[pkix] [Errata Verified] RFC5480 (6670)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Wed, 01 September 2021 16:43 UTC

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Subject: [pkix] [Errata Verified] RFC5480 (6670)
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The following errata report has been verified for RFC5480,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information". 

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6670

--------------------------------------
Status: Verified
Type: Technical

Reported by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Date Reported: 2021-08-31
Verified by: Benjamin Kaduk (IESG)

Section: 3

Original Text
-------------
   If the keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that indicates
   id-ecDH or id-ecMQV in SubjectPublicKeyInfo, then the following
   values MUST NOT be present:

     digitalSignature;
     nonRepudiation;
     keyTransport;
     keyCertSign; and
     cRLSign.

Corrected Text
--------------
   If the keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that indicates
   id-ecDH or id-ecMQV in SubjectPublicKeyInfo, then the following
   values MUST NOT be present:

     digitalSignature;
     nonRepudiation;
     keyEncipherment;
     keyCertSign; and
     cRLSign.

Notes
-----
"keyTransport" KU bit name does not exist; I believe "keyEncipherment" is intended here instead.

While RFC 8813 makes it clear that "keyEncipherment" and "dataEncipherment" are prohibited, I'm marking this erratum as "Technical" due the reference to a non-existent bit name.

--------------------------------------
RFC5480 (draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-subpubkeyinfo-11)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information
Publication Date    : March 2009
Author(s)           : S. Turner, D. Brown, K. Yiu, R. Housley, T. Polk
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG