Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field
Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com> Thu, 01 June 2000 04:01 UTC
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Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 20:42:02 -0700
From: Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com>
Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field
To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
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"Manger, James H" wrote: > Michael, > > > How do you know when the "Time stops" and the "Order begins"? > You never need to know - that is the beauty. What you say below does not work. > > Stamp from TSA_1: 20000529053138.345Z. Accuracy = 1 sec. > > Stamp from TSA_2: 20000529053138.876Z. Accuracy = 1 sec > > How do I do it [compare the stamps]? > Consider T2 - T1. The best estimate (mean) is .876 - .345 = .531. Again, this confuses accuracy with uncertainty (which is the inverse of reliability). If both TSA_1 and TSA_2 have accuracy of 1s (ie, spread of *one* measurement is equal to 1 s for each) this says nothing about their uncertainty (measured by a probability distribution over *many* measurements for each). Accuracy and reliability (uncertainty) are independent concepts. So, in this case to say that the best estimate of the time is the mean is the same as saying that the best estimate between an apple and a speedboat is an orange ;-) Now, if by "accuracy" above you mean uncertainty then I would have to ask about their accuracies, since the time values may have very low uncertainty and still be as far apart as apples and speedboats. So, to the original question: "How do I do it [compare the stamps]?" The answer must be (for what was provided): insufficient data. > If a TSA clock returns digits down to the tenth of a second, e.g. > "5:31:38.8", it will return the same string when the fraction of seconds is > .800, .807, .876 and 0.887 (could use rounding instead of truncation but it > makes no difference). On reading "5:31:38.8" the TSA knows the time > (according to its clock) is in the range [5:31:38.80000.., > 5:31:38.899999...]. Any value in this range is as good a guess as any > other. The TSA can arbitrarily choose any value in this range. Hence, the > TSA can ensure its arbitrary choices always increase while its clock returns > the same value. As I commented a couple days ago, this is fine BUT some restrictions apply, as given there. Cheers, Ed Gerck Received: from rly-ip02.mx.aol.com (rly-ip02.mx.aol.com [152.163.225.160]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA03143 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 22:06:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from tot-tq.proxy.aol.com (tot-tq.proxy.aol.com [152.163.201.1]) by rly-ip02.mx.aol.com (8.8.8/8.8.8/AOL-5.0.0) with ESMTP id BAA05648 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 1 Jun 2000 01:13:39 -0400 (EDT) Received: from djs300y (AC9C79B2.ipt.aol.com [172.156.121.178]) by tot-tq.proxy.aol.com (8.10.0/8.10.0) with ESMTP id e515DcJ12396 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 1 Jun 2000 01:13:38 -0400 (EDT) Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2000 01:13:38 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <01a001bfcb88$1afad460$0100a8c0@djs300y> From: "Dennis Solomon" <solomond@citizenslaw.net> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Legal Assistance MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 X-Apparently-From: Solomondj@aol.com Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id WAA03144 EMAIL: ietf-pkix@imc.org Dear Friends, I am in need of an excellent intellectual property litigator to recover my rights and damages related to the theft of my trade secrets by the principals of Microvision, Inc., NASDAQ: MVIS. I believe I am the first and original inventor of the virtual retinal display, and filed papers with the U.S. Patent Office over one year prior to the first filing by Microvision. The principals I later discovered were doing business with the small electronics firm where I was conducting my experiments. They were later paid over $200,000 by them. The present market value of the technology in over $200,000,000. The details may be found at my new website: www.citizenslaw.net Thank you. Dennis djs@citizenslaw.net Dennis J. Solomon P.O. Box 289 Yarmouth Port, MA 02675 Received: from mta5.snfc21.pbi.net (mta5.snfc21.pbi.net [206.13.28.241]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA26093 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 20:50:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nma.com ([63.204.17.82]) by mta5.snfc21.pbi.net (Sun Internet Mail Server sims.3.5.2000.01.05.12.18.p9) with ESMTP id <0FVG00AU8I9K7G@mta5.snfc21.pbi.net> for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Wed, 31 May 2000 20:41:44 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 20:42:02 -0700 From: Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com> Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-id: <39348A0A.323E3918@nma.com> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en]C-CCK-MCD {Sony} (Win98; I) Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit X-Accept-Language: en References: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BB6@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> "Manger, James H" wrote: > Michael, > > > How do you know when the "Time stops" and the "Order begins"? > You never need to know - that is the beauty. What you say below does not work. > > Stamp from TSA_1: 20000529053138.345Z. Accuracy = 1 sec. > > Stamp from TSA_2: 20000529053138.876Z. Accuracy = 1 sec > > How do I do it [compare the stamps]? > Consider T2 - T1. The best estimate (mean) is .876 - .345 = .531. Again, this confuses accuracy with uncertainty (which is the inverse of reliability). If both TSA_1 and TSA_2 have accuracy of 1s (ie, spread of *one* measurement is equal to 1 s for each) this says nothing about their uncertainty (measured by a probability distribution over *many* measurements for each). Accuracy and reliability (uncertainty) are independent concepts. So, in this case to say that the best estimate of the time is the mean is the same as saying that the best estimate between an apple and a speedboat is an orange ;-) Now, if by "accuracy" above you mean uncertainty then I would have to ask about their accuracies, since the time values may have very low uncertainty and still be as far apart as apples and speedboats. So, to the original question: "How do I do it [compare the stamps]?" The answer must be (for what was provided): insufficient data. > If a TSA clock returns digits down to the tenth of a second, e.g. > "5:31:38.8", it will return the same string when the fraction of seconds is > .800, .807, .876 and 0.887 (could use rounding instead of truncation but it > makes no difference). On reading "5:31:38.8" the TSA knows the time > (according to its clock) is in the range [5:31:38.80000.., > 5:31:38.899999...]. Any value in this range is as good a guess as any > other. The TSA can arbitrarily choose any value in this range. Hence, the > TSA can ensure its arbitrary choices always increase while its clock returns > the same value. As I commented a couple days ago, this is fine BUT some restrictions apply, as given there. Cheers, Ed Gerck Received: from piglet.dstc.edu.au (piglet.dstc.edu.au [130.102.176.1]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id SAA00910 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 18:32:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dstc.edu.au (topaz.dstc.qut.edu.au [131.181.71.25]) by piglet.dstc.edu.au (8.10.1/8.10.1) with ESMTP id e511dko14971; Thu, 1 Jun 2000 11:39:46 +1000 (EST) Sender: cheung@dstc.edu.au Message-ID: <3935BEE9.61277BDE@dstc.edu.au> Date: Thu, 01 Jun 2000 11:39:53 +1000 From: Eddy Cheung <cheung@dstc.edu.au> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.6 [en] (X11; I; SunOS 5.6 sun4u) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Sean Mullan <sean.mullan@sun.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: PKIX library References: <39324849.586ADF80@dif.um.es> <3933F0B3.B8544EB6@dif.um.es> <3934C951.2A292362@dstc.edu.au> <3934DC18.40294CD@sun.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Thanks, Sean. I believe DSTC is already involved in Java Community Process and also in the JCA/JCE area as well. Cheers... Eddy Sean Mullan wrote: > > Hi, > > You may also be interested in the development of a new standard > Java API for handling certification paths. > > The Java Certification Path API is a Java API that is > currently being specified using the Java Community Process. > The API is targeted for the next release of J2SE (Java > 2 Standard Edition). It will include Java classes for building > and validating certification paths, and will be based on > the standard Java Cryptography Architecture. A reference > implementation of the APIs including an RFC 2459 certification > path validation implementation is planned. > > Please see http://java.sun.com/aboutJava/communityprocess/jsr/jsr_055_certp.html > for the Java Specification Request, which includes more information > about this API. > > Thanks, > Sean Received: from levitator.1div0.com ([213.250.43.61]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA19161 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 15:33:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from intergalactic ([10.1.1.2]) by levitator.1div0.com (8.9.3/8.9.3/SuSE Linux 8.9.3-0.1) with SMTP id AAA19469 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 1 Jun 2000 00:41:03 +0200 From: <denis.bider@siol.net> Sender: "denis bider" <denis@denisbider.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Microsoft Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2000 00:41:44 +0200 Message-ID: <000001bfcb51$667cfd00$0201010a@1div0.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook CWS, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Hello, I am developing a certificate-generating application that will be employed in a Microsoft-based environment. I am looking from someone in Microsoft who has the technical insight about how certificate verification has been implemented in IIS, and perhaps also Microsoft Outlook. Is there, perhaps, someone who is reading this list who would know something about this, or someone who would have the appropriate contacts? If so, I would be much obliged if you could send me an email. Kind regards, denis bider Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA14162 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 10:05:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id TAA09388; Wed, 31 May 2000 19:12:29 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Wed, 31 May 2000 19:12:47 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id TAA05309; Wed, 31 May 2000 19:12:28 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id TAA05938; Wed, 31 May 2000 19:12:28 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 19:12:28 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005311712.TAA05938@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr, roland@tuvit.net Subject: Re: Time Stamp V7 Data structure Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, jmanas@dit.upm.es, wes@surety.com, smatyas@us.ibm.com > > > > > I am re-opening it for two reasons: Since the first time (version 5 > > > discussion) I was expecting a change in the IETF document stating that > > > it is optional to have a mechanism identifier (object identifier) in the > > > time stamp request and I also expected a modified data structure > > > allowing to use the option. None of this happened. This information is a > > > prerequisite for developers willing to implement an IETF and ISO > > > compatible TSA. > > This is not quite true: > > > This is a hard statement. There are at least two different ways to have > a default value as it was proposed by Tom: either the default is > interpreted as non-existent or as a pre-set value. And I had the > impression that for the latter at least an indicator is needed to point > out that this field will be used. The 'This' in my message may be misleading: I am refering to 'None of this happened'. > > > It has been proposed not to indicate a mechanism identifier inside > > the information but to allow two different ways secure time > > stamps: > > > > - one is using SignedData > > > > - the other one is using DigestedData to support all cases > > where you need a mechanism: The mechanism identifier would > > become the digestalgorithm. > > > > Thus, you have BOTH a way to indicate a mechanism, and a modified > > data structure. > > Yes that's a solution but not a straight-forward one. And it does not > lead to interoperability for the the ISO protocol is a superset and we > are trying to achieve a common set. That's why I re-opened the > discussion. That seems the point of the dispute. There are TWO proposals. Both the current text of the IETF standard and the ISO proposal may be considered supersets of what we had before. But: The ISO protocol for the format of a time stamp token (not just the info) is NOT a superset, since it encapsulates the signature and data in another sequence. Thus ISO already has another token format, and the mechanism stuff is an inner detail. The IETF proposal is a superset of the original IETF text that allows to provide the SAME functionality as the ISO proposal. It is possible to convert both formats (four cases) - input IETF signeddata : output: a sequence of the content and signeddata without the content - input IETF digesteddata output: a sequence of the messagedigest and a modified content where the digest algo is inserted as 'mechanism in the ISO stamp stamp info - input ISO sequence without mechanism (thus IETF signature assumed as default) output a signeddata where the content is inserted - input ISO sequence WITH mechanism output a digestedData where the mechanism is removed in the content, and used as digestalgorithm. Indeed the last case is somewhat strange because in order to validate the token you need to insert the algorithm into the data structure first. You didn't comment the statements below which are the essential ones. - The proposed solution is using the following rule: 1 - you have a time stamp content 2 - you have a protecting envelope (signature, method based information) - The method indication is assumed to be logically part of the protecting envelope and not of the content. > > > > By this proposal one avoids to create another new ASN1 structures > > and remains completely in the scope of CMS/PKCS7. > > > > The top level data structure of a 'time stamp token' could > > be either : > > > > - a document conforming to a cryptographic message syntax > > - a sequence of some data and whatever protection of that data > > > > This anyway a matter of taste. > > > > One could also create a mime multipart/timestamp to allow having > > two interpreters for the different parts, etc. > > > > Peter Sylvester > > > > > Roland Mueller Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA13756 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 09:52:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA42836; Wed, 31 May 2000 19:00:24 +0200 Message-ID: <39354522.2884AE16@bull.net> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 19:00:18 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Roland Mueller <roland@tuvit.net> CC: IETF-PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, Wes Doonan <wes@surety.com>, "Jose A. Ma~n" <jmanas@dit.upm.es>, Mike Matyas <smatyas@us.ibm.com> Subject: Re: Time Stamp V7 Data structure References: <39348853.D52E6383@tuvit.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Roland, > This is a kind of re-opening the issue of aligning the actual ISO draft > on time stamping with version 07 of the PKIX time stamping draft. > > I am re-opening it for two reasons: Since the first time (version 5 > discussion) I was expecting a change in the IETF document stating that > it is optional to have a mechanism identifier (object identifier) in the > time stamp request and I also expected a modified data structure > allowing to use the option. None of this happened. This information is a > prerequisite for developers willing to implement an IETF and ISO > compatible TSA. > > The answer I received from the eeditor on the change of the data > structure was from my point of view sufficient for it only meant an > endorsement to use additional elements in the ISO data structure: "For > the request the additional element will be in the ISO request, NOT in > the IETF request." The structure of the request in the (next) version of the TSP document that I am maintaining is the following: TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER { v1(1) }, messageImprint MessageImprint, --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be --time stamped reqPolicy PolicyInformation OPTIONAL, nonce INTEGER OPTIONAL, certReq BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extensions [0] IMPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } The ISO document *could* use an additional default parameter (defaulted to mean the IETF protocol where only signed TSTs exist) to signal that this is the ISO protocol and then *could* signal the OID of the mechanism in the extensions field (if there are more than one). An *example* of that case would be: TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER { v1(1) }, protocolIdentifier ProtocolIdentifier DEFAULT v1, messageImprint MessageImprint, --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be --time stamped reqPolicy PolicyInformation OPTIONAL, nonce INTEGER OPTIONAL, certReq BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extensions [0] IMPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } ProtocolIdentifier ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } -- v1 means the IETF protocol defined in TSP. -- v2 means the ISO protocol for the response -- as defined in ISO XXXX-2. -- v3 means the ISO protocol for the response -- as defined in ISO XXXX-3. Another simpler *example* would be to use the following addition (instead of protocolIdentifier) between the fields version and messageImprint: protocolISO BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, -- when the boolean is true, this means the ISO protocols -- as defined in ISO XXXX-2 and ISO XXXX-3. -- when the boolean is false, this means the IETF protocol -- as defined in the document TSP in RFC XXXX. In this way, an IETF client talking to an ISO/IETF compliant server still uses the current request (without any addition) as defined in the TSP document. The ISO/IETF compliant server will compile the ISO description of the request and thus can easily detect which of the two options is being used. An ISO client talking to an IETF server will not get any service and will be returned with an error. An ISO client talking to an ISO server can obtain whatever ISO decides. There are many other ways. Among them, a much simpler (but not cleaner !) solution, without the addition of any other parameter: If ISO starts version numbers of their protocols with, let us say, 100, then there is very little chance that IETF versions will ever reach that number. :-) Note: we have to make sure that there exists at least one solution, but this is not a task of the IETF to decide which solution to pick up for ISO. So once ISO has made a decision, it would be "nice" for the IETF to know about it. > That means, ISO gets endorsement for its data structure. I was asking > for a change in the IETF data structure, the mechanism Identifier > element ALREADY exists in the ISO Time stamp request data structure. > > On the other hand I have to express that the adoption of a mechanism > identifier into the time stamp token is required to allow proper > interpretation by the recipient of such a token. If the mechanism used > for generating the token cannot be identified then the validity of a > time stamp cannot be checked if it is not the IETF mechanism. If time > stamps are generated using a mechanism different from the IETF draft and > there is no information provided within the token what mechanism was > used to generate the time stamp then a verifier does not know how to > proceed. If the time stamp was generated with one of the mechanisms > proposed in the ISO draft then information is needed to successfully > verify the validity of the time stamp. Otherwise an ISO time stamp is > not usable by recipients of the time stamp for they cannot verify its > validity. About the structure of the response, On May 2, I responded privately to you with the following: A proposal has been made to use DigestInfo, which solves your concern, not in the way that was originally requested, but which allows a server to send back a response that may be either IETF conformant or ISO conformant. On April 19, I responded privately to you with the following: TimeStampToken is defined in the document as: TimeStampToken ::= ContentInfo -- contentType is id-signedData ([CMS]) -- content is SignedData ([CMS]) It has been proposed that ISO uses DigestInfo instead of SignedData as defined in the CMS structure. This also means that ISO will have to register the algorithm(s) that are needed to describe what kind of crypto technique will be used. When this will be done, we (i.e. the PKIX WG) might extend the definition of the id-signatureTimeStampToken defined in the annex A to support DigestInfo in addition to SignedData. As the IETF process mandates to wait at least 6 months after the I-D is issued and to have two interoperable independent implementations, we could make the change at that time, provided that your data structure is well defined at that time and your algorithm(s) is/are registered. This explains why no change to the response in the IETF document is needed at that time and also explains that a change to the annex A might be done 6 months from now. Denis Note: Do not expect another E-mail from me soon. I will only be back in my office next monday. > Let me explain the need for the mechanism identifier in the request also > in an example: A client using the IETF protocol may communicate with > either an ISO or an IETF TSA when requesting a time stamp; this will > cause no problem for the ISO TSA will understand the request of the > client. > > The situation gets more difficult if the client uses the ISO protocol. A > TSA only understanding IETF requests will detect general incompatibility > and answer with an error; this leaves the client without a time stamp if > he cannot switch to the other protocol. And this is not called > alignement but downward compatibility. And we should try to achieve > interoperability which means an agreed minimum level of communications. > The accepted changes do not allow communications in both directions. > > And that does not help any of the standardisation bodies, neither the > IETF nor ISO. > > That's in short why I am convinced that the discussion on the acceptance > of these topics has to be reopened. > > What is needed most urgently is a mechanism identifier in the time stamp > request and in the time stamp response (i.e. within the time stamp > token). And that is the only way I can imagine that allows > interoperability between the two approaches. Thanks again for your > patience and support. > > Roland Received: from firewall.andxor.it (firewall.andxor.it [195.223.2.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA13024 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 09:12:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from com-and.com (lello.andxor.it [195.223.2.223]) by firewall.andxor.it (8.9.2/8.9.2) with ESMTP id SAA49776; Wed, 31 May 2000 18:26:31 +0200 (CEST) (envelope-from r.galli@com-and.com) Message-ID: <39353B4D.67DEB540@com-and.com> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 18:18:21 +0200 From: Raffaello Galli <r.galli@com-and.com> Organization: C&A X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.5 [en] (WinNT; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com CC: mzolotarev@baltimore.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Timestamp: id for token References: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFD1@panda.chrysalis-its.com> Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------F032D8B75A2BD8E2AAD7C652" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------F032D8B75A2BD8E2AAD7C652 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit The italian legislation requires a CA to have a TSA. A totally independent third party TSA (i.e. using a self signed certificate) is considered a CA (because creates its own certificates) and is requested to be accepted, by the government, as a CA. Because of this restriction and other (ITSEC) for a CA is simpler to use a local owned and trusted TSA. That is the way most of the italian CA are doing (at least the one that are operating with our TSA). Raffaello FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com wrote: > Michael, > > Do you know if the Italian legislation mandates if these time stamps that a > CA must obtain must come from a totally independent third party TSA (i.e. > using a self signed certificate) or they could come from a TSA trusted by > that CA (e.g. with a certificate issued by that CA)? > > Regards, > > Francois > ___________________________________ > Francois Rousseau > Director of Standards and Conformance > Chrysalis-ITS > 1688 Woodward Drive > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 > > -----Original Message----- > From: Michael Zolotarev [mailto:mzolotarev@baltimore.com] > Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2000 12:43 AM > To: Joerg Seidel; Manger, James H > Cc: 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > Subject: RE: Timestamp: id for token > > Case1: > > Italian legislation mandates that a CA obtains a time stamp for each > published cert and CRLs. It also mandates that the TSA maintains the archive > of all issued timestamps for the life span of the TSA key. So that the CA > can be relieved from keeping the actual tokens. > > [snip] --------------F032D8B75A2BD8E2AAD7C652 Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="r.galli.vcf" Content-Description: Card for Raffaello Galli Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="r.galli.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit begin:vcard n:Galli;Raffaello tel;cell:03482877460 tel;fax:++.39.2.24791826 tel;home:Please call me at work. tel;work:++.39.2.24791823 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:www.com-and.com org:C & A;Improve Your Security adr:;;Viale Fulvio testi 126 ;Cinisello Balsamo (MI);ITALY;20092;ITALY version:2.1 email;internet:r.galli@com-and.com title:Responsabile Tecnologie note:Improving Your Security --- In God we Trust (sometimes) -- all others must submit an X.509 certificate --- x-mozilla-cpt:;-30464 end:vcard --------------F032D8B75A2BD8E2AAD7C652-- Received: from roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil (roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.70]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA12621 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:59:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil (root@localhost) by roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id MAA02703 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 12:00:57 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005311600.MAA02699@roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 12:03:19 -0400 (EDT) From: "David P. Kemp" <dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil> Reply-To: "David P. Kemp" <dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil> Subject: Re: What is the meaning of the "indirectCRL" flag To: ietf-pkix@imc.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-MD5: 2ri6TxKD2BcjQnGmjj/NTw== X-Mailer: dtmail 1.3.0 CDE Version 1.3 SunOS 5.7 sun4u sparc > From: "Bob Jueneman" <bjueneman@novell.com> > > Presumably the relying party's Enterprise should be allowed to issue in internal-only CRL > or the equivalent, and have it be accepted by the various relying parties, so long as that > Enterprise's certificate is in the relying party's cache of trusted CA certificates, whether > or not the name of that Enterprise had previously be listed in the Certificate Issuer Extension. A CRL revokes the binding between identity, key, and attributes that the CA established in the first place. If the Enterprise wants to revoke the privileges of a now-untrusted user, it should do something other than claim that the binding established by the certificate is no longer valid. (Unless the binding actually *is* no longer valid, in which case the Enterprise should request that the CA revoke the certificate.) Received: from c004.sfo.cp.net (c004-h005.c004.sfo.cp.net [209.228.14.76]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id IAA12337 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:55:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: (cpmta 23850 invoked from network); 31 May 2000 09:02:56 -0700 Received: from cs9361-155.austin.rr.com (HELO tuvit.net) (24.93.61.155) by smtp.tuvit.net with SMTP; 31 May 2000 09:02:56 -0700 X-Sent: 31 May 2000 16:02:56 GMT Message-ID: <393537AF.C13F7897@tuvit.net> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 11:02:55 -0500 From: Roland Mueller <roland@tuvit.net> Organization: TUVIT Inc. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en,pdf MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> CC: IETF-PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "Manas, Jose A." <jmanas@dit.upm.es>, "Doonan, Wes" <wes@surety.com>, "Matyas, Mike" <smatyas@us.ibm.com> Subject: Re: Time Stamp V7 Data structure References: <200005311535.RAA05909@emeriau.edelweb.fr> Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------418001B9CC70937931457ABB" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------418001B9CC70937931457ABB Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hello Peter, Peter Sylvester wrote: > > > > > This is a kind of re-opening the issue of aligning the actual ISO draft > > on time stamping with version 07 of the PKIX time stamping draft. > > > > I am re-opening it for two reasons: Since the first time (version 5 > > discussion) I was expecting a change in the IETF document stating that > > it is optional to have a mechanism identifier (object identifier) in the > > time stamp request and I also expected a modified data structure > > allowing to use the option. None of this happened. This information is a > > prerequisite for developers willing to implement an IETF and ISO > > compatible TSA. > This is not quite true: > This is a hard statement. There are at least two different ways to have a default value as it was proposed by Tom: either the default is interpreted as non-existent or as a pre-set value. And I had the impression that for the latter at least an indicator is needed to point out that this field will be used. > It has been proposed not to indicate a mechanism identifier inside > the information but to allow two different ways secure time > stamps: > > - one is using SignedData > > - the other one is using DigestedData to support all cases > where you need a mechanism: The mechanism identifier would > become the digestalgorithm. > > Thus, you have BOTH a way to indicate a mechanism, and a modified > data structure. Yes that's a solution but not a straight-forward one. And it does not lead to interoperability for the the ISO protocol is a superset and we are trying to achieve a common set. That's why I re-opened the discussion. > > By this proposal one avoids to create another new ASN1 structures > and remains completely in the scope of CMS/PKCS7. > > The top level data structure of a 'time stamp token' could > be either : > > - a document conforming to a cryptographic message syntax > - a sequence of some data and whatever protection of that data > > This anyway a matter of taste. > > One could also create a mime multipart/timestamp to allow having > two interpreters for the different parts, etc. > > Peter Sylvester > > Roland Mueller --------------418001B9CC70937931457ABB Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="roland.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for Roland Mueller Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="roland.vcf" begin:vcard n:Mueller;Roland tel;fax:(512) 795-0495 tel;work:(512) 795-0494 x-mozilla-html:FALSE org:TUVIT Inc. version:2.1 email;internet:roland@tuvit.net adr;quoted-printable:;;8716 North MoPac=0D=0ASuite 220;Austin;Texas;78759;U.S.A. x-mozilla-cpt:;-1 fn:Mueller, Roland end:vcard --------------418001B9CC70937931457ABB-- Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA11899 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:42:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id RAA08134; Wed, 31 May 2000 17:50:22 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Wed, 31 May 2000 17:50:22 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id RAA04894; Wed, 31 May 2000 17:50:19 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id RAA05917; Wed, 31 May 2000 17:50:19 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 17:50:19 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005311550.RAA05917@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: tgindin@us.ibm.com, roland@tuvit.net Subject: Re: Time Stamp V7 Data structure Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, wes@surety.com, jmanas@dit.upm.es, smatyas@us.ibm.com The last two drafts of the text also contain serveral incompatible changes to the asn1 syntaxes, is there some attempt to get an alignment? > > as far as I understand the recent draft of the IETF there is nothing > mentioning interoperability with the ISO draft, i.e. at least an > optional data field (mechanism identifier). ISO has that field defined > as an optional one and that was agreed on in January within ISO members. > > ISO will be happy to specify a default value for PKIX mechanism in their > data structure. > > Roland Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA11493 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:32:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA33134; Wed, 31 May 2000 17:39:49 +0200 Message-ID: <39353243.5E7094FD@bull.net> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 17:39:47 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: AIA usage in TSA Certificate References: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFD2@panda.chrysalis-its.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit François, You are right. However the issue is progressing using some private E-mail discusssions and I think that very soon (this week or next week) we will be ready to post a proposal. Just wait a few days more... :-) Denis > > Denis, > > I do not recall that the issue around the optional usage of the AIA > extension in a TSA certificate was ever settle. If it was, what was the > final resolution? > > Regards, > > Francois > ___________________________________ > Francois Rousseau > Director of Standards and Conformance > Chrysalis-ITS > 1688 Woodward Drive > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA11199 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:27:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id RAA07794; Wed, 31 May 2000 17:35:07 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Wed, 31 May 2000 17:35:07 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id RAA04819; Wed, 31 May 2000 17:35:05 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id RAA05909; Wed, 31 May 2000 17:35:05 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 17:35:05 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005311535.RAA05909@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, roland@tuvit.net Subject: Re: Time Stamp V7 Data structure Cc: wes@surety.com, jmanas@dit.upm.es, smatyas@us.ibm.com > > This is a kind of re-opening the issue of aligning the actual ISO draft > on time stamping with version 07 of the PKIX time stamping draft. > > I am re-opening it for two reasons: Since the first time (version 5 > discussion) I was expecting a change in the IETF document stating that > it is optional to have a mechanism identifier (object identifier) in the > time stamp request and I also expected a modified data structure > allowing to use the option. None of this happened. This information is a > prerequisite for developers willing to implement an IETF and ISO > compatible TSA. This is not quite true: It has been proposed not to indicate a mechanism identifier inside the information but to allow two different ways secure time stamps: - one is using SignedData - the other one is using DigestedData to support all cases where you need a mechanism: The mechanism identifier would become the digestalgorithm. Thus, you have BOTH a way to indicate a mechanism, and a modified data structure. By this proposal one avoids to create another new ASN1 structures and remains completely in the scope of CMS/PKCS7. The top level data structure of a 'time stamp token' could be either : - a document conforming to a cryptographic message syntax - a sequence of some data and whatever protection of that data This anyway a matter of taste. One could also create a mime multipart/timestamp to allow having two interpreters for the different parts, etc. Peter Sylvester Received: from europe.std.com (europe.std.com [199.172.62.20]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA10801 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:22:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from world.std.com (geer@world-f.std.com [199.172.62.5]) by europe.std.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA05542; Wed, 31 May 2000 11:30:17 -0400 (EDT) Received: from localhost (geer@localhost) by world.std.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id LAA04585; Wed, 31 May 2000 11:30:16 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005311530.LAA04585@world.std.com> X-Authentication-Warning: world.std.com: geer@localhost didn't use HELO protocol To: Rich Salz <rsalz@caveosystems.com> cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: What is the meaning of the "indirectCRL" flag In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 31 May 2000 09:41:18 EDT." <3935167E.AE4D6975@caveosystems.com> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 11:30:16 -0400 From: Dan Geer <geer@world.std.com> > I believe that the more "important" or "valuable" a certificate is > -- and I am deliberately using vague terms since they are highly > context-specific -- the longer and more involved the > due-diligence/registration process should be. Therefore, your > highly trusted, highly important CA should be off-line except for > those few moments when it needs to sign something. > > Conversely (or should that be "perversely" :), in the event of a > compromise of one of those certificates, speed of revocation is > paramount. Therefore, delegating revocation to an on-line, > always-up, CRL (or OCSP) server is a good thing. downside risk due to certificate compromise: * inversely proportional to certificate's depth in certification hierarchy procedural costs of from-first-principles revocation testing: * proportional to certificate's depth in certification hierarchy because the above curves cross: * separation of issuance and revocation is practically advantageous * neglecting to check very distal certificates is economically rational --dan Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA10627 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:21:40 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQWY1VLQ>; Wed, 31 May 2000 11:30:11 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFD2@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: AIA usage in TSA Certificate Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 11:29:43 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Denis, I do not recall that the issue around the optional usage of the AIA extension in a TSA certificate was ever settle. If it was, what was the final resolution? Regards, Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from mail.spyrus.com (mail.spyrus.com [207.212.34.20]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA10542 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:20:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rhousley_laptop.spyrus.com ([209.172.119.206]) by mail.spyrus.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA12639; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:27:40 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000530184903.00a5a410@mail.spyrus.com> X-Sender: rhousley@mail.spyrus.com (Unverified) X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 18:56:42 -0400 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> From: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> Subject: Re: Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03 Cc: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie, ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <392D494A.7DD543C2@bull.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Denis: I guess that I do not object to the bulk of the rework in the Introduction that you propose. This paragraph is an exception. I do not agree at all. >An AC may be used with various security services like: > > 1. access control in a client-server protocol environment, > 2. data origin authentication in either a client-server protocol > or a store-and-forward environment, and > 3. non-repudiation in a store-and-forward environment. 1. Access control is not limited to interactive protocols. For example, an AC containing clearance may determine whether e-mail should be sent to a particular recipient or not. 3. Some protocols that are defined as interactive have portions of the PDU that persist. For example, signed portions of the SET protocol were intended to provide proof that the cardholder's private key was involved in the transaction. I would consider this non-repudiation, or at least support of non-repudiation. I can easily imagine an AC specifying a short-term credit limit being included in such evidence. In other words, I do not think the type of protocol determines which security services can be supported by an AC. Russ Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA10366 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:19:00 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQWY1VLJ>; Wed, 31 May 2000 11:27:31 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFD1@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: mzolotarev@baltimore.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Timestamp: id for token Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 11:27:00 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Michael, Do you know if the Italian legislation mandates if these time stamps that a CA must obtain must come from a totally independent third party TSA (i.e. using a self signed certificate) or they could come from a TSA trusted by that CA (e.g. with a certificate issued by that CA)? Regards, Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 -----Original Message----- From: Michael Zolotarev [mailto:mzolotarev@baltimore.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2000 12:43 AM To: Joerg Seidel; Manger, James H Cc: 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' Subject: RE: Timestamp: id for token Case1: Italian legislation mandates that a CA obtains a time stamp for each published cert and CRLs. It also mandates that the TSA maintains the archive of all issued timestamps for the life span of the TSA key. So that the CA can be relieved from keeping the actual tokens. [snip] Received: from c004.sfo.cp.net (c004-h009.c004.sfo.cp.net [209.228.14.66]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id IAA10111 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:14:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: (cpmta 16469 invoked from network); 31 May 2000 08:22:09 -0700 Received: from cs9361-155.austin.rr.com (HELO tuvit.net) (24.93.61.155) by smtp.tuvit.net with SMTP; 31 May 2000 08:22:09 -0700 X-Sent: 31 May 2000 15:22:09 GMT Message-ID: <39352E1E.88CB23@tuvit.net> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 10:22:06 -0500 From: Roland Mueller <roland@tuvit.net> Organization: TUVIT Inc. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en,pdf MIME-Version: 1.0 To: tgindin@us.ibm.com CC: IETF-PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, Wes Doonan <wes@surety.com>, "Jose A. Ma~n" <jmanas@dit.upm.es>, smatyas@us.ibm.com Subject: Re: Time Stamp V7 Data structure References: <852568F0.0050791E.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------5CA9DFB7CF0A79148CAB52BF" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------5CA9DFB7CF0A79148CAB52BF Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Tom, as far as I understand the recent draft of the IETF there is nothing mentioning interoperability with the ISO draft, i.e. at least an optional data field (mechanism identifier). ISO has that field defined as an optional one and that was agreed on in January within ISO members. ISO will be happy to specify a default value for PKIX mechanism in their data structure. Roland --------------5CA9DFB7CF0A79148CAB52BF Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="roland.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for Roland Mueller Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="roland.vcf" begin:vcard n:Mueller;Roland tel;fax:(512) 795-0495 tel;work:(512) 795-0494 x-mozilla-html:FALSE org:TUVIT Inc. version:2.1 email;internet:roland@tuvit.net adr;quoted-printable:;;8716 North MoPac=0D=0ASuite 220;Austin;Texas;78759;U.S.A. x-mozilla-cpt:;-1 fn:Mueller, Roland end:vcard --------------5CA9DFB7CF0A79148CAB52BF-- Received: from roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil (roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.70]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA09459 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 07:56:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil (root@localhost) by roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id KAA14607 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 10:57:52 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005311457.KAA14589@roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 10:59:34 -0400 (EDT) From: "David P. Kemp" <dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil> Reply-To: "David P. Kemp" <dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil> Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification To: ietf-pkix@imc.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-MD5: jl7jivLNjnPGPRZ/qoFSWg== X-Mailer: dtmail 1.3.0 CDE Version 1.3 SunOS 5.7 sun4u sparc Bob, In the case of cert field verification, there is a clear binary distinction between explicitly endorsing placing NVI in certificates and explicitly deprecating the practice. That debate happened some time ago. It was decided at that time that NVI belongs somewhere other than in PK certificates (such as directories, LAN management databases, subject-signed Attribute certificates, or ...), that using PK certificates as a transport mechanism for such fluff simply because it's convenient is bad practice, and that defining an NVI flag would encourage the practice. There may be disagreement over the decision itself, or over the process by which it was made. There may be a request to debate the whole thing again and perhaps come to a different decision. But it cannot be said that the decision was made last week, and that a CA which was PKIX-conforming two weeks ago is not PKIX-conforming today. CAs which adhered to the RFC 2459 profile two weeks ago will adhere to RFC 2459bis regardless of whether it contains a statement of the obvious: that some communities may choose to replace the PKIX profile with something else. And given that CAs which choose not to conform with section 4.2.1.7 of RFC 2459 (January 1999) have a fig leaf (specifying in the CPS some minimal gesture that could plausibly, or even implausibly, pass for verification), the assertion that there was some substantive change within the last week related to NVI and PKIX conformance is pure horsewater. - - - - - - On the topic of non-repudiation, I admit to being disappointed that the WG couldn't reach agreement on my point of view :-)! (that key usage bit 1 means "Persistent Data Origin Authentication With Third Party Proof", that "technical non-repudiation" is an acceptable term for PDOAWTPP, and that there are objective processing and handling differences between PDOAWTPP keys, Entity Authentication keys, and Key Establishment keys which make it inadvisable to deprecate the bit entirely). But given that PKIX could not reach agreement after interminable months of discussion, I don't see what could be done other than punt and let individual communities (individually and cooperatively) profile use of the bit as they see fit. If that is what you meant by "letting commercial practice sort out the issue", we agree that no obviously better course of action is apparent. Regards, Dave > Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 11:43:24 -0600 > From: "Bob Jueneman" <bjueneman@novell.com> > Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> > Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification > > Let me offer some comments on what I believe is a very important, > and obviously contentious issue. > > In the past, the IETF has been primarily concerned with issues of > over-the-wire protocol and structures, and the syntactic definitions > of those fields. > > Other issues, and in particular issues that pertained to commercial > business practices and/or various (potential) legal issues have generally > been left to the relevant experts in those fields to define. > > In particular, the tradition within the IETF has been to espouse only > purely technical issues, regardless of their potential business impact -- > indeed, sometimes amazingly oblivious to such issues. > > As a result, the PKIX WG (and X.509) is, at least in my mind, notorious > for failing to adequately come to grips with the precise semantic meaning > of many of the terms that are defined. As a case in point, I would cite > the complete lack of any agreement whatsoever as to the > semantic meaning of the "nonrepudiation" key usage, either from a legal > perspective or a narrower, but still useful set of do/don't do perspectives that > would apply to end user software, either the CA, the originator, or the relying > party. > > As a result, the term is neither defined, nor deprecated. Apparently the > consensus was to let commercial practice sort out the issue, and perhaps > this is in fact the best course. > > The PKIX WG, has long since departed from the traditional IETF practice > of "rough consensus and running code". Now we are institutionalizing > some of the most disliked features of ISO and we have become a > "design-by-committee" organization. Unlike ISO, however, where various > countries explicitly take into account various national objectives, and weigh, > or at least try to weigh, the various commercial interests before coming to > agreement, we generally fail to do so. > > The IETF lacks any form of institutional representation of business interests -- > every contributor's comment or vote is treated exactly the same as every other, > regardless of how small or how large the contributor's company's stake might > be the in the outcome. > > That's of course very democratic, and everyone has a more or less equal chance > to carry the day based on their individual fervor and ability to persuade. Unfortunately, > this tends to mean that anyone can propose his own pet rock for standards > consideration, regardless of the commercial viability of that approach. > > I am particularly thinking of the blatant anti-intellectual property preferences > of the IESG, and their instance on including as mandatory features encryption > algorithms which have not been well accepted in the marketplace. The various > working groups then exacerbate the problem by adding more and more features and > algorithms to the list of "approved" or "standard" featured, often at the behest of > a very small community of interest. Yet every one of these additional features takes > some amount of additional coding (generally not too large) to implement, plus > significantly more in terms of GUIs and documentation, and an exponentially > increasing amount of testing, all for little or no consumer benefit. > > But because of the importance of standards per se, the products are under a > considerable amount of pressure to be "conforming" to requirements that have > not been validated by the user community, and to which the user community had little or > no say so, and the cost and complexity inevitably leads to both buggy and > expensive software > > On the other hand, existing commercial practices may suddenly be deemed to be > inappropriate or nonconforming, sometimes despite a considerable body of commercial > acceptance, in a rather high-handed "father knows best" attitude. Since the commercial > entities may have only a few representatives, they may not be able to offset the > opinions offered by others with competing interests. > > I believe this is an increasingly unsatisfactory state of affairs, and may eventually lead > to the IETF being regarded as more or less irrelevant to both the vendor and the > user community, particularly if existing commercial practices are suddenly, and perhaps > rather capriciously, labeled as being non-conforming. > > Now, how does this apply to the current controversy? > > By not adopting either an opt-out indication that certain perhaps useful > information has not been explicitly validated by the CA, perhaps because it isn't > economically feasible to do so, the implication is that everything in the certificate > is God's own BINARY truth. And if you don't believe that, go off and read 80 > or more pages of legalese to determine exactly what is meant. Of course computer > programs can't do that, so we will resort to more and more complex schemes of > policy OIDs, policy constraints, name constraints, etc., until we have no interoperability > at all, or otherwise the relying parties will decide to limit the amount of trust that > they put in a certificate to a lowest common denominator across the entire > industry. > > I would submit that neither approach is very helpful. > > We don't even seem to be able to agree as to what the problem is. > > Denis Pinckas says: > > >In RFC 2459, section 4.1.2.6 Subject, we currently have: > > > Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 > > distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject > > entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. A > > CA may issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same > > subject entity. > > >Let us suppose that we use an *empty* distinguished name (which is > >allowed by the standard). Should the above property also apply to > >the alternative name ? I would think so and I understood > >"definitively bound" as equivalent to "unique". In other words the > >subject Alternative name once assigned must never be re-assigned for > >a different entity by the CA. To this respect, the other fields that > >where mentioned are not "definitively bound". So you now understand > >the rational of the change that was made. > > I won't say that Denis' argument doesn't make any sense at all, but > equating "definitively bound" to "unique" seems to me to be a very great > leap. > > At least to me, "definitively bound" inherently implies the "correctness" of the > attribute that is bound to the key, and by implication to the persona who is > affiliated with that attribute in some fashion. > > Granted, if the name is merely a e-mail address or post office box, it is very difficult > and perhaps impossible to correlate that name to any particular real person, even if > (especially if) it is Bill_Clinton@aol.com. > > On the other hand, if the DN (or any other field in the certificate) does presumably > uniquely define an organizational or residential person by a globally unique name, > then a reasonable inference to be drawn from the certificate which binds both > the DN and subjectAltName to the same key is that they same persona is somehow > involved. > > Does that mean that the identified user has sole and exclusive access to that > e-mail address (i.e., his spouse and kids don't share the same mail box), or that he > even bothers to read his mail there? Not necessarily. > > Then exactly what does "validate", much less "definitively bound" mean in this > circumstance? I don't like to have to say so, but the only option at this point is to > say "go read the CP/CPS". > > The biggest problem, I believe, is that we are attempting to apply rather > Procrustean binary logic to a problem that inherently involves shades of gray. > > We can say "This value is either a 1 or a 0, and that's that.", but this is subject > to potentially hidden provisos in the CP or CPS, "for suitably defined values of 1 > and/or 0". > > Trying to say that something is "right" or "not right", regardless of existing > commercial practice would seem to pretend to a moral and/or legal > authority that the IETF simply doesn't command, unless the Pope has suddenly > become a silent co-chair. > > On the other hand, saying nothing at all, and leaving it up to a completely laissez faire > interpretation a la nonrepudiation isn't very helpful or useful either. > > That's one reason why in the Novell Security Attributes extension we include in > all of our certificates, we define a "Certificate Class" that ranges from 0 to 255, > in an attempt to define some shades of gray between a completely anonymous user > and a sovereign government. > > Cf. http://developer.novell.com/repository/attributes/certattrs_v10.htm . > > Regards, > > Bob > > Robert R. Jueneman > Security Architect > Novell, Inc. Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA08929 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 07:44:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA35292; Wed, 31 May 2000 16:51:37 +0200 Message-ID: <393526F8.38E8E523@bull.net> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 16:51:36 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol References: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFCF@panda.chrysalis-its.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit François, > Salut Denis, > > I agree with both the word change and the proposed pointer. > > However, I still think that leaving the term "timeliness" in Section 2.2 > could be misinterpreted to mean that a requesting entity MUST reject a > totally valid response because of possible delays in the intervening network > elements and/or a drifting of this requesting entity own local time > reference. > > According to Section 2.2, what would a requesting entity be required to do > if he/she receives a time stamp token with the right hash value and nonce, > however the time included in the response is before or very much later than > his/her own local trusted time reference? The current sentence is: ... by verifying *either* the time included in the response against a local trusted time reference, if one is available, *and/or* the value of the nonce (large random number with a high probability that it is generated by the client only once) included in the response against the value included in the request. Instead of "and/or", we could say "or". Would this solve your concern ? Denis > Regards, > > Francois > ___________________________________ > Francois Rousseau > Director of Standards and Conformance > Chrysalis-ITS > 1688 Woodward Drive > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 > > -----Original Message----- > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2000 4:19 AM > To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol > > François, > > I have inserted your text, with one change, in the security > considerations section of the "moving draft" I am locally > maintening. > > Instead of: If the same hash value is *generated* more than once > within a time window, > > I have inserted: If the same hash value is *present* more than once > within a time window, > > About your proposal of changing the text in section 2.2., I believe > that the current text is fine. Deleting "timeliness" and replacing > is by "replay" is more restrictive. We could however add a pointer > to the security consideration section, like: "For more details, > about replay attack detection see the security considerations > section (item 6)". > > Denis Received: from e2.ny.us.ibm.com (e2.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.102]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA08666 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 07:37:07 -0700 (PDT) From: tgindin@us.ibm.com Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.22]) by e2.ny.us.ibm.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA232174; Wed, 31 May 2000 10:37:23 -0400 Received: from D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com (d51mta04.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.32]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.8.8m3/NCO v4.9) with SMTP id KAA105808; Wed, 31 May 2000 10:39:08 -0400 Received: by D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568F0.00507B37 ; Wed, 31 May 2000 10:39:04 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: IBMUS To: Roland Mueller <roland@tuvit.net> cc: IETF-PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, Wes Doonan <wes@surety.com>, "Jose A. Ma~n" <jmanas@dit.upm.es>, smatyas@us.ibm.com Message-ID: <852568F0.0050791E.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 10:38:56 -0400 Subject: Re: Time Stamp V7 Data structure Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline May I ask what happened to the suggestion that mechanism identifier in the ISO version be given a DEFAULT value which would be assigned to the PKIX mechanism? That would probably allow the ISO version to be used to communicate with the current draft. Tom Gindin Roland Mueller <roland@tuvit.net> on 05/30/2000 11:34:43 PM To: IETF-PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> cc: Wes Doonan <wes@surety.com>, "Jose A. Ma~n" <jmanas@dit.upm.es>, Stephen Matyas/Poughkeepsie/IBM@IBMUS Subject: Time Stamp V7 Data structure This is a kind of re-opening the issue of aligning the actual ISO draft on time stamping with version 07 of the PKIX time stamping draft. I am re-opening it for two reasons: Since the first time (version 5 discussion) I was expecting a change in the IETF document stating that it is optional to have a mechanism identifier (object identifier) in the time stamp request and I also expected a modified data structure allowing to use the option. None of this happened. This information is a prerequisite for developers willing to implement an IETF and ISO compatible TSA. The answer I received from the eeditor on the change of the data structure was from my point of view sufficient for it only meant an endorsement to use additional elements in the ISO data structure: "For the request the additional element will be in the ISO request, NOT in the IETF request." That means, ISO gets endorsement for its data structure. I was asking for a change in the IETF data structure, the mechanism Identifier element ALREADY exists in the ISO Time stamp request data structure. On the other hand I have to express that the adoption of a mechanism identifier into the time stamp token is required to allow proper interpretation by the recipient of such a token. If the mechanism used for generating the token cannot be identified then the validity of a time stamp cannot be checked if it is not the IETF mechanism. If time stamps are generated using a mechanism different from the IETF draft and there is no information provided within the token what mechanism was used to generate the time stamp then a verifier does not know how to proceed. If the time stamp was generated with one of the mechanisms proposed in the ISO draft then information is needed to successfully verify the validity of the time stamp. Otherwise an ISO time stamp is not usable by recipients of the time stamp for they cannot verify its validity. Let me explain the need for the mechanism identifier in the request also in an example: A client using the IETF protocol may communicate with either an ISO or an IETF TSA when requesting a time stamp; this will cause no problem for the ISO TSA will understand the request of the client. The situation gets more difficult if the client uses the ISO protocol. A TSA only understanding IETF requests will detect general incompatibility and answer with an error; this leaves the client without a time stamp if he cannot switch to the other protocol. And this is not called alignement but downward compatibility. And we should try to achieve interoperability which means an agreed minimum level of communications. The accepted changes do not allow communications in both directions. And that does not help any of the standardisation bodies, neither the IETF nor ISO. That's in short why I am convinced that the discussion on the acceptance of these topics has to be reopened. What is needed most urgently is a mechanism identifier in the time stamp request and in the time stamp response (i.e. within the time stamp token). And that is the only way I can imagine that allows interoperability between the two approaches. Thanks again for your patience and support. Roland Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA08425 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 07:30:38 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQWY1VG5>; Wed, 31 May 2000 10:38:59 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFCF@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 10:38:29 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id HAA08426 Salut Denis, I agree with both the word change and the proposed pointer. However, I still think that leaving the term "timeliness" in Section 2.2 could be misinterpreted to mean that a requesting entity MUST reject a totally valid response because of possible delays in the intervening network elements and/or a drifting of this requesting entity own local time reference. According to Section 2.2, what would a requesting entity be required to do if he/she receives a time stamp token with the right hash value and nonce, however the time included in the response is before or very much later than his/her own local trusted time reference? Regards, Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 -----Original Message----- From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2000 4:19 AM To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol François, I have inserted your text, with one change, in the security considerations section of the "moving draft" I am locally maintening. Instead of: If the same hash value is *generated* more than once within a time window, I have inserted: If the same hash value is *present* more than once within a time window, About your proposal of changing the text in section 2.2., I believe that the current text is fine. Deleting "timeliness" and replacing is by "replay" is more restrictive. We could however add a pointer to the security consideration section, like: "For more details, about replay attack detection see the security considerations section (item 6)". Denis Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA07966 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 07:14:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiroj25964; Wed, 31 May 2000 14:22:16 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA15780; Wed, 31 May 00 10:18:46 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id KAA09276; Wed, 31 May 2000 10:22:15 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14645.8214.900858.655099@xedia.com> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 10:22:14 -0400 (EDT) To: James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Timestamp: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BB3@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Manger," == Manger, James H <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> writes: Manger,> ...We could have two uncertainties: (1) the uncertainty between Manger,> genTime and UTC; and (2) the uncertainty between Manger,> "simultaneous" measurements by the TSA. If a TSA has many Manger,> clocks (e.g. one for each crypto engine) the second value is Manger,> the uncertainty in synchronisation between its own clocks. Manger,> However, I don't think this (or your BOOLEAN) is necessary. I agree with that conclusion. A clean way to solve it is to say that the rule for comparing timestamps with their accuracy (i.e., the partial order we've been talking about) applies to pairs of timestamps no matter what their source. In other words, it applies to a pair from a "single" source just as it does for timestamps from two independent TSAs. That's conservative (it is probable that the relative synchronization of multiple internal clocks is tighter than the synchronization to UTC) but I can't see that it hurts a whole lot. This takes care of the "large TSA" issue. It also takes care of the restart problem, where an "internal" clock is volatile but refreshed from a non-volatile reference at startup. That's of course the common PC model, and may well fit other types of devices too. Admittedly it is not all that likely that a box can restart in less time than 2 * accuracy, but it doesn't hurt to cover that case. Hm... if you assume a large modular TSA, should you assume it has a single global "sequence number" generator? Of course, if that data item is just a unique ID (e.g., hash) as has been argued, this is a non-issue. If it is an increasing number, though, then it has to be a single global resource, which would also be problematic in this scenario. Not as much as tightly synchronized clocks, admittedly. paul Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAB07702 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 07:07:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiroj16158; Wed, 31 May 2000 14:15:14 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA15677; Wed, 31 May 00 10:11:44 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id KAA09273; Wed, 31 May 2000 10:15:12 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14645.7792.607970.2291@xedia.com> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 10:15:12 -0400 (EDT) To: James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BB6@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Manger," == Manger, James H <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> writes: Manger,> Michael, >> How do you know when the "Time stops" and the "Order begins"? Manger,> You never need to know - that is the beauty. >> Stamp from TSA_1: 20000529053138.345Z. Accuracy = 1 sec. Stamp >> from TSA_2: 20000529053138.876Z. Accuracy = 1 sec How do I do it >> [compare the stamps]? Manger,> Consider T2 - T1. The best estimate (mean) is .876 - .345 = Manger,> .531. When subtracting measurements the uncertainty is the Manger,> square root of the sum of the squares of the individual Manger,> uncertainties: sd = sqrt(1^2 + 1^2) = 1.414. Manger,> => T2 - T1 = 0.531 +/- 1.414 Manger,> => Probability that T2 is after T1 = Pr(0 < x | x sample of Manger,> X = Normal-Distribution(mean=0.531, sd=1.414)) = Pr(-0.375 < Manger,> x | x sample of X = Standard-Normal-Distribution) = 0.65 Manger,> So there is a 65% chance that the stamp from TSA_1 was Manger,> issued before the stamp from TSA_2. Comparison done. I would rather describe this as "order is indeterminate", but if you are doing fuzzy logic then I guess an answer expressed as a probability may work. However, there are a couple of assumptions that are probably not warranted. First, I would not assume that "accuracy" is the standard deviation. I view it as guarantees on the timestamp. So you might use six sigma, but surely not one sigma. Second, you're (I believe) assuming normal distribution. That may not be valid. In fact, with commonly used crystal oscillators it is known not to be anywhere close to valid. This does indicate the need to spell out more carefully what "accuracy" is supposed to mean. If the consensus is that it's the standard deviation of an assumed normal distribution, I won't be happy about that but so long as it's written down at least I can take corrective measures. >> 1. Do I assume that .345 and .876 is just ordering? Manger,> No. Blame it on the fact my father is a metrologist, but I don't care at all for the inclusion of insignificant digits. As far as I am concerned, and as far as I've been trained, a value given as 123.456 +/- 1 is simply an error. paul Received: from mail-fwd.verio-web.com ([161.58.16.57]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id GAA07024 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 06:35:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from 161.58.117.181 (161.58.117.181) by mail11a.verio-web.com (RS ver 1.0.53) with SMTP id 0252032; Wed, 31 May 2000 09:42:28 -0400 (EDT) Sender: rsalz Message-ID: <3935167E.AE4D6975@caveosystems.com> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 09:41:18 -0400 From: Rich Salz <rsalz@caveosystems.com> Organization: Caveo Systems, Inc. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.2.14-5.0 i686) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Bob Jueneman <bjueneman@novell.com> CC: awa1@home.com, ccwilliams@ntlworld.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: What is the meaning of the "indirectCRL" flag References: <s933e699.056@prv-mail20.provo.novell.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Loop-Detect: 1 > I agree with the statement that normally, only the entity that issued > the certificate is allowed to revoke it, or more generally to respond negatively > to an inquiry about certificate status. I strongly disagree. I believe that the more "important" or "valuable" a certificate is -- and I am deliberately using vague terms since they are highly context-specific -- the longer and more involved the due-diligence/registration process should be. Therefore, your highly trusted, highly important CA should be off-line except for those few moments when it needs to sign something. Conversely (or should that be "perversely" :), in the event of a compromise of one of those certificates, speed of revocation is paramount. Therefore, delegating revocation to an on-line, always-up, CRL (or OCSP) server is a good thing. It is MUCH easier to recover from believing faulty revocation than from relying on a compromised certificate. /r$ Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FAA06305 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 05:55:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA07798; Wed, 31 May 2000 09:02:57 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005311302.JAA07798@ietf.org> To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: RFC Editor <rfc-editor@isi.edu> Cc: Internet Architecture Board <iab@isi.edu> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> Subject: Protocol Action: Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms to Proposed Standard Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 09:02:57 -0400 Sender: scoya@cnri.reston.va.us The IESG has approved the Internet-Draft 'Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms' <draft-ietf-pkix-dhpop-02.txt> as a Proposed Standard. This document is the product of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group. The IESG contact persons are Jeffrey Schiller and Marcus Leech. Technical Summary One of the important requirements in cryptographic protocols is the ability for an entity to prove they have possession of a particular key. In particular, Certifying Authorities prior to the issuance of a certificate, need to prove that the entity for which the certificate will be issued in fact does have the private key that corresponds to the public key which is included in the certificate. The traditional approach used with public key encryption systems such as the RSA system is to have the challenger require the entity holding a given private key to sign a challenge string. However the Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm does not directly lend itself to providing such signatures, as it is at heart a key agreement algorithm. This document describes two methods for producing a signature from a Diffie-Hellman key pair. Working Group Summary Consensus was reached on the approach used in this document. Protocol Quality Jeffrey I. Schiller reviewed this document for the IESG. Furthermore the PKIX Working Group contains members with significant cryptographic experience who also have reviewed this document. Note to RFC Editor: There were some word-wrapping problems introduced in Appendix A of the document that need to be corrected: Appendix A: OLD: DH-Sign DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN --EXPORTS ALL -- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use in -- the other ASN.1 modules. Other applications may use them for their -- own purposes. NEW/FIXED: DH-Sign DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN --EXPORTS ALL -- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use -- in the other ASN.1 modules. Other applications may use them -- for their own purposes. Received: from USCOMM02.aholdusa.com (mch215.aholdusa.com [207.198.9.215] (may be forged)) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id FAA06132 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 05:42:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: by USCOMM02.aholdusa.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568F0.00466DAD ; Wed, 31 May 2000 08:49:15 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: AHOLD From: "Rusty Gregg" <rgregg@aholdusa.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-ID: <852568F0.00466C4A.00@USCOMM02.aholdusa.com> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 08:53:44 -0400 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline unsubscribe Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FAA04669 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 05:05:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id OAA03594; Wed, 31 May 2000 14:12:48 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Wed, 31 May 2000 14:12:48 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id OAA03992; Wed, 31 May 2000 14:12:42 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id OAA05859; Wed, 31 May 2000 14:12:41 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 14:12:41 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005311212.OAA05859@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org All, You can safely forget my comments about the 'chosen plain text' attack from yesterday. I forgot that the message signing used in the time stamp always includes signed attributes. On the other hand I think one could still weaken the requierement that the Nonce of the time stamp must be identical to the one in the request and only require that it must be a prefix/suffix of it. Needless to say, that I am not sure whether a Nonce is ever need anyway, but that's another story. Sorry for the irritation that my comment might not have caused. peter Received: from balinese.baltimore.ie (firewall-user@pc215-8.indigo.ie [194.125.215.8]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA01776 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 03:39:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: by balinese.baltimore.ie; id LAA18650; Wed, 31 May 2000 11:47:03 +0100 (GMT/IST) Received: from bobcat.baltimore.ie(192.168.20.10) by balinese.baltimore.ie via smap (V4.2) id xma018633; Wed, 31 May 00 11:46:38 +0100 Received: from baltimore.ie ([192.168.20.134]) by bobcat.baltimore.ie (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA07681; Wed, 31 May 2000 11:46:26 +0100 Message-ID: <3934EDB1.8E0281E@baltimore.ie> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 11:47:13 +0100 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> Reply-To: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Organization: Baltimore Technologies Ltd. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Ambarish Malpani <ambarish@valicert.com> CC: "'Andy Dowling'" <andy.dowling@sse.ie>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Requirements for remote path processing services References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE2B413CC@seine.valicert.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Ambarish, Though what you suggest is possible, I think its just not in scope for PKIX. There are lots of reasons, but one is that there's really no point in us attempting to define an authorization protocol that can *only* use PKI based authentication. If we omit requirements to do with other forms of authentication (e.g. Kerberos, OTP, RADIUS,...) then we're just not doing a good job. I can't see any way to interpret the PKIX charter to incorporate such (real) requirements. Maybe you should look to the AAA WG to pursue this? Regards, Stephen. Ambarish Malpani wrote: > > Hi Andy, > You could use the remote path processing server (RPPS) to verify > ACs, or even better, you could actually use it to authorize > certain user actions and avoid needing to deal with ACs at all! > > In the case where you do trust the RPPS, the kind of query I expect > an application to send it, would be of the form: > "Can I trust this certificate to do the following action". > > At that state, I would fully expect the RPPS to go out and figure > out what the attributes of the certificate are, so, as an > application, you can be completely relieved of the job of > processing ACs at all. > > Does this make sense? > Regards, > Ambarish > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > Ambarish Malpani > Architect 650.567.5457 > ValiCert, Inc. ambarish@valicert.com > 339 N. Bernardo Ave. http://www.valicert.com > Mountain View, CA 94043 > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Andy Dowling [mailto:andy.dowling@sse.ie] > > Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 4:02 AM > > To: Paul Hoffman > > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > Subject: Re: Requirements for remote path processing services > > > > > > Paul + co., > > > > Having read your post, I was just wondering if these remote > > path processing > > services could be applied to ACs for authorisation purposes? I've put > > together a few points on the subject (see below). > > > > Comments would be appreciated. > > > > Regards, > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > 1) OVERVIEW > > > > In addition to remote path processing services: > > > > a) delegated path construction > > b) delegated path verification > > c) trust and policy centralisation > > > > that apply to public key certificates, there may be scope for > > the application of these services to authorisation-related > > certificates > > i.e. Attribute Certificates could be verified remotely by a single > > trusted entity, and this would bring the benefits of centralised > > trust/policy management and simpler clients. > > > > > > 2) MOTIVATION > > > > Firstly, let's present some arguments *against* introducing remote AC > > validation: > > > > a) The current profile for AC validation is relatively simpler than > > that of PKC validation: > > > > a) AC chains are not used > > b) AAControls is optional > > c) AC revocation checking is optional > > > > Consequently, a very minimal (and conformant) AC validator can be > > implemented and would be "lightweight" enough to provide > > on clients. > > > > b) AC validation for authorisation purposes is typically a server-side > > operation anyway, and clients would hardly need to validate an AC. > > > > > > In response to argument (a): > > > > Whilst a client may indeed conform to the simplest > > version of the AC > > profile with a lightweight implementation, such an implementation > > would have no control over which attributes can be > > issued by which > > authorities (AAControls), due to the lack of chain processing. > > In addition, the client cannot safely validate long-lived ACs. > > This is due to the lack of revocation processing. > > > > In response to argument (b): > > > > Clients *may* need to validate ACs in the push model to > > ensure the integrity of the AC before passing it on to other > > servers. (Complications arise here when the AC is pushed to a > > different "trust domain" where the AC validation policy differs > > to that of the clients policy, so there's scope for > > further study here) > > > > A client will need to validate an AC if it is used in > > the making of > > a client-side access decision. Scenarios in which a client-side > > access decision would need to be made are: > > > > --> Checking the permissions of downloaded content: > > --> Has a piece of downloaded code have > > execute permission > > from the system admin? > > > > --> Client-side content filtering: > > -> Checking if downloaded content has a > > "rating" attribute > > (12, 15, 18, PG-13, NC-17, R, etc.) > > > > > > It is apparent that there is indeed a requirement for: > > (a) clients to validate ACs > > (b) AC validation to be performed "fully". That is, AAControls > > and revocation checking should be done for > > security reasons. > > > > Given these requirements, it seems logical to migrate these > > verification > > tasks to a dedicated AC validation server. > > > > > > 2) BENEFITS: > > > > The benefits are the same as for remote PKC processing: > > > > a) Centralised trust and policy for authorisation purposes > > > > (i) Administrator(s) can say what AAs are trusted by > > the enterprise > > (ii) Administrator(s) can implement complicated trust > > management via > > AAControls and/or AC Chain validation > > (iii) Administrator(s) can implement AC revocation checking > > > > b) Simplified clients > > (i) No need for the client to implement any form of AC > > verification, > > path processing (for AAControls), LDAP/OCSP clients, etc. > > > > c) Server-side caching to improve turnaround time on a > > validation request > > > > > > > > > > -- ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 647 7406 61 Fitzwilliam Lane, fax: +353 1 647 7499 Dublin 2. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Ireland http://www.baltimore.com Received: from mercury.Sun.COM (mercury.Sun.COM [192.9.25.1]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id CAA25606 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 02:24:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ireserver.Ireland.Sun.COM ([129.156.220.7]) by mercury.Sun.COM (8.9.3+Sun/8.9.3) with ESMTP id CAA01322; Wed, 31 May 2000 02:32:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sun.com (boston [129.156.238.80]) by ireserver.Ireland.Sun.COM (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8/ENSMAIL,v1.7) with ESMTP id KAA19249; Wed, 31 May 2000 10:32:08 +0100 (BST) Sender: Sean.Mullan@ireland.sun.com Message-ID: <3934DC18.40294CD@sun.com> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 10:32:08 +0100 From: Sean Mullan <sean.mullan@sun.com> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.51 [en] (X11; U; SunOS 5.7 sun4u) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Eddy <cheung@dstc.edu.au> CC: Gabriel =?iso-8859-1?Q?L=F3pez=20Mill=E1n?