 12:21:55 +1100 (EST) Received: from wsmsg2902.srv.dir.telstra.com (wsmsg2902.srv.dir.telstra.com [172.49.40.51]) by mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) with ESMTP id MAA08619; Thu, 22 Nov 2007 12:21:55 +1100 (EST) Received: from WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com ([172.49.40.20]) by wsmsg2902.srv.dir.telstra.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Thu, 22 Nov 2007 12:21:54 +1100 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2007 12:21:53 +1100 Message-ID: <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F20383906A@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> In-Reply-To: <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F202C39470@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: Acgq2OmrK/CPwedORjuYCnyihrUTXgAQSaBAAF1tZzA= References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F202C39470@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tls@ietf.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 22 Nov 2007 01:21:54.0880 (UTC) FILETIME=[116FEC00:01C82CA6] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from base64 to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAM1M1k2066360 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I agree with Ekr. RFC 4055 âAdditional RSA Algorithms and Identifiersâ §8 âSecurity Considerationsâ describes the reasons for binding a public key to a signature algorithm. It talks about RSA keys, but the logic also applies to DSA keys -- in fact to any crypto key. âGenerally, good cryptographic practice employs a given RSA key pair in only one scheme. This practice avoids the risk that vulnerability in one scheme may compromise the security of the other, and may be essential to maintain provable security. While PKCS #1 Version 1.5 [P1v1.5] has been employed for both key transport and digital signature without any known bad interactions, such a combined use of an RSA key pair is not recommended in the future. Therefore, an RSA key pair used for RSASSA-PSS signature generation should not be used for other purposes. For similar reasons, one RSA key pair should always be used with the same RSASSA-PSS parameters (except possibly for the salt length). Likewise, an RSA key pair used for RSAES-OAEP key transport should not be used for other purposes. For similar reasons, one RSA key pair should always be used with the same RSAES- OAEP parameters.â There actually have been âknown bad interactionsâ with PKCS #1 v1.5. The âmillion-message attackâ against PKCS #1 v1.5 block-type 2 encryption in SSL can be used to create a PKCS #1 v1.5 block-type 1 signature. A certificate binding the SSL serverâs public encryption key to a specific encryption algorithm would prevent the forged signature from being accepted. In this case, a (critical) key usage extension would also suffice. In practise, the benefits of being able to use a single key (for signing and decrypting email, for acting as a TLS server and client, for signing XML and authenticating in TLS) often far outweigh the risk of bad interactions. That is, the risk that an operation in one context being misinterpreted as an operation in a different context. âOftenâ âin practiseâ is not âalwaysâ âfor all usersâ âin all circumstancesâ. Key usage (1), key purpose (2) and signature/encryption/transport algorithm (3) are really three points on a continuum for giving the certificate holder control over where the key->name binding (which is the core of their certificate) will be used. There is no theoretical reason to support controls 1 & 2, but not 3. So we come down to practical objections: * control 3 (eg over signature hash) will be used less than controls 1 & 2 (key usage & purpose) -- perhaps infrequently enough that it doesnât warrant inclusion in a standard for Internet use; * key usage has been a disaster (according to Paul Hoffman), implying that deprecating the existing controls would be better than adding another (though such deprecation would cause too big a storm to contemplate); * messy/painful/awkward to implement given the common divide between crypto libraries, cert processing libraries and application logic (this area is not my forte, but that is the impression I remember from Stefan Santesson -- though it may only concern the placement of the control in subjectPublicKeyInfo vs in an extension); * existing public CAs donât (that I have seen) allow certificate holders to arbitrarily specify the key usage or purposes they want (other than choosing a server or code signing cert) so they are unlikely to allow algorithms to be specified, which means any extension has little hope of widespread deployment; * interoperability issues where a certificate holder wants one algorithm, but a relying party wants another (this is a clash of deliberate crypto choices (policy), not syntax details -- but the resulting frustration is similar). My gut feel is that a new extension holding âalgorithm identifier matching rulesâ should be defined. List hash:SHA-1 in the extension, mark it critical, and pray that the other end understands. ---------- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Eric Rescorla My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA certs to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the public key contained in the cert. This prevents hash algorithm substitution in signatures formed with that key (or rather the private key that corresponds to that key). Do you agree with this? -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALJsxMk046449 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 12:54:59 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lALJsx8Z046448; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 12:54:59 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mx12.bbn.com (mx12.bbn.com [128.33.0.81]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALJsvrb046441 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 12:54:58 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from dommiel.bbn.com ([192.1.122.15] helo=[192.168.0.102]) by mx12.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1Iuvew-0001wr-3n; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 14:54:54 -0500 Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p0624050ac36a3ac1f5ae@[192.168.0.102]> In-Reply-To: <20071121145750.3114833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.micros oft.com> <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.micros oft.com> <20071121145750.3114833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2007 14:53:49 -0500 To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Cc: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 6:57 AM -0800 11/21/07, Eric Rescorla wrote: >... > > Is there any studies out there showing that this is a real security >> issue (has any realistic chance of being exploited) or are we simply >> chasing a ghost far away from the scene of real internet crime? > >Is this the current PKIX standard for work items? > >-Ekr Two observations: PKIX does take into account the viability of attacks when deciding how to address newly discovered vulnerabilities. So, for example, we noted that a CA could assign non-predictable cert serial numbers as a countermeasure to the first published hash attacks, which rely on the attacker being able to know/control the prefix of a signed object such as a cert submitted in a cert request. Several of the recent messages refer to problem of using the right hash algorithm with a given signature algorithm and key size. PKIX will certainly address this problem in the context of our data objects, e.g., certs. It is less clear whether PKIX should advocate carriage of additional data in certs to assist other protocols in this area. One could define suitable conventions for hash alg and signature alg/key size in the context of each protocol, for example. That doesn't mean we ought not consider an extension for carrying this info, but as several there folks have pointed out, this approach has problems too: - a CA may not want to assume liability for putting this info into a cert - a cert lifetime many not match the time frame for expressing new algorithm pairing info - an application/protocol or a CAPI may not have ready access to a private extension used to convey this info We have to proceed cautiously here. I am not (yet) ruling out an extension to carry such info, if these issue can be addressed. Steve Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALI972h037487 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 11:09:07 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lALI9735037483; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 11:09:07 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (news.meritdirect.com [209.213.211.195] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALI96ti037468 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 11:09:06 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EF6733C2B; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 10:04:00 -0800 (PST) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2007 10:03:59 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: max pritikin <pritikin@cisco.com> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs In-Reply-To: <F0182FE9-29A3-48F0-A8AA-5BF59A5D7C29@cisco.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <20071121165258.6F56533C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <F0182FE9-29A3-48F0-A8AA-5BF59A5D7C29@cisco.com> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071121180400.7EF6733C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At Wed, 21 Nov 2007 11:26:53 -0600, max pritikin wrote: > Placing usage instructions in the certificate does not enforce the > verifying parties behavior any more than protocol handshakes would. It's not a matter of enforcement than information. Again, there's no way to do this in the protocol handshake because it needs to be authenticated by a separate mechanism. > Paul's > example of key usage seems to be very topical. > > Long lived device certificates would suffer from this approach. The > certificates on these devices (cable modems, wimax, IEEE 802.1AR, etc > etc etc) are profiled and baked well in advance. Attempting to expand > those profiles to limit the use of the credentials to particular hash > algorithms would be problematic. No more than limiting them to particular signature algorithms, which is baked into the certificate right now. In fact, I'd observe that current DSA certificates are effectively restricted to SHA-1 right now in that there is no DSS for DSA with other digests. -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALHRwMc031107 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 10:27:58 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lALHRw5I031106; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 10:27:58 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ams-iport-1.cisco.com (ams-iport-1.cisco.com [144.254.224.140]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALHRuR9031084 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 10:27:57 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from pritikin@cisco.com) X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.21,447,1188770400"; d="scan'208";a="158442114" Received: from ams-dkim-2.cisco.com ([144.254.224.139]) by ams-iport-1.cisco.com with ESMTP; 21 Nov 2007 18:27:41 +0100 Received: from ams-core-1.cisco.com (ams-core-1.cisco.com [144.254.224.150]) by ams-dkim-2.cisco.com (8.12.11/8.12.11) with ESMTP id lALHRfBe013610; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 18:27:41 +0100 Received: from xbh-ams-331.emea.cisco.com (xbh-ams-331.cisco.com [144.254.231.71]) by ams-core-1.cisco.com (8.12.10/8.12.6) with ESMTP id lALHROZZ000834; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 17:27:24 GMT Received: from xfe-ams-332.cisco.com ([144.254.231.73]) by xbh-ams-331.emea.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 18:27:23 +0100 Received: from [10.32.244.68] ([10.32.244.68]) by xfe-ams-332.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 18:27:23 +0100 In-Reply-To: <20071121165258.6F56533C2B@delta.rtfm.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <20071121165258.6F56533C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v752.3) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; delsp=yes; format=flowed Message-Id: <F0182FE9-29A3-48F0-A8AA-5BF59A5D7C29@cisco.com> Cc: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: max pritikin <pritikin@cisco.com> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2007 11:26:53 -0600 To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.752.3) X-OriginalArrivalTime: 21 Nov 2007 17:27:23.0592 (UTC) FILETIME=[C73A2480:01C82C63] DKIM-Signature: v=0.5; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; l=2863; t=1195666061; x=1196530061; c=relaxed/simple; s=amsdkim2001; h=Content-Type:From:Subject:Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version; d=cisco.com; i=pritikin@cisco.com; z=From:=20max=20pritikin=20<pritikin@cisco.com> |Subject:=20Re=3A=20[TLS]=20DSA/SHA-1,=20and=20OIDs |Sender:=20; bh=3e8YIUVBxBvBewuJQ5w8eqApu9UR0DtUzm2J6aHeGtg=; b=K6yXAEuRBNkpFD0EMZCFkkz2UZR5hA7RWL+bA+hLnOMQ9Cd/2sxtMniIyRxoF1E+WsrT9Pup 66eHD7zHSlEs0HwG697Vmft2DXX9kNZFKWrseAOAShfSyhd0Z47FhNci; Authentication-Results: ams-dkim-2; header.From=pritikin@cisco.com; dkim=pass ( sig from cisco.com/amsdkim2001 verified; ); Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Placing usage instructions in the certificate does not enforce the verifying parties behavior any more than protocol handshakes would. Also it maybe more difficult if the certificate verification operations are distinct from the protocol hashing operations. Paul's example of key usage seems to be very topical. Long lived device certificates would suffer from this approach. The certificates on these devices (cable modems, wimax, IEEE 802.1AR, etc etc etc) are profiled and baked well in advance. Attempting to expand those profiles to limit the use of the credentials to particular hash algorithms would be problematic. - max On Nov 21, 2007, at 10:52 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > At Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:50:33 -0800, > Paul Hoffman wrote: >> >> At 6:57 AM -0800 11/21/07, Eric Rescorla wrote: >>> We're talking about two different kinds of downgrade here. >>> The S/MIME anti-downgrade issue is about signature stripping >>> when multiple signatures are applied. The downgrade issue >>> I'm concerned about is straight-line forgery: Alice always >>> signs with digest algorithm H1: she then generates a signature >>> over some message M where H1(M) = X. The attacker compromises H2 >>> and forms M' st. H2(M2) = X. He can then craft a new message >>> apparently signed by Alice. There's no act that Alice can take >>> involving H1 and her signature algorithm that can prevent this: >>> it has to be in information available to a verifier who has only >>> the cert and a candidate signature. >> >> The proposed solution of an extension that says which hash functions >> can be used with the public key in a cert has a few flaws. First, it >> means that all CAs must understand the safety of all the hash >> algorithms out there to know to not list H2. > > Not really, no. As I said, I think this is pretty much an issue > of matching SHA variant to DSA key size. I agree that this is > imperfect, but the situation is imperfect. > > >> In some sense, they must >> all predict the future as well, because they might list H2 today and >> then next year find out that some set of Mallorys have compromised >> it. Further, this puts CAs into the position of saying what can and >> cannot be done with a public key; "key usage" has proven this to be a >> disaster. > > This strikes me as a pretty different case. > > >> Instead, we have to assume that all relying parties need to know >> which of the hash algorithms that they know how to use are >> trustworthy, and which aren't. Hopefully, for any that are not, the >> relying party simply forgets how to use it, or marks it as poisoned. > > This seems highly undesirable from the perspective of the > verifying party, who has opinions about what digests he > will use, but who needs the relying party to enforce it. > > -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALGw0VD026247 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 09:58:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lALGw0Vc026246; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 09:58:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (74-95-2-169-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net [74.95.2.169] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALGvxtg026234 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 09:58:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6F56533C2B; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:52:58 -0800 (PST) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:52:57 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs In-Reply-To: <p06240806c36a0fa51f9e@[10.20.30.108]> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071121165258.6F56533C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:50:33 -0800, Paul Hoffman wrote: > > At 6:57 AM -0800 11/21/07, Eric Rescorla wrote: > >We're talking about two different kinds of downgrade here. > >The S/MIME anti-downgrade issue is about signature stripping > >when multiple signatures are applied. The downgrade issue > >I'm concerned about is straight-line forgery: Alice always > >signs with digest algorithm H1: she then generates a signature > >over some message M where H1(M) = X. The attacker compromises H2 > >and forms M' st. H2(M2) = X. He can then craft a new message > >apparently signed by Alice. There's no act that Alice can take > >involving H1 and her signature algorithm that can prevent this: > >it has to be in information available to a verifier who has only > >the cert and a candidate signature. > > The proposed solution of an extension that says which hash functions > can be used with the public key in a cert has a few flaws. First, it > means that all CAs must understand the safety of all the hash > algorithms out there to know to not list H2. Not really, no. As I said, I think this is pretty much an issue of matching SHA variant to DSA key size. I agree that this is imperfect, but the situation is imperfect. > In some sense, they must > all predict the future as well, because they might list H2 today and > then next year find out that some set of Mallorys have compromised > it. Further, this puts CAs into the position of saying what can and > cannot be done with a public key; "key usage" has proven this to be a > disaster. This strikes me as a pretty different case. > Instead, we have to assume that all relying parties need to know > which of the hash algorithms that they know how to use are > trustworthy, and which aren't. Hopefully, for any that are not, the > relying party simply forgets how to use it, or marks it as poisoned. This seems highly undesirable from the perspective of the verifying party, who has opinions about what digests he will use, but who needs the relying party to enforce it. -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALGpQY7025640 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 09:51:26 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lALGpQC8025639; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 09:51:26 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from [10.20.30.108] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALGpF4g025608 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 09:51:16 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org) Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p06240806c36a0fa51f9e@[10.20.30.108]> In-Reply-To: <20071121145750.3114833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.micros oft.com> <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.micros oft.com> <20071121145750.3114833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:50:33 -0800 To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Cc: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 6:57 AM -0800 11/21/07, Eric Rescorla wrote: >We're talking about two different kinds of downgrade here. >The S/MIME anti-downgrade issue is about signature stripping >when multiple signatures are applied. The downgrade issue >I'm concerned about is straight-line forgery: Alice always >signs with digest algorithm H1: she then generates a signature >over some message M where H1(M) = X. The attacker compromises H2 >and forms M' st. H2(M2) = X. He can then craft a new message >apparently signed by Alice. There's no act that Alice can take >involving H1 and her signature algorithm that can prevent this: >it has to be in information available to a verifier who has only >the cert and a candidate signature. The proposed solution of an extension that says which hash functions can be used with the public key in a cert has a few flaws. First, it means that all CAs must understand the safety of all the hash algorithms out there to know to not list H2. In some sense, they must all predict the future as well, because they might list H2 today and then next year find out that some set of Mallorys have compromised it. Further, this puts CAs into the position of saying what can and cannot be done with a public key; "key usage" has proven this to be a disaster. Instead, we have to assume that all relying parties need to know which of the hash algorithms that they know how to use are trustworthy, and which aren't. Hopefully, for any that are not, the relying party simply forgets how to use it, or marks it as poisoned. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALF2rso014114 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:02:53 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lALF2rsF014113; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:02:53 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (74-95-2-169-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net [74.95.2.169] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALF2pES014105 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:02:52 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3114833C2B; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 06:57:50 -0800 (PST) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2007 06:57:49 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs In-Reply-To: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071121145750.3114833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At Wed, 21 Nov 2007 12:47:58 +0000, Stefan Santesson wrote: > > This is not the place to request it, but I really think we should > bring this up in a common meeting like the saag, because it is a > general problem that is relevant cross protocols. > > Trying to solve downgrade problems by stuffing hash limitations in > the certificate worries me, feels like the easy way out for the > protocol designers and principally wrong. I don't know what you mean by "the easy way out". TLS, for instance, has extensive anti-downgrade provisions. But this particular one cannot go in the protocol, because it's fundamentally tied to the signing key. [The exception here is to make an explicit tie to key length, i.e., keys of length X need SHA-1. I'll note that this is what FIPS 186-3 already does but it's notmandatory.] > As pointed out, it makes management of hash selection a lot harder > and a slow moving target as it requires certificate issuance to > match the hash policy. I don't see this. What I would expect would simply be that certificates would be issued with digest algorithms that match the FIPS 186-3 recommendations. > As a basic principle I think the major effort to transition to > better hashes is to upgrade the capability of communicating hosts > before the lowest grade of hash used becomes a realistic security > issue. This isn't about turning on new hashes, it's about allowing old ones to be used once the new ones are turned on during the transition period. > As a secondary solution protocols could be amended to protect > against downgrading, as with S/MIME and as a last resort enhance the > certificates. We're talking about two different kinds of downgrade here. The S/MIME anti-downgrade issue is about signature stripping when multiple signatures are applied. The downgrade issue I'm concerned about is straight-line forgery: Alice always signs with digest algorithm H1: she then generates a signature over some message M where H1(M) = X. The attacker compromises H2 and forms M' st. H2(M2) = X. He can then craft a new message apparently signed by Alice. There's no act that Alice can take involving H1 and her signature algorithm that can prevent this: it has to be in information available to a verifier who has only the cert and a candidate signature. > Is there any studies out there showing that this is a real security > issue (has any realistic chance of being exploited) or are we simply > chasing a ghost far away from the scene of real internet crime? Is this the current PKIX standard for work items? -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALEZL8T011796 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 07:35:21 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lALEZLN0011795; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 07:35:21 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from sj-iport-1.cisco.com (sj-iport-1-in.cisco.com [171.71.176.70]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALEZKfd011789 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 07:35:20 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from pritikin@cisco.com) Received: from sj-dkim-3.cisco.com ([171.71.179.195]) by sj-iport-1.cisco.com with ESMTP; 21 Nov 2007 06:35:21 -0800 Received: from sj-core-2.cisco.com (sj-core-2.cisco.com [171.71.177.254]) by sj-dkim-3.cisco.com (8.12.11/8.12.11) with ESMTP id lALEZJZf008011; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 06:35:19 -0800 Received: from xbh-sjc-231.amer.cisco.com (xbh-sjc-231.cisco.com [128.107.191.100]) by sj-core-2.cisco.com (8.12.10/8.12.6) with ESMTP id lALEZJb6020145; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 14:35:19 GMT Received: from xfe-sjc-211.amer.cisco.com ([171.70.151.174]) by xbh-sjc-231.amer.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 06:34:47 -0800 Received: from [10.32.244.67] ([10.32.244.67]) by xfe-sjc-211.amer.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 06:34:46 -0800 In-Reply-To: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v752.3) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; delsp=yes; format=flowed Message-Id: <F01EA0C8-FFA2-44A8-A468-8384A2D2BC5C@cisco.com> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: max pritikin <pritikin@cisco.com> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:34:19 -0600 To: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.752.3) X-OriginalArrivalTime: 21 Nov 2007 14:34:46.0804 (UTC) FILETIME=[AA19B540:01C82C4B] DKIM-Signature: v=0.5; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; l=2170; t=1195655719; x=1196519719; c=relaxed/simple; s=sjdkim3002; h=Content-Type:From:Subject:Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version; d=cisco.com; i=pritikin@cisco.com; z=From:=20max=20pritikin=20<pritikin@cisco.com> |Subject:=20Re=3A=20[TLS]=20DSA/SHA-1,=20and=20OIDs |Sender:=20; bh=fFdcki2T7xPGV8OtL5T7kjE6IOFwknUTxgBxK/0Qs8g=; b=IyOsvZ8CodCxQabjnpw0PBBUgkTcO99hew2DvpXJaCZ1GJeWaH4v5QJQttWHmQ+DZYaipu++ cWyxgeQ0ankOK235mmjybmUGnrHAYnEvRErKNG76YBOa/RGKeTt4nNcB; Authentication-Results: sj-dkim-3; header.From=pritikin@cisco.com; dkim=pass ( sig from cisco.com/sjdkim3002 verified; ); Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I too feel that placing protocol hints in the certificate is a bad way to go. - max On Nov 21, 2007, at 6:47 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote: > > This is not the place to request it, but I really think we should > bring this up in a common meeting like the saag, because it is a > general problem that is relevant cross protocols. > > Trying to solve downgrade problems by stuffing hash limitations in > the certificate worries me, feels like the easy way out for the > protocol designers and principally wrong. > As pointed out, it makes management of hash selection a lot harder > and a slow moving target as it requires certificate issuance to > match the hash policy. > > As a basic principle I think the major effort to transition to > better hashes is to upgrade the capability of communicating hosts > before the lowest grade of hash used becomes a realistic security > issue. As a secondary solution protocols could be amended to > protect against downgrading, as with S/MIME and as a last resort > enhance the certificates. > > Is there any studies out there showing that this is a real security > issue (has any realistic chance of being exploited) or are we > simply chasing a ghost far away from the scene of real internet crime? > > > > Stefan Santesson > Senior Program Manager > Windows Security, Standards > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@networkresonance.com] >> Sent: den 20 november 2007 18:34 >> To: Stefan Santesson >> Cc: Manger, James H; ietf-pkix@imc.org; tls@ietf.org >> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs >> >> At Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:19:40 +0000, >> Stefan Santesson wrote: >>> >>> [1 <text/plain; utf-8 (base64)>] >>> James, >>> >>> The design team has met again and will talk about it at the PKIX >> meeting. >>> However, this has never extended beyond the public key algorithm >> itself. >>> No one has seriously requested a full signature algorithm with hash >> algorithm to be specified in this field. >> >> Please take this message as a request from me that it be so, at >> least for DSA/ECSDA. >> >> -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALCmwJh001767 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 05:48:59 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lALCmwnL001766; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 05:48:58 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-dub.microsoft.com (smtp-dub.microsoft.com [213.199.138.181]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lALCmugk001750 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 05:48:57 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stefans@microsoft.com) Received: from dub-exhub-c302.europe.corp.microsoft.com (65.53.213.92) by DUB-EXGWY-E802.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.129.2) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.1.222.3; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 12:48:55 +0000 Received: from EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.221.79]) by DUB-EXHUB-C302.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([2002:4135:d55c::4135:d55c]) with mapi; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 12:48:55 +0000 From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> CC: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2007 12:47:58 +0000 Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: AcgrnDhnKbG8Kks0RPCy0emscOerSwAnq6EQ Message-ID: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B38B6E@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> In-Reply-To: <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lALCmwgj001760 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is not the place to request it, but I really think we should bring this up in a common meeting like the saag, because it is a general problem that is relevant cross protocols. Trying to solve downgrade problems by stuffing hash limitations in the certificate worries me, feels like the easy way out for the protocol designers and principally wrong. As pointed out, it makes management of hash selection a lot harder and a slow moving target as it requires certificate issuance to match the hash policy. As a basic principle I think the major effort to transition to better hashes is to upgrade the capability of communicating hosts before the lowest grade of hash used becomes a realistic security issue. As a secondary solution protocols could be amended to protect against downgrading, as with S/MIME and as a last resort enhance the certificates. Is there any studies out there showing that this is a real security issue (has any realistic chance of being exploited) or are we simply chasing a ghost far away from the scene of real internet crime? Stefan Santesson Senior Program Manager Windows Security, Standards > -----Original Message----- > From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@networkresonance.com] > Sent: den 20 november 2007 18:34 > To: Stefan Santesson > Cc: Manger, James H; ietf-pkix@imc.org; tls@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs > > At Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:19:40 +0000, > Stefan Santesson wrote: > > > > [1 <text/plain; utf-8 (base64)>] > > James, > > > > The design team has met again and will talk about it at the PKIX > meeting. > > However, this has never extended beyond the public key algorithm > itself. > > No one has seriously requested a full signature algorithm with hash > algorithm to be specified in this field. > > Please take this message as a request from me that it be so, at > least for DSA/ECSDA. > > -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAL7kRHo075761 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 00:46:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAL7kRUe075759; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 00:46:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail1relay.itmaster.local (host48-104-static.43-193-b.business.telecomitalia.it [193.43.104.48] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAL7kP7C075743; Wed, 21 Nov 2007 00:46:26 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Adriano.Santoni@actalis.it) Received: from POSTA02.itmaster.local ([193.43.104.10]) by mail1relay.itmaster.local with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:46:20 +0100 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: R: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:46:18 +0100 Message-ID: <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD421D6EA2D@POSTA02.itmaster.local> In-Reply-To: <200711202154.lAKLsJm6034999@balder-227.proper.