RE: draft-turner-caclearanceconstraints-01.txt

[Stefan Santesson <[e-mail]>]

Santosh,

What you suggest comes closer to the exercise I think need to be done before we decide what to do with this.

To standardize constraints with undefined processing rules feels to me like wanting to have one's cake and eat it too.
I think it is absolutely necessary to limit the logic so that an implementation can process any legal data within it. Otherwise the basic idea with having a standard seems a bit lost.

Now, processing all data does not mean that you know the meaning of all data, but at least you should be able to process it and hand it over to the next layer.

I would also like to have some rationales clarified, but I will ask for that in a separate thread.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: [e-mail] [mailto:owner-ietf-
> [e-mail]] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
> Sent: den 24 oktober 2008 15:52
> To: [e-mail]
> Subject: RE: draft-turner-caclearanceconstraints-01.txt
>
>
> Stefan,
>
> As stated in other strands of this thread, this will be handled by
> enhancing the I-D for a specific set of syntaxes of security categories
> or by deprecating the security categories from the clearance
> constraints.  The latter can obviate the need for taking the
> intersection of security categories.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [e-mail] [mailto:owner-ietf-
> [e-mail]]
> On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
> Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 9:27 AM
> To: Timothy J. Miller; Russ Housley
> Cc: [e-mail]
> Subject: RE: draft-turner-caclearanceconstraints-01.txt
>
>
> Thanks for putting such good words to it :)
>
> Yes, that sounds very much like what I meant.
>
> Stefan Santesson
> Senior Program Manager
> Windows Security, Standards
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Timothy J. Miller [mailto:[e-mail]]
> > Sent: den 24 oktober 2008 15:23
> > To: Russ Housley
> > Cc: Stefan Santesson; [e-mail]
> > Subject: Re: draft-turner-caclearanceconstraints-01.txt
> >
> > Russ Housley wrote:
> >
> > > Where does the document say anything about mapping between security
> > > policies?
> >
> > I don't think that's what he means.  I think what he's driving at is:
> > how does a single vendor writing a single chaining library do it such
> > that the code works under any arbitrary intersection logic the end
> user
> > may specify?
> >
> > Did I get that right, Stefan?
> >
> > -- Tim
>