= <gabilm@dif.um.es>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: PKIX library References: <39324849.586ADF80@dif.um.es> <3933F0B3.B8544EB6@dif.um.es> <3934C951.2A292362@dstc.edu.au> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hi, You may also be interested in the development of a new standard Java API for handling certification paths. The Java Certification Path API is a Java API that is currently being specified using the Java Community Process. The API is targeted for the next release of J2SE (Java 2 Standard Edition). It will include Java classes for building and validating certification paths, and will be based on the standard Java Cryptography Architecture. A reference implementation of the APIs including an RFC 2459 certification path validation implementation is planned. Please see http://java.sun.com/aboutJava/communityprocess/jsr/jsr_055_certp.html for the Java Specification Request, which includes more information about this API. Thanks, Sean Eddy wrote: > > Hi Gabi, > > I assumed that you are talking about implementation of Cert. Management > Protocol (CMP)? > > Since the last release of JCSI, we have implemented and changed a fair > bit. I guess more importantly for you, we have also add CMP support in > JCSI. At the moment, I am working on getting CMC support. > > That said, however, we are still doing some QC before we will release > the next version of JCSI (v1.0). I am not sure even if CMP will make it > into next release. > > If you really keen on getting your hand on CMP library in Java, please > email me separately (ie. not through email list) We can talk about how > and if you can get your hand on those library. > > Cheers... > Eddy > > Gabriel López Millán wrote: > > > > Gabriel López Millán wrote: > > > > > Hello all. > > > > > > There is any free pkix library for Java? > > > > > > Thanks, Gabi. > > > > OK, I am testing JCSI library. It is good, but I want a library > > which I can construct PKIMessages, with PKIBody, PKIHeader, etc. > > > > There is anything? > > > > Thanks a lot, Gabi. Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA22406 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 01:10:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA16114; Wed, 31 May 2000 10:18:30 +0200 Message-ID: <3934CAD8.18A6F3DD@bull.net> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 10:18:32 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol References: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFC3@panda.chrysalis-its.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit François, I have inserted your text, with one change, in the security considerations section of the "moving draft" I am locally maintening. Instead of: If the same hash value is *generated* more than once within a time window, I have inserted: If the same hash value is *present* more than once within a time window, About your proposal of changing the text in section 2.2., I believe that the current text is fine. Deleting "timeliness" and replacing is by "replay" is more restrictive. We could however add a pointer to the security consideration section, like: "For more details, about replay attack detection see the security considerations section (item 6)". Denis > Salut Denis, > > As requested, I have made some small changes to your proposed text about the > nonce for the security consideration section and the amended version, with > deletes and inserts tagged, appears below: > > "Inadvertent or deliberate replays for requests incorporating the same hash > (algorithm and) value may happen. Inadvertent replays occur when more than > one copy of the same request message gets sent to the TSA because of > problems in the intervening network elements. Deliberate replays occur when > a middleman is replaying legitimate TS responses. In order to detect these > situations, several techniques may be used. Using a nonce always allows to > detect replays, and hence its use is RECOMMENDED. Another possibility is to > use both a local clock and a moving time window during which the requester > remembers all the hashes sent during that time window. When receiving a > response, the requester <inserted>ensures</inserted> <deleted>makes sure > that</deleted> both <inserted>that</inserted> the time of the response is > within the time window and that there is only > <deleted>once</deleted><inserted>one occurrence of</inserted> the hash value > in that time window. If <deleted>there is</deleted> the same hash > value<inserted>is generated</inserted> more than once <inserted>within a > time window</inserted>, the requester may either use a nonce, or wait until > the time window has moved to come back to the <deleted>previous</deleted> > case where the same hash value appears only once during that time window." > > However, you have left the second paragraph of Section 2.2 unchanged, which > may still be open to interpretation. The way it is currently written, it > would seem that a requesting entity would have to reject a totally valid > response because of possible delays in the intervening network elements > and/or drifting of the requesting entity own local time reference. In order > to avoid this possible interpretation, an amended version, also with deletes > and inserts tagged, appears below: > > "It SHALL then verify the <deleted>timeliness of the </deleted>response > <inserted>against replay </inserted>by verifying either the time included in > the response against a local <deleted>trusted </deleted>time reference, if > one is available, and/or the value of the nonce (large random number with a > high probability that it is generated by the client only once) included in > the response against the value included in the request. If any of the > verifications above fails, the TimeStampToken SHALL be rejected." > > Regards, > > Francois > ___________________________________ > Francois Rousseau > Director of Standards and Conformance > Chrysalis-ITS > 1688 Woodward Drive > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 > > -----Original Message----- > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2000 6:09 AM > To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol > > François, > > Sorry for the delay to answer, but the trafic is currently rather > heavy on the TSP document and it takes time to prepare answers. > > I do not agree to make the nonce mandatory since there exists cases > where it is not needed. I also do not think that the case of a > subverted TSA falls under the topic of "deliberate replay". > > However, in order to address your concern, I could add the following > text in the security consideration section : > > Inadvertent or deliberate replays for requests incorporating the > same hash (algorithm and) value may happen. Inadvertent replays > occur when more than one copy of the same request message gets sent > to the TSA because of problems in the intervening network elements. > Deliberate replays occur when a middleman is replaying legitimate TS > responses. In order to detect these situations, several techniques > may be used. Using a nonce always allows to detect replays, and > hence its use is RECOMMENDED. Another possibility is to use both a > local clock and a moving time window during which the requester > remembers all the hashes sent during that time window. When > receiving a response, the requester makes sure that both the time of > the response is within the time window and that there is only once > the hash value in that time window. If there is the same hash value > more than once, the requester may either use a nonce, or wait until > the time window has moved to come back to the previous case where > the same hash value appears only once during that time window. > > If you prefer a different wording, please provide the amended text. > > Denis > > > Denis, > > > > We probably need to be clear on the requirement and then we can be sure > that > > the text in the document reflects the requirement. > > > > You seem quite clear that the requirement is to prevent replays - but we > > need to be clear on whether we are trying to detect and/or prevent > > deliberate or inadvertent replay or both. Inadvertent replay could occur > > when more than one copy of a request message gets sent to the TSA because > of > > problems in the intervening network elements. In this case the TSA > because > > of its "no look" policy would just blindly generate time stamps for each > of > > the copies it receives. Deliberate replay, on the other hand, assumes > that > > the TSA has been subverted or its signing key has been compromised, or > that > > a middleman is replaying legitimate TS responses. Each of the various > > potential replays needs to be considered to ensure that the protocol > > protects against it. > > > > 1. Deliberate middleman replay. Since each response contains a signed TS > > Token which includes the message imprint, serial number and time, this > type > > of attack is easily detected within the currently proposed protocol. > > > > 2. Replay by subverted TSA. A subverted TSA could generate any number of > TS > > Tokens containing the same message imprint at any time. Because each > could > > have different serial number and/or time, each would be unique and there > is > > no way the client could detect a replay on the basis of the response. The > > only way this could be detected would be for every request to include a > > nonce and for the client to maintain a record of all nonces generated to > > verify against the responses. > > > > 3. Inadvertent replay. Again, the only way for the client to distinguish > > this type of replay would be through the use of a nonce. In this case, > > however, it should not be necessary to maintain a record of all nonces > > generated but only those generated within a time window as you suggest. If > > the window length is set to, for example, twice the expected delay between > > request and response, the client could be quite confident that there have > > been no inadvertent replays if no duplicate nonce values are detected. > > > > To summarize, the nonce should not be an optional component of replay > > detection (as suggested by the current wording) - it is necessary if the > > client is trying to protect against anything other than deliberate > middleman > > replays. > > > > It is suggested that the wording in the fourth sentence of the second > > paragraph of Section 2.2 (page 3) be changed to: > > > > "It SHALL then verify the value of the nonce (large random number with > high > > probability that is generated by the client only once) included in the > > response against the nonce value included in the corresponding request to > > ensure that no replay has occurred." > > > > In Section 2.4.1 remove the OPTIONAL qualifier from nonce in the > definition > > of TimeStampReq (page 4). > > > > Change the wording of first sentence of the nonce description in Section > > 2.4.1 (page 5)to read: > > > > "The nonce allows the client to verify the response against replay." > > > > In Section 2.4.2 remove the OPTIONAL qualifier from nonce in the > definition > > of TSTInfo (page 7). > > > > Change the wording of the nonce description in Section 2.4.2 (page 5)to > > read: > > > > "The nonce field MUST be equal to the value provided in the TimeStampReq > > structure." > > > > If you agree with this approach, then I would suggest we prepare a short > > annex to describe the two different cases - subverted TSA vice inadvertent > > replay. > > > > Have a good weekend! > > > > Francois > > ___________________________________ > > Francois Rousseau > > Director of Standards and Conformance > > Chrysalis-ITS > > 1688 Woodward Drive > > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > > Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 5:36 AM > > To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com > > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol > > > > Francois, > > > > I realized that I ommited to reply to your E-mail. > > > > > Salut Denis, > > > > > > I do not remember if this issue was raised before, but in Section 2.2 > the > > > following statement is made: > > > > > > "the requesting entity .... SHALL then verify the timeliness of the > > response > > > by verifying either the time included in the response against a local > > > trusted time reference, if one is available, and/or the value of the > nonce > > > (large random number with a high probability that it is generated by the > > > client only once) included in the response against the value included in > > the > > > request." > > > > > > A nonce is normally used to detect attempts at replays, which is not > > > necessarily related to the timeliness of the response to a particular > > > request as mentioned here. > > > > > > The first part of the statement talks about verifying the time included > in > > > the response against a locally trusted time source. This could used to > > > measure round trip path delay for calibration purposes, > > > > No. This is not the goal. The goal is to make sure that you have no > > replay, in particular on the same hash value. > > > > > but unless one could > > > be certain that the locally trusted source is as accurate as the TSA > time > > > source (or, at least, that the difference between them is fixed and > > > well-known), I don't see how it would detect/prevent replays. > > > > Using a moving time window the caller remembers all the hashes he > > sent during that time window. > > If there is not the same hash value within that time window, then he > > makes sure that the time of the response is within the time window. > > If there is the same hash (a very rare situation), it is a little > > bit more complicated, and there are several options. Among them: > > using the nonce, or waiting until the time window has moved to come > > back to the previous case: only one hash value during that time > > window. But we are talking implementations details, which is not the > > topic of an RFC. > > > > > If one has > > > such a trusted time source locally, what is the point in using a TTP for > > > time stamping? > > > > The time is locally trusted, ... which does not mean that other > > people will trust that time. > > > > > > > > Could you please clarify the intent of this statement and if the intent > is > > > to prevent replays or check the timeliness of responses or both? > > > > Now, that you have the explanations, if you still believe that the > > text is not clear enough, I suggest that you submit a proposal to > > clarify the text. > > > > Regards, > > > > Denis > > > > > > > > Francois > > > ___________________________________ > > > Francois Rousseau > > > Director of Standards and Conformance > > > Chrysalis-ITS > > > 1688 Woodward Drive > > > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > > > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > > > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from thunder.dstc.qut.edu.au (thunder.dstc.qut.edu.au [131.181.71.1]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA22074 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 01:05:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dstc.edu.au (cheung.dialup.dstc.edu.au [130.102.182.233]) by thunder.dstc.qut.edu.au (8.10.1/8.10.1) with ESMTP id e4V8CsT29663; Wed, 31 May 2000 18:12:54 +1000 (EST) Message-ID: <3934C951.2A292362@dstc.edu.au> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 18:12:01 +1000 From: Eddy <cheung@dstc.edu.au> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Gabriel =?iso-8859-1?Q?L=F3pez=20Mill=E1n?= <gabilm@dif.um.es> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: PKIX library References: <39324849.586ADF80@dif.um.es> <3933F0B3.B8544EB6@dif.um.es> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hi Gabi, I assumed that you are talking about implementation of Cert. Management Protocol (CMP)? Since the last release of JCSI, we have implemented and changed a fair bit. I guess more importantly for you, we have also add CMP support in JCSI. At the moment, I am working on getting CMC support. That said, however, we are still doing some QC before we will release the next version of JCSI (v1.0). I am not sure even if CMP will make it into next release. If you really keen on getting your hand on CMP library in Java, please email me separately (ie. not through email list) We can talk about how and if you can get your hand on those library. Cheers... Eddy Gabriel López Millán wrote: > > Gabriel López Millán wrote: > > > Hello all. > > > > There is any free pkix library for Java? > > > > Thanks, Gabi. > > OK, I am testing JCSI library. It is good, but I want a library > which I can construct PKIMessages, with PKIBody, PKIHeader, etc. > > There is anything? > > Thanks a lot, Gabi. Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA18164 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 00:22:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA32780; Wed, 31 May 2000 09:29:53 +0200 Message-ID: <3934BF73.6019D6A5@bull.net> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 09:29:55 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Timestamp: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BB3@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit James, I will pick your message to answer. > Denis, > > > Correct, this can ALWAYS been achieved ... if we have the following > property: > > | genTime 1 - GenTime 2 | > Accuracy of GenTime 1 + Accuracy of GenTime 2 > > You don't need this property. Each genTime value is a measurement of UTC > with a given uncertainty, but successive measurements are not independent. > The measuring instrument is a clock and I assume it only increments. No. Your are making an assumption which is not true. You are assuming that the TSA is using a single clock. This is not necessarilly the case with the huge server scenario. Paul gave the right answer: The interpretation of a timestamp with accuracy is simple: the TSA is making an assertion that the time when it generated the stamp is in the range [ts - accuracy .. ts + accuracy]. (In other words, it promises that UTC will be contained in that interval.) Denis > So a > later measurement is never less than an earlier measurement regardless of > the uncertainty. > genTime1 = 6:45 +/- 8 > genTime2 = 6:47 +/- 8 > genTime1 was issued before genTime2 because genTime1 < genTime2. > The uncertainty, +/- 8, is important only when comparing the time to another > clock (e.g. a timestamp from another TSA or some external event such as a > deadline of 7:00). > > > Your "huge server" scenario is interesting, but I don't think it changes the > arguments. The genTime values from a TSA can be the *definition* of order. > With a huge server, the order requests hit the front switch may differ from > the order they are finally processed (after being in different queues in > different crypto engines), but which order is correct? I am not even sure > that "hit the front switch" is a simple concept given that a request is many > octets, perhaps split over many IP packets with any number of TCP/IP > interactions. > > We could have two uncertainties: (1) the uncertainty between genTime and > UTC; and (2) the uncertainty between "simultaneous" measurements by the TSA. > If a TSA has many clocks (e.g. one for each crypto engine) the second value > is the uncertainty in synchronisation between its own clocks. However, I > don't think this (or your BOOLEAN) is necessary. > > > > Peter Sylvester, > > > What kind of decision can you make based on that? [23h59'59'' +/- 2''] > > Probability that timestamp was issued before 12h00'00'' > = Pr(x < 12h00'00'' | x sample of X = > Normal-Distribution(mean=23h59'59'', sd=2'')) > = Pr(x < 0.5 | x sample of X = Standard-Normal-Distribution) > = 0.69 > => There is about a 70% chance that the timestamp was issued before the > deadline. If this is not good enough the user should have got an timestamp > earlier or used a TSA with a lower uncertainty. > If you want a black-and-white decision you could > (A) pick a confidence level, say 60%, and accept any timestamp that has at > least this probability of being before the deadline; or > (B) get your own timestamp from the same TSA at the deadline and accept > timestamps issued before yours (regardless of the actual time and > uncertainty listed in your timestamp). > > UTC is a continuous quantity. Any measurement will have an uncertainty. > Any comparison involves a confidence interval. This is unavoidable. > Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA16884 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 00:05:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA18116; Wed, 31 May 2000 09:12:20 +0200 Message-ID: <3934BB55.A63F386F@bull.net> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 09:12:21 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> CC: Joerg Seidel <seidel@timeproof.de>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Timestamp: id for token References: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA749C9B@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Michael, Thanks for your examples that illustrate that a unique reference for the Time Stamps issued by a given CA name MAY be useful. Denis > Case1: > Italian legislation mandates that a CA obtains a time stamp for each > published cert and CRLs. It also mandates that the TSA maintains the archive > of all issued timestamps for the life span of the TSA key. So that the CA > can be relieved from keeping the actual tokens. > > Case2: > A document management system. Each document (e.g a purchase order) can be > timestamped any number of times at different stages of its life cycle. It > may be appropriate to have an archive containing just the progressing > versions of the document, and some associated references. It is not > necessarily possible/required to keep the document and its associated > timestamps together. Instead, a separate archive of timestamps can be > arranged, with the tokens referenced from other archives. > > I know it all can be done in different ways -i.e. maintaining external > referencing, so that there is nothing in the token itself. Just saying that > there are some cases when a timestamp can be stored separately from the > document/message it was created for. > > M > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Joerg Seidel [mailto:seidel@timeproof.de] > > Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 8:21 PM > > To: Manger, James H > > Cc: 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > Subject: Re: Timestamp: id for token > > > > > > I agree on what James wrote. A unique identifier or serial > > number is not > > necessary. > > > > "Manger, James H" schrieb: > > > > > > Is a standardised unambiguous identifier for a timestamp > > token really needed > > > or wanted? > > > > > > Such an identifier is useful for a certificate as a > > certificate is used in > > > many messages (many SSL sessions, many S/MIME emails, many > > transactions, > > > ...). The certificate is independent of any particular > > use. A timestamp, > > > however, is only relevant to a single message - corresponding to its > > > messageImprint field. > > > > > > The are no timestamp revocation lists. There are no other > > messages from a > > > TSA that need to refer to a specific timestamp. > > > > > > It seems sensible to store a timestamp with its > > corresponding message - so > > > now identifier is needed. Even if they were stored separately the > > > implementation could its own labels to maintain the link, > > i.e. it does not > > > need an explicit field within the timestamp. > > Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA16289 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 23:57:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA18904; Wed, 31 May 2000 09:04:51 +0200 Message-ID: <3934B994.6400FC48@bull.net> Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 09:04:52 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB8A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <14637.14460.418872.887051@xedia.com> <4.2.0.58.20000530164418.00ab04a0@mail.spyrus.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Russ, > Denis: > > I believe that a CA can operate in accordance with one or more > certification policies at the same time. The way that the CA is able to > fulfill the requirements of more than one certification policy is > documented in a single CPS. OK. Let us remove the "s" from "CPS". :-) Denis > Russ > > At 05:15 PM 05/25/2000 +0200, Denis Pinkas wrote: > >Paul and others, > > > >Some major details: > > > >1) I would propose to add an "s" to "certificate policy" making it > >"certificate policies". > > > >In RFC 2459 we have: > > > >4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies > > > > The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or > >more > > policy information terms, each of which consists of an object > > identifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. > > > >2) In the same way, I would add an "s" to "CPS" making it "CPSs". > > > >3) Finally, since the verification is not uniform, I would also add > >an "s" to "verification". > > > >The final sentence would thus look like: > > > >"The precise nature of the verifications is detailed in the > >certificate policies and/or the CPSs." > > > >4) ... and a comment on the use of "definitively": > > > >We were looking for text replacement related only to the subject > >alternative name section 4.2.1.7. Now the sentence has been extended > >to cover parameters like "all other fields in a certificate" and > >"all certificate extensions". So "definitively" also applies to them > >now, and this is wrong. > > > >I would thus propose to delete the sentence "like all other fields > >in a certificate and all certificate extensions," and thus keep the > >idea from RFC 2459, where only the subject alternative name is > >considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, which was: > > > > Because the subject alternative name is considered to be > > definitiviely bound to the public key, all parts of the subject > > alternative name MUST be verified by the CA. > > > >The new text would thus look like: > > > > Denis> "The subject alternative name is considered to > > Denis> be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST > > Denis> verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative > > Denis> names. The precise nature of the verifications is detailed > >in > > Denis> the certificate policies and/or the CPSs." > > > >Denis > > > > > Echoing Paul Hoffman's comment... I find Steve's text to be > > > preferable. For one thing, retaining "definitively" seems a good > > > thing to do. > > > > > paul > > > > > > Warwick> "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a > > Warwick> certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered > >to > > Warwick> be bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST verify (in > > Warwick> accordance with the applicable certificate policy and/or > >the > > Warwick> CPS) all subject alternative names." > > > > > > Steve> "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a > > Steve> certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered > >to > > Steve> be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST > > Steve> verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative > > Steve> names. The precise nature of the verification is detailed > >in > > Steve> the certificate policy and/or the CPS." Received: from mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au [202.12.144.17]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA14364 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 23:21:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id QAA06615 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 16:28:48 +1000 (EST) Received: from maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au(202.12.142.17) via SMTP by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au, id smtpd0Z160d; Wed May 31 16:28:13 2000 Received: (from uucp@localhost) by maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id QAA17729 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 16:28:12 +1000 (EST) Received: from localhost(127.0.0.1), claiming to be "mail.cdn.telstra.com.au" via SMTP by localhost, id smtpd24_We_; Wed May 31 16:27:01 2000 Received: from ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au (ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au [192.74.168.81]) by mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) with ESMTP id QAA27861 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 16:27:01 +1000 (EST) Received: by ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <L4KYMD3S>; Wed, 31 May 2000 16:26:30 +1000 Message-ID: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BB6@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 16:26:21 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Michael, > How do you know when the "Time stops" and the "Order begins"? You never need to know - that is the beauty. > Stamp from TSA_1: 20000529053138.345Z. Accuracy = 1 sec. > Stamp from TSA_2: 20000529053138.876Z. Accuracy = 1 sec > How do I do it [compare the stamps]? Consider T2 - T1. The best estimate (mean) is .876 - .345 = .531. When subtracting measurements the uncertainty is the square root of the sum of the squares of the individual uncertainties: sd = sqrt(1^2 + 1^2) = 1.414. => T2 - T1 = 0.531 +/- 1.414 => Probability that T2 is after T1 = Pr(0 < x | x sample of X = Normal-Distribution(mean=0.531, sd=1.414)) = Pr(-0.375 < x | x sample of X = Standard-Normal-Distribution) = 0.65 So there is a 65% chance that the stamp from TSA_1 was issued before the stamp from TSA_2. Comparison done. > 1. Do I assume that .345 and .876 is just ordering? No. > 2. Do I assume that both TSA_1 mad TSA_2 have a high resolution clock No > 3. Do I assume that 20000529053138.34 was the actual time, and the order is 5? No > What we had: Time, Accuracy, [Unique referencing+Ordering]. > What we are getting to: [Time+order], Accuracy, ConditionVariable, and derived referencing. Not really. We are getting to: (1) Time and (2) Uncertainty with respect to UTC. We are adding an assumption that a TSA's clock never gives a reading less than a previous reading. We are recognizing that adding extra digits beyond the clock reading does not make the quoted time wrong. If a TSA clock returns digits down to the tenth of a second, e.g. "5:31:38.8", it will return the same string when the fraction of seconds is .800, .807, .876 and 0.887 (could use rounding instead of truncation but it makes no difference). On reading "5:31:38.8" the TSA knows the time (according to its clock) is in the range [5:31:38.80000.., 5:31:38.899999...]. Any value in this range is as good a guess as any other. The TSA can arbitrarily choose any value in this range. Hence, the TSA can ensure its arbitrary choices always increase while its clock returns the same value. Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id VAA06112 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 21:58:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id PAA00466; Wed, 31 May 2000 15:10:32 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <L0RK6LJ1>; Wed, 31 May 2000 15:04:21 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA749CBD@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: Andy Dowling <andy.dowling@sse.ie>, Paul Hoffman <phoffman@vpnc.org> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Requirements for remote path processing services Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 15:04:20 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Andy, to me, the obvious way of using the RPPS to validate ACs is to validate the signer's ACA's certificate. The rest - policy, roles, etc - really belongs to the AC's RP (which is an access control server itself, as you have correctly mentioned). Therefore, the request from the RPPS client would be "Is that *ACA* cert valid for me?". I'd say that this is the only way one can use a general purpose RPPS box for ACs. Michael > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Dowling [mailto:andy.dowling@sse.ie] > Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:02 PM > To: Paul Hoffman > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: Requirements for remote path processing services > > > Paul + co., > > Having read your post, I was just wondering if these remote > path processing > services could be applied to ACs for authorisation purposes? I've put > together a few points on the subject (see below). > > Comments would be appreciated. > > Regards, > > Andy > > > > 1) OVERVIEW > > In addition to remote path processing services: > > a) delegated path construction > b) delegated path verification > c) trust and policy centralisation > > that apply to public key certificates, there may be scope for > the application of these services to authorisation-related > certificates > i.e. Attribute Certificates could be verified remotely by a single > trusted entity, and this would bring the benefits of centralised > trust/policy management and simpler clients. > > > 2) MOTIVATION > > Firstly, let's present some arguments *against* introducing remote AC > validation: > > a) The current profile for AC validation is relatively simpler than > that of PKC validation: > > a) AC chains are not used > b) AAControls is optional > c) AC revocation checking is optional > > Consequently, a very minimal (and conformant) AC validator can be > implemented and would be "lightweight" enough to provide > on clients. > > b) AC validation for authorisation purposes is typically a server-side > operation anyway, and clients would hardly need to validate an AC. > > > In response to argument (a): > > Whilst a client may indeed conform to the simplest > version of the AC > profile with a lightweight implementation, such an implementation > would have no control over which attributes can be > issued by which > authorities (AAControls), due to the lack of chain processing. > In addition, the client cannot safely validate long-lived ACs. > This is due to the lack of revocation processing. > > In response to argument (b): > > Clients *may* need to validate ACs in the push model to > ensure the integrity of the AC before passing it on to other > servers. (Complications arise here when the AC is pushed to a > different "trust domain" where the AC validation policy differs > to that of the clients policy, so there's scope for > further study here) > > A client will need to validate an AC if it is used in > the making of > a client-side access decision. Scenarios in which a client-side > access decision would need to be made are: > > --> Checking the permissions of downloaded content: > --> Has a piece of downloaded code have > execute permission > from the system admin? > > --> Client-side content filtering: > -> Checking if downloaded content has a > "rating" attribute > (12, 15, 18, PG-13, NC-17, R, etc.) > > > It is apparent that there is indeed a requirement for: > (a) clients to validate ACs > (b) AC validation to be performed "fully". That is, AAControls > and revocation checking should be done for > security reasons. > > Given these requirements, it seems logical to migrate these > verification > tasks to a dedicated AC validation server. > > > 2) BENEFITS: > > The benefits are the same as for remote PKC processing: > > a) Centralised trust and policy for authorisation purposes > > (i) Administrator(s) can say what AAs are trusted by > the enterprise > (ii) Administrator(s) can implement complicated trust > management via > AAControls and/or AC Chain validation > (iii) Administrator(s) can implement AC revocation checking > > b) Simplified clients > (i) No need for the client to implement any form of AC > verification, > path processing (for AAControls), LDAP/OCSP clients, etc. > > c) Server-side caching to improve turnaround time on a > validation request > > > > > Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id VAA03749 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 21:37:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id OAA00272; Wed, 31 May 2000 14:49:18 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <L0RK6L2H>; Wed, 31 May 2000 14:43:03 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA749C9B@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: Joerg Seidel <seidel@timeproof.de>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> Cc: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Timestamp: id for token Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 14:43:03 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Case1: Italian legislation mandates that a CA obtains a time stamp for each published cert and CRLs. It also mandates that the TSA maintains the archive of all issued timestamps for the life span of the TSA key. So that the CA can be relieved from keeping the actual tokens. Case2: A document management system. Each document (e.g a purchase order) can be timestamped any number of times at different stages of its life cycle. It may be appropriate to have an archive containing just the progressing versions of the document, and some associated references. It is not necessarily possible/required to keep the document and its associated timestamps together. Instead, a separate archive of timestamps can be arranged, with the tokens referenced from other archives. I know it all can be done in different ways -i.e. maintaining external referencing, so that there is nothing in the token itself. Just saying that there are some cases when a timestamp can be stored separately from the document/message it was created for. M > -----Original Message----- > From: Joerg Seidel [mailto:seidel@timeproof.de] > Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 8:21 PM > To: Manger, James H > Cc: 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > Subject: Re: Timestamp: id for token > > > I agree on what James wrote. A unique identifier or serial > number is not > necessary. > > "Manger, James H" schrieb: > > > > Is a standardised unambiguous identifier for a timestamp > token really needed > > or wanted? > > > > Such an identifier is useful for a certificate as a > certificate is used in > > many messages (many SSL sessions, many S/MIME emails, many > transactions, > > ...). The certificate is independent of any particular > use. A timestamp, > > however, is only relevant to a single message - corresponding to its > > messageImprint field. > > > > The are no timestamp revocation lists. There are no other > messages from a > > TSA that need to refer to a specific timestamp. > > > > It seems sensible to store a timestamp with its > corresponding message - so > > now identifier is needed. Even if they were stored separately the > > implementation could its own labels to maintain the link, > i.e. it does not > > need an explicit field within the timestamp. > Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id VAA29011 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 21:13:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id OAA20867; Wed, 31 May 2000 14:26:13 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <L01ZXJR8>; Wed, 31 May 2000 14:20:14 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA749C59@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 14:20:13 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Guys, How do you know when the "Time stops" and the "Order begins"? If we allow two different interpretations of the fractions component - i.e. 'ordering' or 'real time' - we have to say explicitly what it is. And a lot more, to make it unambiguous. How do I know whether I should take the fractions as order index, or as a real value from high resolution clock? Imagine: Stamp from TSA_1: 20000529053138.345Z. Accuracy = 1 sec. Stamp from TSA_2: 20000529053138.876Z. Accuracy = 1 sec The difference is in fractions, as you can see. I trust that the TSAs are in synch with 'absolute time', enough for me to be able to compare the stamps. How do I do it? 1. Do I assume that .345 and .876 is just ordering? And consequently I trim the time down to the order of accuracy (i.e. seconds), and the time is identical? or 2. Do I assume that both TSA_1 mad TSA_2 have a high resolution clock, allowing to assign finer times? And consequently there is a high probability that Stamp1 is older than Stamp2? or 3. Do I assume that 20000529053138.34 was the actual time, and the order is 5? And the order was 6 for the other stamp? What I am trying to say is that imposing two different meaning for one variable inevitable creates a mess. Then you are trying to add a separate variable to clear up the mess. Then you end up with a bloated document explaining how those two variables interact, trying to eliminate any ambiguity :) What we had: Time, Accuracy, [Unique referencing+Ordering]. What we are getting to: [Time+order], Accuracy, ConditionVariable, and derived referencing. This is really a matter of style, though. > -----Original Message----- > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2000 7:25 PM > To: Manger, James H > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field > > > James, > > Thanks for the shortest "simple and complete" message. I picked it > to answer to all the recent messages posted on that topic. > > > TSA clients must support genTime values with > fraction-of-second components, > > e.g "20000529053138.345Z". Consequently, by using sufficient > > fraction-of-seconds digits, it is easy for a TSA to issue > genTime values > > that always increase and never repeat. > > > > * The TSA does not need to maintain another never-repeating value > > (serialNumber) and does not have to worry about maintaining > it when the TSA > > server crashes. > > Correct. This a very important argument. So if we maintain that > field it is *only* to uniquely identify the TST. Now, let us answer > to the question raised: whether that field is NECESSARY. This field > is not *necessary*. It MAY be *useful*. Yes, it usually makes sense > to associate the Time Stamp with the data it applies to. However, it > MAY or MIGHT be useful to be able to reference a Time Stamp that is > stored somewhere else. > > > * The TSA does not need to issue (nor the client expect) > huge integer > > values. > > > * Ordering two timestamps from one TSA is simply achieved > by comparing their > > genTime fields. > > Correct, this can ALWAYS been achieved ... if we have the following > property: > | genTime 1 - GenTime 2 | > Accuracy of GenTime 1 + Accuracy of > GenTime 2 > > In the above equation > means stricly superior. > > Now, when this condition does NOT apply, the BOOLEAN indicator > "ordering" allows to say whether ordering two timestamps from one > TSA can or cannot be achieved by comparing their genTime fields. > > In the case a huge server doing parallel queuing and using parallel > crypto engines that this property is not that easy to maintain. > Allowing to perform an ordering in *any* case (i.e. in time frames > less than the second) is not needed by many applications, hence the > reason to place low contraints on the design, unless this property > is really needed. > > Now, about the last received comment from Ed Gerck, the above > distinction gives a reliability of 100% if we have: | genTime 1 - > GenTime 2 | > Accuracy of GenTime 1 + Accuracy of GenTime 2 and when > that condition does not apply, either a reliability of 100% if the > the BOOLEAN indicator "ordering" is set to TRUE and a reliability of > 0% if the the BOOLEAN indicator "ordering" is set to FALSE. > > > * Accuracy (uncertainty with respect to UTC) is not > affected as it is > > conveyed in a separate field. > > > > Simple. Complete. > > > > The only issue is whether the ordering works from > timestamps with the same > > TSA name or same TSA signing key. > > It works, as indicated above, with the same TSA name. > > As a conclusion: > > 1) Time Stamp Token ordering can be done in most cases (see above) > by only using GenTime and accuracy. > 2) serialNumber is not *necessary*, but may be *useful*. So let us > keep it. > 3) the BOOLEAN indicator "ordering" is useful to allow to address > two segment needs, and does not place design constraints when no > ordering within the second range is needed. > > > Denis > Received: from c004.sfo.cp.net (c004-h007.c004.sfo.cp.net [209.228.14.63]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id UAA22989 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 20:27:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: (cpmta 22953 invoked from network); 30 May 2000 20:34:47 -0700 Received: from 2Cust6.tnt4.austin2.tx.da.uu.net (HELO tuvit.net) (63.11.192.6) by smtp.tuvit.net with SMTP; 30 May 2000 20:34:47 -0700 X-Sent: 31 May 2000 03:34:47 GMT Message-ID: <39348853.D52E6383@tuvit.net> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 22:34:43 -0500 From: Roland Mueller <roland@tuvit.net> Organization: TUVIT Inc. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en,pdf MIME-Version: 1.0 To: IETF-PKIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> CC: Wes Doonan <wes@surety.com>, "Jose A. Ma~n" <jmanas@dit.upm.es>, Mike Matyas <smatyas@us.ibm.com> Subject: Time Stamp V7 Data structure Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------E8FA5F4851A3EC3DB5F4346F" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------E8FA5F4851A3EC3DB5F4346F Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit This is a kind of re-opening the issue of aligning the actual ISO draft on time stamping with version 07 of the PKIX time stamping draft. I am re-opening it for two reasons: Since the first time (version 5 discussion) I was expecting a change in the IETF document stating that it is optional to have a mechanism identifier (object identifier) in the time stamp request and I also expected a modified data structure allowing to use the option. None of this happened. This information is a prerequisite for developers willing to implement an IETF and ISO compatible TSA. The answer I received from the eeditor on the change of the data structure was from my point of view sufficient for it only meant an endorsement to use additional elements in the ISO data structure: "For the request the additional element will be in the ISO request, NOT in the IETF request." That means, ISO gets endorsement for its data structure. I was asking for a change in the IETF data structure, the mechanism Identifier element ALREADY exists in the ISO Time stamp request data structure. On the other hand I have to express that the adoption of a mechanism identifier into the time stamp token is required to allow proper interpretation by the recipient of such a token. If the mechanism used for generating the token cannot be identified then the validity of a time stamp cannot be checked if it is not the IETF mechanism. If time stamps are generated using a mechanism different from the IETF draft and there is no information provided within the token what mechanism was used to generate the time stamp then a verifier does not know how to proceed. If the time stamp was generated with one of the mechanisms proposed in the ISO draft then information is needed to successfully verify the validity of the time stamp. Otherwise an ISO time stamp is not usable by recipients of the time stamp for they cannot verify its validity. Let me explain the need for the mechanism identifier in the request also in an example: A client using the IETF protocol may communicate with either an ISO or an IETF TSA when requesting a time stamp; this will cause no problem for the ISO TSA will understand the request of the client. The situation gets more difficult if the client uses the ISO protocol. A TSA only understanding IETF requests will detect general incompatibility and answer with an error; this leaves the client without a time stamp if he cannot switch to the other protocol. And this is not called alignement but downward compatibility. And we should try to achieve interoperability which means an agreed minimum level of communications. The accepted changes do not allow communications in both directions. And that does not help any of the standardisation bodies, neither the IETF nor ISO. That's in short why I am convinced that the discussion on the acceptance of these topics has to be reopened. What is needed most urgently is a mechanism identifier in the time stamp request and in the time stamp response (i.e. within the time stamp token). And that is the only way I can imagine that allows interoperability between the two approaches. Thanks again for your patience and support. Roland --------------E8FA5F4851A3EC3DB5F4346F Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="roland.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for Roland Mueller Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="roland.vcf" begin:vcard n:Mueller;Roland tel;fax:(512) 795-0495 tel;work:(512) 795-0494 x-mozilla-html:FALSE org:TUVIT Inc. version:2.1 email;internet:roland@tuvit.net adr;quoted-printable:;;8716 North MoPac=0D=0ASuite 220;Austin;Texas;78759;U.S.A. x-mozilla-cpt:;-1 fn:Mueller, Roland end:vcard --------------E8FA5F4851A3EC3DB5F4346F-- Received: from mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au [202.12.144.17]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id SAA03678 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 18:25:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id LAA26477 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 11:32:31 +1000 (EST) Received: from maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au(202.12.142.17) via SMTP by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au, id smtpd0ZNymS; Wed May 31 11:32:03 2000 Received: (from uucp@localhost) by maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id LAA04896 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 11:32:02 +1000 (EST) Received: from localhost(127.0.0.1), claiming to be "mail.cdn.telstra.com.au" via SMTP by localhost, id smtpd6rZtF_; Wed May 31 11:30:57 2000 Received: from ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au (ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au [192.74.168.81]) by mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) with ESMTP id LAA26088 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 31 May 2000 11:30:57 +1000 (EST) Received: by ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <L4KYKDWL>; Wed, 31 May 2000 11:30:26 +1000 Message-ID: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BB3@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Timestamp: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 11:30:15 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Denis, > Correct, this can ALWAYS been achieved ... if we have the following property: > | genTime 1 - GenTime 2 | > Accuracy of GenTime 1 + Accuracy of GenTime 2 You don't need this property. Each genTime value is a measurement of UTC with a given uncertainty, but successive measurements are not independent. The measuring instrument is a clock and I assume it only increments. So a later measurement is never less than an earlier measurement regardless of the uncertainty. genTime1 = 6:45 +/- 8 genTime2 = 6:47 +/- 8 genTime1 was issued before genTime2 because genTime1 < genTime2. The uncertainty, +/- 8, is important only when comparing the time to another clock (e.g. a timestamp from another TSA or some external event such as a deadline of 7:00). Your "huge server" scenario is interesting, but I don't think it changes the arguments. The genTime values from a TSA can be the *definition* of order. With a huge server, the order requests hit the front switch may differ from the order they are finally processed (after being in different queues in different crypto engines), but which order is correct? I am not even sure that "hit the front switch" is a simple concept given that a request is many octets, perhaps split over many IP packets with any number of TCP/IP interactions. We could have two uncertainties: (1) the uncertainty between genTime and UTC; and (2) the uncertainty between "simultaneous" measurements by the TSA. If a TSA has many clocks (e.g. one for each crypto engine) the second value is the uncertainty in synchronisation between its own clocks. However, I don't think this (or your BOOLEAN) is necessary. Peter Sylvester, > What kind of decision can you make based on that? [23h59'59'' +/- 2''] Probability that timestamp was issued before 12h00'00'' = Pr(x < 12h00'00'' | x sample of X = Normal-Distribution(mean=23h59'59'', sd=2'')) = Pr(x < 0.5 | x sample of X = Standard-Normal-Distribution) = 0.69 => There is about a 70% chance that the timestamp was issued before the deadline. If this is not good enough the user should have got an timestamp earlier or used a TSA with a lower uncertainty. If you want a black-and-white decision you could (A) pick a confidence level, say 60%, and accept any timestamp that has at least this probability of being before the deadline; or (B) get your own timestamp from the same TSA at the deadline and accept timestamps issued before yours (regardless of the actual time and uncertainty listed in your timestamp). UTC is a continuous quantity. Any measurement will have an uncertainty. Any comparison involves a confidence interval. This is unavoidable. Received: from e4.ny.us.ibm.com (e4.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.104]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id QAA21340 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 16:11:55 -0700 (PDT) From: tgindin@us.ibm.com Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.22]) by e4.ny.us.ibm.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id TAA266256; Tue, 30 May 2000 19:17:51 -0400 Received: from D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com (d51mta04.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.32]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.8.8m3/NCO v4.9) with SMTP id TAA270770; Tue, 30 May 2000 19:19:34 -0400 Received: by D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568EF.00802073 ; Tue, 30 May 2000 19:19:29 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: IBMUS To: "Bob Jueneman" <bjueneman@novell.com> cc: peterw@valicert.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, awa1@home.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-ID: <852568EF.0080200A.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 19:19:27 -0400 Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline "Bob Jueneman" <bjueneman@novell.com> on 05/30/2000 05:29:44 PM To: Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS, <peterw@valicert.com> cc: <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, <awa1@home.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Tom, >>> <tgindin@us.ibm.com> 05/30/00 12:51PM >>> > I am not sure that VeriSign class 1's E-mail address usage is unverified, as opposed to rather weakly verified, because the challenge/response serves as a form of POP. Whether this is an adequate POP is more questionable. E-mail distribution of the certificate tied to a PIN presumably provides a weak proof that at least someone who has access to that mailbox also has access to the key pair. Unfortunately neither the mailbox nor the key can be shown to be under the exclusive control of the putative user, whoever that may be. [Tom Gindin] Are we in disagreement here? I said "rather weakly verified" and questionably adequate. > Furthermore, a number of fields which are placed in certificates are restrictions on usage and cannot be verified by the CA. The most obvious such fields are the KeyUsage and ExtendedKeyUsage extensions. Well, that isn't quite so clear. At least some cryptographic implementations, e.g., NICI and CDSA, together with most smart cards, implement strong typing of such attributes, and hence could reasonable be relied upon to enforce such restrictions. The fact that most CAs fail to check on what kind of end-user software is in use, or place any constraints or even education requirements on their end-users is another problem, and one that is symptomatic of the over-reliance on CA policies, and a conspicuous lack of attention to the requirements for end-user implementations. [Tom Gindin] Actually, I'm asking whether a CA is supposed to refuse to place such attributes in a certificate if it has no reason to believe that the user's software package enforces them. I know that some software does enforce them. In any case, if keys can be exported from their original software packages and reimported elsewhere, the CA has no way of being sure that they won't be differently used. > This does not, however, necessarily mean that the CA can avoid responsibility for verifying identity fields and other fields that are verifiable, such as Subject, SubjectPublicKey, SubjectAltName, and SubjectDirectoryAttributes. It's beginning to sound as though the CA doesn't really have to verify anything except those things for which it is naturally authoritative, e.g., the uniqueness of the DN within the CA's own domain, etc. [Tom Gindin] Well, that definition would include not doing a POP on the user's private key, so it's pretty extreme. RP's certainly want more from a CA than that. Does it make sense to talk about "verifying" uniqueness only, without somehow verifying the _correctness_ (i.e., in meat-space) of the attributes? In this regard I am in general agreement with Bruno Salgueiro. RECOMMEND or SHOULD would convey the general sense of the technical community (for whatever good that will do with respect to legislative and regulatory authorities) without having to strip off the epaulets and drum the offending CA out of the corps if they don't comply with our infinite wisdom because of their individual business requirements. [Tom Gindin] Now I'm going to ask what the minimum level of verification is. What sort of verification is implied by a true statement that "the subject claimed X (say, that he operates http://www.random.net/~user40), and we put X in the certificate (in this case, under subjectAltName)"? Is that level so low that we need a separate place to put statements like that, or rule them out of the certificate? I doubt that any CA puts things in a certificate with less evidence than that. Regards, Bob Received: from prv-mail20.provo.novell.com (prv-mail20.provo.novell.com [137.65.81.122]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id PAA19786 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 15:04:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from INET-PRV-Message_Server by prv-mail20.provo.novell.com with Novell_GroupWise; Tue, 30 May 2000 16:04:41 -0600 Message-Id: <s933e699.056@prv-mail20.provo.novell.com> X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise Internet Agent 5.5.3.1 Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 16:04:38 -0600 From: "Bob Jueneman" <bjueneman@novell.com> To: <awa1@home.com>, <ccwilliams@ntlworld.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: What is the meaning of the "indirectCRL" flag Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id PAA19787 Al, a belated comment on your note below. I agree with the statement that normally, only the entity that issued the certificate is allowed to revoke it, or more generally to respond negatively to an inquiry about certificate status. But there ares some exceptions, notably where the relying party, or the relying party's Enterprise, is capable of making their own decisions about the trust implications about the end-user's certificate. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that a given Enterprise might want to have their own say-so about whom they trust, regardless of what some CA thinks about the status of a given user. That user may have exceeded their credit line, gone bankrupt, have been convicted of a felony, be under investigation in connection with various financial irregularities, etc., none of which would necessary force a CA to revoke his certificate. The relying party would no longer choose to TRUST that individual, regardless of what the CA might think of him. Presumably the relying party's Enterprise should be allowed to issue in internal-only CRL or the equivalent, and have it be accepted by the various relying parties, so long as that Enterprise's certificate is in the relying party's cache of trusted CA certificates, whether or not the name of that Enterprise had previously be listed in the Certificate Issuer Extension. Regards, Bob >>> Al Arsenault <awa1@home.com> 05/25/00 07:29AM >>> Christopher: An "indirect CRL" is a CRL issued by an entity other than the one that issued the certificate(s) on the CRL. The relevance of this flag is mostly explained in section 5.3.4, namely 5.3.4 Certificate Issuer This CRL entry extension identifies the certificate issuer associated with an entry in an indirect CRL, i.e. a CRL that has the indirectCRL indicator set in its issuing distribution point extension. If this extension is not present on the first entry in an indirect CRL, the certificate issuer defaults to the CRL issuer. On subsequent entries in an indirect CRL, if this extension is not present, the certificate issuer for the entry is the same as that for the preceding entry. That is, the indirectCRL flag is used in combination with the Certificate Issuer Extension to let you know that the issuer of the certs in a CRL was different from the issuer of the CRL, and who it was. (Normally, only the entity that issued the certificate is allowed to revoke it; otherwise, you open yourself up to a nice denial of service attack. However, if you control it properly, this can be a nice revocation management feature.) Al Arsenault Chief Security Architect Diversinet Corp. Christopher Williams wrote: > > RFC2459, section 5.2.5 "Issuing Distribution Point" mentions an indirectCRL > flag, but does not give its significance. Does anybody know? > > Christopher Williams > > Software engineer, NetLexis Ltd. > Solutions for secure electronic commerce > http://www.netlexis.com Received: from prv-mail20.provo.novell.com (prv-mail20.provo.novell.com [137.65.81.122]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id OAA19069 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 14:32:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from INET-PRV-Message_Server by prv-mail20.provo.novell.com with Novell_GroupWise; Tue, 30 May 2000 15:29:47 -0600 Message-Id: <s933de6b.047@prv-mail20.provo.novell.com> X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise Internet Agent 5.5.3.1 Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 15:29:44 -0600 From: "Bob Jueneman" <bjueneman@novell.com> To: <tgindin@us.ibm.com>, <peterw@valicert.com> Cc: <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, <awa1@home.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id OAA19070 Tom, >>> <tgindin@us.ibm.com> 05/30/00 12:51PM >>> > I am not sure that VeriSign class 1's E-mail address usage is unverified, as opposed to rather weakly verified, because the challenge/response serves as a form of POP. Whether this is an adequate POP is more questionable. E-mail distribution of the certificate tied to a PIN presumably provides a weak proof that at least someone who has access to that mailbox also has access to the key pair. Unfortunately neither the mailbox nor the key can be shown to be under the exclusive control of the putative user, whoever that may be. > Furthermore, a number of fields which are placed in certificates are restrictions on usage and cannot be verified by the CA. The most obvious such fields are the KeyUsage and ExtendedKeyUsage extensions. Well, that isn't quite so clear. At least some cryptographic implementations, e.g., NICI and CDSA, together with most smart cards, implement strong typing of such attributes, and hence could reasonable be relied upon to enforce such restrictions. The fact that most CAs fail to check on what kind of end-user software is in use, or place any constraints or even education requirements on their end-users is another problem, and one that is symptomatic of the over-reliance on CA policies, and a conspicuous lack of attention to the requirements for end-user implementations. > This does not, however, necessarily mean that the CA can avoid responsibility for verifying identity fields and other fields that are verifiable, such as Subject, SubjectPublicKey, SubjectAltName, and SubjectDirectoryAttributes. It's beginning to sound as though the CA doesn't really have to verify anything except those things for which it is naturally authoritative, e.g., the uniqueness of the DN within the CA's own domain, etc. Does it make sense to talk about "verifying" uniqueness only, without somehow verifying the _correctness_ (i.e., in meat-space) of the attributes? In this regard I am in general agreement with Bruno Salgueiro. RECOMMEND or SHOULD would convey the general sense of the technical community (for whatever good that will do with respect to legislative and regulatory authorities) without having to strip off the epaulets and drum the offending CA out of the corps if they don't comply with our infinite wisdom because of their individual business requirements. Regards, Bob Received: from mail.spyrus.com (mail.spyrus.com [207.212.34.20]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA18030 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 13:42:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rhousley_laptop.spyrus.com (dial04.spyrus.com [207.212.34.124]) by mail.spyrus.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA02592; Tue, 30 May 2000 13:48:44 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000530164418.00ab04a0@mail.spyrus.com> X-Sender: rhousley@mail.spyrus.com (Unverified) X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 16:47:28 -0400 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> From: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <392D437D.B7B1C2F7@bull.net> References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB8A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <14637.14460.418872.887051@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Denis: I believe that a CA can operate in accordance with one or more certification policies at the same time. The way that the CA is able to fulfill the requirements of more than one certification policy is documented in a single CPS. Russ At 05:15 PM 05/25/2000 +0200, Denis Pinkas wrote: >Paul and others, > >Some major details: > >1) I would propose to add an "s" to "certificate policy" making it >"certificate policies". > >In RFC 2459 we have: > >4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies > > The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or >more > policy information terms, each of which consists of an object > identifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. > >2) In the same way, I would add an "s" to "CPS" making it "CPSs". > >3) Finally, since the verification is not uniform, I would also add >an "s" to "verification". > >The final sentence would thus look like: > >"The precise nature of the verifications is detailed in the >certificate policies and/or the CPSs." > >4) ... and a comment on the use of "definitively": > >We were looking for text replacement related only to the subject >alternative name section 4.2.1.7. Now the sentence has been extended >to cover parameters like "all other fields in a certificate" and >"all certificate extensions". So "definitively" also applies to them >now, and this is wrong. > >I would thus propose to delete the sentence "like all other fields >in a certificate and all certificate extensions," and thus keep the >idea from RFC 2459, where only the subject alternative name is >considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, which was: > > Because the subject alternative name is considered to be > definitiviely bound to the public key, all parts of the subject > alternative name MUST be verified by the CA. > >The new text would thus look like: > > Denis> "The subject alternative name is considered to > Denis> be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST > Denis> verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative > Denis> names. The precise nature of the verifications is detailed >in > Denis> the certificate policies and/or the CPSs." > >Denis > > > Echoing Paul Hoffman's comment... I find Steve's text to be > > preferable. For one thing, retaining "definitively" seems a good > > thing to do. > > > paul > > > Warwick> "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a > Warwick> certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered >to > Warwick> be bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST verify (in > Warwick> accordance with the applicable certificate policy and/or >the > Warwick> CPS) all subject alternative names." > > > Steve> "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a > Steve> certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered >to > Steve> be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST > Steve> verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative > Steve> names. The precise nature of the verification is detailed >in > Steve> the certificate policy and/or the CPS." Received: from mail0.sibs.pt (mail0.sibs.pt [195.138.0.101]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id LAA15788 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 11:55:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 30655 invoked from network); 30 May 2000 18:58:01 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO sibs.pt) (195.138.0.90) by mail0.sibs.pt with SMTP; 30 May 2000 18:58:01 -0000 Message-ID: <393411A8.3A4F10D1@sibs.pt> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 20:08:24 +0100 From: Bruno Salgueiro <bs@sibs.pt> Organization: SIBS X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: pt,en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A0@seine.valicert.com> <3931C773.4B1DFFAF@home.com> <393219A0.90B7542B@nma.com> <3932CB75.A8A90B29@sibs.pt> <v04220801b5594a333a29@[192.168.1.151]> Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="------------ms52421F465528285FF5B5AAAD" This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------ms52421F465528285FF5B5AAAD Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Stephen, I can agree to that in the extent that the CAs MUST verify every data in the certificate that they physically can. In case of closed user groups this is particularly true but on the Internet is this feasible? When the PKIX group addresses these "verify" and "compliance" definitions in a "all or nothing" way, will undoubtedly opt out, as Bob Jueneman explained very well, all the TTPs out there. But this of course will only happen if we mean by verify the same as having a written and legally binding document that says that a certain attribute in the certificate really belongs/represents the applying entity. But, on the other hand, in Peter William's email I assumed that the class 1 (or equivalent) Verisign policy is a PKIX conforming policy which is unacceptable in the view of the EU Directive! You see, until someone really defines what verify means and what kind of quality in certificate data we are aiming for, nobody will understand each other, or I won't understand you! :) So, how do we solve this? I believe that there are really some issues that IETF won't be able to enforce in its standards. If you want to include TTPs that cannot, will not verify everything which depends greatly on the respon- sability of RAs and end users (risk management), then the word RECOMMEND should be used throughout the document regarding these issues and make an explicit reference to the CPS and CP of the certificate and the local legislation where the PKI is issuing certificates. Remember that in closed user groups other issues arise, i.e., confidentiality on the policies used. Is this too awkward? Regards, Stephen Kent wrote: > > Bruno, > > it is worth noting that TTPs, like you company, are not the only > types of CAs, and thus not the only focus of these standards. > Organizational and geopolitical CAs are of interest too. Such CAs > have the advantage of being authoritative for the data they put into > certs, if they limit themselves to what they really know. A problem > faced by TTPs, who are generally authoritative for no data, is how to > make the financial tradeoff you allude to. Maybe this is another > reason not to favor PKI models based on TTPs :-). > > Steve -- ======================================================= Bruno Salgueiro (mailto:bs@sibs.pt) SIBS - Sociedade Interbancária de Serviços Rua Soeiro Pereira Gomes, Lote 1, 1600 Lisboa, Portugal Tel: + 351 21 791 88 33 Fax: + 351 21 794 24 40 http://www.sibs.pt Esta mensagem foi assinada com certificado MULTIcert. Para obter o certificado da Autoridade de Certificação PILOTO MULTIcert dirija-se ao site http://www.sibs.multicert.com "Computers are useless. They can only give you answers." --Pablo Picasso ======================================================= --------------ms52421F465528285FF5B5AAAD Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature MIIFCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIE/DCCBPgCAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCC A4owggOGMIIC76ADAgECAgQ3Ttp2MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMCgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlBUMRkw FwYDVQQKExBQSUxPVE8gTVVMVEljZXJ0MB4XDTk5MDUzMTIzMzIzNFoXDTAwMDYwMTAwMDIz NFowYTELMAkGA1UEBhMCUFQxGTAXBgNVBAoTEFBJTE9UTyBNVUxUSWNlcnQxDTALBgNVBAsT BFNJQlMxDjAMBgNVBAsTBURTSVNUMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9CcnVubyBTYWxndWVpcm8wXDANBgkq hkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAuVICquW4IcbOpM37DdyglXYa8AAdR6UWq2VFEFTUtY0colnZ a9BQ0DvTRB8sO5XuFiTWFnVR5T94R5j5PjE0cwIDAQABo4IBxjCCAcIwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgWg MCsGA1UdEAQkMCKADzE5OTkwNjAxMDAwMjM0WoEPMjAwMDAyMTIwNDAyMzRaMBEGCWCGSAGG +EIBAQQEAwIFoDCBqQYJYIZIAYb4QgENBIGbFoGYQ2VydGlmaWNhZG8gUElMT1RPIE1VTFRJ Y2VydC4gRXN0ZXMgY2VydGlmaWNhZG9zIHNhbyBlbWl0aWRvcyBhbyBhYnJpZ28gZG8gQ1BT IHF1ZSBzZSBlbmNvbnRyYSBubyBzZWd1aW50ZSBVUkwgLSBodHRwczovL3d3dy5zaWJzLm11 bHRpY2VydC5jb20vY3BzLmh0bWwwFQYDVR0RBA4wDIEKYnNAc2licy5wdDBKBgNVHR8EQzBB MD+gPaA7pDkwNzELMAkGA1UEBhMCUFQxGTAXBgNVBAoTEFBJTE9UTyBNVUxUSWNlcnQxDTAL BgNVBAMTBENSTDEwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUuJYgbdZN8aJJDF13gU9LJAiiL+UwHQYDVR0OBBYE FEsyR+XzLWwX2+4LDk6/lA+XyaZtMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwGQYJKoZIhvZ9B0EABAwwChsEVjQu MAMCA6gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAk1GfA3Mtu3ECWCz2SIxkVisgOxt9vDKdQNTevrus an91qvmvoHAtJMAlAolegoiDpq73qdk+9JMODICE5zEXDIK9w2nCkqBheFwJs7frm/tVLnSv H+vQ5/5EX3ARwqforMGtjf+BO8OuYoxRyydKx9xheeyhke9+xJCEnOA2wDwxggFJMIIBRQIB ATAwMCgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlBUMRkwFwYDVQQKExBQSUxPVE8gTVVMVEljZXJ0AgQ3Ttp2MAkG BSsOAwIaBQCggbEwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcN MDAwNTMwMTkwODI0WjAjBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxFgQUVRfj8JdKsjAPKBlxdk0cS1gK4mgwUgYJ KoZIhvcNAQkPMUUwQzAKBggqhkiG9w0DBzAOBggqhkiG9w0DAgICAIAwBwYFKw4DAgcwDQYI KoZIhvcNAwICAUAwDQYIKoZIhvcNAwICASgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEQGGX+t86fuaAwaXs YYDsK4f5b3/rdmZ6cgXIIQX4zAqek7nwDq5Iy6SQbn4kcgYlS9JnodUBJ8hH/ZSy1JYCHvk= --------------ms52421F465528285FF5B5AAAD-- Received: from e3.ny.us.ibm.com (e3.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.103]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA15388 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 11:43:53 -0700 (PDT) From: tgindin@us.ibm.com Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.22]) by e3.ny.us.ibm.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA171732; Tue, 30 May 2000 14:49:47 -0400 Received: from D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com (d51mta04.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.32]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.8.8m3/NCO v4.9) with SMTP id OAA207376; Tue, 30 May 2000 14:51:25 -0400 Received: by D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568EF.006792F0 ; Tue, 30 May 2000 14:51:18 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: IBMUS To: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> cc: "'Al Arsenault'" <awa1@home.com>, "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-ID: <852568EF.0067905D.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 14:51:09 -0400 Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline I am not sure that VeriSign class 1's E-mail address usage is unverified, as opposed to rather weakly verified, because the challenge/response serves as a form of POP. Whether this is an adequate POP is more questionable. Furthermore, a number of fields which are placed in certificates are restrictions on usage and cannot be verified by the CA. The most obvious such fields are the KeyUsage and ExtendedKeyUsage extensions. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the CA can avoid responsibility for verifying identity fields and other fields that are verifiable, such as Subject, SubjectPublicKey, SubjectAltName, and SubjectDirectoryAttributes. Tom Gindin Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA14009 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 10:53:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQirlg12456; Tue, 30 May 2000 18:00:49 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA02933; Tue, 30 May 00 13:57:19 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id OAA00631; Tue, 30 May 2000 14:00:48 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14644.463.804984.618415@xedia.com> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 14:00:47 -0400 (EDT) To: Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr Cc: James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <200005301440.QAA05465@emeriau.edelweb.fr> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Peter" == Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> writes: >> 1) Time Stamp Token ordering can be done in most cases (see >> above) by only using GenTime and accuracy. Peter> A litte flame about accuracy: A user that wants to get a time Peter> stamp in order not to miss a deadline goes to a TSA: The TSA Peter> tells, well it is 23h59'59" but maybe not, since we are not Peter> sure whether we have the right time, it may already be well 2 Peter> seconds later or earlier, well, that's what we think, or Peter> almost. Peter> What kind of decision can you make based on that? What would Peter> be the harm if the TSA would simply adjust the time to the Peter> lower end of the interval, and generate no accuracy. If there Peter> is an application that requires to get the earlimost stamp Peter> just after midnight, and you are too early, you just repeat. Peter> Comparison between two time stamps of the same tsa can be done Peter> without using the accuracy; if the genTime is different, then Peter> there they are ordered by authority of the TSA. I can't see the point of this. The interpretation of a timestamp with accuracy is simple: the TSA is making an assertion that the time when it generated the stamp is in the range [ts - accuracy .. ts + accuracy]. (In other words, it promises that UTC will be contained in that interval.) So if you want to know the lower end of the interval, fine, you can compute that trivially. It is not necessary to throw away information in the protocol to give you that option. Other applications may want to know the upper end of the interval. And a number will want to know the interval itself. For example, to order timestamps from two different TSAs, you have to have the intervals. The order is a partial order: if the intervals don't overlap, the answer is obvious, and if they do overlap, the order is indeterminate. This in fact is the reason for having the accuracy field. >>>>> "Michael" == Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> writes: Michael> 3. a stamp issued by another TSA (AND the precision Michael> diapazons of the two stamps overlap). The only purpose of Michael> comparing is to figure out which stamp was issued Michael> earlier. We have two cases to consider here: Michael> Case1: Precision_TSA1 is equal to Precision_TSA2. Here the Michael> rule would be to treat the precision as the span of the Michael> probability graph, with the probability being the highest at Michael> the middle point (base time value), and 0 at the ends of the Michael> 'hill'. Therefore, the court (my court :) would simply opt Michael> to ignore the precision field at all, and look at just the Michael> base values. I would consequtively reject any claims that Michael> *your* probability graph is not a 'hill-shaped' curve. Michael> Case2: Precision_TSA1 is smaller than Precision_TSA2. As a Michael> judge I fully trust the TSA1 'cause it's time is more Michael> precise. So I again look at the base time value. If TSA1 Michael> stamp says it was generated a second earlier than TSA2 stamp Michael> - that's the truth. If TSA1 stamp says it was generated a Michael> second later than TSA2 stamp - that's the truth as well. I don't understand this reasoning at all. Whether TSA1 has an accuracy smaller than that of TSA2 isn't interesting, as far as I can see. I don't understand why you would use it to make a binary decision of merit (i.e., trusting only the TSA that has the smaller accuracy). If you ignore the accuracy and compare only midpoints, you will definitely be making an incorrect decision when the intervals overlap. ("Incorrect" in the sense of "not supported by the evidence".) This is true whether the accuracy values are the same or different. (For example, in your case 2, if TSA1 says 1:00:00 +/- 1s, and TSA2 says 1:00:01 +/- 3s, it sounds like you're saying that the TSA1 stamp is generated a second before the TSA2 stamp. Not so -- the TSA2 stamp may have been generated as much as 3 seconds before the TSA1 stamp.) paul Received: from prv-mail20.provo.novell.com (prv-mail20.provo.novell.com [137.65.81.122]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id KAA13921 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 10:52:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: from INET-PRV-Message_Server by prv-mail20.provo.novell.com with Novell_GroupWise; Tue, 30 May 2000 11:43:30 -0600 Message-Id: <s933a962.015@prv-mail20.provo.novell.com> X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise Internet Agent 5.5.3.1 Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 11:43:24 -0600 From: "Bob Jueneman" <bjueneman@novell.com> To: <awa1@home.com>, <peterw@valicert.