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Thread-Index: AcgrwE3L7IFHNypBQBGtWwvyBOinsgAUTX1g References: <OF0B45CABE.A644003A-ONC1257398.0048F862@frcl.bull.fr> <200711202154.lAKLsJm6034999@balder-227.proper.com> From: "Santoni Adriano" <Adriano.Santoni@actalis.it> To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <ietf-smime@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 21 Nov 2007 07:46:20.0204 (UTC) FILETIME=[9B074EC0:01C82C12] X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: SMEX-7.0.0.1345-5.0.1023-15558.002 X-TM-AS-Result: No--20.848300-0.000000-2 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAL7kR7D075751 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Russ, I am not sure if you were addressing your comment to me or to Denis... At any rate, I would like to point out that the syntax I am proposing implies no MIME encoding at all. The data (like e.g. a patent, an offer, a contract, an income statement, a device driver, a security patch, a sensitive database, etc) is bundled in its native form, "as is". And thus, there is no MIME header to speak of. That's why I have provided for a 'mimeType' field: as a hint for the recipient/verifying application to guess what kind of data is carried within the TimeStampedData block, and what to do with it. Adriano -----Messaggio originale----- Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] Per conto di Russ Housley Inviato: martedì 20 novembre 2007 22.53 A: ietf-pkix@imc.org; ietf-smime@imc.org Oggetto: Re: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment In S/MIME, the id-data content type is used when the content is MIME encoded. Then, then MIME header in the content is used to determine the format of the content. Why does this suggest a different approach? Russ At 08:16 AM 11/19/2007, Denis Pinkas wrote: >Adriano, > >Thank you for this new proposal. I skimmed through it. > >It is interesting, but I fear that it is targeted to the wrong WG. >Since this would be an extension of CMS, this work item would rather >belong to the S-MIME WG. >For this reason, I copy the S-MIME WG. > >In addition, some polishing would be needed. > >Rather than long words, you will find hereafter a rewriting of the >ASN.1 with a few explanatory comments. > > TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { > version [0] Version DEFAULT v1, > fileName UTF8String, > mimeType PrintableString, > fileLocation UTF8String OPTIONAL, > -- fileLocation is only a hint. > -- The file may or may not be stored at that location. > content OCTET STRING, > temporalEvidences TemporalEvidences } > > Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } > TemporalEvidences ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TemporalEvidence > >-- This structure allows multiple levels of temporal evidences. > > TemporalEvidence ::= SEQUENCE { > evidences Evidences, > certificateLists CertificateLists OPTIONAL >} > > CertificateLists :: = SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertificateList > > Evidence ::= CHOICE { > timeStamps [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken } > >-- For each level there can be one or more time-stamps tokens. > >-- Before re-time stamping a set of former time-stamp tokens, >-- the CRLs of the previous level of time-stamps tokens can be captured >-- and inserted in the data structure. > >Denis > > > >Hello there, > > > >here I am again with my TimeStampedData proposal. > > > >I have submitted a new draft (also attached here) that takes into > account some of the remarks and suggestions received so far. > > > >I have made room for additional types of temporal evidence, like > e.g. RFC 4998, while keeping RFC 3161 as the basis of interoperability. > > > >I would like to invite everybody involved in time-stamping and > archiving e-documents to comment upon it: has it improved? > something is missing? > > > >In particular, please state: > >- are you interested in this work? > >- do you agree to adopt it as a new PKIX work item? > >- are you going to use this format, once it is finished? > > > >Is anybody willing to spend a few words on this draft during the > IETF meeting in Vancouver (as I cannot attend myself) ? > > > >And finally, is anybody willing to invest a little time in > co-authoring this draft with me? > > > >Adriano > >Actalis S.p.A. > >Milano, ITALY > > > > > > > > > >-----Messaggio originale----- > >Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org > [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] Per conto di Santoni Adriano > >Inviato: lunedì 3 settembre 2007 10.42 > >A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > >Oggetto: R: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > > > >Let me summarize the issues discussed so far: > > > >1) allow EvidenceRecord (RFC 4998) in addition to TimeStampToken (RFC > >3161) > > > >In principle, I have no objections as long as we do not complicate > things too much and do not hamper interoperability. > > > >There are at least two possible approaches to accomodate RFC 4998: > > > > a) explicitly provide for (one) ER in the TimeStampedData > syntax, as an alternative to the SET OF TimeStampToken; > > b) do not mention any specific standard for the "evidence", but > just mention RFC 3161 and RFC 4998 as two possibilities; > > > >In any case, it must be possible for the verifying application to > easily detect which of the two (or more) kind of "evidence" has been > used in the TimeStampedData envelope under examination. If we restrict > the kinds of evidence to the two above, then a extra tagging may not > be necessary, as an EvidenceRecord is a SEQUENCE, while the other > choice would be a SET OF. Although unelegant, it would work. On the > other hand, if we do not want to restrict the kinds of evidence to the > two above, then of course we should somehow add an extra tagging > level, because nobody knows at this time what syntax a third kind of > evidence would conform to. > > > >In any case, for the sake of interoperability, strong emphasis > should be given to RFC 3161 as today this is the most widely > implemented type of evidence. > > > >In conclusion: I agree with allowing RFC 4998 if we do that in a > way that does not modify the strong emphasis on RFC 3161 and does not > hamper interoperability (which must be based on supporting RFC 3161, > even though certain applications may also support RFC 4998). > > > >2) filename vs. URI > > > >Some remarked that an URI (or URI Reference) would be more > versatile than a simple filename. That is obviously true, but it > implies that the 'content' field of TimeStampedData may be empty. > This is not what I was addressing in my original proposal. It would > not just require the 'content' field to be declared OPTIONAL: it would > make interoperability very difficult to achieve unless we restrict the > URI schemes to a very small subset (e.g. http:, cid:, file:, ldap:) of > the myriad possibilities. In any case, it would require ages of > interoperability testing. And it would make life much harder for > software implementors, without much of a benefit in view. I strongly > believe in keeping things simple as much as possible. > > > >3) multiple contents and RFC 4073 > > > >The 'content' field in the TimeStampedData envelope is not > structured, in my original proposal. It is just an OCTET STRING. > That allows for any kind of content to be conveyed, even a > ContentCollection according to RFC 4073. > > > >Another remark has been made with reference to RFC 4073: the > ContentWithAttributes structure, also defined in RFC 4073, could in > principle be used to bundle some content with the corrisponding > evidence (the goal of my draft). Although this is true, it would > require definining some additional OIDs, and mandating the presence of > certain Attributes tagged by those OIDs. I frankly believe the > TimeStampedData structure that I am proposing is better, first because > it is dedicated and second because it "implements the ContentInfo > interface", so to speak. It is simpler to manage for applications > already able to parse different kinds of ContentInfo envelopes (there > are a great many), possibly in a recursive way. > > > >Adriano > > > > > >-----Messaggio originale----- > >Da: Young H Etheridge [mailto:yhe@yhetheridge.org] > >Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 17.48 > >A: Santoni Adriano > >Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > >Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > >Adriano, > > > >To add to your thought processes: I believe that a URI of > "file:///private.stuff" addresses your concern for privacy of the > physical URI. But, allowing URI in the syntax will make less private > repositories, not necessarily file systems, more universally > accessible. The intent of the URI in RFC 3986 is to also allow for > abstractly identifying a resource, not necessarily providing a > physical resource. In this manner the URI could then be used as an > object identity in database(s). > > > >Take care, > > > >yhe > > > >Santoni Adriano wrote: > >> To accomodate for RFC 4998, I would propose the following syntax: > >> > >> TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { > >> version INTEGER { v1(1) }, > >> fileName UTF8String, > >> mimeType PrintableString, > >> content OCTET STRING, > >> evidence Evidence > >> } > >> > >> Evidence ::= CHOICE { > >> timeStamps [0] SET (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken, > >> evidenceRecord [1] EvidenceRecord -- according to RFC 4998 } > >> > >> (I am not sure whether it would be better to use explicit or > >> implicit > >> tags...) > >> > >> Regarding the idea of having an URI instead of a filename: I'd > prefer to think over things a little bit more, and maybe collect more feedback. > >> > >> In my mind, I can send a TimeStampedData envelope to business > partners and/or public agencies via email. If the timestamped document > is a local one, which I think is a meaningful and realistic scenario, > then I do not want my company's hostnames and pathnames to be included > in the envelope so that the recipient can see them. > >> > >> Adriano > >> > >> > >> > >> -----Messaggio originale----- > >> Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org > >> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] > >> Per conto di Julien Stern > >> Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 13.43 > >> A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > >> Oggetto: Re: Draft on TimeStampedData > >> > >> > >> On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 12:06:00PM +0200, Tilo Kienitz wrote: > >> > >>> Adriano, > >>> > >>> > >>>> After pondering on this and other remarks, I cannot help but > >>>> agree with Steve. > >>>> > >>>> My original and essential goal is that of facilitating > >>>> interoperability in a currently unregulated field. If we allow > >>>> for several "degrees of freedom", than interoperability will be > hampered from the beginning. > >>>> So I'd better stick to RFC 3161 for now. We could include support > >>>> for RFC 4998 Evidence Records later on, at the time when they > >>>> become a widespread reality comparable to RFC 3161 > >>>> TimeStampTokens (which are widely implemented). > >>>> > >>> I would prefer to have both options: RFC 3161 and RFC 4998. For > >>> our customers evidence records are a widespread reality already. > >>> A standardized way to put some data and their evidence record into > >>> a single file would be useful. > >>> > >> > >> I strongly concur with this comment. Allowing the usage of ERS > as well as simple timestamps would allow the TimestampedData to > leverage all the work of RFC 4998 regarding timestamps instead of > reinventing the wheel in the future. > >> > >> Regards, > >> > >> -- > >> Julien > >> > >> > >>> Kind regards > >>> Tilo > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> -----Messaggio originale----- > >>>> Da: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] > >>>> Inviato: giovedì 30 agosto 2007 23.05 > >>>> A: Young H Etheridge > >>>> Cc: Santoni Adriano; ietf-pkix@imc.org > >>>> Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > >>>> > >>>> At 4:33 PM -0400 8/30/07, Young H Etheridge wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>> ... > >>>>>> > >>>>> Agreed, w.r.t. normative vs informative. The above quote from > >>>>> RFC-4998 merely underscores that this draft should also suggest, > >>>>> informatively, that the choice of Timestamp should be one that > >>>>> meets the normative syntax for Timestamp and not specify that > >>>>> which is in RFC-3161. Nothing gets broken by being less > >>>>> restrictive and generally more informative to the community-at-large. > >>>>> > >>>> I have to disagree with your conclusion. If we require 3161 > time stamps in an RFC of the sort Adriano proposed, then everyone can > parse them if they comply with the RFC. If the RFC says "insert the > time stamp from any standard you want here, and just tell us which one > you used" then we have a problem. A compliant implementation can > generate data structures containing time stamps that other compliant > implementations cannot parse. That's the sort of interoperability > problem we try to avoid in the IETF. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> My notion of resilience does not mean "more encompassing" but > >>>>> that of providing the user community with choice and an enhanced > >>>>> safeguard against the possibility of the weakening of an algorithm. > >>>>> > >>>> Choices can be good, but they can create interoperability > problems in some cases, like this one. Also, we have algorithm agility > as a requirement in all of our work, so the second concern you cite > does not seem to apply here. > >>>> > >>>> Steve > >>>> > >>> -- > >>> Tilo Kienitz > >>> SecCommerce Informationssysteme GmbH Obenhauptstr. 5 D - 22335 > >>> Hamburg > >>> Germany http://www.seccommerce.de Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAL2d9W3056717 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 19:39:09 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAL2d9YJ056716; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 19:39:09 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mx06.plaxo.com (mx.plaxo.com [66.151.128.12]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAL2d88I056708 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 19:39:08 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from bounce-update@mx.plaxo.com) Received: from bes01.plaxo.com (bes01.plaxo.com [10.1.10.1]) by mx06.plaxo.com (Postfix) with QMQP id 995B111074 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 18:39:07 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <1195612747.17357.20535.sendupdate2@mx.plaxo.com> Date: 21 Nov 2007 02:39:07 -0000 From: "Rodrigo Botafogo" <rbotafogo@certisign.com.br> To: "Ietf-Pkix" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Your Contact Info Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> <title>Your Contact Info</title> </head> <body bgcolor="#6897cf"> <div align="center"> <div align="center"> <table width="580" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" height="20"> <tr height="20"> <td valign="top" width="100" height="20"></td> </tr> </table> </div> <table width="580" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" height="72"> <tr align="left" valign="top"> <td align="left" valign="top"> <div align="left"> <img src="http://www.plaxo.com/images/server/email/share_connect/corner_white1.gif" alt="" width="4" height="4" border="0" /></div> </td> <td colspan="2"> <div align="right"> <img src="http://www.plaxo.com/images/server/email/share_connect/plaxo_logo2.gif" alt="Plaxo | Your address book for life" width="274" height="59" border="0" /></div> </td> </tr> </table> <table width="580" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff"> <tr align="left" valign="top" height="45"> <td width="60" height="45"></td> <td align="right" valign="bottom" height="45"> <div align="left"> <font size="-1" color="#0071bb" face="Arial"><strong>A Plaxo member would like to connect with you<br /> </strong></font><font size="-1" color="#666666" face="Arial">From: Rodrigo Botafogo, Diretor de Tecnologia, CertiSign Certificadora Digital S.A </font></div> </td> </tr> </table> <table width="580" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" bgcolor="white" height="30"> <tr valign="top"> <td valign="bottom"><img src="http://www.plaxo.com/images/server/email/share_connect/blue_ramp.gif" alt="" width="100%" height="20" border="0" /></td> </tr> </table> <table width="580" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" height="250"> <tr align="left" valign="top" height="120"> <td rowspan="2" align="left" valign="top" width="60" height="250"> <div align="left"></div> </td> <td rowspan="2" colspan="2" align="left" valign="middle" height="250"> <table height="250"><tr><td height="100%" valign="center"> <font size="-1" color="#666666" face="Arial"> <br /> Estou usando o Plaxo para manter minha agenda de contatos atualizada. Por que você não me envia suas informações de contato mais atuais? Se você fizer parte do Plaxo, sempre teremos as informações de contato mais atuais um do outro nas nossas agendas.<br><br>Obrigado!<br><br> <br /> </font> </td></tr> </table> </td> <td rowspan="2" align="right" valign="top" width="60" height="250"></td> </tr> <tr align="left" valign="top" height="130"></tr> </table> <table width="580" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" align="center" bgcolor="#fffacc" height="105"> <tr align="center" valign="top" height="40"> <td rowspan="3" align="left" valign="bottom" width="60"> <div align="left"> <img src="http://www.plaxo.com/images/server/email/share_connect/corner_yellow3.gif" alt="" width="2" height="2" border="0" /></div> </td> <td colspan="2" valign="bottom" height="40"> </td> <td rowspan="3" align="right" valign="bottom" width="60"><img src="http://www.plaxo.com/images/server/email/share_connect/corner_yellow4.gif" alt="" width="2" height="2" border="0" /></td> </tr> <tr align="center"> <td colspan="2" align="center" valign="middle"> <table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" align="center"> <tr height="2"> <td rowspan="3" align="right" valign="middle" width="2" height="22" bgcolor="f9c07e"></td> <td align="center" valign="bottom" bgcolor="#f9c07e" height="2"></td> <td rowspan="3" align="center" valign="middle" width="2" height="22" bgcolor="ed4f1d"></td> </tr> <tr height="18"> <td align="center" valign="middle" bgcolor="#f5871c" height="18"> <a style="text-decoration:none;" href="https://www.plaxo.com/edit_contact_info?r=25770252128-67700802--321488313"><font size="2" color="white" face="Arial"><strong> View your info </strong></font></a></td> </tr> <tr height="2"> <td align="center" valign="top" bgcolor="#ed4f1d" height="2"></td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> <tr align="center" valign="top" height="30"> <td colspan="2" height="30"><font size="-2" color="#0071bb" face="Arial"></font></td> </tr> </table> <div align="center"> <div align="center"> <table width="580" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tr valign="top"> <td valign="top"> <div align="center"><font size="-2" color="#b4cae6" face="Arial"><br />If you no longer wish to receive emails from Rodrigo Botafogo via Plaxo, <a href=https://www.plaxo.com/opt_out?r=25770252128-67700802--321488313 >click here</a> to opt-out.</font></div> </td> </tr> </table> </div> </div> </div> </body> </html> Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKMsfBh039000 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 15:54:41 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAKMsfP0038999; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 15:54:41 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from EXVS01.ex.dslextreme.net (exvs01.ex.dslextreme.net [66.51.199.86]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKMsch2038992 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 15:54:41 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from chokhani@orionsec.com) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 14:55:02 -0800 Message-ID: <82D5657AE1F54347A734BDD33637C87909D5A908@EXVS01.ex.dslextreme.net> In-Reply-To: <200711202154.lAKLsBFR034985@balder-227.proper.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: Acgrx2NtlIqwAwRzR5q3reb/tLBRZgAANGEg References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223A32833@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071117141738.B445033C21@delta.rtfm.com> <200711202154.lAKLsBFR034985@balder-227.proper.com> From: "Santosh Chokhani" <chokhani@orionsec.com> To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>, "Eric Rescorla" <ekr@networkresonance.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tls@ietf.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAKMsfh2038994 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Russ, But, assuming the trust anchor (self-signed certificate) contains the hashing algorithm you trust (just like the public key) and the certificates in the path have the hash extension, certification path does provide that transitive trust. -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Russ Housley Sent: Tuesday, November 20, 2007 10:42 AM To: Eric Rescorla Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org; tls@ietf.org Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Eric: I disagree. When an actual signature is generated, then signer must indicate which hash was used to generate the signature. Only the holder of the private key can generate the signature, so the holder of the private key is totally in control of which hash function they choose to use. X.509 and CMS include the algorithm identifier of the signature algorithm (which implicitly identifies the hash function) in two places. One is outside the signature to aid in signature validation. The second one is covered by the signature, and it must match the one on the outside. Putting a list of hash functions in the certificate would be protected by the hash function that the CA employed in signing the certificate, which might be a better studied structure, but it just move the concern that you seem to be raising to the certificate instead of the signed data. Russ At 09:17 AM 11/17/2007, Eric Rescorla wrote: >My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA certs >to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the cert. >This prevents hash algorithm substitution in the signature. >Do you agree with this? Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKMQ473037316 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 15:26:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAKMQ46B037315; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 15:26:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKMQ3l0037307 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 15:26:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil) Received: from Cerberus (cerberus.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.51.8]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id lAKMQ30i027201 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 17:26:03 -0500 (EST) X-AuditID: 90333308-00000f1c000007e0-2b-47435efa5b5c Received: from antigone.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.33]) by Cerberus with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 17:26:02 -0500 Received: from EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.21]) by antigone.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 17:26:02 -0500 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 17:26:02 -0500 Message-ID: <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF59890898DB9C@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> In-Reply-To: <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: AcgrnD7GaEgncnFERZiJtjiaoFoeRwAILEpA References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com><20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com><6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com><9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tls@ietf.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 20 Nov 2007 22:26:02.0697 (UTC) FILETIME=[556ED390:01C82BC4] X-Brightmail-Tracker: AAAAAA== Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAKMQ4l0037309 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Is there any reason to believe that DSA or ECDSA signatures are more susceptible to hash downgrade attacks than RSA-with-digest signatures? And is there a reason such attacks are important? It would seem that a relying party should not accept algorithms that it is not willing to accept. I.e., if the RP would accept a DSA-with-SHA1 signature on message X, then why should the RP not accept DSA-with-SHA1 signature on message Y? (Assume X was signed with SHA1 and Y was signed with SHA2 but was attacked). Putting restrictions on the cert used to sign Y will have no effect on other messages. In the logical end, if an RP is willing to accept signed and unsigned messages, there is no way to prevent a "downgrade" attack of stripping the signature entirely. I don't see the value of using certificate contents to constrain and signal hash algorithms as opposed to the established practice of using protocol and configuration mechanisms. The benefit of the latter is that algorithms can be *upgraded* without reissuing the cert, i.e. users who have been signing using SHA1 can also use SHA2. -----Original Message----- From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@networkresonance.com] Sent: Tuesday, November 20, 2007 12:34 PM To: Stefan Santesson Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org; Manger,James H; tls@ietf.org Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs At Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:19:40 +0000, Stefan Santesson wrote: > > [1 <text/plain; utf-8 (base64)>] > James, > > The design team has met again and will talk about it at the PKIX meeting. > However, this has never extended beyond the public key algorithm itself. > No one has seriously requested a full signature algorithm with hash algorithm to be specified in this field. Please take this message as a request from me that it be so, at least for DSA/ECSDA. -Ekr _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKLsKo8035012 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 14:54:20 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAKLsK36035011; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 14:54:20 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lAKLsJm6034999 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 14:54:19 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Message-Id: <200711202154.lAKLsJm6034999@balder-227.proper.com> Received: (qmail 11850 invoked by uid 0); 20 Nov 2007 21:54:11 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (24.131.121.208) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 20 Nov 2007 21:54:11 -0000 X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9 Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:53:20 -0500 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, ietf-smime@imc.org From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment In-Reply-To: <OF0B45CABE.A644003A-ONC1257398.0048F862@frcl.bull.fr> References: <OF0B45CABE.A644003A-ONC1257398.0048F862@frcl.bull.fr> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> In S/MIME, the id-data content type is used when the content is MIME encoded. Then, then MIME header in the content is used to determine the format of the content. Why does this suggest a different approach? Russ At 08:16 AM 11/19/2007, Denis Pinkas wrote: >Adriano, > >Thank you for this new proposal. I skimmed through it. > >It is interesting, but I fear that it is targeted to the wrong WG. >Since this would be an extension of CMS, this work item >would rather belong to the S-MIME WG. >For this reason, I copy the S-MIME WG. > >In addition, some polishing would be needed. > >Rather than long words, you will find hereafter a rewriting of the ASN.1 >with a few explanatory comments. > > TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { > version [0] Version DEFAULT v1, > fileName UTF8String, > mimeType PrintableString, > fileLocation UTF8String OPTIONAL, > -- fileLocation is only a hint. > -- The file may or may not be stored at that location. > content OCTET STRING, > temporalEvidences TemporalEvidences >} > > Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } > TemporalEvidences ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TemporalEvidence > >-- This structure allows multiple levels of temporal evidences. > > TemporalEvidence ::= SEQUENCE { > evidences Evidences, > certificateLists CertificateLists OPTIONAL >} > > CertificateLists :: = SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertificateList > > Evidence ::= CHOICE { > timeStamps [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken } > >-- For each level there can be one or more time-stamps tokens. > >-- Before re-time stamping a set of former time-stamp tokens, >-- the CRLs of the previous level of time-stamps tokens can be captured >-- and inserted in the data structure. > >Denis > > > >Hello there, > > > >here I am again with my TimeStampedData proposal. > > > >I have submitted a new draft (also attached here) that takes into > account some of the remarks and suggestions received so far. > > > >I have made room for additional types of temporal evidence, like > e.g. RFC 4998, while keeping RFC 3161 as the basis of interoperability. > > > >I would like to invite everybody involved in time-stamping and > archiving e-documents to comment upon it: has it improved? > something is missing? > > > >In particular, please state: > >- are you interested in this work? > >- do you agree to adopt it as a new PKIX work item? > >- are you going to use this format, once it is finished? > > > >Is anybody willing to spend a few words on this draft during the > IETF meeting in Vancouver (as I cannot attend myself) ? > > > >And finally, is anybody willing to invest a little time in > co-authoring this draft with me? > > > >Adriano > >Actalis S.p.A. > >Milano, ITALY > > > > > > > > > >-----Messaggio originale----- > >Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org > [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] Per conto di Santoni Adriano > >Inviato: lunedì 3 settembre 2007 10.42 > >A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > >Oggetto: R: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > > > >Let me summarize the issues discussed so far: > > > >1) allow EvidenceRecord (RFC 4998) in addition to TimeStampToken (RFC 3161) > > > >In principle, I have no objections as long as we do not complicate > things too much and do not hamper interoperability. > > > >There are at least two possible approaches to accomodate RFC 4998: > > > > a) explicitly provide for (one) ER in the TimeStampedData > syntax, as an alternative to the SET OF TimeStampToken; > > b) do not mention any specific standard for the "evidence", but > just mention RFC 3161 and RFC 4998 as two possibilities; > > > >In any case, it must be possible for the verifying application to > easily detect which of the two (or more) kind of "evidence" has > been used in the TimeStampedData envelope under examination. If we > restrict the kinds of evidence to the two above, then a extra > tagging may not be necessary, as an EvidenceRecord is a SEQUENCE, > while the other choice would be a SET OF. Although unelegant, it > would work. On the other hand, if we do not want to restrict the > kinds of evidence to the two above, then of course we should > somehow add an extra tagging level, because nobody knows at this > time what syntax a third kind of evidence would conform to. > > > >In any case, for the sake of interoperability, strong emphasis > should be given to RFC 3161 as today this is the most widely > implemented type of evidence. > > > >In conclusion: I agree with allowing RFC 4998 if we do that in a > way that does not modify the strong emphasis on RFC 3161 and does > not hamper interoperability (which must be based on supporting RFC > 3161, even though certain applications may also support RFC 4998). > > > >2) filename vs. URI > > > >Some remarked that an URI (or URI Reference) would be more > versatile than a simple filename. That is obviously true, but it > implies that the 'content' field of TimeStampedData may be empty. > This is not what I was addressing in my original proposal. It would > not just require the 'content' field to be declared OPTIONAL: it > would make interoperability very difficult to achieve unless we > restrict the URI schemes to a very small subset (e.g. http:, cid:, > file:, ldap:) of the myriad possibilities. In any case, it would > require ages of interoperability testing. And it would make life > much harder for software implementors, without much of a benefit in > view. I strongly believe in keeping things simple as much as possible. > > > >3) multiple contents and RFC 4073 > > > >The 'content' field in the TimeStampedData envelope is not > structured, in my original proposal. It is just an OCTET STRING. > That allows for any kind of content to be conveyed, even a > ContentCollection according to RFC 4073. > > > >Another remark has been made with reference to RFC 4073: the > ContentWithAttributes structure, also defined in RFC 4073, could in > principle be used to bundle some content with the corrisponding > evidence (the goal of my draft). Although this is true, it would > require definining some additional OIDs, and mandating the presence > of certain Attributes tagged by those OIDs. I frankly believe the > TimeStampedData structure that I am proposing is better, first > because it is dedicated and second because it "implements the > ContentInfo interface", so to speak. It is simpler to manage for > applications already able to parse different kinds of ContentInfo > envelopes (there are a great many), possibly in a recursive way. > > > >Adriano > > > > > >-----Messaggio originale----- > >Da: Young H Etheridge [mailto:yhe@yhetheridge.org] > >Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 17.48 > >A: Santoni Adriano > >Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > >Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > >Adriano, > > > >To add to your thought processes: I believe that a URI of > "file:///private.stuff" addresses your concern for privacy of the > physical URI. But, allowing URI in the syntax will make less > private repositories, not necessarily file systems, more > universally accessible. The intent of the URI in RFC 3986 is to > also allow for abstractly identifying a resource, not necessarily > providing a physical resource. In this manner the URI could then > be used as an object identity in database(s). > > > >Take care, > > > >yhe > > > >Santoni Adriano wrote: > >> To accomodate for RFC 4998, I would propose the following syntax: > >> > >> TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { > >> version INTEGER { v1(1) }, > >> fileName UTF8String, > >> mimeType PrintableString, > >> content OCTET STRING, > >> evidence Evidence > >> } > >> > >> Evidence ::= CHOICE { > >> timeStamps [0] SET (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken, > >> evidenceRecord [1] EvidenceRecord -- according to RFC 4998 > >> } > >> > >> (I am not sure whether it would be better to use explicit or implicit > >> tags...) > >> > >> Regarding the idea of having an URI instead of a filename: I'd > prefer to think over things a little bit more, and maybe collect more feedback. > >> > >> In my mind, I can send a TimeStampedData envelope to business > partners and/or public agencies via email. If the timestamped > document is a local one, which I think is a meaningful and > realistic scenario, then I do not want my company's hostnames and > pathnames to be included in the envelope so that the recipient can see them. > >> > >> Adriano > >> > >> > >> > >> -----Messaggio originale----- > >> Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] > >> Per conto di Julien Stern > >> Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 13.43 > >> A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > >> Oggetto: Re: Draft on TimeStampedData > >> > >> > >> On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 12:06:00PM +0200, Tilo Kienitz wrote: > >> > >>> Adriano, > >>> > >>> > >>>> After pondering on this and other remarks, I cannot help but agree > >>>> with Steve. > >>>> > >>>> My original and essential goal is that of facilitating > >>>> interoperability in a currently unregulated field. If we allow for > >>>> several "degrees of freedom", than interoperability will be > hampered from the beginning. > >>>> So I'd better stick to RFC 3161 for now. We could include support > >>>> for RFC 4998 Evidence Records later on, at the time when they become > >>>> a widespread reality comparable to RFC 3161 TimeStampTokens (which > >>>> are widely implemented). > >>>> > >>> I would prefer to have both options: RFC 3161 and RFC 4998. For our > >>> customers evidence records are a widespread reality already. > >>> A standardized way to put some data and their evidence record into a > >>> single file would be useful. > >>> > >> > >> I strongly concur with this comment. Allowing the usage of ERS > as well as simple timestamps would allow the TimestampedData to > leverage all the work of RFC 4998 regarding timestamps instead of > reinventing the wheel in the future. > >> > >> Regards, > >> > >> -- > >> Julien > >> > >> > >>> Kind regards > >>> Tilo > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> -----Messaggio originale----- > >>>> Da: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] > >>>> Inviato: giovedì 30 agosto 2007 23.05 > >>>> A: Young H Etheridge > >>>> Cc: Santoni Adriano; ietf-pkix@imc.org > >>>> Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > >>>> > >>>> At 4:33 PM -0400 8/30/07, Young H Etheridge wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>> ... > >>>>>> > >>>>> Agreed, w.r.t. normative vs informative. The above quote from > >>>>> RFC-4998 merely underscores that this draft should also suggest, > >>>>> informatively, that the choice of Timestamp should be one that > >>>>> meets the normative syntax for Timestamp and not specify that which > >>>>> is in RFC-3161. Nothing gets broken by being less restrictive and > >>>>> generally more informative to the community-at-large. > >>>>> > >>>> I have to disagree with your conclusion. If we require 3161 > time stamps in an RFC of the sort Adriano proposed, then everyone > can parse them if they comply with the RFC. If the RFC says "insert > the time stamp from any standard you want here, and just tell us > which one you used" then we have a problem. A compliant > implementation can generate data structures containing time stamps > that other compliant implementations cannot parse. That's the sort > of interoperability problem we try to avoid in the IETF. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> My notion of resilience does not mean "more encompassing" but that > >>>>> of providing the user community with choice and an enhanced > >>>>> safeguard against the possibility of the weakening of an algorithm. > >>>>> > >>>> Choices can be good, but they can create interoperability > problems in some cases, like this one. Also, we have algorithm > agility as a requirement in all of our work, so the second concern > you cite does not seem to apply here. > >>>> > >>>> Steve > >>>> > >>> -- > >>> Tilo Kienitz > >>> SecCommerce Informationssysteme GmbH > >>> Obenhauptstr. 5 > >>> D - 22335 Hamburg > >>> Germany http://www.seccommerce.de Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKLsCH4034993 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 14:54:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAKLsCgV034992; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 14:54:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lAKLsBFR034985 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 14:54:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Message-Id: <200711202154.lAKLsBFR034985@balder-227.proper.com> Received: (qmail 11643 invoked by uid 0); 20 Nov 2007 21:54:04 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (24.131.121.208) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 20 Nov 2007 21:54:04 -0000 X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9 Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 10:42:09 -0500 To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, tls@ietf.org In-Reply-To: <20071117141738.B445033C21@delta.rtfm.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223A32833@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <20071117141738.B445033C21@delta.rtfm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Eric: I disagree. When an actual signature is generated, then signer must indicate which hash was used to generate the signature. Only the holder of the private key can generate the signature, so the holder of the private key is totally in control of which hash function they choose to use. X.509 and CMS include the algorithm identifier of the signature algorithm (which implicitly identifies the hash function) in two places. One is outside the signature to aid in signature validation. The second one is covered by the signature, and it must match the one on the outside. Putting a list of hash functions in the certificate would be protected by the hash function that the CA employed in signing the certificate, which might be a better studied structure, but it just move the concern that you seem to be raising to the certificate instead of the signed data. Russ At 09:17 AM 11/17/2007, Eric Rescorla wrote: >My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA certs >to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the cert. >This prevents hash algorithm substitution in the signature. >Do you agree with this? Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKHcbih012323 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 10:38:37 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAKHcba4012322; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 10:38:37 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (news.meritdirect.com [209.213.211.195] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKHcbqi012316 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 10:38:37 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B3C8133C21; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 09:33:36 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 09:33:36 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> Cc: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs In-Reply-To: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071120173336.B3C8133C21@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:19:40 +0000, Stefan Santesson wrote: > > [1 <text/plain; utf-8 (base64)>] > James, > > The design team has met again and will talk about it at the PKIX meeting. > However, this has never extended beyond the public key algorithm itself. > No one has seriously requested a full signature algorithm with hash algorithm to be specified in this field. Please take this message as a request from me that it be so, at least for DSA/ECSDA. -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKGj1hB007322 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 09:45:01 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAKGj1eR007321; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 09:45:01 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp1.pacifier.net (smtp1.pacifier.net [64.255.237.171]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKGj0Om007307 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 09:45:01 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ietf@augustcellars.com) Received: from GALATIONS (pool-71-111-65-176.ptldor.dsl-w.verizon.net [71.111.65.176]) by smtp1.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56EFD6F19D; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 08:44:58 -0800 (PST) From: "Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com> To: "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <p0624051fc368a94e601f@[128.89.89.71]> In-Reply-To: <p0624051fc368a94e601f@[128.89.89.71]> Subject: RE: WG last call (2nd pass) on CMC docs Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 08:44:58 -0800 Message-ID: <03c601c82b94$b0a47060$11ed5120$@com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0 Thread-Index: AcgriVgu8tdTHm1FTYykLFRYll++HQACzitQ Content-Language: en-us Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I forgot to check the ASN.1 prior to doing the submission of the final draft. I have since done so and found a couple of errors. I have a fixed version and will re-submit this when the repository is opened at the IETF meeting. Jim > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf- > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent > Sent: Tuesday, November 20, 2007 7:17 AM > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: WG last call (2nd pass) on CMC docs > > > Folks, > > The 3 CNC documents that Jim Schaad has revised are done, and > progressing through the IESG. The WG approved these previously, but > if anyone wants to review the latest versions, please do so now. We > are executing this WG last call in parallel with the IETF last call, > because it has been such a long process. > > The documents in question are: > > - 'Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Transport Protocols ' > <draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt> as a Proposed Standard > - 'CMC Compliance Document ' > <draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt> as a Proposed Standard > - 'Certificate Management Messages over CMS ' > <draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt> as a Proposed Standard > > Steve Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKGKWsW005224 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 09:20:32 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAKGKW6e005223; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 09:20:32 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-dub.microsoft.com (smtp-dub.microsoft.com [213.199.138.191]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKGKTSS005215 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 09:20:31 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stefans@microsoft.com) Received: from DUB-EXHUB-C301.europe.corp.microsoft.com (65.53.213.91) by DUB-EXGWY-E801.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.129.1) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.1.222.3; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:20:29 +0000 Received: from EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.221.79]) by DUB-EXHUB-C301.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.213.91]) with mapi; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:20:29 +0000 From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:19:40 +0000 Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: Acgq2OmrK/CPwedORjuYCnyihrUTXgAQSaBAAB21BnA= Message-ID: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223B387DF@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> In-Reply-To: <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from base64 to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAKGKVSR005217 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> James, The design team has met again and will talk about it at the PKIX meeting. However, this has never extended beyond the public key algorithm itself. No one has seriously requested a full signature algorithm with hash algorithm to be specified in this field. Stefan Santesson Senior Program Manager Windows Security, Standards > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf- > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Manger, James H > Sent: den 20 november 2007 03:18 > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org; tls@ietf.org > Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs > > > Eric, > > PKIX discussed this issue in depth a year ago. > Different approaches had be specified for ECC and RSA > [draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-pkalgs-03.txt][RFC 4055]. > A Design Team was formed to propose a solution. > Apparently they suggested a 3rd alternative -- > defining a new certificate extension. > I cannot remember seeing any further progress on that work. > I am sure no such extension was actually standardized. > > A good place to start in the email archive would be > "Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info", > by Stefan Santesson. > http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02305.html > > > ----- ----- > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf- > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Eric Rescorla > > My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA > certs to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with > the public key contained in the cert. This prevents hash > algorithm substitution in signatures formed with that key > (or rather the private key that corresponds to that key). Do > you agree with this? > > -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKFGjIF097540 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 08:16:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAKFGjB2097539; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 08:16:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mx11.bbn.com (mx11.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAKFGiID097533 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 08:16:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from dhcp89-089-071.bbn.com ([128.89.89.71]) by mx11.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1IuUqC-0003hx-3X for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 10:16:44 -0500 Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p0624051fc368a94e601f@[128.89.89.71]> Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 10:16:49 -0500 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: WG last call (2nd pass) on CMC docs Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Folks, The 3 CNC documents that Jim Schaad has revised are done, and progressing through the IESG. The WG approved these previously, but if anyone wants to review the latest versions, please do so now. We are executing this WG last call in parallel with the IETF last call, because it has been such a long process. The documents in question are: - 'Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Transport Protocols ' <draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt> as a Proposed Standard - 'CMC Compliance Document ' <draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt> as a Proposed Standard - 'Certificate Management Messages over CMS ' <draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt> as a Proposed Standard Steve Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAK7SAMa063321 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 00:28:10 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAK7SAKd063320; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 00:28:10 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail1relay.itmaster.local (host48-104-static.43-193-b.business.telecomitalia.it [193.43.104.48] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAK7S8E9063307 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 00:28:09 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Adriano.Santoni@actalis.it) Received: from POSTA02.itmaster.local ([193.43.104.10]) by mail1relay.itmaster.local with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 08:28:05 +0100 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: R: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 08:28:03 +0100 Message-ID: <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD421D6E95C@POSTA02.itmaster.local> In-Reply-To: <474202C3.9020200@seccommerce.de> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Thread-Index: Acgq9M9RxLR3F8/NQKKSVO0x3cMRFAAUVjFA References: <200708311007.l7VA7PYP040483@balder-227.proper.com> <20070831114237.GH4767@mars.cry.pto> <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD4218A737D@POSTA02.itmaster.local> <46D8383A.2020003@yhetheridge.org> <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD4218A73D2@POSTA02.itmaster.local> <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD421D6E8D3@POSTA02.itmaster.local> <474202C3.9020200@seccommerce.de> From: "Santoni Adriano" <Adriano.Santoni@actalis.it> To: "Tilo Kienitz" <tk-tlslist@seccommerce.de> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 20 Nov 2007 07:28:05.0004 (UTC) FILETIME=[E3D34CC0:01C82B46] X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: SMEX-7.0.0.1345-5.0.1023-15556.002 X-TM-AS-Result: No--4.580700-0.000000-31 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAK7S9E9063315 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Thank you for your reply. I agree with your remarks #1 and #3. Not sure about #2. Regarding the "right WG" ... I am really agnostic about that; I believe this WG is fine, as my proposal is strongly related to time-stamping, and this is where RFC 3161 was born (if I am not mistaken). But I would not object if the hosting WG was another one, like e.g. the S/MIME one. Let's see who else is willing to reply to my questions... Adriano -----Messaggio originale----- Da: Tilo Kienitz [mailto:tk-tlslist@seccommerce.de] Inviato: lunedì 19 novembre 2007 22.40 A: Santoni Adriano Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Oggetto: Re: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Adriano, Santoni Adriano wrote: > Hello there, > > here I am again with my TimeStampedData proposal. > > I have submitted a new draft (also attached here) that takes into > account > some of the remarks and suggestions received so far. I have some comments: 1. In section 3 you write: > Compliant applications SHALL always populate the fileName field In section 4 you write: > check the fileName field (it must not be empty) I suggest to exchange the "must" by "SHALL". The same applies to the mime-type-field. 2. I'm not sure whether section 4 "Recommanded processing" is really necessary. In my opinion the syntax implies the processing clearly. 3. Section 9 "References" should mention RFC 4998 EvidenceRecord. > I have made room for additional types of temporal evidence, like e.g. > RFC > 4998, while keeping RFC 3161 as the basis of interoperability. > > I would like to invite everybody involved in time-stamping and > archiving > e-documents to comment upon it: has it improved? something is missing? > > In particular, please state: > - are you interested in this work? Yes, I am interested. > - do you agree to adopt it as a new PKIX work item? I would like to see it in some working group. But I don't know which WG is the right place for this. > - are you going to use this format, once it is finished? Yes. I will implement this as soon as there is a defined way to insert a RFC 4998 evidence record. > [...] > is anybody willing to invest a little time in co-authoring > this draft with me? Maybe I would. Kind regards Tilo > -----Messaggio originale----- > Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] > Per conto di Santoni Adriano > Inviato: lunedì 3 settembre 2007 10.42 > A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Oggetto: R: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > Let me summarize the issues discussed so far: > > 1) allow EvidenceRecord (RFC 4998) in addition to TimeStampToken (RFC > 3161) > > In principle, I have no objections as long as we do not complicate things too much and do not hamper interoperability. > > There are at least two possible approaches to accomodate RFC 4998: > > a) explicitly provide for (one) ER in the TimeStampedData syntax, as an alternative to the SET OF TimeStampToken; > b) do not mention any specific standard for the "evidence", but > just mention RFC 3161 and RFC 4998 as two possibilities; > > In any case, it must be possible for the verifying application to easily detect which of the two (or more) kind of "evidence" has been used in the TimeStampedData envelope under examination. If we restrict the kinds of evidence to the two above, then a extra tagging may not be necessary, as an EvidenceRecord is a SEQUENCE, while the other choice would be a SET OF. Although unelegant, it would work. On the other hand, if we do not want to restrict the kinds of evidence to the two above, then of course we should somehow add an extra tagging level, because nobody knows at this time what syntax a third kind of evidence would conform to. > > In any case, for the sake of interoperability, strong emphasis should be given to RFC 3161 as today this is the most widely implemented type of evidence. > > In conclusion: I agree with allowing RFC 4998 if we do that in a way that does not modify the strong emphasis on RFC 3161 and does not hamper interoperability (which must be based on supporting RFC 3161, even though certain applications may also support RFC 4998). > > 2) filename vs. URI > > Some remarked that an URI (or URI Reference) would be more versatile than a simple filename. That is obviously true, but it implies that the 'content' field of TimeStampedData may be empty. This is not what I was addressing in my original proposal. It would not just require the 'content' field to be declared OPTIONAL: it would make interoperability very difficult to achieve unless we restrict the URI schemes to a very small subset (e.g. http:, cid:, file:, ldap:) of the myriad possibilities. In any case, it would require ages of interoperability testing. And it would make life much harder for software implementors, without much of a benefit in view. I strongly believe in keeping things simple as much as possible. > > 3) multiple contents and RFC 4073 > > The 'content' field in the TimeStampedData envelope is not structured, in my original proposal. It is just an OCTET STRING. That allows for any kind of content to be conveyed, even a ContentCollection according to RFC 4073. > > Another remark has been made with reference to RFC 4073: the ContentWithAttributes structure, also defined in RFC 4073, could in principle be used to bundle some content with the corrisponding evidence (the goal of my draft). Although this is true, it would require definining some additional OIDs, and mandating the presence of certain Attributes tagged by those OIDs. I frankly believe the TimeStampedData structure that I am proposing is better, first because it is dedicated and second because it "implements the ContentInfo interface", so to speak. It is simpler to manage for applications already able to parse different kinds of ContentInfo envelopes (there are a great many), possibly in a recursive way. > > Adriano > > > -----Messaggio originale----- > Da: Young H Etheridge [mailto:yhe@yhetheridge.org] > Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 17.48 > A: Santoni Adriano > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > Adriano, > > To add to your thought processes: I believe that a URI of "file:///private.stuff" addresses your concern for privacy of the physical URI. But, allowing URI in the syntax will make less private repositories, not necessarily file systems, more universally accessible. The intent of the URI in RFC 3986 is to also allow for abstractly identifying a resource, not necessarily providing a physical resource. In this manner the URI could then be used as an object identity in database(s). > > Take care, > > yhe > > Santoni Adriano wrote: >> To accomodate for RFC 4998, I would propose the following syntax: >> >> TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { >> version INTEGER { v1(1) }, >> fileName UTF8String, >> mimeType PrintableString, >> content OCTET STRING, >> evidence Evidence >> } >> >> Evidence ::= CHOICE { >> timeStamps [0] SET (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken, >> evidenceRecord [1] EvidenceRecord -- according to RFC 4998 >> } >> >> (I am not sure whether it would be better to use explicit or implicit >> tags...) >> >> Regarding the idea of having an URI instead of a filename: I'd prefer to think over things a little bit more, and maybe collect more feedback. >> >> In my mind, I can send a TimeStampedData envelope to business partners and/or public agencies via email. If the timestamped document is a local one, which I think is a meaningful and realistic scenario, then I do not want my company's hostnames and pathnames to be included in the envelope so that the recipient can see them. >> >> Adriano >> >> >> >> -----Messaggio originale----- >> Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org >> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] >> Per conto di Julien Stern >> Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 13.43 >> A: ietf-pkix@imc.org >> Oggetto: Re: Draft on TimeStampedData >> >> >> On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 12:06:00PM +0200, Tilo Kienitz wrote: >> >>> Adriano, >>> >>> >>>> After pondering on this and other remarks, I cannot help but agree >>>> with Steve. >>>> >>>> My original and essential goal is that of facilitating >>>> interoperability in a currently unregulated field. If we allow for >>>> several "degrees of freedom", than interoperability will be hampered from the beginning. >>>> So I'd better stick to RFC 3161 for now. We could include support >>>> for RFC 4998 Evidence Records later on, at the time when they >>>> become a widespread reality comparable to RFC 3161 TimeStampTokens >>>> (which are widely implemented). >>>> >>> I would prefer to have both options: RFC 3161 and RFC 4998. For our >>> customers evidence records are a widespread reality already. >>> A standardized way to put some data and their evidence record into a >>> single file would be useful. >>> >> I strongly concur with this comment. Allowing the usage of ERS as well as simple timestamps would allow the TimestampedData to leverage all the work of RFC 4998 regarding timestamps instead of reinventing the wheel in the future. >> >> Regards, >> >> -- >> Julien >> >> >>> Kind regards >>> Tilo >>> >>> >>> >>>> -----Messaggio originale----- >>>> Da: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] >>>> Inviato: giovedì 30 agosto 2007 23.05 >>>> A: Young H Etheridge >>>> Cc: Santoni Adriano; ietf-pkix@imc.org >>>> Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData >>>> >>>> At 4:33 PM -0400 8/30/07, Young H Etheridge wrote: >>>> >>>>>> ... >>>>>> >>>>> Agreed, w.r.t. normative vs informative. The above quote from >>>>> RFC-4998 merely underscores that this draft should also suggest, >>>>> informatively, that the choice of Timestamp should be one that >>>>> meets the normative syntax for Timestamp and not specify that >>>>> which is in RFC-3161. Nothing gets broken by being less >>>>> restrictive and generally more informative to the community-at-large. >>>>> >>>> I have to disagree with your conclusion. If we require 3161 time stamps in an RFC of the sort Adriano proposed, then everyone can parse them if they comply with the RFC. If the RFC says "insert the time stamp from any standard you want here, and just tell us which one you used" then we have a problem. A compliant implementation can generate data structures containing time stamps that other compliant implementations cannot parse. That's the sort of interoperability problem we try to avoid in the IETF. >>>> >>>> >>>>> My notion of resilience does not mean "more encompassing" but that >>>>> of providing the user community with choice and an enhanced >>>>> safeguard against the possibility of the weakening of an algorithm. >>>>> >>>> Choices can be good, but they can create interoperability problems in some cases, like this one. Also, we have algorithm agility as a requirement in all of our work, so the second concern you cite does not seem to apply here. >>>> >>>> Steve -- Tilo Kienitz SecCommerce Informationssysteme GmbH Obenhauptstr. 5 D - 22335 Hamburg Germany http://www.seccommerce.de Received: from h223.67.16.72.ip.alltel.net (h223.67.16.72.ip.alltel.net [72.16.67.223]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lAK4Adhi050821; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 21:10:40 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from gccitizen@bcsnet.net) Received: from young2 ([151.87.252.246]:2004 "HELO young2" smtp-auth: <none> TLS-CIPHER: <none> TLS-PEER-CN1: <none>) by df431048bcsnet.net with ESMTP id 033930664C389 (ORCPT <rfc822;ietf-pgp-mime@imc.org@mx1.imc.org>); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 22:10:36 -0600 Message-ID: <001901c82af9$02c13960$0120cefc@young2> From: "Oliver W. Aldrich" <gccitizen@bcsnet.net> To: ietf-pgp-mime@imc.org Subject: A is delete Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 22:10:36 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0016_01C82AF9.02C13960" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2720.3000 X-Mimeole: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2720.1409 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0016_01C82AF9.02C13960 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0017_01C82AF9.02C13960" ------=_NextPart_001_0017_01C82AF9.02C13960 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable communications in a different way - an area of communications other little yet significant things that split trust in our North think abo= ut stuff & talk about stuff & write about stuff and do to this. 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No Ex< >ercis< >es! </DIV> <P><DIV><b><font size=3D5>namutk. com </font></b> (* Delete Empty Space)</D= IV></P> <DIV>Manipulation and digital production of visual artwork provides</DIV> </BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_001_0017_01C82AF9.02C13960-- ------=_NextPart_000_0016_01C82AF9.02C13960 Content-Type: image/gif; name="rox781.gif" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: <001901c82af9$02c13960$0120cefc@young2> ------=_NextPart_000_0016_01C82AF9.02C13960-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAK2HwAD045577 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 19:17:58 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAK2HwpZ045576; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 19:17:58 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mailipbo.ntcif.telstra.com.au (mailipbo.ntcif.telstra.com.au [202.12.233.29]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAK2HuiZ045569 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 19:17:57 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com) Received: from unknown (HELO mailai.ntcif.telstra.com.au) ([202.12.162.17]) by mailipbi.ntcif.telstra.com.au with ESMTP; 20 Nov 2007 13:17:54 +1100 Received: from mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mailai.ntcif.telstra.com.au (Postfix) with ESMTP id 525CAFF85; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 13:17:54 +1100 (EST) Received: from wsmsg2952.srv.dir.telstra.com (wsmsg2952.srv.dir.telstra.com [192.74.195.51]) by mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) with ESMTP id NAA20036; Tue, 20 Nov 2007 13:17:53 +1100 (EST) Received: from WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com ([172.49.40.20]) by wsmsg2952.srv.dir.telstra.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Tue, 20 Nov 2007 13:17:53 +1100 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 13:17:50 +1100 Message-ID: <6215401E01247448A306C54F499111F2037FFFC9@WSMSG2103V.srv.dir.telstra.com> In-Reply-To: <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: Acgq2OmrK/CPwedORjuYCnyihrUTXgAQSaBA References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <tls@ietf.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 20 Nov 2007 02:17:53.0002 (UTC) FILETIME=[8E352CA0:01C82B1B] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from base64 to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAK2HviZ045571 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Eric, PKIX discussed this issue in depth a year ago. Different approaches had be specified for ECC and RSA [draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-pkalgs-03.txt][RFC 4055]. A Design Team was formed to propose a solution. Apparently they suggested a 3rd alternative -- defining a new certificate extension. I cannot remember seeing any further progress on that work. I am sure no such extension was actually standardized. A good place to start in the email archive would be "Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info", by Stefan Santesson. http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02305.html ----- ----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Eric Rescorla My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA certs to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the public key contained in the cert. This prevents hash algorithm substitution in signatures formed with that key (or rather the private key that corresponds to that key). Do you agree with this? -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJLeTAm025501 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 14:40:29 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJLeTrV025500; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 14:40:29 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail.seccommerce.de (mail.seccommerce.de [80.152.147.206]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJLeOYV025490 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 14:40:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from tk-tlslist@seccommerce.de) Received: (qmail 6662 invoked from network); 19 Nov 2007 22:40:23 +0100 Received: from pop1-2539.catv.wtnet.de (HELO ?192.168.0.107?) (tk@84.46.89.244) by mail.seccommerce.de with SMTP; 19 Nov 2007 22:40:23 +0100 Message-ID: <474202C3.9020200@seccommerce.de> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 22:40:19 +0100 From: Tilo Kienitz <tk-tlslist@seccommerce.de> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Santoni Adriano <Adriano.Santoni@actalis.it> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment References: <200708311007.l7VA7PYP040483@balder-227.proper.com> <20070831114237.GH4767@mars.cry.pto> <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD4218A737D@POSTA02.itmaster.local> <46D8383A.2020003@yhetheridge.org> <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD4218A73D2@POSTA02.itmaster.local> <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD421D6E8D3@POSTA02.itmaster.local> In-Reply-To: <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD421D6E8D3@POSTA02.itmaster.local> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Adriano, Santoni Adriano wrote: > Hello there, > > here I am again with my TimeStampedData proposal. > > I have submitted a new draft (also attached here) that takes into account > some of the remarks and suggestions received so far. I have some comments: 1. In section 3 you write: > Compliant applications SHALL always populate the fileName field In section 4 you write: > check the fileName field (it must not be empty) I suggest to exchange the "must" by "SHALL". The same applies to the mime-type-field. 2. I'm not sure whether section 4 "Recommanded processing" is really necessary. In my opinion the syntax implies the processing clearly. 3. Section 9 "References" should mention RFC 4998 EvidenceRecord. > I have made room for additional types of temporal evidence, like e.g. RFC > 4998, while keeping RFC 3161 as the basis of interoperability. > > I would like to invite everybody involved in time-stamping and archiving > e-documents to comment upon it: has it improved? something is missing? > > In particular, please state: > - are you interested in this work? Yes, I am interested. > - do you agree to adopt it as a new PKIX work item? I would like to see it in some working group. But I don't know which WG is the right place for this. > - are you going to use this format, once it is finished? Yes. I will implement this as soon as there is a defined way to insert a RFC 4998 evidence record. > [...] > is anybody willing to invest a little time in co-authoring > this draft with me? Maybe I would. Kind regards Tilo > -----Messaggio originale----- > Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] Per conto di Santoni Adriano > Inviato: lunedì 3 settembre 2007 10.42 > A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Oggetto: R: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > Let me summarize the issues discussed so far: > > 1) allow EvidenceRecord (RFC 4998) in addition to TimeStampToken (RFC 3161) > > In principle, I have no objections as long as we do not complicate things too much and do not hamper interoperability. > > There are at least two possible approaches to accomodate RFC 4998: > > a) explicitly provide for (one) ER in the TimeStampedData syntax, as an alternative to the SET OF TimeStampToken; > b) do not mention any specific standard for the "evidence", but just mention RFC 3161 and RFC 4998 as two possibilities; > > In any case, it must be possible for the verifying application to easily detect which of the two (or more) kind of "evidence" has been used in the TimeStampedData envelope under examination. If we restrict the kinds of evidence to the two above, then a extra tagging may not be necessary, as an EvidenceRecord is a SEQUENCE, while the other choice would be a SET OF. Although unelegant, it would work. On the other hand, if we do not want to restrict the kinds of evidence to the two above, then of course we should somehow add an extra tagging level, because nobody knows at this time what syntax a third kind of evidence would conform to. > > In any case, for the sake of interoperability, strong emphasis should be given to RFC 3161 as today this is the most widely implemented type of evidence. > > In conclusion: I agree with allowing RFC 4998 if we do that in a way that does not modify the strong emphasis on RFC 3161 and does not hamper interoperability (which must be based on supporting RFC 3161, even though certain applications may also support RFC 4998). > > 2) filename vs. URI > > Some remarked that an URI (or URI Reference) would be more versatile than a simple filename. That is obviously true, but it implies that the 'content' field of TimeStampedData may be empty. This is not what I was addressing in my original proposal. It would not just require the 'content' field to be declared OPTIONAL: it would make interoperability very difficult to achieve unless we restrict the URI schemes to a very small subset (e.g. http:, cid:, file:, ldap:) of the myriad possibilities. In any case, it would require ages of interoperability testing. And it would make life much harder for software implementors, without much of a benefit in view. I strongly believe in keeping things simple as much as possible. > > 3) multiple contents and RFC 4073 > > The 'content' field in the TimeStampedData envelope is not structured, in my original proposal. It is just an OCTET STRING. That allows for any kind of content to be conveyed, even a ContentCollection according to RFC 4073. > > Another remark has been made with reference to RFC 4073: the ContentWithAttributes structure, also defined in RFC 4073, could in principle be used to bundle some content with the corrisponding evidence (the goal of my draft). Although this is true, it would require definining some additional OIDs, and mandating the presence of certain Attributes tagged by those OIDs. I frankly believe the TimeStampedData structure that I am proposing is better, first because it is dedicated and second because it "implements the ContentInfo interface", so to speak. It is simpler to manage for applications already able to parse different kinds of ContentInfo envelopes (there are a great many), possibly in a recursive way. > > Adriano > > > -----Messaggio originale----- > Da: Young H Etheridge [mailto:yhe@yhetheridge.org] > Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 17.48 > A: Santoni Adriano > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > Adriano, > > To add to your thought processes: I believe that a URI of "file:///private.stuff" addresses your concern for privacy of the physical URI. But, allowing URI in the syntax will make less private repositories, not necessarily file systems, more universally accessible. The intent of the URI in RFC 3986 is to also allow for abstractly identifying a resource, not necessarily providing a physical resource. In this manner the URI could then be used as an object identity in database(s). > > Take care, > > yhe > > Santoni Adriano wrote: >> To accomodate for RFC 4998, I would propose the following syntax: >> >> TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { >> version INTEGER { v1(1) }, >> fileName UTF8String, >> mimeType PrintableString, >> content OCTET STRING, >> evidence Evidence >> } >> >> Evidence ::= CHOICE { >> timeStamps [0] SET (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken, >> evidenceRecord [1] EvidenceRecord -- according to RFC 4998 >> } >> >> (I am not sure whether it would be better to use explicit or implicit >> tags...) >> >> Regarding the idea of having an URI instead of a filename: I'd prefer to think over things a little bit more, and maybe collect more feedback. >> >> In my mind, I can send a TimeStampedData envelope to business partners and/or public agencies via email. If the timestamped document is a local one, which I think is a meaningful and realistic scenario, then I do not want my company's hostnames and pathnames to be included in the envelope so that the recipient can see them. >> >> Adriano >> >> >> >> -----Messaggio originale----- >> Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] >> Per conto di Julien Stern >> Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 13.43 >> A: ietf-pkix@imc.org >> Oggetto: Re: Draft on TimeStampedData >> >> >> On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 12:06:00PM +0200, Tilo Kienitz wrote: >> >>> Adriano, >>> >>> >>>> After pondering on this and other remarks, I cannot help but agree >>>> with Steve. >>>> >>>> My original and essential goal is that of facilitating >>>> interoperability in a currently unregulated field. If we allow for >>>> several "degrees of freedom", than interoperability will be hampered from the beginning. >>>> So I'd better stick to RFC 3161 for now. We could include support >>>> for RFC 4998 Evidence Records later on, at the time when they become >>>> a widespread reality comparable to RFC 3161 TimeStampTokens (which >>>> are widely implemented). >>>> >>> I would prefer to have both options: RFC 3161 and RFC 4998. For our >>> customers evidence records are a widespread reality already. >>> A standardized way to put some data and their evidence record into a >>> single file would be useful. >>> >> I strongly concur with this comment. Allowing the usage of ERS as well as simple timestamps would allow the TimestampedData to leverage all the work of RFC 4998 regarding timestamps instead of reinventing the wheel in the future. >> >> Regards, >> >> -- >> Julien >> >> >>> Kind regards >>> Tilo >>> >>> >>> >>>> -----Messaggio originale----- >>>> Da: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] >>>> Inviato: giovedì 30 agosto 2007 23.05 >>>> A: Young H Etheridge >>>> Cc: Santoni Adriano; ietf-pkix@imc.org >>>> Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData >>>> >>>> At 4:33 PM -0400 8/30/07, Young H Etheridge wrote: >>>> >>>>>> ... >>>>>> >>>>> Agreed, w.r.t. normative vs informative. The above quote from >>>>> RFC-4998 merely underscores that this draft should also suggest, >>>>> informatively, that the choice of Timestamp should be one that >>>>> meets the normative syntax for Timestamp and not specify that which >>>>> is in RFC-3161. Nothing gets broken by being less restrictive and >>>>> generally more informative to the community-at-large. >>>>> >>>> I have to disagree with your conclusion. If we require 3161 time stamps in an RFC of the sort Adriano proposed, then everyone can parse them if they comply with the RFC. If the RFC says "insert the time stamp from any standard you want here, and just tell us which one you used" then we have a problem. A compliant implementation can generate data structures containing time stamps that other compliant implementations cannot parse. That's the sort of interoperability problem we try to avoid in the IETF. >>>> >>>> >>>>> My notion of resilience does not mean "more encompassing" but that >>>>> of providing the user community with choice and an enhanced >>>>> safeguard against the possibility of the weakening of an algorithm. >>>>> >>>> Choices can be good, but they can create interoperability problems in some cases, like this one. Also, we have algorithm agility as a requirement in all of our work, so the second concern you cite does not seem to apply here. >>>> >>>> Steve -- Tilo Kienitz SecCommerce Informationssysteme GmbH Obenhauptstr. 5 D - 22335 Hamburg Germany http://www.seccommerce.de Received: from [85.124.207.246] ([85.125.183.231]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJK7WIf017328 for <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 13:07:36 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from erik@hecbi.com) Received: by 10.43.27.191 with SMTP id eFLkStUNTYPUJ; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 21:07:32 +0100 (GMT) Received: by 192.168.27.107 with SMTP id FbBnUmozRbfCmp.9037064301866; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 21:07:30 +0100 (GMT) Message-ID: <000901c82ae7$ceb5ebe0$f6cf7c55@Vaio> From: "erik Hole" <erik@hecbi.com> To: <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org> Subject: 0hsabaw Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 21:07:27 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0008_01C82AF0.307A53E0" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.3028 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3028 ------=_NextPart_000_0008_01C82AF0.307A53E0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Doesn't matter how serious the situation is - we have meds for everyone. Moeiz Hooey http://www.generallone.com/ ------=_NextPart_000_0008_01C82AF0.307A53E0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1"> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2900.3059" name=3DGENERATOR> <STYLE></STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV><FONT "Times New Roman" color=3D#0072ED>Doesn't matter how serious = the=20 situation is - we have meds for everyone.</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT "Times New Roman" color=3D#0072ED></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT "Times New Roman" color=3D#0072ED>Moeiz Hooey</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT "Times New Roman" size=3D4><A=20 HREF=3D"http://www.generallone.com/">http://www.generallone.com/</A></FON= T></DIV></BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_000_0008_01C82AF0.307A53E0-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJK1Bia016586 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 13:01:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJK1B5J016585; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 13:01:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mx12.bbn.com (mx12.bbn.com [128.33.0.81]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJK17Ps016577 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 13:01:10 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from dhcp89-089-071.bbn.com ([128.89.89.71]) by mx12.