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id KAA13922 Let me offer some comments on what I believe is a very important, and obviously contentious issue. In the past, the IETF has been primarily concerned with issues of over-the-wire protocol and structures, and the syntactic definitions of those fields. Other issues, and in particular issues that pertained to commercial business practices and/or various (potential) legal issues have generally been left to the relevant experts in those fields to define. In particular, the tradition within the IETF has been to espouse only purely technical issues, regardless of their potential business impact -- indeed, sometimes amazingly oblivious to such issues. As a result, the PKIX WG (and X.509) is, at least in my mind, notorious for failing to adequately come to grips with the precise semantic meaning of many of the terms that are defined. As a case in point, I would cite the complete lack of any agreement whatsoever as to the semantic meaning of the "nonrepudiation" key usage, either from a legal perspective or a narrower, but still useful set of do/don't do perspectives that would apply to end user software, either the CA, the originator, or the relying party. As a result, the term is neither defined, nor deprecated. Apparently the consensus was to let commercial practice sort out the issue, and perhaps this is in fact the best course. The PKIX WG, has long since departed from the traditional IETF practice of "rough consensus and running code". Now we are institutionalizing some of the most disliked features of ISO and we have become a "design-by-committee" organization. Unlike ISO, however, where various countries explicitly take into account various national objectives, and weigh, or at least try to weigh, the various commercial interests before coming to agreement, we generally fail to do so. The IETF lacks any form of institutional representation of business interests -- every contributor's comment or vote is treated exactly the same as every other, regardless of how small or how large the contributor's company's stake might be the in the outcome. That's of course very democratic, and everyone has a more or less equal chance to carry the day based on their individual fervor and ability to persuade. Unfortunately, this tends to mean that anyone can propose his own pet rock for standards consideration, regardless of the commercial viability of that approach. I am particularly thinking of the blatant anti-intellectual property preferences of the IESG, and their instance on including as mandatory features encryption algorithms which have not been well accepted in the marketplace. The various working groups then exacerbate the problem by adding more and more features and algorithms to the list of "approved" or "standard" featured, often at the behest of a very small community of interest. Yet every one of these additional features takes some amount of additional coding (generally not too large) to implement, plus significantly more in terms of GUIs and documentation, and an exponentially increasing amount of testing, all for little or no consumer benefit. But because of the importance of standards per se, the products are under a considerable amount of pressure to be "conforming" to requirements that have not been validated by the user community, and to which the user community had little or no say so, and the cost and complexity inevitably leads to both buggy and expensive software On the other hand, existing commercial practices may suddenly be deemed to be inappropriate or nonconforming, sometimes despite a considerable body of commercial acceptance, in a rather high-handed "father knows best" attitude. Since the commercial entities may have only a few representatives, they may not be able to offset the opinions offered by others with competing interests. I believe this is an increasingly unsatisfactory state of affairs, and may eventually lead to the IETF being regarded as more or less irrelevant to both the vendor and the user community, particularly if existing commercial practices are suddenly, and perhaps rather capriciously, labeled as being non-conforming. Now, how does this apply to the current controversy? By not adopting either an opt-out indication that certain perhaps useful information has not been explicitly validated by the CA, perhaps because it isn't economically feasible to do so, the implication is that everything in the certificate is God's own BINARY truth. And if you don't believe that, go off and read 80 or more pages of legalese to determine exactly what is meant. Of course computer programs can't do that, so we will resort to more and more complex schemes of policy OIDs, policy constraints, name constraints, etc., until we have no interoperability at all, or otherwise the relying parties will decide to limit the amount of trust that they put in a certificate to a lowest common denominator across the entire industry. I would submit that neither approach is very helpful. We don't even seem to be able to agree as to what the problem is. Denis Pinckas says: >In RFC 2459, section 4.1.2.6 Subject, we currently have: > Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 > distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject > entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. A > CA may issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same > subject entity. >Let us suppose that we use an *empty* distinguished name (which is >allowed by the standard). Should the above property also apply to >the alternative name ? I would think so and I understood >"definitively bound" as equivalent to "unique". In other words the >subject Alternative name once assigned must never be re-assigned for >a different entity by the CA. To this respect, the other fields that >where mentioned are not "definitively bound". So you now understand >the rational of the change that was made. I won't say that Denis' argument doesn't make any sense at all, but equating "definitively bound" to "unique" seems to me to be a very great leap. At least to me, "definitively bound" inherently implies the "correctness" of the attribute that is bound to the key, and by implication to the persona who is affiliated with that attribute in some fashion. Granted, if the name is merely a e-mail address or post office box, it is very difficult and perhaps impossible to correlate that name to any particular real person, even if (especially if) it is Bill_Clinton@aol.com. On the other hand, if the DN (or any other field in the certificate) does presumably uniquely define an organizational or residential person by a globally unique name, then a reasonable inference to be drawn from the certificate which binds both the DN and subjectAltName to the same key is that they same persona is somehow involved. Does that mean that the identified user has sole and exclusive access to that e-mail address (i.e., his spouse and kids don't share the same mail box), or that he even bothers to read his mail there? Not necessarily. Then exactly what does "validate", much less "definitively bound" mean in this circumstance? I don't like to have to say so, but the only option at this point is to say "go read the CP/CPS". The biggest problem, I believe, is that we are attempting to apply rather Procrustean binary logic to a problem that inherently involves shades of gray. We can say "This value is either a 1 or a 0, and that's that.", but this is subject to potentially hidden provisos in the CP or CPS, "for suitably defined values of 1 and/or 0". Trying to say that something is "right" or "not right", regardless of existing commercial practice would seem to pretend to a moral and/or legal authority that the IETF simply doesn't command, unless the Pope has suddenly become a silent co-chair. On the other hand, saying nothing at all, and leaving it up to a completely laissez faire interpretation a la nonrepudiation isn't very helpful or useful either. That's one reason why in the Novell Security Attributes extension we include in all of our certificates, we define a "Certificate Class" that ranges from 0 to 255, in an attempt to define some shades of gray between a completely anonymous user and a sovereign government. Cf. http://developer.novell.com/repository/attributes/certattrs_v10.htm . Regards, Bob Robert R. Jueneman Security Architect Novell, Inc. >>> Al Arsenault <awa1@home.com> 05/28/00 07:27PM >>> Peter, In a word, "No". Details below: Peter Williams wrote: > > User includes account name in the subject DN. A Private > organization's CA service services a closed intranet and > extranet community. It issues a certificate including > the account name. This circumstance is common in the Internet > community today. > > CA has a policy, which is partially disclosed. The disclosed > Policy Elements are made available only to subscribers. This > circumstance is common in the Internet community today. > > The motivations for establishing the extent > of a field verification policy are beyond the understanding > level of the CA's subscribers. This circumstance is common > in the Internet community today. > I won't argue with any of these; I'll simply state that the fact that it's common in the Internet community today doesn't make it the right thing to do. > The CA does disclose a policy element to susbcribers to > procedurally follow a "limited" technical verification procedure > concerning account names. The procedure establishes that an account > of that name "exists" - in an account management system acceptable > to the CA - at the time of certificate issuance. > In other words: the CA verified that there was someone named "Bill Clinton" purporting to reside at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC at the time of certificate issuance, so I'll put that in the certificate. I make no representation that the subject of this certificate is the same "Bill Clinton" as the one you might be thinking of, but I'll put it in the cert anyway. All other data in the certificate are verified as per the CP/CPS/other appropriate document. Is this useful? To what relying party? > All other data in a certificate is "verified", according > to other per-CA policy criteria and/or PKIX mandates. > > Does the resulting certificate, when issued > under the above scenario, conform with the > proposed PKIX standards for field verification? > Not according to the ones I'm recommending. :-) > A fourth party undertakes a private PKIX-audit of > the CA for the benefit of the CA. Should it > determine the CA is acting according to the spirit > of the proposal concerning field verification > when executing this scenario? > Again, in a word: "NO". The presence of an "attribute" whose value has not been verified - either directly or indirectly - by the CA is at best misleading, and at worst openly harmful to the relying party. Al Arsenault Chief Security Architect Diversinet Corp. Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA13446 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 10:38:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQirlf27544; Tue, 30 May 2000 17:46:29 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA02672; Tue, 30 May 00 13:42:56 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id NAA00623; Tue, 30 May 2000 13:46:24 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14643.65136.229164.518816@xedia.com> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 13:46:24 -0400 (EDT) To: azb@llnl.gov Cc: Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <200005271355.PAA04347@emeriau.edelweb.fr> <4.2.2.20000530103115.00aa1b00@poptop.llnl.gov> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Tony" == Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov> writes: Tony> At 12:21 PM 5/30/00 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: >> >> Peter> 1, 1, 1, 1 ... would respect this requirement :-) >> No, because the sequence 1 1 1 is NOT "increasing". It is >> "non-decreasing" which is not the same thing. >> >> "Increasing" means A(i+1) > Ai for all i. (Non-decreasing means >> A(i+1) >= Ai for all i.) >> >> "Monotonically" is a bit redundant but it doesn't hurt. Tony> Sorry Paul. The sequence 1, 1, 1, ... IS monotonically Tony> increasing (and decreasing, for that matter.) Perverse but Tony> true. That doesn't match the math I learned, but I guess it goes to show that you can't count on using this sort of terminology if you want to communicate the requirements clearly. Ok, so eliminate the words and replace by the requirement (i.e., the required relationship is > ) paul Received: from poptop.llnl.gov (poptop.llnl.gov [128.115.18.65]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA13012 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 10:28:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from catalyst (catalyst.llnl.gov [128.115.222.68]) by poptop.llnl.gov (8.8.8/LLNL-3.0.2/pop.llnl.gov-5.1) with ESMTP id KAA11982; Tue, 30 May 2000 10:35:33 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <4.2.2.20000530103115.00aa1b00@poptop.llnl.gov> X-Sender: e048786@poptop.llnl.gov X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.2 Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 10:39:49 -0700 To: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com>, Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr From: Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov> Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <14643.60017.405615.920032@xedia.com> References: <200005271355.PAA04347@emeriau.edelweb.fr> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed At 12:21 PM 5/30/00 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: > >> > Peter> 1, 1, 1, 1 ... would respect this requirement :-) > >No, because the sequence 1 1 1 is NOT "increasing". It is >"non-decreasing" which is not the same thing. > >"Increasing" means A(i+1) > Ai for all i. (Non-decreasing means >A(i+1) >= Ai for all i.) > >"Monotonically" is a bit redundant but it doesn't hurt. Sorry Paul. The sequence 1, 1, 1, ... IS monotonically increasing (and decreasing, for that matter.) Perverse but true. That is, one has Xi <= Xj whenever i <= j. To eliminate the "=" in the "<=" one must specify "strictly" increasing. (I will grant that the term "monotonic" seems redundant when "strictly" is specified. What could be the difference between "strictly increasing" and "strictly monotonically increasing?") ___tony___ Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> Information Operations, Warfare and Assurance Center Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, CA 94551-9900 Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA12577 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 10:17:38 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQWY1T6C>; Tue, 30 May 2000 13:26:04 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFC3@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 13:25:30 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id KAA12578 Salut Denis, As requested, I have made some small changes to your proposed text about the nonce for the security consideration section and the amended version, with deletes and inserts tagged, appears below: "Inadvertent or deliberate replays for requests incorporating the same hash (algorithm and) value may happen. Inadvertent replays occur when more than one copy of the same request message gets sent to the TSA because of problems in the intervening network elements. Deliberate replays occur when a middleman is replaying legitimate TS responses. In order to detect these situations, several techniques may be used. Using a nonce always allows to detect replays, and hence its use is RECOMMENDED. Another possibility is to use both a local clock and a moving time window during which the requester remembers all the hashes sent during that time window. When receiving a response, the requester <inserted>ensures</inserted> <deleted>makes sure that</deleted> both <inserted>that</inserted> the time of the response is within the time window and that there is only <deleted>once</deleted><inserted>one occurrence of</inserted> the hash value in that time window. If <deleted>there is</deleted> the same hash value<inserted>is generated</inserted> more than once <inserted>within a time window</inserted>, the requester may either use a nonce, or wait until the time window has moved to come back to the <deleted>previous</deleted> case where the same hash value appears only once during that time window." However, you have left the second paragraph of Section 2.2 unchanged, which may still be open to interpretation. The way it is currently written, it would seem that a requesting entity would have to reject a totally valid response because of possible delays in the intervening network elements and/or drifting of the requesting entity own local time reference. In order to avoid this possible interpretation, an amended version, also with deletes and inserts tagged, appears below: "It SHALL then verify the <deleted>timeliness of the </deleted>response <inserted>against replay </inserted>by verifying either the time included in the response against a local <deleted>trusted </deleted>time reference, if one is available, and/or the value of the nonce (large random number with a high probability that it is generated by the client only once) included in the response against the value included in the request. If any of the verifications above fails, the TimeStampToken SHALL be rejected." Regards, Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 -----Original Message----- From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2000 6:09 AM To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol François, Sorry for the delay to answer, but the trafic is currently rather heavy on the TSP document and it takes time to prepare answers. I do not agree to make the nonce mandatory since there exists cases where it is not needed. I also do not think that the case of a subverted TSA falls under the topic of "deliberate replay". However, in order to address your concern, I could add the following text in the security consideration section : Inadvertent or deliberate replays for requests incorporating the same hash (algorithm and) value may happen. Inadvertent replays occur when more than one copy of the same request message gets sent to the TSA because of problems in the intervening network elements. Deliberate replays occur when a middleman is replaying legitimate TS responses. In order to detect these situations, several techniques may be used. Using a nonce always allows to detect replays, and hence its use is RECOMMENDED. Another possibility is to use both a local clock and a moving time window during which the requester remembers all the hashes sent during that time window. When receiving a response, the requester makes sure that both the time of the response is within the time window and that there is only once the hash value in that time window. If there is the same hash value more than once, the requester may either use a nonce, or wait until the time window has moved to come back to the previous case where the same hash value appears only once during that time window. If you prefer a different wording, please provide the amended text. Denis > Denis, > > We probably need to be clear on the requirement and then we can be sure that > the text in the document reflects the requirement. > > You seem quite clear that the requirement is to prevent replays - but we > need to be clear on whether we are trying to detect and/or prevent > deliberate or inadvertent replay or both. Inadvertent replay could occur > when more than one copy of a request message gets sent to the TSA because of > problems in the intervening network elements. In this case the TSA because > of its "no look" policy would just blindly generate time stamps for each of > the copies it receives. Deliberate replay, on the other hand, assumes that > the TSA has been subverted or its signing key has been compromised, or that > a middleman is replaying legitimate TS responses. Each of the various > potential replays needs to be considered to ensure that the protocol > protects against it. > > 1. Deliberate middleman replay. Since each response contains a signed TS > Token which includes the message imprint, serial number and time, this type > of attack is easily detected within the currently proposed protocol. > > 2. Replay by subverted TSA. A subverted TSA could generate any number of TS > Tokens containing the same message imprint at any time. Because each could > have different serial number and/or time, each would be unique and there is > no way the client could detect a replay on the basis of the response. The > only way this could be detected would be for every request to include a > nonce and for the client to maintain a record of all nonces generated to > verify against the responses. > > 3. Inadvertent replay. Again, the only way for the client to distinguish > this type of replay would be through the use of a nonce. In this case, > however, it should not be necessary to maintain a record of all nonces > generated but only those generated within a time window as you suggest. If > the window length is set to, for example, twice the expected delay between > request and response, the client could be quite confident that there have > been no inadvertent replays if no duplicate nonce values are detected. > > To summarize, the nonce should not be an optional component of replay > detection (as suggested by the current wording) - it is necessary if the > client is trying to protect against anything other than deliberate middleman > replays. > > It is suggested that the wording in the fourth sentence of the second > paragraph of Section 2.2 (page 3) be changed to: > > "It SHALL then verify the value of the nonce (large random number with high > probability that is generated by the client only once) included in the > response against the nonce value included in the corresponding request to > ensure that no replay has occurred." > > In Section 2.4.1 remove the OPTIONAL qualifier from nonce in the definition > of TimeStampReq (page 4). > > Change the wording of first sentence of the nonce description in Section > 2.4.1 (page 5)to read: > > "The nonce allows the client to verify the response against replay." > > In Section 2.4.2 remove the OPTIONAL qualifier from nonce in the definition > of TSTInfo (page 7). > > Change the wording of the nonce description in Section 2.4.2 (page 5)to > read: > > "The nonce field MUST be equal to the value provided in the TimeStampReq > structure." > > If you agree with this approach, then I would suggest we prepare a short > annex to describe the two different cases - subverted TSA vice inadvertent > replay. > > Have a good weekend! > > Francois > ___________________________________ > Francois Rousseau > Director of Standards and Conformance > Chrysalis-ITS > 1688 Woodward Drive > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 > > -----Original Message----- > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 5:36 AM > To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol > > Francois, > > I realized that I ommited to reply to your E-mail. > > > Salut Denis, > > > > I do not remember if this issue was raised before, but in Section 2.2 the > > following statement is made: > > > > "the requesting entity .... SHALL then verify the timeliness of the > response > > by verifying either the time included in the response against a local > > trusted time reference, if one is available, and/or the value of the nonce > > (large random number with a high probability that it is generated by the > > client only once) included in the response against the value included in > the > > request." > > > > A nonce is normally used to detect attempts at replays, which is not > > necessarily related to the timeliness of the response to a particular > > request as mentioned here. > > > > The first part of the statement talks about verifying the time included in > > the response against a locally trusted time source. This could used to > > measure round trip path delay for calibration purposes, > > No. This is not the goal. The goal is to make sure that you have no > replay, in particular on the same hash value. > > > but unless one could > > be certain that the locally trusted source is as accurate as the TSA time > > source (or, at least, that the difference between them is fixed and > > well-known), I don't see how it would detect/prevent replays. > > Using a moving time window the caller remembers all the hashes he > sent during that time window. > If there is not the same hash value within that time window, then he > makes sure that the time of the response is within the time window. > If there is the same hash (a very rare situation), it is a little > bit more complicated, and there are several options. Among them: > using the nonce, or waiting until the time window has moved to come > back to the previous case: only one hash value during that time > window. But we are talking implementations details, which is not the > topic of an RFC. > > > If one has > > such a trusted time source locally, what is the point in using a TTP for > > time stamping? > > The time is locally trusted, ... which does not mean that other > people will trust that time. > > > > > Could you please clarify the intent of this statement and if the intent is > > to prevent replays or check the timeliness of responses or both? > > Now, that you have the explanations, if you still believe that the > text is not clear enough, I suggest that you submit a proposal to > clarify the text. > > Regards, > > Denis > > > > > Francois > > ___________________________________ > > Francois Rousseau > > Director of Standards and Conformance > > Chrysalis-ITS > > 1688 Woodward Drive > > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from unimur.um.es (unimur.um.es [155.54.1.1]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA11727 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 09:40:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from aries.dif.um.es (aries.dif.um.es [155.54.210.253]) by unimur.um.es (8.9.1b+Sun/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA16895 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 18:47:52 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from dif.um.es (labredes15.dif.um.es [155.54.210.9]) by aries.dif.um.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id C332FEC1A for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 18:47:46 +0200 (MET DST) Sender: root@aries.dif.um.es Message-ID: <3933F0B3.B8544EB6@dif.um.es> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 18:47:48 +0200 From: Gabriel =?iso-8859-1?Q?L=F3pez=20Mill=E1n?= <gabilm@dif.um.es> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.51 [en] (X11; I; Linux 2.2.5-15 i586) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: PKIX library References: <39324849.586ADF80@dif.um.es> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from base64 to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id JAA11730 Gabriel López Millán wrote: > Hello all. > > There is any free pkix library for Java? > > Thanks, Gabi. OK, I am testing JCSI library. It is good, but I want a library which I can construct PKIMessages, with PKIBody, PKIHeader, etc. There is anything? Thanks a lot, Gabi. Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA11042 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 09:13:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQirkz14525; Tue, 30 May 2000 16:21:07 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA01519; Tue, 30 May 00 12:17:37 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id MAA00557; Tue, 30 May 2000 12:21:05 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14643.60017.405615.920032@xedia.com> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 12:21:05 -0400 (EDT) To: Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <200005271355.PAA04347@emeriau.edelweb.fr> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Peter" == Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> writes: >> At 15:38 26.05.00 +0200, Denis Pinkas wrote: >1) for the first >> requirement, stick to the use of this parameter as >required for >> PKCs, CRLs in RFC 2459 and for ACs. This means only >require >> uniqueness and nothing else. We may then keep the name >> >"serialNumber". >> >> Just a short remark: CRL serialnumbers (=the cRLNumber extension) >> are required to be monotonically increasing. "5.2.3 CRL Number >> The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension which conveys a >> monotonically increasing sequence number for each CRL issued by a >> CA. " >> Peter> 1, 1, 1, 1 ... would respect this requirement :-) No, because the sequence 1 1 1 is NOT "increasing". It is "non-decreasing" which is not the same thing. "Increasing" means A(i+1) > Ai for all i. (Non-decreasing means A(i+1) >= Ai for all i.) "Monotonically" is a bit redundant but it doesn't hurt. paul Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA10554 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 08:59:37 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQWY1TWB>; Tue, 30 May 2000 12:08:03 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFC2@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, rgm@icsa.net Subject: RE: Encrypting private keys - how do you achieve this in practice ? Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 12:07:33 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Dave, As you are probably aware, the PKCS#11 wrapping function should be supported by hardware cryptographic modules that are used to generate certificate subject private keys in order for these private keys to be extracted and exported to end entities since these private keys should never appear in plaintext form outside of such hardware cryptographic modules. Our hardware cryptographic modules, which are used by many PKI vendors, support the standard PKCS#11 v2.01 wrapping and unwrapping functions to export and import private keys. This implies the following steps according to Section 11.9 of PKCS#11 for an RSA private key: 1. The RSA private key must first be BER-encoded according to PKCS #1's RSAPrivateKey ASN.1 type. This type requires values to be present for all the attributes specific to Cryptoki's RSA private key objects. In other words, if a Cryptoki library does not have values for an RSA private key's CKA_MODULUS, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, CKA_PRIME_1, CKA_PRIME_2, CKA_EXPONENT_1, CKA_EXPONENT2, and CKA_COEFFICIENT values, it cannot create an RSAPrivateKey BER-encoding of the key, and so it cannot prepare it for wrapping; 2. The RSA private key is then BER-encoded according to PKCS #8's PrivateKeyInfo ASN.1 type; and 3. The resulting string of bytes is encrypted with the secret key. This encryption must be done in CBC mode with PKCS padding. Do you mean by your response to Christopher that the PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo type is what gets encrypted in the encValue field of the EncryptedValue structure? If not, do you know what gets encrypted in the encValue field or is it something that will need to be profiled under the upcoming CMP testing? Regards, Francois -----Original Message----- From: David P. Kemp [mailto:dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil] Sent: Friday, May 26, 2000 11:48 AM To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Encrypting private keys - how do you achieve this in practice? Christopher, If your implementation always exports password-protected private keys, and you don't want to (or can't, because it's in hardware) touch the existing code, then you could just put some glue around the module to unwrap the key with the password and then wrap the plaintext key for the intended recipient in an EnvelopedData structure, using PKIArchiveOptions:encryptedPrivKey:envelopedData. Put the private key in EnvelopedData:encryptedContentInfo:encryptedContent and set EnvelopedData:encryptedContentInfo:contentType to id-data. It isn't recommended (at least by me) to place a password-wrapped private key directly in PKIArchiveOptions:encryptedPrivKey:encryptedValue. But the straightforward approach to doing so would be to populate: encryptedValue:symmAlg - ??? encryptedValue:encValue - BER of EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo Fortunately, PKCS#8 does not define an OID for EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo, as they obviously felt that this structure is never suitable for use within another protocol :-). Dave > From: "Christopher Williams" <ccwilliams@ntlworld.com> > To: "PKIX Mailing List" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> > Subject: Encrypting private keys - how do you achieve this in practice? > Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 11:35:06 +0100 > X-Priority: 3 > X-MSMail-Priority: Normal > X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 > > When you encrypt a private key to put it in the EncryptedValue structure, it > appears from the standard that you take the private key octets as the plain > text and encrypt under the symmetric algorithm / symmetric key, etc. > > There's a problem here. Our implementation of RSA / DSA / DH, etc. does not > give out private keys in plain text and I guess that many other > implementations are the same. We do support password wrapping of the > private key (e.g. PKCS#8) but the EncryptedValue structure does not seem to > be designed to take a password-wrapped key. > > How do you reconcile PKCS#8 with the EncryptedValue structure? For example, > I guess that you could supply the password as the symmetric key and encode > the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure as a bit string, but what would then > be the symmetric algorithm? > > How have other people implemented private key encryption? > > Christopher Williams > > Software engineer, NetLexis Ltd. > Solutions for secure electronic commerce > http://www.netlexis.com Received: from seine.valicert.com (corporate-gw.valicert.com [63.65.221.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA10423 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 08:59:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: by seine.valicert.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LS0CRV2Z>; Tue, 30 May 2000 09:01:47 -0700 Message-ID: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2AB@seine.valicert.com> From: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> To: "'Al Arsenault'" <awa1@home.com> Cc: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 09:01:46 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Al, could you add a little, just a little, technical argument to your mails, please? The matters at hand are very important issues of conformance, and represent a major change in policy. You ask if ACES was referred to. No! ACES was NOT the "national" infrastructure referred to, in the parenthesis. Stop inventing spurious denials and protestation on matters that I simply have not introduced. It is simply not fair to the ACES people who have no voice here to deny your assertions. NO! VeriSign's commercial work in support of ACES was not mentioned, implied, and should NOT be inferred. No, ACES is not the only (major) "national" CA infrastructure in the world, Al. But thankyou for the opportunity to correct a US-centric view of the Internet. Forgive me if I do not name the government; it is for similar reasons as you feel when you censure VeriSign. Forgive me if I avoid responding a whole series of erroneous assertions drawn from your false assumption. They confuse the conformance issue - which is nicely framed for legitimate community discussion, if any. To the valuable element of your contribution: Nobody (at ValiCert) is writing standards to benefit VeriSign, unelss we all win in the usual open standards way! We are trying to ensure tha the deployed PKI (compliant with RFC 2459) continues to grow, if possible. If we collectively decide that systems that were conforming with a draft standard's version X must now be declared non-conforming with verison Y, then its perfectly proper to specifically call out this for explicit endorsement by the WG. At least it must be discussed in the next WG meeting; of such magnitude is the change. Persoally I vote against: VeriSign's PCS Class 1 contribution to the general internet should continue to be incorporated in PKIX, not cast out. What we saw happen here last week was quite an extraordinary event. -----Original Message----- From: Al Arsenault [mailto:awa1@home.com] Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2000 8:33 AM To: Peter Williams Cc: 'Denis Pinkas'; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification I'll try to step lightly here, because the company is question is a partner of my own employer. However, I'm in complete disagreement with one of Peter's central points: Peter Williams wrote: ><snip> > > Some or all of VeriSign's Class 1 offering > of its Public Certification Service(s) is/are > apparently no longer PKIX-conforming, if one applies > the conformance principles now proposed by Steve. It > was conforming, last week. > <snip> > > This seems an excessive impact of your > suggestion. I, as one of its co-designers, would > like to include VeriSign PCS's current Class 1 > offering within the PKIX family of conforming CAs. In general, writing requirements in any standard to ensure that a particular product or implementation succeeds is a really bad idea. (Else I'd be proposing requirements to ensure that Diversinet's products suddenly become PKIX-conformant, even though we currently rely heavily on an unpublished proprietary protocol for communication between RAs and CAs.) While we should not single out any company's product or implementation unfairly, neither should we tailor a requirement or set of requirements to fit a particular product or implmentation. Thus, if VeriSign's Class 1 service is not "PKIX-conformant", my response would be to question why. If it's because VeriSign has chosen not to meet a requirement that this group deems useful, then that's too bad - VeriSign loses. If it's because we're imposing a requirement that's not really important, okay, I could see deleting the requirement, but I don't believe that that's the case. As for >(A "national" > ie governmental CA service to residents also suddenly > became non-conforming last week, also, because > of other subtle tweaks) okay, I'll bite. I'll assume that you're alluding to ACES here, since that's the only major "national" program that fits your description. I know how ACES policy says that information in certs is to be verified - it's done indirectly, using existing Government databases to provide verification of data to the approved CAs. However, I'm confused, since (a) VeriSign's class 1 service was never and will never be "good enough" for ACES; and (b) I'm not sure what tweaks killed any existing PKIX conformance for the ACES vendors. (BTW: did just one ACES vendor become non-conformant, or all three of them?) And if there's something else you're talking about here, please be less obtuse. Be specific, even. Al Arsenault Chief Security Architect Diversinet Corp. Received: from mail.rdc1.md.home.com (imail@ha1.rdc1.md.home.com [24.2.2.66]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA10299 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 08:57:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from home.com ([24.180.131.6]) by mail.rdc1.md.home.com (InterMail vM.4.01.02.00 201-229-116) with ESMTP id <20000530160512.RBPP23916.mail.rdc1.md.home.com@home.com>; Tue, 30 May 2000 09:05:12 -0700 Message-ID: <3933E62B.32967168@home.com> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 12:02:51 -0400 From: Al Arsenault <awa1@home.com> Organization: @Home Network X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en]C-AtHome0407 (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com>, "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A9@seine.valicert.com> <3933DF1C.480CD45C@home.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Al Arsenault wrote: > <snip> > I'll assume that you're alluding to ACES here, since > that's the only major "national" program that fits your description. Geesh - working for a Canadian company, you'd think I'd know better by now. My apologies for that remark - ACES is the only "national" program IN THE US that fits Peter's description, and since he now mostly resides in the US, I jumped to the conclusion that he was referring to a US program. Of course, there are major national PKI-based programs in any number of countries - if it was one of them we knocked out of PKIX conformance last week (without a good reason for doing so), I'd be interested in hearing about it. > Al Arsenault > Chief Security Architect > Diversinet Corp. Received: from mail.rdc1.md.home.com (imail@ha1.rdc1.md.home.com [24.2.2.66]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA09545 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 08:27:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from home.com ([24.180.131.6]) by mail.rdc1.md.home.com (InterMail vM.4.01.02.00 201-229-116) with ESMTP id <20000530153506.QJIF23916.mail.rdc1.md.home.com@home.com>; Tue, 30 May 2000 08:35:06 -0700 Message-ID: <3933DF1C.480CD45C@home.com> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 11:32:44 -0400 From: Al Arsenault <awa1@home.com> Organization: @Home Network X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en]C-AtHome0407 (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> CC: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A9@seine.valicert.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I'll try to step lightly here, because the company is question is a partner of my own employer. However, I'm in complete disagreement with one of Peter's central points: Peter Williams wrote: ><snip> > > Some or all of VeriSign's Class 1 offering > of its Public Certification Service(s) is/are > apparently no longer PKIX-conforming, if one applies > the conformance principles now proposed by Steve. It > was conforming, last week. > <snip> > > This seems an excessive impact of your > suggestion. I, as one of its co-designers, would > like to include VeriSign PCS's current Class 1 > offering within the PKIX family of conforming CAs. In general, writing requirements in any standard to ensure that a particular product or implementation succeeds is a really bad idea. (Else I'd be proposing requirements to ensure that Diversinet's products suddenly become PKIX-conformant, even though we currently rely heavily on an unpublished proprietary protocol for communication between RAs and CAs.) While we should not single out any company's product or implementation unfairly, neither should we tailor a requirement or set of requirements to fit a particular product or implmentation. Thus, if VeriSign's Class 1 service is not "PKIX-conformant", my response would be to question why. If it's because VeriSign has chosen not to meet a requirement that this group deems useful, then that's too bad - VeriSign loses. If it's because we're imposing a requirement that's not really important, okay, I could see deleting the requirement, but I don't believe that that's the case. As for >(A "national" > ie governmental CA service to residents also suddenly > became non-conforming last week, also, because > of other subtle tweaks) okay, I'll bite. I'll assume that you're alluding to ACES here, since that's the only major "national" program that fits your description. I know how ACES policy says that information in certs is to be verified - it's done indirectly, using existing Government databases to provide verification of data to the approved CAs. However, I'm confused, since (a) VeriSign's class 1 service was never and will never be "good enough" for ACES; and (b) I'm not sure what tweaks killed any existing PKIX conformance for the ACES vendors. (BTW: did just one ACES vendor become non-conformant, or all three of them?) And if there's something else you're talking about here, please be less obtuse. Be specific, even. Al Arsenault Chief Security Architect Diversinet Corp. Received: from cam-mailer1.bbn.com (cam-mailer1.bbn.com [171.78.68.5]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA08851 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 08:03:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [128.33.238.120] (TC120.BBN.COM [128.33.238.120]) by cam-mailer1.bbn.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP id LAA21562; Tue, 30 May 2000 11:10:48 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220803b5594e23273e@[192.168.1.151]> In-Reply-To: <39337C27.8F0FB63F@bull.net> References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB8A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <14637.14460.418872.887051@xedia.com> <392D437D.B7B1C2F7@bull.net> <v04220806b554462eec3e@[128.33.238.95]> <39337C27.8F0FB63F@bull.net> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 11:04:53 -0400 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Denis, I agree with your analysis of where to put which text. In fact, I think an early message from me on this topic acknowledged that since the text in question was only present in the Subject alt name section, that the broader attribute verification issue might better be addressed elsewhere, but that got lost along the way. Sorry. So, let's make the alt name text match the base attribute text, as you suggest. I am happy with your proposed rewording for this text. Separately, I'd like to insert a comment re verification of all attributes contained in a certificate. Again, I am happy with your wording, and the suggested placement of the text in 4.1.1.1. Thanks for the response, Steve Received: from cam-mailer1.bbn.com (cam-mailer1.bbn.com [171.78.68.5]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA08766 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 08:03:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [128.33.238.120] (TC120.BBN.COM [128.33.238.120]) by cam-mailer1.bbn.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP id LAA21489; Tue, 30 May 2000 11:10:29 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220801b5594a333a29@[192.168.1.151]> In-Reply-To: <3932CB75.A8A90B29@sibs.pt> References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A0@seine.valicert.com> <3931C773.4B1DFFAF@home.com> <393219A0.90B7542B@nma.com> <3932CB75.A8A90B29@sibs.pt> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 11:04:53 -0400 To: Bruno Salgueiro <bs@sibs.pt> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Bruno, it is worth noting that TTPs, like you company, are not the only types of CAs, and thus not the only focus of these standards. Organizational and geopolitical CAs are of interest too. Such CAs have the advantage of being authoritative for the data they put into certs, if they limit themselves to what they really know. A problem faced by TTPs, who are generally authoritative for no data, is how to make the financial tradeoff you allude to. Maybe this is another reason not to favor PKI models based on TTPs :-). Steve Received: from seine.valicert.com (corporate-gw.valicert.com [63.65.221.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA08418 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 07:55:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: by seine.valicert.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LS0CRVBC>; Tue, 30 May 2000 07:57:48 -0700 Message-ID: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A9@seine.valicert.com> From: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> To: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 07:57:48 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Denis, The mandatory operational policy element that was advocated by one co-chair based off of your suggestion is potentially very damaging to the current Internet PKI, as we who built what individual users can use, know it. Please reconsider your text, given how others may apply it, carefully. Based on Al's and Steve's replies to my deliberately contentious policy scenario, we can now apply the interpretive principles established as community standards. That exercise showed clearly that naming verification policy is not only now mandatory on PKIX CAs, but which policies are conforming is determined by PKIX. The conformance testing procedure is unspecified in the text, but none the less it evidently exists - as a subjective process. Lets apply the principles to VeriSign's branded services, to see the ramifications. Some or all of VeriSign's Class 1 offering of its Public Certification Service(s) is/are apparently no longer PKIX-conforming, if one applies the conformance principles now proposed by Steve. It was conforming, last week. (A "national" ie governmental CA service to residents also suddenly became non-conforming last week, also, because of other subtle tweaks) Goto a formal certificate repository https://digitalid.verisign.com/services/client/index.html and perform the instructions. Type in peterw@valicert.com, and see (apparently) that a certificate is recorded, with "pending" status. The common name is "No Such Agency" and an unverified email address exists in the name form selected by VeriSign. To be fair to VeriSign, I have not completed all procedures. To complete, someone must send a challenge-response pin sent to peterw@valicert.com to VeriSign to verify that such email account-name exists. (This is apparently a non-conforming verification event.) The resulting certificate binds one legally to certain digital signatures, according to the governing policy. VeriSign PCS's Class 1 Service is apparently (suddenly) no longer conforming with PKIX, under any interpretion of the new mandatory policy language concerning name field verification This seems an excessive impact of your suggestion. I, as one of its co-designers, would like to include VeriSign PCS's current Class 1 offering within the PKIX family of conforming CAs. Peter. -----Original Message----- From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2000 1:31 AM To: Stephen Kent Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Steve, It took me longer to respond to your message because you did not included my message in your response. :-( Several comments to your E-mail: The place where we intend to have the text is section 4.2.1.7. which is only related to the subject alternative name. Hence it is not the right place to cover other topics. Maybe I misread the text while reading the sentence "definitively bound" and I guess this hides a much bigger issue here. :-( In RFC 2459, section 4.1.2.6 Subject, we currently have: Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. A CA may issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same subject entity. Let us suppose that we use an *empty* distinguished name (which is allowed by the standard). Should the above property also apply to the alternative name ? I would think so and I understood "definitively bound" as equivalent to "unique". In other words the subject Alternative name once assigned must never be re-assigned for a different entity by the CA. To this respect, the other fields that where mentioned are not "definitively bound". So you now understand the rational of the change that was made. If we want to fix this, I propose that we do the fixing in the appropriate sections. For the subject alternative name (section 4.1.2.6) I would propose the following: The subject alternative name MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. The CA MUST verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative names. The precise nature of the verifications is detailed in the certificate policies and/or the CPSs." Somewhere else we could have a general statement to cover the point that all fields MUST be verified. This could be, for example, at the end of section 4.1.1.1. which would look like: 4.1.1.1 tbsCertificate The field contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public key associated with the subject, a validity period, and other associated information. The fields are described in detail in section 4.1.2; the tbscertificate may also include extensions which are described in section 4.2. The CA MUST verify (directly or indirectly) all the fields contained in this field. The precise nature of the verifications is detailed in the certificate policies and/or the CPSs. Denis Note: At the end of this E-mail, you will find my original message. > Denis, > > The latter part of your message gets at the contentious point in this > discussion. > > Some of us believe that ALL data in a certificate is definitively > bound to the public key. After much debate the WG rejected the > notion of marking data in a cert as non-verified. So, the current > posture is that the EXTENT to which data is verified is a matter of > CA policy, but the basic notion is that the CA has verified all of > the data. > > Warwick gave some examples that he felt supported the notion that not > all certificate data is verified, but my response argued that these > examples were either not a violation of the verification notion > (e.g., OUs), or were anomalous (pseudonyms). > > So, while I agree with your suggestions re pluralizing the references > in the cited text, I don't agree with the suggestion to limit the > scope of the comment to just the subject alternate name. > > Steve ORIGINAL MESSAGE: Paul and others, Some major details: 1) I would propose to add an "s" to "certificate policy" making it "certificate policies". In RFC 2459 we have: 4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or more policy information terms, each of which consists of an object identifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. 2) In the same way, I would add an "s" to "CPS" making it "CPSs". 3) Finally, since the verification is not uniform, I would also add an "s" to "verification". The final sentence would thus look like: "The precise nature of the verifications is detailed in the certificate policies and/or the CPSs." 4) ... and a comment on the use of "definitively": We were looking for text replacement related only to the subject alternative name section 4.2.1.7. Now the sentence has been extended to cover parameters like "all other fields in a certificate" and "all certificate extensions". So "definitively" also applies to them now, and this is wrong. I would thus propose to delete the sentence "like all other fields in a certificate and all certificate extensions," and thus keep the idea from RFC 2459, where only the subject alternative name is considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, which was: Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, all parts of the subject alternative name MUST be verified by the CA. The new text would thus look like: Denis> "The subject alternative name is considered to Denis> be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST Denis> verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative Denis> names. The precise nature of the verifications is detailed Denis> in the certificate policies and/or the CPSs." Denis Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA08099 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 07:51:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id QAA18154; Tue, 30 May 2000 16:58:34 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Tue, 30 May 2000 16:58:34 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id QAA29758; Tue, 30 May 2000 16:58:32 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id QAA05468; Tue, 30 May 2000 16:58:32 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 16:58:32 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005301458.QAA05468@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > François, > > Sorry for the delay to answer, but the trafic is currently rather > heavy on the TSP document and it takes time to prepare answers. > > I do not agree to make the nonce mandatory since there exists cases > where it is not needed. I also do not think that the case of a > subverted TSA falls under the topic of "deliberate replay". I would even say that I rarely see a case where a client would really need to use a nonce to avoid whatever kind of replay. A replay of a response WITH THE SAME HASH is most likely a good thing for the client. What is actually missing is an output nonce from the TSA in order to avoid known plain text attacks in case when the results are otherwise predictable. I would suggest to change the text about the nonce in the following way: The Nonce in the response MUST contain a possible Nonce of the request as a prefix. By this, the TSA can add an ouput Nonce in order to avoid known-plain text attacks, as well as it gives the possibility to front-end proxies to append data to the request Nonce when concentrating requests from many requesters in such a way that duplicates and replays can be avoided. > > However, in order to address your concern, I could add the following > text in the security consideration section : > > Inadvertent or deliberate replays for requests incorporating the > same hash (algorithm and) value may happen. Inadvertent replays > occur when more than one copy of the same request message gets sent > to the TSA because of problems in the intervening network elements. So, where is the problem? > Deliberate replays occur when a middleman is replaying legitimate TS > responses. In order to detect these situations, several techniques > may be used. Using a nonce always allows to detect replays, and > hence its use is RECOMMENDED. Another possibility is to use both a Why recommended? I would like to get a replay to have a proof of an earlier time. > local clock and a moving time window during which the requester > remembers all the hashes sent during that time window. When > receiving a response, the requester makes sure that both the time of > the response is within the time window and that there is only once > the hash value in that time window. If there is the same hash value > more than once, the requester may either use a nonce, or wait until > the time window has moved to come back to the previous case where > the same hash value appears only once during that time window. If there is the same hash value twice, the requester can just the previous time stamp, why should one go to the TSA in this case? Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA07503 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 07:33:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id QAA17826; Tue, 30 May 2000 16:40:39 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Tue, 30 May 2000 16:40:40 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id QAA29639; Tue, 30 May 2000 16:40:34 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id QAA05465; Tue, 30 May 2000 16:40:34 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 16:40:34 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005301440.QAA05465@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > 1) Time Stamp Token ordering can be done in most cases (see above) > by only using GenTime and accuracy. A litte flame about accuracy: A user that wants to get a time stamp in order not to miss a deadline goes to a TSA: The TSA tells, well it is 23h59'59" but maybe not, since we are not sure whether we have the right time, it may already be well 2 seconds later or earlier, well, that's what we think, or almost. What kind of decision can you make based on that? What would be the harm if the TSA would simply adjust the time to the lower end of the interval, and generate no accuracy. If there is an application that requires to get the earlimost stamp just after midnight, and you are too early, you just repeat. Comparison between two time stamps of the same tsa can be done without using the accuracy; if the genTime is different, then there they are ordered by authority of the TSA. > 2) serialNumber is not *necessary*, but may be *useful*. So let us > keep it. That's a strange reasoning. Just because something may be useful, doesn't mean that it MUST be supported. But actually that's not the problem: You did not really address the proposals about how to generate unique numbers, or in which scope they need to be unique. - as it is now, the number has to be unique during the whole lifetime of the TSA. (1) "the time stamp token number xxx - it was proposed to solve this unique identification requirement by either - a combination of some serialnumber that can make round trips AND the genTime value. (2) "The time stamp token number xxx issued at genTime" - or simply by using arbitrarily trailing things at genTime (3) "The time stamp issued at genTime". If you have any of these UNIQUE identifications, you can most likely transform this into an order, if you you allocate the 'numbers' not in a completely unorderable way, unlikely, since you would need to avoid collisions by other means than 'hierachical counting'. Personally I have a tendancy to like the idea of the genTime+serialnumber approach (2) for unique identification, and leave it up to the TSA how to reuse or not the serialnumber, but I am also happy with the text as it stands since 3 years. > 3) the BOOLEAN indicator "ordering" is useful to allow to address > two segment needs, and does not place design constraints when no > ordering within the second range is needed. How would an application decide in advance whether it could use a time stamping authority, if there is a requirement to compare time stamps. Would a TSA always either set the indicator in all certs or never, or could it decide from stamp to stamp. (probably it's always on or off). Some purists may also see a need for a third service possible without genTime, and just an serialNumber to establish an order, but then I wouldn't call the service 'time' stamping . Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA06957 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 07:14:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA28816; Tue, 30 May 2000 16:22:00 +0200 Message-ID: <3933CE89.926DE70B@bull.net> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 16:22:01 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@vpnc.org> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Requirements for remote path processing services References: <p04320307b550772f168c@[165.227.249.13]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Paul, Thank you for posting the requirements. In general I do not find the document precise enough, so that we can make sure we really agree on the goals. There are too many variants possible and I would have prefer to have identified the various functions that would be offered and the various parameters that would been sent and received, of course, at a broad level. There are several duplications of text and ideas and a more concise document would be more appropriate. However, this is better than the previous situation. :-) > After the discussion in Adelaide, a group of us got together to hammer > out what we consider requirements for remote path processing services. > The general consensus of that group follows. The group who came to > agreement that these are in fact a good statement of requirements > include: > > Ambarish Malpani, ValiCert > Carlisle Adams, Entrust > Michael Myers, VeriSign > Michael Zolotarev, Baltimore > Paul Hoffman, IMC & VPNC > Peter Sylvester, EdelWeb > Stephen Farrell, Baltimore > Stephen Kent, BBN > > 1. Requirements for remote path processing services It would be important to say upfront against "what" a path may be validated. I see two options : 1) against a security policy defined by an OID, 2) against multiple roots, Certification Policy constraints and naming constraints. > Remote path processing provides two primary services: delegated path > construction for client-based path validation, and delegated path > validation. Not all clients require both services in all scenarios. Many > clients require only delegated path construction (including path > discovery) to help them perform their own path validation, while other > clients have requirements for offloaded path validation and have no need > for data acquisition. > > The delegated path construction features of remote path processing are > valuable for clients that do much of the PKI processing themselves and > simply want a server to collect information for them. Does this means : 1) collect all ? 2) collect only the certification chain ? 3) collect the certification chain and the associated revocation information ? When revocation information is requested, does this mean: a) anything ? b) CRLs ? c) OCSP responses ? ... and is it for the leaf certificate only or for all the elements of the chain ? > The server need > not even be trusted, because the client will ultimately perform path > validation. Offloading path validation to a server may be required by a > client that lacks the processing, and/or communication capabilities to > perform path discovery and path validation. (Path discovery may not be > required in all cases, e.g., some applications provide means for > certification paths to be transmitted as part of the protocol.) Another > motivation for offloading path validation is that it allows centralized > management of validation policies in a consistent fashion across an > enterprise. > > A client that performs path validation for itself may still benefit in > several ways from using a server to acquire certificates, CRLs, and OCSP > responses to aid in the validation process. In this context, the client > is relying on the server to interact with repositories to acquire the > data that the client would otherwise have to acquire using LDAP, HTTP, > and so on. Since these data items are digitally signed, the client need > not trust the server to return the "right" data any more than the client > would have to trust the repositories. There are several benefits to this > approach; for example, a single query to a server can replace multiple > queries to one or more directories and caching by the server can reduce > latency. Another benefit to the client system is that it need not > incorporate a diverse set of software to interact with various forms of > repositories, perhaps via different protocols, nor to perform the graph > processing necessary to discover paths, separate from making the queries > to acquire path validation data. > > A client whose networking and/or processing capabilities are limited may > be unable to perform path validation itself. In this case, there must be > a fully-trusted server to which the client can delegate path validation > services. Such a server can take direction from the client about how I would say : Such a server MUST take directions from the client about how path validation should be done. > path validation should be done (such as which roots are to be trusted), > and the server can even provide to the client proof (e.g., certificates > and CRLs or OCSP responses) of how the server validated the target > certificate. Yes. It must be able to say whether or not the information shall be returned. > Even clients that are able to do their own path validation > might instead rely on a trusted server to do path validation if the > client is in an environment where centralized management of trusted > roots or centralized management of non-standard policy processing is > needed for some applications. Good point. > 1.1 Collecting path validation information > > An untrusted server can provide a client the certificate path needed for > path validation. It also can provide clients with revocation > information, e.g., CRLs and OCSP responses, that the client can use to > perform path validation. See the questions raised above about the granularity of the information to be returned. > These services can be valuable to client > systems that do not include the protocols needed to find and download > all of the intermediate certificates, CRLs, and OCSP responses needed > for the client to perform complete path validation. > > 1.2 Delegating path validation > > A server can perform full certificate validation for the client. If a > client uses this service, it inherently trusts the server as much as it > would its own path validation software (if it contained such software). > One reason that a client may want to delegate to such a server is that > the client does not have sufficient processing or networking resources > to perform path validation for each certificate it receives. In > addition, because the algorithms required for path validation are > complex, not all applications may embody high quality implementations of > this processing. In constrained execution environments such as > telephones and PDAs, memory and processing limitations may preclude > implementation of complete, PKIX-compliant path validation. Even if the validation is fully done by the server, I would still like in that case that the information that has been used is returned. It is not clear whether this is the case. See the questions raised above about the granularity of the information to be returned. > In applications where minimum latency is critical, delegating validation > to a trusted server can offer significant advantages. The time required > to send the target certificate to the validation server, receive the > response, and verify the signature on the response, can be considerably > less than the time required by the client to perform path discovery and > validation. Even if a certificate path were readily available to the > client, the delay associated with processing the signatures for each > certificate in the path might (under some circumstances such as very > long paths or very limited processor speed) be greater than the delay > associated with use of a validation server. A basic question that is not answered is the following: Does the client want to take advantage of the signed response and make the server liable in case of an error ? If this is the case, then the response MUST contain the criteria against which the validation has been performed by the server, otherwise this is not necessary. > 1.3 Centralized trust and policy > > Organizations that impose a centralized management discipline usually > want consistent policy enforcement across all clients in particular > scenarios. In such cases, allowing a client to manage its own set of > trusted roots or the policies that it accepts during path validation is > unacceptable. A trusted server can enforce particular policy decisions > while performing path validation. Also, experience shows that it is > difficult to manage software configuration on end systems in a corporate > environment. The case of a client working with a single (or a small set of) policy is not our scope and so the protocol should be able to handle multiple validation schemes at the same time. If a server decides to support one and only one policy, that's fine, but this should not be visible at the level of the protocol. So I wonder why this section has been added, because it should not change anything in the design of the protocol. I probably missed something. :-) > Because path validation software is controlled by many parameters which, > if incorrectly set, may result in insecure behavior, it is often > important to be able to centralize path validation in a single or small > set of servers, where system security administrators can carefully > manage them. Both services (delegated path construction and delegated > path validation) can be potentially used by the enterprise for enforcing > various aspects of centralized policy. Well, requesters might "forget" to correctly use the result of the server, so enforcement of the policy might be a dream in some cases. :-) Denis > Note that it is not clear which aspects of PKI policy can, in general, > be usefully separated from other application specific policy using this > approach. This is a matter for further study. > > --Paul Hoffman, Director > --VPN Consortium Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA26923 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 03:01:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA18206; Tue, 30 May 2000 12:08:54 +0200 Message-ID: <39339338.B3036714@bull.net> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 12:08:56 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol References: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFB6@panda.chrysalis-its.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit François, Sorry for the delay to answer, but the trafic is currently rather heavy on the TSP document and it takes time to prepare answers. I do not agree to make the nonce mandatory since there exists cases where it is not needed. I also do not think that the case of a subverted TSA falls under the topic of "deliberate replay". However, in order to address your concern, I could add the following text in the security consideration section : Inadvertent or deliberate replays for requests incorporating the same hash (algorithm and) value may happen. Inadvertent replays occur when more than one copy of the same request message gets sent to the TSA because of problems in the intervening network elements. Deliberate replays occur when a middleman is replaying legitimate TS responses. In order to detect these situations, several techniques may be used. Using a nonce always allows to detect replays, and hence its use is RECOMMENDED. Another possibility is to use both a local clock and a moving time window during which the requester remembers all the hashes sent during that time window. When receiving a response, the requester makes sure that both the time of the response is within the time window and that there is only once the hash value in that time window. If there is the same hash value more than once, the requester may either use a nonce, or wait until the time window has moved to come back to the previous case where the same hash value appears only once during that time window. If you prefer a different wording, please provide the amended text. Denis > Denis, > > We probably need to be clear on the requirement and then we can be sure that > the text in the document reflects the requirement. > > You seem quite clear that the requirement is to prevent replays - but we > need to be clear on whether we are trying to detect and/or prevent > deliberate or inadvertent replay or both. Inadvertent replay could occur > when more than one copy of a request message gets sent to the TSA because of > problems in the intervening network elements. In this case the TSA because > of its "no look" policy would just blindly generate time stamps for each of > the copies it receives. Deliberate replay, on the other hand, assumes that > the TSA has been subverted or its signing key has been compromised, or that > a middleman is replaying legitimate TS responses. Each of the various > potential replays needs to be considered to ensure that the protocol > protects against it. > > 1. Deliberate middleman replay. Since each response contains a signed TS > Token which includes the message imprint, serial number and time, this type > of attack is easily detected within the currently proposed protocol. > > 2. Replay by subverted TSA. A subverted TSA could generate any number of TS > Tokens containing the same message imprint at any time. Because each could > have different serial number and/or time, each would be unique and there is > no way the client could detect a replay on the basis of the response. The > only way this could be detected would be for every request to include a > nonce and for the client to maintain a record of all nonces generated to > verify against the responses. > > 3. Inadvertent replay. Again, the only way for the client to distinguish > this type of replay would be through the use of a nonce. In this case, > however, it should not be necessary to maintain a record of all nonces > generated but only those generated within a time window as you suggest. If > the window length is set to, for example, twice the expected delay between > request and response, the client could be quite confident that there have > been no inadvertent replays if no duplicate nonce values are detected. > > To summarize, the nonce should not be an optional component of replay > detection (as suggested by the current wording) - it is necessary if the > client is trying to protect against anything other than deliberate middleman > replays. > > It is suggested that the wording in the fourth sentence of the second > paragraph of Section 2.2 (page 3) be changed to: > > "It SHALL then verify the value of the nonce (large random number with high > probability that is generated by the client only once) included in the > response against the nonce value included in the corresponding request to > ensure that no replay has occurred." > > In Section 2.4.1 remove the OPTIONAL qualifier from nonce in the definition > of TimeStampReq (page 4). > > Change the wording of first sentence of the nonce description in Section > 2.4.1 (page 5)to read: > > "The nonce allows the client to verify the response against replay." > > In Section 2.4.2 remove the OPTIONAL qualifier from nonce in the definition > of TSTInfo (page 7). > > Change the wording of the nonce description in Section 2.4.2 (page 5)to > read: > > "The nonce field MUST be equal to the value provided in the TimeStampReq > structure." > > If you agree with this approach, then I would suggest we prepare a short > annex to describe the two different cases - subverted TSA vice inadvertent > replay. > > Have a good weekend! > > Francois > ___________________________________ > Francois Rousseau > Director of Standards and Conformance > Chrysalis-ITS > 1688 Woodward Drive > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 > > -----Original Message----- > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 5:36 AM > To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol > > Francois, > > I realized that I ommited to reply to your E-mail. > > > Salut Denis, > > > > I do not remember if this issue was raised before, but in Section 2.2 the > > following statement is made: > > > > "the requesting entity .... SHALL then verify the timeliness of the > response > > by verifying either the time included in the response against a local > > trusted time reference, if one is available, and/or the value of the nonce > > (large random number with a high probability that it is generated by the > > client only once) included in the response against the value included in > the > > request." > > > > A nonce is normally used to detect attempts at replays, which is not > > necessarily related to the timeliness of the response to a particular > > request as mentioned here. > > > > The first part of the statement talks about verifying the time included in > > the response against a locally trusted time source. This could used to > > measure round trip path delay for calibration purposes, > > No. This is not the goal. The goal is to make sure that you have no > replay, in particular on the same hash value. > > > but unless one could > > be certain that the locally trusted source is as accurate as the TSA time > > source (or, at least, that the difference between them is fixed and > > well-known), I don't see how it would detect/prevent replays. > > Using a moving time window the caller remembers all the hashes he > sent during that time window. > If there is not the same hash value within that time window, then he > makes sure that the time of the response is within the time window. > If there is the same hash (a very rare situation), it is a little > bit more complicated, and there are several options. Among them: > using the nonce, or waiting until the time window has moved to come > back to the previous case: only one hash value during that time > window. But we are talking implementations details, which is not the > topic of an RFC. > > > If one has > > such a trusted time source locally, what is the point in using a TTP for > > time stamping? > > The time is locally trusted, ... which does not mean that other > people will trust that time. > > > > > Could you please clarify the intent of this statement and if the intent is > > to prevent replays or check the timeliness of responses or both? > > Now, that you have the explanations, if you still believe that the > text is not clear enough, I suggest that you submit a proposal to > clarify the text. > > Regards, > > Denis > > > > > Francois > > ___________________________________ > > Francois Rousseau > > Director of Standards and Conformance > > Chrysalis-ITS > > 1688 Woodward Drive > > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id CAA23485 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 02:17:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA32336; Tue, 30 May 2000 11:24:53 +0200 Message-ID: <393388E6.5E5191BD@bull.net> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 11:24:54 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BA8@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit James, Thanks for the shortest "simple and complete" message. I picked it to answer to all the recent messages posted on that topic. > TSA clients must support genTime values with fraction-of-second components, > e.g "20000529053138.345Z". Consequently, by using sufficient > fraction-of-seconds digits, it is easy for a TSA to issue genTime values > that always increase and never repeat. > > * The TSA does not need to maintain another never-repeating value > (serialNumber) and does not have to worry about maintaining it when the TSA > server crashes. Correct. This a very important argument. So if we maintain that field it is *only* to uniquely identify the TST. Now, let us answer to the question raised: whether that field is NECESSARY. This field is not *necessary*. It MAY be *useful*. Yes, it usually makes sense to associate the Time Stamp with the data it applies to. However, it MAY or MIGHT be useful to be able to reference a Time Stamp that is stored somewhere else. > * The TSA does not need to issue (nor the client expect) huge integer > values. > * Ordering two timestamps from one TSA is simply achieved by comparing their > genTime fields. Correct, this can ALWAYS been achieved ... if we have the following property: | genTime 1 - GenTime 2 | > Accuracy of GenTime 1 + Accuracy of GenTime 2 In the above equation > means stricly superior. Now, when this condition does NOT apply, the BOOLEAN indicator "ordering" allows to say whether ordering two timestamps from one TSA can or cannot be achieved by comparing their genTime fields. In the case a huge server doing parallel queuing and using parallel crypto engines that this property is not that easy to maintain. Allowing to perform an ordering in *any* case (i.e. in time frames less than the second) is not needed by many applications, hence the reason to place low contraints on the design, unless this property is really needed. Now, about the last received comment from Ed Gerck, the above distinction gives a reliability of 100% if we have: | genTime 1 - GenTime 2 | > Accuracy of GenTime 1 + Accuracy of GenTime 2 and when that condition does not apply, either a reliability of 100% if the the BOOLEAN indicator "ordering" is set to TRUE and a reliability of 0% if the the BOOLEAN indicator "ordering" is set to FALSE. > * Accuracy (uncertainty with respect to UTC) is not affected as it is > conveyed in a separate field. > > Simple. Complete. > > The only issue is whether the ordering works from timestamps with the same > TSA name or same TSA signing key. It works, as indicated above, with the same TSA name. As a conclusion: 1) Time Stamp Token ordering can be done in most cases (see above) by only using GenTime and accuracy. 2) serialNumber is not *necessary*, but may be *useful*. So let us keep it. 3) the BOOLEAN indicator "ordering" is useful to allow to address two segment needs, and does not place design constraints when no ordering within the second range is needed. Denis Received: from mail0.sse.ie (mail0.sse.ie [193.120.32.47]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id BAA22296 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 01:40:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail0.sse.ie (actually localhost) by mail0.sse.ie; Tue, 30 May 2000 09:47:48 +0100 Received: from taalap (taa-lap.sse.ie [193.120.32.86]) by mail0.sse.ie (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with SMTP id JAA11173; Tue, 30 May 2000 09:47:35 +0100 (BST) Message-ID: <006901bfca13$a6951240$562078c1@sse.ie> From: "Andy Dowling" <andy.dowling@sse.ie> To: "Ambarish Malpani" <ambarish@valicert.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE2B413CC@seine.valicert.com> Subject: Re: Requirements for remote path processing services Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 09:47:03 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hi Ambarish, thanks for the prompt reply. I can identify two distinct stages in the use of ACs for making an access decision: 1) Verify/validate the AC in accordance with system trust policy. 2) Extract the attributes and make an access decision based on the "required" attributes, versus the attributes encoded in the AC. Whilst delegating task (1) to RPPS is fine by me, I see task (2) as more of a "local" action that would be made at the location of the resource/action being requested. Hence, delegating this decision to a centralised server seems like an unnecessary offload of the access decision. Whilst I can see this working in the specific case where the access control rules for an entire domain are defined centrally, I can't see this working for the general case. Another point to note is that ACs are not limited to more than just authorisation and access control services. By separating the access decision process from the underlying privilege representation (i.e. ACs), we are not limiting RPPS to verifying ACs for authorisation purposes. Instead, we can use RPPS solely for the validation of ACs, meaning that the client can then extract the attributes and use them in local processing (for access control purposes or otherwise). Regards, Andy Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA21845 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 01:26:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA05166; Tue, 30 May 2000 10:30:30 +0200 Message-ID: <39337C27.8F0FB63F@bull.net> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 10:30:32 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB8A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <14637.14460.418872.887051@xedia.com> <392D437D.B7B1C2F7@bull.net> <v04220806b554462eec3e@[128.33.238.95]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Steve, It took me longer to respond to your message because you did not included my message in your response. :-( Several comments to your E-mail: The place where we intend to have the text is section 4.2.1.7. which is only related to the subject alternative name. Hence it is not the right place to cover other topics. Maybe I misread the text while reading the sentence "definitively bound" and I guess this hides a much bigger issue here. :-( In RFC 2459, section 4.1.2.6 Subject, we currently have: Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. A CA may issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same subject entity. Let us suppose that we use an *empty* distinguished name (which is allowed by the standard). Should the above property also apply to the alternative name ? I would think so and I understood "definitively bound" as equivalent to "unique". In other words the subject Alternative name once assigned must never be re-assigned for a different entity by the CA. To this respect, the other fields that where mentioned are not "definitively bound". So you now understand the rational of the change that was made. If we want to fix this, I propose that we do the fixing in the appropriate sections. For the subject alternative name (section 4.1.2.6) I would propose the following: The subject alternative name MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. The CA MUST verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative names. The precise nature of the verifications is detailed in the certificate policies and/or the CPSs." Somewhere else we could have a general statement to cover the point that all fields MUST be verified. This could be, for example, at the end of section 4.1.1.1. which would look like: 4.1.1.1 tbsCertificate The field contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public key associated with the subject, a validity period, and other associated information. The fields are described in detail in section 4.1.2; the tbscertificate may also include extensions which are described in section 4.2. The CA MUST verify (directly or indirectly) all the fields contained in this field. The precise nature of the verifications is detailed in the certificate policies and/or the CPSs. Denis Note: At the end of this E-mail, you will find my original message. > Denis, > > The latter part of your message gets at the contentious point in this > discussion. > > Some of us believe that ALL data in a certificate is definitively > bound to the public key. After much debate the WG rejected the > notion of marking data in a cert as non-verified. So, the current > posture is that the EXTENT to which data is verified is a matter of > CA policy, but the basic notion is that the CA has verified all of > the data. > > Warwick gave some examples that he felt supported the notion that not > all certificate data is verified, but my response argued that these > examples were either not a violation of the verification notion > (e.g., OUs), or were anomalous (pseudonyms). > > So, while I agree with your suggestions re pluralizing the references > in the cited text, I don't agree with the suggestion to limit the > scope of the comment to just the subject alternate name. > > Steve ORIGINAL MESSAGE: Paul and others, Some major details: 1) I would propose to add an "s" to "certificate policy" making it "certificate policies". In RFC 2459 we have: 4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or more policy information terms, each of which consists of an object identifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. 2) In the same way, I would add an "s" to "CPS" making it "CPSs". 3) Finally, since the verification is not uniform, I would also add an "s" to "verification". The final sentence would thus look like: "The precise nature of the verifications is detailed in the certificate policies and/or the CPSs." 4) ... and a comment on the use of "definitively": We were looking for text replacement related only to the subject alternative name section 4.2.1.7. Now the sentence has been extended to cover parameters like "all other fields in a certificate" and "all certificate extensions". So "definitively" also applies to them now, and this is wrong. I would thus propose to delete the sentence "like all other fields in a certificate and all certificate extensions," and thus keep the idea from RFC 2459, where only the subject alternative name is considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, which was: Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, all parts of the subject alternative name MUST be verified by the CA. The new text would thus look like: Denis> "The subject alternative name is considered to Denis> be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST Denis> verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative Denis> names. The precise nature of the verifications is detailed Denis> in the certificate policies and/or the CPSs." Denis Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA16440 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 30 May 2000 00:03:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA16066; Tue, 30 May 2000 09:11:12 +0200 Message-ID: <39336991.865325E0@bull.net> Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 09:11:13 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: marco_casassa-mont@hp.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Use cases for digital credentials References: <NCBBKBHNJBPPOHEDNAGNIEFLDLAA.marco_casassa-mont@hp.