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1IuCnq-0007Rr-3z; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 15:01:06 -0500 Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p06240510c3677b8aa64a@[128.89.89.71]> In-Reply-To: <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 15:01:07 -0500 To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 8:47 AM -0800 11/19/07, Eric Rescorla wrote: >At Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:35:47 -0500, >Stephen Kent wrote: >> >> Eric, >> >> Your question was: >> My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA certs >> to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the cert. >> This prevents hash algorithm substitution in the signature. >> Do you agree with this? >> >> The wording here strikes me as a bit odd. The hash algorithm used to >> verify a cert IS specified in the cert, in the SignatureAlgorithm >> field. >> >> The hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the public KEY in the >> cert are not specified, in general, as the key may be used to verify >> signatures for certs or for other signed objects (in the case of EE >> certs). > >I agree my wording was imprecise. Let me rephrase: > > My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA > certs to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with > the public key contained in the cert. This prevents hash > algorithm substitution in signatures formed with that key > (or rather the private key that corresponds to that key). Do > you agree with this? > >-Ekr OK, that is clearer. While I do see some benefits to being able to specify a has algorithm to use with a public key and algorithm specified in a cert, I agree with Stefan that the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field is NOT the place to do this, given the history of how this field is used and the peripheral nature of the info you want to specify. I think it would be best to create a new extension that one could use for this purpose, like the extension created for S/MIME to express the symmetric algorithm(s) supported by a recipient of encrypted messages. Steve Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJJC2wG012699 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 12:12:02 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJJC2Gn012697; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 12:12:02 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (74-95-2-169-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net [74.95.2.169] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJJC0Tt012687 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 12:12:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 800F233C2B; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:07:03 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:07:03 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs In-Reply-To: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223A32C93@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223A32C93@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071119190703.800F233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At Mon, 19 Nov 2007 18:39:00 +0000, Stefan Santesson wrote: > On the subject I have a clear opinion and that is an absolute no to > do this through subject public key info. > > The subject public key info is a core field of a certificate and it > has a defined meaning to provide the key and its parameters. In > addition to this the field also supplies an identifier of the key > which identifies the key and parameter structure and syntax so it > can be parsed. All X.509 software and systems using X.509 built to > this date that I know of is designed to use the field exclusively in > this manner. OK. > In general, it is the responsibility of the protocol to limit the > algorithms used, not the public key certificate. This seems problematic: the issue here is downgrade attack. The relying party has support for a variety of digest algorithms and if there's no indication in the certificate of which digests will be used, then essentially an attacker can attack the weakest one. > When limitations > are specified in the certificate this is guidance for the > applications using it. Except for a few core restrictions defined in > path validation, it is nothing that will be enforced on the crypto > API level. ANSI has made attempts to defined expanded restrictions > in the subject public key field for ECC algorithm modes and this is > exactly the type of complexity and change in field usage we don't > need in X.509. Especially since nobody has defined where in the > system architecture these restrictions should be enforced (protocol > level, application level or crypto library level where keys are > stored and used). > > Conclusion is. Any new types of usage restrictions must be provided > in a new field. i.e. in a certificate extension and it must be > understood that this serves as information to the relying party on > when it is appropriate to use this certificate. OK well, I don't have a problem with it being in a new field, or that it's for the information of the relying party, but for the reasons I argue above, I think it needs to be uniform for all protocols and needs to be in the cert. -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJIdi3v009198 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:39:44 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJIdiV1009197; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:39:44 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-dub.microsoft.com (smtp-dub.microsoft.com [213.199.138.181]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJIdgJe009189 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:39:43 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stefans@microsoft.com) Received: from DUB-EXHUB-C301.europe.corp.microsoft.com (65.53.213.91) by DUB-EXGWY-E802.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.129.2) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.1.222.3; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 18:39:41 +0000 Received: from EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.221.79]) by DUB-EXHUB-C301.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.213.91]) with mapi; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 18:39:41 +0000 From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 18:39:00 +0000 Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: AcgqzKXJLLPnSoYjSlyrf9YbiBN5gAADC46A Message-ID: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223A32C93@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> In-Reply-To: <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAJIdhJd009192 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> First a small technicality. I copied the OID from the ASN'1 section of the draft. Someone pointed out to me that the two OIDs were identical. So here are the correct OIDs -- -- DSA with SHA-224 and SHA-256 signature algorithms -- dsa-with-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso- ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 1} dsa-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso- ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2} On the subject I have a clear opinion and that is an absolute no to do this through subject public key info. The subject public key info is a core field of a certificate and it has a defined meaning to provide the key and its parameters. In addition to this the field also supplies an identifier of the key which identifies the key and parameter structure and syntax so it can be parsed. All X.509 software and systems using X.509 built to this date that I know of is designed to use the field exclusively in this manner. In general, it is the responsibility of the protocol to limit the algorithms used, not the public key certificate. When limitations are specified in the certificate this is guidance for the applications using it. Except for a few core restrictions defined in path validation, it is nothing that will be enforced on the crypto API level. ANSI has made attempts to defined expanded restrictions in the subject public key field for ECC algorithm modes and this is exactly the type of complexity and change in field usage we don't need in X.509. Especially since nobody has defined where in the system architecture these restrictions should be enforced (protocol level, application level or crypto library level where keys are stored and used). Conclusion is. Any new types of usage restrictions must be provided in a new field. i.e. in a certificate extension and it must be understood that this serves as information to the relying party on when it is appropriate to use this certificate. Stefan Santesson Senior Program Manager Windows Security, Standards > -----Original Message----- > From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@networkresonance.com] > Sent: den 19 november 2007 17:48 > To: Stephen Kent > Cc: Eric Rescorla; Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org; tls@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs > > At Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:35:47 -0500, > Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > Eric, > > > > Your question was: > > My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA > certs > > to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the > cert. > > This prevents hash algorithm substitution in the signature. > > Do you agree with this? > > > > The wording here strikes me as a bit odd. The hash algorithm used to > > verify a cert IS specified in the cert, in the SignatureAlgorithm > > field. > > > > The hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the public KEY in the > > cert are not specified, in general, as the key may be used to verify > > signatures for certs or for other signed objects (in the case of EE > > certs). > > I agree my wording was imprecise. Let me rephrase: > > My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA > certs to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with > the public key contained in the cert. This prevents hash > algorithm substitution in signatures formed with that key > (or rather the private key that corresponds to that key). Do > you agree with this? > > -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJGqqLD099762 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 09:52:52 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJGqqQ8099761; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 09:52:52 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (74-95-2-169-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net [74.95.2.169] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJGqpvr099754 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 09:52:51 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8147233C2B; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 08:47:54 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 08:47:53 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs In-Reply-To: <p0624050ac367691c5467@[128.89.89.71]> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071119164754.8147233C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:35:47 -0500, Stephen Kent wrote: > > Eric, > > Your question was: > My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA certs > to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the cert. > This prevents hash algorithm substitution in the signature. > Do you agree with this? > > The wording here strikes me as a bit odd. The hash algorithm used to > verify a cert IS specified in the cert, in the SignatureAlgorithm > field. > > The hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the public KEY in the > cert are not specified, in general, as the key may be used to verify > signatures for certs or for other signed objects (in the case of EE > certs). I agree my wording was imprecise. Let me rephrase: My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA certs to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the public key contained in the cert. This prevents hash algorithm substitution in signatures formed with that key (or rather the private key that corresponds to that key). Do you agree with this? -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJGZnDY098732 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 09:35:49 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJGZnoG098731; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 09:35:49 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mx12.bbn.com (mx12.bbn.com [128.33.0.81]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJGZlTS098725 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 09:35:48 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from kent@bbn.com) Received: from dhcp89-089-071.bbn.com ([128.89.89.71]) by mx12.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1Iu9b8-0003zT-6O; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:35:47 -0500 Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p0624050ac367691c5467@[128.89.89.71]> In-Reply-To: <20071117141738.B445033C21@delta.rtfm.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223A32833@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.micros oft.com> <20071117141738.B445033C21@delta.rtfm.com> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:35:47 -0500 To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Cc: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Eric, Your question was: My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA certs to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the cert. This prevents hash algorithm substitution in the signature. Do you agree with this? The wording here strikes me as a bit odd. The hash algorithm used to verify a cert IS specified in the cert, in the SignatureAlgorithm field. The hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the public KEY in the cert are not specified, in general, as the key may be used to verify signatures for certs or for other signed objects (in the case of EE certs). Steve Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJGSVuF098178 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 09:28:31 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJGSVii098177; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 09:28:31 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from [10.20.30.108] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJGSTgY098163 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 09:28:31 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org) Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p06240801c3676a0d8b40@[10.20.30.249]> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 08:28:15 -0800 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> (by way of Paul Hoffman) Subject: Last Call: draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis (Certificate Management Messages over CMS) to Proposed Standard Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following documents: - 'Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Transport Protocols ' <draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt> as a Proposed Standard - 'CMC Compliance Document ' <draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt> as a Proposed Standard - 'Certificate Management Messages over CMS ' <draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt> as a Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2007-12-03. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. The file can be obtained via http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt IESG discussion can be tracked via https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=view_id&dTag=6869&rfc_flag=0 Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJFkoga093970 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 08:46:50 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJFkoow093969; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 08:46:50 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ns1.neustar.com (ns1.neustar.com [156.154.16.138]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJFknu2093961 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 08:46:50 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ietf@ietf.org) Received: from stiedprstage1.ietf.org (stiedprstage1.va.neustar.com [10.31.47.10]) by ns1.neustar.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ACAA426E39; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 15:46:48 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ietf by stiedprstage1.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.43) id 1Iu8pk-00036q-J1; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 10:46:48 -0500 X-test-idtracker: no To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org> From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> Subject: Last Call: draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis (Certificate Management Messages over CMS) to Proposed Standard Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Message-Id: <E1Iu8pk-00036q-J1@stiedprstage1.ietf.org> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 10:46:48 -0500 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following documents: - 'Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Transport Protocols ' <draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt> as a Proposed Standard - 'CMC Compliance Document ' <draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt> as a Proposed Standard - 'Certificate Management Messages over CMS ' <draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt> as a Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2007-12-03. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. 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You will forget about you problem for sure. http://demotch.com/ Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJDHX1S077461 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 06:17:33 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJDHX3V077460; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 06:17:33 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJDHTgD077441; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 06:17:30 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from denis.pinkas@bull.net) Received: from MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (msga-001.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA55058; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 14:25:17 +0100 Received: from frcls4013 ([129.182.108.120]) by MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (Lotus Domino Release 5.0.11) with SMTP id 2007111914170173:22070 ; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 14:17:01 +0100 Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 14:16:58 +0100 From: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net> To: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Cc: "S-MIME / IETF" <ietf-smime@imc.org> Subject: Re: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment X-mailer: Foxmail 5.0 [-fr-] Mime-Version: 1.0 X-MIMETrack: Itemize by SMTP Server on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11 |July 24, 2002) at 19/11/2007 14:17:01, Serialize by Router on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11 |July 24, 2002) at 19/11/2007 14:17:28, Serialize complete at 19/11/2007 14:17:28 Message-ID: <OF0B45CABE.A644003A-ONC1257398.0048F862@frcl.bull.fr> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from base64 to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAJDHWgD077448 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Adriano, Thank you for this new proposal. I skimmed through it. It is interesting, but I fear that it is targeted to the wrong WG. Since this would be an extension of CMS, this work item would rather belong to the S-MIME WG. For this reason, I copy the S-MIME WG. In addition, some polishing would be needed. Rather than long words, you will find hereafter a rewriting of the ASN.1 with a few explanatory comments. TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] Version DEFAULT v1, fileName UTF8String, mimeType PrintableString, fileLocation UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- fileLocation is only a hint. -- The file may or may not be stored at that location. content OCTET STRING, temporalEvidences TemporalEvidences } Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } TemporalEvidences ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TemporalEvidence -- This structure allows multiple levels of temporal evidences. TemporalEvidence ::= SEQUENCE { evidences Evidences, certificateLists CertificateLists OPTIONAL } CertificateLists :: = SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertificateList Evidence ::= CHOICE { timeStamps [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken } -- For each level there can be one or more time-stamps tokens. -- Before re-time stamping a set of former time-stamp tokens, -- the CRLs of the previous level of time-stamps tokens can be captured -- and inserted in the data structure. Denis >Hello there, > >here I am again with my TimeStampedData proposal. > >I have submitted a new draft (also attached here) that takes into account some of the remarks and suggestions received so far. > >I have made room for additional types of temporal evidence, like e.g. RFC 4998, while keeping RFC 3161 as the basis of interoperability. > >I would like to invite everybody involved in time-stamping and archiving e-documents to comment upon it: has it improved? something is missing? > >In particular, please state: >- are you interested in this work? >- do you agree to adopt it as a new PKIX work item? >- are you going to use this format, once it is finished? > >Is anybody willing to spend a few words on this draft during the IETF meeting in Vancouver (as I cannot attend myself) ? > >And finally, is anybody willing to invest a little time in co-authoring this draft with me? > >Adriano >Actalis S.p.A. >Milano, ITALY > > > > >-----Messaggio originale----- >Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] Per conto di Santoni Adriano >Inviato: lunedì 3 settembre 2007 10.42 >A: ietf-pkix@imc.org >Oggetto: R: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > > >Let me summarize the issues discussed so far: > >1) allow EvidenceRecord (RFC 4998) in addition to TimeStampToken (RFC 3161) > >In principle, I have no objections as long as we do not complicate things too much and do not hamper interoperability. > >There are at least two possible approaches to accomodate RFC 4998: > > a) explicitly provide for (one) ER in the TimeStampedData syntax, as an alternative to the SET OF TimeStampToken; > b) do not mention any specific standard for the "evidence", but just mention RFC 3161 and RFC 4998 as two possibilities; > >In any case, it must be possible for the verifying application to easily detect which of the two (or more) kind of "evidence" has been used in the TimeStampedData envelope under examination. If we restrict the kinds of evidence to the two above, then a extra tagging may not be necessary, as an EvidenceRecord is a SEQUENCE, while the other choice would be a SET OF. Although unelegant, it would work. On the other hand, if we do not want to restrict the kinds of evidence to the two above, then of course we should somehow add an extra tagging level, because nobody knows at this time what syntax a third kind of evidence would conform to. > >In any case, for the sake of interoperability, strong emphasis should be given to RFC 3161 as today this is the most widely implemented type of evidence. > >In conclusion: I agree with allowing RFC 4998 if we do that in a way that does not modify the strong emphasis on RFC 3161 and does not hamper interoperability (which must be based on supporting RFC 3161, even though certain applications may also support RFC 4998). > >2) filename vs. URI > >Some remarked that an URI (or URI Reference) would be more versatile than a simple filename. That is obviously true, but it implies that the 'content' field of TimeStampedData may be empty. This is not what I was addressing in my original proposal. It would not just require the 'content' field to be declared OPTIONAL: it would make interoperability very difficult to achieve unless we restrict the URI schemes to a very small subset (e.g. http:, cid:, file:, ldap:) of the myriad possibilities. In any case, it would require ages of interoperability testing. And it would make life much harder for software implementors, without much of a benefit in view. I strongly believe in keeping things simple as much as possible. > >3) multiple contents and RFC 4073 > >The 'content' field in the TimeStampedData envelope is not structured, in my original proposal. It is just an OCTET STRING. That allows for any kind of content to be conveyed, even a ContentCollection according to RFC 4073. > >Another remark has been made with reference to RFC 4073: the ContentWithAttributes structure, also defined in RFC 4073, could in principle be used to bundle some content with the corrisponding evidence (the goal of my draft). Although this is true, it would require definining some additional OIDs, and mandating the presence of certain Attributes tagged by those OIDs. I frankly believe the TimeStampedData structure that I am proposing is better, first because it is dedicated and second because it "implements the ContentInfo interface", so to speak. It is simpler to manage for applications already able to parse different kinds of ContentInfo envelopes (there are a great many), possibly in a recursive way. > >Adriano > > >-----Messaggio originale----- >Da: Young H Etheridge [mailto:yhe@yhetheridge.org] >Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 17.48 >A: Santoni Adriano >Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org >Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData > >Adriano, > >To add to your thought processes: I believe that a URI of "file:///private.stuff" addresses your concern for privacy of the physical URI. But, allowing URI in the syntax will make less private repositories, not necessarily file systems, more universally accessible. The intent of the URI in RFC 3986 is to also allow for abstractly identifying a resource, not necessarily providing a physical resource. In this manner the URI could then be used as an object identity in database(s). > >Take care, > >yhe > >Santoni Adriano wrote: >> To accomodate for RFC 4998, I would propose the following syntax: >> >> TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE { >> version INTEGER { v1(1) }, >> fileName UTF8String, >> mimeType PrintableString, >> content OCTET STRING, >> evidence Evidence >> } >> >> Evidence ::= CHOICE { >> timeStamps [0] SET (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken, >> evidenceRecord [1] EvidenceRecord -- according to RFC 4998 >> } >> >> (I am not sure whether it would be better to use explicit or implicit >> tags...) >> >> Regarding the idea of having an URI instead of a filename: I'd prefer to think over things a little bit more, and maybe collect more feedback. >> >> In my mind, I can send a TimeStampedData envelope to business partners and/or public agencies via email. If the timestamped document is a local one, which I think is a meaningful and realistic scenario, then I do not want my company's hostnames and pathnames to be included in the envelope so that the recipient can see them. >> >> Adriano >> >> >> >> -----Messaggio originale----- >> Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] >> Per conto di Julien Stern >> Inviato: venerdì 31 agosto 2007 13.43 >> A: ietf-pkix@imc.org >> Oggetto: Re: Draft on TimeStampedData >> >> >> On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 12:06:00PM +0200, Tilo Kienitz wrote: >> >>> Adriano, >>> >>> >>>> After pondering on this and other remarks, I cannot help but agree >>>> with Steve. >>>> >>>> My original and essential goal is that of facilitating >>>> interoperability in a currently unregulated field. If we allow for >>>> several "degrees of freedom", than interoperability will be hampered from the beginning. >>>> So I'd better stick to RFC 3161 for now. We could include support >>>> for RFC 4998 Evidence Records later on, at the time when they become >>>> a widespread reality comparable to RFC 3161 TimeStampTokens (which >>>> are widely implemented). >>>> >>> I would prefer to have both options: RFC 3161 and RFC 4998. For our >>> customers evidence records are a widespread reality already. >>> A standardized way to put some data and their evidence record into a >>> single file would be useful. >>> >> >> I strongly concur with this comment. Allowing the usage of ERS as well as simple timestamps would allow the TimestampedData to leverage all the work of RFC 4998 regarding timestamps instead of reinventing the wheel in the future. >> >> Regards, >> >> -- >> Julien >> >> >>> Kind regards >>> Tilo >>> >>> >>> >>>> -----Messaggio originale----- >>>> Da: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] >>>> Inviato: giovedì 30 agosto 2007 23.05 >>>> A: Young H Etheridge >>>> Cc: Santoni Adriano; ietf-pkix@imc.org >>>> Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData >>>> >>>> At 4:33 PM -0400 8/30/07, Young H Etheridge wrote: >>>> >>>>>> ... >>>>>> >>>>> Agreed, w.r.t. normative vs informative. The above quote from >>>>> RFC-4998 merely underscores that this draft should also suggest, >>>>> informatively, that the choice of Timestamp should be one that >>>>> meets the normative syntax for Timestamp and not specify that which >>>>> is in RFC-3161. Nothing gets broken by being less restrictive and >>>>> generally more informative to the community-at-large. >>>>> >>>> I have to disagree with your conclusion. If we require 3161 time stamps in an RFC of the sort Adriano proposed, then everyone can parse them if they comply with the RFC. If the RFC says "insert the time stamp from any standard you want here, and just tell us which one you used" then we have a problem. A compliant implementation can generate data structures containing time stamps that other compliant implementations cannot parse. That's the sort of interoperability problem we try to avoid in the IETF. >>>> >>>> >>>>> My notion of resilience does not mean "more encompassing" but that >>>>> of providing the user community with choice and an enhanced >>>>> safeguard against the possibility of the weakening of an algorithm. >>>>> >>>> Choices can be good, but they can create interoperability problems in some cases, like this one. Also, we have algorithm agility as a requirement in all of our work, so the second concern you cite does not seem to apply here. >>>> >>>> Steve >>>> >>> -- >>> Tilo Kienitz >>> SecCommerce Informationssysteme GmbH >>> Obenhauptstr. 5 >>> D - 22335 Hamburg >>> Germany http://www.seccommerce.de Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJBbqYZ067979 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 04:37:52 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJBbqZn067978; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 04:37:52 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail1relay.itmaster.local (host48-104-static.43-193-b.business.telecomitalia.it [193.43.104.48] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJBbnCR067960 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 04:37:51 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Adriano.Santoni@actalis.it) Received: from POSTA02.itmaster.local ([193.43.104.10]) by mail1relay.itmaster.local with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 12:37:03 +0100 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C82AA0.78F9608C" Subject: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 12:36:48 +0100 Message-ID: <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD421D6E8D3@POSTA02.itmaster.local> In-Reply-To: <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD4218A73D2@POSTA02.itmaster.local> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: TimeStampedData draft updated - please comment Thread-Index: Acfr5lpn9VemHXgsRge4idPMW7Jr1ACD5vMADyZpYIA= References: <200708311007.l7VA7PYP040483@balder-227.proper.com> <20070831114237.GH4767@mars.cry.pto> <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD4218A737D@POSTA02.itmaster.local> <46D8383A.2020003@yhetheridge.org> <FF374A5075949C4D87367831AAAFD4218A73D2@POSTA02.itmaster.local> From: "Santoni Adriano" <Adriano.Santoni@actalis.it> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 19 Nov 2007 11:37:03.0453 (UTC) FILETIME=[816BF8D0:01C82AA0] X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: SMEX-7.0.0.1345-5.0.1023-15554.003 X-TM-AS-Result: No--9.237500-0.000000-31 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C82AA0.78F9608C Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hello there, here I am again with my TimeStampedData proposal. I have submitted a new draft (also attached here) that takes into = account some of the remarks and suggestions received so far. I have made room for additional types of temporal evidence, like e.g. = RFC 4998, while keeping RFC 3161 as the basis of interoperability. I would like to invite everybody involved in time-stamping and archiving = e-documents to comment upon it: has it improved? something is missing? In particular, please state: - are you interested in this work? - do you agree to adopt it as a new PKIX work item? - are you going to use this format, once it is finished? Is anybody willing to spend a few words on this draft during the IETF = meeting in Vancouver (as I cannot attend myself) ? And finally, is anybody willing to invest a little time in co-authoring = this draft with me? Adriano Actalis S.p.A. Milano, ITALY -----Messaggio originale----- Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] = Per conto di Santoni Adriano Inviato: luned=EC 3 settembre 2007 10.42 A: ietf-pkix@imc.org Oggetto: R: R: Draft on TimeStampedData Let me summarize the issues discussed so far: 1) allow EvidenceRecord (RFC 4998) in addition to TimeStampToken (RFC = 3161) In principle, I have no objections as long as we do not complicate = things too much and do not hamper interoperability.=20 There are at least two possible approaches to accomodate RFC 4998: a) explicitly provide for (one) ER in the TimeStampedData syntax, as = an alternative to the SET OF TimeStampToken; b) do not mention any specific standard for the "evidence", but just = mention RFC 3161 and RFC 4998 as two possibilities; In any case, it must be possible for the verifying application to easily = detect which of the two (or more) kind of "evidence" has been used in = the TimeStampedData envelope under examination. If we restrict the kinds = of evidence to the two above, then a extra tagging may not be necessary, = as an EvidenceRecord is a SEQUENCE, while the other choice would be a = SET OF. Although unelegant, it would work. On the other hand, if we do = not want to restrict the kinds of evidence to the two above, then of = course we should somehow add an extra tagging level, because nobody = knows at this time what syntax a third kind of evidence would conform = to. In any case, for the sake of interoperability, strong emphasis should be = given to RFC 3161 as today this is the most widely implemented type of = evidence. In conclusion: I agree with allowing RFC 4998 if we do that in a way = that does not modify the strong emphasis on RFC 3161 and does not hamper = interoperability (which must be based on supporting RFC 3161, even = though certain applications may also support RFC 4998). 2) filename vs. URI=20 Some remarked that an URI (or URI Reference) would be more versatile = than a simple filename. That is obviously true, but it implies that the = 'content' field of TimeStampedData may be empty. This is not what I was = addressing in my original proposal. It would not just require the = 'content' field to be declared OPTIONAL: it would make interoperability = very difficult to achieve unless we restrict the URI schemes to a very = small subset (e.g. http:, cid:, file:, ldap:) of the myriad = possibilities. In any case, it would require ages of interoperability = testing. And it would make life much harder for software implementors, = without much of a benefit in view. I strongly believe in keeping things = simple as much as possible. 3) multiple contents and RFC 4073 The 'content' field in the TimeStampedData envelope is not structured, = in my original proposal. It is just an OCTET STRING. That allows for any = kind of content to be conveyed, even a ContentCollection according to = RFC 4073. Another remark has been made with reference to RFC 4073: the = ContentWithAttributes structure, also defined in RFC 4073, could in = principle be used to bundle some content with the corrisponding evidence = (the goal of my draft). Although this is true, it would require = definining some additional OIDs, and mandating the presence of certain = Attributes tagged by those OIDs. I frankly believe the TimeStampedData = structure that I am proposing is better, first because it is dedicated = and second because it "implements the ContentInfo interface", so to = speak. It is simpler to manage for applications already able to parse = different kinds of ContentInfo envelopes (there are a great many), = possibly in a recursive way. Adriano=20 -----Messaggio originale----- Da: Young H Etheridge [mailto:yhe@yhetheridge.org] Inviato: venerd=EC 31 agosto 2007 17.48 A: Santoni Adriano Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData Adriano, To add to your thought processes: I believe that a URI of = "file:///private.stuff" addresses your concern for privacy of the = physical URI. But, allowing URI in the syntax will make less private = repositories, not necessarily file systems, more universally accessible. = The intent of the URI in RFC 3986 is to also allow for abstractly = identifying a resource, not necessarily providing a physical resource. = In this manner the URI could then be used as an object identity in = database(s). Take care, yhe Santoni Adriano wrote: > To accomodate for RFC 4998, I would propose the following syntax: > > TimeStampedData ::=3D SEQUENCE { > version INTEGER { v1(1) }, > fileName UTF8String, > mimeType PrintableString, > content OCTET STRING, > evidence Evidence > } > > Evidence ::=3D CHOICE { > timeStamps [0] SET (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF TimeStampToken, > evidenceRecord [1] EvidenceRecord -- according to RFC 4998 > } > > (I am not sure whether it would be better to use explicit or implicit > tags...) > > Regarding the idea of having an URI instead of a filename: I'd prefer = to think over things a little bit more, and maybe collect more feedback. > > In my mind, I can send a TimeStampedData envelope to business partners = and/or public agencies via email. If the timestamped document is a local = one, which I think is a meaningful and realistic scenario, then I do not = want my company's hostnames and pathnames to be included in the envelope = so that the recipient can see them. > > Adriano > > > > -----Messaggio originale----- > Da: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] > Per conto di Julien Stern > Inviato: venerd=EC 31 agosto 2007 13.43 > A: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Oggetto: Re: Draft on TimeStampedData > > > On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 12:06:00PM +0200, Tilo Kienitz wrote: > =20 >> Adriano, >> >> =20 >>> After pondering on this and other remarks, I cannot help but agree=20 >>> with Steve. >>> >>> My original and essential goal is that of facilitating=20 >>> interoperability in a currently unregulated field. If we allow for=20 >>> several "degrees of freedom", than interoperability will be hampered = from the beginning. >>> So I'd better stick to RFC 3161 for now. We could include support=20 >>> for RFC 4998 Evidence Records later on, at the time when they become = >>> a widespread reality comparable to RFC 3161 TimeStampTokens (which=20 >>> are widely implemented). >>> =20 >> I would prefer to have both options: RFC 3161 and RFC 4998. For our=20 >> customers evidence records are a widespread reality already. >> A standardized way to put some data and their evidence record into a=20 >> single file would be useful. >> =20 > > I strongly concur with this comment. Allowing the usage of ERS as well = as simple timestamps would allow the TimestampedData to leverage all the = work of RFC 4998 regarding timestamps instead of reinventing the wheel = in the future. > > Regards, > > -- > Julien > > =20 >> Kind regards >> Tilo >> >> >> =20 >>> -----Messaggio originale----- >>> Da: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] >>> Inviato: gioved=EC 30 agosto 2007 23.05 >>> A: Young H Etheridge >>> Cc: Santoni Adriano; ietf-pkix@imc.org >>> Oggetto: Re: R: Draft on TimeStampedData >>> >>> At 4:33 PM -0400 8/30/07, Young H Etheridge wrote: >>> =20 >>>>> ... >>>>> =20 >>>> Agreed, w.r.t. normative vs informative. The above quote from >>>> RFC-4998 merely underscores that this draft should also suggest,=20 >>>> informatively, that the choice of Timestamp should be one that=20 >>>> meets the normative syntax for Timestamp and not specify that which = >>>> is in RFC-3161. Nothing gets broken by being less restrictive and=20 >>>> generally more informative to the community-at-large. >>>> =20 >>> I have to disagree with your conclusion. If we require 3161 time = stamps in an RFC of the sort Adriano proposed, then everyone can parse = them if they comply with the RFC. If the RFC says "insert the time stamp = from any standard you want here, and just tell us which one you used" = then we have a problem. A compliant implementation can generate data = structures containing time stamps that other compliant implementations = cannot parse. That's the sort of interoperability problem we try to = avoid in the IETF. >>> >>> =20 >>>> My notion of resilience does not mean "more encompassing" but that=20 >>>> of providing the user community with choice and an enhanced=20 >>>> safeguard against the possibility of the weakening of an algorithm. >>>> =20 >>> Choices can be good, but they can create interoperability problems = in some cases, like this one. Also, we have algorithm agility as a = requirement in all of our work, so the second concern you cite does not = seem to apply here. >>> >>> Steve >>> =20 >> -- >> Tilo Kienitz >> SecCommerce Informationssysteme GmbH >> Obenhauptstr. 5 >> D - 22335 Hamburg >> Germany http://www.seccommerce.de >> >> >> =20 > > > =20 ------_=_NextPart_001_01C82AA0.78F9608C Content-Type: text/plain; name="draft-santoni-timestampeddata-01.txt" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Description: draft-santoni-timestampeddata-01.txt Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="draft-santoni-timestampeddata-01.txt" DQoNCg0KDQoNCg0KDQoNCg0KICAgICANCiAgICAgDQogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICBBLiBTYW50b25pIA0KICAgIElu dGVybmV0IERyYWZ0ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgQWN0 YWxpcyBTLnAuQS4gDQogICAgSW50ZW5kZWQgc3RhdHVzOiBQcm9wb3NlZCBTdGFuZGFyZCAgICAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgTm92ZW1iZXIgMTksIDIwMDcgDQogICAgRXhwaXJlczogTWF5IDIwMDgg 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balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJ7K3L4045785 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 00:20:03 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJ7K3EP045784; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 00:20:03 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ns0.neustar.com (ns0.neustar.com [156.154.16.158]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJ7K2gW045778 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 00:20:02 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ietf@ietf.org) Received: from stiedprstage1.ietf.org (stiedprstage1.va.neustar.com [10.31.47.10]) by ns0.neustar.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95697328F4; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 07:20:01 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ietf by stiedprstage1.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.43) id 1Iu0vJ-0004Bv-Gj; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 02:20:01 -0500 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" Mime-Version: 1.0 To: i-d-announce@ietf.org Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D Action:draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt Message-Id: <E1Iu0vJ-0004Bv-Gj@stiedprstage1.ietf.org> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 02:20:01 -0500 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Certificate Management Messages over CMS Author(s) : J. Schaad, M. Myers Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt Pages : 92 Date : 2007-11-19 This document defines the base syntax for CMC, a Certificate Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This protocol addresses two immediate needs within the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) community: 1. The need for an interface to public key certification products and services based on CMS and PKCS #10 (Public Key Cryptography Standard), and 2. The need for a PKI enrollment protocol for encryption only keys due to algorithm or hardware design. CMC also requires the use of the transport document and the requirements usage document along with this document for a full definition. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to i-d-announce-request@ietf.org with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. You can also visit https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/I-D-announce to change your subscription settings. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2007-11-19021027.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2007-11-19021027.I-D\@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJ704WP044425 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 00:00:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJ704Ao044423; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 00:00:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ns3.neustar.com (ns3.neustar.com [156.154.24.138]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJ703AX044411 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 00:00:03 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ietf@ietf.org) Received: from stiedprstage1.ietf.org (stiedprstage1.va.neustar.com [10.31.47.10]) by ns3.neustar.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6999B175BF; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 07:00:02 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ietf by stiedprstage1.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.43) id 1Iu0bx-0002oI-Tp; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 02:00:01 -0500 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" Mime-Version: 1.0 To: i-d-announce@ietf.org Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D Action:draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt Message-Id: <E1Iu0bx-0002oI-Tp@stiedprstage1.ietf.org> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 02:00:01 -0500 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : CMC Compliance Document Author(s) : J. Schaad, M. Myers Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt Pages : 21 Date : 2007-11-19 This document provides a set of compliance statements about the CMC (Certificate Management over CMS) enrollment protocol. The ASN.1 structures and the transport mechanisms for the CMC enrollment protocol are covered in other documents. This document provides the information needed to make a compliant version of CMC. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to i-d-announce-request@ietf.org with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. You can also visit https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/I-D-announce to change your subscription settings. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2007-11-19015759.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-compl-04.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2007-11-19015759.I-D\@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJ704U7044424 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 19 Nov 2007 00:00:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAJ704AJ044422; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 00:00:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ns0.neustar.com (ns0.neustar.com [156.154.16.158]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAJ702ih044410 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 00:00:03 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ietf@ietf.org) Received: from stiedprstage1.ietf.org (stiedprstage1.va.neustar.com [10.31.47.10]) by ns0.neustar.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C3E3328F8; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 07:00:02 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ietf by stiedprstage1.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.43) id 1Iu0by-0002pL-00; Mon, 19 Nov 2007 02:00:02 -0500 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" Mime-Version: 1.0 To: i-d-announce@ietf.org Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D Action:draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt Message-Id: <E1Iu0by-0002pL-00@stiedprstage1.ietf.org> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 02:00:02 -0500 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Transport Protocols Author(s) : J. Schaad, M. Myers Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt Pages : 7 Date : 2007-11-19 This document defines a number of transport mechanisms that are used to move CMC (Certificate Management over CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax)) messages. The transport mechanisms described in this document are: HTTP, file, mail and TCP.1. Overview This document defines a number of transport methods that are used to move CMC messages (defined in [CMC-STRUCT]). The transport mechanisms described in this document are: HTTP, file, mail and TCP. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to i-d-announce-request@ietf.org with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. You can also visit https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/I-D-announce to change your subscription settings. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2007-11-19015908.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-06.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <2007-11-19015908.I-D\@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from muskoka.com ([218.75.149.218]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lAI9DaJY063027; Sun, 18 Nov 2007 02:13:37 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from cfraud@muskoka.com) Received: (qmail 43376 invoked from network); Sun, 18 Nov 2007 17:27:50 +0800 Received: from unknown (HELO S47) (cfraud@muskoka.com@83.28.182.235) by da954bdamuskoka.com with SMTP; Sun, 18 Nov 2007 17:27:50 +0800 Message-ID: <001a01c82a08$57fd1d50$0160e494@S47> From: "Jamar E. 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Kablia matteson http://chimla.com/ ------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C8292F.6E0C7110 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1"> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2900.3059" name=3DGENERATOR> <STYLE></STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2>Learn the sex secrets of the PC muscle and = have sex for=20 hours ejaculating many times.</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2>Kablia matteson</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2><A=20 HREF=3D"http://chimla.com/">http://chimla.com/</A></FONT></DIV></BODY></H= TML> ------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C8292F.6E0C7110-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAHEMZWK095400 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sat, 17 Nov 2007 07:22:35 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAHEMZck095399; Sat, 17 Nov 2007 07:22:35 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (74-95-2-169-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net [74.95.2.169] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAHEMYjY095392 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 17 Nov 2007 07:22:34 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B445033C21; Sat, 17 Nov 2007 06:17:38 -0800 (PST) Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2007 06:17:38 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs In-Reply-To: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223A32833@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223A32833@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071117141738.B445033C21@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At Fri, 16 Nov 2007 15:27:20 +0000, Stefan Santesson wrote: > > The OID 1 2 840 10040 4 1 identifies DSA only and is used in the subject public key info for declaring the DSA key. In FIPS 186-2 sha-1 was the only hash algorithm, but this is expanded in FIPS 186-3 > > The following OIDs are relevant > > >From RFC 3279: > > -- OID for DSA public key > id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { > iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9algorithm(4) 1 } > > -- OID for DSA signature generated with SHA-1 hash > id-dsa-with-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { > iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) x9algorithm(4) 3 } > > > >From draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-01.txt > > id-dsa-with-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso- > ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) > csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 1} > > id-dsa-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso- > ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) > csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 1} Stefan, Maybe it's worth upleveling a bit. My claim is that for security reasons it's necessary for DSA certs to indicate the hash algorithm(s) that may be used with the cert. This prevents hash algorithm substitution in the signature. Do you agree with this? If so, then it becomes a question of encoding this information in the cert. I'm not a PKIX expert and don't have an opinion about how it should be encoded except that: 1. Current certificates must obviously be usable with at least SHA-1. 2. There must be a way for future certificates to rule out SHA-1. How does PKIX propose to solve this? -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAGFRgST070092 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 16 Nov 2007 08:27:42 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAGFRgqm070091; Fri, 16 Nov 2007 08:27:42 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-dub.microsoft.com (smtp-dub.microsoft.com [213.199.138.181]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAGFRet1070082 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 16 Nov 2007 08:27:41 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stefans@microsoft.com) Received: from DUB-EXHUB-C303.europe.corp.microsoft.com (65.53.213.93) by DUB-EXGWY-E802.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.129.2) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.1.222.3; Fri, 16 Nov 2007 15:27:39 +0000 Received: from EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.221.79]) by DUB-EXHUB-C303.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.213.93]) with mapi; Fri, 16 Nov 2007 15:27:39 +0000 From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2007 15:27:20 +0000 Subject: RE: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Topic: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs Thread-Index: AcglYyixk89m+4dNQ8SjtdSWyP3DzwDAR28Q Message-ID: <9F11911AED01D24BAA1C2355723C3D3223A32833@EA-EXMSG-C332.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> In-Reply-To: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAGFRft0070086 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Not really. The OID 1 2 840 10040 4 1 identifies DSA only and is used in the subject public key info for declaring the DSA key. In FIPS 186-2 sha-1 was the only hash algorithm, but this is expanded in FIPS 186-3 The following OIDs are relevant >From RFC 3279: -- OID for DSA public key id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9algorithm(4) 1 } -- OID for DSA signature generated with SHA-1 hash id-dsa-with-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) x9algorithm(4) 3 } >From draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-01.txt id-dsa-with-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso- ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 1} id-dsa-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso- ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 1} Stefan Santesson Senior Program Manager Windows Security, Standards > -----Original Message----- > From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@networkresonance.com] > Sent: den 12 november 2007 20:11 > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org; tls@ietf.org > Subject: [TLS] DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs > > Hi PKIX guys, > > As you probably know, in some modes of TLS one or the other party > signs data. In some cases, this presumably means DSA. This is > fine if you can guarantee that you are going to use SHA-1 with > DSA, but obviously there's going to be a desire to transition > to SHA-256, which raises the issue of digest substitution. > > My understanding of the current thinking on how to prevent this > is to indicate in the certificate which digest algorithm is to > be used with the cert. So, the rule we plan to promulgate in TLS > is: > > OID 1 2 840 10040 4 1 MUST only be used with SHA-1. Future > revisions of [PKIX] MAY define new object identifiers for DSA > with other hash algorithms. > > I wanted to check that this is compatible with the current PKIX > thinking. > > Thanks, > -Ekr > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@lists.ietf.org > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAFNLcSx095400 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 15 Nov 2007 16:21:38 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAFNLcSp095399; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 16:21:38 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from host.eb2bcom.com (host.eb2bcom.com [72.232.34.10]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAFNLasO095391 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 16:21:37 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from steven.legg@eb2bcom.com) Received: from [202.164.192.219] (helo=[192.168.99.100]) by host.eb2bcom.com with esmtpa (Exim 4.68) (envelope-from <steven.legg@eb2bcom.com>) id 1Iso1f-0005zE-Ui; Fri, 16 Nov 2007 10:21:36 +1100 Message-ID: <473CD47B.1000501@eb2bcom.com> Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2007 10:21:31 +1100 From: Steven Legg <steven.legg@eb2bcom.com> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AAB27@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B9E10.6060703@eb2bcom.com> <473C6664.2020404@pobox.com> In-Reply-To: <473C6664.2020404@pobox.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - host.eb2bcom.com X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - imc.org X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - eb2bcom.com X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Mike, Mike wrote: > >> the change from this: >> >> Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { >> type AttributeDescription, >> vals SET OF AttributeValue } >> >> to this: >> >> PartialAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { >> type AttributeDescription, >> vals SET OF value AttributeValue } >> >> Attribute ::= PartialAttribute(WITH COMPONENTS { >> ..., >> vals (SIZE(1..MAX))}) >> >> The addition of the WITH COMPONENTS constraint was motivated by the >> desire to express formally in the ASN.1 what was previously expressed >> only in the text of the RFC. > > I think this could have been achieved with: > > Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { > type AttributeDescription, > vals SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF value AttributeValue } No. In the information model an attribute is required to have at least one value, but in the protocol there are cases where the values may be omitted. The split into PartialAttribute and Attribute allows the two cases to be distinguished. > > and my existing parser could have handled it. > > But it appears that the move to ASN.1 2002 is inevitable and I > should just accept it. I would just ask that the transition be > completed over the course of a year or so to allow people to > catch up. I will have to rewrite my existing code, as I can > not take advantage of the a2c compiler that is now available. You have the choice of rewriting your existing parser, rewriting any ASN.1 that uses the 2002 syntax to suit your parser, or continuing to use the 1988-syntax definitions. Regards, Steven > > Mike > Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAFIePsY072216 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 15 Nov 2007 11:40:25 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAFIePjF072215; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 11:40:25 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lAFIeLDP072203 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 11:40:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Message-Id: <200711151840.lAFIeLDP072203@balder-227.proper.com> Received: (qmail 23263 invoked by uid 0); 15 Nov 2007 18:40:16 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (96.231.48.203) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 15 Nov 2007 18:40:16 -0000 X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9 Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 13:40:18 -0500 To: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt In-Reply-To: <473C6664.2020404@pobox.com> References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AAB27@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B9E10.6060703@eb2bcom.com> <473C6664.2020404@pobox.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Here is how I would see the transition: - publish the updates that provide the new syntax, but the 1988 syntax remains normative - as each specification gets revised, the newer syntax will become the only one in the RFC I believe that this transition will take many years. Russ At 10:31 AM 11/15/2007, Mike wrote: >>the change from this: >> Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { >> type AttributeDescription, >> vals SET OF AttributeValue } >>to this: >> PartialAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { >> type AttributeDescription, >> vals SET OF value AttributeValue } >> Attribute ::= PartialAttribute(WITH COMPONENTS { >> ..., >> vals (SIZE(1..MAX))}) >>The addition of the WITH COMPONENTS constraint was motivated by the >>desire to express formally in the ASN.1 what was previously expressed >>only in the text of the RFC. > >I think this could have been achieved with: > > Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { > type AttributeDescription, > vals SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF value AttributeValue } > >and my existing parser could have handled it. > >But it appears that the move to ASN.1 2002 is inevitable and I >should just accept it. I would just ask that the transition be >completed over the course of a year or so to allow people to >catch up. I will have to rewrite my existing code, as I can >not take advantage of the a2c compiler that is now available. > >Mike > Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAFHIjWg063832 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 15 Nov 2007 10:18:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAFHIjsY063831; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 10:18:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail.newbay.com (87-198-172-198.ptr.magnet.ie [87.198.172.198]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAFHIg0U063813 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 10:18:44 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie) Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mail.newbay.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 59E7A100415A4; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 17:18:38 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at newbay.com Received: from mail.newbay.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.newbay.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 3Uk+zHgKjsDc; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 17:18:35 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [192.168.2.156] (unknown [192.168.2.156]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.newbay.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6FA41004072A; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 17:18:34 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: <473C7F6B.5090909@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 17:18:35 +0000 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> CC: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AAB27@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B8A4B.5060100@cs.tcd.ie> <E75F200AF1718F45B2024A88C3141A1D0647BDC117@EA-EXMSG-C320.europe.corp.microsoft.com> In-Reply-To: <E75F200AF1718F45B2024A88C3141A1D0647BDC117@EA-EXMSG-C320.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Sure;-) The IETF does have a choice. The IETT cannot sensibly claim that X.208 was invented here. The opposite of the above is nonsense. Stephen. PS: Note that I've not said that moving to asn.1 2002 is nonsense. I just think that that's something to be done v. carefully. Stefan Santesson wrote: > Stephen, > > I think it would be fair to give a rationale why you think the claims presented here are "ridiculous nonsense" and "more nonsense". > > Stefan Santesson > Senior Program Manager > Windows Security, Standards > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf- >> pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell >> Sent: den 15 november 2007 00:53 >> To: Kemp, David P. >> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org >> Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt >> >> >> >> >> Kemp, David P. wrote: >>> The IETF does not have a choice. It could claim to be using its >>> own language (X.208) ... >> More nonsense. >> >> S. > > Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAFFuxL7056548 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 15 Nov 2007 08:56:59 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAFFuxpI056547; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 08:56:59 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-dub.microsoft.com (smtp-dub.microsoft.com [213.199.138.191]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAFFuvVq056541 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 08:56:58 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stefans@microsoft.com) Received: from dub-exhub-c302.europe.corp.microsoft.com (65.53.213.92) by DUB-EXGWY-E801.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.129.1) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.1.222.3; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 15:56:56 +0000 Received: from EA-EXMSG-C320.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.221.77]) by DUB-EXHUB-C302.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([2002:4135:d55c::4135:d55c]) with mapi; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 15:56:56 +0000 From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 15:56:45 +0000 Subject: RE: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Thread-Topic: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Thread-Index: AcgnId3f74D2bG6+RFS8/S8VdULVOQAfeiAA Message-ID: <E75F200AF1718F45B2024A88C3141A1D0647BDC117@EA-EXMSG-C320.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AAB27@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B8A4B.5060100@cs.tcd.ie> In-Reply-To: <473B8A4B.5060100@cs.tcd.ie> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAFFuwVp056542 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen, I think it would be fair to give a rationale why you think the claims presented here are "ridiculous nonsense" and "more nonsense". Stefan Santesson Senior Program Manager Windows Security, Standards > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf- > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell > Sent: den 15 november 2007 00:53 > To: Kemp, David P. > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt > > > > > Kemp, David P. wrote: > > The IETF does not have a choice. It could claim to be using its > > own language (X.208) ... > > More nonsense. > > S. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAFFTtkq054584 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 15 Nov 2007 08:29:55 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAFFTt18054583; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 08:29:55 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from sceptre.pobox.com (sceptre.pobox.com [207.106.133.20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAFFTsBP054577 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 08:29:55 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from mike-list@pobox.com) Received: from sceptre (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by sceptre.pobox.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38AC62F9 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 10:30:16 -0500 (EST) Received: from [192.168.1.8] (wsip-24-234-114-35.lv.lv.cox.net [24.234.114.35]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by sceptre.sasl.smtp.pobox.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08A2795F6E for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 10:30:15 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <473C6664.2020404@pobox.com> Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 07:31:48 -0800 From: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AAB27@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B9E10.6060703@eb2bcom.com> In-Reply-To: <473B9E10.6060703@eb2bcom.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> > the change from this: > > Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { > type AttributeDescription, > vals SET OF AttributeValue } > > to this: > > PartialAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { > type AttributeDescription, > vals SET OF value AttributeValue } > > Attribute ::= PartialAttribute(WITH COMPONENTS { > ..., > vals (SIZE(1..MAX))}) > > The addition of the WITH COMPONENTS constraint was motivated by the > desire to express formally in the ASN.1 what was previously expressed > only in the text of the RFC. I think this could have been achieved with: Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeDescription, vals SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF value AttributeValue } and my existing parser could have handled it. But it appears that the move to ASN.1 2002 is inevitable and I should just accept it. I would just ask that the transition be completed over the course of a year or so to allow people to catch up. I will have to rewrite my existing code, as I can not take advantage of the a2c compiler that is now available. Mike Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAF1HBKu093430 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 14 Nov 2007 18:17:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAF1HBj7093429; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 18:17:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from host.eb2bcom.com (host.eb2bcom.com [72.232.34.10]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAF1HAEl093422 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 18:17:10 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from steven.legg@eb2bcom.com) Received: from cust3803.vic01.dataco.com.au ([202.164.192.219] helo=[192.168.99.100]) by host.eb2bcom.com with esmtpa (Exim 4.68) (envelope-from <steven.legg@eb2bcom.com>) id 1IsTLx-0002HX-El; Thu, 15 Nov 2007 12:17:10 +1100 Message-ID: <473B9E10.6060703@eb2bcom.com> Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 12:17:04 +1100 From: Steven Legg <steven.legg@eb2bcom.com> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AAB27@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> In-Reply-To: <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AAB27@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - host.eb2bcom.com X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - imc.org X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - eb2bcom.com X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> David, Kemp, David P. wrote: > I believe in KISS. And I see plenty of examples of ASN.1-based > protocols (and was co-author of one, to my shame) which became > complex just because it is easier to get carried away in ASN.1 > than in, for example, bits-in-boxes. > > However, that is orthogonal to the issue of whether IETF should > make it's ASN.1-based RFCs conform to the ASN.1 standard. > The LDAP example you gave is unrelated to a switch from X.208 > to X.680 - the simple definition is perfectly legal under X.680, > thus the gratuitous complexity of the second definition > was motivated by something other than the desire to be ASN.1 > compliant. In the LDAP example Mike gave, i.e., the change from this: Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeDescription, vals SET OF AttributeValue } to this: PartialAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeDescription, vals SET OF value AttributeValue } Attribute ::= PartialAttribute(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., vals (SIZE(1..MAX))}) there are two different motivations involved. The inclusion of the "value" identifier into SET OF AttributeValue was to make XML encodings of the LDAP protocol messages more aesthetically pleasing (in support of experimental extensions to LDAP). The change doesn't affect the bits on the wire for BER and a programmer using a 1998-syntax ASN.1 compiler can simply remove the identifiers after the SET OFs to get the module to compile. The addition of the WITH COMPONENTS constraint was motivated by the desire to express formally in the ASN.1 what was previously expressed only in the text of the RFC. This means that the revised ASN.1 is a more complete and precise specification of the protocol than the ASN.1 in the previous edition. A complete and precise specification of the protocol is the main point of the RFC after all. The constraint notation is still conformant to the 1988 syntax, so an older ASN.1 compiler should be able to parse it. If not, then the remedy is simple - edit the constraint out of the ASN.1 before passing it to the compiler. > > X.509 uses a relatively simple subset of ASN.1, and making the > minimal changes required to become legal under X.680 should not > require a parser with 4 tokens of lookahead. Making more extensive > changes that explore the more esoteric features of X.680 is a > separate issue, and on that I'd come down on the side of KISS. > Some things are simpler under X.680, for example the ability to > use real UTF8STRINGs rather than a hack to produce the same bits > on the wire as X.680. Simplicity depends on one's perspective. As a programmer, it is easier for me to replace ANYs with open types and component relation constraints so that my ASN.1 toolkit takes care of all the encoding and decoding details, rather than using the ASN.1 as is. Yes, it makes the ASN.1 more complex, but for me it makes the overall implementation trivial. Whether a specification is written in 1998 syntax or 2002 syntax, some group of implementors is going to be disadvantaged. The disadvantaged group always has the option to edit the ASN.1 to suit. To that end, perhaps Paul could consider adding to the ASN.1 (as comments) some instructions on how to dumb it down to the 1988 level. In my opinion, moving to the 2002 syntax is better in the long term because it allows more precise protocol specifications and allows greater levels of automation. Regards, Steven > > The IETF does not have a choice. It could claim to be using its > own language (X.208) just like it defines its own language to express > the TLS protocol. But PKIX claims to be a profile of X.509, not > an independent certificate format that sort of resembles X.509, > and so the modules contained in the normative sections of > RFC 3280bis must be written in ASN.1. That requires updates to > the RFCs, with informative annexes to contain the pseudo-ASN.1. > > Received: from AMarseille-157-1-94-230.w90-37.abo.wanadoo.fr (AMarseille-157-1-94-230.w90-37.abo.wanadoo.fr [90.37.101.230]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAF0T145090071 for <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org>; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 17:29:03 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Arjan558@elite-environmental.com) Received: from ACER ([173.107.166.84]:1039 "EHLO ACER" smtp-auth: <none> TLS-CIPHER: <none> TLS-PEER-CN1: <none>) by AMarseille-157-1-94-230.w90-37.abo.wanadoo.fr with ESMTP id S22YENHNTNERQULX (ORCPT <rfc822;ietf-pkix-archive%imc.org@mail.imc.org>); Thu, 15 Nov 2007 01:29:31 +0100 Message-ID: <000401c8271e$85ab3030$e665255a@ACER> From: "Arjan Mannonen" <Arjan558@elite-environmental.com> To: ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org Subject: 1txen Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 01:29:02 +0100 Message-ID: <000401c8271e$85ab3030$e665255a@ACER> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.6626 Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.2962 her pussy wont know what hit it once your new cock has finished Nicolai Perica http://www.alderny.com/ Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAENqvJP086904 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 14 Nov 2007 16:52:57 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAENqv4w086903; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 16:52:57 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from relay.imagine.ie (dns2.dns.imagine.ie [87.232.1.41]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAENqtEV086896 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 16:52:56 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie) Received: from mail1.int.imagine.ie (mail1 [87.232.1.152]) by relay.imagine.