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Marco, Take a look at ES 201733 "Electronic Signature Formats" in particular section 8.12.3. The document is available at: http://www.etsi.org/SEC/el-sign.htm Denis > Dear all, > > I am analysing a B2B scenario where employees working for different > enterprises (which have no previous business relationships and are not > member of any EDI VAN or extranet) need to interact together: for trust > reasons they need to exchange digital credentials (identity certificates and > *expecially* attribute certificates). > > I wonder if you are aware of any document/paper describing use cases for > digital credentials in such a B2B scenario. In particular I am interested in > use cases and examples for attribute certificates. > > Any link/reference is welcome. > > Marco > > P.S.: Apologies if this is not the right mailing list to ask for this kind > of information > > ========================================================================= > Marco Casassa Mont > Trusted E-Services Laboratory +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > Hewlett-Packard Laboratories +++++++ _/ +++++++ > Filton Road, Stoke Gifford +++++ _/ +++++ > BRISTOL, BS34 8QZ, UK. ++++ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ ++++ > +++ _/ _/ _/ _/ +++ > Phone: +44 117 312 8794 (direct) ++++ _/ _/ _/_/_/ ++++ > Telnet: 312 8794 +++++ _/ +++++ > Fax: +44 117 312 9250 +++++++ _/ +++++++ > Email: marco_casassa-mont@hp.com +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > ========================================================================= > 'All points of view are my own and not necessarily HP's as well' Received: from mail0.sibs.pt (mail0.sibs.pt [195.138.0.101]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id MAA05288 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:44:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 25720 invoked from network); 29 May 2000 19:46:18 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO sibs.pt) (195.138.0.90) by mail0.sibs.pt with SMTP; 29 May 2000 19:46:18 -0000 Message-ID: <3932CB75.A8A90B29@sibs.pt> Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 20:56:37 +0100 From: Bruno Salgueiro <bs@sibs.pt> Organization: SIBS X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: pt,en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A0@seine.valicert.com> <3931C773.4B1DFFAF@home.com> <393219A0.90B7542B@nma.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="------------ms1445816AA442E7D145F663F2" This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------ms1445816AA442E7D145F663F2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hi to all. I'm just a reader in this mailing list but this subject is of great concern to our organisation (which is a TTP) so here are my 2 cents. Let me start to say that Al has touched a very important point which I didn't see quite addressed yet. The thing here that has a great influence in business is the ratio bet- ween the verifying effort in certificate data and the risk that a CA wants to have in its business. This ratio has to be improved by increa- sing the verify effort and lessening the risk factor. The problem I see in this discussion is that you are going to the limit of "all or nothing" and this worries me and I hope all the listeners that play in the same field (or please tel me why I shouldn't!). I would like to know how this discussion fits in the EU Directive on digi- tal signatures and the ETSI/EESSI efforts which will really influence how a certificate has legal quality. I would also like to see more PKI business players influencing standards (because if standards are to be used they ha- ve to be realistic) than just vendors (not trying to flame anyone, please). Besides this and despite the heat of this discussion I think that "both sides" are presenting high quality comments. Best regards, Ed Gerck wrote: > > Al Arsenault wrote: > > [snip] > > > The presence of an "attribute" whose value has not been verified > > - either directly or indirectly - by the CA is at best misleading, and > > at worst openly harmful to the relying party. > > Al: > > I agree entirely with what you wrote above. The devil is -- what do we > mean by "verifying"? Of course, the word "verifying" must be understood > according to both the PKIX standard AND the CA's CPS. This means that > such certificates are essentially statements from a CA, not fact, and that > meaning and trust on a certificate (like beauty) is in the eyes of the beholder, > i.e., depends on each relying-party. > > And certificates also contain fields which are not very intuitively defined or > even coherent with their names, such as the Distinguished Name field, which > is neither always distinguished nor necessarily contains the subject's name. > And, the SerialNumber field, etc. So, data fields themselves are not clear in > *their* names -- more or less like a CA making no representation that the > subject "Bill Clinton" of a certificate is the same "Bill Clinton" as the one > you might be thinking of, but they put it in the cert anyway ;-) > > Yes, in legal reliance terms one may trust the confirmation procedures of the > CA during certificate reliance, but one cannot rely upon them for other than > their value as a representation of the CA's authentication management act > expressed in the CA's own terms and rules -- therefore, a PKIX certificate is > neither necessarily meaningful nor valid in a r-p's reference frame or for the > r-p's purposes. To pretend otherwise is at best misleading and at worst openly > naive. > > To see a graphical birds's eye view of my comment, with a less terse treatment, > the reader can visit the "unabridged inside view of a typical X.509 certificate" > in http://www.mcg.org.br/x509cert.htm > > Cheers, > > Ed Gerck -- ======================================================= Bruno Salgueiro (mailto:bs@sibs.pt) SIBS - Sociedade Interbancária de Serviços Rua Soeiro Pereira Gomes, Lote 1, 1600 Lisboa, Portugal Tel: + 351 21 791 88 33 Fax: + 351 21 794 24 40 http://www.sibs.pt Esta mensagem foi assinada com certificado MULTIcert. Para obter o certificado da Autoridade de Certificação PILOTO MULTIcert dirija-se ao site http://www.sibs.multicert.com "Computers are useless. They can only give you answers." --Pablo Picasso ======================================================= --------------ms1445816AA442E7D145F663F2 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature MIIFCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIE/DCCBPgCAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCC A4owggOGMIIC76ADAgECAgQ3Ttp2MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMCgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlBUMRkw FwYDVQQKExBQSUxPVE8gTVVMVEljZXJ0MB4XDTk5MDUzMTIzMzIzNFoXDTAwMDYwMTAwMDIz NFowYTELMAkGA1UEBhMCUFQxGTAXBgNVBAoTEFBJTE9UTyBNVUxUSWNlcnQxDTALBgNVBAsT BFNJQlMxDjAMBgNVBAsTBURTSVNUMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9CcnVubyBTYWxndWVpcm8wXDANBgkq hkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAuVICquW4IcbOpM37DdyglXYa8AAdR6UWq2VFEFTUtY0colnZ a9BQ0DvTRB8sO5XuFiTWFnVR5T94R5j5PjE0cwIDAQABo4IBxjCCAcIwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgWg MCsGA1UdEAQkMCKADzE5OTkwNjAxMDAwMjM0WoEPMjAwMDAyMTIwNDAyMzRaMBEGCWCGSAGG +EIBAQQEAwIFoDCBqQYJYIZIAYb4QgENBIGbFoGYQ2VydGlmaWNhZG8gUElMT1RPIE1VTFRJ Y2VydC4gRXN0ZXMgY2VydGlmaWNhZG9zIHNhbyBlbWl0aWRvcyBhbyBhYnJpZ28gZG8gQ1BT IHF1ZSBzZSBlbmNvbnRyYSBubyBzZWd1aW50ZSBVUkwgLSBodHRwczovL3d3dy5zaWJzLm11 bHRpY2VydC5jb20vY3BzLmh0bWwwFQYDVR0RBA4wDIEKYnNAc2licy5wdDBKBgNVHR8EQzBB MD+gPaA7pDkwNzELMAkGA1UEBhMCUFQxGTAXBgNVBAoTEFBJTE9UTyBNVUxUSWNlcnQxDTAL BgNVBAMTBENSTDEwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUuJYgbdZN8aJJDF13gU9LJAiiL+UwHQYDVR0OBBYE FEsyR+XzLWwX2+4LDk6/lA+XyaZtMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwGQYJKoZIhvZ9B0EABAwwChsEVjQu MAMCA6gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAk1GfA3Mtu3ECWCz2SIxkVisgOxt9vDKdQNTevrus an91qvmvoHAtJMAlAolegoiDpq73qdk+9JMODICE5zEXDIK9w2nCkqBheFwJs7frm/tVLnSv H+vQ5/5EX3ARwqforMGtjf+BO8OuYoxRyydKx9xheeyhke9+xJCEnOA2wDwxggFJMIIBRQIB ATAwMCgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlBUMRkwFwYDVQQKExBQSUxPVE8gTVVMVEljZXJ0AgQ3Ttp2MAkG BSsOAwIaBQCggbEwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcN MDAwNTI5MTk1NjM3WjAjBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxFgQU1vIpKdFu0Yov5v1jEbDzLFRZDFMwUgYJ KoZIhvcNAQkPMUUwQzAKBggqhkiG9w0DBzAOBggqhkiG9w0DAgICAIAwBwYFKw4DAgcwDQYI KoZIhvcNAwICAUAwDQYIKoZIhvcNAwICASgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEQIunyFFJVzhB8H12 ew7RhqQm/a4ZzVdoT0wpStKKKbAR7vRZt0UTMng6dwV1HPJdAPY7w00H7glsJlpORhfao0E= --------------ms1445816AA442E7D145F663F2-- Received: from seine.valicert.com (corporate-gw.valicert.com [63.65.221.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA04049 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 11:25:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: by seine.valicert.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LS0CRTX5>; Mon, 29 May 2000 11:27:34 -0700 Message-ID: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE2B413CC@seine.valicert.com> From: Ambarish Malpani <ambarish@valicert.com> To: "'Andy Dowling'" <andy.dowling@sse.ie> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Requirements for remote path processing services Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 11:27:33 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Andy, You could use the remote path processing server (RPPS) to verify ACs, or even better, you could actually use it to authorize certain user actions and avoid needing to deal with ACs at all! In the case where you do trust the RPPS, the kind of query I expect an application to send it, would be of the form: "Can I trust this certificate to do the following action". At that state, I would fully expect the RPPS to go out and figure out what the attributes of the certificate are, so, as an application, you can be completely relieved of the job of processing ACs at all. Does this make sense? Regards, Ambarish --------------------------------------------------------------------- Ambarish Malpani Architect 650.567.5457 ValiCert, Inc. ambarish@valicert.com 339 N. Bernardo Ave. http://www.valicert.com Mountain View, CA 94043 > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Dowling [mailto:andy.dowling@sse.ie] > Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 4:02 AM > To: Paul Hoffman > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: Requirements for remote path processing services > > > Paul + co., > > Having read your post, I was just wondering if these remote > path processing > services could be applied to ACs for authorisation purposes? I've put > together a few points on the subject (see below). > > Comments would be appreciated. > > Regards, > > Andy > > > > 1) OVERVIEW > > In addition to remote path processing services: > > a) delegated path construction > b) delegated path verification > c) trust and policy centralisation > > that apply to public key certificates, there may be scope for > the application of these services to authorisation-related > certificates > i.e. Attribute Certificates could be verified remotely by a single > trusted entity, and this would bring the benefits of centralised > trust/policy management and simpler clients. > > > 2) MOTIVATION > > Firstly, let's present some arguments *against* introducing remote AC > validation: > > a) The current profile for AC validation is relatively simpler than > that of PKC validation: > > a) AC chains are not used > b) AAControls is optional > c) AC revocation checking is optional > > Consequently, a very minimal (and conformant) AC validator can be > implemented and would be "lightweight" enough to provide > on clients. > > b) AC validation for authorisation purposes is typically a server-side > operation anyway, and clients would hardly need to validate an AC. > > > In response to argument (a): > > Whilst a client may indeed conform to the simplest > version of the AC > profile with a lightweight implementation, such an implementation > would have no control over which attributes can be > issued by which > authorities (AAControls), due to the lack of chain processing. > In addition, the client cannot safely validate long-lived ACs. > This is due to the lack of revocation processing. > > In response to argument (b): > > Clients *may* need to validate ACs in the push model to > ensure the integrity of the AC before passing it on to other > servers. (Complications arise here when the AC is pushed to a > different "trust domain" where the AC validation policy differs > to that of the clients policy, so there's scope for > further study here) > > A client will need to validate an AC if it is used in > the making of > a client-side access decision. Scenarios in which a client-side > access decision would need to be made are: > > --> Checking the permissions of downloaded content: > --> Has a piece of downloaded code have > execute permission > from the system admin? > > --> Client-side content filtering: > -> Checking if downloaded content has a > "rating" attribute > (12, 15, 18, PG-13, NC-17, R, etc.) > > > It is apparent that there is indeed a requirement for: > (a) clients to validate ACs > (b) AC validation to be performed "fully". That is, AAControls > and revocation checking should be done for > security reasons. > > Given these requirements, it seems logical to migrate these > verification > tasks to a dedicated AC validation server. > > > 2) BENEFITS: > > The benefits are the same as for remote PKC processing: > > a) Centralised trust and policy for authorisation purposes > > (i) Administrator(s) can say what AAs are trusted by > the enterprise > (ii) Administrator(s) can implement complicated trust > management via > AAControls and/or AC Chain validation > (iii) Administrator(s) can implement AC revocation checking > > b) Simplified clients > (i) No need for the client to implement any form of AC > verification, > path processing (for AAControls), LDAP/OCSP clients, etc. > > c) Server-side caching to improve turnaround time on a > validation request > > > > > Received: from dfw-smtpout2.email.verio.net (dfw-smtpout2.email.verio.net [129.250.36.42]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA03158 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 10:37:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [129.250.38.61] (helo=dfw-mmp1.email.verio.net) by dfw-smtpout2.email.verio.net with esmtp (Exim 3.12 #7) id 12wTay-0002cY-00; Mon, 29 May 2000 17:44:56 +0000 Received: from [209.21.28.68] (helo=nma.com) by dfw-mmp1.email.verio.net with esmtp (Exim 3.12 #7) id 12wTav-0004ag-00; Mon, 29 May 2000 17:44:54 +0000 Message-ID: <3932ACA1.D13ADB7E@nma.com> Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 10:45:05 -0700 From: Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en]C-CCK-MCD {Sony} (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: applying detection theory, was Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BAC@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------66835B78283B43348B514C00" --------------66835B78283B43348B514C00 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit "Manger, James H" wrote: > The accuracy (I assume this is what you mean by "precision value") > simply conveys the uncertainty of the genTime value with > respect to UTC. > ... > Quoting many more digits than the accuracy warrants does not make > it wrong. In some situations (e.g. a physics article) it might be > considered bad form because the extra digits are worthless (but > still harmless), but in our situation they do have a use - to order > timestamps. We need to introduce the concept of "threshhold level" as well as to use "accuracy" in standard engineering form, together with "reliability." This will, I believe, clarify the discussion. Before I present some ASCII graphs that will illustrate my points, let me cut to some of the conclusions to be gained from those graphs: 1. Accuracy is not the uncertainty of a value -- which would be reliability and depends on *many* events on average. Accuracy is the spread of *one* event. The accuracy and reliability of a measurement depend *also* on the threshhold level of measurement. 2. In the case where the measurement is the uniqueness (or, ordering) of an *issued* timestamp, we can consider the following correspondence for a series of timestamps issued by a TSA: accuracy = formal precision value of timestamp (set by the TSA for each event, independently of its actual time precision) reliability = uncertainty of timestamp in the series (on average, for that TSA and based on the timestamp value) threshhold level = the TSA's actual time precision. We can easily see that as a function of these three values, a timestamp may be accurate but unreliable, accurate and reliable, etc. -- generating four cases (depicted below). The method that Manger mentions is correct to provide uniqueness for the issued timestamps, because it garantees reliability of 100% for a r-p to detect ordered timestamps -- by dynamically changing the accuracy so that no value is repeated within that accuracy. This should NOT be confused however with reliability of 100% to detect different time events as measured *by* the TSA, NOR confused with a reliability of 100% for the TSA to order different time events -- because in this case we are not talking about measurement of what is issued by a TSA (the cert) but measurement by the TSA itself. The treshhold level affecting the TSA may produce aliasing and re-ordering that is undistiguishable (ie, unmeasurable) by the TSA -- and thus, wrongly reflected in the othwerwise correct but formally ordered certs. So, there is a finite probability that a TSA may issue two or more ordered timestamps that can be 100% reliably ordered by a r-p, but which actually correspond to reverse or shuffled events in time. IN OTHER WORDS: Do not try to extract from the data more than what the data has -- and that is why in a physics essay it IS considered bad form to imply more accuracy than one has. It is OK however to format the data so as to reflect the accuracy of what you can express (here, for the usual purpose of ordering the data issued). In physics papers this is also useful (e.g. to reflect the instrument's precision) and is handled by using the form (1.000456 +- 0.3), as an example. RECOMMENDATION: besides the above, include a declaration of the TSA's *overall* certified error for timestamping -- which defines its treshhold level AND its actual event ordering reliability but does NOT influence its ordering reliability per cert (which can be 100%, as above). Now, the technical background from detection theory. "Accuracy" and "reliability" are standard terminology in many engineering disciplines and can be better understood by an example in terms of a signal that varies in time and is detected when it crosses a given threshhold level Eo, in four cases, for each of the logical possibilities of combination: 1. high accuracy and high reliability: signal ^ | | __ | || | || |Eo---------------------------- | || | || | || | || __ | || || | || || | || || |----- -- ---- -------------------------> time 2. high accuracy and low reliability signal ^ | | __ | || __ | || || |Eo---------------------------- | || || | || || | || || | || || | || || | || || | || || |----- -- ---- -------------------------> time 3. low accuracy and high reliability: signal ^ | | _____ | | | | | | |Eo---------------------------- | | | | | | | | | | | | _____ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |----- -- ---- -------------------------> time 4. low accuracy and low reliability signal ^ | | _____ | | | _____ | | | | | |Eo---------------------------- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |----- -- ---- -------------------------> time Cheers, Ed Gerck --------------66835B78283B43348B514C00 Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit <!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en"> <html> <tt></tt> <tt></tt> <p><tt>"Manger, James H" wrote:</tt> <blockquote TYPE=CITE><tt> The accuracy (I assume this is what you mean by "precision value")</tt> <br><tt>simply conveys the uncertainty of the genTime value with</tt> <br><tt>respect to UTC.</tt> <br><tt>...<br> Quoting many more digits than the accuracy warrants does not make</tt> <br><tt>it wrong. In some situations (e.g. a physics article) it might be</tt> <br><tt>considered bad form because the extra digits are worthless (but</tt> <br><tt>still harmless), but in our situation they do have a use - to order</tt> <br><tt>timestamps.</tt></blockquote> <tt>We need to introduce the concept of "threshhold level" as well</tt> <br><tt>as to use "accuracy" in standard engineering form, together with</tt> <br><tt>"reliability." This will, I believe, clarify the discussion.</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>Before I present some ASCII graphs that will illustrate my points,</tt> <br><tt>let me cut to some of the conclusions to be gained from those graphs:</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>1. Accuracy is not the uncertainty of a value -- which would be</tt> <br><tt>reliability and depends on *many* events on average. Accuracy is the</tt> <br><tt>spread of *one* event. The accuracy and reliability of a measurement</tt> <br><tt>depend *also* on the threshhold level of measurement.</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>2. In the case where the measurement is the uniqueness (or, ordering) of</tt> <br><tt>an *issued* timestamp, we can consider the following correspondence for</tt> <br><tt>a series of timestamps issued by a TSA:</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt> accuracy = formal precision value of timestamp (set by the TSA for each</tt> <br><tt> event, independently of its actual time precision)</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt> reliability = uncertainty of timestamp in the series (on average, for</tt> <br><tt> that TSA and based on the timestamp value)</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt> threshhold level = the TSA's actual time precision.</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>We can easily see that as a function of these three values, a timestamp</tt> <br><tt>may be accurate but unreliable, accurate and reliable, etc. -- generating</tt> <br><tt>four cases (depicted below). The method that Manger mentions is correct</tt> <br><tt>to provide uniqueness for the issued timestamps, because it garantees</tt> <br><tt>reliability of 100% for a r-p to detect ordered timestamps -- by dynamically</tt> <br><tt>changing the accuracy so that no value is repeated within that accuracy.</tt> <br><tt>This should NOT be confused however with reliability of 100% to detect</tt> <br><tt>different time events as measured *by* the TSA, NOR confused with a</tt> <br><tt>reliability of 100% for the TSA to order different time events -- because</tt> <br><tt>in this case we are not talking about measurement of what is issued by a</tt> <br><tt>TSA (the cert) but measurement by the TSA itself. The treshhold level</tt> <br><tt>affecting the TSA may produce aliasing and re-ordering that is</tt> <br><tt>undistiguishable (ie, <u>unmeasurable</u>) by the TSA -- and thus, wrongly</tt> <br><tt>reflected in the othwerwise correct but formally ordered certs. So,</tt> <br><tt>there is a finite probability that a TSA may issue two or more ordered</tt> <br><tt>timestamps that can be 100% reliably ordered by a r-p, but which actually</tt> <br><tt>correspond to reverse or shuffled events in time.</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>IN OTHER WORDS: Do not try to extract from the data more than what the</tt> <br><tt>data has -- and that is why in a physics essay it IS considered bad form</tt> <br><tt>to imply more accuracy than one has. It is OK however to format the</tt> <br><tt>data so as to reflect the accuracy of what you can express (here, for the</tt> <br><tt>usual purpose of ordering the data issued). In physics papers this is</tt> <br><tt>also useful (e.g. to reflect the instrument's precision) and is handled</tt> <br><tt>by using the form (1.000456 +- 0.3), as an example.</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>RECOMMENDATION: besides the above, include a declaration of the TSA's</tt> <br><tt>*overall* certified error for timestamping -- which defines its treshhold</tt> <br><tt>level AND its actual event ordering reliability but does NOT influence its</tt> <br><tt>ordering reliability per cert (which can be 100%, as above).</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>Now, the technical background from detection theory.</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>"Accuracy" and "reliability" are standard terminology in many engineering</tt> <br><tt>disciplines and can be better understood by an example in terms of a</tt> <br><tt>signal that varies in time and is detected when it crosses a given</tt> <br><tt>threshhold level Eo, in four cases, for each of the logical possibilities</tt> <br><tt>of combination:</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>1. high accuracy and high reliability:</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>signal</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>^</tt> <br><tt>|</tt> <br><tt>| __</tt> <br><tt>| ||</tt> <br><tt>| ||</tt> <br><tt>|Eo----------------------------</tt> <br><tt>| ||</tt> <br><tt>| ||</tt> <br><tt>| ||</tt> <br><tt>| || __</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>|----- -- ----</tt> <br><tt>-------------------------> time</tt> <br><tt></tt> <tt></tt> <p><tt>2. high accuracy and low reliability</tt> <br><tt> </tt> <br><tt>signal</tt> <br><tt> </tt> <br><tt>^</tt> <br><tt>|</tt> <br><tt>| __</tt> <br><tt>| || __</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>|Eo----------------------------</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>| || ||</tt> <br><tt>|----- -- ----</tt> <br><tt>-------------------------> time</tt> <br><tt></tt> <tt></tt> <p><tt>3. low accuracy and high reliability:</tt> <br><tt> </tt> <br><tt>signal</tt> <br><tt> </tt> <br><tt>^</tt> <br><tt>|</tt> <br><tt>| _____</tt> <br><tt>| | |</tt> <br><tt>| | |</tt> <br><tt>|Eo----------------------------</tt> <br><tt>| | |</tt> <br><tt>| | |</tt> <br><tt>| | |</tt> <br><tt>| | | _____</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>|----- -- ----</tt> <br><tt>-------------------------> time</tt> <br><tt></tt> <tt></tt> <p><tt>4. low accuracy and low reliability</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>signal</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>^</tt> <br><tt>|</tt> <br><tt>| _____</tt> <br><tt>| | | _____</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>|Eo----------------------------</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>| | | | |</tt> <br><tt>|----- -- ----</tt> <br><tt>-------------------------> time</tt> <br><tt></tt> <br><tt></tt> <tt></tt> <p><tt>Cheers,</tt><tt></tt> <p><tt>Ed Gerck</tt></html> --------------66835B78283B43348B514C00-- Received: from mail.siol.net (odin.siol.net [193.189.160.10]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA25456 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 07:21:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.60.30] ([213.250.20.245]) by mail.siol.net (InterMail vK.4.02.00.10 201-232-116-110 license def7f3c1ccee590d715bf25c5fe4cbb9) with ESMTP id <20000529142930.QAZV462.mail@[213.250.20.245]>; Mon, 29 May 2000 16:29:30 +0200 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220804b5581f6bed2a@[171.78.60.30]> In-Reply-To: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A0@seine.valicert.com> References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A0@seine.valicert.com> Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 09:30:37 -0400 To: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Peter, >User includes account name in the subject DN. A Private >organization's CA service services a closed intranet and >extranet community. It issues a certificate including >the account name. This circumstance is common in the Internet >community today. As Al said, just because people do it doesn't mean it's right or should be condoned by our standards. But, to continue with your example, let's assume that the CA finds an acceptable way to embed the account name in the cert somewhere. >CA has a policy, which is partially disclosed. The disclosed >Policy Elements are made available only to subscribers. This >circumstance is common in the Internet community today. partially disclosed? partially trusted? partially useful? >The motivations for establishing the extent >of a field verification policy are beyond the understanding >level of the CA's subscribers. This circumstance is common >in the Internet community today. Greed? >The CA does disclose a policy element to susbcribers to >procedurally follow a "limited" technical verification procedure >concerning account names. The procedure establishes that an account >of that name "exists" - in an account management system acceptable >to the CA - at the time of certificate issuance. I would not want to rely on this CA, and I expect most people would feel the same way. I would "naturally" expect the CA to verify that the account name is bound to the user in question, not merely that the account name exists. This is the danger of adopting too liberal an interpretation of the "verified by whatever rules the CA wants to use" approach. >All other data in a certificate is "verified", according >to other per-CA policy criteria and/or PKIX mandates. Based on the disclosed part of the "verification" process, I can't be too comfortable with what the CA may be doing for the rest of the data. > >Does the resulting certificate, when issued >under the above scenario, conform with the >proposed PKIX standards for field verification? I think not. >A fourth party undertakes a private PKIX-audit of >the CA for the benefit of the CA. Should it >determine the CA is acting according to the spirit >of the proposal concerning field verification >when executing this scenario? The auditor should issue a negative report. Steve Received: from hplb.hpl.hp.com (hplb.hpl.hp.com [192.6.10.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id EAA18159 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 04:48:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sooty.hpl.hp.com (sooty.hpl.hp.com [15.144.30.249]) by hplb.hpl.hp.com (8.9.3/8.8.6 HPLabs Bristol Relay) with ESMTP id MAA05611 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:56:29 +0100 (BST) Received: from casassamontm5 (dhcp-27-6.hpl.hp.com [15.144.27.6]) by sooty.hpl.hp.com with SMTP (8.7.6/8.7.3 SMKit7.0) id MAA02944 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:56:27 +0100 (BST) Reply-To: <marco_casassa-mont@hp.com> From: "Marco Casassa Mont" <marco_casassa-mont@hp.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Use cases for digital credentials Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 12:58:28 +0100 Message-ID: <NCBBKBHNJBPPOHEDNAGNIEFLDLAA.marco_casassa-mont@hp.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Importance: Normal Dear all, I am analysing a B2B scenario where employees working for different enterprises (which have no previous business relationships and are not member of any EDI VAN or extranet) need to interact together: for trust reasons they need to exchange digital credentials (identity certificates and *expecially* attribute certificates). I wonder if you are aware of any document/paper describing use cases for digital credentials in such a B2B scenario. In particular I am interested in use cases and examples for attribute certificates. Any link/reference is welcome. Marco P.S.: Apologies if this is not the right mailing list to ask for this kind of information ========================================================================= Marco Casassa Mont Trusted E-Services Laboratory +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Hewlett-Packard Laboratories +++++++ _/ +++++++ Filton Road, Stoke Gifford +++++ _/ +++++ BRISTOL, BS34 8QZ, UK. ++++ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ ++++ +++ _/ _/ _/ _/ +++ Phone: +44 117 312 8794 (direct) ++++ _/ _/ _/_/_/ ++++ Telnet: 312 8794 +++++ _/ +++++ Fax: +44 117 312 9250 +++++++ _/ +++++++ Email: marco_casassa-mont@hp.com +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ========================================================================= 'All points of view are my own and not necessarily HP's as well' Received: from mail0.sse.ie (mail0.sse.ie [193.120.32.47]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id DAA16508 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 03:56:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail0.sse.ie (actually localhost) by mail0.sse.ie; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:02:36 +0100 Received: from taalap (taa-lap.sse.ie [193.120.32.86]) by mail0.sse.ie (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with SMTP id MAA05474; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:02:07 +0100 (BST) Message-ID: <003801bfc95d$51c41650$562078c1@sse.ie> From: "Andy Dowling" <andy.dowling@sse.ie> To: "Paul Hoffman" <phoffman@vpnc.org> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <p04320307b550772f168c@[165.227.249.13]> Subject: Re: Requirements for remote path processing services Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 12:01:30 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300 X-Mimeole: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Paul + co., Having read your post, I was just wondering if these remote path processing services could be applied to ACs for authorisation purposes? I've put together a few points on the subject (see below). Comments would be appreciated. Regards, Andy 1) OVERVIEW In addition to remote path processing services: a) delegated path construction b) delegated path verification c) trust and policy centralisation that apply to public key certificates, there may be scope for the application of these services to authorisation-related certificates i.e. Attribute Certificates could be verified remotely by a single trusted entity, and this would bring the benefits of centralised trust/policy management and simpler clients. 2) MOTIVATION Firstly, let's present some arguments *against* introducing remote AC validation: a) The current profile for AC validation is relatively simpler than that of PKC validation: a) AC chains are not used b) AAControls is optional c) AC revocation checking is optional Consequently, a very minimal (and conformant) AC validator can be implemented and would be "lightweight" enough to provide on clients. b) AC validation for authorisation purposes is typically a server-side operation anyway, and clients would hardly need to validate an AC. In response to argument (a): Whilst a client may indeed conform to the simplest version of the AC profile with a lightweight implementation, such an implementation would have no control over which attributes can be issued by which authorities (AAControls), due to the lack of chain processing. In addition, the client cannot safely validate long-lived ACs. This is due to the lack of revocation processing. In response to argument (b): Clients *may* need to validate ACs in the push model to ensure the integrity of the AC before passing it on to other servers. (Complications arise here when the AC is pushed to a different "trust domain" where the AC validation policy differs to that of the clients policy, so there's scope for further study here) A client will need to validate an AC if it is used in the making of a client-side access decision. Scenarios in which a client-side access decision would need to be made are: --> Checking the permissions of downloaded content: --> Has a piece of downloaded code have execute permission from the system admin? --> Client-side content filtering: -> Checking if downloaded content has a "rating" attribute (12, 15, 18, PG-13, NC-17, R, etc.) It is apparent that there is indeed a requirement for: (a) clients to validate ACs (b) AC validation to be performed "fully". That is, AAControls and revocation checking should be done for security reasons. Given these requirements, it seems logical to migrate these verification tasks to a dedicated AC validation server. 2) BENEFITS: The benefits are the same as for remote PKC processing: a) Centralised trust and policy for authorisation purposes (i) Administrator(s) can say what AAs are trusted by the enterprise (ii) Administrator(s) can implement complicated trust management via AAControls and/or AC Chain validation (iii) Administrator(s) can implement AC revocation checking b) Simplified clients (i) No need for the client to implement any form of AC verification, path processing (for AAControls), LDAP/OCSP clients, etc. c) Server-side caching to improve turnaround time on a validation request Received: from unimur.um.es (unimur.um.es [155.54.1.1]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA15898 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 03:30:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from aries.dif.um.es (aries.dif.um.es [155.54.210.253]) by unimur.um.es (8.9.1b+Sun/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA01368 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:37:20 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from dif.um.es (labredes15.dif.um.es [155.54.210.9]) by aries.dif.um.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8AA05EC1A for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:37:15 +0200 (MET DST) Sender: root@aries.dif.um.es Message-ID: <39324849.586ADF80@dif.um.es> Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 12:36:57 +0200 From: Gabriel =?iso-8859-1?Q?L=F3pez=20Mill=E1n?= <gabilm@dif.um.es> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.51 [en] (X11; I; Linux 2.2.5-15 i586) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: PKIX library Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from base64 to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id DAA15902 Hello all. There is any free pkix library for Java? Thanks, Gabi. Received: from mail-relay-1.maz.net (mail-relay-1.maz.net [194.163.252.17]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA13154 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 03:03:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sysiphos.maz-hh.de (sysiphos.maz-hh.de [192.109.56.14]) by mail-relay-1.maz.net (8.9.3) with ESMTP id <MAA05083> (multiple receipients); Mon, 29 May 2000 12:10:50 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from timeproof.de (sp-pc-sej.maz-hh.de [192.109.56.145]) by sysiphos.maz-hh.de (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA15873; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:10:20 +0200 (MEST) Message-ID: <39324471.DD137BB0@timeproof.de> Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 12:20:33 +0200 From: Joerg Seidel <seidel@timeproof.de> Organization: timeproof X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.5 [de] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: de MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> CC: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Timestamp: id for token References: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BAB@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I agree on what James wrote. A unique identifier or serial number is not necessary. "Manger, James H" schrieb: > > Is a standardised unambiguous identifier for a timestamp token really needed > or wanted? > > Such an identifier is useful for a certificate as a certificate is used in > many messages (many SSL sessions, many S/MIME emails, many transactions, > ...). The certificate is independent of any particular use. A timestamp, > however, is only relevant to a single message - corresponding to its > messageImprint field. > > The are no timestamp revocation lists. There are no other messages from a > TSA that need to refer to a specific timestamp. > > It seems sensible to store a timestamp with its corresponding message - so > now identifier is needed. Even if they were stored separately the > implementation could its own labels to maintain the link, i.e. it does not > need an explicit field within the timestamp. Received: from mail-relay-1.maz.net (mail-relay-1.maz.net [194.163.252.17]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id CAA12889 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 02:56:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sysiphos.maz-hh.de (sysiphos.maz-hh.de [192.109.56.14]) by mail-relay-1.maz.net (8.9.3) with ESMTP id <MAA04774> (multiple receipients); Mon, 29 May 2000 12:03:43 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from timeproof.de (sp-pc-sej.maz-hh.de [192.109.56.145]) by sysiphos.maz-hh.de (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA15739; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:03:09 +0200 (MEST) Message-ID: <393242C2.BD26D4A1@timeproof.de> Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 12:13:22 +0200 From: Joerg Seidel <seidel@timeproof.de> Organization: timeproof X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.5 [de] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: de MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> CC: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA722607@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Michael, Michael Zolotarev schrieb: > > Not that simple to me. You'd have to go into lengths explaining how the > precision value should be applied. For instance, what would you say about a > token with base time ="20000529053138.345Z", and the precision of 1 second? The precision describes the probability of the official time being inside the intervall from "20000529053137.345Z" to "20000529053139.345Z". So if you want to compare with a second time source you can use the presision field. If you compare with the same time source the actual precision is much better. Actual it is +-0, because you compare the clock with itself. Note that the values are not randomly spread inside of the time intervall. They are always increasing. > Should we then trim the base value to make the precision meaningful (i.e. > the base time is just "20000529053138Z")? You should do this only for comparing the time stamping time with GMT. Jörg Received: from mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au [202.12.144.17]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA09597 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 01:13:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id SAA10113 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 18:20:11 +1000 (EST) Received: from maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au(202.12.142.17) via SMTP by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au, id smtpdYbqbc_; Mon May 29 18:19:57 2000 Received: (from uucp@localhost) by maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id SAA28070 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 18:19:56 +1000 (EST) Received: from localhost(127.0.0.1), claiming to be "mail.cdn.telstra.com.au" via SMTP by localhost, id smtpdHvrn6_; Mon May 29 18:19:21 2000 Received: from ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au (ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au [192.74.168.81]) by mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) with ESMTP id SAA12772 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 18:19:21 +1000 (EST) Received: by ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <L4KYCQWX>; Mon, 29 May 2000 18:18:50 +1000 Message-ID: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BAC@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 18:18:47 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > You'd have to go into lengths explaining how > the precision value should be applied. Why. The accuracy (I assume this is what you mean by "precision value") simply conveys the uncertainty of the genTime value with respect to UTC. > base time ="20000529053138.345Z", and the precision of 1 second? The TSA's best estimate for UTC when this timestamp was issued was 29 May 2000 at 5:31 AM and 38.345 seconds. The TSA's uncertainty (1 standard deviation) in this estimate is +/- 1 second. So UTC may actually have been 37.8 seconds or 39 seconds or 38.11123 for instance. > trim the base value to make the precision meaningful No. Why would you? Quoting many more digits than the accuracy warrants does not make it wrong. In some situations (e.g. a physics article) it might be considered bad form because the extra digits are worthless (but still harmless), but in our situation they do have a use - to order timestamps. > consistency in style with 2459 A certificate and timestamp are very different beasts. The former is useful independently of any particular message, the latter is only relevant to one message. [A more useful consistency would have been to use a SIGNED { tbsTimestamp } ASN.1 construct, instead of CMS] > - e.g. having a unique reference to the token I am not even sure that a standardised unique reference to a timestamp is useful at all, let alone necessary in the base standard. Received: from mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au [202.12.144.17]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA08682 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 00:44:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id RAA25008 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 17:51:20 +1000 (EST) Received: from maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au(202.12.142.17) via SMTP by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au, id smtpd0vSSMm; Mon May 29 17:51:12 2000 Received: (from uucp@localhost) by maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id RAA07026 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 17:51:12 +1000 (EST) Received: from localhost(127.0.0.1), claiming to be "mail.cdn.telstra.com.au" via SMTP by localhost, id smtpdMNGQW_; Mon May 29 17:50:39 2000 Received: from ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au (ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au [192.74.168.81]) by mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) with ESMTP id RAA29172 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 17:50:39 +1000 (EST) Received: by ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <L4KYCNVH>; Mon, 29 May 2000 17:50:08 +1000 Message-ID: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BAB@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> To: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Timestamp: id for token Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 17:50:04 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Is a standardised unambiguous identifier for a timestamp token really needed or wanted? Such an identifier is useful for a certificate as a certificate is used in many messages (many SSL sessions, many S/MIME emails, many transactions, ...). The certificate is independent of any particular use. A timestamp, however, is only relevant to a single message - corresponding to its messageImprint field. The are no timestamp revocation lists. There are no other messages from a TSA that need to refer to a specific timestamp. It seems sensible to store a timestamp with its corresponding message - so now identifier is needed. Even if they were stored separately the implementation could its own labels to maintain the link, i.e. it does not need an explicit field within the timestamp. Received: from dfw-smtpout2.email.verio.net (dfw-smtpout2.email.verio.net [129.250.36.42]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA07962 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 00:10:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [129.250.38.63] (helo=dfw-mmp3.email.verio.net) by dfw-smtpout2.email.verio.net with esmtp (Exim 3.12 #7) id 12wJo5-0004C0-00; Mon, 29 May 2000 07:17:49 +0000 Received: from [209.21.28.126] (helo=nma.com) by dfw-mmp3.email.verio.net with esmtp (Exim 3.12 #7) id 12wJnz-0002ER-00; Mon, 29 May 2000 07:17:43 +0000 Message-ID: <393219A0.90B7542B@nma.com> Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 00:17:52 -0700 From: Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en]C-CCK-MCD {Sony} (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Al Arsenault <awa1@home.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A0@seine.valicert.com> <3931C773.4B1DFFAF@home.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Al Arsenault wrote: [snip] > The presence of an "attribute" whose value has not been verified > - either directly or indirectly - by the CA is at best misleading, and > at worst openly harmful to the relying party. Al: I agree entirely with what you wrote above. The devil is -- what do we mean by "verifying"? Of course, the word "verifying" must be understood according to both the PKIX standard AND the CA's CPS. This means that such certificates are essentially statements from a CA, not fact, and that meaning and trust on a certificate (like beauty) is in the eyes of the beholder, i.e., depends on each relying-party. And certificates also contain fields which are not very intuitively defined or even coherent with their names, such as the Distinguished Name field, which is neither always distinguished nor necessarily contains the subject's name. And, the SerialNumber field, etc. So, data fields themselves are not clear in *their* names -- more or less like a CA making no representation that the subject "Bill Clinton" of a certificate is the same "Bill Clinton" as the one you might be thinking of, but they put it in the cert anyway ;-) Yes, in legal reliance terms one may trust the confirmation procedures of the CA during certificate reliance, but one cannot rely upon them for other than their value as a representation of the CA's authentication management act expressed in the CA's own terms and rules -- therefore, a PKIX certificate is neither necessarily meaningful nor valid in a r-p's reference frame or for the r-p's purposes. To pretend otherwise is at best misleading and at worst openly naive. To see a graphical birds's eye view of my comment, with a less terse treatment, the reader can visit the "unabridged inside view of a typical X.509 certificate" in http://www.mcg.org.br/x509cert.htm Cheers, Ed Gerck Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA06329 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 28 May 2000 23:10:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id QAA05460; Mon, 29 May 2000 16:23:07 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <L6FWDHJH>; Mon, 29 May 2000 16:16:59 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA722607@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 16:16:58 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Not that simple to me. You'd have to go into lengths explaining how the precision value should be applied. For instance, what would you say about a token with base time ="20000529053138.345Z", and the precision of 1 second? Should we then trim the base value to make the precision meaningful (i.e. the base time is just "20000529053138Z")? And the consistency in style with 2459 - e.g. having a unique reference to the token comprised of its SerialNumber and the issuer name, was also one of the goals. Michael > -----Original Message----- > From: Manger, James H [mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com] > Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 3:59 PM > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field > > > TSA clients must support genTime values with > fraction-of-second components, > e.g "20000529053138.345Z". Consequently, by using sufficient > fraction-of-seconds digits, it is easy for a TSA to issue > genTime values > that always increase and never repeat. > > * The TSA does not need to maintain another never-repeating value > (serialNumber) and does not have to worry about maintaining > it when the TSA > server crashes. > * The TSA does not need to issue (nor the client expect) huge integer > values. > * Ordering two timestamps from one TSA is simply achieved by > comparing their > genTime fields. > * Accuracy (uncertainty with respect to UTC) is not affected as it is > conveyed in a separate field. > > Simple. Complete. > > The only issue is whether the ordering works from timestamps > with the same > TSA name or same TSA signing key. > > > > > Received: from mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au [202.12.144.17]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA05241 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 28 May 2000 22:54:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id QAA13540 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 16:01:06 +1000 (EST) Received: from maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au(202.12.142.17) via SMTP by mailo.vtcif.telstra.com.au, id smtpd0F6.qW; Mon May 29 16:00:44 2000 Received: (from uucp@localhost) by maili.vtcif.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) id QAA14672 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 16:00:43 +1000 (EST) Received: from localhost(127.0.0.1), claiming to be "mail.cdn.telstra.com.au" via SMTP by localhost, id smtpd4X5_h_; Mon May 29 15:59:48 2000 Received: from ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au (ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au [192.74.168.81]) by mail.cdn.telstra.com.au (8.8.2/8.6.9) with ESMTP id PAA27985 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 29 May 2000 15:59:48 +1000 (EST) Received: by ntmsg0011.corpmail.telstra.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <L4KYBYMK>; Mon, 29 May 2000 15:59:17 +1000 Message-ID: <73388857A695D31197EF00508B08F2988A3BA8@ntmsg0131.corpmail.telstra.com.au> From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 15:59:15 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" TSA clients must support genTime values with fraction-of-second components, e.g "20000529053138.345Z". Consequently, by using sufficient fraction-of-seconds digits, it is easy for a TSA to issue genTime values that always increase and never repeat. * The TSA does not need to maintain another never-repeating value (serialNumber) and does not have to worry about maintaining it when the TSA server crashes. * The TSA does not need to issue (nor the client expect) huge integer values. * Ordering two timestamps from one TSA is simply achieved by comparing their genTime fields. * Accuracy (uncertainty with respect to UTC) is not affected as it is conveyed in a separate field. Simple. Complete. The only issue is whether the ordering works from timestamps with the same TSA name or same TSA signing key. Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id TAA24266 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 28 May 2000 19:36:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id MAA00998; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:49:10 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <L6FWDHCB>; Mon, 29 May 2000 12:43:01 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA7224B8@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, xme <Mzolotarev@baltimore.com.au>, Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr>, pkoning@xedia.com, William Lattin <wlattin@earthlink.net>, kent@bbn.com Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 12:42:58 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Folks, I'll be very short: The most significant points raised, related to what I've proposed, are: 1. By Denis about having two requirements: a) accepting the 2459 style interpretation for the SerialNumber, and b) preserving the order. 2. By Peter that a TSA IS(!) the authority which establishes the order. So the natural order of timestamps as being issued by the TSA is the ONLY order we should recognize. A simple way to put it all together would be to: 1) Define a SerialNumber as a strictly monotonically increasing number (1, 3,47, 543) across all tokens by the same TSA. 2) Accept the point that a TSA *always* naturally establishes the order makes the BOOLEAN flag proposed by Denis unnecessary. The draft should not say anything about the requirement(!) of maintaining the order at all. And guess what: the previous two point are EXACTLY what is covered by the very original text of the draft. Exactly that! Not a bad outcome of a good technical discussion :) What is missing is: 3) a 2459-styled statement about the uniqueness of TSA_Name+SerialNumber. 4) A statement *not preventing* the crash recovery handling suggested by Bill Lattin. 4) Long integer handling. I've stolen a sentence from 2459, and slightly modified and shortened the original text from the draft: ** The serialNumber field shall include a strictly monotonically increasing integer from one TimeStampToken to the next (e.g. 45, 236, 245, 1023, ...). It MUST be unique for each token issued by a given TSA (i.e., the TSA name and serial number identify a unique time stamp), providing the way to build a unique identifier to reference the token. The serialNumber also allows to compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA, which is useful in particular when two time stamps bear the same time. It should be noticed that the uniqueness of the token references must remain valid even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) of the service. The clients MUST be able to handle serialNumber longer than 4 bytes digits. *** To what I saw, this should keep the most of us happy. Or am I dreaming? Regards Michael Received: from mail.rdc1.md.home.com (imail@ha1.rdc1.md.home.com [24.2.2.66]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id SAA12392 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 28 May 2000 18:22:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from home.com ([24.180.131.6]) by mail.rdc1.md.home.com (InterMail vM.4.01.02.00 201-229-116) with ESMTP id <20000529012938.MKEI23916.mail.rdc1.md.home.com@home.com>; Sun, 28 May 2000 18:29:38 -0700 Message-ID: <3931C773.4B1DFFAF@home.com> Date: Sun, 28 May 2000 21:27:15 -0400 From: Al Arsenault <awa1@home.com> Organization: @Home Network X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en]C-AtHome0407 (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A0@seine.valicert.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Peter, In a word, "No". Details below: Peter Williams wrote: > > User includes account name in the subject DN. A Private > organization's CA service services a closed intranet and > extranet community. It issues a certificate including > the account name. This circumstance is common in the Internet > community today. > > CA has a policy, which is partially disclosed. The disclosed > Policy Elements are made available only to subscribers. This > circumstance is common in the Internet community today. > > The motivations for establishing the extent > of a field verification policy are beyond the understanding > level of the CA's subscribers. This circumstance is common > in the Internet community today. > I won't argue with any of these; I'll simply state that the fact that it's common in the Internet community today doesn't make it the right thing to do. > The CA does disclose a policy element to susbcribers to > procedurally follow a "limited" technical verification procedure > concerning account names. The procedure establishes that an account > of that name "exists" - in an account management system acceptable > to the CA - at the time of certificate issuance. > In other words: the CA verified that there was someone named "Bill Clinton" purporting to reside at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC at the time of certificate issuance, so I'll put that in the certificate. I make no representation that the subject of this certificate is the same "Bill Clinton" as the one you might be thinking of, but I'll put it in the cert anyway. All other data in the certificate are verified as per the CP/CPS/other appropriate document. Is this useful? To what relying party? > All other data in a certificate is "verified", according > to other per-CA policy criteria and/or PKIX mandates. > > Does the resulting certificate, when issued > under the above scenario, conform with the > proposed PKIX standards for field verification? > Not according to the ones I'm recommending. :-) > A fourth party undertakes a private PKIX-audit of > the CA for the benefit of the CA. Should it > determine the CA is acting according to the spirit > of the proposal concerning field verification > when executing this scenario? > Again, in a word: "NO". The presence of an "attribute" whose value has not been verified - either directly or indirectly - by the CA is at best misleading, and at worst openly harmful to the relying party. Al Arsenault Chief Security Architect Diversinet Corp. Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id RAA04071 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sun, 28 May 2000 17:31:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id KAA15125; Mon, 29 May 2000 10:43:30 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <LWX2NNCD>; Mon, 29 May 2000 10:37:44 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA722396@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 10:37:35 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Note also that the precision becomes a somewhat strange information, > how do you compare two time stamps that just happen to to be > a second aprt with a precision of 999 milliseconds. > Peter, You compare a time stamp with: 1. 'Real' time. When dealing with real time, you do not compare, strictly speaking. You just use the precision to say that "the time was somewhere around X, within +-Y interval". This is the prime intention of the precision field. 2. a stamp issued by the same TSA. When comparing with a stamp issued by the same TSA (2), you ignore the precision at all. 3. a stamp issued by another TSA (AND the precision diapazons of the two stamps overlap). The only purpose of comparing is to figure out which stamp was issued earlier. We have two cases to consider here: Case1: Precision_TSA1 is equal to Precision_TSA2. Here the rule would be to treat the precision as the span of the probability graph, with the probability being the highest at the middle point (base time value), and 0 at the ends of the 'hill'. Therefore, the court (my court :) would simply opt to ignore the precision field at all, and look at just the base values. I would consequtively reject any claims that *your* probability graph is not a 'hill-shaped' curve. Case2: Precision_TSA1 is smaller than Precision_TSA2. As a judge I fully trust the TSA1 'cause it's time is more precise. So I again look at the base time value. If TSA1 stamp says it was generated a second earlier than TSA2 stamp - that's the truth. If TSA1 stamp says it was generated a second later than TSA2 stamp - that's the truth as well. If TSA2 wants to argue that the *other* TSA's precision field is a fake, then it is the matter for another, totaly unrelated to this one, court hearing. Regards M Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA24615 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 27 May 2000 09:12:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id SAA13551; Sat, 27 May 2000 18:19:54 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Sat, 27 May 2000 18:19:54 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id SAA20201; Sat, 27 May 2000 18:19:53 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id SAA04384; Sat, 27 May 2000 18:19:53 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Sat, 27 May 2000 18:19:53 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005271619.SAA04384@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, mzolotarev@baltimore.com > Denis, > > You could still achieve your objective of maintaining ISO compatibility and > requiring global uniqueness of each TS token using only a combination of the > TSA's name and the serialNumber provided the serialNumber field itself can > be made up of a date/time component and a numbering counter that start over > with every new time interval (e.g. a day, an hour, a minute, etc.). Note > this is similar to what I had suggested in my original message on May 18, > which started this whole thread. > > For this reason I support the text proposed by Michael for the serialNumber > field. Ooops, I forgot to mention Francois. > > I also support your rationale for the addition of the proposed BOOLEAN on > ordering in TS tokens with a minor change as suggested below. I think if it > is missing, or if the ordering field is present and set to false, then it > should only indicate that the ordering of Time Stamps issued by the same TSA > can not be guaranteed. I don't think that this observation is worth the boolean. Since the serialnumber field indicates a unique value within a period of a second or so, I do not see what a TSA cannot simply be the authority of establishing the order. People might try to misinterprete the unique identifier as order anyway. Thus, I would propose to say somewhere either: - "The TSA defines order of time stamps by a combination of the genTime and serialnumber value." - "The TSA defines the order of time stamps by the serialNumber value." Or 'the order of time stamps is defined by ...' > > In section 2.4.2. Page 8. > > "If the ordering field is present and set to true, Time Stamps tokens can > always be ordered by looking only at the genTime and the serialNumber > parameters. > > If the ordering field is missing, or if the ordering field is present and > set to false, then the genTime field only indicates the time at which the > timestamp has been created by the TSA. In such a case, the ordering of Time > Stamps issued by the same TSA can not be guaranteed." Comments about DER as in my previous message. Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA23892 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 27 May 2000 08:53:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id SAA13481; Sat, 27 May 2000 18:01:18 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Sat, 27 May 2000 18:01:19 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id SAA20183; Sat, 27 May 2000 18:01:17 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id SAA04377; Sat, 27 May 2000 18:01:17 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Sat, 27 May 2000 18:01:17 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005271601.SAA04377@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: mzolotarev@baltimore.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Michael, > > Thank you for this good analysis of the issue. > > The problem we have is that, currently, the serialNumber is used > for two different purposes in order to address two different > requirements, hence why we have some difficulties. > These requirements are the following: > > 1) Uniquely designate a TS token using a combination of the TSA's > name and the serialNumber. This is how serialNumber is used in RFC > 2459 for both Public Key Certificates and CRLs, as well as how it is > used for Attributes Certificates, at least at the time being as > defined by ISO (and I suppose we are not going to change this). :-) > > 2) Distinguish betwen two time-stamps issued with the same time > (e.g. the same second). These are not TWO requirements but one, since one obviously assumes that whatever time interval is chosen, it occurs only once. The requirement is: 'Each time stamp token has a unique identification', and you 2 points are just two ways of adressing this. In the current text this requirement is addressed by having a unique serialNumber. Of course it could be addressed by many other things, you could even issue a new certificate for each signature with a name component uniqueId=nnn I rather see that the data retrurned respond to the following requirements: 1 - unique identification 2 - associate a time value to an event 3 - determine an order between two events. > > I would propose a simple (and new) way to solve this issue: use one > parameter for one purpose only. 1 - is addressed by the serialNumber 2 - is addressed by the time value 3 - is currently also addressed by the serialNumber > > 1) for the first requirement, stick to the use of this parameter as > required for PKCs, CRLs in RFC 2459 and for ACs. This means only > require uniqueness and nothing else. We may then keep the name > "serialNumber". > > 2) for the second requirement, let us first look at it slightly > differently. > > Today we implicitly MANDATE TSAs to be able to indicate which one of This is rather explicit and whether they are issued within the same second is not important. > two time stamps (e.g. issued within the same second) was first. We > could simply ALLOW TSAs to be able to indicate which one of two time > stamps (e.g. issued within the same second) was first. In many > cases, the ordering of the token will be artificial and even wrong, > in particular when the TSA is handling multiple crypto-engines in > parallel. It may be indesirable or pretty hard to try to distinguish > between who came first in a waiting queue for a given crypto-engine > and who came out first from a waiting queue for another given > crypto-engine from the same TSA. In some designs shall parallel > crypto-engines use the same clock or can they use their own clock ? Allocating a time valiue, and SIGNING the result may not necessarily happen in the same processor. You could just start creating the unsigned time stamp and then hand out this to several signing engines in parallel. See below for more. > If the clock is different, how is it possible to still guarantee the > ordering ? I would not like to answer to these questions and hence > mandate designs where all TSAs MUST always guarantee the ordering. The time stamp does not guarantee the ordering of what they recived etc. They simply establish the order, the TSA *IS* the authority, they don't have to justify the order. It's like asking the clock providers to guarantee the order they generate. What testing device how would you create in order to test whether a TSA hands out time stamps in a wrong order? How would you try to establish a proof of such misbehaviour. In the same way as for a clock: You just send request, get an anwser, create a new request etc. If for the new request the order is wrong, you have an indication of misbehaviour. > This would prevent some implentation designs. I would rather prefer > to ALLOW TSAs to guarantee the ordering, if they wish to do so. This > is more flexible and also recognizes the fact that mandating this > requirement in some environments is not at all needed. Assume a parallel solution where the time of each of the processing engines can have some access to a time value within let's say a precision of n milliseconds. Each engine gets a a unique identifier let's say 0 - 2**x-1. Each engine maintains a local counter within this precision value, create time stamps of the form time + id + counter (concatenation) AND delay the delivery of the stamp by about 2*n. This avoids that a client could get a time stamp, create a hash of the time stamp, and get a time stamp of the token with a serialnumber with is lower serial number. > > Now let us look how to achieve these goals: > > genTime is defined as the time at which the timestamp has been > created by the TSA. It can include any *precision*. However the > accuraccy (i.e. the time difference with UTC - not the precision) is > indicated in another parameter called accuracy which represents the > time deviation around the UTC time contained in GeneralizedTime. genTime is the time that the TSA has allocated to that time stamp, not more. > > If a TSA wants to ALLOW users to make the difference, it may then > use a precision much better than the second (and, for example, > still have an accuracy of one second). Otherwise it does what > it wants. > > To this end the following changes are proposed: > > Section 2.1. Requirements of the TSA > > The TSA is REQUIRED: > > (snip) > > 3. to include a unique integer for each newly > generated time stamp token. Can you tell me a method to create a unique identifier that is substantially faster than one that you cannot easily transform into one having the property that the integer also grows. > > In section 2.4.2. Page 8. The serialNumber is an integer assigned by > the TSA to each Time Stamp token. It MUST be unique for each Time > Stamp token issued by a given TSA (i.e., the TSA name and > serialNumber identify a unique Time Stamp token). > > On page 8, just after the sentence: " However, when there is no need > to have a precision better than the second, then GeneralizedTime > with a precision limited to one second should be used (as in > [RFC 2459]).", add the following: > > "When there is a need to sequence the time stamps issued from the > same TSA at a granularity better than the second, then a greater > precision must be used and be commensurate with the number of time > stamps that can be generated by that TSA within the same second." Horrible. > > There is however one major drawback with this. How can a TS user > know if the TS token issued by a given TSA are garanteed or not to > be ordered ? Simply looking at genTime and accuracy does not allow > to always make the difference. So we would need another parameter > (e.g. a BOOLEAN) :-( or use the security policy which is not > directly machine procn application has to establish in its context whether to accept a time stamp authority, and WHICH one; you never just say I will accept all tokens that are signed as a TSA. > > The BOOLEAN would be "better", simple to understand, and allow more > more flexibility than we have today. It is quite late to introduce > another parameter at this stage, :-( but if it is not now, it will > never be. :-). > > If we do so, it could be after: > > policy PolicyInformation, > > add: > > ordering BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, > > with the following explanations: > > " If the ordering field is present and set to true, Time Stamps > tokens > can always be ordered by looking only at the genTime parameter, > whatever their accuracy is. This is USELESS: Either you have all time stamps with a different time value, then you can compare them, or it can happen that they have the same. Then you don't need a boolean to indicate that. I think you will almost never be in a situation of an application that uses one time first to determine whether a document or whatever is conformant, i.e., a verifier would reject the time stamped data with an indication saying: Sorry, this TIMESTAMP is not good enough since we won't be able to establish an order between this one and another one of the same authority. I don't believe that a TSA would create different time stamps based on the load or wahatever. You might consider to indicate in the request to ask for an ordered or unordered time stamp. The question is there: Do we want two different types of services or not. > > If the ordering field is missing, or if the ordering field is > present and set to false, then the genTime field only indicates the nit picking: when the value is THERE it is ALWAYS TRUE. I thought that we had already been beyond this discussion. We already had consensus that the genTime is not a good value to establish the order of two time stamps. > time at which the timestamp has been created by the TSA. In such > a case, the ordering of Time Stamps issued by the same TSA is > only possible when the difference between their genTime is greater > than the accuracy of the first Time Stamp token plus the accuracy > of the second Time Stamp token." Trying to compare tokens on the basis of a precision and non unique and arbitraily injected time values, one per vaguely defined second, doesn't seem a good solution. One thing to retain is whether the time stamp authority does establish an order among time stamps or not. Another: Would there be any possibility to use time stamps from several authorities? In fact this latter question is much more interesting, and probably shows that exact ordering and TIME stamping are two different services, anyway. Note that I didn't say 'compare two time stamps'. An application would be to get a time stamp in order to demonstrate that you have made your tax declaration in time. There is no requirement to have an order among two time stamps. > > Now, an alternative to this proposal would be to MANDATE Time stamps > ordering (which does not appear to be a good requirement as > explained earlier). If so we should rename the current parameter > differently (in order to avoid confusion), like: Why do you say 'WOULD BE'. This is the actual definition since 3 years, you just change the name from serialNumber to increasingNumber. > > increasingNumber INTEGER, > > and have the following changes: > > Section 2.1. Requirements of the TSA > > The TSA is REQUIRED: > > (snip) > > 3. to include a strictly incrementing integer for > each newly generated time stamp token. > > In section 2.4.2. Page 8. The increasingNumber field shall include a > strictly increasing integer from one TimeStampToken to the next > (e.g. 45, 236, 245, 1023, ...). This guarantees two properties: (1) > When used in combination with the TSA's name the increasing number > identifies a unique Time Stamp token. (2) It is always possible to > compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA by looking > only at that field. This may be useful in particular when two time > stamps from the same TSA bear the same time. It should be noticed > that the stricly increasing numbering property must remain valid > even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) of the service. A > recipient of a Time Stamp token MUST be able to handle increasing > numbers that are up to 16-bytes. The latter mean just renaming of the actual text, but not what had been discussed by Bill, Paul and Michael, i.e., it was questioned whether it can be achieved in all circumstances, and whether it wouldn't be sufficient to just have ordering property AND the unique identification defined by the combination of the genTime and "that number". Personally I prefer the current text, i.e., uniqueness and ordering defined by the serialNumber. Peter Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA20587 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 27 May 2000 08:00:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id RAA13292; Sat, 27 May 2000 17:07:42 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Sat, 27 May 2000 17:07:43 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id RAA20108; Sat, 27 May 2000 17:07:40 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id RAA04368; Sat, 27 May 2000 17:07:40 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Sat, 27 May 2000 17:07:40 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005271507.RAA04368@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: pkoning@xedia.com, kent@bbn.com, mzolotarev@baltimore.com Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr, ietf-pkix@imc.org, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net > Folks, > > As I can recall, the original idea behind the SerialNumber was simple: to > preserve the ordering, and to arbitrate between timestamps which happen to > have the same time value. It itself enforces that each timestamp is now > unique (time+SerialNumber_within_time_interval is a unique combination), > though the global uniqueness of the stamps was not the initial intent. I cannot read brains, so I don't know what was the original idea (not that we have drafts on the table since almost 3 years now). >From recalling the discussions, there have been SEVERAL interpretations, one of them was that: - a serial number uniquely identifies a time stamp. - a serial number ONLY is used to order time stamps. That is the actual text. I am not against a change as proposed: to use the time value to take part of the global order. Thus, the unique identifier of a time stamp and its order is at least defined by the indicated time and the serialNumber. On the other hand you might note that in the actual text, the time value may not be mononotical increasing for time stamps ordered by serialNumber. You are able to adjust your clock. Thus the serialnumber, and not the time defines the order. Agreed, this might create some confusion if you detect that your clock is two seconds ahead and you have to go back, well, in the new rule, you would create a LOOONGG second. Note also that the precision becomes a somewhat strange information, how do you compare two time stamps that just happen to to be a second aprt with a precision of 999 milliseconds. > > Considering that the original intention for the field is still there, let me > put a few short points together, to straighten things up a bit: > > Point 1: "SerialNumber" in TSA is not the same thing as the 2459's serial > number. > > Point 2: a hash can NOT be used as a serialNumber - we need some sort of > *integer sequentual etc numbering*. > > Point 3: Within the same time value interval, the numbering can be "strictly > monotonically incremental by one" (1,2,3,4) or more relaxed "strictly > monotonically increasing" (1,34,111,112,654). Both choices are perfectly > suitable for the purpose. But the latter is a superset of the former, so we > can use just "scrictly monotonically increasing". > > Point 4: The numbering counter can be "ever going", or start over with every > new time interval. Both choices are perfectly suitable for the purpose. So > that the draft should NOT dictate which one to be used. > > Point 5: Depending on which numbering scheme is used by the TSA, a > SerialNumber can reach a big value. Therefore the recepient should be > prepared to handle 4+ bytes integer. > > Point 6: A TSA can switch from one numbering scheme to another, or reset the > counter at its will, provided that the order (uniqueness) of timestamps with > the same time interval is preserved (not violated). This is the only comment > the draft should probably bear. > > Point 7: A unique Time+SerialNumber_within_that_interval combination should > be sufficient for audits. > > > To summarize all above, the [slightly modified] statement about the > SerialNumber could be: > *** > The serialNumber field shall include a strictly monotonically increasing > integer (e.g. 45, 236, 245, 1023, ...), across all time stamps or at least > across all tokens bearing the same time value. This guarantees that each > token is unique and allows > to compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA. This is useful > in particular when two time stamps from the same TSA bear the same time. > This field also provides the way to build a unique identifier to reference > the token. It should be noticed that the ordering is defined by the > combination of the time value and the SerialNumber of the tokens. The > ordering MUST be maintained even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) > of the service. A recepient of a token MUST be able to handle serial numbers > that are greater than 4-bytes integers. > *** This is a possible way. Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA16381 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 27 May 2000 06:48:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id PAA12947; Sat, 27 May 2000 15:55:52 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Sat, 27 May 2000 15:55:52 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id PAA20029; Sat, 27 May 2000 15:55:51 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id PAA04347; Sat, 27 May 2000 15:55:50 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Sat, 27 May 2000 15:55:50 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005271355.PAA04347@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, brauckmann@trustcenter.de Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field > At 15:38 26.05.00 +0200, Denis Pinkas wrote: > >1) for the first requirement, stick to the use of this parameter as > >required for PKCs, CRLs in RFC 2459 and for ACs. This means only > >require uniqueness and nothing else. We may then keep the name > >"serialNumber". > > Just a short remark: CRL serialnumbers (=the cRLNumber extension) are > required to be monotonically increasing. > "5.2.3 CRL Number > The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension which conveys a > monotonically increasing sequence number for each CRL issued by a CA. > " > 1, 1, 1, 1 ... would respect this requirement :-) Received: from seine.valicert.com (corporate-gw.valicert.com [63.65.221.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA10867 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 20:15:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: by seine.valicert.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LS0CRR33>; Fri, 26 May 2000 20:18:02 -0700 Message-ID: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E2A0@seine.valicert.com> From: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 20:17:58 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" User includes account name in the subject DN. A Private organization's CA service services a closed intranet and extranet community. It issues a certificate including the account name. This circumstance is common in the Internet community today. CA has a policy, which is partially disclosed. The disclosed Policy Elements are made available only to subscribers. This circumstance is common in the Internet community today. The motivations for establishing the extent of a field verification policy are beyond the understanding level of the CA's subscribers. This circumstance is common in the Internet community today. The CA does disclose a policy element to susbcribers to procedurally follow a "limited" technical verification procedure concerning account names. The procedure establishes that an account of that name "exists" - in an account management system acceptable to the CA - at the time of certificate issuance. All other data in a certificate is "verified", according to other per-CA policy criteria and/or PKIX mandates. Does the resulting certificate, when issued under the above scenario, conform with the proposed PKIX standards for field verification? A fourth party undertakes a private PKIX-audit of the CA for the benefit of the CA. Should it determine the CA is acting according to the spirit of the proposal concerning field verification when executing this scenario? -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] Sent: Friday, May 26, 2000 8:29 AM To: Denis Pinkas Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Denis, The latter part of your message gets at the contentious point in this discussion. Some of us believe that ALL data in a certificate is definitively bound to the public key. After much debate the WG rejected the notion of marking data in a cert as non-verified. So, the current posture is that the EXTENT to which data is verified is a matter of CA policy, but the basic notion is that the CA has verified all of the data. Warwick gave some examples that he felt supported the notion that not all certificate data is verified, but my response argued that these examples were either not a violation of the verification notion (e.g., OUs), or were anomalous (pseudonyms). So, while I agree with your suggestions re pluralizing the references in the cited text, I don't agree with the suggestion to limit the scope of the comment to just the subject alternate name. Steve Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id TAA02166 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 19:07:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.30.108] (comsecpb.bbn.com [171.78.30.108]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id WAA19451; Fri, 26 May 2000 22:14:11 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com (Unverified) Message-Id: <v04220806b554462eec3e@[128.33.238.95]> In-Reply-To: <392D437D.B7B1C2F7@bull.net> References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB8A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <14637.14460.418872.887051@xedia.com> <392D437D.B7B1C2F7@bull.net> Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 11:28:44 -0400 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Denis, The latter part of your message gets at the contentious point in this discussion. Some of us believe that ALL data in a certificate is definitively bound to the public key. After much debate the WG rejected the notion of marking data in a cert as non-verified. So, the current posture is that the EXTENT to which data is verified is a matter of CA policy, but the basic notion is that the CA has verified all of the data. Warwick gave some examples that he felt supported the notion that not all certificate data is verified, but my response argued that these examples were either not a violation of the verification notion (e.g., OUs), or were anomalous (pseudonyms). So, while I agree with your suggestions re pluralizing the references in the cited text, I don't agree with the suggestion to limit the scope of the comment to just the subject alternate name. Steve Received: from goose.prod.itd.earthlink.net (goose.prod.itd.earthlink.net [207.217.120.18]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA13944 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 14:07:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: from winnt (1Cust2.tnt26.sfo3.da.uu.net [63.28.72.2]) by goose.prod.itd.earthlink.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id OAA15860; Fri, 26 May 2000 14:14:26 -0700 (PDT) From: "William Lattin" <wlattin@earthlink.net> To: "Denis Pinkas" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, "Michael Zolotarev" <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 14:15:33 -0700 Message-ID: <000101bfc757$8779c590$ad0c173f@winnt> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600 In-Reply-To: <392E7E52.A00E7B40@bull.net> Importance: Normal Denis, Looks like we're converging on a better solution. Bill > -----Original Message----- > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > Sent: Friday, May 26, 2000 06:38 > To: Michael Zolotarev > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field > > > Michael, > > Thank you for this good analysis of the issue. > > The problem we have is that, currently, the serialNumber is used > for two different purposes in order to address two different > requirements, hence why we have some difficulties. > These requirements are the following: > > 1) Uniquely designate a TS token using a combination of the TSA's > name and the serialNumber. This is how serialNumber is used in RFC > 2459 for both Public Key Certificates and CRLs, as well as how it is > used for Attributes Certificates, at least at the time being as > defined by ISO (and I suppose we are not going to change this). :-) > > 2) Distinguish betwen two time-stamps issued with the same time > (e.g. the same second). > > I would propose a simple (and new) way to solve this issue: use one > parameter for one purpose only. > > 1) for the first requirement, stick to the use of this parameter as > required for PKCs, CRLs in RFC 2459 and for ACs. This means only > require uniqueness and nothing else. We may then keep the name > "serialNumber". > > 2) for the second requirement, let us first look at it slightly > differently. > > Today we implicitly MANDATE TSAs to be able to indicate which one of > two time stamps (e.g. issued within the same second) was first. We > could simply ALLOW TSAs to be able to indicate which one of two time > stamps (e.g. issued within the same second) was first. In many > cases, the ordering of the token will be artificial and even wrong, > in particular when the TSA is handling multiple crypto-engines in > parallel. It may be indesirable or pretty hard to try to distinguish > between who came first in a waiting queue for a given crypto-engine > and who came out first from a waiting queue for another given > crypto-engine from the same TSA. In some designs shall parallel > crypto-engines use the same clock or can they use their own clock ? > If the clock is different, how is it possible to still guarantee the > ordering ? I would not like to answer to these questions and hence > mandate designs where all TSAs MUST always guarantee the ordering. > This would prevent some implentation designs. I would rather prefer > to ALLOW TSAs to guarantee the ordering, if they wish to do so. This > is more flexible and also recognizes the fact that mandating this > requirement in some environments is not at all needed. > > Now let us look how to achieve these goals: > > genTime is defined as the time at which the timestamp has been > created by the TSA. It can include any *precision*. However the > accuraccy (i.e. the time difference with UTC - not the precision) is > indicated in another parameter called accuracy which represents the > time deviation around the UTC time contained in GeneralizedTime. > > If a TSA wants to ALLOW users to make the difference, it may then > use a precision much better than the second (and, for example, > still have an accuracy of one second). Otherwise it does what > it wants. > > To this end the following changes are proposed: > > Section 2.1. Requirements of the TSA > > The TSA is REQUIRED: > > (snip) > > 3. to include a unique integer for each newly > generated time stamp token. > > In section 2.4.2. Page 8. The serialNumber is an integer assigned by > the TSA to each Time Stamp token. It MUST be unique for each Time > Stamp token issued by a given TSA (i.e., the TSA name and > serialNumber identify a unique Time Stamp token). > > On page 8, just after the sentence: " However, when there is no need > to have a precision better than the second, then GeneralizedTime > with a precision limited to one second should be used (as in > [RFC 2459]).", add the following: > > "When there is a need to sequence the time stamps issued from the > same TSA at a granularity better than the second, then a greater > precision must be used and be commensurate with the number of time > stamps that can be generated by that TSA within the same second." > > There is however one major drawback with this. How can a TS user > know if the TS token issued by a given TSA are garanteed or not to > be ordered ? Simply looking at genTime and accuracy does not allow > to always make the difference. So we would need another parameter > (e.g. a BOOLEAN) :-( or use the security policy which is not > directly machine processable. :-( > > The BOOLEAN would be "better", simple to understand, and allow more > more flexibility than we have today. It is quite late to introduce > another parameter at this stage, :-( but if it is not now, it will > never be. :-). > > If we do so, it could be after: > > policy PolicyInformation, > > add: > > ordering BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, > > with the following explanations: > > " If the ordering field is present and set to true, Time Stamps > tokens > can always be ordered by looking only at the genTime parameter, > whatever their accuracy is. > > If the ordering field is missing, or if the ordering field is > present and set to false, then the genTime field only indicates the > time at which the timestamp has been created by the TSA. In such > a case, the ordering of Time Stamps issued by the same TSA is > only possible when the difference between their genTime is greater > than the accuracy of the first Time Stamp token plus the accuracy > of the second Time Stamp token." > > Now, an alternative to this proposal would be to MANDATE Time stamps > ordering (which does not appear to be a good requirement as > explained earlier). If so we should rename the current parameter > differently (in order to avoid confusion), like: > > increasingNumber INTEGER, > > and have the following changes: > > Section 2.1. Requirements of the TSA > > The TSA is REQUIRED: > > (snip) > > 3. to include a strictly incrementing integer for > each newly generated time stamp token. > > In section 2.4.2. Page 8. The increasingNumber field shall include a > strictly increasing integer from one TimeStampToken to the next > (e.g. 45, 236, 245, 1023, ...). This guarantees two properties: (1) > When used in combination with the TSA's name the increasing number > identifies a unique Time Stamp token. (2) It is always possible to > compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA by looking > only at that field. This may be useful in particular when two time > stamps from the same TSA bear the same time. It should be noticed > that the stricly increasing numbering property must remain valid > even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) of the service. A > recipient of a Time Stamp token MUST be able to handle increasing > numbers that are up to 16-bytes. > > As a conclusion, at the time being, there are thus two choices. > > Denis > > > Folks, > > > > As I can recall, the original idea behind the SerialNumber was > simple: to > > preserve the ordering, and to arbitrate between timestamps > which happen to > > have the same time value. It itself enforces that each timestamp is now > > unique (time+SerialNumber_within_time_interval is a unique combination), > > though the global uniqueness of the stamps was not the initial intent. > > > > Considering that the original intention for the field is still > there, let me > > put a few short points together, to straighten things up a bit: > > > > Point 1: "SerialNumber" in TSA is not the same thing as the > 2459's serial > > number. > > > > Point 2: a hash can NOT be used as a serialNumber - we need some sort of > > *integer sequentual etc numbering*. > > > > Point 3: Within the same time value interval, the numbering can > be "strictly > > monotonically incremental by one" (1,2,3,4) or more relaxed "strictly > > monotonically increasing" (1,34,111,112,654). Both choices are perfectly > > suitable for the purpose. But the latter is a superset of the > former, so we > > can use just "scrictly monotonically increasing". > > > > Point 4: The numbering counter can be "ever going", or start > over with every > > new time interval. Both choices are perfectly suitable for the > purpose. So > > that the draft should NOT dictate which one to be used. > > > > Point 5: Depending on which numbering scheme is used by the TSA, a > > SerialNumber can reach a big value. Therefore the recepient should be > > prepared to handle 4+ bytes integer. > > > > Point 6: A TSA can switch from one numbering scheme to another, > or reset the > > counter at its will, provided that the order (uniqueness) of > timestamps with > > the same time interval is preserved (not violated). This is the > only comment > > the draft should probably bear. > > > > Point 7: A unique Time+SerialNumber_within_that_interval > combination should > > be sufficient for audits. > > > > To summarize all above, the [slightly modified] statement about the > > SerialNumber could be: > > *** > > The serialNumber field shall include a strictly monotonically increasing > > integer (e.g. 45, 236, 245, 1023, ...), across all time stamps > or at least > > across all tokens bearing the same time value. This guarantees that each > > token is unique and allows > > to compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA. > This is useful > > in particular when two time stamps from the same TSA bear the same time. > > This field also provides the way to build a unique identifier > to reference > > the token. It should be noticed that the ordering is defined by the > > combination of the time value and the SerialNumber of the tokens. The > > ordering MUST be maintained even after a possible interruption > (e.g. crash) > > of the service. A recepient of a token MUST be able to handle > serial numbers > > that are greater than 4-bytes integers. > > > > > > Regards > > Michael > Received: from pigeon.verisign.com ([208.206.241.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA12742 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 12:48:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from postal-gw2.verisign.com (mailhost2.verisign.com [208.206.241.102]) by pigeon.verisign.com (8.9.3/BCH1.7.1) with ESMTP id MAA15053; Fri, 26 May 2000 12:52:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: by postal-gw2.verisign.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <L4X9GKNH>; Fri, 26 May 2000 12:53:49 -0700 Message-ID: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F4832F03@vhqpostal.verisign.com> From: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> To: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Cc: kent@bbn.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 12:53:47 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" So what is the difference between "bound" and "definitively bound" (in a standard isn't everything definitive)? Also, what is the semantic difference when the remaining words are simplified? I fear you might be reading in some meaning that is not there. Warwick -----Original Message----- From: Paul Koning [mailto:pkoning@xedia.com] Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2000 7:28 AM To: WFord@verisign.com Cc: kent@bbn.com; Denis.Pinkas@bull.net; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Echoing Paul Hoffman's comment... I find Steve's text to be preferable. For one thing, retaining "definitively" seems a good thing to do. paul >>>>> "Warwick" == Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> writes: Warwick> With Steve's concurrence, I propose the following modified Warwick> wording to the clause of concern: Warwick> "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a Warwick> certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered to Warwick> be bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST verify (in Warwick> accordance with the applicable certificate policy and/or the Warwick> CPS) all subject alternative names." Steve> I worry that we are unduly singling out this attribute, even Steve> though ALL the attributes have the same sort of Steve> requirement. How about: Steve> "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a Steve> certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered to Steve> be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST Steve> verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative Steve> names. The precise nature of the verification is detailed in Steve> the certificate policy and/or the CPS." Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA11644 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 11:44:09 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQWY1Q9V>; Fri, 26 May 2000 14:52:16 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFB7@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, mzolotarev@baltimore.com Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 14:51:43 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Denis, You could still achieve your objective of maintaining ISO compatibility and requiring global uniqueness of each TS token using only a combination of the TSA's name and the serialNumber provided the serialNumber field itself can be made up of a date/time component and a numbering counter that start over with every new time interval (e.g. a day, an hour, a minute, etc.). Note this is similar to what I had suggested in my original message on May 18, which started this whole thread. For this reason I support the text proposed by Michael for the serialNumber field. I also support your rationale for the addition of the proposed BOOLEAN on ordering in TS tokens with a minor change as suggested below. I think if it is missing, or if the ordering field is present and set to false, then it should only indicate that the ordering of Time Stamps issued by the same TSA can not be guaranteed. In section 2.4.2. Page 8. "If the ordering field is present and set to true, Time Stamps tokens can always be ordered by looking only at the genTime and the serialNumber parameters. If the ordering field is missing, or if the ordering field is present and set to false, then the genTime field only indicates the time at which the timestamp has been created by the TSA. In such a case, the ordering of Time Stamps issued by the same TSA can not be guaranteed." Regards Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 -----Original Message----- From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] Sent: Friday, May 26, 2000 9:38 AM To: Michael Zolotarev Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Michael, Thank you for this good analysis of the issue. The problem we have is that, currently, the serialNumber is used for two different purposes in order to address two different requirements, hence why we have some difficulties. These requirements are the following: 1) Uniquely designate a TS token using a combination of the TSA's name and the serialNumber. This is how serialNumber is used in RFC 2459 for both Public Key Certificates and CRLs, as well as how it is used for Attributes Certificates, at least at the time being as defined by ISO (and I suppose we are not going to change this). :-) 2) Distinguish betwen two time-stamps issued with the same time (e.g. the same second). I would propose a simple (and new) way to solve this issue: use one parameter for one purpose only. 1) for the first requirement, stick to the use of this parameter as required for PKCs, CRLs in RFC 2459 and for ACs. This means only require uniqueness and nothing else. We may then keep the name "serialNumber". 2) for the second requirement, let us first look at it slightly differently. Today we implicitly MANDATE TSAs to be able to indicate which one of two time stamps (e.g. issued within the same second) was first. We could simply ALLOW TSAs to be able to indicate which one of two time stamps (e.g. issued within the same second) was first. In many cases, the ordering of the token will be artificial and even wrong, in particular when the TSA is handling multiple crypto-engines in parallel. It may be indesirable or pretty hard to try to distinguish between who came first in a waiting queue for a given crypto-engine and who came out first from a waiting queue for another given crypto-engine from the same TSA. In some designs shall parallel crypto-engines use the same clock or can they use their own clock ? If the clock is different, how is it possible to still guarantee the ordering ? I would not like to answer to these questions and hence mandate designs where all TSAs MUST always guarantee the ordering. This would prevent some implentation designs. I would rather prefer to ALLOW TSAs to guarantee the ordering, if they wish to do so. This is more flexible and also recognizes the fact that mandating this requirement in some environments is not at all needed. Now let us look how to achieve these goals: genTime is defined as the time at which the timestamp has been created by the TSA. It can include any *precision*. However the accuraccy (i.e. the time difference with UTC - not the precision) is indicated in another parameter called accuracy which represents the time deviation around the UTC time contained in GeneralizedTime. If a TSA wants to ALLOW users to make the difference, it may then use a precision much better than the second (and, for example, still have an accuracy of one second). Otherwise it does what it wants. To this end the following changes are proposed: Section 2.1. Requirements of the TSA The TSA is REQUIRED: (snip) 3. to include a unique integer for each newly generated time stamp token. In section 2.4.2. Page 8. The serialNumber is an integer assigned by the TSA to each Time Stamp token. It MUST be unique for each Time Stamp token issued by a given TSA (i.e., the TSA name and serialNumber identify a unique Time Stamp token). On page 8, just after the sentence: " However, when there is no need to have a precision better than the second, then GeneralizedTime with a precision limited to one second should be used (as in [RFC 2459]).", add the following: "When there is a need to sequence the time stamps issued from the same TSA at a granularity better than the second, then a greater precision must be used and be commensurate with the number of time stamps that can be generated by that TSA within the same second." There is however one major drawback with this. How can a TS user know if the TS token issued by a given TSA are garanteed or not to be ordered ? Simply looking at genTime and accuracy does not allow to always make the difference. So we would need another parameter (e.g. a BOOLEAN) :-( or use the security policy which is not directly machine processable. :-( The BOOLEAN would be "better", simple to understand, and allow more more flexibility than we have today. It is quite late to introduce another parameter at this stage, :-( but if it is not now, it will never be. :-). If we do so, it could be after: policy PolicyInformation, add: ordering BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, with the following explanations: " If the ordering field is present and set to true, Time Stamps tokens can always be ordered by looking only at the genTime parameter, whatever their accuracy is. If the ordering field is missing, or if the ordering field is present and set to false, then the genTime field only indicates the time at which the timestamp has been created by the TSA. In such a case, the ordering of Time Stamps issued by the same TSA is only possible when the difference between their genTime is greater than the accuracy of the first Time Stamp token plus the accuracy of the second Time Stamp token." Now, an alternative to this proposal would be to MANDATE Time stamps ordering (which does not appear to be a good requirement as explained earlier). If so we should rename the current parameter differently (in order to avoid confusion), like: increasingNumber INTEGER, and have the following changes: Section 2.1. Requirements of the TSA The TSA is REQUIRED: (snip) 3. to include a strictly incrementing integer for each newly generated time stamp token. In section 2.4.2. Page 8. The increasingNumber field shall include a strictly increasing integer from one TimeStampToken to the next (e.g. 45, 236, 245, 1023, ...). This guarantees two properties: (1) When used in combination with the TSA's name the increasing number identifies a unique Time Stamp token. (2) It is always possible to compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA by looking only at that field. This may be useful in particular when two time stamps from the same TSA bear the same time. It should be noticed that the stricly increasing numbering property must remain valid even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) of the service. A recipient of a Time Stamp token MUST be able to handle increasing numbers that are up to 16-bytes. As a conclusion, at the time being, there are thus two choices. Denis > Folks, > > As I can recall, the original idea behind the SerialNumber was simple: to > preserve the ordering, and to arbitrate between timestamps which happen to > have the same time value. It itself enforces that each timestamp is now > unique (time+SerialNumber_within_time_interval is a unique combination), > though the global uniqueness of the stamps was not the initial intent. > > Considering that the original intention for the field is still there, let me > put a few short points together, to straighten things up a bit: > > Point 1: "SerialNumber" in TSA is not the same thing as the 2459's serial > number. > > Point 2: a hash can NOT be used as a serialNumber - we need some sort of > *integer sequentual etc numbering*. > > Point 3: Within the same time value interval, the numbering can be "strictly > monotonically incremental by one" (1,2,3,4) or more relaxed "strictly > monotonically increasing" (1,34,111,112,654). Both choices are perfectly > suitable for the purpose. But the latter is a superset of the former, so we > can use just "scrictly monotonically increasing". > > Point 4: The numbering counter can be "ever going", or start over with every > new time interval. Both choices are perfectly suitable for the purpose. So > that the draft should NOT dictate which one to be used. > > Point 5: Depending on which numbering scheme is used by the TSA, a > SerialNumber can reach a big value. Therefore the recepient should be > prepared to handle 4+ bytes integer. > > Point 6: A TSA can switch from one numbering scheme to another, or reset the > counter at its will, provided that the order (uniqueness) of timestamps with > the same time interval is preserved (not violated). This is the only comment > the draft should probably bear. > > Point 7: A unique Time+SerialNumber_within_that_interval combination should > be sufficient for audits. > > To summarize all above, the [slightly modified] statement about the > SerialNumber could be: > *** > The serialNumber field shall include a strictly monotonically increasing > integer (e.g. 45, 236, 245, 1023, ...), across all time stamps or at least > across all tokens bearing the same time value. This guarantees that each > token is unique and allows > to compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA. This is useful > in particular when two time stamps from the same TSA bear the same time. > This field also provides the way to build a unique identifier to reference > the token. It should be noticed that the ordering is defined by the > combination of the time value and the SerialNumber of the tokens. The > ordering MUST be maintained even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) > of the service. A recepient of a token MUST be able to handle serial numbers > that are greater than 4-bytes integers. > > > Regards > Michael Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA10166 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 10:18:57 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQWY1QXR>; Fri, 26 May 2000 13:27:03 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFB6@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 13:26:34 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Denis, We probably need to be clear on the requirement and then we can be sure that the text in the document reflects the requirement. You seem quite clear that the requirement is to prevent replays - but we need to be clear on whether we are trying to detect and/or prevent deliberate or inadvertent replay or both. Inadvertent replay could occur when more than one copy of a request message gets sent to the TSA because of problems in the intervening network elements. In this case the TSA because of its "no look" policy would just blindly generate time stamps for each of the copies it receives. Deliberate replay, on the other hand, assumes that the TSA has been subverted or its signing key has been compromised, or that a middleman is replaying legitimate TS responses. Each of the various potential replays needs to be considered to ensure that the protocol protects against it. 1. Deliberate middleman replay. Since each response contains a signed TS Token which includes the message imprint, serial number and time, this type of attack is easily detected within the currently proposed protocol. 2. Replay by subverted TSA. A subverted TSA could generate any number of TS Tokens containing the same message imprint at any time. Because each could have different serial number and/or time, each would be unique and there is no way the client could detect a replay on the basis of the response. The only way this could be detected would be for every request to include a nonce and for the client to maintain a record of all nonces generated to verify against the responses. 3. Inadvertent replay. Again, the only way for the client to distinguish this type of replay would be through the use of a nonce. In this case, however, it should not be necessary to maintain a record of all nonces generated but only those generated within a time window as you suggest. If the window length is set to, for example, twice the expected delay between request and response, the client could be quite confident that there have been no inadvertent replays if no duplicate nonce values are detected. To summarize, the nonce should not be an optional component of replay detection (as suggested by the current wording) - it is necessary if the client is trying to protect against anything other than deliberate middleman replays. It is suggested that the wording in the fourth sentence of the second paragraph of Section 2.2 (page 3) be changed to: "It SHALL then verify the value of the nonce (large random number with high probability that is generated by the client only once) included in the response against the nonce value included in the corresponding request to ensure that no replay has occurred." In Section 2.4.1 remove the OPTIONAL qualifier from nonce in the definition of TimeStampReq (page 4). Change the wording of first sentence of the nonce description in Section 2.4.1 (page 5)to read: "The nonce allows the client to verify the response against replay." In Section 2.4.2 remove the OPTIONAL qualifier from nonce in the definition of TSTInfo (page 7). Change the wording of the nonce description in Section 2.4.2 (page 5)to read: "The nonce field MUST be equal to the value provided in the TimeStampReq structure." If you agree with this approach, then I would suggest we prepare a short annex to describe the two different cases - subverted TSA vice inadvertent replay. Have a good weekend! Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 -----Original Message----- From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 5:36 AM To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol Francois, I realized that I ommited to reply to your E-mail. > Salut Denis, > > I do not remember if this issue was raised before, but in Section 2.2 the > following statement is made: > > "the requesting entity .... SHALL then verify the timeliness of the response > by verifying either the time included in the response against a local > trusted time reference, if one is available, and/or the value of the nonce > (large random number with a high probability that it is generated by the > client only once) included in the response against the value included in the > request." > > A nonce is normally used to detect attempts at replays, which is not > necessarily related to the timeliness of the response to a particular > request as mentioned here. > > The first part of the statement talks about verifying the time included in > the response against a locally trusted time source. This could used to > measure round trip path delay for calibration purposes, No. This is not the goal. The goal is to make sure that you have no replay, in particular on the same hash value. > but unless one could > be certain that the locally trusted source is as accurate as the TSA time > source (or, at least, that the difference between them is fixed and > well-known), I don't see how it would detect/prevent replays. Using a moving time window the caller remembers all the hashes he sent during that time window. If there is not the same hash value within that time window, then he makes sure that the time of the response is within the time window. If there is the same hash (a very rare situation), it is a little bit more complicated, and there are several options. Among them: using the nonce, or waiting until the time window has moved to come back to the previous case: only one hash value during that time window. But we are talking implementations details, which is not the topic of an RFC. > If one has > such a trusted time source locally, what is the point in using a TTP for > time stamping? The time is locally trusted, ... which does not mean that other people will trust that time. > > Could you please clarify the intent of this statement and if the intent is > to prevent replays or check the timeliness of responses or both? Now, that you have the explanations, if you still believe that the text is not clear enough, I suggest that you submit a proposal to clarify the text. Regards, Denis > > Francois > ___________________________________ > Francois Rousseau > Director of Standards and Conformance > Chrysalis-ITS > 1688 Woodward Drive > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil (roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.70]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA08038 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 08:43:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil (root@localhost) by roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id LAA25270 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 11:45:09 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005261545.LAA25266@roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil> Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 11:47:41 -0400 (EDT) From: "David P. Kemp" <dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil> Reply-To: "David P. Kemp" <dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil> Subject: Re: Encrypting private keys - how do you achieve this in practice? To: ietf-pkix@imc.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-MD5: ldJJVH1qPkuDwazA2ooMOQ== X-Mailer: dtmail 1.3.0 CDE Version 1.3 SunOS 5.7 sun4u sparc Christopher, If your implementation always exports password-protected private keys, and you don't want to (or can't, because it's in hardware) touch the existing code, then you could just put some glue around the module to unwrap the key with the password and then wrap the plaintext key for the intended recipient in an EnvelopedData structure, using PKIArchiveOptions:encryptedPrivKey:envelopedData. Put the private key in EnvelopedData:encryptedContentInfo:encryptedContent and set EnvelopedData:encryptedContentInfo:contentType to id-data. It isn't recommended (at least by me) to place a password-wrapped private key directly in PKIArchiveOptions:encryptedPrivKey:encryptedValue. But the straightforward approach to doing so would be to populate: encryptedValue:symmAlg - ??? encryptedValue:encValue - BER of EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo Fortunately, PKCS#8 does not define an OID for EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo, as they obviously felt that this structure is never suitable for use within another protocol :-). Dave > From: "Christopher Williams" <ccwilliams@ntlworld.com> > To: "PKIX Mailing List" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> > Subject: Encrypting private keys - how do you achieve this in practice? > Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 11:35:06 +0100 > X-Priority: 3 > X-MSMail-Priority: Normal > X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 > > When you encrypt a private key to put it in the EncryptedValue structure, it > appears from the standard that you take the private key octets as the plain > text and encrypt under the symmetric algorithm / symmetric key, etc. > > There's a problem here. Our implementation of RSA / DSA / DH, etc. does not > give out private keys in plain text and I guess that many other > implementations are the same. We do support password wrapping of the > private key (e.g. PKCS#8) but the EncryptedValue structure does not seem to > be designed to take a password-wrapped key. > > How do you reconcile PKCS#8 with the EncryptedValue structure? For example, > I guess that you could supply the password as the symmetric key and encode > the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure as a bit string, but what would then > be the symmetric algorithm? > > How have other people implemented private key encryption? > > Christopher Williams > > Software engineer, NetLexis Ltd. > Solutions for secure electronic commerce > http://www.netlexis.com Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA06301 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 07:09:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA42744; Fri, 26 May 2000 16:16:21 +0200 Message-ID: <392E8738.8F8BBD9A@bull.net> Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 16:16:24 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Juergen Brauckmann <brauckmann@trustcenter.de> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA722158@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> <3.0.5.32.20000526155201.039ee160@callisto> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Juergen, Good remark. However, the parameter is called cRLNumber, not serialNumber, hence no confusion. :-) Denis > At 15:38 26.05.00 +0200, Denis Pinkas wrote: > >1) for the first requirement, stick to the use of this parameter as > >required for PKCs, CRLs in RFC 2459 and for ACs. This means only > >require uniqueness and nothing else. We may then keep the name > >"serialNumber". > > Just a short remark: CRL serialnumbers (=the cRLNumber extension) are > required to be monotonically increasing. > "5.2.3 CRL Number > The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension which conveys a > monotonically increasing sequence number for each CRL issued by a CA. > " > > Regards > Juergen > -- > Juergen Brauckmann Tel.: 040 / 8080 26 311 > TC TrustCenter GmbH Fax.: 040 / 8080 26 126 > Sonninstraße 24-28 mailto:brauckmann@trustcenter.de > 20097 Hamburg http://www.trustcenter.de Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA06205 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 07:07:02 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQWY1Q2H>; Fri, 26 May 2000 10:15:07 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFB0@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: ccwilliams@ntlworld.com, carlisle.adams@entrust.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Encrypting private keys - how do you achieve this in practice ? Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 10:14:39 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Christopher, This is why I ask a similar question to Carlisle yesterday. I hope that the type "PrivateKeyInfo" from Section 6 of PKCS#8 is what is being used in reality in the EncryptedValue structure since it is also what Section 11.9 of PKCS#11 v2.01 mandates for wrapping a private key: "Cryptoki Version 2.01 allows the use of secret keys for wrapping and unwrapping RSA private keys, Diffie-Hellman private keys, and DSA private keys. For wrapping, a private key is BER-encoded according to PKCS #8's PrivateKeyInfo ASN.1 type." This way, as mandated by Appendix B2 of RFC 2510bis, a PKCS#8 encoded private key would be wrap using the PROT_SYM_ALG symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g. 3-DES, 3-key-EDE, CBC mode) and not a password wrapping as you suggested. The symmetric key is then encrypted using a previously agreed PROT_ENC_ALG asymmetric algorithm (e.g. Diffie-Hellman, RSA). Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 -----Original Message----- From: Christopher Williams [mailto:ccwilliams@ntlworld.com] Sent: Friday, May 26, 2000 6:35 AM To: PKIX Mailing List Subject: Encrypting private keys - how do you achieve this in practice? When you encrypt a private key to put it in the EncryptedValue structure, it appears from the standard that you take the private key octets as the plain text and encrypt under the symmetric algorithm / symmetric key, etc. There's a problem here. Our implementation of RSA / DSA / DH, etc. does not give out private keys in plain text and I guess that many other implementations are the same. We do support password wrapping of the private key (e.g. PKCS#8) but the EncryptedValue structure does not seem to be designed to take a password-wrapped key. How do you reconcile PKCS#8 with the EncryptedValue structure? For example, I guess that you could supply the password as the symmetric key and encode the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure as a bit string, but what would then be the symmetric algorithm? How have other people implemented private key encryption? Christopher Williams Software engineer, NetLexis Ltd. Solutions for secure electronic commerce http://www.netlexis.com Received: from mystic1.trustcenter.de (mystic1.trustcenter.de [193.194.157.34]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id GAA05647 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 06:46:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mystic1.trustcenter.de; id PAA27216; Fri, 26 May 2000 15:51:30 +0200 Received: from nodnsquery(192.168.200.3) by mystic1.trustcenter.de via smap (V5.0) id xma027212; Fri, 26 May 00 15:50:39 +0200 Received: from ew-jbr (titan.trustcenter.de [192.168.200.244]) by callisto.trustcenter.de (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id PAA11724 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 15:52:01 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.20000526155201.039ee160@callisto> X-Sender: jbr@callisto X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.5 (32) Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 15:52:01 +0200 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Juergen Brauckmann <brauckmann@trustcenter.de> Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field In-Reply-To: <392E7E52.A00E7B40@bull.net> References: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA722158@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id GAA05648 At 15:38 26.05.00 +0200, Denis Pinkas wrote: >1) for the first requirement, stick to the use of this parameter as >required for PKCs, CRLs in RFC 2459 and for ACs. This means only >require uniqueness and nothing else. We may then keep the name >"serialNumber". Just a short remark: CRL serialnumbers (=the cRLNumber extension) are required to be monotonically increasing. "5.2.3 CRL Number The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension which conveys a monotonically increasing sequence number for each CRL issued by a CA. " Regards Juergen -- Juergen Brauckmann Tel.: 040 / 8080 26 311 TC TrustCenter GmbH Fax.: 040 / 8080 26 126 Sonninstraße 24-28 mailto:brauckmann@trustcenter.de 20097 Hamburg http://www.trustcenter.de Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA04651 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 06:31:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA14982; Fri, 26 May 2000 15:38:24 +0200 Message-ID: <392E7E52.A00E7B40@bull.net> Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 15:38:26 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA722158@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Michael, Thank you for this good analysis of the issue. The problem we have is that, currently, the serialNumber is used for two different purposes in order to address two different requirements, hence why we have some difficulties. These requirements are the following: 1) Uniquely designate a TS token using a combination of the TSA's name and the serialNumber. This is how serialNumber is used in RFC 2459 for both Public Key Certificates and CRLs, as well as how it is used for Attributes Certificates, at least at the time being as defined by ISO (and I suppose we are not going to change this). :-) 2) Distinguish betwen two time-stamps issued with the same time (e.g. the same second). I would propose a simple (and new) way to solve this issue: use one parameter for one purpose only. 1) for the first requirement, stick to the use of this parameter as required for PKCs, CRLs in RFC 2459 and for ACs. This means only require uniqueness and nothing else. We may then keep the name "serialNumber". 2) for the second requirement, let us first look at it slightly differently. Today we implicitly MANDATE TSAs to be able to indicate which one of two time stamps (e.g. issued within the same second) was first. We could simply ALLOW TSAs to be able to indicate which one of two time stamps (e.g. issued within the same second) was first. In many cases, the ordering of the token will be artificial and even wrong, in particular when the TSA is handling multiple crypto-engines in parallel. It may be indesirable or pretty hard to try to distinguish between who came first in a waiting queue for a given crypto-engine and who came out first from a waiting queue for another given crypto-engine from the same TSA. In some designs shall parallel crypto-engines use the same clock or can they use their own clock ? If the clock is different, how is it possible to still guarantee the ordering ? I would not like to answer to these questions and hence mandate designs where all TSAs MUST always guarantee the ordering. This would prevent some implentation designs. I would rather prefer to ALLOW TSAs to guarantee the ordering, if they wish to do so. This is more flexible and also recognizes the fact that mandating this requirement in some environments is not at all needed. Now let us look how to achieve these goals: genTime is defined as the time at which the timestamp has been created by the TSA. It can include any *precision*. However the accuraccy (i.e. the time difference with UTC - not the precision) is indicated in another parameter called accuracy which represents the time deviation around the UTC time contained in GeneralizedTime. If a TSA wants to ALLOW users to make the difference, it may then use a precision much better than the second (and, for example, still have an accuracy of one second). Otherwise it does what it wants. To this end the following changes are proposed: Section 2.1. Requirements of the TSA The TSA is REQUIRED: (snip) 3. to include a unique integer for each newly generated time stamp token. In section 2.4.2. Page 8. The serialNumber is an integer assigned by the TSA to each Time Stamp token. It MUST be unique for each Time Stamp token issued by a given TSA (i.e., the TSA name and serialNumber identify a unique Time Stamp token). On page 8, just after the sentence: " However, when there is no need to have a precision better than the second, then GeneralizedTime with a precision limited to one second should be used (as in [RFC 2459]).", add the following: "When there is a need to sequence the time stamps issued from the same TSA at a granularity better than the second, then a greater precision must be used and be commensurate with the number of time stamps that can be generated by that TSA within the same second." There is however one major drawback with this. How can a TS user know if the TS token issued by a given TSA are garanteed or not to be ordered ? Simply looking at genTime and accuracy does not allow to always make the difference. So we would need another parameter (e.g. a BOOLEAN) :-( or use the security policy which is not directly machine processable. :-( The BOOLEAN would be "better", simple to understand, and allow more more flexibility than we have today. It is quite late to introduce another parameter at this stage, :-( but if it is not now, it will never be. :-). If we do so, it could be after: policy PolicyInformation, add: ordering BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, with the following explanations: " If the ordering field is present and set to true, Time Stamps tokens can always be ordered by looking only at the genTime parameter, whatever their accuracy is. If the ordering field is missing, or if the ordering field is present and set to false, then the genTime field only indicates the time at which the timestamp has been created by the TSA. In such a case, the ordering of Time Stamps issued by the same TSA is only possible when the difference between their genTime is greater than the accuracy of the first Time Stamp token plus the accuracy of the second Time Stamp token." Now, an alternative to this proposal would be to MANDATE Time stamps ordering (which does not appear to be a good requirement as explained earlier). If so we should rename the current parameter differently (in order to avoid confusion), like: increasingNumber INTEGER, and have the following changes: Section 2.1. Requirements of the TSA The TSA is REQUIRED: (snip) 3. to include a strictly incrementing integer for each newly generated time stamp token. In section 2.4.2. Page 8. The increasingNumber field shall include a strictly increasing integer from one TimeStampToken to the next (e.g. 45, 236, 245, 1023, ...). This guarantees two properties: (1) When used in combination with the TSA's name the increasing number identifies a unique Time Stamp token. (2) It is always possible to compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA by looking only at that field. This may be useful in particular when two time stamps from the same TSA bear the same time. It should be noticed that the stricly increasing numbering property must remain valid even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) of the service. A recipient of a Time Stamp token MUST be able to handle increasing numbers that are up to 16-bytes. As a conclusion, at the time being, there are thus two choices. Denis > Folks, > > As I can recall, the original idea behind the SerialNumber was simple: to > preserve the ordering, and to arbitrate between timestamps which happen to > have the same time value. It itself enforces that each timestamp is now > unique (time+SerialNumber_within_time_interval is a unique combination), > though the global uniqueness of the stamps was not the initial intent. > > Considering that the original intention for the field is still there, let me > put a few short points together, to straighten things up a bit: > > Point 1: "SerialNumber" in TSA is not the same thing as the 2459's serial > number. > > Point 2: a hash can NOT be used as a serialNumber - we need some sort of > *integer sequentual etc numbering*. > > Point 3: Within the same time value interval, the numbering can be "strictly > monotonically incremental by one" (1,2,3,4) or more relaxed "strictly > monotonically increasing" (1,34,111,112,654). Both choices are perfectly > suitable for the purpose. But the latter is a superset of the former, so we > can use just "scrictly monotonically increasing". > > Point 4: The numbering counter can be "ever going", or start over with every > new time interval. Both choices are perfectly suitable for the purpose. So > that the draft should NOT dictate which one to be used. > > Point 5: Depending on which numbering scheme is used by the TSA, a > SerialNumber can reach a big value. Therefore the recepient should be > prepared to handle 4+ bytes integer. > > Point 6: A TSA can switch from one numbering scheme to another, or reset the > counter at its will, provided that the order (uniqueness) of timestamps with > the same time interval is preserved (not violated). This is the only comment > the draft should probably bear. > > Point 7: A unique Time+SerialNumber_within_that_interval combination should > be sufficient for audits. > > To summarize all above, the [slightly modified] statement about the > SerialNumber could be: > *** > The serialNumber field shall include a strictly monotonically increasing > integer (e.g. 45, 236, 245, 1023, ...), across all time stamps or at least > across all tokens bearing the same time value. This guarantees that each > token is unique and allows > to compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA. This is useful > in particular when two time stamps from the same TSA bear the same time. > This field also provides the way to build a unique identifier to reference > the token. It should be noticed that the ordering is defined by the > combination of the time value and the SerialNumber of the tokens. The > ordering MUST be maintained even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) > of the service. A recepient of a token MUST be able to handle serial numbers > that are greater than 4-bytes integers. > > > Regards > Michael Received: from mta03-svc.ntlworld.com (mta03-svc.ntlworld.com [62.253.162.43]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA20695 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 03:26:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: from darxstar ([62.252.200.33]) by mta03-svc.ntlworld.com (InterMail vM.4.01.02.27 201-229-119-110) with SMTP id <20000526103351.VTJS290.mta03-svc.ntlworld.com@darxstar> for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 11:33:51 +0100 Message-ID: <002e01bfc6fe$70e8c8c0$0100a8c0@darxstar> From: "Christopher Williams" <ccwilliams@ntlworld.com> To: "PKIX Mailing List" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Encrypting private keys - how do you achieve this in practice? Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 11:35:06 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 When you encrypt a private key to put it in the EncryptedValue structure, it appears from the standard that you take the private key octets as the plain text and encrypt under the symmetric algorithm / symmetric key, etc. There's a problem here. Our implementation of RSA / DSA / DH, etc. does not give out private keys in plain text and I guess that many other implementations are the same. We do support password wrapping of the private key (e.g. PKCS#8) but the EncryptedValue structure does not seem to be designed to take a password-wrapped key. How do you reconcile PKCS#8 with the EncryptedValue structure? For example, I guess that you could supply the password as the symmetric key and encode the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure as a bit string, but what would then be the symmetric algorithm? How have other people implemented private key encryption? Christopher Williams Software engineer, NetLexis Ltd. Solutions for secure electronic commerce http://www.netlexis.com Received: from buffy.tpgi.com.au (buffy.tpgi.com.au [203.12.160.34]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id CAA12554 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 02:42:02 -0700 (PDT) From: info@animationallsorts.com Received: (from smtpd@localhost) by buffy.tpgi.com.au (8.9.3/8.9.3) id TAA01564 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 26 May 2000 19:49:20 +1000 Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 19:49:20 +1000 Message-Id: <200005260949.TAA01564@buffy.tpgi.com.au> Received: from syd3-56k-150.tpgi.com.au(203.29.148.150), claiming to be "home" via SMTP by buffy.tpgi.com.au, id smtpdQp9Ycz; Fri May 26 19:49:11 2000 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org X-Mailer: 6D559AED.5C036C2E.050f5278980406d9d1e3143a14e56baf Subject: Open Mind Organization: Animation Allsorts I have discovered your webside on the Internet and find it really interesting.I do believe that you or your clients may benefit from the information we are offering. There are a lot of people trying to get rich quick, without any interest in another human being whatsoever. Well, I doubt that they will succeed. There is a law in success like there is a law in physics. You may not believe in gravity or not know about it, but it still works. The Law of Success says: If you help enough people to get what they want, You will get what You want. Therefore, if you think, that you may gain and discover a benefit for yourself, click on: http://www.animationallsorts.com/00-Main-Journey.htm or you can have a look at our Newsletter to find out if you can benefit from it: http://www.animationallsorts.com/NEWSLETER/April-00/NLetter-index.htm Don't hesitate to forward a copy of this newsletter to friends and associates, but please ask for permission before reproducing the content in any form -- we would like to know who you are. Pavel Kyral Director Animation Allsorts - Open Mind 105/3 Bruce Street, Crows Nest, NSW, 2065, Australia Phone: 612 9955 7990 | Fax: 612 9955 0076 Copyright © 1990-2000 All Rights Reserved If you think, that you will not benefit from this corespondence, send an email to: remove@animationallsorts.com Subject:Remove gravity Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA28737 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 22:34:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id PAA08588; Fri, 26 May 2000 15:46:03 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <L45KCZ6R>; Fri, 26 May 2000 15:40:04 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA722158@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com>, kent@bbn.com Cc: Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr, ietf-pkix@imc.org, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 15:40:03 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Folks, As I can recall, the original idea behind the SerialNumber was simple: to preserve the ordering, and to arbitrate between timestamps which happen to have the same time value. It itself enforces that each timestamp is now unique (time+SerialNumber_within_time_interval is a unique combination), though the global uniqueness of the stamps was not the initial intent. Considering that the original intention for the field is still there, let me put a few short points together, to straighten things up a bit: Point 1: "SerialNumber" in TSA is not the same thing as the 2459's serial number. Point 2: a hash can NOT be used as a serialNumber - we need some sort of *integer sequentual etc numbering*. Point 3: Within the same time value interval, the numbering can be "strictly monotonically incremental by one" (1,2,3,4) or more relaxed "strictly monotonically increasing" (1,34,111,112,654). Both choices are perfectly suitable for the purpose. But the latter is a superset of the former, so we can use just "scrictly monotonically increasing". Point 4: The numbering counter can be "ever going", or start over with every new time interval. Both choices are perfectly suitable for the purpose. So that the draft should NOT dictate which one to be used. Point 5: Depending on which numbering scheme is used by the TSA, a SerialNumber can reach a big value. Therefore the recepient should be prepared to handle 4+ bytes integer. Point 6: A TSA can switch from one numbering scheme to another, or reset the counter at its will, provided that the order (uniqueness) of timestamps with the same time interval is preserved (not violated). This is the only comment the draft should probably bear. Point 7: A unique Time+SerialNumber_within_that_interval combination should be sufficient for audits. To summarize all above, the [slightly modified] statement about the SerialNumber could be: *** The serialNumber field shall include a strictly monotonically increasing integer (e.g. 45, 236, 245, 1023, ...), across all time stamps or at least across all tokens bearing the same time value. This guarantees that each token is unique and allows to compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA. This is useful in particular when two time stamps from the same TSA bear the same time. This field also provides the way to build a unique identifier to reference the token. It should be noticed that the ordering is defined by the combination of the time value and the SerialNumber of the tokens. The ordering MUST be maintained even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) of the service. A recepient of a token MUST be able to handle serial numbers that are greater than 4-bytes integers. *** Regards Michael Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id QAA21042 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 16:07:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [128.33.238.70] (TC070.BBN.COM [128.33.238.70]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA04657; Thu, 25 May 2000 19:14:21 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com (Unverified) Message-Id: <v04220804b5534df54672@[128.33.238.61]> In-Reply-To: <14637.21206.475028.42529@xedia.com> References: <200005251532.RAA03541@emeriau.edelweb.fr> <v04220806b552fcd5851e@[171.78.30.107]> <14637.21206.475028.42529@xedia.com> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 17:42:08 -0400 To: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Paul, >Better yet, perhaps we need to revisit what requirement prompted the >inclusion of this message component.\ Agreed. > >If it is to distinguish one timestamp from another, the requirement >stated should be uniqueness, no more. no, its more than that, I think. > >If it is to distinguish one timestamp from another for the case where >the time values are identical, the requirement should be just that. still more. >If the requirement is to let you order the timestamps that have the >same time value, then the requirement should be that the value is >increasing over that scope. I think this is the requirement Denis had in mind, and that others did, based on the traffic from some time ago. > >If the requirement is a total order (regardless of time value) then >the requirement should be "increasing". This satisfies the previous requirement, but is more stringent. it is what is required now, but maybe it's overkill, modulo the potential benefits I ascribed to a 1-up counter used here. Steve Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id QAA20997 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 16:07:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [128.33.238.70] (TC070.BBN.COM [128.33.238.70]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA04652; Thu, 25 May 2000 19:14:10 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com (Unverified) Message-Id: <v04220803b5534d78293b@[128.33.238.61]> In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.4.10.10005251215150.10614-100000@holstein.doit.wisc.edu> References: <Pine.A41.4.10.10005251215150.10614-100000@holstein.doit.wisc.edu> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 17:38:25 -0400 To: Eric Norman <ejnorman@doit.wisc.edu> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Eric, Whoops, you're right. No requirement for the sequence to increment by 1 each time. Of course, the benefits I cited for such an increment are lost in the more general case. Steve Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA18301 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 12:34:09 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQWY1PLD>; Thu, 25 May 2000 15:42:10 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BFAD@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: carlisle.adams@entrust.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Encryption of Private Keys in CRMF and CMP Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 15:41:47 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Carlisle, In Section 6.4 of RFC 2511 on CRMF, it is indicated that the EncryptedValue field "encValue" is a BIT STRING, however I could not find any further detail in RFC 2511 nor in RFC 2510bis, which also use this syntax, about how to create this encrypted value (restricted, in RFC 2510bis, to be either private keys or certificates). Am I missing something? I understand that RFC 2511 EncryptedValue field "symmAlg" tells me the symmetric algorithm that was used to encrypt a private key value and that Appendix B2 of RFC 2510bis mandates that conforming implementations MUST support 3-DES (3-key-EDE, CBC mode) for this. However, this does not tell me what exactly is being encrypted. Is it a type "PrivateKeyInfo" from Section 6 of PKCS#8 or a type "RSAPrivateKey" from Section 11.1.2 of PKCS#1 for a RSA private key since RFC 2511 EncryptedValue field "intendedAlg" already tell me the intended algorithm for which the private key will be used for? Thanks in advance for any help. Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from poptop.llnl.gov (poptop.llnl.gov [128.115.18.65]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA16138 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 10:37:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from catalyst (catalyst.llnl.gov [128.115.222.68]) by poptop.llnl.gov (8.8.8/LLNL-3.0.2/pop.llnl.gov-5.1) with ESMTP id KAA04042; Thu, 25 May 2000 10:41:50 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <4.2.2.20000525103607.00a7dc30@poptop.llnl.gov> X-Sender: e048786@poptop.llnl.gov X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.2 Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 10:45:14 -0700 To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr>, kent@bbn.com From: Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov> Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <200005251634.SAA03571@emeriau.edelweb.fr> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed At 06:34 PM 5/25/00 +0200, Peter Sylvester wrote: > > Peter, > > > > >Steve, > > > > > >Hm, the actual text says: > > > > > > 'strictly monotonical increasing'. > > > > > >At least the example in the text about non-consecutive > > >number is there. > > > > The text I was referring to in the TSP draft states: > > > > 3. to include a monotonically incrementing integer for each > > newly generated time stamp token. > > > > "Monotonically increasing" means that the counter increments by > > exactly one each time. If it is not an increment by one, a phrase > > such as "strictly increasing" > > would be appropriate. > >"Monotonically increasing" means that a sequence is >monotonical, thus either always non-decreasing or non-increasing, >and increasing selects one of the possibilities. "Strictly" >means that you never have two numbers twice. Precisely. Put another way, the sequence of differences never changes sign. (Zero excluded as a "sign change". Where zero IS included as a sign change, one gets the "strictly monotonic" definition.) >I don't know what 'monotonically INCREMENTING" could mean. :-) It would be useful to have a term for "must increase by one." Perhaps "unitarily increasing" ;) ___tony___ Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> Information Operations, Warfare and Assurance Center Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, CA 94551-9900 Received: from imap1.doit.wisc.edu (imap1.doit.wisc.edu [144.92.9.75]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA15525 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 10:08:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [128.104.19.109] (HELO holstein.doit.wisc.edu) by imap1.doit.wisc.edu (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 3.2.4) with ESMTP id 2067074 for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Thu, 25 May 2000 12:16:06 -0500 Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 12:16:06 -0500 (CDT) From: Eric Norman <ejnorman@doit.wisc.edu> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.4.10.10005251202270.10614-100000@holstein.doit.wisc.edu> Message-ID: <Pine.A41.4.10.10005251215150.10614-100000@holstein.doit.wisc.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII On Thu, 25 May 2000, Peter Sylvester wrote: > "Monotonically increasing" means that a sequence is > monotonical, thus either always non-decreasing or non-increasing, > and increasing selects one of the possibilities. "Strictly" > means that you never have two numbers twice. For what it's worth, a math major and someone who considers himself a mathematician will chime in and point out the the above is essentially correct. In particular, "monotonic" DOES NOT imply "increase by one". And now, to tell you more than you wanted to know, the word "monotonic" is actually an adjective that is applied to functions. A function F is call monotonic if it is order preserving; that means that if x <= y, then then F(x) <= F(y). I return you now to your regular discussion about the real issues. Eric Norman "Congress shall make no law restricting the size of integers that may be multiplied together, or the number of times that an integer may be multiplied by itself, or the modulus by which an integer may be reduced". Received: from roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil (roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.70]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA15163 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 09:52:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil (root@localhost) by roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id MAA01424 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 12:53:51 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005251653.MAA01420@roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 12:56:18 -0400 (EDT) From: "David P. Kemp" <dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil> Reply-To: "David P. Kemp" <dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification To: ietf-pkix@imc.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-MD5: n3OxXH3zWqdc8OkFKoHPGA== X-Mailer: dtmail 1.3.0 CDE Version 1.3 SunOS 5.7 sun4u sparc Peter, You seem intent on reaffirming the validity of the text quoted from RFC2459. But to what end? > Internet CAs are free, and must be free, to operate public-key > certification according to wholly-private practices. This includes > acting in PKIX-non-conforming or other PKIX opt-out manners, where > (nationally-regulated) CAs and such CA's alone designate such practices > to be appropriate to meet their interworking communities security needs. There is not much to disagree with in the above, except for the first word. If your interpretation of "Internet CA" is merely a private CA which uses the Internet as a common carrier to communicate with its customers, no problem. But if an "Internet CA" is one which complies with (i.e. does not opt-out from) Internet standards, it is perverse to argue that: 1) CA X acts in a PKIX-non-conforming manner, i.e. by performing no validation on some fields of its issued certificates 2) RFC 2459 says "some communities may replace this profile ..." 3) ergo CA X complies with RFC 2459 and is thus entitled to describe itself as an "Internet CA". Surely you weren't pursuing that line of reasoning. But in case you were, you will need to demonstrate that including NVI in certificates meets the test of RFC 2459 to support "additional authorization, assurance, or operational requirements". In other words, RFC 2459 says you can do more than the basics. But you can't do less and still validly claim to be an Internet CA. Dave > From: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> > > (1) You should realize that the text I quoted, repeated below from your > reply, is from RFC 2459. > > > "Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this > > profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application > > domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or > > operational requirements. However, for basic applications, common > > representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that > > application developers can obtain necessary information without > > regard to the issuer of a particular certificate or certificate revo- > > cation list (CRL)." [RFC 2459, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt] Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA14589 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 09:26:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id SAA14490; Thu, 25 May 2000 18:34:07 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Thu, 25 May 2000 18:34:07 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id SAA12716; Thu, 25 May 2000 18:34:05 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id SAA03571; Thu, 25 May 2000 18:34:05 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 18:34:05 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005251634.SAA03571@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr, kent@bbn.com Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Peter, > > >Steve, > > > >Hm, the actual text says: > > > > 'strictly monotonical increasing'. > > > >At least the example in the text about non-consecutive > >number is there. > > The text I was referring to in the TSP draft states: > > 3. to include a monotonically incrementing integer for each > newly generated time stamp token. > > "Monotonically increasing" means that the counter increments by > exactly one each time. If it is not an increment by one, a phrase > such as "strictly increasing" > would be appropriate. "Monotonically increasing" means that a sequence is monotonical, thus either always non-decreasing or non-increasing, and increasing selects one of the possibilities. "Strictly" means that you never have two numbers twice. At least that is what I recall from initial math courses. I don't know what 'monotonically INCREMENTING" could mean. :-) > > > > >What you are asking for is to create consecutive time stamps. > > Well, the time value will not be consecutive, which is why I though > Denis specified that the counter would be. There can be legitimate > gaps in the time values. Denis did not specify that. Just see the example. > > > > >What you indicate is not mentioned in the text at all in the > >text, maybe it was intended at some time (the usage of > >'monotonically incrementing' may be an indication). > >Maybe the original author's can comment on that. > > > >Your point is an interesting one. This is ONE method, if a TSA > >is able and willing to increment by one, they can do that. > > Yes, it's just one method. I assumed that it might have been > specified because its cheap to do and not patented, etc. I guess I get your point :-) > > >But that doesn't help, a TSA can replace any stamp > >and then claim in 30 years that the key was corrupted. > > > >If you imagine the possibility not to trust the TSA,* > >then you might require that the TSA stores all stamps with > >a notary, or whatever else third/forth/fifth tp to store > >a complete archive of all tokens. > > Elsewhere the document talks about recovery from a possible key > compromise and says: > > . When the TSA private key has been compromised, then the > corresponding certificate SHALL be revoked. In this case, > any token signed by the TSA using that private key cannot > be trusted anymore. For this reason, it is imperative that > the TSA's private key be guarded with proper security and > controls in order to minimize the possibility of compromise. > In case the private key does become compromised, an audit > trail of all tokens generated by the TSA MAY provide a means > to discriminate between genuine and false backdated tokens. > > By sequentially numbering the TSTs, there may be some further > protection against back dating an audit log, but maybe this is such a > small added feature that it's not worth pursuing. The problem was that this feature may be difficult to implement, and in fact it doesn't solve anything. A TSA can easily generate random hash numbers and time stamp them, and store them. This means they can produce an audit trail that everything behaved in a +1 way if you ask them. Nevertheless, since they have been the only ones that have ever seen the radom stamps, they can still remove them whenever you want. If you don't trust a TSA, you need someone else. Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA14255 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 09:13:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiqsn04950; Thu, 25 May 2000 16:20:40 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA08851; Thu, 25 May 00 12:17:12 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id MAA11944; Thu, 25 May 2000 12:20:38 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14637.21206.475028.42529@xedia.com> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 12:20:38 -0400 (EDT) To: kent@bbn.com Cc: Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <200005251532.RAA03541@emeriau.edelweb.fr> <v04220806b552fcd5851e@[171.78.30.107]> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Stephen" == Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: Stephen> Peter, >> Steve, Hm, the actual text says: 'strictly monotonical >> increasing'. At least the example in the text about >> non-consecutive number is there. Stephen> The text I was referring to in the TSP draft states: Stephen> 3. to include a monotonically incrementing integer for each Stephen> newly generated time stamp token. Stephen> "Monotonically increasing" means that the counter increments Stephen> by exactly one each time. If it is not an increment by one, Stephen> a phrase such as "strictly increasing" would be appropriate. Well, it says "monotonically incrementing" not "increasing". I'm not at all sure this terminology implies consecutive values must be used. Then again, I view "monotonically" as a rhetorical flourish, "increasing" is sufficient. (Note that "increasing" is not a synonym for "non-decreasing".) What possible value would be served by a requirement that the numbers must be consecutive? I can see no possible use that anyone could make of this, given that we live in a datagram world. That being the case, there shouldn't be such a requirement. Better yet, perhaps we need to revisit what requirement prompted the inclusion of this message component. If it is to distinguish one timestamp from another, the requirement stated should be uniqueness, no more. If it is to distinguish one timestamp from another for the case where the time values are identical, the requirement should be just that. If the requirement is to let you order the timestamps that have the same time value, then the requirement should be that the value is increasing over that scope. If the requirement is a total order (regardless of time value) then the requirement should be "increasing". Etc... paul Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA13959 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 09:04:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.30.107] (comsec.bbn.com [171.78.30.107]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA13008; Thu, 25 May 2000 12:11:55 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220806b552fcd5851e@[171.78.30.107]> In-Reply-To: <200005251532.RAA03541@emeriau.edelweb.fr> References: <200005251532.RAA03541@emeriau.edelweb.fr> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 12:11:48 -0400 To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="============_-1252851303==_ma============" --============_-1252851303==_ma============ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Peter, >Steve, > >Hm, the actual text says: > > 'strictly monotonical increasing'. > >At least the example in the text about non-consecutive >number is there. The text I was referring to in the TSP draft states: 3. to include a monotonically incrementing integer for each newly generated time stamp token. "Monotonically increasing" means that the counter increments by exactly one each time. If it is not an increment by one, a phrase such as "strictly increasing" would be appropriate. > >What you are asking for is to create consecutive time stamps. Well, the time value will not be consecutive, which is why I though Denis specified that the counter would be. There can be legitimate gaps in the time values. > >What you indicate is not mentioned in the text at all in the >text, maybe it was intended at some time (the usage of >'monotonically incrementing' may be an indication). >Maybe the original author's can comment on that. > >Your point is an interesting one. This is ONE method, if a TSA >is able and willing to increment by one, they can do that. Yes, it's just one method. I assumed that it might have been specified because its cheap to do and not patented, etc. >But that doesn't help, a TSA can replace any stamp >and then claim in 30 years that the key was corrupted. > >If you imagine the possibility not to trust the TSA,* >then you might require that the TSA stores all stamps with >a notary, or whatever else third/forth/fifth tp to store >a complete archive of all tokens. Elsewhere the document talks about recovery from a possible key compromise and says: . When the TSA private key has been compromised, then the corresponding certificate SHALL be revoked. In this case, any token signed by the TSA using that private key cannot be trusted anymore. For this reason, it is imperative that the TSA's private key be guarded with proper security and controls in order to minimize the possibility of compromise. In case the private key does become compromised, an audit trail of all tokens generated by the TSA MAY provide a means to discriminate between genuine and false backdated tokens. By sequentially numbering the TSTs, there may be some further protection against back dating an audit log, but maybe this is such a small added feature that it's not worth pursuing. Steve --============_-1252851303==_ma============ Content-Type: text/enriched; charset="us-ascii" Peter, <excerpt>Steve, Hm, the actual text says: 'strictly monotonical increasing'. At least the example in the text about non-consecutive number is there. </excerpt> The text I was referring to in the TSP draft states: <bigger>3. to include a monotonically incrementing integer for each newly generated time stamp token. </bigger>"Monotonically increasing" means that the counter increments by exactly one each time. If it is not an increment by one, a phrase such as "strictly increasing" would be appropriate. <excerpt> What you are asking for is to create consecutive time stamps. </excerpt> Well, the time value will not be consecutive, which is why I though Denis specified that the counter would be. There can be legitimate gaps in the time values. <excerpt> What you indicate is not mentioned in the text at all in the text, maybe it was intended at some time (the usage of 'monotonically incrementing' may be an indication). Maybe the original author's can comment on that. Your point is an interesting one. This is ONE method, if a TSA is able and willing to increment by one, they can do that. </excerpt> Yes, it's just one method. I assumed that it might have been specified because its cheap to do and not patented, etc. <excerpt>But that doesn't help, a TSA can replace any stamp and then claim in 30 years that the key was corrupted. If you imagine the possibility not to trust the TSA,* then you might require that the TSA stores all stamps with a notary, or whatever else third/forth/fifth tp to store a complete archive of all tokens. </excerpt> Elsewhere the document talks about recovery from a possible key compromise and says: <fontfamily><param>Courier_New</param><bigger>. When the TSA private key has been compromised, then the corresponding certificate SHALL be revoked. In this case, any token signed by the TSA using that private key cannot be trusted anymore. For this reason, it is imperative that the TSA's private key be guarded with proper security and controls in order to minimize the possibility of compromise. In case the private key does become compromised, an audit trail of all tokens generated by the TSA MAY provide a means to discriminate between genuine and false backdated tokens. </bigger></fontfamily>By sequentially numbering the TSTs, there may be some further protection against back dating an audit log, but maybe this is such a small added feature that it's not worth pursuing. Steve --============_-1252851303==_ma============-- Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA13031 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 08:34:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id RAA12601; Thu, 25 May 2000 17:38:16 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Thu, 25 May 2000 17:38:17 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id RAA12088; Thu, 25 May 2000 17:38:15 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id RAA03546; Thu, 25 May 2000 17:38:15 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 17:38:15 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005251538.RAA03546@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: serafim@cripto.di.uminho.pt Subject: Re: ASN.1 OPTIONAL in TSA Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > How can we distinguish the OPTIÕNAL fields if they are not present? > > TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE { > version Integer { v1(1) }, > messageImprint MessageImprint, > --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be > --time stamped > reqPolicy PolicyInformation OPTIONAL, > nonce Integer OPTIONAL, > certReq BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, > extensions [0] Extensions OPTIONAL > } > > > If we omit reqPolicy, how do we know that the field next to > messageImprint is Nonce?!! We don´t have tags like in Extension. > You do. SEQUENCE = UNIVERSAL 16 for PolicyPnformation and INTEGER = UNIVERSAL 2 for nonce, etc. The CONTEXT 0 tag for extension is there in order to detect it if none of the previous is present. Peter BTW: In order to avoid implementation bugs it seems useful to me to be sure whether > extensions [0] Extensions OPTIONAL actually means the same as extensions [0] IMPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL or extensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA12925 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 08:32:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA31718 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 17:39:52 +0200 Message-ID: <392D494A.7DD543C2@bull.net> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 17:39:54 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: IETF-PXIX <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Comments on document ac509prof-03 Foreword. The comments are numbered and presented in sequence, following the page numbering of the document. However they are not all of equal importance. 1. Page 3. Section 1. The introduction is too long and too much access control oriented. This comment was made originally on the first version but has not been corrected. Since the last call is now being made (maybe to trigger reading the whole document in detail), it is now the time to fix it. It is important to say first what an AC is and why attributes are not included in the certificates (before saying what it can be used for). The proposal which follows has been using the current text which has been re-shuffled to cover the point. It has also be augmented to cover the fact that access control is simply one of three security services able to take profit of the content of an AC. The following is proposed to replace the whole section 1: " 1.Introduction X.509 public key certificates (PKCs) [X.509-97, X.509-DAM, PKIXPROF] bind an identity and a public key. An AC is a structure similar to a PKC; the main difference being that the AC contains no public key. An AC may contain attributes that specify group membership, role, security clearance, or other authorization information associated with the AC holder. The syntax for the AC is defined in Recommendation X.509, making the term "X.509 certificate" ambiguous. Some people constantly confuse PKCs and ACs. An analogy may make the distinction clear. A PKC can be considered to be like a passport: it identifies the holder, tends to last for a long time, and should not be trivial to obtain. An AC is more like an entry visa: it is typically issued by a different authority and does not last for as long a time. As acquiring an entry visa typically requires presenting a passport, getting a visa can be a simpler process. Authorization information may be placed in a PKC extension or placed in a separate attribute certificate (AC). The placement of authorization information in PKCs is usually undesirable for two reasons. First, authorization information often does not have the same lifetime as the binding of the identity and the public key. When authorization information is placed in a PKC extension, the general result is the shortening of the PKC useful lifetime. Second, the PKC issuer is not usually authoritative for the authorization information. This results in additional steps for the PKC issuer to obtain authorization information from the authoritative source. For these reasons, it is often better to separate this authorization information from the PKC. Yet, this authorization information also needs to be protected in a fashion similar to a PKC. An AC provides this protection; it is simply a digitally signed (or certified) set of attributes. An AC may be used with various security services like: 1. access control in a client-server protocol environment, 2. data origin authentication in either a client-server protocol or a store-and-forward environment, and 3. non-repudiation in a store-and-forward environment. PKCs allow to provide an identity to access control decision functions. However, in many contexts the identity is not the criteria that is used for access control, but rather the role or the group-membership of the accessor. This class of access control functions are called role-based access control. When making an access control decision based on an AC, an access control decision function may need to ensure that the appropriate AC holder is the entity that has requested access. For example, one way in which the linkage between the request and the AC can be achieved is if the AC has a reference to a PKC for the requester and that the private key corresponding to the PKC has been used to authenticate both the AC and the access request. ACs may also be used in the context of a data origin authentication service and of a non repudiation service. In theses contexts, the attributes contained in the AC provide additional information about the attributes from the signing entity. This information can be used to make sure that the entity is authorized to sign the data. This kind of checking depends either from the context where the data is exchanged or from the data that has been digitally signed." In the remaining of the document the bias towards access control needs to be corrected. To this extend the following change relates to this argument: 2. Page 4. Section 1.2. End of the first sentence. Delete " to access control decision functions". 