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7AFAF4358; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 23:52:54 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.3] (dsl-102-234.cust.imagine.ie [87.232.102.234]) by mail1.int.imagine.ie (8.13.4/8.13.4/Debian-3) with ESMTP id lAENqmO4009074 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 14 Nov 2007 23:52:50 GMT Message-ID: <473B8A4B.5060100@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2007 23:52:43 +0000 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AAB27@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> In-Reply-To: <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AAB27@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Bayes-Prob: 0.0508 (Score 0) X-Spam-Score: 0.00 () [Hold at 8.00] X-Canit-Stats-ID: 17227992 - b0394f359410 X-CanItPRO-Stream: outgoing X-Scanned-By: CanIt (www . roaringpenguin . com) on 87.232.1.52 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Kemp, David P. wrote: > The IETF does not have a choice. It could claim to be using its > own language (X.208) ... More nonsense. S. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAEMWcID080651 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 14 Nov 2007 15:32:38 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAEMWcpx080650; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 15:32:38 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAEMWc4O080642 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 15:32:38 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil) Received: from Cerberus (cerberus.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.51.8]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id lAEMWZsb003046 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 17:32:35 -0500 (EST) X-AuditID: 90333308-000029cc00000750-9d-473b778334f9 Received: from antigone.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.33]) by Cerberus with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Wed, 14 Nov 2007 17:32:35 -0500 Received: from EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.21]) by antigone.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Wed, 14 Nov 2007 17:32:35 -0500 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2007 17:32:34 -0500 Message-ID: <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AAB27@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> In-Reply-To: <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Thread-Index: Acgm9cdNS0VFARdvR3yqIqIafaR+iwAEc1fQ References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 14 Nov 2007 22:32:35.0208 (UTC) FILETIME=[40E8C080:01C8270E] X-Brightmail-Tracker: AAAAAA== Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lAEMWc4O080645 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I believe in KISS. And I see plenty of examples of ASN.1-based protocols (and was co-author of one, to my shame) which became complex just because it is easier to get carried away in ASN.1 than in, for example, bits-in-boxes. However, that is orthogonal to the issue of whether IETF should make it's ASN.1-based RFCs conform to the ASN.1 standard. The LDAP example you gave is unrelated to a switch from X.208 to X.680 - the simple definition is perfectly legal under X.680, thus the gratuitous complexity of the second definition was motivated by something other than the desire to be ASN.1 compliant. X.509 uses a relatively simple subset of ASN.1, and making the minimal changes required to become legal under X.680 should not require a parser with 4 tokens of lookahead. Making more extensive changes that explore the more esoteric features of X.680 is a separate issue, and on that I'd come down on the side of KISS. Some things are simpler under X.680, for example the ability to use real UTF8STRINGs rather than a hack to produce the same bits on the wire as X.680. The IETF does not have a choice. It could claim to be using its own language (X.208) just like it defines its own language to express the TLS protocol. But PKIX claims to be a profile of X.509, not an independent certificate format that sort of resembles X.509, and so the modules contained in the normative sections of RFC 3280bis must be written in ASN.1. That requires updates to the RFCs, with informative annexes to contain the pseudo-ASN.1. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAEKo3XE071871 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 14 Nov 2007 13:50:03 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAEKo3LW071870; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 13:50:03 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lAEKo0b0071853 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 13:50:03 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Message-Id: <200711142050.lAEKo0b0071853@balder-227.proper.com> Received: (qmail 20085 invoked by uid 0); 14 Nov 2007 20:49:54 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (96.231.48.203) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 14 Nov 2007 20:49:54 -0000 X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9 Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2007 15:49:41 -0500 To: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt In-Reply-To: <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Mike: There is one feature in the newer ASN.1 specification that helps avoid programming errors. The use of CLASS instead of ANY DEFINED BY allows one to construct a table of the object identifiers and their associated structures. This is very helpful. It allows the decoder to automatically do the right thing. This concept was added by BBN to their ASN.1 compiler (for the 1988 syntax). They added a TABLE key word to handle it. I used this feature in a development many years ago, and it was better than having to write code for every possibility that might appear in an ANY. I agree that the newer syntax is a bit harder to read. But, in my opinion, it is worth the little bit of extra pain to get the automatic handling of ANY DEFINED BY. I'm pleased to see the open source compiler that handles all of the ASN.1 modules in IETF specifications. Russ P.S. The LDAP WG has been using the newer syntax for many years. At 01:54 PM 11/14/2007, Mike wrote: >>Let's see - 15 years in real time is how many years in >>Internet time? NCSA Mosaic was introduced in 1992, and >>Mike thinks we should still be basing RFCs on a standard >>that was deprecated before the web was born? > >It was the creator of ASN.1 who deprecated the 1988 version. >As I said before, I believe this is a self-preservation move >more than anything else. If they didn't add unnecessary >complexity and instead kept things simple, they would have >put the ASN.1 folks out of a job. The specs are all about >complexity -- consider X.400 versus Internet email, and X.500 >DAP versus LDAP, and how widely used those standard are. It >was probably a mistake to even adopt ASN.1 and X.509 for the >Internet in the first place, but that ship unfortunately >sailed long ago. > >Consider TCP/IP, the backbone of the Internet. Quoting >from Wikipedia: > > TCP is a complex and evolving protocol. However, > while significant enhancements have been made and > proposed over the years, its most basic operation > has not changed significantly since its first > specification RFC 675 in 1974.... > >So TCP has been around for over 30 years. It is precisely >the *simplicity* of TCP (and its relative stability) that >makes it so successful. Back to ASN.1 1988: even I was >able to write a parser for it, and I've had no formal >computer science education. I've heard that you need 4 >tokens of look-ahead to disambiguate some of the newer >ASN.1 constructs. I'm sure you've heard of the K.I.S.S. >principle? It applies here. > >And again, I have no objection to the publishing of the new >ASN.1 as an Informational RFC. An update RFC will lead to >new future versions of PKIX and CMS documents that drop the >simpler syntax, which is what I am against. > >Mike > Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAEIsDhl057805 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 14 Nov 2007 11:54:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAEIsDag057804; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 11:54:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from sceptre.pobox.com (sceptre.pobox.com [207.106.133.20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAEIsBSI057795 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 11:54:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from mike-list@pobox.com) Received: from sceptre (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by sceptre.pobox.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 221212F9 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 13:54:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from [192.168.1.8] (wsip-24-234-114-35.lv.lv.cox.net [24.234.114.35]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by sceptre.sasl.smtp.pobox.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E330B959A6 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 13:54:32 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <473B447F.4030702@pobox.com> Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2007 10:54:55 -0800 From: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> In-Reply-To: <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> > Let's see - 15 years in real time is how many years in > Internet time? NCSA Mosaic was introduced in 1992, and > Mike thinks we should still be basing RFCs on a standard > that was deprecated before the web was born? It was the creator of ASN.1 who deprecated the 1988 version. As I said before, I believe this is a self-preservation move more than anything else. If they didn't add unnecessary complexity and instead kept things simple, they would have put the ASN.1 folks out of a job. The specs are all about complexity -- consider X.400 versus Internet email, and X.500 DAP versus LDAP, and how widely used those standard are. It was probably a mistake to even adopt ASN.1 and X.509 for the Internet in the first place, but that ship unfortunately sailed long ago. Consider TCP/IP, the backbone of the Internet. Quoting from Wikipedia: TCP is a complex and evolving protocol. However, while significant enhancements have been made and proposed over the years, its most basic operation has not changed significantly since its first specification RFC 675 in 1974.... So TCP has been around for over 30 years. It is precisely the *simplicity* of TCP (and its relative stability) that makes it so successful. Back to ASN.1 1988: even I was able to write a parser for it, and I've had no formal computer science education. I've heard that you need 4 tokens of look-ahead to disambiguate some of the newer ASN.1 constructs. I'm sure you've heard of the K.I.S.S. principle? It applies here. And again, I have no objection to the publishing of the new ASN.1 as an Informational RFC. An update RFC will lead to new future versions of PKIX and CMS documents that drop the simpler syntax, which is what I am against. Mike Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAEIPFX6054708 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 14 Nov 2007 11:25:15 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAEIPFWV054706; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 11:25:15 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp-dub.microsoft.com (smtp-dub.microsoft.com [213.199.138.191]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAEIPDju054696 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 11:25:14 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stefans@microsoft.com) Received: from dub-exhub-c302.europe.corp.microsoft.com (65.53.213.92) by DUB-EXGWY-E801.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.129.1) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.1.222.3; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 18:25:12 +0000 Received: from EA-EXMSG-C320.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([65.53.221.77]) by DUB-EXHUB-C302.europe.corp.microsoft.com ([2002:4135:d55c::4135:d55c]) with mapi; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 18:25:11 +0000 From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com> To: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2007 18:25:07 +0000 Subject: Preliminary agenda uploaded Thread-Topic: Preliminary agenda uploaded Thread-Index: Acgm668Hvs4KW7TNQ4qCTLVxj9fLhQ== Message-ID: <E75F200AF1718F45B2024A88C3141A1D0647BDBD7A@EA-EXMSG-C320.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_E75F200AF1718F45B2024A88C3141A1D0647BDBD7AEAEXMSGC320eu_" MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --_000_E75F200AF1718F45B2024A88C3141A1D0647BDBD7AEAEXMSGC320eu_ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable A preliminary agenda has been uploaded and is available from: http://www3.i= etf.org/proceedings/07dec/agenda/pkix.txt We still have some slack in the agenda and not all presentations are confir= med. If you are on the agenda, please confirm that you will be able to make your= presentation in Vancouver. Stefan Santesson Senior Program Manager Windows Security, Standards --_000_E75F200AF1718F45B2024A88C3141A1D0647BDBD7AEAEXMSGC320eu_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr= osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:dt=3D"uuid:C2F41010-65B3-11d1-A29F-00AA00C14882" xmlns:m=3D"http://sc= hemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-= html40"> <head> <meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"> <meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 12 (filtered medium)"> <style> <!-- /* Font Definitions */ @font-face {font-family:"Cambria Math"; panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;} @font-face {font-family:Calibri; panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;} /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {margin:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";} a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {mso-style-priority:99; color:blue; text-decoration:underline;} a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed {mso-style-priority:99; color:purple; text-decoration:underline;} span.EmailStyle17 {mso-style-type:personal-compose; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; color:windowtext;} .MsoChpDefault {mso-style-type:export-only;} @page Section1 {size:612.0pt 792.0pt; margin:70.85pt 70.85pt 70.85pt 70.85pt;} div.Section1 {page:Section1;} --> </style> <!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" /> </xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit"> <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" /> </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--> </head> <body lang=3DSV link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple> <div class=3DSection1> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>A preliminary agenda has been uploa= ded and is available from: <a href=3D"http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07dec/agenda/pk= ix.txt">http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07dec/agenda/pkix.txt</a><o:p></o:= p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>We still have some slack in the age= nda and not all presentations are confirmed.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>If you are on the agenda, please co= nfirm that you will be able to make your presentation in Vancouver.<o:p></o:p></s= pan></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f= amily: "Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D= EN-GB style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F49= 7D'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami= ly:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'fon= t-size: 12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span>= </p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f= amily: "Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><= span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p> </div> </body> </html> --_000_E75F200AF1718F45B2024A88C3141A1D0647BDBD7AEAEXMSGC320eu_-- Received: from estacion8 (200-110-173-38.mediacommerce.com.co [200.110.173.38] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lAEFJAJa033427; Wed, 14 Nov 2007 08:19:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from LucascathodicCobb@quantumdiaries.org) Message-ID: dee001c826d2$49e82f40$6c01a8c0@estacion8 From: "BackgammonRoom" <LucascathodicCobb@quantumdiaries.org> To: <ietf-pkix-@imc.org> Subject: The best place to play Backgammon with 100$ bonus Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2007 10:23:09 +0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=original Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1106 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1106 OnlineBackgammonRoom is giving away FREE_MONEY. 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Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lADH4gBj028458 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 13 Nov 2007 10:04:42 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lADH4gh3028457; Tue, 13 Nov 2007 10:04:42 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lADH4fl8028447 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 13 Nov 2007 10:04:41 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil) Received: from Cerberus (cerberus.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.51.8]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id lADH4csI019035 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 13 Nov 2007 12:04:38 -0500 (EST) X-AuditID: 90333308-000029c000000750-95-4739d9263b37 Received: from antigone.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.33]) by Cerberus with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); Tue, 13 Nov 2007 12:04:38 -0500 Received: from EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.21]) by antigone.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Tue, 13 Nov 2007 12:04:38 -0500 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2007 12:04:36 -0500 Message-ID: <FA998122A677CF4390C1E291BFCF5989088AA587@EXCH.missi.ncsc.mil> In-Reply-To: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Thread-Index: Acgk6+qnBwvvg0i+ToSZyoJy4+GGEwBJ+zlA References: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 13 Nov 2007 17:04:38.0258 (UTC) FILETIME=[461EB520:01C82617] X-Brightmail-Tracker: AAAAAA== Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lADH4fl8028452 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> The fact that X.208 1988 was withdrawn as a standard in 2002 does not mean that all paper and electronic copies have disappeared from the face of the earth. Get it from http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.208-198811-W/en. The fact that copies can be had, however, does not imply that the IETF should continue to base standards on it. The 1992 version of X.680 says that although X.208 was still being maintained at time of publication, continued maintenance depends on an annual resolution by the subcommittee and "cannot be expected to be indefinite". Let's see - 15 years in real time is how many years in Internet time? NCSA Mosaic was introduced in 1992, and Mike thinks we should still be basing RFCs on a standard that was deprecated before the web was born? -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Peter Gutmann Sent: Sunday, November 11, 2007 11:21 PM To: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt [Sorry, my previous response may have been a bit unclear. Let me rephrase it]. Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> >Peter Gutmann wrote: >> Technically since ASN.1:1988 doesn't exist... > >Ridiculous nonsense. Attached at the end of this message is what I claim to be a PKIX-compliant X.509 certificate encoded in ASN.1:1988. If you would like to dispute this, please show me where to get the ASN.1:1988 standard from the ISO to show that it's not what I claim it is. Peter. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lADEHDcb011653 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 13 Nov 2007 07:17:14 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lADEHDHn011652; Tue, 13 Nov 2007 07:17:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from michael.checkpoint.com (michael.checkpoint.com [194.29.32.68]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lADEHAgH011641 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 13 Nov 2007 07:17:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ynir@checkpoint.com) Received: from MBP.checkpoint.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by michael.checkpoint.com (8.12.10+Sun/8.12.10) with ESMTP id lADEH76a018480; Tue, 13 Nov 2007 16:17:07 +0200 (IST) Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-Id: <987CA45E-212B-4CBE-9501-86EF28C07715@checkpoint.com> From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> In-Reply-To: <E1IrQNC-0003O6-8i@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary=Apple-Mail-11--239632127; micalg=sha1; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v912) Subject: Re: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2007 16:16:56 +0200 References: <E1IrQNC-0003O6-8i@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.912) Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> --Apple-Mail-11--239632127 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed; delsp=yes Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Well, I have a copy of "ASN.1 The Tutorial and Reference" lying around somewhere. Also, I'm sure a 1988 specification is somewhere on the web (although 4 minutes with google were not enough to find it) Seriously, the fact that IETF has created IKEv2 and TLS 1.1 that obsoleted IKEv1 and TLS 1.0 respectively does not mean those standards are gone. In fact, I would be very surprised if IKEv2 and TLS 1.1 account for ever 0.1% of IKE and SSL/TLS traffic. On Nov 12, 2007, at 5:54 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > > Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> >> Peter Gutmann wrote: >>> Technically since ASN.1:1988 doesn't exist... >> >> Ridiculous nonsense. > > Well how else do you explain requiring IETF standards to use an ISO > standard > that was withdrawn five years ago? If someone comes up to you and > asks where > they can get a copy of the standard that PKIX RFCs are based on, > what do you > tell them? > > Seriously, what *do* you tell people when they ask where they can > get the > ASN.1:1988 standard? > > Peter. > > > Scanned by Check Point VPN-1 UTM NGX R65 with Messaging Security > --Apple-Mail-11--239632127 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAQAAoIIGJzCCAuAw ggJJoAMCAQICEAJIh/K+B1TMJ8nzoNjVff4wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwYjELMAkGA1UEBhMCWkEx JTAjBgNVBAoTHFRoYXd0ZSBDb25zdWx0aW5nIChQdHkpIEx0ZC4xLDAqBgNVBAMTI1RoYXd0ZSBQ ZXJzb25hbCBGcmVlbWFpbCBJc3N1aW5nIENBMB4XDTA3MDkwNDEzMzAzN1oXDTA4MDkwMzEzMzAz N1owRTEfMB0GA1UEAxMWVGhhd3RlIEZyZWVtYWlsIE1lbWJlcjEiMCAGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYTeW5p ckBjaGVja3BvaW50LmNvbTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANk5dX7Jjgb3 WcWBXGkva0ksYj49cHGta9zLei/8L36hnOgHfChX7jMU1scWGg4fA6v43SGB32/bjtioMt4FDazd MR/yqYykPSZ82X6MIDd/hqXJy2kWlLEzELy4UymxoBtZV0Woea0gO4rObjgQDf2JsacEt9Qxi+77 BA3W931iG2sjue0KdRx6xX3U1pwgx0M81fZ54gFgAhMlCf8AVqCgL6bv+HYAc2j4XjSGFjODjNyp n2Pumc9TVkj2uxmV+mMtclIhbXPy/5z0wg83ttnIfcI9cTKI88407fHTaUKmXf4Vhdp/NhbuHZWH bCBOMP0AiefcmvdGfqJc7o3JOYsCAwEAAaMwMC4wHgYDVR0RBBcwFYETeW5pckBjaGVja3BvaW50 LmNvbTAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4GBADEczlw8AJPiBRktBh113TwJrqL9 MeyaI+FB1yFUamAtd1i/Db0l9Xeb6iOK1M/MWwLbXTWBWxwhe3q7sayp8BZPJsLfBDyb1MYi8yGC ieBEatY6nP1Yy9KELX8frAfJ038FFw/rP2IqvUa2gxS0LW0vrgOg8hB1fRAUTlOr3MSDMIIDPzCC AqigAwIBAgIBDTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCB0TELMAkGA1UEBhMCWkExFTATBgNVBAgTDFdlc3Rl cm4gQ2FwZTESMBAGA1UEBxMJQ2FwZSBUb3duMRowGAYDVQQKExFUaGF3dGUgQ29uc3VsdGluZzEo MCYGA1UECxMfQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBTZXJ2aWNlcyBEaXZpc2lvbjEkMCIGA1UEAxMbVGhhd3Rl IFBlcnNvbmFsIEZyZWVtYWlsIENBMSswKQYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhxwZXJzb25hbC1mcmVlbWFpbEB0 aGF3dGUuY29tMB4XDTAzMDcxNzAwMDAwMFoXDTEzMDcxNjIzNTk1OVowYjELMAkGA1UEBhMCWkEx JTAjBgNVBAoTHFRoYXd0ZSBDb25zdWx0aW5nIChQdHkpIEx0ZC4xLDAqBgNVBAMTI1RoYXd0ZSBQ ZXJzb25hbCBGcmVlbWFpbCBJc3N1aW5nIENBMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDE pjxVc1X7TrnKmVoeaMB1BHCd3+n/ox7svc31W/Iadr1/DDph8r9RzgHU5VAKMNcCY1osiRVwjt3J 8CuFWqo/cVbLrzwLB+fxH5E2JCoTzyvV84J3PQO+K/67GD4Hv0CAAmTXp6a7n2XRxSpUhQ9IBH+n ttE8YQRAHmQZcmC3+wIDAQABo4GUMIGRMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwQwYDVR0fBDwwOjA4 oDagNIYyaHR0cDovL2NybC50aGF3dGUuY29tL1RoYXd0ZVBlcnNvbmFsRnJlZW1haWxDQS5jcmww CwYDVR0PBAQDAgEGMCkGA1UdEQQiMCCkHjAcMRowGAYDVQQDExFQcml2YXRlTGFiZWwyLTEzODAN BgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQBIjNFQg+oLLswNo2asZw9/r6y+whehQ5aUnX9MIbj4Nh+qLZ82L8D0 HFAgk3A8/a3hYWLD2ToZfoSxmRsAxRoLgnSeJVCUYsfbJ3FXJY3dqZw5jowgT2Vfldr394fWxghO rvbqNOUQGls1TXfjViF4gtwhGTXeJLHTHUb/XV9lTzGCAxAwggMMAgEBMHYwYjELMAkGA1UEBhMC WkExJTAjBgNVBAoTHFRoYXd0ZSBDb25zdWx0aW5nIChQdHkpIEx0ZC4xLDAqBgNVBAMTI1RoYXd0 ZSBQZXJzb25hbCBGcmVlbWFpbCBJc3N1aW5nIENBAhACSIfyvgdUzCfJ86DY1X3+MAkGBSsOAwIa BQCgggFvMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTA3MTExMzE0 MTY1NlowIwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMRYEFF2a7Rs+w3WRBBTbJg6EO4w/AuKMMIGFBgkrBgEEAYI3EAQx eDB2MGIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMSUwIwYDVQQKExxUaGF3dGUgQ29uc3VsdGluZyAoUHR5KSBMdGQu MSwwKgYDVQQDEyNUaGF3dGUgUGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgSXNzdWluZyBDQQIQAkiH8r4HVMwn yfOg2NV9/jCBhwYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAgsxeKB2MGIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMSUwIwYDVQQKExxUaGF3 dGUgQ29uc3VsdGluZyAoUHR5KSBMdGQuMSwwKgYDVQQDEyNUaGF3dGUgUGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1h aWwgSXNzdWluZyBDQQIQAkiH8r4HVMwnyfOg2NV9/jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQBOm5XUC8WP CbcNxJgGYLhWiqAYvJpFtQQrh2KpqRJSnWCj7UayMhDI+eOHXMEYXhSornxS5asEAmS003suM8LM YmOTBAi5zK4fESo883Lg3cOPlLB2ZurxwyoErEt4pu4iLYM4D4XU6Fv7y4hP3UbvsTXg0hogNDLL gsk8BreQGvUK8mwXTTzZm9qU2XpyyG6XvrimRNZCg5HZGpMSGJEUSWCDZdBlfDqb6lzCGoWZMnFn 2hskDKTasKHFPU2/c33E/nEomZRMGaX9x0SXdRIrs+0L6jErfWiGYis+/QAadPdVvgKv+sIcA2zp KtNNIc9/3xfCa8k5vp7JaXwa72x1AAAAAAAA --Apple-Mail-11--239632127-- Received: from 27.Red-80-37-197.staticIP.rima-tde.net (27.Red-80-37-197.staticIP.rima-tde.net [80.37.197.27]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAD9iLGL087044 for <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org>; 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JoAnna Bushfield http://unweacad.com/ ------=_NextPart_000_0009_01C825E2.0E0DA130 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1"> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2900.3059" name=3DGENERATOR> <STYLE></STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2>what will you do when a bigger cock takes your = girl away?</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2>JoAnna Bushfield</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2><A=20 HREF=3D"http://unweacad.com/">http://unweacad.com/</A></FONT></DIV></BODY= ></HTML> ------=_NextPart_000_0009_01C825E2.0E0DA130-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lACKaNEF032636 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 12 Nov 2007 13:36:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lACKaNRB032635; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 13:36:23 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from [10.20.30.150] (adsl-66-125-125-65.dsl.pltn13.pacbell.net [66.125.125.65]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lACKaM2Y032628 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 13:36:23 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org) Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p06240802c35e64dd8f30@[10.20.30.150]> In-Reply-To: <4736DCA2.7@cs.tcd.ie> References: <p0624083ac3592924cca5@[10.20.30.150]> <4734AF27.4020502@pobox.com> <p06240807c35a734e379c@[10.20.30.150]> <4736DCA2.7@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2007 12:35:13 -0800 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 10:42 AM +0000 11/11/07, Stephen Farrell wrote: >Paul Hoffman wrote: >> >>At 11:04 AM -0800 11/9/07, Mike wrote: >>>What is the intended status of the RFC this draft would become? >> >>Standards track. That is, it is updating standards-track documents. > >Updating, but not obsoleting? If so, that's ok. Right. It will not obsolete any of the specs. In order to do so, it would have to contain all of the text of the earlier specs. This is a straight update. >BTW - how certain are you that there are no differences between the >encodings allowed by rfc3280bis and this? Terribly certain, of course! :-) >I think it might take a >while (and some coding/testing) to be confident of that. Of course. We want extensive review by picky PKIX folks, pick ASN.1 folks, and anyone else. We have already gotten some off-list corrections to our ASN.1 (one real error, some optional corrections), but we are hoping to get much more review. To that end, I have made a file of all the modules from draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt and draft-hoffman-cms-new-asn1-00.txt so everyone can test without having to cut-and-paste: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/draft-00-modules.tgz>. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lACJZ1LZ026008 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 12 Nov 2007 12:35:01 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lACJZ1It026007; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 12:35:01 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (news.meritdirect.com [209.213.211.195] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lACJZ06C026000 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 12:35:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 543C833C2B; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 11:11:15 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2007 11:11:14 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, tls@ietf.org Subject: DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071112191115.543C833C2B@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi PKIX guys, As you probably know, in some modes of TLS one or the other party signs data. In some cases, this presumably means DSA. This is fine if you can guarantee that you are going to use SHA-1 with DSA, but obviously there's going to be a desire to transition to SHA-256, which raises the issue of digest substitution. My understanding of the current thinking on how to prevent this is to indicate in the certificate which digest algorithm is to be used with the cert. So, the rule we plan to promulgate in TLS is: OID 1 2 840 10040 4 1 MUST only be used with SHA-1. Future revisions of [PKIX] MAY define new object identifiers for DSA with other hash algorithms. I wanted to check that this is compatible with the current PKIX thinking. Thanks, -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lACJHZjj024605 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 12 Nov 2007 12:17:35 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lACJHZQ1024604; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 12:17:35 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from delta.rtfm.com (news.meritdirect.com [209.213.211.195] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lACJHXBv024596 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 12:17:34 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com) Received: from delta.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by delta.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1881733C3D; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 11:12:23 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2007 11:12:23 -0800 From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, tls@ietf.org Subject: DSA/SHA-1, and OIDs User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Message-Id: <20071112191223.1881733C3D@delta.rtfm.com> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi PKIX guys, As you probably know, in some modes of TLS one or the other party signs data. In some cases, this presumably means DSA. This is fine if you can guarantee that you are going to use SHA-1 with DSA, but obviously there's going to be a desire to transition to SHA-256, which raises the issue of digest substitution. My understanding of the current thinking on how to prevent this is to indicate in the certificate which digest algorithm is to be used with the cert. So, the rule we plan to promulgate in TLS is: OID 1 2 840 10040 4 1 MUST only be used with SHA-1. Future revisions of [PKIX] MAY define new object identifiers for DSA with other hash algorithms. I wanted to check that this is compatible with the current PKIX thinking. Thanks, -Ekr Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAC4WO7l055710 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sun, 11 Nov 2007 21:32:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAC4WO4W055709; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 21:32:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (larry.its.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.34]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAC4WMkC055703 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 21:32:23 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F85E1855B; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:32:22 +1300 (NZDT) X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mailhost.auckland.ac.nz Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (larry.its.auckland.ac.nz [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id UrZ2LMXcd8Li; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:32:21 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.33.152]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDEBE185BC; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:32:20 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.38]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0EEBE080B5; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:32:18 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from pgut001 by wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from <pgut001@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1IrQna-0004yD-Bh; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:21:22 +1300 From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-Id: <E1IrQna-0004yD-Bh@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:21:22 +1300 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> [Sorry, my previous response may have been a bit unclear. Let me rephrase it]. Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> >Peter Gutmann wrote: >> Technically since ASN.1:1988 doesn't exist... > >Ridiculous nonsense. Attached at the end of this message is what I claim to be a PKIX-compliant X.509 certificate encoded in ASN.1:1988. If you would like to dispute this, please show me where to get the ASN.1:1988 standard from the ISO to show that it's not what I claim it is. Peter. -- Snip -- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- mQGiBD3SS2sRBAD2+GyR36eyTqcAnjnK4bGO1TXZV3awn90I73T+WsiyDGUu8ReP E3IcaFbO6SX2Y8bVZ6l+aYvctoRyETEhQMa+ZA8hCxGS0XoLKptn1i3gNC7MThzr 3WHTdT6x3T2bR3vkpmheiKwEHuzWDJcZn7FdyeQc5kNU33T4DK/zmRNFZwCg/6TI DDQJpaLZfS+396OAFR3CiA8D+gO9hpp6bYwf6z0ZNzjLlQHbxTnBTj9qHoyerrvy 54rui8i25Qha6M8oL2QDY+yVeSz0p8Z4arTxHlBssp/Z0Hv3llRNlLdBCrUtnkas oVPxCGoeu+8fT2ftBrfmJd+QOOqWZsmtMvRUSW3sauQtVNjRJ5HGy6w9faafZjGJ mVsRA/0Y5nx+OSsYBzAGRI8xG+hW/BUpyUJro0EyKs2JCjHA880b61zk/6xVV4B9 TqSU1s+u8w5+b0EAOPus1L2pWV7b16SNAjaajcHs6wxcvd/uC0q2JPayTV+qFwgD oPxAjlI1xG/bFoWYQwgQ0RmSUKa5OwgX0TFn4MrilIRlpXgnarQMbm9jQGFybmVz LnNpiEsEEBECAAsFAj3SS2wECwMBAgAKCRBigg3uSAJ/fQSKAKDYi4RQ5Q9rV3z5 WzCzkPi279InkwCfRJlHWq4lMHMcvgioBOKWaozI3AuInAQTAQIABgUCPpUgOgAK CRB7qiN1erJgzc6NA/kBbEFD1XLqnW7t1tKwEH7imTvdX87EHEiVA3PdfZscb8kd DWbfrO7hcsvVfathsWsSEN7Gnkg8NdM4J6uyQzIWuiKXEI0FEyeeG/botouC+uva xjO8T5ylCYg3qThi1UjagTGJARblL70qBDfBNI8iAOlDfy2wN0iPMl0ZR7LQlLkB DQQ90kvhEAQA9us9kL++VfLgbXEVQzqQtoqu7ONeX2PrxBzzxl9dAP4kdoC/LTay 0JSfSoHBl/GkJo3m9yI965XTEpfsrPuOezLFdpUKfujj8r6E+V4Zy4IMJCia+g1w qICqXcvf5E7AwHOWkp7WJnedqMDtP5qgnwGZ6n1CBD4uWVAngHPOcIcAAgID/12X rlvZq0fq2nwTYea1oQxdiRrGzSpIgYYX5TZJujFNTxQ16b1bHsJvv7yuLtskCKaU 1TFvBRbuqPKTlq6obcxzcdycetGH50HcdNeG/o1gNIgoQ7P7BEOId1vufOhoICoQ sX2WYtSdz8LdaZH9PGZGieL/bQ1t+JgKe3w1KDS/iD8DBRg90kvhYoIN7kgCf30R AnwdAKCPt4LB9/5e2PLI50aPKJa/LoplcQCfbiHBebc39EcR/t4idGM5XIfRhBk= =dg/R -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAC42RYq054392 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sun, 11 Nov 2007 21:02:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAC42Rag054391; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 21:02:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (moe.its.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.35]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAC42Nna054372 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 21:02:26 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id C122E4805AF; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:02:22 +1300 (NZDT) X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mailhost.auckland.ac.nz Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (moe.its.auckland.ac.nz [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id TnPJvno0cXHG; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:02:22 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.33.152]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 81B5A480597; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:02:21 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.38]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id BB16919EC0B6; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:02:18 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from pgut001 by wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from <pgut001@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1IrQNC-0003O6-8i; Mon, 12 Nov 2007 16:54:06 +1300 From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, mike-list@pobox.com, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org In-Reply-To: <4736DD7F.3080204@cs.tcd.ie> Message-Id: <E1IrQNC-0003O6-8i@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2007 16:54:06 +1300 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> >Peter Gutmann wrote: >> Technically since ASN.1:1988 doesn't exist... > >Ridiculous nonsense. Well how else do you explain requiring IETF standards to use an ISO standard that was withdrawn five years ago? If someone comes up to you and asks where they can get a copy of the standard that PKIX RFCs are based on, what do you tell them? Seriously, what *do* you tell people when they ask where they can get the ASN.1:1988 standard? Peter. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAC0dBFk045317 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sun, 11 Nov 2007 17:39:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAC0dBSs045316; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 17:39:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp102.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp102.