3. Page 4. Section 1.2. This section is too much oriented towards the benefits of the "pull", whereas "push" is much better. In order to correct this, it is proposed to add the following sentence at the bottom of the page 4: "The additional benefit is that only what the other party "needs to know" is presented and thus there is no access control to be exercised on which ACs should be made available to AC users." 4. Page 5. Section 1.2. This section is too much oriented towards the benefits of the "pull", whereas "push" is much better. In order to correct this, it is proposed to add the following sentence after the second paragraph. "A major drawback of the "pull" model is that it may require to exercise an access control service to decide which ACs can be pulled by access control decision functions. It is also less suitable for some inter-domain cases where the client's right should be assigned in the client's domain, rather than within the server's domain." 5. Page 6. Client definition. This definition should be modified to indicate that it is specific to connection mode and access control. Proposal: In a connection mode, the entity which is requesting the action for which access control is being exercised. 6. Page 6. Server definition. This definition should be modified to indicate that it is specific to connection mode and access control. Proposal: In a connection mode, the entity which requires access control to be enforced. 7. Page 6. Section 3. The section called "requirements" is confusing. This seems more a list of design goals, rather than requirements. Maybe the real question is whether this section should be called design goals or conformance clauses, ... or even something else ? A related question : is this section really needed ? 8. Page 6. Section 3. Time/validity requirements: If this is to be interpreted as a conformance clause, then in many contexts, short lived ACs are sufficient. Using CRLs or OCSP responses for attribute certificates makes a much more complicated implementation. The standard should thus mandate support for short-lived ACs, but not for long-lived ACs whether it is applicable to AC issuers or AC verifiers. Change the sentence into: Support for short-lived ACs is required for both AC issuers and AC verifiers. If this is to be interpreted as a design goal, then the text should read: "ACs should be able to be used to carry short-term attributes as well as long-term attributes. 9. Page 10. Section 4.2.2. Holder. First sentence. We should RECOMMEND the use of the baseCertificateID and in the conformance clause mandate its support. Proposed rewording. Instead of: "... the holder field SHOULD use the baseCertificateID " replace with "... the use of the baseCertificate in the holder field is RECOMMENDED." 10. Page 11. Section 4.2.2. After the third paragraph of this page, add: "See the security consideration section which mentions some name collision problems that may arise when using the entityName option." 11. Page 11. Section 4.2.2. After the previous addition, add: " Implementations conforming to this profile are not required to support the use of the entityName field." 12. Page 12. Section 4.2.6. Greenwich Mean Time does not exist anymore and has been replaced by UTC. BTW, UTC and GMT mean the same time, but standards should reference UTC. 13. Page 12. Section 4.2.6. Last sentence at the bottom, which says :"AC users MUST be able to handle an AC which, at the time of processing, has its entire validity period in the future (a post-dated AC).". The sentence should be expanded to cover the case of old ACs as well. Proposal: :"AC users MUST be able to handle an AC which, at the time of processing, has parts of its validity period or all its validity period in the past or in the future (a post-dated AC)". 14. Page 12. Section 4.2.9. The first sentence says: "The extensions field generally gives information about the AC as opposed to information about the AC holder". The first extension on the next page negates this statement. It is proposed to replace the sentence by the following: "The extensions field gives information either about the use of the AC, the AA or about the AC holder". 15. Page 15. Section 4.3.2. I could not understand the sentence : "The targetCert CHOICE is only present ..." since in the syntax there is no CHOICE. 16. Page 17. Section 4.3.6. No Revocation Available. I would move this extension in a new section 4.2.10 so that we can mandate the support of that extension for conforming implementations, since this is what section 6 mandates. I would add: "Implementations conforming to this profile are required to support the use of the noRevAvail extension." 17. Page 17. Section 4.4. Attribute types. I would prefer to rename that section "Useful Attribute types" to show better that none needed to be supported. 18. Page 17. Section 4.4. About the IetfAttrSyntax. The use of policyAuthority is interesting. However, there is a potential security risk here. When using GeneralNames (without further restrictions) there is no guarantee that the name of the policy authority is understood in the same way by various AAs and AC users. Also a name could be re-used creating some ambiguities. A name that is unique and cannot be re-used is required for secure implementations. An OID fulfils this requirement. A URN does not since the same name can be resold to another organization (and thus be re-used). When this field is present, it is thus proposed to RECOMMEND (or mandate ?) the inclusion of an OID in GeneralNames to point to the organization and allow the addition of a DN or a URN that may be used as an *hint* to know the name of the organization. 19. Page 18. Section 4.4.1. Service Authentication Information . This attribute definition should be moved in section 7.1 since it is an encrypted attribute. 20. Page 18. Section 4.4.2. Access identity. The name is confusing. Use "Service Identification" instead of Access Identity would be much better. An Access Identity is an identity that is understandable by any service, which is not the case here. Define SvceAuthInfo here since Service Authentication Information should be moved in section 7.1. 21. Page 19. Section 4.4.5. Role. I do not see the rational for some limitations that are introduced here. The text states: RoleSyntax ::= SEQUENCE { roleAuthority [0] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, roleName [1] GeneralName } The roleAuthority field MUST NOT be used. The roleName field MUST be present, and roleName MUST use the uniformResourceIdentifier CHOICE of the GeneralName. Why must the roleAuthority field NOT be used ? Why must the roleName use the uniformResourceIdentifier CHOICE ? Why is the case of the roleAuthority different from the policyAuthority ? 22. Page 22. Section 5. Typo: "timelyand" 23. Page 23. Section 6. Why making crlDistributionPoints, authorityInformationAccess mutually exclusive ? For PKCs we allow both. So why should we make that restriction for AC ? I would like to get the rational. Denis Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA12455 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 08:25:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id RAA12429; Thu, 25 May 2000 17:32:39 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Thu, 25 May 2000 17:32:40 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id RAA12071; Thu, 25 May 2000 17:32:38 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id RAA03541; Thu, 25 May 2000 17:32:38 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 17:32:38 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005251532.RAA03541@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, kent@bbn.com Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Steve, Hm, the actual text says: 'strictly monotonical increasing'. At least the example in the text about non-consecutive number is there. What you are asking for is to create consecutive time stamps. What you indicate is not mentioned in the text at all in the text, maybe it was intended at some time (the usage of 'monotonically incrementing' may be an indication). Maybe the original author's can comment on that. Your point is an interesting one. This is ONE method, if a TSA is able and willing to increment by one, they can do that. But that doesn't help, a TSA can replace any stamp and then claim in 30 years that the key was corrupted. If you imagine the possibility not to trust the TSA,* then you might require that the TSA stores all stamps with a notary, or whatever else third/forth/fifth tp to store a complete archive of all tokens. > > >Peter, > > > >You are right. The name "serialNumber" in this context is > >misleading. I forgot to look backwards to find out the additional > >statements you mention. :-( > > > >The serialNumber field serves several purposes, one of them being to > >be used in conjunction with the DN to uniquely identify a TS token. > > > >We have added another constraint, i.e. monotonically increasing, > >that does not appear in other standards. This was done to save an > >additional parameter. The main idea was to be able to compare two > >time stamps issued during the same second. > > I think that is critical and there is another possible reason for > wanting the counter to be monotonically increasing. It helps detect > if a TSA tries to insert a late arriving hash into the time stamp > stream. If there are no sequence number gaps, there are no "hole" > into which a later arriving hash can be inserted. I assumed this was > another motivation. > > Steve > > Received: from mail.ec.auckland.ac.nz (mail.student.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.201]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA12331 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 08:23:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz (pgut001@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.36.13]) by mail.ec.auckland.ac.nz (8.9.3/8.8.6/cs-master) with SMTP id DAA21860; Fri, 26 May 2000 03:31:10 +1200 (NZST) (sender pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: by kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz (relaymail v0.9) id <95926866924313>; Fri, 26 May 2000 03:31:09 (NZST) From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, serafim@cripto.di.uminho.pt Subject: Re: ASN.1 OPTIONAL in TSA Sender: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Reply-To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz X-Charge-To: pgut001 X-Authenticated: relaymail v0.9 on kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 03:31:09 (NZST) Message-ID: <95926866924313@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz> "Serafim Gomes" <serafim@pobox.com> writes: >If we omit reqPolicy, how do we know that the field next to messageImprint is >Nonce?!! We donM-4t have tags like in Extension. Yes we do, reqPolicy is tagged as a SEQUENCE, nonce is tagged as an INTEGER (although it'd help to have the keyword capitalised to make this explicit). Peter. Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA11972 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 08:14:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.30.107] (comsec.bbn.com [171.78.30.107]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA04276; Thu, 25 May 2000 11:22:07 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220801b552da7671bf@[171.78.30.107]> In-Reply-To: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E294@seine.valicert.com> References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E294@seine.valicert.com> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 11:14:10 -0400 To: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Peter, >Steve: > >Perhaps comment. I'll respond to each point. > >(1) You should realize that the text I quoted, repeated below from your >reply, is from RFC 2459. Whoops, caught me on that one :-). > >(2) The text quoted is not some bullshit from Peter's English pen. Didn't say it was. > > (2.1) The text is the work of Ford et al., NIST/NSA, PKIX WG, > PKIX mailing list, IESG et al., and a PKIX WG and IETF Final >call. Guess I missed it the last time. And, the fact that I missed it probably says something about the level of scrutiny that one ought to assume despite the list you cite here. I know that the IESG members, other than the cognizant area director(s), do not, as a rule, read documents before approving them as RFCs. And, given the large number of WGs that each AD must cover, they often rely primarily on WG chairs and the WG process to ensure that the documents are reasonable. So, it would be erroneous to assume that the review process ensures that all the cited parties have read an RFC carefully prior to its publication. > > (2.2) The text has been present in the I-Ds leading to RFC 2459 from > very early moments of our mailing-list deliberations. I'll grant that it has probably been there for a long while. > >(3) You do not agree that the cited paragraph (from RFC 2459) represents >group consensus. That the same paragraph remains in son-of-2459 I-D is not >relevant to you, presumably. The fact that it currently is in the revised text is relevant to me, and I'll see if we can fix that now that you have pointed it out. (See the end of this message.) > >(4) You view the "supplement/replace" assumption stated by the authors >of RFC 2459, as stated in the 1st quoted sentence (from RFC 2459), >to be "out of the question". Yes, in my opinion, and in the opinion of at least one other WG member who cared to respond to your message. I'll ask Tim if he recalls where it came from. But the point is that it is an odd comment that seems out of place in a standards document of this sort. The fact that it was present and that I didn't notice it is a failure on my part, but that doesn't mean we can't fix it now. Many reviewers, myself included, probably focused on the technical details of 2459, e.g., syntax and processing rules, rather than this context-setting text. X.509 and other standards have been published with errors that have later been fixed. That's what the defect report process is about. Here we're dealing with two distinct sentences, each with different problems. The first, as noted above, strikes me as completely inappropriate for a standard. The second is confusing. Presumably it can be clarified, and then we can debate whether it should be in the RFC. > >(5) You view the second sentence of the same quote (from RFC 2459) as >"confusing." Yes, for exactly the reason I cited. > >(6) And...despite your repeated misdirections as chair, you will perhaps >now agree that Peter did not write a word of the cited text that you >criticise so severely. THIS WG wrote and reviewed the text... You're right that I assumed you were the author, and I'll admit that my criticism was probably heightened by that thought :-). However, if the criticism is valid, we should address it, irrespective of authorship. Let's be accurate about this Peter. WG's don't write text. Authors write text. In the case of any large document with many listed authors there are lots of opportunities for details to not be carefully reviewed. We have uncovered a number of such details in 2459. I'm certain that several, perhaps most, of the long list of authors of 2459 have NOT reviewed MOST of the text for a long time. Tim is the one individual who, as the editor, has the best chance of keeping on top of the document. > >(7) The text, which was discussed in mailing list discussions, also >passed Final Call in both PKIX WG and IETF Final Call. See comments above. > >(8) IETF Final call is a conventional signal of consensus. But perhaps >not in PKIX WG, under the rules of our chairs. The IETF last call is the means by which the IETF notifies interested parties that a document is about to become a standard, unless someone raises objections. To the extent that consent by abstaining is consensus, then you're right, since that is what happens for most documents and most members of the IETF. Personally, I have used the last call to trigger reading of documents that I was not tracking, and I have made suggestions to the IESG re changes to such documents. Sometimes my proposed changes have been adopted, sometime not. In at least two cases where I did not prevail, the matter was one of technical accuracy and my objections were overruled despite being objectively correct. So, the process is far from perfect. > >(9) The use of quote symbols around text is an accepted practice to >denote a quotation. > > >(10) The appendage of [RFC 2459, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt] after >a quoted passage represents an accepted practice to clearly identify the >source of a quotation. I missed that, obviously. So, where are we now? Well, I stand by my objections to the text. It is inappropriate to have inserted the first sentence into a standard, and I now propose to the WG that we remove it. The second part also strikes me as very sloppy, for exactly the reasons I cited. So, I propose removing it as well, unless someone can clarify the meaning, and then justify why it is present. Presumably you don't argue that just because we published this text before that it is perfect. To do so would suggest that we ought not be making all the other changes to 2459 that we have so far. The only question now is whether the WG wants to retain this text, expressing such a desire via a positive action (vs. silent assent) or if the WG is willing to strike it. Steve Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA11663 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 08:08:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA31576; Thu, 25 May 2000 17:15:06 +0200 Message-ID: <392D437D.B7B1C2F7@bull.net> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 17:15:09 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> CC: WFord@verisign.com, kent@bbn.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB8A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <14637.14460.418872.887051@xedia.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Paul and others, Some major details: 1) I would propose to add an "s" to "certificate policy" making it "certificate policies". In RFC 2459 we have: 4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or more policy information terms, each of which consists of an object identifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. 2) In the same way, I would add an "s" to "CPS" making it "CPSs". 3) Finally, since the verification is not uniform, I would also add an "s" to "verification". The final sentence would thus look like: "The precise nature of the verifications is detailed in the certificate policies and/or the CPSs." 4) ... and a comment on the use of "definitively": We were looking for text replacement related only to the subject alternative name section 4.2.1.7. Now the sentence has been extended to cover parameters like "all other fields in a certificate" and "all certificate extensions". So "definitively" also applies to them now, and this is wrong. I would thus propose to delete the sentence "like all other fields in a certificate and all certificate extensions," and thus keep the idea from RFC 2459, where only the subject alternative name is considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, which was: Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, all parts of the subject alternative name MUST be verified by the CA. The new text would thus look like: Denis> "The subject alternative name is considered to Denis> be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST Denis> verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative Denis> names. The precise nature of the verifications is detailed in Denis> the certificate policies and/or the CPSs." Denis > Echoing Paul Hoffman's comment... I find Steve's text to be > preferable. For one thing, retaining "definitively" seems a good > thing to do. > paul Warwick> "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a Warwick> certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered to Warwick> be bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST verify (in Warwick> accordance with the applicable certificate policy and/or the Warwick> CPS) all subject alternative names." Steve> "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a Steve> certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered to Steve> be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST Steve> verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative Steve> names. The precise nature of the verification is detailed in Steve> the certificate policy and/or the CPS." Received: from e2.ny.us.ibm.com (e2.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.102]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA11125 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 07:54:04 -0700 (PDT) From: tgindin@us.ibm.com Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.22]) by e2.ny.us.ibm.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA291534; Thu, 25 May 2000 10:59:03 -0400 Received: from D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com (d51mta04.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.32]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.8.8m3/NCO v4.9) with SMTP id LAA139492; Thu, 25 May 2000 11:00:40 -0400 Received: by D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568EA.0052751A ; Thu, 25 May 2000 11:00:39 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: IBMUS To: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> cc: "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-ID: <852568EA.00527365.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 11:00:31 -0400 Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline I agree that the text you cite is in RFC 2459, and presumably represents WG consensus. However, I don't think that what it says is quite what you seem to think it means. First, the statement that communities may replace the profile would appear to be a recognition that the basic standard involved here is X.509 and a community may well find it appropriate to build their own profile directly from X.509 without using the PKIX profile, in which case no question of conformity to PKIX can arise. Second, a community may supplement the profile. A new profile may certainly be created from this one by adding new features using one of the extensible mechanisms (extensions, attributes, OTHER-NAME's, etc.) or by imposing constraints not found in this profile (such as limitations on the range of DN attributes or the allowable types of alternate name). Taking one of the explicit requirements of this profile (say, that private key usage period MUST NOT be critical) and eliminating it is not supplementing the profile, but dispensing from specific requirements within it. Building a new profile by doing this might well be valid, but the resulting profile would not be conformant to RFC 2459 or a supplement to RFC 2459, and should not be described as such. Tom Gindin Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> on 05/24/2000 10:46:20 PM To: "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com> cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Steve: Perhaps comment. (1) You should realize that the text I quoted, repeated below from your reply, is from RFC 2459. (2) The text quoted is not some bullshit from Peter's English pen. (2.1) The text is the work of Ford et al., NIST/NSA, PKIX WG, PKIX mailing list, IESG et al., and a PKIX WG and IETF Final call. (2.2) The text has been present in the I-Ds leading to RFC 2459 from very early moments of our mailing-list deliberations. (3) You do not agree that the cited paragraph (from RFC 2459) represents group consensus. That the same paragraph remains in son-of-2459 I-D is not relevant to you, presumably. (4) You view the "supplement/replace" assumption stated by the authors of RFC 2459, as stated in the 1st quoted sentence (from RFC 2459), to be "out of the question". (5) You view the second sentence of the same quote (from RFC 2459) as "confusing." (6) And...despite your repeated misdirections as chair, you will perhaps now agree that Peter did not write a word of the cited text that you criticise so severely. THIS WG wrote and reviewed the text... (7) The text, which was discussed in mailing list discussions, also passed Final Call in both PKIX WG and IETF Final Call. (8) IETF Final call is a conventional signal of consensus. But perhaps not in PKIX WG, under the rules of our chairs. (9) The use of quote symbols around text is an accepted practice to denote a quotation. (10) The appendage of [RFC 2459, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt] after a quoted passage represents an accepted practice to clearly identify the source of a quotation. Peter. -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 8:42 AM To: Peter Williams Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Peter, > "Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this > profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application > domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or > operational requirements. However, for basic applications, common > representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that > application developers can obtain necessary information without > regard to the issuer of a particular certificate or certificate revo- > cation list (CRL)." [RFC 2459, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt] > >Do you affirm the above to be group consensus? No, I do not agree. It seems out of place to insert text into a standard saying that "we understand if you don't want to use this standard." So the first sentence is out of the question. The second sentence confuses me. What do you mean by "common representations of frequently used attributes?" The "representation" of an attribute is its syntax, which is certainly part of the standard, but not the focus of this discussion. Steve Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA10541 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 07:34:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.30.107] (comsec.bbn.com [171.78.30.107]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA28076; Thu, 25 May 2000 10:42:08 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220803b552eb215c38@[171.78.30.107]> In-Reply-To: <392D34FD.30E26C84@bull.net> References: <200005251159.NAA03472@emeriau.edelweb.fr> <392D34FD.30E26C84@bull.net> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 10:41:28 -0400 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Denis, >Peter, > >You are right. The name "serialNumber" in this context is >misleading. I forgot to look backwards to find out the additional >statements you mention. :-( > >The serialNumber field serves several purposes, one of them being to >be used in conjunction with the DN to uniquely identify a TS token. > >We have added another constraint, i.e. monotonically increasing, >that does not appear in other standards. This was done to save an >additional parameter. The main idea was to be able to compare two >time stamps issued during the same second. I think that is critical and there is another possible reason for wanting the counter to be monotonically increasing. It helps detect if a TSA tries to insert a late arriving hash into the time stamp stream. If there are no sequence number gaps, there are no "hole" into which a later arriving hash can be inserted. I assumed this was another motivation. Steve Received: from nemesio.ci.uminho.pt (nemesio.ci.uminho.pt [193.136.16.244]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA10238 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 07:27:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from cripto20 (shannon.di.uminho.pt [193.136.20.84] (may be forged)) by nemesio.ci.uminho.pt (8.8.7/8.8.7) with ESMTP id PAA07674 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 15:28:37 +0100 From: "Serafim Gomes" <serafim@pobox.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 15:30:22 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Subject: ASN.1 OPTIONAL in TSA Reply-to: serafim@cripto.di.uminho.pt Message-ID: <392D470E.10721.8D4D4C@localhost> Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from Quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id HAA10241 How can we distinguish the OPTIÕNAL fields if they are not present? TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE { version Integer { v1(1) }, messageImprint MessageImprint, --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be --time stamped reqPolicy PolicyInformation OPTIONAL, nonce Integer OPTIONAL, certReq BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extensions [0] Extensions OPTIONAL } If we omit reqPolicy, how do we know that the field next to messageImprint is Nonce?!! We don´t have tags like in Extension. I'm working in JAVA with the IAIK package, does anyone work with this package? -- Serafim Gomes serafim@pobox.com telm: +351 - 938421578 telf: +351-253548100 http://www.pobox.com/~serafim Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA09968 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 07:22:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiqsf01703; Thu, 25 May 2000 14:28:13 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA07206; Thu, 25 May 00 10:24:46 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id KAA11837; Thu, 25 May 2000 10:28:12 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14637.14460.418872.887051@xedia.com> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 10:28:12 -0400 (EDT) To: WFord@verisign.com Cc: kent@bbn.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB8A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid Echoing Paul Hoffman's comment... I find Steve's text to be preferable. For one thing, retaining "definitively" seems a good thing to do. paul >>>>> "Warwick" == Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> writes: Warwick> With Steve's concurrence, I propose the following modified Warwick> wording to the clause of concern: Warwick> "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a Warwick> certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered to Warwick> be bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST verify (in Warwick> accordance with the applicable certificate policy and/or the Warwick> CPS) all subject alternative names." Steve> I worry that we are unduly singling out this attribute, even Steve> though ALL the attributes have the same sort of Steve> requirement. How about: Steve> "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a Steve> certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered to Steve> be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST Steve> verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative Steve> names. The precise nature of the verification is detailed in Steve> the certificate policy and/or the CPS." Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA09659 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 07:14:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiqsf24291; Thu, 25 May 2000 14:21:35 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA07102; Thu, 25 May 00 10:18:07 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id KAA11798; Thu, 25 May 2000 10:21:33 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14637.14061.749288.318400@xedia.com> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 10:21:33 -0400 (EDT) To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <95917836715346@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz> <392CE49B.BF9C4E9C@bull.net> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Denis" == Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> writes: Denis> Peter, This issue is not specific to the TSP. Denis> RFC 2459 does not include any text about the size of serial Denis> number. Denis> The draft draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt proposes an upper Denis> limit of 20 bytes. So you should also complain in the same way Denis> for that draft. :-) Denis> So there are two options: Denis> 1) Provide an upper limit, or 2) Provide a warning, without Denis> any limit (as you have suggested). Denis> I would, personally, prefer the former since, in practice, Denis> implementors will have to use an upper limit. Why? If it's just a unique ID, then the only meaningful operation on it is memcmp() for which a tightly bounded size is not at all needed. paul Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA09456 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 07:12:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiqsf22238; Thu, 25 May 2000 14:19:43 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA07065; Thu, 25 May 00 10:16:15 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id KAA11796; Thu, 25 May 2000 10:19:42 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14637.13949.941475.89950@xedia.com> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 10:19:41 -0400 (EDT) To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <200005241622.SAA03150@emeriau.edelweb.fr> <392CD797.FE37732F@bull.net> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Denis" == Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> writes: Denis> Folks, Do not ask more than what RFC 2459 is saying about the Denis> serial number from a public key certificate; Denis> Extract from RFC 2459 page 18, section 4.1.2.2: Denis> The serial number is an integer assigned by the CA to each Denis> certificate. It MUST be unique for each certificate issued by Denis> a given CA (i.e., the issuer name and serial number identify a Denis> unique certificate). Denis> The same field in a TS token serves the same purpose. There is Denis> no notion of sequentiality. Maybe we should have called it Denis> unique number. This has not been done since we wanted to Denis> maintain consistancy with ISO. In order to maintain Denis> consistancy between standards, it would not be appropriate to Denis> change the name and/or the concept. Ok, if uniqueness is the requirement to be satisfied, then that is what should be required of the number in question. And yes, in that case it really should be called "Unique number" or "Unique ID". The fact that ISO calls it something else is not important in my view; the fact that someone uses a misleading term is not good reason for others to copy that mistake. But if we keep the misleading term, the least that is needed is a note right next to its definition that says "we call it this only for compatibility with ISO; it actually is only a unique ID. Values are not ordered in any way." paul Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA09042 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 07:06:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiqse14483; Thu, 25 May 2000 14:13:50 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA06999; Thu, 25 May 00 10:10:22 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id KAA11794; Thu, 25 May 2000 10:13:49 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14637.13596.701054.240210@xedia.com> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 10:13:48 -0400 (EDT) To: peterw@valicert.com Cc: kent@bbn.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E294@seine.valicert.com> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Peter" == Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> writes: Peter> Steve: Peter> Perhaps comment. Peter> (1) You should realize that the text I quoted, repeated below Peter> from your reply, is from RFC 2459. ... Peter> (6) And...despite your repeated misdirections as chair, you Peter> will perhaps now agree that Peter did not write a word of the Peter> cited text that you criticise so severely. THIS WG wrote and Peter> reviewed the text... >> "Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, >> this profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized >> application domains or environments with additional authorization, >> assurance, or operational requirements. However, for basic >> applications, common representations of frequently used attributes >> are defined so that application developers can obtain necessary >> information without regard to the issuer of a particular >> certificate or certificate revo- cation list (CRL)." [RFC 2459, >> http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt] That's all very nice, but I don't see any reason to disagree with Steve's basic objection -- which is that it doesn't make much sense in a standard to say "of course implementations are free not to conform to the standard". That's true, obvious, and irrelevant. I wonder why that text ever made it into this RFC. paul Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA09017 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 07:06:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA31598; Thu, 25 May 2000 16:13:14 +0200 Message-ID: <392D34FD.30E26C84@bull.net> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 16:13:17 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <200005251159.NAA03472@emeriau.edelweb.fr> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Peter, You are right. The name "serialNumber" in this context is misleading. I forgot to look backwards to find out the additional statements you mention. :-( The serialNumber field serves several purposes, one of them being to be used in conjunction with the DN to uniquely identify a TS token. We have added another constraint, i.e. monotonically increasing, that does not appear in other standards. This was done to save an additional parameter. The main idea was to be able to compare two time stamps issued during the same second. An implementation could use a concatenation of a time (up to the second granularity) and a counter. The counter may be preset to any value when starting a new second, then incremented using some fixed value, and make sure that the counter cannot overflow within one second. Since I do not know today a server recovering from a deep crash in one second, there should be no problem. When such a recovery time will happen, the TSA functionality could possibly wait for one second. Note that in that case the use of a hash function is far less obvious than before and a limit 128 bits would probably be much more than needed. Denis > Denis, > > > > > A monotonically increasing serial number for all time is not > > REQUIRED. See my previous response to Peter Sylvester. > > This is exactly the contrary of what is defined. > > See below (the first X* should be like the second one). > > 2.1. Requirements of the TSA > > The TSA is REQUIRED: > > 1. to use a trustworthy source of time. > > 2. to include a trustworthy time value for each time stamp token. > > 3. to include a monotonically incrementing integer for each > XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX > newly generated time stamp token. > > ..... > > The serialNumber field shall include a strictly monotonically > XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX > > increasing integer from one TimeStampToken to the next (e.g. 45, 236, > XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX YYYYYYYY > 245, 1023, ...). > YYYYYYYYYYYYYY > This guarantees that each token is unique and allows > to compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA. This is > useful in particular when two time stamps from the same TSA bear the > same time. This field also provides the way to build a unique > identifier to reference the token. It should be noticed that the > monotonic property must remain valid even after a possible > interruption (e.g. crash) of the service. > > > > > However, your concern on how to recover from a situation where the > > serial number is lost due to equipment failure is valid. The concern > > is to make sure to have no duplicate when re-starting the service. > > There are several ways to solve this issue. > Indeed. > This is implementation > > details that should not appear in an RFC. > Some hints about possible ways to do this can be given as examples. > > > > > As an example, you can use a concatenation of a time on 32 (or 33) > > bits and a random number. In this way, when you recover from a > > crash, at least one second has elapsed and there is no problem. > How do you avoid a duplicate random number in the same interval. > > > > > You can use the result of a hash applied to a concatenation of a > > time on 32 (or 33) bits and a random number. The risk of collisions > > is low if keep around 2 ^64 time stamps. > > How would you compare two time stamps in this case? > > Regards > > Received: from mail.rdc1.md.home.com (imail@ha1.rdc1.md.home.com [24.2.2.66]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA08184 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 06:24:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from home.com ([24.4.133.54]) by mail.rdc1.md.home.com (InterMail vM.4.01.02.00 201-229-116) with ESMTP id <20000525133206.REMG23916.mail.rdc1.md.home.com@home.com>; Thu, 25 May 2000 06:32:06 -0700 Message-ID: <392D2ACB.DA02D7CD@home.com> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 09:29:47 -0400 From: Al Arsenault <awa1@home.com> Organization: @Home Network X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en]C-AtHome0407 (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Christopher Williams <ccwilliams@ntlworld.com> CC: PKIX Mailing List <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: What is the meaning of the "indirectCRL" flag References: <001f01bfc648$b29d4720$0100a8c0@darxstar> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Christopher: An "indirect CRL" is a CRL issued by an entity other than the one that issued the certificate(s) on the CRL. The relevance of this flag is mostly explained in section 5.3.4, namely 5.3.4 Certificate Issuer This CRL entry extension identifies the certificate issuer associated with an entry in an indirect CRL, i.e. a CRL that has the indirectCRL indicator set in its issuing distribution point extension. If this extension is not present on the first entry in an indirect CRL, the certificate issuer defaults to the CRL issuer. On subsequent entries in an indirect CRL, if this extension is not present, the certificate issuer for the entry is the same as that for the preceding entry. That is, the indirectCRL flag is used in combination with the Certificate Issuer Extension to let you know that the issuer of the certs in a CRL was different from the issuer of the CRL, and who it was. (Normally, only the entity that issued the certificate is allowed to revoke it; otherwise, you open yourself up to a nice denial of service attack. However, if you control it properly, this can be a nice revocation management feature.) Al Arsenault Chief Security Architect Diversinet Corp. Christopher Williams wrote: > > RFC2459, section 5.2.5 "Issuing Distribution Point" mentions an indirectCRL > flag, but does not give its significance. Does anybody know? > > Christopher Williams > > Software engineer, NetLexis Ltd. > Solutions for secure electronic commerce > http://www.netlexis.com Received: from mta01-svc.server.ntlworld.com (mta01-svc.ntlworld.com [62.253.162.41]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FAA07289 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 05:45:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from darxstar ([62.252.196.132]) by mta01-svc.server.ntlworld.com (InterMail vM.4.01.02.27 201-229-119-110) with SMTP id <20000525125255.UBDK381.mta01-svc.server.ntlworld.com@darxstar> for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 13:52:55 +0100 Message-ID: <001f01bfc648$b29d4720$0100a8c0@darxstar> From: "Christopher Williams" <ccwilliams@ntlworld.com> To: "PKIX Mailing List" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: What is the meaning of the "indirectCRL" flag Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 13:56:38 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 RFC2459, section 5.2.5 "Issuing Distribution Point" mentions an indirectCRL flag, but does not give its significance. Does anybody know? Christopher Williams Software engineer, NetLexis Ltd. Solutions for secure electronic commerce http://www.netlexis.com Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id EAA04882 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 04:52:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id NAA07609; Thu, 25 May 2000 13:59:44 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Thu, 25 May 2000 13:59:44 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id NAA10613; Thu, 25 May 2000 13:59:43 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id NAA03472; Thu, 25 May 2000 13:59:42 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 13:59:42 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005251159.NAA03472@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Denis, > > A monotonically increasing serial number for all time is not > REQUIRED. See my previous response to Peter Sylvester. This is exactly the contrary of what is defined. See below (the first X* should be like the second one). 2.1. Requirements of the TSA The TSA is REQUIRED: 1. to use a trustworthy source of time. 2. to include a trustworthy time value for each time stamp token. 3. to include a monotonically incrementing integer for each XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX newly generated time stamp token. ..... The serialNumber field shall include a strictly monotonically XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX increasing integer from one TimeStampToken to the next (e.g. 45, 236, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX YYYYYYYY 245, 1023, ...). YYYYYYYYYYYYYY This guarantees that each token is unique and allows to compare the ordering of two time stamps from the same TSA. This is useful in particular when two time stamps from the same TSA bear the same time. This field also provides the way to build a unique identifier to reference the token. It should be noticed that the monotonic property must remain valid even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) of the service. > > However, your concern on how to recover from a situation where the > serial number is lost due to equipment failure is valid. The concern > is to make sure to have no duplicate when re-starting the service. > There are several ways to solve this issue. Indeed. This is implementation > details that should not appear in an RFC. Some hints about possible ways to do this can be given as examples. > > As an example, you can use a concatenation of a time on 32 (or 33) > bits and a random number. In this way, when you recover from a > crash, at least one second has elapsed and there is no problem. How do you avoid a duplicate random number in the same interval. > > You can use the result of a hash applied to a concatenation of a > time on 32 (or 33) bits and a random number. The risk of collisions > is low if keep around 2 ^64 time stamps. How would you compare two time stamps in this case? Regards Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA23652 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 01:23:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA21080; Thu, 25 May 2000 10:30:18 +0200 Message-ID: <392CE49B.BF9C4E9C@bull.net> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 10:30:19 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <95917836715346@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Peter, This issue is not specific to the TSP. RFC 2459 does not include any text about the size of serial number. The draft draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt proposes an upper limit of 20 bytes. So you should also complain in the same way for that draft. :-) So there are two options: 1) Provide an upper limit, or 2) Provide a warning, without any limit (as you have suggested). I would, personally, prefer the former since, in practice, implementors will have to use an upper limit. You should also notice that the document does not specify the use of a hash. The hash is only one of many ways to generate serial numbers. Since this is invisible to the outside world, TSAs can do what they think is appropriate (and cannot be mandated to use SHA-2). Denis > >I understand that using 20 octects allows to use the result of a hash function > >and thus does not mandate any sequentiality. It also has the further benefit > >to hide the number of time stamps generated. > > Limiting it to a current hash size may cause problems in the future, when SHA-2 > appears (accompanied by an edict that "All organisations shall transition to > use of SHA-2 by 2005") then the 20-byte upper limit is going to be a problem. > > Peter. Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA20256 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 00:44:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA20590; Thu, 25 May 2000 09:51:15 +0200 Message-ID: <392CDB75.2029E1F7@bull.net> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 09:51:17 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: William Lattin <wlattin@earthlink.net> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <000001bfc58e$594623a0$45e61b3f@winnt> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Bill, A monotonically increasing serial number for all time is not REQUIRED. See my previous response to Peter Sylvester. However, your concern on how to recover from a situation where the serial number is lost due to equipment failure is valid. The concern is to make sure to have no duplicate when re-starting the service. There are several ways to solve this issue. This is implementation details that should not appear in an RFC. As an example, you can use a concatenation of a time on 32 (or 33) bits and a random number. In this way, when you recover from a crash, at least one second has elapsed and there is no problem. You can use the result of a hash applied to a concatenation of a time on 32 (or 33) bits and a random number. The risk of collisions is low if keep around 2 ^64 time stamps. You can use a sequential number to derive from it (using some other stuff) the serial number. Storing that sequential number every day may allow you to make sure to have no duplicate (by skipping some of the numbers that would have been normaly generated). There are many other ways or variants, and we are not going to detail them. However, if you would like some additional text in the security considerations section to warn better implementors (without specifying how to meet the requirement), I would be ready to consider a proposal. Denis > Denis, > > The approach I suggested does allow for unique determination of a time > stamp, but to do so the validator must also have the certificate for the TSA > signature key. I don't think this is unreasonable since proper verification > should include this information. > > The issue I am attempting to address is the requirement for a monotonically > increasing serial number for all time. The draft does not address how to > recover from a situation where the serial number is lost due to equipment > failure. Such a failure is likely to occur at least once over all time :-). > The approach I suggest above does allow graceful recovery, since one could > generate a new TSA signature key and certificate and start again with a > reset counter. > > I strongly suggest that we consider the ramifications of trying to assure > seamless operation for all time. I don't think it is practical and we > should not design a standard requiring such. I am open to other solutions > if the above suggestion is perceived as too burdensome. > > Cheers, > > Bill > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > > Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 01:47 > > To: wlattin@earthlink.net > > Cc: 'pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz'; 'FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com'; > > 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field > > > > > > Bill, > > > > Your proposal would not allow to unambiguously distinguing two TS > > token using the TSA mane and the serialNumber. The same issue arises > > in other documents. For example, in draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt > > there is the following text. > > > > Given the uniqueness and timing requirements above serial numbers > > can be expected to contain long integers. AC users MUST be able to > > handle serialNumber values longer than 4 octets. Conformant ACs MUST > > NOT contain serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. > > > > We could take the text proposed by Peter, which is a good warning, > > but does not include an upper limit. > > I understand that using 20 octects allows to use the result of a > > hash function and thus does not mandate any sequentiality. It also > > has the further benefit to hide the number of time stamps generated. > > > > I would thus propose to have a text like: > > > > Given the uniqueness and timing requirements above serial numbers > > can be expected to contain long integers, TSA users MUST be able to > > handle serialNumber values longer than 4 octets. Conformant Time > > Stamps MUST NOT contain serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. > > > > Can we agree on this ? > > > > Denis > > > > > > > I think a better way to address this would be to reset the > > counter when the > > > TSA signature key pair is generated. This way, we could be > > more confident > > > that a 64-bit counter is sufficient, plus given the real world > > difficulties > > > of guaranteeing a monotonic counter for all time, this gives us a way to > > > recover from system failures. Linkage to the TSA signature key is a > > > natural delimiter since the counter would be unique per key and > > the stated > > > objective of the counter - to identify sequential time stamps containing > > > the same time - would still be still achieved. > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > Bill Lattin > > > TTFN Associates > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Peter Gutmann [SMTP:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz] > > > Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2000 8:37 PM > > > To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net; FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com > > > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > > Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field > > > > > > FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com writes: > > > > > > >To accomodate your issue we could add a comment in the ASN1 for the > > > >serialNumber saying: > > > > > > > >-- Time Stamps users must be ready to accomodate integers up > > to 64 bits. > > > > > > I think a more general way of putting this would be "...must be ready to > > > accomodate integers larger than the machine's native word size", which > > > warns > > > of potential problems without implying that there's some magic > > limit which > > > they can expect to find. Actually for anyone who's worked with certs on > > > any scale, the use of 128-bit and 160-bit "serial numbers" > > there should be > > > enough of a warning. > > > > > > Peter. > > Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA19044 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 25 May 2000 00:30:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA21146; Thu, 25 May 2000 09:34:45 +0200 Message-ID: <392CD797.FE37732F@bull.net> Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 09:34:47 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <200005241622.SAA03150@emeriau.edelweb.fr> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Folks, Do not ask more than what RFC 2459 is saying about the serial number from a public key certificate; Extract from RFC 2459 page 18, section 4.1.2.2: The serial number is an integer assigned by the CA to each certificate. It MUST be unique for each certificate issued by a given CA (i.e., the issuer name and serial number identify a unique certificate). The same field in a TS token serves the same purpose. There is no notion of sequentiality. Maybe we should have called it unique number. This has not been done since we wanted to maintain consistancy with ISO. In order to maintain consistancy between standards, it would not be appropriate to change the name and/or the concept. Denis > > I understand that using 20 octects allows to use the result of a > > hash function and thus does not mandate any sequentiality. It also > > has the further benefit to hide the number of time stamps generated. > > > > What do you mean by your first sentence 'sequentiality'? > I guess you mean contiguous 'no holes in the sequence'? > > Where is a hash in that scenario? > > The requirement is to have unique values AND and that the numbers > are ordered in time. > > An example is to make a concatenation of a binary time value > with some arbritrary precision, and a counter below like > a STCK instruction on IBMs, time with 2**-20 seconds + 12 bits > counter. > > > > Received: from hawk.prod.itd.earthlink.net (hawk.prod.itd.earthlink.net [207.217.120.22]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA07961 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 20:48:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from winnt (1Cust145.tnt31.sfo3.da.uu.net [63.28.86.145]) by hawk.prod.itd.earthlink.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id UAA01578; Wed, 24 May 2000 20:55:57 -0700 (PDT) From: "William Lattin" <wlattin@earthlink.net> To: "Peter Sylvester" <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr>, <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 20:57:03 -0700 Message-ID: <000101bfc5fd$495fb4f0$91561c3f@winnt> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 In-Reply-To: <200005241648.SAA03157@emeriau.edelweb.fr> Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600 Peter: > Strictly increasing does not mean that you cannot have holes. Agreed, but as written, one will have to pay carefull attention to ensure, in the event of a failure, a sufficiently large jump ahead is made to ensure a strictly increasing serial number. My suspicion is this will require a significant amount of work by humans. > > > The approach I suggested does allow for unique determination of a time > > stamp, but to do so the validator must also have the > certificate for the TSA > > signature key. I don't think this is unreasonable since proper > verification > > should include this information. > In 30 years the certificate used may have no value anymore. A validation > of the signature of the time stamp is only one method to validate it. > > The TSA has or should have to create logs of all time stamps, and it > or someone else may provide a service to validate a time stamp by > looking at the archive, in order to have at least two independant ways > of validation. > > Well, that's not the point. You may need then to define a mechanism that > compares two time stamps of *the same* authority with different > keys. It may also happen that two key/certs are used in a roll-over > situation with several servers in parallel. > There may be a variety of mechanisms to validate a time stamp. Your scenario in which the certificate has no value and one must trust a list created by a TSA is not a trust model to which I would subscribe. This is an implementation detail, however, so we don't need to resolve this here. Key transitions in server farms are also implementation details. Neither outright precludes the ability to use my suggested approach. > > > > The issue I am attempting to address is the requirement for a > monotonically > > increasing serial number for all time. The draft does not > address how to > > recover from a situation where the serial number is lost due to > equipment > > failure. Such a failure is likely to occur at least once over > all time :-). > > The approach I suggest above does allow graceful recovery, > since one could > > generate a new TSA signature key and certificate and start again with a > > reset counter. > > > > I strongly suggest that we consider the ramifications of trying > to assure > > seamless operation for all time. I don't think it is practical and we > > should not design a standard requiring such. I am open to > other solutions > > if the above suggestion is perceived as too burdensome. > > You can still do this if you include a time value in the number. > True enough. At the end of the day, both techniques will work. IMHO, the approach I've suggested would seem to provide a cleaner and more complete audit trail of TSA time stamps. The validation step does not require verification that the strictly increasing hole was indeed that. I rest here. If others don't really view this as an issue then let the current text stand. Cheers, Bill Received: from seine.valicert.com (corporate-gw.valicert.com [63.65.221.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id TAA00606 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 19:44:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: by seine.valicert.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LS0CRKFX>; Wed, 24 May 2000 19:46:21 -0700 Message-ID: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E294@seine.valicert.com> From: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> To: "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 19:46:20 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Steve: Perhaps comment. (1) You should realize that the text I quoted, repeated below from your reply, is from RFC 2459. (2) The text quoted is not some bullshit from Peter's English pen. (2.1) The text is the work of Ford et al., NIST/NSA, PKIX WG, PKIX mailing list, IESG et al., and a PKIX WG and IETF Final call. (2.2) The text has been present in the I-Ds leading to RFC 2459 from very early moments of our mailing-list deliberations. (3) You do not agree that the cited paragraph (from RFC 2459) represents group consensus. That the same paragraph remains in son-of-2459 I-D is not relevant to you, presumably. (4) You view the "supplement/replace" assumption stated by the authors of RFC 2459, as stated in the 1st quoted sentence (from RFC 2459), to be "out of the question". (5) You view the second sentence of the same quote (from RFC 2459) as "confusing." (6) And...despite your repeated misdirections as chair, you will perhaps now agree that Peter did not write a word of the cited text that you criticise so severely. THIS WG wrote and reviewed the text... (7) The text, which was discussed in mailing list discussions, also passed Final Call in both PKIX WG and IETF Final Call. (8) IETF Final call is a conventional signal of consensus. But perhaps not in PKIX WG, under the rules of our chairs. (9) The use of quote symbols around text is an accepted practice to denote a quotation. (10) The appendage of [RFC 2459, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt] after a quoted passage represents an accepted practice to clearly identify the source of a quotation. Peter. -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 8:42 AM To: Peter Williams Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Peter, > "Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this > profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application > domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or > operational requirements. However, for basic applications, common > representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that > application developers can obtain necessary information without > regard to the issuer of a particular certificate or certificate revo- > cation list (CRL)." [RFC 2459, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt] > >Do you affirm the above to be group consensus? No, I do not agree. It seems out of place to insert text into a standard saying that "we understand if you don't want to use this standard." So the first sentence is out of the question. The second sentence confuses me. What do you mean by "common representations of frequently used attributes?" The "representation" of an attribute is its syntax, which is certainly part of the standard, but not the focus of this discussion. Steve Received: from [165.227.249.13] (ip13.proper.com [165.227.249.13]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA11347 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 15:54:50 -0700 (PDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: phoffman@mail.imc.org Message-Id: <p04320330b5520fa30e02@[165.227.249.13]> In-Reply-To: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB8A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB8A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 16:02:02 -0700 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Paul Hoffman / IMC <phoffman@imc.org> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" I prefer Steve's wording to Warwick's. It is clearer and describes more of the limitations. At 1:48 PM -0700 5/24/00, Warwick Ford wrote: >With Steve's concurrence, I propose the following modified wording to the >clause of concern: > >"The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a certificate and >all certificate extensions, is considered to be bound to the public key. >Thus the CA MUST verify (in accordance with the applicable certificate >policy and/or the CPS) all subject alternative names." > >Warwick > >-----Original Message----- >From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] >Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 8:05 AM >To: Denis Pinkas >Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org >Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification > > >[snip] > >I worry that we are unduly singling out this attribute, even though >ALL the attributes have the same sort of requirement. How about: > >"The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a certificate >and all certificate extensions, is considered to be definitively >bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST verify (directly or >indirectly) all subject alternative names. The precise nature of the >verification is detailed in the certificate policy and/or the CPS." > >Steve Received: from eagle.verisign.com ([208.206.241.105]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA08476 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 13:42:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from postal-gw1.verisign.com (mailhost1.verisign.com [208.206.241.101]) by eagle.verisign.com (8.9.3/BCH1.7.1) with ESMTP id NAA27299; Wed, 24 May 2000 13:49:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: by postal-gw1.verisign.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <L3SVVAAM>; Wed, 24 May 2000 13:48:20 -0700 Message-ID: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB8A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> From: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> To: "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 13:48:19 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" With Steve's concurrence, I propose the following modified wording to the clause of concern: "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered to be bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST verify (in accordance with the applicable certificate policy and/or the CPS) all subject alternative names." Warwick -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 8:05 AM To: Denis Pinkas Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification [snip] I worry that we are unduly singling out this attribute, even though ALL the attributes have the same sort of requirement. How about: "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered to be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative names. The precise nature of the verification is detailed in the certificate policy and/or the CPS." Steve Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA02098 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 09:41:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id SAA22914; Wed, 24 May 2000 18:48:30 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Wed, 24 May 2000 18:48:31 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id SAA07186; Wed, 24 May 2000 18:48:28 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id SAA03157; Wed, 24 May 2000 18:48:28 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 18:48:28 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005241648.SAA03157@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, wlattin@earthlink.net Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Strictly increasing does not mean that you cannot have holes. > The approach I suggested does allow for unique determination of a time > stamp, but to do so the validator must also have the certificate for the TSA > signature key. I don't think this is unreasonable since proper verification > should include this information. In 30 years the certificate used may have no value anymore. A validation of the signature of the time stamp is only one method to validate it. The TSA has or should have to create logs of all time stamps, and it or someone else may provide a service to validate a time stamp by looking at the archive, in order to have at least two independant ways of validation. Well, that's not the point. You may need then to define a mechanism that compares two time stamps of *the same* authority with different keys. It may also happen that two key/certs are used in a roll-over situation with several servers in parallel. > > The issue I am attempting to address is the requirement for a monotonically > increasing serial number for all time. The draft does not address how to > recover from a situation where the serial number is lost due to equipment > failure. Such a failure is likely to occur at least once over all time :-). > The approach I suggest above does allow graceful recovery, since one could > generate a new TSA signature key and certificate and start again with a > reset counter. > > I strongly suggest that we consider the ramifications of trying to assure > seamless operation for all time. I don't think it is practical and we > should not design a standard requiring such. I am open to other solutions > if the above suggestion is perceived as too burdensome. You can still do this if you include a time value in the number. Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA01563 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 09:15:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id SAA22212; Wed, 24 May 2000 18:22:03 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Wed, 24 May 2000 18:22:03 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id SAA07063; Wed, 24 May 2000 18:22:00 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id SAA03150; Wed, 24 May 2000 18:22:00 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 18:22:00 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005241622.SAA03150@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: wlattin@earthlink.net, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org > I understand that using 20 octects allows to use the result of a > hash function and thus does not mandate any sequentiality. It also > has the further benefit to hide the number of time stamps generated. > What do you mean by your first sentence 'sequentiality'? I guess you mean contiguous 'no holes in the sequence'? Where is a hash in that scenario? The requirement is to have unique values AND and that the numbers are ordered in time. An example is to make a concatenation of a binary time value with some arbritrary precision, and a counter below like a STCK instruction on IBMs, time with 2**-20 seconds + 12 bits counter. Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA29711 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 08:33:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.30.107] (comsec.bbn.com [171.78.30.107]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA11740; Wed, 24 May 2000 11:40:47 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220802b551a7bc92e0@[171.78.30.107]> In-Reply-To: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28D@seine.valicert.com> References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28D@seine.valicert.com> Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 11:41:32 -0400 To: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Peter, > "Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this > profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application > domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or > operational requirements. However, for basic applications, common > representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that > application developers can obtain necessary information without > regard to the issuer of a particular certificate or certificate revo- > cation list (CRL)." [RFC 2459, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt] > >Do you affirm the above to be group consensus? No, I do not agree. It seems out of place to insert text into a standard saying that "we understand if you don't want to use this standard." So the first sentence is out of the question. The second sentence confuses me. What do you mean by "common representations of frequently used attributes?" The "representation" of an attribute is its syntax, which is certainly part of the standard, but not the focus of this discussion. Steve Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA28832 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 08:01:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.30.107] (comsec.bbn.com [171.78.30.107]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA06968; Wed, 24 May 2000 11:08:41 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220800b5519f0f9dde@[171.78.30.107]> In-Reply-To: <392B9313.B96DE3E5@bull.net> References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB5E@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <v04220811b54a0fdf6fcc@[128.33.238.33]> <3928F5A2.BF8B017B@bull.net> <v0422080ab55067a93675@[171.78.30.107]> <392B9313.B96DE3E5@bull.net> Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 11:05:24 -0400 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Denis, >Steve, > >Let us try now to agree on a text replacement. I have had some >private exchanges with Russ where I have proposed the following: > >The current text is as follows: > > Because the subject alternative name is considered to be > definitiviely bound to the public key, all parts of the subject > alternative name MUST be verified by the CA. > >Using a mixture of both texts, here *was* the proposal: > >Because the subject alternative name is considered to be >definitiviely bound to the public key, the CA is expected >to perform verification (directly or indirectly) for all >parts of the subject alternative name, leaving to the policy >and/or CPS to refine the level of verification performed. > >In order to incorporate a "MUST", I would propose the following: > >Because the subject alternative name is considered to be >definitiviely bound to the public key, the CA MUST >perform verification (directly or indirectly) for all >parts of the subject alternative name, leaving to the policy >and/or CPS to refine the level of verification performed. > >Can you agree on this ? I worry that we are unduly singling out this attribute, even though ALL the attributes have the same sort of requirement. How about: "The subject alternative name, like all other fields in a certificate and all certificate extensions, is considered to be definitively bound to the public key. Thus the CA MUST verify (directly or indirectly) all subject alternative names. The precise nature of the verification is detailed in the certificate policy and/or the CPS." Steve Received: from scaup.prod.itd.earthlink.net (scaup.prod.itd.earthlink.net [207.217.121.49]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA27900 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 07:34:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from winnt (1Cust69.tnt22.sfo3.da.uu.net [63.27.230.69]) by scaup.prod.itd.earthlink.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id HAA17538; Wed, 24 May 2000 07:41:50 -0700 (PDT) From: "William Lattin" <wlattin@earthlink.net> To: "Denis Pinkas" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 07:42:56 -0700 Message-ID: <000001bfc58e$594623a0$45e61b3f@winnt> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <392B9701.377C7F3D@bull.net> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600 Denis, The approach I suggested does allow for unique determination of a time stamp, but to do so the validator must also have the certificate for the TSA signature key. I don't think this is unreasonable since proper verification should include this information. The issue I am attempting to address is the requirement for a monotonically increasing serial number for all time. The draft does not address how to recover from a situation where the serial number is lost due to equipment failure. Such a failure is likely to occur at least once over all time :-). The approach I suggest above does allow graceful recovery, since one could generate a new TSA signature key and certificate and start again with a reset counter. I strongly suggest that we consider the ramifications of trying to assure seamless operation for all time. I don't think it is practical and we should not design a standard requiring such. I am open to other solutions if the above suggestion is perceived as too burdensome. Cheers, Bill > -----Original Message----- > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 01:47 > To: wlattin@earthlink.net > Cc: 'pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz'; 'FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com'; > 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field > > > Bill, > > Your proposal would not allow to unambiguously distinguing two TS > token using the TSA mane and the serialNumber. The same issue arises > in other documents. For example, in draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt > there is the following text. > > Given the uniqueness and timing requirements above serial numbers > can be expected to contain long integers. AC users MUST be able to > handle serialNumber values longer than 4 octets. Conformant ACs MUST > NOT contain serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. > > We could take the text proposed by Peter, which is a good warning, > but does not include an upper limit. > I understand that using 20 octects allows to use the result of a > hash function and thus does not mandate any sequentiality. It also > has the further benefit to hide the number of time stamps generated. > > I would thus propose to have a text like: > > Given the uniqueness and timing requirements above serial numbers > can be expected to contain long integers, TSA users MUST be able to > handle serialNumber values longer than 4 octets. Conformant Time > Stamps MUST NOT contain serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. > > Can we agree on this ? > > Denis > > > > I think a better way to address this would be to reset the > counter when the > > TSA signature key pair is generated. This way, we could be > more confident > > that a 64-bit counter is sufficient, plus given the real world > difficulties > > of guaranteeing a monotonic counter for all time, this gives us a way to > > recover from system failures. Linkage to the TSA signature key is a > > natural delimiter since the counter would be unique per key and > the stated > > objective of the counter - to identify sequential time stamps containing > > the same time - would still be still achieved. > > > > Cheers, > > > > Bill Lattin > > TTFN Associates > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Peter Gutmann [SMTP:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz] > > Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2000 8:37 PM > > To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net; FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com > > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field > > > > FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com writes: > > > > >To accomodate your issue we could add a comment in the ASN1 for the > > >serialNumber saying: > > > > > >-- Time Stamps users must be ready to accomodate integers up > to 64 bits. > > > > I think a more general way of putting this would be "...must be ready to > > accomodate integers larger than the machine's native word size", which > > warns > > of potential problems without implying that there's some magic > limit which > > they can expect to find. Actually for anyone who's worked with certs on > > any scale, the use of 128-bit and 160-bit "serial numbers" > there should be > > enough of a warning. > > > > Peter. > Received: from mail.ec.auckland.ac.nz (mail.student.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.201]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA27412 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 07:19:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz (pgut001@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.36.13]) by mail.ec.auckland.ac.nz (8.9.3/8.8.6/cs-master) with SMTP id CAA05677; Thu, 25 May 2000 02:26:07 +1200 (NZST) (sender pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: by kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz (relaymail v0.9) id <95917836715346>; Thu, 25 May 2000 02:26:07 (NZST) From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, wlattin@earthlink.net Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Sender: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Reply-To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz X-Charge-To: pgut001 X-Authenticated: relaymail v0.9 on kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz Date: Thu, 25 May 2000 02:26:07 (NZST) Message-ID: <95917836715346@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz> >I understand that using 20 octects allows to use the result of a hash function >and thus does not mandate any sequentiality. It also has the further benefit >to hide the number of time stamps generated. Limiting it to a current hash size may cause problems in the future, when SHA-2 appears (accompanied by an edict that "All organisations shall transition to use of SHA-2 by 2005") then the 20-byte upper limit is going to be a problem. Peter. Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA26950 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 06:58:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiqom03406; Wed, 24 May 2000 14:05:30 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA21749; Wed, 24 May 00 10:02:03 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id KAA09651; Wed, 24 May 2000 10:05:29 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14635.57768.828440.700171@xedia.com> Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 10:05:28 -0400 (EDT) To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <01BFC48F.976354A0.wlattin@earthlink.net> <392B9701.377C7F3D@bull.net> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Denis" == Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> writes: Denis> ... Denis> We could take the text proposed by Peter, which is a good Denis> warning, but does not include an upper limit. I understand Denis> that using 20 octects allows to use the result of a hash Denis> function and thus does not mandate any sequentiality. It also Denis> has the further benefit to hide the number of time stamps Denis> generated. Denis> I would thus propose to have a text like: Denis> Given the uniqueness and timing requirements above serial Denis> numbers can be expected to contain long integers, TSA users Denis> MUST be able to handle serialNumber values longer than 4 Denis> octets. Conformant Time Stamps MUST NOT contain serialNumber Denis> values longer than 20 octets. Sounds good. If the intent is to allow hash function outputs -- and that is a good feature -- then I question the use of the name "serial number". The problem with that name is that it implies sequentiality. If the only property required is uniqueness, then "Unique ID" is a better name. Incidentally, note that a 20 bytes hash function does not guarantee 2^160 unique values. By the birthday rule, you have a good chance of a duplicate after 2^80 values have been generated. So in fact it would be wise not to use such a hash for more than 2^64 or so values, which is fine since you're not going to go that high anyway in any plausible amount of time.... paul Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id CAA13095 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 02:29:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA15268; Wed, 24 May 2000 11:36:18 +0200 Message-ID: <392BA294.36A4E2F6@bull.net> Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 11:36:20 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol References: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BF9A@panda.chrysalis-its.