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [68.142.229.216]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lAC0dAIb045309 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 17:39:10 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com) Received: (qmail 80932 invoked from network); 12 Nov 2007 00:39:05 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@70.108.39.68 with login) by smtp102.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 12 Nov 2007 00:39:05 -0000 X-YMail-OSG: kjoYsNUVM1lWaZ.dOE0h7CIzFxDOfh5NY5VE71Vin_XXKx4tkWXNcgYHMHcIVWXqLc49Ys5_yfpLuRm.pLNqhdR1NnQhgcz50EL6X_4uae0c77vnOEa6Q0YfD9zzXPiOUePtPvaCS8Sa3Ds- From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com> To: "'Stephen Farrell'" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "'Peter Gutmann'" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <mike-list@pobox.com>, <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> References: <E1Ir8tp-00017O-Ag@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <4736DD7F.3080204@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: RE: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2007 19:35:46 -0500 Organization: IECA, Inc. Message-ID: <001a01c824c3$f7961550$0301a8c0@Wylie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198 Thread-Index: AcgkVGA1YUyM+hAMQCSYbDPqn5S+kwAbunMw In-Reply-To: <4736DD7F.3080204@cs.tcd.ie> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> It's kind of ridiculous but bean counting contracting types are sometimes very unhappy when you have to explain to them that you're referencing a standard that they can't go and get. Sometimes you can talk them down sometimes not. spt >-----Original Message----- >From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org >[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell >Sent: Sunday, November 11, 2007 5:46 AM >To: Peter Gutmann >Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org; mike-list@pobox.com; paul.hoffman@vpnc.org >Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt > > > > >Peter Gutmann wrote: > > Technically since ASN.1:1988 doesn't >> exist... > >Ridiculous nonsense. > >Stephen. > Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lABAkMGC083238 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sun, 11 Nov 2007 03:46:22 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lABAkMLQ083237; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 03:46:22 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from relay.imagine.ie (relay.imagine.ie [87.232.1.41]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lABAkKMP083219 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 03:46:21 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie) Received: from mail1.int.imagine.ie (mail1 [87.232.1.152]) by relay.imagine.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 98DFE41C1; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 10:46:19 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (dsl-102-234.cust.imagine.ie [87.232.102.234]) by mail1.int.imagine.ie (8.13.4/8.13.4/Debian-3) with ESMTP id lABAkGKS000664 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT); Sun, 11 Nov 2007 10:46:17 GMT Message-ID: <4736DD7F.3080204@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2007 10:46:23 +0000 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org, mike-list@pobox.com, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt References: <E1Ir8tp-00017O-Ag@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> In-Reply-To: <E1Ir8tp-00017O-Ag@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Bayes-Prob: 0.0001 (Score 0) X-Spam-Score: 0.00 () [Hold at 8.00] X-Canit-Stats-ID: 17105436 - 6f20666acf7c X-CanItPRO-Stream: outgoing X-Scanned-By: CanIt (www . roaringpenguin . com) on 87.232.1.52 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Peter Gutmann wrote: > Technically since ASN.1:1988 doesn't > exist... Ridiculous nonsense. Stephen. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lABAghUe083056 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sun, 11 Nov 2007 03:42:43 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lABAghr5083055; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 03:42:43 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from relay.imagine.ie (dns2.dns.imagine.ie [87.232.1.41]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lABAgfJv083039 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 03:42:42 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie) Received: from mail1.int.imagine.ie (mail1 [87.232.1.152]) by relay.imagine.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB5B542B6; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 10:42:40 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (dsl-102-234.cust.imagine.ie [87.232.102.234]) by mail1.int.imagine.ie (8.13.4/8.13.4/Debian-3) with ESMTP id lABAgZYS032626 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT); Sun, 11 Nov 2007 10:42:36 GMT Message-ID: <4736DCA2.7@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2007 10:42:42 +0000 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> CC: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt References: <p0624083ac3592924cca5@[10.20.30.150]> <4734AF27.4020502@pobox.com> <p06240807c35a734e379c@[10.20.30.150]> In-Reply-To: <p06240807c35a734e379c@[10.20.30.150]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Bayes-Prob: 0.0004 (Score 0) X-Spam-Score: 0.00 () [Hold at 8.00] X-Canit-Stats-ID: 17105385 - 1d3ff8427c8e (trained as not-spam) X-CanItPRO-Stream: outgoing X-Scanned-By: CanIt (www . roaringpenguin . com) on 87.232.1.52 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Paul Hoffman wrote: > > At 11:04 AM -0800 11/9/07, Mike wrote: >> What is the intended status of the RFC this draft would become? > > Standards track. That is, it is updating standards-track documents. Updating, but not obsoleting? If so, that's ok. BTW - how certain are you that there are no differences between the encodings allowed by rfc3280bis and this? I think it might take a while (and some coding/testing) to be confident of that. S. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAB9Fuce077434 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sun, 11 Nov 2007 02:15:56 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAB9FuGN077433; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 02:15:56 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (curly.its.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.33]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAB9Fta4077427 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 02:15:56 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id B70799C367; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:15:54 +1300 (NZDT) X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mailhost.auckland.ac.nz Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (curly.its.auckland.ac.nz [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 95CJQMMcoIzM; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:15:54 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.33.152]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id F36FB9C380; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:15:53 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.38]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id DEF9819EC0B6; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:15:51 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from pgut001 by wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from <pgut001@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1Ir8v1-0001J4-Pc; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:15:51 +1300 From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, mike-list@pobox.com Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt In-Reply-To: <473606CE.1080909@pobox.com> Message-Id: <E1Ir8v1-0001J4-Pc@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:15:51 +1300 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Mike <mike-list@pobox.com> writes: >Forcing developers to abandon their perfectly good tools and rewrite their >code is asking for trouble. Having a bunch of supposed IETF standards that aren't really standards at all is even worse... Peter. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAB9Erhd077350 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sun, 11 Nov 2007 02:14:53 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAB9Er2I077349; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 02:14:53 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (larry.its.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.34]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAB9Ej6d077328 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 02:14:50 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 53CD3183A3; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:14:45 +1300 (NZDT) X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mailhost.auckland.ac.nz Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (larry.its.auckland.ac.nz [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id V6dOtJ7HZKGd; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:14:44 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.33.152]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA91F183A7; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:14:43 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.38]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D02019EC0B6; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:14:37 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from pgut001 by wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from <pgut001@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1Ir8tp-00017O-Ag; Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:14:37 +1300 From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, mike-list@pobox.com, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt In-Reply-To: <p06240807c35a734e379c@[10.20.30.150]> Message-Id: <E1Ir8tp-00017O-Ag@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2007 22:14:37 +1300 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> writes: >At 11:04 AM -0800 11/9/07, Mike wrote: >>However, if the plan is to replace the 1988 syntax with the 2002 >>version, then I couldn't be more opposed. I don't see any benefit >>to making this change -- as you say there are -no- changes to the >>bits on the wire. > >The code emitted by the compilers can be much more robust. For example, >instead of 1988's "ANY", there are structures that allow (but not force) a >compiler to do better validation checking, bounds checking, and so on. There's a much bigger problem with the use of 1988 ASN.1: It's not a standard at all, since it was withdrawn more than five years ago. Any IETF standard that uses the 1988 form is by extension a non-standard, since what it's using as its syntax is also a non-standard. Technically since ASN.1:1988 doesn't exist, you could be justified in claiming that anything at all (for example the works of Shakespeare) are a valid interpretation of the relevant IETF standards, since they're based on an undefined non-entity. (The argument gets a bit philosophical at this point since the semantics of basing an IETF standard on something that's undefined leads to an undefined result. Maybe Dr.Dan Streetmentioner could write a text on the terminology that's required to described this bizarre situation. Until it's resolved, an implementation of PGP (or an implementation of Windows Media Audio, for that matter) is at least as compliant with the relevant IETF pseudo-standards as an implementation of CMS). Peter. Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAAJVbgL029449 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sat, 10 Nov 2007 12:31:37 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lAAJVbxC029448; Sat, 10 Nov 2007 12:31:37 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from rune.pobox.com (rune.pobox.com [208.210.124.79]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAAJVZSo029431 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 10 Nov 2007 12:31:36 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from mike-list@pobox.com) Received: from rune (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by rune.pobox.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 539401583EB for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 10 Nov 2007 14:31:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from [192.168.1.8] (wsip-24-234-114-35.lv.lv.cox.net [24.234.114.35]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by rune.sasl.smtp.pobox.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 22A85157F7B for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 10 Nov 2007 14:31:46 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <473606CE.1080909@pobox.com> Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2007 11:30:22 -0800 From: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt References: <p0624083ac3592924cca5@[10.20.30.150]> <4734AF27.4020502@pobox.com> <p06240807c35a734e379c@[10.20.30.150]> In-Reply-To: <p06240807c35a734e379c@[10.20.30.150]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> >> However, if the plan is to replace the 1988 syntax with the 2002 >> version, then I couldn't be more opposed. I don't see any benefit >> to making this change -- as you say there are -no- changes to the >> bits on the wire. > > The code emitted by the compilers can be much more robust. For example, > instead of 1988's "ANY", there are structures that allow (but not force) > a compiler to do better validation checking, bounds checking, and so on. That is a valid argument for an -informational- RFC since only compilers that want to do the extra validation need to know how to parse such things. In practice, there isn't really a problem with ANY, and there are places where things are packed into an OCTET STRING, which is the same thing, different tag. >> The downside, though, is huge. Every ASN.1 >> compiler that can only parse 1988 syntax will need to be upgraded, >> lest they be "left behind" by the IETF whose purported goal is to >> maximize interoperability between differing implementations. > > Note that the compilers themselves have nothing to do with the > interoperability of the implementations. What such a change does, of > course, is force developers to use a compiler that can handle the new > ASN.1. Forcing developers to abandon their perfectly good tools and rewrite their code is asking for trouble. >> And since you are one of the authors of said open- >> source software, I think there is at least the possibility of a >> conflict of interest. > > It's not clear what you mean. We make no money from people using our > compiler. That's why we even have a web site where you can compile every > one of these modules without even downloading the compiler. I just found it curious that you didn't mention in your original message that you were one of the authors of the software.... > Regardless of their reason(s), we feel that the value of the changes are > well worth it. Could you list the important changes and why they are valuable, so that an informed decision can be made? Thanks, Mike Received: from customer68-118-37.iplannetworks.net (customer68-118-37.iplannetworks.net [200.68.118.37] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lAAHfS6H020682 for <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org>; Sat, 10 Nov 2007 10:42:01 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Jungervkng@iguatemicgd.com.br) Received: from pc-0c83b8812310 ([128.158.41.47]:27062 "EHLO pc-0c83b8812310" smtp-auth: <none> TLS-CIPHER: <none> TLS-PEER-CN1: <none>) by customer68-118-37.iplannetworks.net with ESMTP id S22IKNJWPJSVXCZE (ORCPT <rfc822;ietf-pkix-archive%imc.org@mail.imc.org>); Sat, 10 Nov 2007 14:42:23 -0300 Message-ID: <000501c823c0$fbc12010$257644c8@pc0c83b8812310> From: "MUHAMMET Junger" <Jungervkng@iguatemicgd.com.br> To: <ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org> Subject: ocerped Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2007 14:41:54 -0300 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0006_01C823A7.D673E810" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.3028 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3028 ------=_NextPart_000_0006_01C823A7.D673E810 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable http://romusoft.com/ My peni*s grew 2" after 5 months of use odiongan obese0 ocerllew ociferer ------=_NextPart_000_0006_01C823A7.D673E810 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1"> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2900.3059" name=3DGENERATOR> <STYLE></STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2><A=20 HREF=3D"http://romusoft.com/">http://romusoft.com/</A></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2>My peni*s grew 2" after 5 months of = use</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2>odiongan obese0</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT Arial size=3D2>ocerllew ociferer</FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_000_0006_01C823A7.D673E810-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA9MoF7r047444 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 9 Nov 2007 15:50:15 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA9MoF7G047443; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 15:50:15 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mail.exchange.microsoft.com (mail7.exchange.microsoft.com [131.107.1.27]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA9MoDsx047435 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 15:50:14 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com) Received: from DF-GWY-14.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.96.140) by df-gwy-07.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.63.164) with Microsoft SMTP Server id 8.1.236.0; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 14:50:13 -0800 Received: from DF-MLT-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.63.150) by DF-GWY-14.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.96.140) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.0.194.3; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 14:50:13 -0800 Received: from df-bulldog-msg.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.52.157]) by DF-MLT-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.63.150]) with mapi; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 14:50:13 -0800 From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com> To: "Vijay K. Gurbani" <vkg@alcatel-lucent.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> CC: Scott Lawrence <slawrence@bluesocket.com> Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2007 14:49:56 -0800 Subject: RE: sip-eku and sip-domain-certs drafts Thread-Topic: sip-eku and sip-domain-certs drafts Thread-Index: AQHIIjKV8xEwDxn17YbbdwZ0TOSMN4y1xaDg Message-ID: <EDD69DA79CED964A992A1F7798F40F2D1CD21BA5CB@DF-BULLDOG-MSG.exchange.corp.microsoft.com> References: <47334969.5040908@alcatel-lucent.com> In-Reply-To: <47334969.5040908@alcatel-lucent.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lA9MoEsw047436 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi Vijay, draft-ietf-sip-eku-00 Overall I think the objectives of this draft are good. However as this draft stands I don't see how products conforming to this draft could be deployed because it does not lay out guidance on how to deal with the body of certificates and products deployed today. There are also a few places where this draft seems to be impinging on rfc3280 which need to be clarified what you actually mean. Also while under some circumstances it may be desirable to restive usage to SIP, it is equally desirable to coexist with other applications on the same server. For many deployments, users will have more than one application on a server and want to get a single certificate for that server which meets the needs of all the services on the server, not just sip. I don't see how that works with this draft. Setting the EKU extension to be critical. Setting this extension to be critical will not have the effect you describe and will likely case interoperability problems and should be removed as a requirement. RFC3280 requires conformant applications to recognize the EKU extension. It further requires to only reject critical extensions it does not recognize. It also exempts applications from recognizing all EKU purposes. There is a body of SIP applications who are conformant to 3280 and therefore recognize the EKU extension but do not recognize this new purpose, all of whom would still accept the certificate if there was another EKU in the certificate they did recognize. The behavior of the applications would be totally driven by the presence\absence of the purposes of interest in the extension and not by the criticality of the extension. EKU usage This draft does not define behavior with respect to the id-kp-serverAuth purpose which is the most widely deployed today. The presence of the "and" clause with the current text also effectively ignores the id-kp-anyExtendedKeyUsage and should be removed. The id-kp-anyExtendedKeyUsage purpose means any and should be respected. I would suggest the following text for 4.1 The Extended Key Usage extension does not exist, the certificate is valid for SIP usage. It is a matter of local policy to accept certificates with no EKU extension as valid for SIP usage. If the extension exists, it MUST be examined to determine whether or not the certificate is valid for SIP usage: o If the certificate contains the id-kp-anyExtendedKeyUsage purpose the certificate MUST be accepted as valid for SIP usage. o If the certificate contains the id-kp-sipDomain purpose the certificate MUST be accepted as valid for SIP usage. o If the certificate contains the id-kp-serverAuth purpose the certificate SHOULD be accepted as valid for SIP usage It is a matter of local policy to accept the certificate. o If the EKU extension exists but does not contain the above purposes then the certificate MUST be rejected as valid for SIP usage. A summary of the logic flow for peer certificate validation follows: 1. If there is no EKU extension and local policy allows accept the certificate. 2. If the EKU extension is present and contains id-kp-anyExtendedKeyUsage accept the certificate. 3. If the EKU extension is present and contains the id-kp-sipDomain purpose accept the certificate. 4. If the EKU extension is present and contains the id-kp-serverAuth purpose and local policy allows accept the certificate. draft-ietf-sip-domain-certs-00 URI to represent Domain Names I can sympathize why you have taken this approach, but it does seem an error prone path. Scribing special significance due to the presence\absence of the @ character is going to be hard to understand to users. URI is a superset of the allowed characters for DNS so it would be big ask of service provider to ensure the name conforms to just the DNS rules in some instances of URI names in certificates. This would increase support costs due to some certificates having valid names using to URI rules but invalid under DNS rules. Have you considered just defining a new SAN name to represent SIP domains. I know some folks will moan at that suggestion but having a new name type would allow stronger and simpler typing for content and would be less ambiguous for applications or service providers. Email domains have a similar problem and it would be nice to come up with a common model. Hosting and service providers This draft does not address the needs of hosting and service providers. If a hoster is responsible for 1000's of domains, it's totally impractical to consider having 1000's of names in a certificate or to have 1000's of certificates available on a server. You need some kind of delegation model and preferably without local configuration so it can be automated and therefore scale. Have you looked at some delegation models for SIP? Email again has the same problem without a good solution today so it would be good to come up with a common solution. Trevor * -----Original Message----- * From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf- * pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Vijay K. Gurbani * Sent: Thursday, November 08, 2007 9:38 AM * To: ietf-pkix@imc.org * Cc: Scott Lawrence * Subject: sip-eku and sip-domain-certs drafts * * * Hello: * * For a good part of this year, Scott Lawrence and I have been working * on the usage of X.509 certificates in SIP TLS connections. As part * of that work, we have solicited -- and received excellent -- advice * from the PKIX WG on related issues (many thanks!). * * The PKIX-related parts of the work has been defining a key usage * extension that identifies the holder of the certificate as * authoritative for a SIP service in a domain, and the interpretation * and usage of identities stored in a X.509 certificate when used * for SIP. * * The original draft that was reviewed by the PKIX WG was * draft-gurbani-sip-domain-certs. When this work was adopted as * a SIP WG deliverable, we split the draft into two. One of these * drafts -- draft-ietf-sip-eku -- discusses EKU extension. A * companion draft -- draft-ietf-sip-domain-certs -- describes * how to use identities in X.509 certificates and perform mutual * authentication between two SIP domains. * * Now that the ideas and the work has been fully fleshed out, we * would kindly like to solicit a final review from PKIX on these * documents. The URLs are: * * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-eku-00 * http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sip-domain-certs-00.txt * * Thank you in advance for your time and attention to this. * * Regards, * * - vijay * -- * Vijay K. Gurbani, Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent * 2701 Lucent Lane, Rm. 9F-546, Lisle, Illinois 60532 (USA) * Email: vkg@{alcatel-lucent.com,bell-labs.com,acm.org} * WWW: http://www.alcatel-lucent.com/bell-labs Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA9KdWe9038189 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 9 Nov 2007 13:39:32 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA9KdWRX038188; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 13:39:32 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from [10.20.30.150] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA9KdAaE038080 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 9 Nov 2007 13:39:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org) Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p06240807c35a734e379c@[10.20.30.150]> In-Reply-To: <4734AF27.4020502@pobox.com> References: <p0624083ac3592924cca5@[10.20.30.150]> <4734AF27.4020502@pobox.com> Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2007 12:39:01 -0800 To: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> At 11:04 AM -0800 11/9/07, Mike wrote: >What is the intended status of the RFC this draft would become? Standards track. That is, it is updating standards-track documents. > If >it is -informational- then I have no problem with it. > >However, if the plan is to replace the 1988 syntax with the 2002 >version, then I couldn't be more opposed. I don't see any benefit >to making this change -- as you say there are -no- changes to the >bits on the wire. The code emitted by the compilers can be much more robust. For example, instead of 1988's "ANY", there are structures that allow (but not force) a compiler to do better validation checking, bounds checking, and so on. >The downside, though, is huge. Every ASN.1 >compiler that can only parse 1988 syntax will need to be upgraded, >lest they be "left behind" by the IETF whose purported goal is to >maximize interoperability between differing implementations. Note that the compilers themselves have nothing to do with the interoperability of the implementations. What such a change does, of course, is force developers to use a compiler that can handle the new ASN.1. >The existence of one open-source compiler does not justify this >sweeping change. Fully agree. There are already multiple commercial ASN.1 compilers that conform to the new syntax rules. Fortunately, the IETF has not forced developers to move to the new syntax based on the existence of those commercial compilers. Now that there is an open source, freeware compiler, we can decide if the benefits of the new syntax for compilers (and therefore implementers) is worth the cost of changing compilers. >And since you are one of the authors of said open- >source software, I think there is at least the possibility of a >conflict of interest. It's not clear what you mean. We make no money from people using our compiler. That's why we even have a web site where you can compile every one of these modules without even downloading the compiler. >Yes, the ITU has deprecated the 1988 syntax, but for what reason? >It's my opinion that the 14 years of added complexity in the ASN.1 >spec is simply the result of an organization trying to justify the >need for its own existence. As long as the funding arrives, there >is work to be done! Regardless of their reason(s), we feel that the value of the changes are well worth it. >Some developers thrive on complexity -- it is good job security, so >I can understand why they would welcome this proposal, but that has >no place in critical IETF standards. Fully agree. However, that is not why we proposed the changes. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA9J4wot031248 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 9 Nov 2007 12:04:58 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA9J4w38031247; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 12:04:58 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from sceptre.pobox.com (sceptre.pobox.com [207.106.133.20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA9J4r95031238 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 12:04:56 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from mike-list@pobox.com) Received: from sceptre (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by sceptre.pobox.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6EBDC2FC for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 14:05:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from [192.168.1.8] (wsip-24-234-114-35.lv.lv.cox.net [24.234.114.35]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by sceptre.sasl.smtp.pobox.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2A01D93A61 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 14:05:15 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <4734AF27.4020502@pobox.com> Date: Fri, 09 Nov 2007 11:04:07 -0800 From: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt References: <p0624083ac3592924cca5@[10.20.30.150]> In-Reply-To: <p0624083ac3592924cca5@[10.20.30.150]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> What is the intended status of the RFC this draft would become? If it is -informational- then I have no problem with it. However, if the plan is to replace the 1988 syntax with the 2002 version, then I couldn't be more opposed. I don't see any benefit to making this change -- as you say there are -no- changes to the bits on the wire. The downside, though, is huge. Every ASN.1 compiler that can only parse 1988 syntax will need to be upgraded, lest they be "left behind" by the IETF whose purported goal is to maximize interoperability between differing implementations. The existence of one open-source compiler does not justify this sweeping change. And since you are one of the authors of said open- source software, I think there is at least the possibility of a conflict of interest. The LDAP spec used to have close to the simplest ASN.1 syntax possible (an exception is the use of APPLICATION tags on types), yet those folks did something ridiculous and changed: Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeDescription, vals SET of AttributeValue } to: PartialAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeDescription, vals SET OF value AttributeValue } Attribute ::= PartialAttribute(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., vals (SIZE(1..MAX))}) The amount of additional code required to parse this one silly construct would be considerable. I complained to the working group while the specifications were still drafts and they lamented that it was "too late" to change it back. Isn't that why we have *drafts*? Yes, the ITU has deprecated the 1988 syntax, but for what reason? It's my opinion that the 14 years of added complexity in the ASN.1 spec is simply the result of an organization trying to justify the need for its own existence. As long as the funding arrives, there is work to be done! Some developers thrive on complexity -- it is good job security, so I can understand why they would welcome this proposal, but that has no place in critical IETF standards. Mike Paul Hoffman wrote: > > Greetings again. Jim Schaad and I have created a draft that contains > revised ASN.1 modules for some of the standards-track RFCs for PKIX. > These modules conform to ASN.1 2002. We want to see if people are > interested in bringing the PKIX specs up to the new ASN.1 now that there > is an open source, freeware ASN.1 compiler for ASN.1 2002, a2c (see > <http://code.google.com/p/a2c/>). > > This is definitely a first draft. There is a list of issues that we want > to address, and we expect more issues to come up in the WG. Please > review the draft and let us know what you think. FWIW, there is a > parallel draft for CMS and S/MIME. > >> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts >> directories. >> >> Title : New ASN.1 Modules for PKIX >> Author(s) : P. Hoffman, J. Schaad >> Filename : draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt >> Pages : 68 >> Date : 2007-11-08 >> >> The PKIX certificate format, and many associated formats, are >> expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 >> version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1 modules to >> conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire >> changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. >> >> A URL for this Internet-Draft is: >> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt > > --Paul Hoffman, Director > --VPN Consortium Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA9GJ0qK015465 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 9 Nov 2007 09:19:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA9GJ0nn015464; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 09:19:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from visa.com (portal4.visa.com [198.241.156.21]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA9GIwDe015456 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 9 Nov 2007 09:18:59 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from aterwil@visa.com) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: RE: RFC3647 Question Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2007 08:18:36 -0800 Message-ID: <E5641FC3F848364D8AC48CEC14655D490306D517@sw720ex064.visa.com> In-Reply-To: <200711082211.lA8MBVKt041689@balder-227.proper.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: RFC3647 Question Thread-Index: AcgiXdbzQjA4xxudRqGHtCi1Mr2+8AAjcOkg References: <01ed01c82242$e13211c0$0301a8c0@Wylie> <47337750.5050704@Dartmouth.EDU> <200711082211.lA8MBVKt041689@balder-227.proper.com> From: "Terwilliger, Ann" <aterwil@visa.com> To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>, "Scott Rea" <Scott.Rea@Dartmouth.EDU>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 09 Nov 2007 16:18:37.0759 (UTC) FILETIME=[2F14FCF0:01C822EC] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by balder-227.proper.com id lA9GJ0Dd015459 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I think that the same provisions that apply to protection of the CA in situ also apply to protection of the CA components in transit--dual control, audit trails on transfer of custody, etc. When we moved our root CA several years ago, that was the approach we used. I think that the sections of 3647 already cited cover it. -----Original Message----- From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Russ Housley Sent: Thursday, November 08, 2007 2:11 PM To: Scott Rea; Turner, Sean P. Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: RFC3647 Question I think Sean is asking where to document the protection necessary if the CA is physically moved from one facility to another. Russ At 03:53 PM 11/8/2007, Scott Rea wrote: >Sean, > >I am not quite sure what you are asking here? Are you talking about >moving keys in terms of where back-ups (or perhaps archival data) >are kept, or is there some reason an operational key needs to move?? >Anyway the following 3 places may be good candidates... >6.1 Key pair generation and installation >6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls >6.3 Other aspects of key pair management > >Regards, >-Scott > > >Turner, Sean P. wrote: >> >>Where would you put statements about physically moving a CA's >>private from one location to another (e.g., from New York to >>L.A.)? There doesn't seem to be a place to put it in the RFC3647 >>format. Has anybody got something like this in their CP/CPS? >> >>spt > >-- >Scott Rea > > Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA92GeTe056300 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 8 Nov 2007 19:16:40 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA92GeZE056299; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 19:16:40 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp102.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp102.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [68.142.229.216]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lA92GaNu056284 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 19:16:39 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com) Received: (qmail 35009 invoked from network); 9 Nov 2007 02:16:30 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@70.108.46.209 with login) by smtp102.