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Francois, I realized that I ommited to reply to your E-mail. > Salut Denis, > > I do not remember if this issue was raised before, but in Section 2.2 the > following statement is made: > > "the requesting entity .... SHALL then verify the timeliness of the response > by verifying either the time included in the response against a local > trusted time reference, if one is available, and/or the value of the nonce > (large random number with a high probability that it is generated by the > client only once) included in the response against the value included in the > request." > > A nonce is normally used to detect attempts at replays, which is not > necessarily related to the timeliness of the response to a particular > request as mentioned here. > > The first part of the statement talks about verifying the time included in > the response against a locally trusted time source. This could used to > measure round trip path delay for calibration purposes, No. This is not the goal. The goal is to make sure that you have no replay, in particular on the same hash value. > but unless one could > be certain that the locally trusted source is as accurate as the TSA time > source (or, at least, that the difference between them is fixed and > well-known), I don't see how it would detect/prevent replays. Using a moving time window the caller remembers all the hashes he sent during that time window. If there is not the same hash value within that time window, then he makes sure that the time of the response is within the time window. If there is the same hash (a very rare situation), it is a little bit more complicated, and there are several options. Among them: using the nonce, or waiting until the time window has moved to come back to the previous case: only one hash value during that time window. But we are talking implementations details, which is not the topic of an RFC. > If one has > such a trusted time source locally, what is the point in using a TTP for > time stamping? The time is locally trusted, ... which does not mean that other people will trust that time. > > Could you please clarify the intent of this statement and if the intent is > to prevent replays or check the timeliness of responses or both? Now, that you have the explanations, if you still believe that the text is not clear enough, I suggest that you submit a proposal to clarify the text. Regards, Denis > > Francois > ___________________________________ > Francois Rousseau > Director of Standards and Conformance > Chrysalis-ITS > 1688 Woodward Drive > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA11360 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 01:40:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA20688; Wed, 24 May 2000 10:46:56 +0200 Message-ID: <392B9701.377C7F3D@bull.net> Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 10:46:57 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "wlattin@earthlink.net" <wlattin@earthlink.net> CC: "'pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz'" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "'FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com'" <FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com>, "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <01BFC48F.976354A0.wlattin@earthlink.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Bill, Your proposal would not allow to unambiguously distinguing two TS token using the TSA mane and the serialNumber. The same issue arises in other documents. For example, in draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt there is the following text. Given the uniqueness and timing requirements above serial numbers can be expected to contain long integers. AC users MUST be able to handle serialNumber values longer than 4 octets. Conformant ACs MUST NOT contain serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. We could take the text proposed by Peter, which is a good warning, but does not include an upper limit. I understand that using 20 octects allows to use the result of a hash function and thus does not mandate any sequentiality. It also has the further benefit to hide the number of time stamps generated. I would thus propose to have a text like: Given the uniqueness and timing requirements above serial numbers can be expected to contain long integers, TSA users MUST be able to handle serialNumber values longer than 4 octets. Conformant Time Stamps MUST NOT contain serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. Can we agree on this ? Denis > I think a better way to address this would be to reset the counter when the > TSA signature key pair is generated. This way, we could be more confident > that a 64-bit counter is sufficient, plus given the real world difficulties > of guaranteeing a monotonic counter for all time, this gives us a way to > recover from system failures. Linkage to the TSA signature key is a > natural delimiter since the counter would be unique per key and the stated > objective of the counter - to identify sequential time stamps containing > the same time - would still be still achieved. > > Cheers, > > Bill Lattin > TTFN Associates > > -----Original Message----- > From: Peter Gutmann [SMTP:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz] > Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2000 8:37 PM > To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net; FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field > > FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com writes: > > >To accomodate your issue we could add a comment in the ASN1 for the > >serialNumber saying: > > > >-- Time Stamps users must be ready to accomodate integers up to 64 bits. > > I think a more general way of putting this would be "...must be ready to > accomodate integers larger than the machine's native word size", which > warns > of potential problems without implying that there's some magic limit which > they can expect to find. Actually for anyone who's worked with certs on > any scale, the use of 128-bit and 160-bit "serial numbers" there should be > enough of a warning. > > Peter. Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA10234 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 24 May 2000 01:23:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA41882; Wed, 24 May 2000 10:30:09 +0200 Message-ID: <392B9313.B96DE3E5@bull.net> Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 10:30:11 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB5E@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <v04220811b54a0fdf6fcc@[128.33.238.33]> <3928F5A2.BF8B017B@bull.net> <v0422080ab55067a93675@[171.78.30.107]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Steve, Let us try now to agree on a text replacement. I have had some private exchanges with Russ where I have proposed the following: The current text is as follows: Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, all parts of the subject alternative name MUST be verified by the CA. Using a mixture of both texts, here *was* the proposal: Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, the CA is expected to perform verification (directly or indirectly) for all parts of the subject alternative name, leaving to the policy and/or CPS to refine the level of verification performed. In order to incorporate a "MUST", I would propose the following: Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitiviely bound to the public key, the CA MUST perform verification (directly or indirectly) for all parts of the subject alternative name, leaving to the policy and/or CPS to refine the level of verification performed. Can you agree on this ? Denis > Denis, > > >Let me extract two of your statements: > > > >(snip) > > > > > >Also, as both Denis and I pointed out, > > > >there are wide variations in the meaning of "verify", some of them being > > > >arguably very weak. Where does one draw the line between very weak > > > >verification and no verification? > > > > > Fair point. > > > > > I think its important that PKIX continue to express the > > > notion that a CA is expected to perform verification (directly or > > > indirectly) for all attributes in a cert, leaving to the policy > > > and/or CPS to refine the level of verification performed. > > > >(snip) > > > > > Still, I > > > do believe PKIX should continue to promote the notion, through our > > > standards, that the contents of a certificate represent data that the > > > issuer has verified and thus stands behind. To do otherwise would > > > endorse behavior that creates confusion, a generally undesirable > > > security characteristic. > > > >The later statement is different from the former. I like the former. > >Can we build a consensus around it ? > > > >If so, this should be reflected in the "son-of-RFC2459". > > The former is more appropriate for inclusion in the revised RFC; the > latter statement was more of a rationale for my position. > > Steve Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id QAA27561 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 16:38:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id JAA30912; Wed, 24 May 2000 09:49:35 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <L3WNLG5W>; Wed, 24 May 2000 09:43:43 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA702937@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: wlattin@earthlink.net, "'pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz'" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "'Denis.Pinkas@bull.net'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, "'FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com'" <FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com> Cc: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 09:43:41 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" A very fair comment, Bill. Worth mentioning in the draft, Denis? > -----Original Message----- > From: Bill Lattin [mailto:wlattin@earthlink.net] > Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 1:14 AM > To: 'pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz'; 'Denis.Pinkas@bull.net'; > 'FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com' > Cc: 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field > > > I think a better way to address this would be to reset the > counter when the > TSA signature key pair is generated. This way, we could be > more confident > that a 64-bit counter is sufficient, plus given the real > world difficulties > of guaranteeing a monotonic counter for all time, this gives > us a way to > recover from system failures. Linkage to the TSA signature key is a > natural delimiter since the counter would be unique per key > and the stated > objective of the counter - to identify sequential time stamps > containing > the same time - would still be still achieved. > > Cheers, > > Bill Lattin > TTFN Associates > > -----Original Message----- > From: Peter Gutmann [SMTP:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz] > Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2000 8:37 PM > To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net; FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field > > FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com writes: > > >To accomodate your issue we could add a comment in the ASN1 for the > >serialNumber saying: > > > >-- Time Stamps users must be ready to accomodate integers up > to 64 bits. > > I think a more general way of putting this would be "...must > be ready to > accomodate integers larger than the machine's native word > size", which > warns > of potential problems without implying that there's some > magic limit which > they can expect to find. Actually for anyone who's worked > with certs on > any scale, the use of 128-bit and 160-bit "serial numbers" > there should be > enough of a warning. > > Peter. > Received: from seine.valicert.com (corporate-gw.valicert.com [63.65.221.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA26688 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 15:36:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: by seine.valicert.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQRCL2QZ>; Tue, 23 May 2000 15:38:31 -0700 Message-ID: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28D@seine.valicert.com> From: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> To: "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 15:38:30 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Steve: "Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or operational requirements. However, for basic applications, common representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that application developers can obtain necessary information without regard to the issuer of a particular certificate or certificate revo- cation list (CRL)." [RFC 2459, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt] Do you affirm the above to be group consensus? Peter. -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2000 1:33 PM To: Peter Williams Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Peter, >Steve: > >You question me if enough is said. I demurr from the >suggested rewriting of my contribution, in what is >hopefully my last message on this topic. > >I had not assumed any need for restatement of the >IETF-community consensus concerning the legitimacy >of intentional non-conformity - when operating >Internet protocols and services. > >There was and perhaps is a continuing need to restate >the *additional* "PKI-specific" consensus positions >concerning "supplementing and replacing" PKIX >recommendations and mandates, as stated in 2459. > >Perhaps we can be of one mind by engaging in a joint >action: > >Perhaps we can both now reaffirm our support for the position >that the obvious meaning of, if the not the very text of, the >"supplement/replace language" present in the >previously-referenced element of RFC 2459 >Section 2 should continue to be expressed in all subsequent >versions of the Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile. > >Do we reaffirm the consensus on MY point, or not? > >I think this is the real question. For a native speaker of English, your writing often seems unduly obscure. I don't recall what your proposed rewording of 2459 is. However, if it differs significantly from the first of two statement by me that Denis cited in his message, then it is probably the case that I do NOT affirm (much less reaffirm) a WG consensus on YOUR point. Steve Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA24317 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 13:26:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.30.107] (comsec.bbn.com [171.78.30.107]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA00171; Tue, 23 May 2000 16:33:46 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220815b5509a9f2f8e@[171.78.30.107]> In-Reply-To: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28B@seine.valicert.com> References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28B@seine.valicert.com> Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 16:33:00 -0400 To: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Peter, >Steve: > >You question me if enough is said. I demurr from the >suggested rewriting of my contribution, in what is >hopefully my last message on this topic. > >I had not assumed any need for restatement of the >IETF-community consensus concerning the legitimacy >of intentional non-conformity - when operating >Internet protocols and services. > >There was and perhaps is a continuing need to restate >the *additional* "PKI-specific" consensus positions >concerning "supplementing and replacing" PKIX >recommendations and mandates, as stated in 2459. > >Perhaps we can be of one mind by engaging in a joint >action: > >Perhaps we can both now reaffirm our support for the position >that the obvious meaning of, if the not the very text of, the >"supplement/replace language" present in the >previously-referenced element of RFC 2459 >Section 2 should continue to be expressed in all subsequent >versions of the Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile. > >Do we reaffirm the consensus on MY point, or not? > >I think this is the real question. For a native speaker of English, your writing often seems unduly obscure. I don't recall what your proposed rewording of 2459 is. However, if it differs significantly from the first of two statement by me that Denis cited in his message, then it is probably the case that I do NOT affirm (much less reaffirm) a WG consensus on YOUR point. Steve Received: from seine.valicert.com (corporate-gw.valicert.com [63.65.221.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA23875 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 13:15:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: by seine.valicert.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQH17R0P>; Tue, 23 May 2000 13:17:44 -0700 Message-ID: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28B@seine.valicert.com> From: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> To: "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 13:17:34 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Steve: You question me if enough is said. I demurr from the suggested rewriting of my contribution, in what is hopefully my last message on this topic. I had not assumed any need for restatement of the IETF-community consensus concerning the legitimacy of intentional non-conformity - when operating Internet protocols and services. There was and perhaps is a continuing need to restate the *additional* "PKI-specific" consensus positions concerning "supplementing and replacing" PKIX recommendations and mandates, as stated in 2459. Perhaps we can be of one mind by engaging in a joint action: Perhaps we can both now reaffirm our support for the position that the obvious meaning of, if the not the very text of, the "supplement/replace language" present in the previously-referenced element of RFC 2459 Section 2 should continue to be expressed in all subsequent versions of the Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile. Do we reaffirm the consensus on MY point, or not? I think this is the real question. Peter. -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2000 12:30 PM To: Peter Williams Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Peter, >Internet CAs are free, and must be free, to operate public-key >certification according to wholly-private practices. This includes >acting in PKIX-non-conforming or other PKIX opt-out manners, where >(nationally-regulated) CAs and such CA's alone designate such practices >to be appropriate to meet their interworking communities security needs. Your message seems to cover the bases, i.e., a CA can always choose to be non-conforming with PKIX. So, 'nuf said, right? Steve Received: from homebase.htt-consult.com ([63.82.18.210]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id NAA23364 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 13:05:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rgm.htt-consult.com ([63.82.18.195]) by homebase.htt-consult.com ; Tue, 23 May 2000 16:13:24 -0500 Message-Id: <4.3.1.2.20000523160913.00ea6b30@homebase.htt-consult.com> X-Sender: rgm-sec@homebase.htt-consult.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1 Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 16:12:07 -0400 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> Subject: Next round of CMP testing -- jun 6 - 8 In-Reply-To: <v0422080db5508c54d3db@[171.78.30.107]> References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28A@seine.valicert.com> <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28A@seine.valicert.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed ICSA and the PKI Forum is getting ready for the next round of CMP testing. This is a virtual workshop for Jun 6 - 8. So far, 8 vendors have indicated that they are ready for more testing then, and a few more are expecting to be ready then as well. Please contact me at rgm@icsa.net if you are developing a CMP implementation and wish to participate in this or one of the later workshops. Robert Moskowitz ICSA Security Interest EMail: rgm-sec@htt-consult.com Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA22469 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 12:26:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.30.107] (comsec.bbn.com [171.78.30.107]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA22055; Tue, 23 May 2000 15:33:58 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v0422080db5508c54d3db@[171.78.30.107]> In-Reply-To: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28A@seine.valicert.com> References: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28A@seine.valicert.com> Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 15:29:38 -0400 To: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Peter, >Internet CAs are free, and must be free, to operate public-key >certification according to wholly-private practices. This includes >acting in PKIX-non-conforming or other PKIX opt-out manners, where >(nationally-regulated) CAs and such CA's alone designate such practices >to be appropriate to meet their interworking communities security needs. Your message seems to cover the bases, i.e., a CA can always choose to be non-conforming with PKIX. So, 'nuf said, right? Steve Received: from seine.valicert.com (corporate-gw.valicert.com [63.65.221.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA21981 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 12:10:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: by seine.valicert.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <LQH17RRN>; Tue, 23 May 2000 12:12:40 -0700 Message-ID: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E28A@seine.valicert.com> From: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> To: "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 12:12:39 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Internet CAs are free, and must be free, to operate public-key certification according to wholly-private practices. This includes acting in PKIX-non-conforming or other PKIX opt-out manners, where (nationally-regulated) CAs and such CA's alone designate such practices to be appropriate to meet their interworking communities security needs. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt Section 2. -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2000 9:53 AM To: Denis Pinkas Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Denis, >Let me extract two of your statements: > >(snip) > > > >Also, as both Denis and I pointed out, > > >there are wide variations in the meaning of "verify", some of them being > > >arguably very weak. Where does one draw the line between very weak > > >verification and no verification? > > > Fair point. > > > I think its important that PKIX continue to express the > > notion that a CA is expected to perform verification (directly or > > indirectly) for all attributes in a cert, leaving to the policy > > and/or CPS to refine the level of verification performed. > >(snip) > > > Still, I > > do believe PKIX should continue to promote the notion, through our > > standards, that the contents of a certificate represent data that the > > issuer has verified and thus stands behind. To do otherwise would > > endorse behavior that creates confusion, a generally undesirable > > security characteristic. > >The later statement is different from the former. I like the former. >Can we build a consensus around it ? > >If so, this should be reflected in the "son-of-RFC2459". The former is more appropriate for inclusion in the revised RFC; the latter statement was more of a rationale for my position. Steve Received: from [165.227.249.13] (ip13.proper.com [165.227.249.13]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA19987 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 10:52:42 -0700 (PDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: phoffvpnc@mail.vpnc.org Message-Id: <p04320307b550772f168c@[165.227.249.13]> Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 10:59:45 -0700 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@vpnc.org> Subject: Requirements for remote path processing services Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" After the discussion in Adelaide, a group of us got together to hammer out what we consider requirements for remote path processing services. The general consensus of that group follows. The group who came to agreement that these are in fact a good statement of requirements include: Ambarish Malpani, ValiCert Carlisle Adams, Entrust Michael Myers, VeriSign Michael Zolotarev, Baltimore Paul Hoffman, IMC & VPNC Peter Sylvester, EdelWeb Stephen Farrell, Baltimore Stephen Kent, BBN 1. Requirements for remote path processing services Remote path processing provides two primary services: delegated path construction for client-based path validation, and delegated path validation. Not all clients require both services in all scenarios. Many clients require only delegated path construction (including path discovery) to help them perform their own path validation, while other clients have requirements for offloaded path validation and have no need for data acquisition. The delegated path construction features of remote path processing are valuable for clients that do much of the PKI processing themselves and simply want a server to collect information for them. The server need not even be trusted, because the client will ultimately perform path validation. Offloading path validation to a server may be required by a client that lacks the processing, and/or communication capabilities to perform path discovery and path validation. (Path discovery may not be required in all cases, e.g., some applications provide means for certification paths to be transmitted as part of the protocol.) Another motivation for offloading path validation is that it allows centralized management of validation policies in a consistent fashion across an enterprise. A client that performs path validation for itself may still benefit in several ways from using a server to acquire certificates, CRLs, and OCSP responses to aid in the validation process. In this context, the client is relying on the server to interact with repositories to acquire the data that the client would otherwise have to acquire using LDAP, HTTP, and so on. Since these data items are digitally signed, the client need not trust the server to return the "right" data any more than the client would have to trust the repositories. There are several benefits to this approach; for example, a single query to a server can replace multiple queries to one or more directories and caching by the server can reduce latency. Another benefit to the client system is that it need not incorporate a diverse set of software to interact with various forms of repositories, perhaps via different protocols, nor to perform the graph processing necessary to discover paths, separate from making the queries to acquire path validation data. A client whose networking and/or processing capabilities are limited may be unable to perform path validation itself. In this case, there must be a fully-trusted server to which the client can delegate path validation services. Such a server can take direction from the client about how path validation should be done (such as which roots are to be trusted), and the server can even provide to the client proof (e.g., certificates and CRLs or OCSP responses) of how the server validated the target certificate. Even clients that are able to do their own path validation might instead rely on a trusted server to do path validation if the client is in an environment where centralized management of trusted roots or centralized management of non-standard policy processing is needed for some applications. 1.1 Collecting path validation information An untrusted server can provide a client the certificate path needed for path validation. It also can provide clients with revocation information, e.g., CRLs and OCSP responses, that the client can use to perform path validation. These services can be valuable to client systems that do not include the protocols needed to find and download all of the intermediate certificates, CRLs, and OCSP responses needed for the client to perform complete path validation. 1.2 Delegating path validation A server can perform full certificate validation for the client. If a client uses this service, it inherently trusts the server as much as it would its own path validation software (if it contained such software). One reason that a client may want to delegate to such a server is that the client does not have sufficient processing or networking resources to perform path validation for each certificate it receives. In addition, because the algorithms required for path validation are complex, not all applications may embody high quality implementations of this processing. In constrained execution environments such as telephones and PDAs, memory and processing limitations may preclude implementation of complete, PKIX-compliant path validation. In applications where minimum latency is critical, delegating validation to a trusted server can offer significant advantages. The time required to send the target certificate to the validation server, receive the response, and verify the signature on the response, can be considerably less than the time required by the client to perform path discovery and validation. Even if a certificate path were readily available to the client, the delay associated with processing the signatures for each certificate in the path might (under some circumstances such as very long paths or very limited processor speed) be greater than the delay associated with use of a validation server. 1.3 Centralized trust and policy Organizations that impose a centralized management discipline usually want consistent policy enforcement across all clients in particular scenarios. In such cases, allowing a client to manage its own set of trusted roots or the policies that it accepts during path validation is unacceptable. A trusted server can enforce particular policy decisions while performing path validation. Also, experience shows that it is difficult to manage software configuration on end systems in a corporate environment. Because path validation software is controlled by many parameters which, if incorrectly set, may result in insecure behavior, it is often important to be able to centralize path validation in a single or small set of servers, where system security administrators can carefully manage them. Both services (delegated path construction and delegated path validation) can be potentially used by the enterprise for enforcing various aspects of centralized policy. Note that it is not clear which aspects of PKI policy can, in general, be usefully separated from other application specific policy using this approach. This is a matter for further study. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium Received: from 5sigexch1.hq.5sigcmd.army.mil (5sigexch1.hq.5sigcmd.army.mil [147.40.98.21]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA18703 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 10:04:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 5sigexch1.hq.5sigcmd.army.mil with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.10) id <KTDMLL86>; Tue, 23 May 2000 19:11:13 +0200 Message-ID: <7FB25443A2E7D311B79500810080A69C1B1A1B@5sigexch5.hq.5sigcmd.army.mil> From: "Stringfield, Robert Mr." <stringfr@hq.5sigcmd.army.mil> To: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: FW: FQDN vs ALIAS Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 19:11:06 +0200 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.10) Is this question acceptable to this list? If not could you provide me with pointers as we have no ideas :-).... --bob -----Original Message----- From: reidw@hqasc.army.mil [mailto:reidw@hqasc.army.mil] Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2000 6:41 PM To: stringfr@hq.5sigcmd.army.mil Subject: FQDN vs ALIAS Mr. Stringfield, I work with Jenny Dolak here at Ft Huachuca in PKI Server registration. I have recently had several questions concerning how a certificate should be registered when an Alias is involved, and cannot seem to find an answer. The only rule I know is that the certificate should be registered using the FQDN, but I can't have the SA's do this if the certificate will not work when their people are redirected. Have you come across this problem before? Any hints or directions to an answer would be greatly appreciated. Thank you, Wendy Reid Network Administration Team Army Network and Systems Operations Center (ANSOC) U.S. Army Signal Command, ATTN: AFSN-NN Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-5000 520-538-1247 DSN 879-1247 FAX 520-538-1232 reidw@hqasc.army.mil Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA18183 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 09:47:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.30.107] (comsec.bbn.com [171.78.30.107]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA00531; Tue, 23 May 2000 12:54:19 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v0422080ab55067a93675@[171.78.30.107]> In-Reply-To: <3928F5A2.BF8B017B@bull.net> References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB5E@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <v04220811b54a0fdf6fcc@[128.33.238.33]> <3928F5A2.BF8B017B@bull.net> Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 12:52:58 -0400 To: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Denis, >Let me extract two of your statements: > >(snip) > > > >Also, as both Denis and I pointed out, > > >there are wide variations in the meaning of "verify", some of them being > > >arguably very weak. Where does one draw the line between very weak > > >verification and no verification? > > > Fair point. > > > I think its important that PKIX continue to express the > > notion that a CA is expected to perform verification (directly or > > indirectly) for all attributes in a cert, leaving to the policy > > and/or CPS to refine the level of verification performed. > >(snip) > > > Still, I > > do believe PKIX should continue to promote the notion, through our > > standards, that the contents of a certificate represent data that the > > issuer has verified and thus stands behind. To do otherwise would > > endorse behavior that creates confusion, a generally undesirable > > security characteristic. > >The later statement is different from the former. I like the former. >Can we build a consensus around it ? > >If so, this should be reflected in the "son-of-RFC2459". The former is more appropriate for inclusion in the revised RFC; the latter statement was more of a rationale for my position. Steve Received: from duck.prod.itd.earthlink.net (duck.prod.itd.earthlink.net [207.217.121.117]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA16272 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 08:12:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from william-lattin (1Cust138.tnt31.sfo3.da.uu.net [63.28.86.138]) by duck.prod.itd.earthlink.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id IAA21528; Tue, 23 May 2000 08:18:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: by localhost with Microsoft MAPI; Tue, 23 May 2000 08:19:18 -0700 Message-ID: <01BFC48F.976354A0.wlattin@earthlink.net> From: Bill Lattin <wlattin@earthlink.net> Reply-To: "wlattin@earthlink.net" <wlattin@earthlink.net> To: "'pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz'" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "'Denis.Pinkas@bull.net'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, "'FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com'" <FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com> Cc: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 08:13:59 -0700 X-Mailer: Microsoft Internet E-mail/MAPI - 8.0.0.4211 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I think a better way to address this would be to reset the counter when the TSA signature key pair is generated. This way, we could be more confident that a 64-bit counter is sufficient, plus given the real world difficulties of guaranteeing a monotonic counter for all time, this gives us a way to recover from system failures. Linkage to the TSA signature key is a natural delimiter since the counter would be unique per key and the stated objective of the counter - to identify sequential time stamps containing the same time - would still be still achieved. Cheers, Bill Lattin TTFN Associates -----Original Message----- From: Peter Gutmann [SMTP:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz] Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2000 8:37 PM To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net; FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com writes: >To accomodate your issue we could add a comment in the ASN1 for the >serialNumber saying: > >-- Time Stamps users must be ready to accomodate integers up to 64 bits. I think a more general way of putting this would be "...must be ready to accomodate integers larger than the machine's native word size", which warns of potential problems without implying that there's some magic limit which they can expect to find. Actually for anyone who's worked with certs on any scale, the use of 128-bit and 160-bit "serial numbers" there should be enough of a warning. Peter. Received: from mta03-svc.ntlworld.com (mta03-svc.ntlworld.com [62.253.162.43]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FAA13277 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 05:17:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from darxstar ([62.252.196.103]) by mta03-svc.ntlworld.com (InterMail vM.4.01.02.27 201-229-119-110) with SMTP id <20000523122427.HWBB290.mta03-svc.ntlworld.com@darxstar>; Tue, 23 May 2000 13:24:27 +0100 Message-ID: <000a01bfc4b2$611c2340$0100a8c0@darxstar> From: "Christopher Williams" <ccwilliams@ntlworld.com> To: <serafim@cripto.di.uminho.pt> Cc: "PKIX Mailing List" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <392A6F2C.28836.775E1F@localhost> Subject: Re: Multiple questions Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 13:28:15 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Serafim, > Q1.1: I have look for imformation about the OID, where can I find the repository of OIDs Try www.alvestrand.no/objectid/top.html > Q2: An OPTIONAL field can be NULL right? An optional field could be zero if zero is an appropriate value but you indicate that an optional field is not used by leaving it out entirely, so for the structure below you would indicate that there are no extensions by simply not setting anything at all for the extensions, rather than setting the field to NULL. > TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE { > version Integer { v1(1) }, > messageImprint MessageImprint, > --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be > --time stamped > reqPolicy PolicyInformation OPTIONAL, > nonce Integer OPTIONAL, > certReq BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, > extensions [0] Extensions OPTIONAL > } > > And in this case the extensions? Why the brackets? ([0]) doesn't the brackets mean OPTIONAL? The value 0 in the square brackets is the tag applied to the field. Recall that an ASN.1 object is encoded TLV (type, length, value). In this case, 0 is the type arbitrarily assigned to the Extensions field. Its meaning is obtained from its context. The brackets do not mean that the field is optional. Christopher Williams Software engineer, NetLexis Ltd. Solutions for secure electronic commerce http://www.netlexis.com Received: from nemesio.ci.uminho.pt (nemesio.ci.uminho.pt [193.136.16.244]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA11555 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 03:42:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from cripto20 (shannon.di.uminho.pt [193.136.20.84] (may be forged)) by nemesio.ci.uminho.pt (8.8.7/8.8.7) with ESMTP id LAA03340 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 23 May 2000 11:42:57 +0100 From: "Serafim Gomes" <serafim@pobox.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 11:44:44 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/enriched; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: TSA: Multiple questions Reply-to: serafim@cripto.di.uminho.pt Message-ID: <392A6F2C.28836.775E1F@localhost> Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) <color><param>0100,0100,0100</param>Hi, I'm making a Tsa (client and server), and i have some questions. Forgive my english, and my questions( if they are "stupid"). Q1: Where can I find information on Policy. Where are the OID of the know policy? Can I make some policy, of my own? Q1.1: I have look for imformation about the OID, where can I find the repository of OIDs Q2: An OPTIONAL field can be NULL right? </color><FontFamily><param>courier</param><smaller>TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE { version Integer { v1(<color><param>C200,0000,0000</param>1</color>) }, messageImprint MessageImprint, --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be --time stamped reqPolicy PolicyInformation OPTIONAL, nonce Integer OPTIONAL, certReq BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extensions [<color><param>C200,0000,0000</param>0</color>] Extensions OPTIONAL } <FontFamily><param>Fixedsys</param><bigger>And in this case the extensions? Why the brackets? ([0]) doesn't the brackets mean OPTIONAL? Q3: How can i test this with, some others servers? does anyone have one to test? test iteoperability? I have a beta version of a client and sever. Best Regards, Serafim Gomes serafim@pobox.com Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA12345 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 22 May 2000 01:47:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA41792; Mon, 22 May 2000 10:53:54 +0200 Message-ID: <3928F5A2.BF8B017B@bull.net> Date: Mon, 22 May 2000 10:53:54 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB5E@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <v04220811b54a0fdf6fcc@[128.33.238.33]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Steve, Let me extract two of your statements: (snip) > >Also, as both Denis and I pointed out, > >there are wide variations in the meaning of "verify", some of them being > >arguably very weak. Where does one draw the line between very weak > >verification and no verification? > Fair point. > I think its important that PKIX continue to express the > notion that a CA is expected to perform verification (directly or > indirectly) for all attributes in a cert, leaving to the policy > and/or CPS to refine the level of verification performed. (snip) > Still, I > do believe PKIX should continue to promote the notion, through our > standards, that the contents of a certificate represent data that the > issuer has verified and thus stands behind. To do otherwise would > endorse behavior that creates confusion, a generally undesirable > security characteristic. The later statement is different from the former. I like the former. Can we build a consensus around it ? If so, this should be reflected in the "son-of-RFC2459". Denis > Steve Received: from prv-mail20.provo.novell.com (prv-mail20.provo.novell.com [137.65.81.122]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id OAA20173 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 19 May 2000 14:48:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from INET-PRV-Message_Server by prv-mail20.provo.novell.com with Novell_GroupWise; Fri, 19 May 2000 15:47:27 -0600 Message-Id: <s925620f.037@prv-mail20.provo.novell.com> X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise Internet Agent 5.5.3.1 Date: Fri, 19 May 2000 15:47:22 -0600 From: "Bob Jueneman" <bjueneman@novell.com> To: <Peter.Lipp@iaik.at> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: AW: SubjectAltName verification Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id OAA20174 Not really, Peter -- at least I don't look at it that way. The certificate class is just one of four elements within a field that is used to describe the "Quality" of the certificate itself, intended to answer the question of "why should I believe this certificate?". The other parameters deal with where and how the keys were generated, where they are going to be used, and where they are stored in the meantime. The other portion of the Novell Security Attributes extension is a three tiered, hierarchical, mandatory access control label that is intended to convey what _rights_ the subject of the certificate possesses, at least according to the issuer of the certificate. The result is effectively a multi-dimensional policy statement, if you want to look at it that way, that permits a very rapid calculation of the equivalent of the name subordination rules, policy OID constraints, certificate classes, and something like the ESS security label supported S/MIME v3. Take a read -- I think you'll find it interesting. Bob >>> "Peter Lipp" <Peter.Lipp@iaik.at> 05/19/00 10:55AM >>> > That's why we include an explicit encoding of a certificate class > (from 0 to 255, with a rather rich set of definitions) in the > Novell Security Attributes in all of the certificate we create. Honestly, isn't that a shortcut for a possible policy-Id like Novell.sercurtityAttributes.policies.0 - Novell.sercurtityAttributes.policies.255? Peter Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA17067 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 19 May 2000 11:53:10 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KLC3N329>; Fri, 19 May 2000 15:00:41 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BF9A@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Rationale for Nonce in Time Stamp Protocol Date: Fri, 19 May 2000 15:00:21 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Salut Denis, I do not remember if this issue was raised before, but in Section 2.2 the following statement is made: "the requesting entity .... SHALL then verify the timeliness of the response by verifying either the time included in the response against a local trusted time reference, if one is available, and/or the value of the nonce (large random number with a high probability that it is generated by the client only once) included in the response against the value included in the request." A nonce is normally used to detect attempts at replays, which is not necessarily related to the timeliness of the response to a particular request as mentioned here. The first part of the statement talks about verifying the time included in the response against a locally trusted time source. This could used to measure round trip path delay for calibration purposes, but unless one could be certain that the locally trusted source is as accurate as the TSA time source (or, at least, that the difference between them is fixed and well-known), I don't see how it would detect/prevent replays. If one has such a trusted time source locally, what is the point in using a TTP for time stamping? Could you please clarify the intent of this statement and if the intent is to prevent replays or check the timeliness of responses or both? Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from iaik.tu-graz.ac.at ([129.27.152.30]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA14207 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 19 May 2000 09:48:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from PLIPP2 [129.27.152.34] by iaik.tu-graz.ac.at (SMTPD32-6.00) id A1D61B7010C; Fri, 19 May 2000 18:54:46 +0200 Received: from 127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1] by PLIPP2 (IAIK S/MIME Mapper 2.0beta3 22/March/2000); Fr, 19 Mai 2000 18:55:31 +0100 From: "Peter Lipp" <Peter.Lipp@iaik.at> To: "Bob Jueneman" <BJUENEMAN@novell.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: AW: SubjectAltName verification Date: Fri, 19 May 2000 18:55:30 +0200 Message-ID: <NDBBLDEHJKOODMJCNBNCEEKDDNAA.Peter.Lipp@iaik.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=sha1; boundary="--IAIK.SMIME.MAPPER.92F749A7--"; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature" X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) In-Reply-To: <s92475fa.089@prv-mail20.provo.novell.com> Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6700 This is a multipart MIME message, it may require a MIME capable user agent. ----IAIK.SMIME.MAPPER.92F749A7-- Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > That's why we include an explicit encoding of a certificate class > (from 0 to 255, with a rather rich set of definitions) in the > Novell Security Attributes in all of the certificate we create. Honestly, isn't that a shortcut for a possible policy-Id like Novell.sercurtityAttributes.policies.0 - Novell.sercurtityAttributes.policies.255? 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06:51:55 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005191051.GAA02521@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-dhpop-03.txt Date: Fri, 19 May 2000 06:51:54 -0400 Sender: nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms Author(s) : H. Prafullchandra, J. Schaad Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-dhpop-03.txt Pages : 20 Date : 18-May-00 This document describes two methods for producing an integrity check value from a Diffie-Hellman key pair. This behavior is needed for such operations as creating the signature of a PKCS #10 certification request. These algorithms are designed to provide a proof-of-possession rather than general purpose signing. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-dhpop-03.txt Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-dhpop-03.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-dhpop-03.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <20000518091812.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-dhpop-03.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-dhpop-03.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <20000518091812.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from prv-mail20.provo.novell.com (prv-mail20.provo.novell.com [137.65.81.122]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id VAA05866 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 21:54:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from INET-PRV-Message_Server by prv-mail20.provo.novell.com with Novell_GroupWise; Thu, 18 May 2000 23:00:10 -0600 Message-Id: <s92475fa.089@prv-mail20.provo.novell.com> X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise Internet Agent 5.5.3.1 Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 22:52:41 -0600 From: "Bob Jueneman" <BJUENEMAN@novell.com> To: <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, <awa1@home.com>, <WFord@verisign.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id VAA05867 I don't believe so, Warwick, because of the difficulties inherent in referring to a CP and CPS in a non-machine readable fashion when trying to evaluate the credibility of a certificate. That's why we include an explicit encoding of a certificate class (from 0 to 255, with a rather rich set of definitions) in the Novell Security Attributes in all of the certificate we create. Cf. http://developer.novell.com/repository/attributes/certattrs_v10.htm. Bob >>> Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> 05/18/00 07:54AM >>> Denis: It seems to me that classes constitute the classic example of different certificate policies. Don't we have all the mechanism we need? Warwick Received: from fhufw.fhu.disa.mil (fhu2.fhu.disa.mil [207.132.160.62]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id PAA00785 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 15:08:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fhu2.fhu.disa.mil by fhufw.fhu.disa.mil via smtpd (for mail.imc.org [208.184.76.43]) with SMTP; 18 May 2000 19:16:09 UT Received: by fhu2.fhu.disa.mil with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.10) id <K8QQAL2P>; Thu, 18 May 2000 15:15:18 -0700 Message-ID: <7C07F1B20FE0D21185670020484009DC018C4B08@fhu2.fhu.disa.mil> From: "Nelson, Patt" <NelsonP@fhu.disa.mil> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: remove Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 15:15:10 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.10) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0031_01BFC0DB.DC26E2D0"; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA-1 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2120.0 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0031_01BFC0DB.DC26E2D0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; 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Thu, 18 May 2000 14:57:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [128.33.238.33] (TC057.BBN.COM [128.33.238.57]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA17141; Thu, 18 May 2000 18:03:16 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220811b54a0fdf6fcc@[128.33.238.33]> In-Reply-To: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB5E@vhqpostal.verisign.com> References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB5E@vhqpostal.verisign.com> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 17:57:21 -0400 To: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Warwick, >A common example of a nonverified name, as mentioned by Denis, is an alias >which is deliberately not verified, sometimes because of privacy or >annonymity requirements. I presume you mean pseudonym here, a rare case, but even here I think there is a consistent interpretation of my argument. Specifically, a pseudonym, appearing as a subject name or subject alt name must clearly be identified as such, else the CA is misrepresenting the information in these fields. One might reasonably require that such names be drawn from a name space that precludes easy confusion with "real" names. I recall that we did just that in RFC 1422. >There are also examples where a part of a name is >not verified at all. For example, when issuing a certificate to an >organizational system (server, even intermediate CA) it is not uncommon for >the CA to verify the organization name, but allow any name the organization >cares to ask for in the OU fields. An organization is authoritative for its internal naming, so it is fine for a CA to rely on an authorized rep for the organization to declare an OU in such cases. I'd say that the CA is doing its job by relying on an authorized RA in this case. >Also, as both Denis and I pointed out, >there are wide variations in the meaning of "verify", some of them being >arguably very weak. Where does one draw the line between very weak >verification and no verification? Fair point. I think its important that PKIX continue to express the notion that a CA is expected to perform verification (directly or indirectly) for all attributes in a cert, leaving to the policy and/or CPS to refine the level of verification performed. As another WG member noted, it would seem that a major rationale for violating this rule is a desire to put too much into a single certificate. The bigger security issue here is that we create new opportunities for vulnerabilities whenever we represent information that is not vouched for in a context where RPs ought to be able to rely on the accuracy of the information. Anything one does that leads to easy confusion on the part of a user or system administrator is a contribution to the security failures that will inevitably result. >I respectfully propose that, as in the past, we leave such issues as a >matter of policy, and expressly exclude judgements on them from the PKIX >standards. I certainly do not believe that PKIX should be in the business >of "censuring" CAs over their policies. It is a pity that PKIX cannot effectively censure CAs :-). Still, I do believe PKIX should continue to promote the notion, through our standards, that the contents of a certificate represent data that the issuer has verified and thus stands behind. To do otherwise would endorse behavior that creates confusion, a generally undesirable security characteristic. Steve Received: from crack.x509.com (root@crack.x509.com [199.175.150.1]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA24638 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 11:17:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xcert.com (saxifrage.x509.com [199.175.148.75]) by crack.x509.com (8.10.0/XCERT) with ESMTP id e4IIOIj21589 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 11:24:18 -0700 (PDT) Sender: marcnarc@crack.x509.com Message-ID: <39243C1B.A97DF45C@xcert.com> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 11:53:15 -0700 From: Marc Branchaud <marcnarc@xcert.com> Organization: Xcert International Inc. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.2.10 i686) X-Accept-Language: en, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB57@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <v04220801b549227ae10c@[128.33.238.84]> <39239354.7F5AEB3E@bull.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Denis Pinkas wrote: > > Maybe it is now the right time to raise the question whether we > should standardize the concept of classes of certificates. > This whole issue of different levels of verification for the values in a certificate stems from the misguided idea that a single certificate needs to contain everything about a subject. This is misguided because it expands the scope of the CA's responsibility beyond reasonable limits. For example, it seems to me that a domain name registrar, not a CA, is authoritative about who owns a domain. Similarly for email addresses, IP addresses, and pretty much all of the other altName forms. CAs should be authoritative for only one thing: linking a public key value to a name. This provides a level of indirection that allows other authorities to attach attributes to that name. In other words, the public-key certificate allows relying parties to identify the owner of a name, and attribute certs (or other attribution protocols) allow relying parties to discern facts about the owner of that name. Clearly separating the scope of responsibility has numerous benefits. Each authority's legal liabilities are vastly reduced, as each is solely responsible for its own domain. Attribute and key management is also greatly simplified, as compared to using more "monolithic" certs where a cert must be revoked and re-issued if any of its attributes changes. Trying to define standardized classes of levels of validation is frankly a bit naive, since no two CAs will ever operate in the same way. It also perpetuates the misguided notion of a single authority for several attributes. This notion must be abandoned if PKI is ever to reach the wide-scale deployment we're all hoping for. Few organizations want to take responsibility for all the attributes in current certificate profiles. Giving them a way to state which bits they really take responsibility for is just complicating the whole thing, rather than solving the problem. Marc +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ Marc Branchaud \/ Chief PKI Architect /\CERT INTERNATIONAL INC. marcnarc@xcert.com PKI References page: www.xcert.com 604-640-6227 www.xcert.com/~marcnarc/PKI/ +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ Received: from eup2intra.euskaltel.es (mail.euskaltel.es [212.55.0.243]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA22924 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 09:58:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from euskaltel.es ([212.8.127.1]) by eup2intra.euskaltel.es (Netscape Messaging Server 4.15) with ESMTP id FURM2C00.A04; Thu, 18 May 2000 19:03:48 +0200 Message-ID: <392422C9.406466BA@euskaltel.es> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 19:05:13 +0200 From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Bego=F1a?= Canas <bcanas@euskaltel.es> Organization: EUSKALTEL X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: BJUENEMAN@novell.com CC: peterw@valicert.com, ietf-pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Thierry Van Doninck'" <Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be> Subject: Re: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI References: <200005161442.HAA14677@ns.secondary.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------7695007A7B1C7CFEB42E8C6C" --------------7695007A7B1C7CFEB42E8C6C Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hello, Can anyone give me the address to subscribe to certalk list? Because this is to technical for me, I'm more interested on a list about certs, pki, ca, ... but not so technical. Thank you BJUENEMAN@novell.com wrote: > Peter, > > Although I agree that such questions might better be addressed to the > certalk list, I also agree with you that we should occasionally take the > pulse of the industry and see who has actually rolled out commercial-grade > products that implement that various standards. > > And I thank you for including the link to one of Novell's web pages, which I was > not aware of. I have contacted the document owner to have it updated. > > For the record, Novell's GroupWise 5.5 Enhancement Pack e-mail product > supports S/MIME using EITHER the Entrust PKI solution, OR a more conventional > PKI solution that is based on the CSP capabilities provided by MS-CAPI and Internet > Explorer. > > The current version supports S/MIME version 2, and most of version 3. Release > schedules together with the uncertain state of CRL support by various CAs back > in mid-1999 led us to delay the availability of CRL processing in GroupWise. > This capability is currently scheduled for later this year. > > Likewise, although support for S/MIME v3's separation between encryption keys > and digital signature keys was part of the original development, we chose not to > feature ro recommend that usage at this time, due to the fact that Outlook Express > seriously mishandles such dual keys, and frequently ends up sending > an encrypted reply to the sender, using the sender's signature key. > > Entrust chose to try to undo that kind of mess by obligingly decrypting the message > using the signature key, but we felt that such an approach would seriously distort > the intent of the key usage policy, including controls over how the keys were > generated, how they were archived, etc. We expect to fully support dual key usage > later this year, and we hope by that time the Outlook Express bug will have been fixed. > > To the best of our knowledge, GroupWise can be used to request certificates from > any commercial CA, and our interoperability tests did not disclose any particular > difficulties with a rather wide variety of X.509 v3 certificates. > > GroupWise can also consume certificates issued in bulk from Novell's own free > Novell Certificate Server product 2.0, of course, and those certificates can also > be used by IE for SSL mutual authentication. > > Sometimes it seems like it takes forever, but we have in fact come a long, long way > from the PEM days. > > Regards, > > Bob > > >>> Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> 05/15/00 04:46PM >>> > http://support.microsoft.com/support/exchange/content/whitepapers/win2k_kms. > doc > > Thierry, > > I disagree with Phil. I personally measure the state > of open-ness of the actual PKIX industry in the US by the work > that Microsoft does in X.509. Determining open standards adoption > and interoperability over time is an important element of > standards making and national infrastructure(s) planning, in my > perhaps simplistic view. > > http://www.microsoft.com/Exchange/55/gen/compare.htm > is a (Microsoft-marketing) comparison of Exchange > and PKI with competitive products that include PKI. The > link give a glimpse of reality of PKIX in average > enterprise mail products. > > Some other URLs discussing important aspects > of S/MIME integration into commercial-grade > internet environments: > > Beyond S/MIME and onto X.400 secure stacks/networks: > http://www.microsoft.com/exchange/55/gen/Security.htm > > A Lotus study of PKI and S/MIME deployment - for Identrus banks: > http://www.lotus.com/99/session.nsf/187801dd8d07636a8525677d005a4ac8/78888aa > 0af9ec29b8525684e0079a8d3 > > A Study of Novell's integration with the world-class Entrust solution. > > http://support.novell.com/cgi-bin/search/search.pl?database_name=kb&type=HTML&docid=%03%1fF170985%3a958429713%3a%20%28%20S%2fMIME%20%29%20%20%07%01%00&byte_count=4399 > > If you add Netscape Certificate Server and RSA Keon/VeriSign to > the analysis, we have moved quite a long way in the US from the > PEM days. > > Peter. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Philip Hallam-Baker [mailto:pbaker@verisign.com] > Sent: Monday, May 15, 2000 6:05 AM > To: 'Thierry Van Doninck'; ietf-pkix > Subject: RE: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI > > Same answer, ask Microsoft, not an IETF development list. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Thierry Van Doninck [mailto:Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be] > Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 7:40 AM > To: ietf-pkix > Subject: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI > > Hi, > > Same message as on the smime mailing list. > Has any of you good people any info on Windows 2000 PKI ? > > Thanks, > > Thierry > > ======================================================================== > ============ > > Hi everybody, > > Just a question : > > Is there any known issues using S/MIME with Win2000PKI-certificates ? > More generally, are Win2000 certificates usable with (and understood by > ) the others mailers (especially Lotus Notes, Netscape, Eudora > +plug-in?) > > Isn't Baltimore Unicert a "better choice" due to its greater > compatibility ? > > Any advices are welcome. > > Regards, > > Laurent Deffranne -- ---------------------------------------- Begoña Canas Sistemas Internet Euskaltel Tfno: 94 4011465 e-mail: bcanas@euskaltel.es ---------------------------------------- --------------7695007A7B1C7CFEB42E8C6C Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit <!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en"> <html> Hello, <p>Can anyone give me the address to subscribe to certalk list? Because this is to technical for me, I'm more interested on a list about certs, pki, ca, ... but not so technical. <p>Thank you <p>BJUENEMAN@novell.com wrote: <blockquote TYPE=CITE>Peter, <p>Although I agree that such questions might better be addressed to the <br>certalk list, I also agree with you that we should occasionally take the <br>pulse of the industry and see who has actually rolled out commercial-grade <br>products that implement that various standards. <p>And I thank you for including the link to one of Novell's web pages, which I was <br>not aware of. I have contacted the document owner to have it updated. <p>For the record, Novell's GroupWise 5.5 Enhancement Pack e-mail product <br>supports S/MIME using EITHER the Entrust PKI solution, OR a more conventional <br>PKI solution that is based on the CSP capabilities provided by MS-CAPI and Internet <br>Explorer. <p>The current version supports S/MIME version 2, and most of version 3. Release <br>schedules together with the uncertain state of CRL support by various CAs back <br>in mid-1999 led us to delay the availability of CRL processing in GroupWise. <br>This capability is currently scheduled for later this year. <p>Likewise, although support for S/MIME v3's separation between encryption keys <br>and digital signature keys was part of the original development, we chose not to <br>feature ro recommend that usage at this time, due to the fact that Outlook Express <br>seriously mishandles such dual keys, and frequently ends up sending <br>an encrypted reply to the sender, using the sender's signature key. <p>Entrust chose to try to undo that kind of mess by obligingly decrypting the message <br>using the signature key, but we felt that such an approach would seriously distort <br>the intent of the key usage policy, including controls over how the keys were <br>generated, how they were archived, etc. We expect to fully support dual key usage <br>later this year, and we hope by that time the Outlook Express bug will have been fixed. <p>To the best of our knowledge, GroupWise can be used to request certificates from <br>any commercial CA, and our interoperability tests did not disclose any particular <br>difficulties with a rather wide variety of X.509 v3 certificates. <p>GroupWise can also consume certificates issued in bulk from Novell's own free <br>Novell Certificate Server product 2.0, of course, and those certificates can also <br>be used by IE for SSL mutual authentication. <p>Sometimes it seems like it takes forever, but we have in fact come a long, long way <br>from the PEM days. <p>Regards, <p>Bob <p>>>> Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> 05/15/00 04:46PM >>> <br><a href="http://support.microsoft.com/support/exchange/content/whitepapers/win2k_kms">http://support.microsoft.com/support/exchange/content/whitepapers/win2k_kms</a>. <br>doc <p>Thierry, <p>I disagree with Phil. I personally measure the state <br>of open-ness of the actual PKIX industry in the US by the work <br>that Microsoft does in X.509. Determining open standards adoption <br>and interoperability over time is an important element of <br>standards making and national infrastructure(s) planning, in my <br>perhaps simplistic view. <p><a href="http://www.microsoft.com/Exchange/55/gen/compare.htm">http://www.microsoft.com/Exchange/55/gen/compare.htm</a> <br>is a (Microsoft-marketing) comparison of Exchange <br>and PKI with competitive products that include PKI. The <br>link give a glimpse of reality of PKIX in average <br>enterprise mail products. <p>Some other URLs discussing important aspects <br>of S/MIME integration into commercial-grade <br>internet environments: <p>Beyond S/MIME and onto X.400 secure stacks/networks: <br><a href="http://www.microsoft.com/exchange/55/gen/Security.htm">http://www.microsoft.com/exchange/55/gen/Security.htm</a> <p>A Lotus study of PKI and S/MIME deployment - for Identrus banks: <br><a href="http://www.lotus.com/99/session.nsf/187801dd8d07636a8525677d005a4ac8/78888aa">http://www.lotus.com/99/session.nsf/187801dd8d07636a8525677d005a4ac8/78888aa</a> <br>0af9ec29b8525684e0079a8d3 <p>A Study of Novell's integration with the world-class Entrust solution. <p><a href="http://support.novell.com/cgi-bin/search/search.pl?database_name=kb&type=HTML&docid=%03%1fF170985%3a958429713%3a%20%28%20S%2fMIME%20%29%20%20%07%01%00&byte_count=4399">http://support.novell.com/cgi-bin/search/search.pl?database_name=kb&type=HTML&docid=%03%1fF170985%3a958429713%3a%20%28%20S%2fMIME%20%29%20%20%07%01%00&byte_count=4399</a> <p>If you add Netscape Certificate Server and RSA Keon/VeriSign to <br>the analysis, we have moved quite a long way in the US from the <br>PEM days. <p>Peter. <p>-----Original Message----- <br>From: Philip Hallam-Baker [<a href="mailto:pbaker@verisign.com">mailto:pbaker@verisign.com</a>] <br>Sent: Monday, May 15, 2000 6:05 AM <br>To: 'Thierry Van Doninck'; ietf-pkix <br>Subject: RE: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI <p>Same answer, ask Microsoft, not an IETF development list. <p>-----Original Message----- <br>From: Thierry Van Doninck [<a href="mailto:Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be">mailto:Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be</a>] <br>Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 7:40 AM <br>To: ietf-pkix <br>Subject: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI <p>Hi, <p>Same message as on the smime mailing list. <br>Has any of you good people any info on Windows 2000 PKI ? <p>Thanks, <p>Thierry <p>======================================================================== <br>============ <p>Hi everybody, <p>Just a question : <p>Is there any known issues using S/MIME with Win2000PKI-certificates ? <br>More generally, are Win2000 certificates usable with (and understood by <br>) the others mailers (especially Lotus Notes, Netscape, Eudora <br>+plug-in?) <p>Isn't Baltimore Unicert a "better choice" due to its greater <br>compatibility ? <p>Any advices are welcome. <p>Regards, <p>Laurent Deffranne</blockquote> <p>-- <br>---------------------------------------- <br>Begoña Canas <br>Sistemas Internet <br>Euskaltel <br>Tfno: 94 4011465 <br>e-mail: bcanas@euskaltel.es <br>---------------------------------------- <br> </html> --------------7695007A7B1C7CFEB42E8C6C-- Received: from roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil (roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.70]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA21645 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 09:01:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil (root@localhost) by roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id MAA27159 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 12:03:24 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005181603.MAA27151@roadblock.missi.ncsc.mil> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 12:02:52 -0400 From: Mike Jenkins <mjjenki@missi.ncsc.mil> Reply-To: mjjenki@missi.ncsc.mil X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Standardization of certificate classes Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Standardizing levels-of-assurance for broad-based certificate application (i.e., in the Internet-wide context) gives me the heebie-jeebies. My mantra wrt CPs and CPSs (as editor of the US DOD CP) has always been that a CP is a statement of the minimum requirements of the certificate-using community; a CPS is a statement of what a certificate-issuer (CA, RA, LRA, etc.) actually does. Some certificate vendors publish CP/CPSs; in this case, the vendor is suggesting to what uses you might want to put the certificate, which might be useful to the masses who don't have a system accreditor to tell them. Standardization within industries is inevitable; it is just as inevitable that these standards will be wildly different from industry to industry. In my model, if the certificate-using community wants all certificate contents to be checked, it should say so in its CP. Any CA who checks in the desired manner (other reqts notwithstanding) fits the bill. Note that this does not require exposure of the CA's CPS (which some CAs seem to want), since the relying party can find what it wants to know in the CP (to the extent that any relying party will read anything, an issue that has been discussed before, etc.) I really doubt that this is a PKIX issue. Mike Jenkins Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA21364 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 08:54:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA27352; Thu, 18 May 2000 18:00:58 +0200 Message-ID: <392413BA.4F42F02A@bull.net> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 18:00:58 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB57@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <v04220801b549227ae10c@[128.33.238.84]> <14627.62851.728262.288552@xedia.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Paul, I like your proposal in general. ... However, I would reword it a litlle bit differently, changing "whether" by "how" in two places. The other concern I have is that your proposed text mentions "THE CPS". This is assuming ONE CP, which is the RECOMMENDATION we presently have in RFC 2459. I raised the question whether we should relax this a little bit, to be able to include some "well known" OIDs which would state how the verification of the registration information has been performed. See below: > >>>>> "Stephen" == Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: > > Stephen> Warwick, > >> The meaning of "verify" (in this context) is entirely a matter of > >> policy, and needs to be made clear in the CP/CPS wrt all fields of > >> material significance. Re our long-ago discussion on > >> "non-verified subscriber information", I recall us agreeing that a > >> certificate *may* (subject to policy) contain non-verified > >> subscriber information. However, because "verification" means > >> different things for different fields, a binary flag was not the > >> answer. The extent to which different fields are verified (or > >> not) by a CA is expressed in the CP/CPS. > >> > >> I believe this interpretation extends to subjectAltName since > >> different alternatives will unquestionably be "verified" in > >> different ways. > > Stephen> We disagree wrt inclusion of non-verified info, and the > Stephen> consensus of the WG in this regard. I agree that a CA > Stephen> policy may declare that a CA has chosen to do this, but I > Stephen> believe that such behavior warrants censure. > > I'm inclined to agree. > > If Warwick's interpretation is to be adopted, then the text urgently > needs to be repaired so it does not mislead. The current text (i.e., > its intuitive meaning in plain English) supports Steve's > interpretation and not Warwick's. If the other interpretation is > intended, then the text needs to say so quite explicitly. For > example, with words like this: > > "Whether the subjectAltName or any other field of the certificate has > been verified by the CA is a matter of policy and can be ascertained > only by examination of the CPS. If a RP needs to know that a > particular attribute is definitively bound to the public key of the > subject, it must examine the CPS to learn whether the CA has indeed > verified this binding." "How the subjectAltName or any other field of the certificate has been verified by the CA is a matter of policy and can be ascertained only by the knowledge of the CP(s) or by examination of the CPS(s). If a RP needs to know how a particular attribute is bound to the public key of the subject, it must now have the knowledge of the CP(s) or examine the CPS(s) to learn how the CA has indeed verified this binding." Denis > It would be possible to take a middle ground between the two > positions, i.e., encouraging the definitive binding but not requiring > it. That of course means changing the "MUST" to a "SHOULD" and > perhaps adding words to the effect that the CPS must indicate what is > done. > > Personally, I prefer Steve's position. I wonder if it is necessary to > add words to the effect that a conforming CA cannot use the CPS to get > out of supporting mandatory items in the RFC and still be considered > conforming. After all, that's we're talking about right now. It > really shouldn't be, after all that's why we use standardized > terminology (like "MUST"). > > paul Received: from mail.ec.auckland.ac.nz (mail.student.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.201]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA20670 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 08:30:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz (pgut001@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.36.13]) by mail.ec.auckland.ac.nz (8.9.3/8.8.6/cs-master) with SMTP id DAA09643; Fri, 19 May 2000 03:37:07 +1200 (NZST) (sender pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: by kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz (relaymail v0.9) id <95866422706718>; Fri, 19 May 2000 03:37:07 (NZST) From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Reply-To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz X-Charge-To: pgut001 X-Authenticated: relaymail v0.9 on kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz Date: Fri, 19 May 2000 03:37:07 (NZST) Message-ID: <95866422706718@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz> FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com writes: >To accomodate your issue we could add a comment in the ASN1 for the >serialNumber saying: > >-- Time Stamps users must be ready to accomodate integers up to 64 bits. I think a more general way of putting this would be "...must be ready to accomodate integers larger than the machine's native word size", which warns of potential problems without implying that there's some magic limit which they can expect to find. Actually for anyone who's worked with certs on any scale, the use of 128-bit and 160-bit "serial numbers" there should be enough of a warning. Peter. Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA18182 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 07:16:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA13500; Thu, 18 May 2000 16:21:14 +0200 Message-ID: <3923FC5C.F8548AB9@bull.net> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 16:21:16 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB5F@vhqpostal.verisign.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Warwick, Certificate policies may certainly contain information that relates to the quality of checking of the various fields of the certificate. However, using a single CP in the CP field (as this is RECOMMENDED by RFC 2459) does not easily allow to compare the quality of the checking performed by two different CAS. If we (or someone else) were defining an OID, e.g. for "Class 32", that would come in addition to another OID specific to the CA, this would be better. So we might need a small text change to solve the case. Denis Extract from RFC 2459: To promote interoperability, this profile RECOMMENDS that policy information terms consist of only an OID. Where an OID alone is insufficient, this profile strongly recommends that use of qualifiers be limited to those identified in this section. > Denis: > > It seems to me that classes constitute the classic example of different > certificate policies. Don't we have all the mechanism we need? > > Warwick Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA17942 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 07:12:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id QAA17651; Thu, 18 May 2000 16:19:03 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Thu, 18 May 2000 16:19:03 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id QAA14490; Thu, 18 May 2000 16:19:02 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id QAA00894; Thu, 18 May 2000 16:19:01 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 16:19:01 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005181419.QAA00894@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > > A certificate must contain a name that may be carried in the DN > > > field or the SubjectAltName extension. That name must be unique and > > > is assigned by the CA. The name, wherever it is placed, must be > > > verified (well with the exception of pseudonyms that can only be > > > verified not to collide) with some *reasonable* degree of > > > verification. > > > > > 'Unique' does seem the right word to me. You can have more than one > > 'name' for the same object, like a pseudonym and a 'real' name. > > > > Are you talking about 'non-ambigous names'? > > No. Unique means that a name, once given to one entity, must not be > given to a different entity (in short not issued twice to two > different entities). Hm, that's unique (= the only one/sole cf Webster's dict) attribution of a name to an object. Which makes the name unambiguous. X.501 (88) 8.1 d: (directory) name: a construct that singles out a particular object from all other objects. A name must be unambiguous (that is denote just one object), however it need not be unique (that is, be the only name which unambigously denotes the object); This definition seems to be conformant the definition 1 found in Webster's dictionary unique = the only one 'sole'. But rfc1439: This RFC provides information that may be useful when selecting a method to use for assigning unique identifiers to people. But in fact this RFC talks about the uniqueness of the assignment of an identifier to an entity. Or, 'unique identifier' is used as a new term but not using 'unique' as an attribute of the identifier. The sentence: 'In general, these identifiers must be unique.' is not consistent with the rest of the text, explaining that the attribution of an identifier to an object must be unique/sole, which is a quality of the inverse relation. Or, uniqueness is the opposite of unambiguous, it just depends from which part of the relation you see it. Combining this all, you can still consider a term 'unique name' as a term that describes what you say, but then you cannot necessarily say that a 'unique name' is 'unique' since the object may have several names; a very unfortunate wording problem. Thus, the reason I mentioned that was not to comment the statement about the subject of the message, rather a comment to the paragraph in 2.4 the qualified certificate draft. In the context of a single DIT *the distinguished names* form a subset of name, where each name is unique (since you can only have one distinguished name for an object.); it is unambiguous because it is a name (X.501) and not because it is a distinguished name. Or, maybe one should rename 2.4 to 'uniqueness of name assignments'. In the context of qualified certificates, a distinguished name denotes a set of attribute values [X.501] which forms a name that is unambiguous within a certain domain Well, sorry for any misunderstanding that my comments may or may not have caused. Peter PS: My English has always been *very* bad, anyway. Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA17554 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 07:02:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQipsi25566; Thu, 18 May 2000 14:09:04 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA04698; Thu, 18 May 00 10:05:39 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id KAA24758; Thu, 18 May 2000 10:09:03 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14627.63871.259416.144622@xedia.com> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 10:09:03 -0400 (EDT) To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BF89@panda.chrysalis-its.com> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "FRousseau" == FRousseau <FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com> writes: FRousseau> Salut Denis, I do not remember if this issue was raised FRousseau> before, but although I understand that there is no limit FRousseau> on the size of an Integer value, the "serialNumber" field FRousseau> of a time stamping response in Section 2.4.2 will FRousseau> ultimately become an enormously large number over the life FRousseau> of a TSA that is issuing numerous time stamps per second. 64 bits is not that large, and will last more than long enough. In network management, 64 bit counters are often used because you can make a byte counter on a high speed link 64 bits and never have to worry about wrapping it. So clearly it's good enough for this application. FRousseau> Would it not be more sensible for the serialNumber field FRousseau> to optionally be a monotonically increasing integer from FRousseau> one TimeStampToken to the next within a fixed period of FRousseau> time specified by the TSA's policy (e.g. a week, a day, an FRousseau> hour, etc.)? FRousseau> Such a serialNumber with the appropriate period of time FRousseau> would still provide a way to build a unique identifier to FRousseau> reference a time stamp token. Yes, but it would be a very different thing and if such a field is included it really should have a different name. paul Received: from eagle.verisign.com ([208.206.241.105]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA17128 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 06:49:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from postal-gw1.verisign.com (mailhost1.verisign.com [208.206.241.101]) by eagle.verisign.com (8.9.3/BCH1.7.1) with ESMTP id GAA11882; Thu, 18 May 2000 06:56:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: by postal-gw1.verisign.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KJDK8CVL>; Thu, 18 May 2000 06:54:59 -0700 Message-ID: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB5F@vhqpostal.verisign.com> From: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> To: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>, Al Arsenault <awa1@home.