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 9 Nov 2007 02:16:30 -0000 X-YMail-OSG: yF9_ukEVM1nAvVnVXeOIggTO.hWzJNuyi5ULJrNT6fVzVDSe0av.InfXUS4dSTjwf5bPN3DswXm4PhMGv3SIpqDYBGFT_leGpQeoqsTKCcqeVxtKcIU- From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com> To: "'Paul Hoffman'" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <p0624083ac3592924cca5@[10.20.30.150]> Subject: RE: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2007 21:13:18 -0500 Organization: IECA, Inc. Message-ID: <033e01c82276$182ff2e0$0301a8c0@Wylie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 Thread-Index: AcgiT3+vlZpMfmNXQymt6uVliYG5/gAJn2xw In-Reply-To: <p0624083ac3592924cca5@[10.20.30.150]> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I am interested in moving the specs up to the later ASN.1 version. spt >-----Original Message----- >From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org >[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Paul Hoffman >Sent: Thursday, November 08, 2007 4:00 PM >To: ietf-pkix@imc.org >Subject: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt > > >Greetings again. Jim Schaad and I have created a draft that >contains revised ASN.1 modules for some of the standards-track >RFCs for PKIX. >These modules conform to ASN.1 2002. We want to see if people >are interested in bringing the PKIX specs up to the new ASN.1 >now that there is an open source, freeware ASN.1 compiler for >ASN.1 2002, a2c (see <http://code.google.com/p/a2c/>). > >This is definitely a first draft. There is a list of issues >that we want to address, and we expect more issues to come up >in the WG. >Please review the draft and let us know what you think. FWIW, >there is a parallel draft for CMS and S/MIME. > >>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts >>directories. >> >> Title : New ASN.1 Modules for PKIX >> Author(s) : P. Hoffman, J. Schaad >> Filename : draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt >> Pages : 68 >> Date : 2007-11-08 >> >>The PKIX certificate format, and many associated formats, are >expressed >>using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 >version of >>ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1 modules to conform to the >>2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire changes >to any of >>the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. >> >>A URL for this Internet-Draft is: >>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt > >--Paul Hoffman, Director >--VPN Consortium > Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8MBWuq041696 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 8 Nov 2007 15:11:32 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA8MBWZ4041695; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 15:11:32 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lA8MBVKt041689 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 15:11:31 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com) Message-Id: <200711082211.lA8MBVKt041689@balder-227.proper.com> Received: (qmail 11944 invoked by uid 0); 8 Nov 2007 22:11:23 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (96.231.48.203) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 8 Nov 2007 22:11:23 -0000 X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9 Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2007 17:11:28 -0500 To: Scott Rea <Scott.Rea@Dartmouth.EDU>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Subject: Re: RFC3647 Question Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <47337750.5050704@Dartmouth.EDU> References: <01ed01c82242$e13211c0$0301a8c0@Wylie> <47337750.5050704@Dartmouth.EDU> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> I think Sean is asking where to document the protection necessary if the CA is physically moved from one facility to another. Russ At 03:53 PM 11/8/2007, Scott Rea wrote: >Sean, > >I am not quite sure what you are asking here? Are you talking about >moving keys in terms of where back-ups (or perhaps archival data) >are kept, or is there some reason an operational key needs to move?? >Anyway the following 3 places may be good candidates... >6.1 Key pair generation and installation >6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls >6.3 Other aspects of key pair management > >Regards, >-Scott > > >Turner, Sean P. wrote: >> >>Where would you put statements about physically moving a CA's >>private from one location to another (e.g., from New York to >>L.A.)? There doesn't seem to be a place to put it in the RFC3647 >>format. Has anybody got something like this in their CP/CPS? >> >>spt > >-- >Scott Rea > > Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8LWKDs039348 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 8 Nov 2007 14:32:20 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA8LWKBw039347; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 14:32:20 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp103.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp103.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [68.142.229.217]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lA8LWI4N039339 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 14:32:19 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com) Received: (qmail 10415 invoked from network); 8 Nov 2007 21:32:14 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@70.108.46.209 with login) by smtp103.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 8 Nov 2007 21:32:14 -0000 X-YMail-OSG: Mbxtb0QVM1kCcvHf0bpLV9LNSAHuxNmo5HIAgu1PIcDphFExUEOVaHTiuCKHQAFXh92JfVpgUZCKuc4LSBzNOvZ2Xjv5fN375jP3HB5iC9IQGepHxOP_5NqebhURxClnXrp9gMDLm2jf7Q-- From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <01ed01c82242$e13211c0$0301a8c0@Wylie> <82D5657AE1F54347A734BDD33637C87909B6A32B@EXVS01.ex.dslextreme.net> Subject: RE: RFC3647 Question Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2007 16:29:01 -0500 Organization: IECA, Inc. Message-ID: <022301c8224e$61d06560$0301a8c0@Wylie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0224_01C82224.78FA5D60" X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 Thread-Index: AcgiQuDVVtRsYNgvQmeMnD/s/4Ir1gACj5zgAAA1j6A= In-Reply-To: <82D5657AE1F54347A734BDD33637C87909B6A32B@EXVS01.ex.dslextreme.net> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0224_01C82224.78FA5D60 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sorry I should have been more specific, I was definitely thinking about moving the HSM that has the private key from one location to another. _____ From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:chokhani@orionsec.com] Sent: Thursday, November 08, 2007 4:22 PM To: Turner, Sean P.; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: RFC3647 Question Sean, Sections 5.1.2, 5.2.2, and/or 6.2.2 are appropriate places. They can address generation, backup transport and invocation of the CA private key requires multi-party control. In addition, Section 5.1.2 can address the multi-party control on the HSM transportation. _____ From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Turner, Sean P. Sent: Thursday, November 08, 2007 3:07 PM To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RFC3647 Question Where would you put statements about physically moving a CA's private from one location to another (e.g., from New York to L.A.)? There doesn't seem to be a place to put it in the RFC3647 format. Has anybody got something like this in their CP/CPS? spt ------=_NextPart_000_0224_01C82224.78FA5D60 Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40" xmlns:v =3D=20 "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o =3D=20 "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w =3D=20 "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:st1 =3D=20 "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"><HEAD><TITLE>RFC3647 = Question</TITLE> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; = charset=3Dus-ascii"> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.6000.16544" name=3DGENERATOR><!--[if !mso]> <STYLE>v\:* { BEHAVIOR: url(#default#VML) } o\:* { BEHAVIOR: url(#default#VML) } w\:* { BEHAVIOR: url(#default#VML) } .shape { BEHAVIOR: url(#default#VML) } </STYLE> <![endif]--><o:SmartTagType name=3D"place"=20 namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"></o:SmartTagT= ype><o:SmartTagType=20 name=3D"City"=20 namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"></o:SmartTagT= ype><o:SmartTagType=20 name=3D"State"=20 namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"></o:SmartTagT= ype><!--[if !mso]> <STYLE>st1\:* { BEHAVIOR: url(#default#ieooui) } </STYLE> <![endif]--> <STYLE>@font-face { font-family: Tahoma; } @page Section1 {size: 8.5in 11.0in; margin: 1.0in 1.25in 1.0in 1.25in; } P.MsoNormal { FONT-SIZE: 12pt; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: "Times New Roman" } LI.MsoNormal { FONT-SIZE: 12pt; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: "Times New Roman" } DIV.MsoNormal { FONT-SIZE: 12pt; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: "Times New Roman" } H1 { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; MARGIN: 12pt 0in 3pt 0.3in; = TEXT-INDENT: -0.3in; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2 } H2 { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; MARGIN: 12pt 0in 3pt 0.4in; = TEXT-INDENT: -0.4in; FONT-FAMILY: "Times New Roman"; mso-list: l0 level2 = lfo2 } A:link { COLOR: blue; TEXT-DECORATION: underline } SPAN.MsoHyperlink { COLOR: blue; TEXT-DECORATION: underline } A:visited { COLOR: purple; TEXT-DECORATION: underline } SPAN.MsoHyperlinkFollowed { COLOR: purple; TEXT-DECORATION: underline } P { FONT-SIZE: 12pt; MARGIN-LEFT: 0in; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0in; FONT-FAMILY: = "Times New Roman"; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto } P.StyleCentered { FONT-SIZE: 11pt; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial } LI.StyleCentered { FONT-SIZE: 11pt; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial } DIV.StyleCentered { FONT-SIZE: 11pt; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial } SPAN.EmailStyle19 { COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-style-type: personal-reply } DIV.Section1 { page: Section1 } OL { MARGIN-BOTTOM: 0in } UL { MARGIN-BOTTOM: 0in } </STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY lang=3DEN-US vLink=3Dpurple link=3Dblue> <DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff = size=3D2><SPAN=20 class=3D703002621-08112007>Sorry I should have been more specific, I was = definitely thinking about moving the HSM that has the private key from = one=20 location to another. </SPAN></FONT></DIV><BR> <BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr=20 style=3D"PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px = solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> <DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader lang=3Den-us dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft> <HR tabIndex=3D-1> <FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><B>From:</B> Santosh Chokhani=20 [mailto:chokhani@orionsec.com] <BR><B>Sent:</B> Thursday, November 08, = 2007=20 4:22 PM<BR><B>To:</B> Turner, Sean P.; = ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B>=20 RE: RFC3647 Question<BR></FONT><BR></DIV> <DIV></DIV> <DIV class=3DSection1> <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: = Arial">Sean,<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: = Arial"><BR>Sections 5.1.2,=20 5.2.2, and/or 6.2.2 are appropriate places. They can address = generation,=20 backup transport and invocation of the CA private key requires = multi-party=20 control. In addition, Section 5.1.2 can address the multi-party = control=20 on the HSM transportation.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P> <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: = Arial"><o:p> </o:p></SPAN></FONT></P> <DIV> <DIV class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"TEXT-ALIGN: center" = align=3Dcenter><FONT=20 face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"> <HR tabIndex=3D-1 align=3Dcenter width=3D"100%" SIZE=3D2> </SPAN></FONT></DIV> <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN=20 style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: = Tahoma">From:</SPAN></FONT></B><FONT=20 face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: = Tahoma">=20 owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] = <B><SPAN=20 style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">On Behalf Of </SPAN></B>Turner, Sean = P.<BR><B><SPAN=20 style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> Thursday, November 08, = 2007 3:07=20 PM<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B>=20 ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: = bold">Subject:</SPAN></B>=20 RFC3647 Question</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV> <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p> </o:p></SPAN></FONT></P> <P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Where would you put = statements=20 about physically moving a CA's private from one location to another = (e.g.,=20 from <st1:State w:st=3D"on">New York</st1:State> to <st1:City=20 w:st=3D"on"><st1:place = w:st=3D"on">L.A.</st1:place></st1:City>)? There=20 doesn't seem to be a place to put it in the RFC3647 format. Has = anybody=20 got something like this in their CP/CPS?</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P> <P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">spt</SPAN></FONT>=20 <o:p></o:p></P></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_000_0224_01C82224.78FA5D60-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8LLoA3038879 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 8 Nov 2007 14:21:51 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA8LLokV038878; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 14:21:50 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from EXVS01.ex.dslextreme.net (exvs01.ex.dslextreme.net [66.51.199.86]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8LLomj038871 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 14:21:50 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from chokhani@orionsec.com) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C8224D.96052FD4" Subject: RE: RFC3647 Question Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2007 13:22:08 -0800 Message-ID: <82D5657AE1F54347A734BDD33637C87909B6A32B@EXVS01.ex.dslextreme.net> In-Reply-To: <01ed01c82242$e13211c0$0301a8c0@Wylie> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: RFC3647 Question thread-index: AcgiQuDVVtRsYNgvQmeMnD/s/4Ir1gACj5zg References: <01ed01c82242$e13211c0$0301a8c0@Wylie> From: "Santosh Chokhani" <chokhani@orionsec.com> To: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C8224D.96052FD4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sean, Sections 5.1.2, 5.2.2, and/or 6.2.2 are appropriate places. They can address generation, backup transport and invocation of the CA private key requires multi-party control. In addition, Section 5.1.2 can address the multi-party control on the HSM transportation. =20 ________________________________ From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Turner, Sean P. Sent: Thursday, November 08, 2007 3:07 PM To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RFC3647 Question =20 Where would you put statements about physically moving a CA's private from one location to another (e.g., from New York to L.A.)? There doesn't seem to be a place to put it in the RFC3647 format. Has anybody got something like this in their CP/CPS? spt=20 ------_=_NextPart_001_01C8224D.96052FD4 Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" = xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" = xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" = xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"> <head> <META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; = charset=3Dus-ascii"> <meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 11 (filtered medium)"> <!--[if !mso]> <style> v\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} o\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} w\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} .shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);} </style> <![endif]--> <title>RFC3647 Question</title> <o:SmartTagType = namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"place"/> <o:SmartTagType = namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"City"/> <o:SmartTagType = namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"State"/> <!--[if !mso]> <style> st1\:*{behavior:url(#default#ieooui) } </style> <![endif]--> <style> <!-- /* Font Definitions */ @font-face {font-family:Tahoma; 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They = can address generation, backup transport and invocation of the CA private key = requires multi-party control. In addition, Section 5.1.2 can address the = multi-party control on the HSM transportation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span = style=3D'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p> <div> <div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font = size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'> <hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1> </span></font></div> <p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span = style=3D'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font = size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] = <b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Turner, Sean P.<br> <b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, November = 08, 2007 3:07 PM<br> <b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br> <b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RFC3647 = Question</span></font><o:p></o:p></p> </div> <p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span = style=3D'font-size: 12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p> <p><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span = style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Where would you put statements about physically moving a CA's private from one location to another (e.g., from <st1:State w:st=3D"on">New = York</st1:State> to <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place = w:st=3D"on">L.A.</st1:place></st1:City>)? There doesn't seem to be a place to put it in the RFC3647 format. Has = anybody got something like this in their CP/CPS?</span></font><o:p></o:p></p> <p><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span = style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>spt</span></font> <o:p></o:p></p> </div> </body> </html> ------_=_NextPart_001_01C8224D.96052FD4-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8L0C3h037349 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 8 Nov 2007 14:00:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA8L0CCX037348; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 14:00:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from [10.20.30.150] (adsl-66-125-125-65.dsl.pltn13.pacbell.net [66.125.125.65]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8L09Vt037333 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 14:00:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org) Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p0624083ac3592924cca5@[10.20.30.150]> Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2007 13:00:02 -0800 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Subject: Fwd: I-D Action:draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Greetings again. Jim Schaad and I have created a draft that contains revised ASN.1 modules for some of the standards-track RFCs for PKIX. These modules conform to ASN.1 2002. We want to see if people are interested in bringing the PKIX specs up to the new ASN.1 now that there is an open source, freeware ASN.1 compiler for ASN.1 2002, a2c (see <http://code.google.com/p/a2c/>). This is definitely a first draft. There is a list of issues that we want to address, and we expect more issues to come up in the WG. Please review the draft and let us know what you think. FWIW, there is a parallel draft for CMS and S/MIME. >A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts >directories. > > Title : New ASN.1 Modules for PKIX > Author(s) : P. Hoffman, J. Schaad > Filename : draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt > Pages : 68 > Date : 2007-11-08 > >The PKIX certificate format, and many associated formats, are >expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 >version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1 modules to >conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire >changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. > >A URL for this Internet-Draft is: >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-hoffman-pkix-new-asn1-00.txt --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8KsDK6036875 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 8 Nov 2007 13:54:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA8KsDjn036874; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 13:54:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from mailhub1.dartmouth.edu (mailhub1.dartmouth.edu [129.170.16.122]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8KsBvX036866 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 13:54:13 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Scott.Rea@Dartmouth.EDU) Received: from [127.0.0.1] ([129.170.87.243]) (authenticated bits=0) by mailhub1.dartmouth.edu (8.13.5/DND2.0/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8Krb9k019711 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 8 Nov 2007 15:53:51 -0500 Message-ID: <47337750.5050704@Dartmouth.EDU> Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2007 15:53:36 -0500 From: Scott Rea <Scott.Rea@Dartmouth.EDU> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: RFC3647 Question References: <01ed01c82242$e13211c0$0301a8c0@Wylie> In-Reply-To: <01ed01c82242$e13211c0$0301a8c0@Wylie> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-MailScanner: Found to be clean by mailhub.Dartmouth.EDU X-MailScanner-From: scott.rea@dartmouth.edu Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Sean, I am not quite sure what you are asking here? Are you talking about moving keys in terms of where back-ups (or perhaps archival data) are kept, or is there some reason an operational key needs to move?? Anyway the following 3 places may be good candidates... 6.1 Key pair generation and installation 6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls 6.3 Other aspects of key pair management Regards, -Scott Turner, Sean P. wrote: > > Where would you put statements about physically moving a CA's private > from one location to another (e.g., from New York to L.A.)? There > doesn't seem to be a place to put it in the RFC3647 format. Has > anybody got something like this in their CP/CPS? > > spt > -- Scott Rea Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8K9tPn033901 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 8 Nov 2007 13:09:55 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA8K9taD033900; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 13:09:55 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.175]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id lA8K9stO033890 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 13:09:54 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com) Received: (qmail 84228 invoked from network); 8 Nov 2007 20:09:53 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@70.108.46.209 with login) by smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 8 Nov 2007 20:09:53 -0000 X-YMail-OSG: yXwD3Y0VM1nCP3MYzExBLXzlDtW0IpKI8SXVWE6GzB9tn9q1 From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RFC3647 Question Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2007 15:06:41 -0500 Organization: IECA, Inc. Message-ID: <01ed01c82242$e13211c0$0301a8c0@Wylie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_01EE_01C82218.F85C09C0" X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 Thread-Index: AcgiQuDVVtRsYNgvQmeMnD/s/4Ir1g== X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_01EE_01C82218.F85C09C0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Where would you put statements about physically moving a CA's private from one location to another (e.g., from New York to L.A.)? There doesn't seem to be a place to put it in the RFC3647 format. Has anybody got something like this in their CP/CPS? spt ------=_NextPart_000_01EE_01C82218.F85C09C0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; = charset=3Dus-ascii"> <META NAME=3D"Generator" CONTENT=3D"MS Exchange Server version = 6.5.7036.0"> <TITLE>RFC3647 Question</TITLE> </HEAD> <BODY> <!-- Converted from text/rtf format --> <P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">Where would you put statements about = physically moving a CA's private from one location to another (e.g., = from New York to L.A.)? There doesn't seem to be a place to = put it in the RFC3647 format. Has anybody got something like this = in their CP/CPS?</FONT></P> <P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">spt</FONT> </P> </BODY> </HTML> ------=_NextPart_000_01EE_01C82218.F85C09C0-- Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8Hbuqp020362 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 8 Nov 2007 10:37:56 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA8Hbut9020361; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 10:37:56 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from ihemail4.lucent.com (ihemail4.lucent.com [135.245.0.39]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA8HbsLg020354 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 10:37:55 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from vkg@alcatel-lucent.com) Received: from ihmail.ih.lucent.com (h135-1-218-70.lucent.com [135.1.218.70]) by ihemail4.lucent.com (8.13.8/IER-o) with ESMTP id lA8HbkrO028473; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 11:37:46 -0600 (CST) Received: from [135.185.244.90] (il0015vkg1.ih.lucent.com [135.185.244.90]) by ihmail.ih.lucent.com (8.11.7p1+Sun/8.12.11) with ESMTP id lA8Hbkj15889; Thu, 8 Nov 2007 11:37:46 -0600 (CST) Message-ID: <47334969.5040908@alcatel-lucent.com> Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2007 11:37:45 -0600 From: "Vijay K. Gurbani" <vkg@alcatel-lucent.com> Organization: Bell Labs Security Technology Research Group User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org CC: Scott Lawrence <slawrence@bluesocket.com> Subject: sip-eku and sip-domain-certs drafts Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.57 on 135.245.2.39 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hello: For a good part of this year, Scott Lawrence and I have been working on the usage of X.509 certificates in SIP TLS connections. As part of that work, we have solicited -- and received excellent -- advice from the PKIX WG on related issues (many thanks!). The PKIX-related parts of the work has been defining a key usage extension that identifies the holder of the certificate as authoritative for a SIP service in a domain, and the interpretation and usage of identities stored in a X.509 certificate when used for SIP. The original draft that was reviewed by the PKIX WG was draft-gurbani-sip-domain-certs. When this work was adopted as a SIP WG deliverable, we split the draft into two. One of these drafts -- draft-ietf-sip-eku -- discusses EKU extension. A companion draft -- draft-ietf-sip-domain-certs -- describes how to use identities in X.509 certificates and perform mutual authentication between two SIP domains. Now that the ideas and the work has been fully fleshed out, we would kindly like to solicit a final review from PKIX on these documents. The URLs are: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-eku-00 http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sip-domain-certs-00.txt Thank you in advance for your time and attention to this. Regards, - vijay -- Vijay K. Gurbani, Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent 2701 Lucent Lane, Rm. 9F-546, Lisle, Illinois 60532 (USA) Email: vkg@{alcatel-lucent.com,bell-labs.com,acm.org} WWW: http://www.alcatel-lucent.com/bell-labs Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA5AjRDG023546 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 5 Nov 2007 03:45:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA5AjRmX023545; Mon, 5 Nov 2007 03:45:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from pfepa.post.tele.dk (pfepa.post.tele.dk [195.41.46.235]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA5AjQRx023538 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 5 Nov 2007 03:45:26 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from era@tdcadsl.dk) Received: from morten (0x50a4450b.albnxx10.adsl-dhcp.tele.dk [80.164.69.11]) by pfepa.post.tele.dk (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63B0FFAC03F; Mon, 5 Nov 2007 11:45:13 +0100 (CET) From: "Erik Andersen" <era@tdcadsl.dk> To: "PKIX" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "Directory list" <x500standard@freelists.org>, <ESI@LIST.ETSI.FR> Subject: RE: Free standards! Get your free standards here! Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2007 11:46:14 +0100 Message-ID: <000901c81f99$1c21e5a0$0100a8c0@morten> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.6822 In-Reply-To: <a06240803c354303c3d18@[192.168.0.4]> Importance: Normal Thread-Index: AcgfYid/FO0fWJf/SUWnazkF8BFslQANmGiw X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> Hi, For your information, our X.500 site (http://www.x500standard.com/) has direct links to all the latest X.500 documents. In addition you can find information about the extension work. Erik Andersen Andersen's L-Service Mobile: +45 20 97 14 90 e-mail: era@tdcadsl.dk http://www.x500standard.com/ http://home20.inet.tele.dk/era/me > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] > On Behalf Of Hoyt L Kesterson II > Sent: 5. november 2007 03:51 > To: Recipient List Suppressed: > Subject: Free standards! Get your free standards here! > > > A few years ago ITU began several trials of free distribution of its > recommendations. In the most recent trial, anyone could get three > free recommendations in PDF. The recommendations had to be at least > two years old. > > ITU considers that experiment a substantial success. It recently > announced that the experimental phase is over. The announcement can > be found at > http://www.itu.int/ITU- > T/newslog/Free+Access+For+All+To+ITUT+Standards.aspx > > One can now get any number of recommendations at no charge regardless > of when the recommendations were published. > > These are still copyrighted documents so one should probably not > redistribute the actual standards. However, since they are online, > one need only publish the appropriate URL. > > Links to all recommendations can be found at > http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/publications/recs.html > > Links to the X series, including the X.500 series, can be found at > http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X/e These are in English; links for > versions in French and Spanish can be be found at the top right-hand > corner of the page. > > Links to the latest two editions of X.509, March 2000 and August > 2007, can be found at http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509/en > > Enjoy. I for one am grateful for the permanent adoption of this > enlightened policy. > > hoyt Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA58b1Zs012459 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 5 Nov 2007 01:37:01 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA58b1BI012458; Mon, 5 Nov 2007 01:37:01 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net (elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net [209.86.89.69]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA58b0wY012451 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 5 Nov 2007 01:37:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from hoytkesterson@earthlink.net) DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=dk20050327; d=earthlink.net; b=J4MAzlZNJdenGtvPrFles1KWW4KIE/eGAdH0/m5eDSsd9F7jCu3Rfr6Wpp7jJ/Zu; h=Received:Mime-Version:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References:Date:To:From:Subject:Content-Type:X-ELNK-Trace:X-Originating-IP; Received: from [151.118.178.5] (helo=[192.168.0.4]) by elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net with asmtp (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.34) id 1IoxS7-0008ET-Ia; Mon, 05 Nov 2007 03:36:59 -0500 Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <a06240805c35480d01f93@[192.168.0.4]> In-Reply-To: <c9a3e4540711042305r4631bdd6jafd25ecacf80eb5a@mail.gmail.com> References: <a06240803c354303c3d18@192.168.0.4> <c9a3e4540711042305r4631bdd6jafd25ecacf80eb5a@mail.gmail.com> Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2007 01:35:38 -0700 To: "ronnie sahlberg" <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Hoyt L Kesterson II <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> Subject: Re: Free standards! Get your free standards here! Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-ELNK-Trace: 59f3edefb26af0321a6f9084d36cbc6474bf435c0eb9d478cd9d7aa2e6231870d6ca8b9c7f914e35ddc7f265eccadb89350badd9bab72f9c350badd9bab72f9c X-Originating-IP: 151.118.178.5 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> That's correct. The ASN.1 has always been freely available. Other work can include it in part or in whole. That has not changed. I suspect that identifying the Recommendation number and year of publication is adequate for attribution. I identify both the ISO and ITU standards if appropriate. X.500 is collaborative work and the standard is published identically by both organizations differing only in the foreword. For example ITU-T Recommendation (or Rec.) X.509 (08 2005) and ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005. The practice in the standard is to replace the "and" with the vertical bar character, as in Backus-Naur or Unix pipe. The addition of the month to the ITU-T recommendation is recent with the last edition. Note also that for several edltions of the standard the dates are different for ISO and ITU since the practice of ITU is to use the date of plenary approval and ISO uses the date of publication. hoyt >Great news! > >Many of the standard documents contain ASN.1 definitions for various protocols. >I recall a copyright policy document that said that ASN.1 definitions >should be treated as contributed text and as such >there were no restrictions on implementations based on these ASN.1 definitions. >Is this correct? > >If that is correct, can it be clarified more explicitely? > > >Also, if using the ASN.1 definitions verbatim from a ITU-T standard, >are there any recommendations on how one should >annotate the ASN.1 file to credit ITU-T ? > >I think there was (but could be wrong) an RFC that talked about how >one should annotate and credit ietf when extracting/using ASN.1 >definitions from RFCs >but can not really find that document any more. (it might be a false >memory, but i think there was such a document). > > >It would be great if ITU-T would extend this with explicit guidelines >and recommendations for how to correctly extract/use ASN.1 from ITU-T >standards and >guidelines on how to make sure that attribution to ITU-T for these >ASN.1 definitions are done correctly. > >(my question here is because wireshark contains many ASN.1 definitions >for telco protocols, and now that the standards become much easier to >access I expect there will be an influx of a lot more additional new >protocols supported by wireshark) > > >best regards >ronnie sahlberg > > > >On Nov 5, 2007 1:51 PM, Hoyt L Kesterson II <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> wrote: >> >> A few years ago ITU began several trials of free distribution of its >> recommendations. In the most recent trial, anyone could get three >> free recommendations in PDF. The recommendations had to be at least >> two years old. >> >> ITU considers that experiment a substantial success. It recently >> announced that the experimental phase is over. The announcement can >> be found at >> http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/newslog/Free+Access+For+All+To+ITUT+Standards.aspx >> >> One can now get any number of recommendations at no charge regardless >> of when the recommendations were published. >> >> These are still copyrighted documents so one should probably not >> redistribute the actual standards. However, since they are online, >> one need only publish the appropriate URL. >> >> Links to all recommendations can be found at >> http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/publications/recs.html >> >> Links to the X series, including the X.500 series, can be found at >> http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X/e These are in English; links for >> versions in French and Spanish can be be found at the top right-hand >> corner of the page. >> >> Links to the latest two editions of X.509, March 2000 and August >> 2007, can be found at http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509/en >> >> Enjoy. I for one am grateful for the permanent adoption of this >> enlightened policy. >> >> hoyt >> >> Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA52pOxF080743 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sun, 4 Nov 2007 19:51:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id lA52pO7E080742; Sun, 4 Nov 2007 19:51:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org) X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org using -f Received: from elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net (elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net [209.86.89.66]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id lA52pNHe080736 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 4 Nov 2007 19:51:23 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from hoytkesterson@earthlink.net) DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=dk20050327; d=earthlink.net; b=G9SIXd7+ygEzTnvehjXaC6T92oleLBKTztPWudrJc+BvYKP2pgQh9zQ2gxuWZROL; h=Received:Mime-Version:Message-Id:Date:To:From:Subject:Content-Type:X-ELNK-Trace:X-Originating-IP; Received: from [151.118.178.5] (helo=[192.168.0.4]) by elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net with asmtp (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.34) id 1Ios3e-0007us-BG; Sun, 04 Nov 2007 21:51:22 -0500 Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <a06240803c354303c3d18@[192.168.0.4]> Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2007 19:51:02 -0700 To: Recipient List Suppressed:; From: Hoyt L Kesterson II <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> Subject: Free standards! Get your free standards here! Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" X-ELNK-Trace: 59f3edefb26af0321a6f9084d36cbc6474bf435c0eb9d478cd9d7aa2e62318706d8e6f02f6e6926966abd96fb4e16af2350badd9bab72f9c350badd9bab72f9c X-Originating-IP: 151.118.178.5 Sender: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Precedence: bulk List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe> A few years ago ITU began several trials of free distribution of its recommendations. In the most recent trial, anyone could get three free recommendations in PDF. The recommendations had to be at least two years old. ITU considers that experiment a substantial success. It recently announced that the experimental phase is over. The announcement can be found at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/newslog/Free+Access+For+All+To+ITUT+Standards.aspx One can now get any number of recommendations at no charge regardless of when the recommendations were published. These are still copyrighted documents so one should probably not redistribute the actual standards. However, since they are online, one need only publish the appropriate URL. Links to all recommendations can be found at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/publications/recs.html Links to the X series, including the X.500 series, can be found at http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X/e These are in English; links for versions in French and Spanish can be be found at the top right-hand corner of the page. Links to the latest two editions of X.509, March 2000 and August 2007, can be found at http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509/en Enjoy. 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