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 06:54:59 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Denis: It seems to me that classes constitute the classic example of different certificate policies. Don't we have all the mechanism we need? Warwick Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA16901 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 06:45:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQipsh28527; Thu, 18 May 2000 13:52:05 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA04418; Thu, 18 May 00 09:48:40 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id JAA24746; Thu, 18 May 2000 09:52:03 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14627.62851.728262.288552@xedia.com> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 09:52:03 -0400 (EDT) To: kent@bbn.com Cc: WFord@verisign.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB57@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <v04220801b549227ae10c@[128.33.238.84]> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Stephen" == Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes: Stephen> Warwick, >> The meaning of "verify" (in this context) is entirely a matter of >> policy, and needs to be made clear in the CP/CPS wrt all fields of >> material significance. Re our long-ago discussion on >> "non-verified subscriber information", I recall us agreeing that a >> certificate *may* (subject to policy) contain non-verified >> subscriber information. However, because "verification" means >> different things for different fields, a binary flag was not the >> answer. The extent to which different fields are verified (or >> not) by a CA is expressed in the CP/CPS. >> >> I believe this interpretation extends to subjectAltName since >> different alternatives will unquestionably be "verified" in >> different ways. Stephen> We disagree wrt inclusion of non-verified info, and the Stephen> consensus of the WG in this regard. I agree that a CA Stephen> policy may declare that a CA has chosen to do this, but I Stephen> believe that such behavior warrants censure. I'm inclined to agree. If Warwick's interpretation is to be adopted, then the text urgently needs to be repaired so it does not mislead. The current text (i.e., its intuitive meaning in plain English) supports Steve's interpretation and not Warwick's. If the other interpretation is intended, then the text needs to say so quite explicitly. For example, with words like this: "Whether the subjectAltName or any other field of the certificate has been verified by the CA is a matter of policy and can be ascertained only by examination of the CPS. If a RP needs to know that a particular attribute is definitively bound to the public key of the subject, it must examine the CPS to learn whether the CA has indeed verified this binding." It would be possible to take a middle ground between the two positions, i.e., encouraging the definitive binding but not requiring it. That of course means changing the "MUST" to a "SHOULD" and perhaps adding words to the effect that the CPS must indicate what is done. Personally, I prefer Steve's position. I wonder if it is necessary to add words to the effect that a conforming CA cannot use the CPS to get out of supporting mandatory items in the RFC and still be considered conforming. After all, that's we're talking about right now. It really shouldn't be, after all that's why we use standardized terminology (like "MUST"). paul Received: from eagle.verisign.com ([208.206.241.105]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA16711 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 06:44:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from postal-gw1.verisign.com (mailhost1.verisign.com [208.206.241.101]) by eagle.verisign.com (8.9.3/BCH1.7.1) with ESMTP id GAA11722; Thu, 18 May 2000 06:51:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: by postal-gw1.verisign.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KJDK8CTT>; Thu, 18 May 2000 06:50:20 -0700 Message-ID: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB5E@vhqpostal.verisign.com> From: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> To: "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 06:50:19 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Steve: A common example of a nonverified name, as mentioned by Denis, is an alias which is deliberately not verified, sometimes because of privacy or annonymity requirements. There are also examples where a part of a name is not verified at all. For example, when issuing a certificate to an organizational system (server, even intermediate CA) it is not uncommon for the CA to verify the organization name, but allow any name the organization cares to ask for in the OU fields. Also, as both Denis and I pointed out, there are wide variations in the meaning of "verify", some of them being arguably very weak. Where does one draw the line between very weak verification and no verification? I respectfully propose that, as in the past, we leave such issues as a matter of policy, and expressly exclude judgements on them from the PKIX standards. I certainly do not believe that PKIX should be in the business of "censuring" CAs over their policies. Warwick Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA16451 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 06:40:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA41878; Thu, 18 May 2000 15:46:32 +0200 Message-ID: <3923F43A.60E379D3@bull.net> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 15:46:34 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Al Arsenault <awa1@home.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB57@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <v04220801b549227ae10c@[128.33.238.84]> <39239354.7F5AEB3E@bull.net> <3923E1E8.F078A303@home.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Al, There was indeed two open questions (one explicit, one implicit). You answered to the first one, and I agree that some "other" body might be more appropriate to start the work and, maybe, when they are done, they should present their work to us. The second question is our concern. I said : "We would also need to say how to express the concept of class in the certificate." So the question is: Should we say how/where to express the concept of class in a certificate (in particular an end-user certificate) ? Maybe we already have the right field and the right syntax to accommodate the information, but we would need to extend/modify some rules. Denis > Denis Pinkas wrote: > > > > Hum !!! Interesting discussion between the two co-chairs. :-) > > > > I agree with Steve on this one. > > > Whatever information is contained in a certificate, there are > > various degrees of verification that can apply. The verification > > level may even be different for each field. To this respect, Warwick > > is right to say that a flag would not be adequate. > > > > A certificate must contain a name that may be carried in the DN > > field or the SubjectAltName extension. That name must be unique and > > is assigned by the CA. The name, wherever it is placed, must be > > verified (well with the exception of pseudonyms that can only be > > verified not to collide) with some *reasonable* degree of > > verification. > > > > All other extra fields related to the user that we allow to be > > present in a certificate are not mandated. If a phone number is > > included does that means that the CA has simply accepted the phone > > number that was included in the registration form ? or that the CA > > has requested a proof from a telephone company that the applicant > > was the legitimate subscriber of the phone line ? or that the CA has > > made a phone call to that number to get the person on the phone ? > > > > In general, if the CA is not also the RA, the CA accepts the RA's > assertion that the RA is either authoritative for all information to go > in the certificate, or that the RA has verified the information with > whomever is authoritative. That is, the RA has certified that "this is > Al's e-mail address, because I issued it", and "this is Al's phone > number, which I ran around to his desk and verified or called the > company phone office to verify or ..." If the CA is also acting as the > RA, then it is the CA's job to do this verification. > > Of course, how well this job is done is a function of the CPS (or other > policy document which serves in place of the CPS, as I was reminded at a > meeting yesterday :-), but it needs to be done. Giving me a certificate > with a subjectAltName, OtherName type, of Phone_number = > the_White_House_switchboard is somewhat irresponsible on the part of the > CA, and should not be condoned by PKIX. > > > The answer to the issue raised is not black or white. Today there > > exists (free) certificates where no verification (except uniqueness > > of name) is performed. There are used for testing purposes, and > > should be recognized as such (but they are not). A next level is to > > verify very loosely the name, in particular when it is an E-mail > > address, by sending back an E-mail to that address. A next level is > > to use some background check with a data base to make sure of the > > information that is provided. A next level is to ask for one proof > > of identity and other related information. A next level is to ask > > for two proofs of identity and other related information. I will > > stop here these examples. > > > > The industry has introduced the concept of classes of certificates. > > The problem is that each CA issuer has made its own definition of > > what such a class is. > > > > Maybe it is now the right time to raise the question whether we > > should standardize the concept of classes of certificates. > > > > For PKIX, I would vote "NO" to this question. Maybe the PKI Forum or > somebody else should pick it up. > > > In this way we would recognize various levels of verification. We > > would also need to say how the express the concept of class in the > > certificate. We do not necessarily need a new extension for this. > > Let us keep certificates slim. :-). > > > > Denis > > > > Al Arsenault > Chief Security Architect > Diversinet Corp. Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA15654 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 06:13:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA13416; Thu, 18 May 2000 15:20:02 +0200 Message-ID: <3923EE04.480BD85C@bull.net> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 15:20:04 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field References: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BF89@panda.chrysalis-its.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > Salut Denis, > > I do not remember if this issue was raised before, but although I understand > that there is no limit on the size of an Integer value, the "serialNumber" > field of a time stamping response in Section 2.4.2 will ultimately become an > enormously large number over the life of a TSA that is issuing numerous time > stamps per second. I do not see a problem here. We do not have a limitation for serialNumber in a public key certificate. In our case, 64 bits would be quite enough, while 32 bits would be too small. To accomodate your issue we could add a comment in the ASN1 for the serialNumber saying: -- Time Stamps users must be ready to accomodate integers up to 64 bits. > Would it not be more sensible for the serialNumber field to optionally be a > monotonically increasing integer from one TimeStampToken to the next within > a fixed period of time specified by the TSA's policy (e.g. a week, a day, an > hour, etc.)? I do not think so. > Such a serialNumber with the appropriate period of time would still provide > a way to build a unique identifier to reference a time stamp token. But such an identifier would be much longer. :-( Thanks for your comment, Denis > Francois > ___________________________________ > Francois Rousseau > Director of Standards and Conformance > Chrysalis-ITS > 1688 Woodward Drive > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from mailgw2a.lmco.com (mailgw2a.lmco.com [192.91.147.7]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FAA14064 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 05:39:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from emss03g01.ems.lmco.com (emss03g01.ems.lmco.com [141.240.4.144]) by mailgw2a.lmco.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id IAA20275; Thu, 18 May 2000 08:46:31 -0400 (EDT) Received: from CONVERSION-DAEMON by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38888) id <0FUR00K01A479F@lmco.com>; Thu, 18 May 2000 08:45:44 -0400 (EDT) Received: from emss03i01.ems.lmco.com ([141.240.30.127]) by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38888) with ESMTP id <0FUR009AEA45G1@lmco.com>; Thu, 18 May 2000 08:45:41 -0400 (EDT) Received: by emss03i01.orl.lmco.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KYDKMLWJ>; Thu, 18 May 2000 08:44:01 -0400 Content-return: allowed Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 08:41:30 -0400 From: "Yutzy, Murray" <murray.yutzy@lmco.com> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification To: "'Al Arsenault'" <awa1@home.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-id: <F87704CDCF62D311A7C200508B1216326D118E@emss03m02.orl.lmco.com> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Denis Pinkas wrote: > > Hum !!! Interesting discussion between the two co-chairs. :-) > I agree with Steve on this one. > Whatever information is contained in a certificate, there are > various degrees of verification that can apply. The verification > level may even be different for each field. To this respect, Warwick > is right to say that a flag would not be adequate. > > A certificate must contain a name that may be carried in the DN > field or the SubjectAltName extension. That name must be unique and > is assigned by the CA. The name, wherever it is placed, must be > verified (well with the exception of pseudonyms that can only be > verified not to collide) with some *reasonable* degree of > verification. > > All other extra fields related to the user that we allow to be > present in a certificate are not mandated. If a phone number is > included does that means that the CA has simply accepted the phone > number that was included in the registration form ? or that the CA > has requested a proof from a telephone company that the applicant > was the legitimate subscriber of the phone line ? or that the CA has > made a phone call to that number to get the person on the phone ? > In general, if the CA is not also the RA, the CA accepts the RA's assertion that the RA is either authoritative for all information to go in the certificate, or that the RA has verified the information with whomever is authoritative. That is, the RA has certified that "this is Al's e-mail address, because I issued it", and "this is Al's phone number, which I ran around to his desk and verified or called the company phone office to verify or ..." If the CA is also acting as the RA, then it is the CA's job to do this verification. Of course, how well this job is done is a function of the CPS (or other policy document which serves in place of the CPS, as I was reminded at a meeting yesterday :-), but it needs to be done. Giving me a certificate with a subjectAltName, OtherName type, of Phone_number = the_White_House_switchboard is somewhat irresponsible on the part of the CA, and should not be condoned by PKIX. > The answer to the issue raised is not black or white. Today there > exists (free) certificates where no verification (except uniqueness > of name) is performed. There are used for testing purposes, and > should be recognized as such (but they are not). A next level is to > verify very loosely the name, in particular when it is an E-mail > address, by sending back an E-mail to that address. A next level is > to use some background check with a data base to make sure of the > information that is provided. A next level is to ask for one proof > of identity and other related information. A next level is to ask > for two proofs of identity and other related information. I will > stop here these examples. > > The industry has introduced the concept of classes of certificates. > The problem is that each CA issuer has made its own definition of > what such a class is. > > Maybe it is now the right time to raise the question whether we > should standardize the concept of classes of certificates. > For PKIX, I would vote "NO" to this question. Maybe the PKI Forum or somebody else should pick it up. Murray> I agree with refraining from attaching a level of class to a certificate. We went through iterations of trying to implement levels of trust based on CA hierarchy. Basically a root CA over n Sub CA's, each having a level of assurance. We moved away from it due to consuming applications not really comprehending the difference and that they all chain to a common root. We are hoping that a user will be issued a primary identification certificate, which does exactly that identifies who they are not what they can or can't do, and then depend on either policy OID's or attribute certificates to provide capabilities. > In this way we would recognize various levels of verification. We > would also need to say how the express the concept of class in the > certificate. We do not necessarily need a new extension for this. > Let us keep certificates slim. :-). > > Denis > Al Arsenault Chief Security Architect Diversinet Corp. Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FAA13749 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 05:37:13 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KLC3NL9W>; Thu, 18 May 2000 08:44:38 -0400 Message-ID: <918C70B01822D411A87400B0D0204DFF04BF89@panda.chrysalis-its.com> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: TSA Response serialNumber Field Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 08:44:20 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Salut Denis, I do not remember if this issue was raised before, but although I understand that there is no limit on the size of an Integer value, the "serialNumber" field of a time stamping response in Section 2.4.2 will ultimately become an enormously large number over the life of a TSA that is issuing numerous time stamps per second. Would it not be more sensible for the serialNumber field to optionally be a monotonically increasing integer from one TimeStampToken to the next within a fixed period of time specified by the TSA's policy (e.g. a week, a day, an hour, etc.)? Such a serialNumber with the appropriate period of time would still provide a way to build a unique identifier to reference a time stamp token. Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5076 ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from mail.rdc1.md.home.com (imail@ha1.rdc1.md.home.com [24.2.2.66]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FAA13067 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 05:24:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from home.com ([24.4.133.54]) by mail.rdc1.md.home.com (InterMail vM.4.01.02.00 201-229-116) with ESMTP id <20000518123038.BORU23916.mail.rdc1.md.home.com@home.com> for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 05:30:38 -0700 Message-ID: <3923E1E8.F078A303@home.com> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 08:28:24 -0400 From: Al Arsenault <awa1@home.com> Organization: @Home Network X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en]C-AtHome0407 (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB57@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <v04220801b549227ae10c@[128.33.238.84]> <39239354.7F5AEB3E@bull.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Denis Pinkas wrote: > > Hum !!! Interesting discussion between the two co-chairs. :-) > I agree with Steve on this one. > Whatever information is contained in a certificate, there are > various degrees of verification that can apply. The verification > level may even be different for each field. To this respect, Warwick > is right to say that a flag would not be adequate. > > A certificate must contain a name that may be carried in the DN > field or the SubjectAltName extension. That name must be unique and > is assigned by the CA. The name, wherever it is placed, must be > verified (well with the exception of pseudonyms that can only be > verified not to collide) with some *reasonable* degree of > verification. > > All other extra fields related to the user that we allow to be > present in a certificate are not mandated. If a phone number is > included does that means that the CA has simply accepted the phone > number that was included in the registration form ? or that the CA > has requested a proof from a telephone company that the applicant > was the legitimate subscriber of the phone line ? or that the CA has > made a phone call to that number to get the person on the phone ? > In general, if the CA is not also the RA, the CA accepts the RA's assertion that the RA is either authoritative for all information to go in the certificate, or that the RA has verified the information with whomever is authoritative. That is, the RA has certified that "this is Al's e-mail address, because I issued it", and "this is Al's phone number, which I ran around to his desk and verified or called the company phone office to verify or ..." If the CA is also acting as the RA, then it is the CA's job to do this verification. Of course, how well this job is done is a function of the CPS (or other policy document which serves in place of the CPS, as I was reminded at a meeting yesterday :-), but it needs to be done. Giving me a certificate with a subjectAltName, OtherName type, of Phone_number = the_White_House_switchboard is somewhat irresponsible on the part of the CA, and should not be condoned by PKIX. > The answer to the issue raised is not black or white. Today there > exists (free) certificates where no verification (except uniqueness > of name) is performed. There are used for testing purposes, and > should be recognized as such (but they are not). A next level is to > verify very loosely the name, in particular when it is an E-mail > address, by sending back an E-mail to that address. A next level is > to use some background check with a data base to make sure of the > information that is provided. A next level is to ask for one proof > of identity and other related information. A next level is to ask > for two proofs of identity and other related information. I will > stop here these examples. > > The industry has introduced the concept of classes of certificates. > The problem is that each CA issuer has made its own definition of > what such a class is. > > Maybe it is now the right time to raise the question whether we > should standardize the concept of classes of certificates. > For PKIX, I would vote "NO" to this question. Maybe the PKI Forum or somebody else should pick it up. > In this way we would recognize various levels of verification. We > would also need to say how the express the concept of class in the > certificate. We do not necessarily need a new extension for this. > Let us keep certificates slim. :-). > > Denis > Al Arsenault Chief Security Architect Diversinet Corp. Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA27815 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 01:15:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA20640; Thu, 18 May 2000 10:22:02 +0200 Message-ID: <3923A82D.8F4BC33F@bull.net> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 10:22:05 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <200005180749.JAA00795@emeriau.edelweb.fr> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > > A certificate must contain a name that may be carried in the DN > > field or the SubjectAltName extension. That name must be unique and > > is assigned by the CA. The name, wherever it is placed, must be > > verified (well with the exception of pseudonyms that can only be > > verified not to collide) with some *reasonable* degree of > > verification. > > > 'Unique' does seem the right word to me. You can have more than one > 'name' for the same object, like a pseudonym and a 'real' name. > > Are you talking about 'non-ambigous names'? No. Unique means that a name, once given to one entity, must not be given to a different entity (in short not issued twice to two different entities). Denis Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA24859 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 18 May 2000 00:43:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id JAA07881; Thu, 18 May 2000 09:49:16 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Thu, 18 May 2000 09:49:16 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id JAA13365; Thu, 18 May 2000 09:49:14 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id JAA00795; Thu, 18 May 2000 09:49:14 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 09:49:14 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005180749.JAA00795@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: kent@bbn.com, WFord@verisign.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > A certificate must contain a name that may be carried in the DN > field or the SubjectAltName extension. That name must be unique and > is assigned by the CA. The name, wherever it is placed, must be > verified (well with the exception of pseudonyms that can only be > verified not to collide) with some *reasonable* degree of > verification. > 'Unique' does seem the right word to me. You can have more than one 'name' for the same object, like a pseudonym and a 'real' name. Are you talking about 'non-ambigous names'? Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA21235 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 17 May 2000 23:47:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA20388; Thu, 18 May 2000 08:53:06 +0200 Message-ID: <39239354.7F5AEB3E@bull.net> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 08:53:08 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB57@vhqpostal.verisign.com> <v04220801b549227ae10c@[128.33.238.84]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hum !!! Interesting discussion between the two co-chairs. :-) Whatever information is contained in a certificate, there are various degrees of verification that can apply. The verification level may even be different for each field. To this respect, Warwick is right to say that a flag would not be adequate. A certificate must contain a name that may be carried in the DN field or the SubjectAltName extension. That name must be unique and is assigned by the CA. The name, wherever it is placed, must be verified (well with the exception of pseudonyms that can only be verified not to collide) with some *reasonable* degree of verification. All other extra fields related to the user that we allow to be present in a certificate are not mandated. If a phone number is included does that means that the CA has simply accepted the phone number that was included in the registration form ? or that the CA has requested a proof from a telephone company that the applicant was the legitimate subscriber of the phone line ? or that the CA has made a phone call to that number to get the person on the phone ? The answer to the issue raised is not black or white. Today there exists (free) certificates where no verification (except uniqueness of name) is performed. There are used for testing purposes, and should be recognized as such (but they are not). A next level is to verify very loosely the name, in particular when it is an E-mail address, by sending back an E-mail to that address. A next level is to use some background check with a data base to make sure of the information that is provided. A next level is to ask for one proof of identity and other related information. A next level is to ask for two proofs of identity and other related information. I will stop here these examples. The industry has introduced the concept of classes of certificates. The problem is that each CA issuer has made its own definition of what such a class is. Maybe it is now the right time to raise the question whether we should standardize the concept of classes of certificates. In this way we would recognize various levels of verification. We would also need to say how the express the concept of class in the certificate. We do not necessarily need a new extension for this. Let us keep certificates slim. :-). Denis > Warwick, > > >The meaning of "verify" (in this context) is entirely a matter of policy, > >and needs to be made clear in the CP/CPS wrt all fields of material > >significance. Re our long-ago discussion on "non-verified subscriber > >information", I recall us agreeing that a certificate *may* (subject to > >policy) contain non-verified subscriber information. However, because > >"verification" means different things for different fields, a binary flag > >was not the answer. The extent to which different fields are verified (or > >not) by a CA is expressed in the CP/CPS. > > > >I believe this interpretation extends to subjectAltName since different > >alternatives will unquestionably be "verified" in different ways. > > We disagree wrt inclusion of non-verified info, and the consensus of > the WG in this regard. I agree that a CA policy may declare that a > CA has chosen to do this, but I believe that such behavior warrants > censure. > > Steve Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id VAA12388 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 17 May 2000 21:30:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [128.33.238.32] (TC032.BBN.COM [128.33.238.32]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id AAA11661; Thu, 18 May 2000 00:35:48 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220801b549227ae10c@[128.33.238.84]> In-Reply-To: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB57@vhqpostal.verisign.com> References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB57@vhqpostal.verisign.com> Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 00:32:21 -0400 To: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Warwick, >The meaning of "verify" (in this context) is entirely a matter of policy, >and needs to be made clear in the CP/CPS wrt all fields of material >significance. Re our long-ago discussion on "non-verified subscriber >information", I recall us agreeing that a certificate *may* (subject to >policy) contain non-verified subscriber information. However, because >"verification" means different things for different fields, a binary flag >was not the answer. The extent to which different fields are verified (or >not) by a CA is expressed in the CP/CPS. > >I believe this interpretation extends to subjectAltName since different >alternatives will unquestionably be "verified" in different ways. We disagree wrt inclusion of non-verified info, and the consensus of the WG in this regard. I agree that a CA policy may declare that a CA has chosen to do this, but I believe that such behavior warrants censure. Steve Received: from mtiwmhc27.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc27.worldnet.att.net [204.127.131.52]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id RAA14072 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 17 May 2000 17:47:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: from CC787228A ([12.78.235.241]) by mtiwmhc27.worldnet.att.net (InterMail vM.4.01.02.39 201-229-119-122) with SMTP id <20000518005404.UKIB2120.mtiwmhc27.worldnet.att.net@CC787228A>; Thu, 18 May 2000 00:54:04 +0000 Message-ID: <000201bfc063$8e2073d0$f1eb4e0c@CC787228A> From: "Al Arsenault" <aarsenault@dvnet.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Cc: <awa1@home.com> References: <01bfbfa7$d76f4320$36850418@cc787228-a.hwrd1.md.home.com> Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Date: Wed, 17 May 2000 13:25:38 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2014.211 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2014.211 Bob, I think that in general Steve and Paul have addressed this issue well - PKIX should not support the presence of an "unverified" attribute in a certificate. To the extent that a CPS specifies, a CA should make every attempt to validate that a subject is entitled to claim some attribute - such as an e-mail address - the CA puts in a certificate. Such validation will typically include interaction with the name authority responsible for that particular namespace - e.g., with whomever issues e-mail accounts at the particular mail server. Specific comments: > > -----Original Message----- > From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> > To: Al Arsenault <aarsenault@dvnet.com>; 'Paul Koning' <pkoning@xedia.com> > Cc: martin.szotkowski@ica.cz <martin.szotkowski@ica.cz>; ietf-pkix@imc.org > <ietf-pkix@imc.org> > Date: Monday, May 15, 2000 3:10 PM > Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification > > > >At 02:50 PM 5/15/2000 -0400, Al Arsenault wrote: > >>I have to disagree with Bob on this. To me, the words imply what they > say - > >>that if the CA is going to issue a certificate that says that my > >>subjectAltName of the form rfc822Name is "aarsenault@dvnet.com", the CA > >>must have taken some steps to verify that that is indeed the case. (e.g., > >>the CA could have a notarized letter from the authority responsible for > >>assigning those e-mail addresses.) To do otherwise is false or misleading > >>behavior on the part of the CA. > > > >First question: > > > >What are we going to use as the SubjectAltName in your Netopia box on your > >DSL line in your house, Al? Shouldn't be YOUR email address, Al. What > >FQDN? Remember there is no static IP address for you, everytime you boot > >the Netopia, it can get a new IP address from the ISP. > > AWA: Let's suppose hypothetically that my cable modem provider uses DHCP, and issues me a new IP address every time I power on my computer. To me, it would be foolish for any CA to issue me a certificate with an IP address in a subjectAltName, since the certificate would become invalid every time I powered off the computer. On the other hand, since my e-mail address doesn't change very often, it's perfectly OK for a CA, after checking with the account administrator, to issue me a cert with rfc822Name = awa1@home.com. > >Taking the FQDN further, these are internal boxes, getting a third party > >cert. The CA cannot do a DNS query on the internal DNS server. > > > >This all comes down to the CP and CPS. Here is where is stated the method > >use to establish the content of SubjectAltName. Now it would be really > >nice if there were a KEYNOTE object in the cert that would express the > >method of validation... > > Al Arsenault Chief Security Architect Diversinet Corp. Received: from pigeon.verisign.com ([208.206.241.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA11082 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 17 May 2000 15:35:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from postal-gw2.verisign.com (mailhost2.verisign.com [208.206.241.102]) by pigeon.verisign.com (8.9.3/BCH1.7.1) with ESMTP id PAA28438; Wed, 17 May 2000 15:38:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: by postal-gw2.verisign.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KJDMG3RL>; Wed, 17 May 2000 15:39:45 -0700 Message-ID: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB57@vhqpostal.verisign.com> From: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> To: "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Wed, 17 May 2000 15:39:43 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" The meaning of "verify" (in this context) is entirely a matter of policy, and needs to be made clear in the CP/CPS wrt all fields of material significance. Re our long-ago discussion on "non-verified subscriber information", I recall us agreeing that a certificate *may* (subject to policy) contain non-verified subscriber information. However, because "verification" means different things for different fields, a binary flag was not the answer. The extent to which different fields are verified (or not) by a CA is expressed in the CP/CPS. I believe this interpretation extends to subjectAltName since different alternatives will unquestionably be "verified" in different ways. Warwick -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com] Sent: Monday, May 15, 2000 9:46 PM To: Robert Moskowitz Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Bob, The underlying assumption is that the CA is vouching for the accuracy of ALL data in a certificate. A syntax check is NOT what one would expect. yes, the CPS may hedge on how good a check the CA does, but there IS a presumption that the CA has made some effort to verify the info. We long ago debated this issue; some folks wanted to have a flag for a CA to set to indicate the presence of non-verified data. We rejected that approach. Steve Received: from ns1.point.cz (ns1.point.cz [194.212.10.45]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA09360 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 17 May 2000 14:20:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from redwolf (im [192.168.172.250]) by ns1.point.cz (8.9.3/8.8.7) with ESMTP id WAA01119 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 17 May 2000 22:24:34 +0200 Message-ID: <038e01bfc046$f9c452e0$faaca8c0@citynet.cz> From: "Ivo MACHULDA" <im@point.cz> To: "ietf-pkix" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Can I insert char "@" in to common name in certificate? Date: Wed, 17 May 2000 23:29:25 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-2" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2919.6600 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600 Dear sir, Please tell me.Can I insert char "@" in to common name in certificate? Thank you very much Ivo MACHULDA Received: from 5sigexch2.hq.5sigcmd.army.mil (5sigexch2.hq.5sigcmd.army.mil [147.40.98.22]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA03754 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 23:20:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 5sigexch2.hq.5sigcmd.army.mil with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.10) id <K4K5SCY2>; Wed, 17 May 2000 08:26:16 +0200 Message-ID: <7FB25443A2E7D311B79500810080A69C1B188F@5sigexch5.hq.5sigcmd.army.mil> From: "Stringfield, Robert Mr." <stringfr@hq.5sigcmd.army.mil> To: "'BJUENEMAN@novell.com'" <BJUENEMAN@novell.com>, peterw@valicert.com, ietf-pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Thierry Van Doninck'" <Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be> Subject: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI Date: Wed, 17 May 2000 08:26:04 +0200 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.10) It was not being able to read the text that I found interesting but the fact that the cert came intact to me over a Listserver. Using my DOD PKI cert I was able to trust the Novell cert and read the tact. Think that I also am able to use it to send SMIME mail to Bob. How for I have been unable to send SMIME text over Lsoft's ListServ. --bob Robert L. Stringfield DMS/PKI 5th Signal Command DSN: 380-5857 FAX: 380-5858 mailto:stringfr@hq.5sigcmd.army.mil http://www.5sigcmd.army.mil/DMS/dms.htm http://www.5sigcmd.army.mil/pki/pki.htm http://144.170.207.251/archives/index.html > Truth: We own the Night!!! - DeathStar Warriors > -----Original Message----- From: BJUENEMAN@novell.com [mailto:BJUENEMAN@novell.com] [My apologies -- in the course of reconfiguring my NT to be C2 compliant, the setting for digitally signed mail reverted to base64 encoding, leaving some people who are not S/MIME capable (poor souls!) unable to read the text. Sorry 'bout that.] <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<SNIP>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Received: from prv-mail20.provo.novell.com (prv-mail20.provo.novell.com [137.65.81.122]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id NAA22246 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 13:07:02 -0700 (PDT) From: BJUENEMAN@novell.com Message-Id: <200005162007.NAA22246@ns.secondary.com> Received: from INET-PRV-Message_Server by prv-mail20.provo.novell.com with Novell_GroupWise; Tue, 16 May 2000 14:13:02 -0600 Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 14:12:00 -0600 X-Mailer: Groupwise 5.5.3.1 Subject: RE: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI To: peterw@valicert.com, ietf-pkix<ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Thierry Van Doninck'"<Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be> Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="____SRUSHISZHIUMINBRKRDA____" --____SRUSHISZHIUMINBRKRDA____ Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="____THGSLHIQVBYKABORKGBY____" --____THGSLHIQVBYKABORKGBY____ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable [My apologies -- in the course of reconfiguring my NT to be C2 compliant, the setting for digitally signed mail reverted to base64 encoding, leaving = some=20 people who are not S/MIME capable (poor souls!) unable to read the text. Sorry 'bout that.] Peter, Although I agree that such questions might better be addressed to the=20 certalk list, I also agree with you that we should occasionally take = the=20 pulse of the industry and see who has actually rolled out commercial-grade= =20 products that implement that various standards. And I thank you for including the link to one of Novell's web pages, which = I was not aware of. I have contacted the document owner to have it updated. For the record, Novell's GroupWise 5.5 Enhancement Pack e-mail product =20 supports S/MIME using EITHER the Entrust PKI solution, OR a more convention= al PKI solution that is based on the CSP capabilities provided by MS-CAPI and = Internet=20 Explorer. The current version supports S/MIME version 2, and most of version 3. = Release schedules together with the uncertain state of CRL support by various CAs = back=20 in mid-1999 led us to delay the availability of CRL processing in = GroupWise. This capability is currently scheduled for later this year.=20 Likewise, although support for S/MIME v3's separation between encryption = keys=20 and digital signature keys was part of the original development, we chose = not to=20 feature ro recommend that usage at this time, due to the fact that Outlook = Express=20 seriously mishandles such dual keys, and frequently ends up sending=20 an encrypted reply to the sender, using the sender's signature key. Entrust chose to try to undo that kind of mess by obligingly decrypting = the message=20 using the signature key, but we felt that such an approach would seriously = distort the intent of the key usage policy, including controls over how the keys = were=20 generated, how they were archived, etc. We expect to fully support dual = key usage later this year, and we hope by that time the Outlook Express bug will = have been fixed. To the best of our knowledge, GroupWise can be used to request certificates= from any commercial CA, and our interoperability tests did not disclose any = particular difficulties with a rather wide variety of X.509 v3 certificates. GroupWise can also consume certificates issued in bulk from Novell's own = free Novell Certificate Server product 2.0, of course, and those certificates = can also=20 be used by IE for SSL mutual authentication. Sometimes it seems like it takes forever, but we have in fact come a long, = long way=20 from the PEM days. Regards, Bob >>> Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> 05/15/00 04:46PM >>> http://support.microsoft.com/support/exchange/content/whitepapers/win2k_kms= Received: from sothmxs01.entrust.com (gatekeeper.entrust.com [204.101.128.170]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA20114 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 11:14:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: by sothmxs01.entrust.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <K828BML2>; Tue, 16 May 2000 14:20:04 -0400 Message-ID: <01E1D01C12D7D211AFC70090273D20B101715911@sothmxs06.entrust.com> From: Carlisle Adams <carlisle.adams@entrust.com> To: "'denis bider'" <denis.bider@siol.net> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, "'rgm@icsa.net'" <rgm@icsa.net> Subject: RE: RFC 2511: PKIArchiveOptions encoding? Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 14:20:03 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Denis, Your first alternative below ("the clean one") is correct: tagging is EXPLICIT in a CHOICE. If you don't have the ASN.1 specifications, there are a number of publicly-available books and tutorials on the subject. One such example is the book "ASN.1: The Tutorial and Reference" by Douglas Steedman (1990) -- see pages 66-67 for a discussion on this particular issue. Carlisle. P.S., As for real-world implementations of 2511 for interoperability testing purposes, you can join the CMP/CRMF interop trials that have been on-going for some time now. Contact Bob Moskowitz (rgm@icsa.net) or the PKI Forum (http://www.pkiforum.org) for further details. > ---------- > From: denis bider[SMTP:denis.bider@siol.net] > Sent: Tuesday, May 16, 2000 9:15 AM > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: RFC 2511: PKIArchiveOptions encoding? > > Hello, > > I am reading RFC 2511 and trying to understand how to properly parse the > PKIArchiveOptions choice field. For your convenience, I am attaching the > relevant ASN.1 definitions at the end of this message. > > PKIArchiveOptions is a CHOICE with three possible value types, each of > which > is implicitly tagged ([0], [1], [2]). Now, the problem is, the first one > of > these types, [0] EncryptedKey, is a CHOICE as well. Now, EncryptedKey has > two possible value types with two possible tags among them. One > possibility, > EnvelopedData, has an implicit tag of [0], and the other one, > EncryptedValue, is a SEQUENCE. > > My question is - how does this fit together? I see two possibilities: > - The clean one: the EncryptedKey type within PKIArchiveOptions is > actually not implicitly tagged, but rather is explicitly tagged, because > it > is a CHOICE within a CHOICE. However, this fact is not stated in the ASN.1 > definition because there is some clause in the ASN.1 specification that > already says that this applies in such cases. (Unfortunately, I do not > have > access to such an ASN.1 specification.) > - The dirty one: the EncryptedKey type within PKIArchiveOptoins is > indeed > implicitly tagged. Therefore, it actually has two possible tags: [0] if > the > sub-type being used is EnvelopedData, and SEQUENCE if the sub-type being > used is EncryptedValue. > > Is there someone here who would care to point me in the right direction? > > Also, I would be glad if someone could enumerate some real-world > implementations of RFC 2511; it would be great if I could test my > implementation against others that are already proven. > > Note: I tried searching the archives, but the archive site turned out to > be > rather useless. The only feasible way to search the archives is to scan > the > subject lines, which are on 13 different pages, for keywords that one > might > only hope will appear in the subject of a related message. The only > alternative is to download the entire archive file and search that file > with > one's favourite tools. However, at a file size of 16 MB and a throughput > of > 10KB per second this is not a very appealing alternative. > > Kind regards, > > denis bider > > > > Some relevant ASN.1 definitions: > > PKIArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE { > encryptedPrivKey [0] EncryptedKey, > -- the actual value of the private key > keyGenParameters [1] KeyGenParameters, > -- parameters which allow the private key to be re-generated > archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN } > -- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private > -- key of a key pair which the receiver generates in response to > -- this request; set to FALSE if no archival is desired. > > EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { > encryptedValue EncryptedValue, > envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } > -- The encrypted private key MUST be placed in the envelopedData > -- encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING. > > EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE { > ... > } > > Received: from prv-mail20.provo.novell.com (prv-mail20.provo.novell.com [137.65.81.122]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id HAA14677 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 07:42:23 -0700 (PDT) From: BJUENEMAN@novell.com Message-Id: <200005161442.HAA14677@ns.secondary.com> Received: from INET-PRV-Message_Server by prv-mail20.provo.novell.com with Novell_GroupWise; Tue, 16 May 2000 08:48:08 -0600 Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 08:47:00 -0600 X-Mailer: Groupwise 5.5.3.1 Subject: RE: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI To: peterw@valicert.com, ietf-pkix<ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Thierry Van Doninck'"<Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be> Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7m"; modification-date="Tue, 16 May 2000 08:47:48 -0600" MIIiqQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIimjCCIpYCAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIIWGwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBoIIW DASCFghGcm9tOiBCSlVFTkVNQU5Abm92ZWxsLmNvbQ0KU3ViamVjdDogUkU6IERvZXMgU21pbWUg d29ya3MgZmluZSB3aXRoIFdpbmRvd3MgMjAwMCBQS0kNClRvOiBwZXRlcndAdmFsaWNlcnQuY29t 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PAA14384; Tue, 16 May 2000 15:06:43 +0100 (GMT/IST) Received: from bobcat.baltimore.ie(192.168.20.10) by balinese.baltimore.ie via smap (V4.2) id xma014376; Tue, 16 May 00 15:06:41 +0100 Received: from baltimore.ie (lease173-21.baltimore.ie [192.168.21.173]) by bobcat.baltimore.ie (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA21395; Tue, 16 May 2000 15:06:41 +0100 Message-ID: <39215610.7C98049D@baltimore.ie> Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 15:07:13 +0100 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> Reply-To: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Organization: Baltimore Technologies Ltd. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Linn, John" <jlinn@rsasecurity.com> CC: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, xme <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> Subject: Re: Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03 References: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A02D906@exna07.securitydynamics.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit John, "Linn, John" wrote: > > Stephen, re: > > ...PKINIT... So, we should keep the current text, but be ready to update the reference? Good. > Thanks. Particularly for long-lived ACs, it seems to me that the same > rationale (multiple revocation mechanisms) as contemplated for new-part1-01 > can apply here as well. Generally, since usage practice for AC management > is an early emerging area, I'm not sure that we've reached the best point to > make informed restrictive judgments about which of the techniques defined > for PKCs and ACs (in X.509) and PKCs (in new-part1-01) will be best > applicable to ACs for the Internet. As such, my inclination (here, as with > some other comments) was towards flexibility. Maybe I should ask the opposite questions: does anyone object to including more than one AIA AccessDescription? Does anyone object to including both AIA and CRLDP in an AC? > > The intent is really that svceAuthInfo is usable to authenticate the > > AC holder to some application "behind" the AC verifier, whereas, > > accessIdentity is intended to be used for authorization purposes, > > "by" the application that includes the AC verifier. > > Is the central distinction actually (1) authentication vs. authorization, or > (2) between the inclusion of (2a) information which is intended for > interpretation and validation within the AC verifier vs. (2b) information > which the AC verifier is expected to pass on for interpretation by some > other element at the target system? It seems more like (2) than (1) to me. > For (2b), the AC is basically acting as a container for the attribute, with > its contents' usage for authentication and/or authorization taking place > outside the scope of target-side AC processing. Fine. I've no problem adding the text below, including your mod to the scveAuthInfo paragraph. > > You're right that there is some potential for confusion here. Would > > the following additional text help? > > > > In 4.4.1 (svceAuthInfo): > > > > "This attribute is intended to be used to provide > > information, that can be used by the AC verifier (or a > > larger system of which the AC veriifer is a component) > > to authenticate the AC holder to another application. > > Note that this is a different use to that intended for > > the accessIdentity attribute in 4.4.2 below." > > What about, "information, that can be presented by the AC verifier to be > interpreted and authenticated by a separate application within the target > system"? If I'm understanding correctly above, it doesn't seem that the AC > verifier is actually performing the authentication. > > > > > In 4.4.1 (accessIdentity): > > > > "This attribute is intended to be used to provide > > information about the AC holder, that can be used > > by the AC verifier (or a larger system of which the > > AC veriifer is a component) to authorize the actions > > of the AC holder within the AC verifier's system. Note > > that this is a different use to that intended for > > the svceAuthInfo attribute described in 4.4.1 above." > > OK. > > In the interests of conciseness here, I'll defer discussion of the role > authority question to the separate subthread already opened on it. Yep. Stephen. -- ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 647 7406 61 Fitzwilliam Lane, fax: +353 1 647 7499 Dublin 2. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Ireland http://www.baltimore.com Received: from tholian.securitydynamics.com (tholian.securid.com [204.167.112.129]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id GAA12649 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 06:47:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sdtihq24.securitydynamics.com by tholian.securitydynamics.com via smtpd (for mail.imc.org [208.184.76.43]) with SMTP; 16 May 2000 13:49:16 UT Received: from exna00.securitydynamics.com (exna00.securitydynamics.com [10.2.1.110]) by sdtihq24.securid.com (Pro-8.9.3/Pro-8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA28222; Tue, 16 May 2000 09:52:50 -0400 (EDT) Received: by exna00.securitydynamics.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <KVNJD1G8>; Tue, 16 May 2000 09:53:26 -0400 Message-ID: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A02D906@exna07.securitydynamics.com> From: "Linn, John" <jlinn@rsasecurity.com> To: "'stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie'" <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> Cc: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03 Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 09:53:23 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Stephen, re: > > In Section 4.2, 1st paragraph, [PKINIT]'s CAT-WG Last-Call > is currently > > pending on revisions to another document; it hasn't yet > been submitted to > > the IESG. Note that if AC509 reaches the RFC editor first, > it may find its > > progress serialized on a normative reference. > > Do you think we should wait on PKINIT or duplicate the definition > of how to include a KerberosName into a GeneralName? The downside > of the latter is that two specs. define the same OID > (krb5PrincipalName), > which is ok so long as the OID doesn't change, but I'd rather refer > to PKINIT so long as it won't cause a v. long hold. What's the likely > downside of waiting on PKINIT? (i.e. what's it depend on, any idea > of likely timing) I agree with the merits of citing the definition if feasible, and thereby avoiding the possibility of future divergence. PKINIT is targeted for WG Last-Call along with Kerberos-Revisions (aka RFC1510bis). Depending on scheduling, this may happen either under the current CAT-WG umbrella or under the auspices of a new WG being chartered specifically to pursue Kerberos topics. In either case, I hope to see the pair of documents at the WG Last-Call level in advance of the Pittsburgh meeting. > > > 4.3.4, 1st paragraph: new-part1-01 allows a SEQUENCE OF > AccessDescription in > > an AIA extension, which allows multiple access modes to be > specified for > > revocation information and/or allows other CA-related > information to be > > defined and accessed via AIA. Why apply a tighter > constraint (single > > AccessDescription only) for use of AIA in ACs? > > I guess that was me trying to make the implementation easier, but I've > no problem changing this if folks need more than one. What do others > think? Thanks. Particularly for long-lived ACs, it seems to me that the same rationale (multiple revocation mechanisms) as contemplated for new-part1-01 can apply here as well. Generally, since usage practice for AC management is an early emerging area, I'm not sure that we've reached the best point to make informed restrictive judgments about which of the techniques defined for PKCs and ACs (in X.509) and PKCs (in new-part1-01) will be best applicable to ACs for the Internet. As such, my inclination (here, as with some other comments) was towards flexibility. > > > 4.4.1 and 4.4.2: I'm confused about the relationship between Service > > Authentication Information and Access Identity attributes. > Both are based > > on the SvceAuthInfo structure, differing only in that > Access Identity > > prohibits inclusion of its authInfo element. If I'm > presenting only a > > "service" and an "ident", is there any rationale for > deciding whether to do > > so in a Service Authentication Information (omitting the > OPTIONAL authInfo) > > or to do so in an Access Identity? As a verifier, should I > look equivalently > > at both? > > The intent is really that svceAuthInfo is usable to authenticate the > AC holder to some application "behind" the AC verifier, whereas, > accessIdentity is intended to be used for authorization purposes, > "by" the application that includes the AC verifier. Is the central distinction actually (1) authentication vs. authorization, or (2) between the inclusion of (2a) information which is intended for interpretation and validation within the AC verifier vs. (2b) information which the AC verifier is expected to pass on for interpretation by some other element at the target system? It seems more like (2) than (1) to me. For (2b), the AC is basically acting as a container for the attribute, with its contents' usage for authentication and/or authorization taking place outside the scope of target-side AC processing. > > You're right that there is some potential for confusion here. Would > the following additional text help? > > In 4.4.1 (svceAuthInfo): > > "This attribute is intended to be used to provide > information, that can be used by the AC verifier (or a > larger system of which the AC veriifer is a component) > to authenticate the AC holder to another application. > Note that this is a different use to that intended for > the accessIdentity attribute in 4.4.2 below." What about, "information, that can be presented by the AC verifier to be interpreted and authenticated by a separate application within the target system"? If I'm understanding correctly above, it doesn't seem that the AC verifier is actually performing the authentication. > > In 4.4.1 (accessIdentity): > > "This attribute is intended to be used to provide > information about the AC holder, that can be used > by the AC verifier (or a larger system of which the > AC veriifer is a component) to authorize the actions > of the AC holder within the AC verifier's system. Note > that this is a different use to that intended for > the svceAuthInfo attribute described in 4.4.1 above." OK. In the interests of conciseness here, I'll defer discussion of the role authority question to the separate subthread already opened on it. --jl Received: from shym.com (smtp.shym.com [208.247.128.18]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA11537 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 06:10:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from destroyer (gatekeeper.shym.com [208.247.128.2]) by shym.com (8.9.0/8.9.0) with SMTP id JAA29990 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 09:16:56 -0400 (EDT) From: "Scott J. Tamosunas" <STamosunas@shym.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: unsubscribe Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 09:17:21 -0400 Message-ID: <NDBBJHEGIKDNEFIKMICEGEHIDCAA.STamosunas@shym.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 unsubscribe Received: from mail.siol.net (odin.siol.net [193.189.160.10]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA11295 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 06:09:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from intergalactic ([213.250.43.61]) by mail.siol.net (InterMail vK.4.02.00.10 201-232-116-110 license def7f3c1ccee590d715bf25c5fe4cbb9) with SMTP id <20000516131535.JTQB14024.mail@intergalactic> for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 15:15:35 +0200 From: "denis bider" <denis.bider@siol.net> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RFC 2511: PKIArchiveOptions encoding? Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 15:15:57 +0200 Message-ID: <000001bfbf38$dff71910$0201010a@1div0.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook CWS, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Importance: Normal Hello, I am reading RFC 2511 and trying to understand how to properly parse the PKIArchiveOptions choice field. For your convenience, I am attaching the relevant ASN.1 definitions at the end of this message. PKIArchiveOptions is a CHOICE with three possible value types, each of which is implicitly tagged ([0], [1], [2]). Now, the problem is, the first one of these types, [0] EncryptedKey, is a CHOICE as well. Now, EncryptedKey has two possible value types with two possible tags among them. One possibility, EnvelopedData, has an implicit tag of [0], and the other one, EncryptedValue, is a SEQUENCE. My question is - how does this fit together? I see two possibilities: - The clean one: the EncryptedKey type within PKIArchiveOptions is actually not implicitly tagged, but rather is explicitly tagged, because it is a CHOICE within a CHOICE. However, this fact is not stated in the ASN.1 definition because there is some clause in the ASN.1 specification that already says that this applies in such cases. (Unfortunately, I do not have access to such an ASN.1 specification.) - The dirty one: the EncryptedKey type within PKIArchiveOptoins is indeed implicitly tagged. Therefore, it actually has two possible tags: [0] if the sub-type being used is EnvelopedData, and SEQUENCE if the sub-type being used is EncryptedValue. Is there someone here who would care to point me in the right direction? Also, I would be glad if someone could enumerate some real-world implementations of RFC 2511; it would be great if I could test my implementation against others that are already proven. Note: I tried searching the archives, but the archive site turned out to be rather useless. The only feasible way to search the archives is to scan the subject lines, which are on 13 different pages, for keywords that one might only hope will appear in the subject of a related message. The only alternative is to download the entire archive file and search that file with one's favourite tools. However, at a file size of 16 MB and a throughput of 10KB per second this is not a very appealing alternative. Kind regards, denis bider Some relevant ASN.1 definitions: PKIArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE { encryptedPrivKey [0] EncryptedKey, -- the actual value of the private key keyGenParameters [1] KeyGenParameters, -- parameters which allow the private key to be re-generated archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN } -- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private -- key of a key pair which the receiver generates in response to -- this request; set to FALSE if no archival is desired. EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { encryptedValue EncryptedValue, envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } -- The encrypted private key MUST be placed in the envelopedData -- encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING. EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE { ... } Received: from mail0.sse.ie (mail0.sse.ie [193.120.32.47]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id FAA08135 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 05:18:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail0.sse.ie (actually localhost) by mail0.sse.ie; Tue, 16 May 2000 13:17:03 +0100 Received: from taalap (taa-lap.sse.ie [193.120.32.86]) by mail0.sse.ie (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with SMTP id NAA15770; Tue, 16 May 2000 13:16:44 +0100 (BST) Message-ID: <000f01bfbf30$9342d7b0$562078c1@sse.ie> From: "Andy Dowling" <andy.dowling@sse.ie> To: <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie>, "Linn, John" <jlinn@rsasecurity.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "RussHousley" <housley@spyrus.com>, "xme" <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> References: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A02D904@exna07.securitydynamics.com> <39212CEC.44BB5C7E@baltimore.ie> Subject: Re: Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03 Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 13:16:15 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hi all, some comments regarding the PolicyAuthority: > Possible fixes are: > > 1. add back the role attribute with IetfAttrSyntax and delete > the role with RoleSyntax > 2. add back the role attribute with IetfAttrSyntax and leave in > the role with RoleSyntax, and say that if you want > policyAuthority information use the one with IetfAttrSyntax > 3. use the RoleSyntax.roleAuthority field in a way that doesn't > fit with X.509 > 4. define a method for including the policyAuthority in a http > URL in the RoleSyntax.roleName field, e.g. > "http://[[<host>][:<port>]]/<role>[?pa=<policy-authority>]" > and recommend that a (human readable) description of the > role be made available at that URL if a host:port are > present. > 5. Like 3, but define a new uri scheme, e.g. > "pkixrole:///<role>[/<policy-authority>] > > I'd go for 4, anyone else? If we do go for either 4 or 5, we'll need a standardised and "human readable" form of GeneralNames (which is what IETFAttrSyntax uses for the P.A.) in order to achieve the same level of flexibility with regard to naming a P.A. For example, let's suppose that we restrict our P.A. to a *single* GeneralName for encoding simplicity: The PA could be represented in the URL using the string representation of GeneralName from the PKIX group: http://manager?pa=directory: C=IE, O=SSE, CN=PA1 (Option 4) pkixrole://manager/directory: C=IE, O=SSE, CN=PA1 (Option 5) One question here would be how to handle spacing, etc. Will we permit spaces in this, or would we have to use the %HEX encoding scheme used on the web. If we do have to decode the hexes, this seems like a lot of overhead for decoding a simple PA GeneralNames. :-( Given such an encoding/decoding overhead, I'd be more inclined to go for 2. Any comments, folks? Andy Received: from balinese.baltimore.ie (firewall-user@pc215-8.indigo.ie [194.125.215.8]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id EAA04242 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 16 May 2000 04:05:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: by balinese.baltimore.ie; id MAA20523; Tue, 16 May 2000 12:11:34 +0100 (GMT/IST) Received: from bobcat.baltimore.ie(192.168.20.10) by balinese.baltimore.ie via smap (V4.2) id xma020481; Tue, 16 May 00 12:11:13 +0100 Received: from baltimore.ie (lease173-21.baltimore.ie [192.168.21.173]) by bobcat.baltimore.ie (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA11699; Tue, 16 May 2000 12:11:09 +0100 Message-ID: <39212CEC.44BB5C7E@baltimore.ie> Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 12:11:41 +0100 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> Reply-To: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Organization: Baltimore Technologies Ltd. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Linn, John" <jlinn@rsasecurity.com> CC: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, RussHousley <housley@spyrus.com>, xme <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> Subject: Re: Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03 References: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A02D904@exna07.securitydynamics.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hi John, > In Section 4.2, 1st paragraph, [PKINIT]'s CAT-WG Last-Call is currently > pending on revisions to another document; it hasn't yet been submitted to > the IESG. Note that if AC509 reaches the RFC editor first, it may find its > progress serialized on a normative reference. Do you think we should wait on PKINIT or duplicate the definition of how to include a KerberosName into a GeneralName? The downside of the latter is that two specs. define the same OID (krb5PrincipalName), which is ok so long as the OID doesn't change, but I'd rather refer to PKINIT so long as it won't cause a v. long hold. What's the likely downside of waiting on PKINIT? (i.e. what's it depend on, any idea of likely timing) > 4.2.6, 2nd line: suggest changing "period for which the AC issuer expects" > to "period for which the AC issuer certifies". Fine. > 4.3.4, 1st paragraph: new-part1-01 allows a SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription in > an AIA extension, which allows multiple access modes to be specified for > revocation information and/or allows other CA-related information to be > defined and accessed via AIA. Why apply a tighter constraint (single > AccessDescription only) for use of AIA in ACs? I guess that was me trying to make the implementation easier, but I've no problem changing this if folks need more than one. What do others think? > 4.4.1 and 4.4.2: I'm confused about the relationship between Service > Authentication Information and Access Identity attributes. Both are based > on the SvceAuthInfo structure, differing only in that Access Identity > prohibits inclusion of its authInfo element. If I'm presenting only a > "service" and an "ident", is there any rationale for deciding whether to do > so in a Service Authentication Information (omitting the OPTIONAL authInfo) > or to do so in an Access Identity? As a verifier, should I look equivalently > at both? The intent is really that svceAuthInfo is usable to authenticate the AC holder to some application "behind" the AC verifier, whereas, accessIdentity is intended to be used for authorization purposes, "by" the application that includes the AC verifier. You're right that there is some potential for confusion here. Would the following additional text help? In 4.4.1 (svceAuthInfo): "This attribute is intended to be used to provide information, that can be used by the AC verifier (or a larger system of which the AC veriifer is a component) to authenticate the AC holder to another application. Note that this is a different use to that intended for the accessIdentity attribute in 4.4.2 below." In 4.4.1 (accessIdentity): "This attribute is intended to be used to provide information about the AC holder, that can be used by the AC verifier (or a larger system of which the AC veriifer is a component) to authorize the actions of the AC holder within the AC verifier's system. Note that this is a different use to that intended for the svceAuthInfo attribute described in 4.4.1 above." > Is it valid to present both Service Authentication Information and > Access Identity in a single AC and, if so, are their corresponding elements > expected to match? It is valid to hold an AC containing both attributes, and of course, each may be multivalued, so there is no implication of any matching between the values, even if the service field has the same value. Its really up to the AC verifier to handle this (and the AC issuer not to issue nonsense ACs!). > 4.4.5: Reconsidering the list exchange about prohibiting roleAuthority > because of its X.509 association with role specification certificates, its > prohibition apparently implies that the authority responsible for a role > assignment must always be the AC issuer itself. This seems to conflict with > requirement 4 under Attribute Types in Section 3. Do we have a rationale > for requiring authority qualification more strongly for groups than for > roles, or if not do we need another means to represent roles' associated > authorities? You're right about this, I guess its a side-effect of using the X.509 role attribute that slipped in:-( Possible fixes are: 1. add back the role attribute with IetfAttrSyntax and delete the role with RoleSyntax 2. add back the role attribute with IetfAttrSyntax and leave in the role with RoleSyntax, and say that if you want policyAuthority information use the one with IetfAttrSyntax 3. use the RoleSyntax.roleAuthority field in a way that doesn't fit with X.509 4. define a method for including the policyAuthority in a http URL in the RoleSyntax.roleName field, e.g. "http://[[<host>][:<port>]]/<role>[?pa=<policy-authority>]" and recommend that a (human readable) description of the role be made available at that URL if a host:port are present. 5. Like 3, but define a new uri scheme, e.g. "pkixrole:///<role>[/<policy-authority>] I'd go for 4, anyone else? > Sec. 5, first numbered list, item 6: I believe that this profile shouldn't > preclude acceptance of ACs bearing critical extensions which are recognized > by the verifier even if those extensions are defined in other documents. Fine. > Sec. 6, penultimate paragraph: I can see why noRevAvail wouldn't coexist > with other revocation-related extensions, but what's the rationale for > diverging from new-part1-01 and prohibiting use of multiple revocation > facilities for an AC? I guess my response is the same as to your comment on 4.3.4: simplicity for the implementor, and as above, I'm ok with changing it if folks want that. BTW: As an aside, is the relying party behaviour when faced with a cert (PKC or AC) containing many sources of revocation status well defined? > Editorial: > > 4.3.4, 5th paragraph, last line: "administrator identify" -> "administrator > to identify". > > 7.1, 5th para, 3rd line: "attribue" -> "attribute". > > Sec. 8, 6th para: "issued to the AC issuer" -> "issued by the AC issuer"? > > Sec. 8, 2nd para, 3rd line: "issuer's" -> "issuers". > > Sec. 8, penultimate para, penultimate line: "AC verified trusts" -> "AC > verifier trusts". Ta, Stephen. -- ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 647 7406 61 Fitzwilliam Lane, fax: +353 1 647 7499 Dublin 2. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Ireland http://www.baltimore.com Received: from iaik.tu-graz.ac.at (excalibur.iaik.tu-graz.ac.at [129.27.152.30]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA16768 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 23:46:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from PLIPP2 [129.27.152.34] by iaik.tu-graz.ac.at (SMTPD32-6.00) id A013B850152; Tue, 16 May 2000 08:52:03 +0200 Received: from 127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1] by PLIPP2 (IAIK S/MIME Mapper 2.0beta3 22/March/2000); Di, 16 Mai 2000 08:52:50 +0100 From: "Peter Lipp" <Peter.Lipp@iaik.at> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, <spki@c2.net>, <cert-talk@mail.structuredarts.com>, <ietf@ietf.org> Subject: announce: xmlcert discussion list Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 08:52:49 +0200 Message-ID: <NDBBLDEHJKOODMJCNBNCGEBHDNAA.Peter.Lipp@iaik.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=sha1; boundary="--IAIK.SMIME.MAPPER.018ED18F--"; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature" X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6700 Importance: Normal This is a multipart MIME message, it may require a MIME capable user agent. ----IAIK.SMIME.MAPPER.018ED18F-- Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable folks, In a discussion on the XML-DSig mailing list, it was suggested to consider representing (X-509?)-certificates in XML as an IETF/W3C-activity. To find out about the general interest in and potential support for such an activity, we set up a mailing-list to discuss this. You are invited to subscribe to this list by sending a message to listserv@iaik.at, which contains subscribe xmlcert <your name> in the body of the message. Contributions can then be sent to xmlcert@iaik.at, archives are available at http://jcewww.iaik.at/mailarchive/xmlcert/xmlthreads.html. Peter ______________________________________ Dr. Peter Lipp IAIK, TU Graz Inffeldgasse 16a, A-8010 Graz, Austria Tel: +43 316 873 5513 Fax: +43 316 873 5520 Web: www.iaik.at ----IAIK.SMIME.MAPPER.018ED18F-- Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAQAA oIIVIDCCBE0wggM5oAMCAQICAwGGrTAJBgUrDgMCHQUAMIIBEzELMAkGA1UEBhMC QVQxDzANBgNVBAgTBlN0eXJpYTENMAsGA1UEBxMER1JBWjEZMBcGA1UECRMQSW5m ZmVsZGdhc3NlIDE2YTEmMCQGA1UEChMdR1JBWiBVTklWRVJTSVRZIE9GIFRFQ0hO T0xPR1kxRzBFBgNVBAsTPkluc2l0dXRlIGZvciBBcHBsaWVkIEluZm9ybWF0aW9u IFByb2Nlc3NpbmcgYW5kIENvbW11bmljYXRpb25zMRkwFwYDVQQLExBJQUlLIElO VFJBTkVUIENBMRkwFwYDVQQDExBJQUlLIFRVLUdSQVogU0lHMSIwIAYDVQQMExlJ QUlLIGVsZWN0cm9uaWMgc2lnbmF0dXJlMB4XDTk5MTEyODIwMjIzOVoXDTAwMTEy ODIwMjIzOVowgZMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFUMSYwJAYDVQQKEx1HUkFaIFVOSVZFUlNJ 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for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 21:40:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [128.33.238.53] (TC084.BBN.COM [128.33.238.84]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id AAA16674; Tue, 16 May 2000 00:46:32 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220810b546822bbb03@[128.33.238.53]> In-Reply-To: <4.3.1.2.20000515145919.00e8a1f0@homebase.htt-consult.com> References: <4.3.1.2.20000515145919.00e8a1f0@homebase.htt-consult.com> Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 00:45:40 -0400 To: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Cc: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Bob, The underlying assumption is that the CA is vouching for the accuracy of ALL data in a certificate. A syntax check is NOT what one would expect. yes, the CPS may hedge on how good a check the CA does, but there IS a presumption that the CA has made some effort to verify the info. We long ago debated this issue; some folks wanted to have a flag for a CA to set to indicate the presence of non-verified data. We rejected that approach. Steve Received: from seine.valicert.com (corporate-gw.valicert.com [63.65.221.2]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA06051 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 15:44:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: by seine.valicert.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KZ4LHBSS>; Mon, 15 May 2000 15:46:49 -0700 Message-ID: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE235E276@seine.valicert.com> From: Peter Williams <peterw@valicert.com> To: "'Thierry Van Doninck'" <Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be>, ietf-pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 15:46:39 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" http://support.microsoft.com/support/exchange/content/whitepapers/win2k_kms. doc Thierry, I disagree with Phil. I personally measure the state of open-ness of the actual PKIX industry in the US by the work that Microsoft does in X.509. Determining open standards adoption and interoperability over time is an important element of standards making and national infrastructure(s) planning, in my perhaps simplistic view. http://www.microsoft.com/Exchange/55/gen/compare.htm is a (Microsoft-marketing) comparison of Exchange and PKI with competitive products that include PKI. The link give a glimpse of reality of PKIX in average enterprise mail products. Some other URLs discussing important aspects of S/MIME integration into commercial-grade internet environments: Beyond S/MIME and onto X.400 secure stacks/networks: http://www.microsoft.com/exchange/55/gen/Security.htm A Lotus study of PKI and S/MIME deployment - for Identrus banks: http://www.lotus.com/99/session.nsf/187801dd8d07636a8525677d005a4ac8/78888aa 0af9ec29b8525684e0079a8d3 A Study of Novell's integration with the world-class Entrust solution. http://support.novell.com/cgi-bin/search/search.pl?database_name=kb&type=HTM L&docid=%03%1fF170985%3a958429713%3a%20%28%20S%2fMIME%20%29%20%20%07%01%00&b yte_count=4399 If you add Netscape Certificate Server and RSA Keon/VeriSign to the analysis, we have moved quite a long way in the US from the PEM days. Peter. -----Original Message----- From: Philip Hallam-Baker [mailto:pbaker@verisign.com] Sent: Monday, May 15, 2000 6:05 AM To: 'Thierry Van Doninck'; ietf-pkix Subject: RE: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI Same answer, ask Microsoft, not an IETF development list. -----Original Message----- From: Thierry Van Doninck [mailto:Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be] Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 7:40 AM To: ietf-pkix Subject: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI Hi, Same message as on the smime mailing list. Has any of you good people any info on Windows 2000 PKI ? Thanks, Thierry ======================================================================== ============ Hi everybody, Just a question : Is there any known issues using S/MIME with Win2000PKI-certificates ? More generally, are Win2000 certificates usable with (and understood by ) the others mailers (especially Lotus Notes, Netscape, Eudora +plug-in?) Isn't Baltimore Unicert a "better choice" due to its greater compatibility ? Any advices are welcome. Regards, Laurent Deffranne Received: from tholian.securitydynamics.com (tholian.securid.com [204.167.112.129]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id NAA03328 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 13:38:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sdtihq24.securitydynamics.com by tholian.securitydynamics.com via smtpd (for mail.imc.org [208.184.76.43]) with SMTP; 15 May 2000 20:40:26 UT Received: from exna00.securitydynamics.com (exna00.securitydynamics.com [10.2.1.110]) by sdtihq24.securid.com (Pro-8.9.3/Pro-8.9.3) with ESMTP id QAA29793 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 16:44:09 -0400 (EDT) Received: by exna00.securitydynamics.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <KVNJC806>; Mon, 15 May 2000 16:44:44 -0400 Message-ID: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A02D904@exna07.securitydynamics.com> From: "Linn, John" <jlinn@rsasecurity.com> To: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03 Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 16:44:42 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" I'd like to offer some Last-Call comments and questions on draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt. Specifics: In Section 4.2, 1st paragraph, [PKINIT]'s CAT-WG Last-Call is currently pending on revisions to another document; it hasn't yet been submitted to the IESG. Note that if AC509 reaches the RFC editor first, it may find its progress serialized on a normative reference. 4.2.6, 2nd line: suggest changing "period for which the AC issuer expects" to "period for which the AC issuer certifies". It's quite probable that bindings to attributes will remain valid (and, hence, recertified) across the lifetimes of many successive short-lived ACs, and that the AC issuer will have no reason to expect otherwise at the point when an AC is issued. If a change occurs within an AC's validity period, then revocation can be applied if available; if not, the attributes' certification remains inextricably valid until the validity period expires. 4.3.4, 1st paragraph: new-part1-01 allows a SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription in an AIA extension, which allows multiple access modes to be specified for revocation information and/or allows other CA-related information to be defined and accessed via AIA. Why apply a tighter constraint (single AccessDescription only) for use of AIA in ACs? 4.4.1 and 4.4.2: I'm confused about the relationship between Service Authentication Information and Access Identity attributes. Both are based on the SvceAuthInfo structure, differing only in that Access Identity prohibits inclusion of its authInfo element. If I'm presenting only a "service" and an "ident", is there any rationale for deciding whether to do so in a Service Authentication Information (omitting the OPTIONAL authInfo) or to do so in an Access Identity? As a verifier, should I look equivalently at both? Is it valid to present both Service Authentication Information and Access Identity in a single AC and, if so, are their corresponding elements expected to match? 4.4.5: Reconsidering the list exchange about prohibiting roleAuthority because of its X.509 association with role specification certificates, its prohibition apparently implies that the authority responsible for a role assignment must always be the AC issuer itself. This seems to conflict with requirement 4 under Attribute Types in Section 3. Do we have a rationale for requiring authority qualification more strongly for groups than for roles, or if not do we need another means to represent roles' associated authorities? Sec. 5, first numbered list, item 6: I believe that this profile shouldn't preclude acceptance of ACs bearing critical extensions which are recognized by the verifier even if those extensions are defined in other documents. Sec. 6, penultimate paragraph: I can see why noRevAvail wouldn't coexist with other revocation-related extensions, but what's the rationale for diverging from new-part1-01 and prohibiting use of multiple revocation facilities for an AC? Editorial: 4.3.4, 5th paragraph, last line: "administrator identify" -> "administrator to identify". 7.1, 5th para, 3rd line: "attribue" -> "attribute". Sec. 8, 6th para: "issued to the AC issuer" -> "issued by the AC issuer"? Sec. 8, 2nd para, 3rd line: "issuer's" -> "issuers". Sec. 8, penultimate para, penultimate line: "AC verified trusts" -> "AC verifier trusts". --jl Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA02376 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 12:49:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQipid15689; Mon, 15 May 2000 19:55:23 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA27299; Mon, 15 May 00 15:51:59 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id PAA24414; Mon, 15 May 2000 15:55:18 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14624.22053.939286.749650@xedia.com> Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 15:55:17 -0400 (EDT) To: tgindin@us.ibm.com Cc: rgm-sec@htt-consult.com, martin.szotkowski@ica.cz, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <852568E0.006CDA80.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "tgindin" == tgindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> writes: tgindin> Existence of an IP address, DNS name or E-Mail address is tgindin> probably the wrong check for a CA to perform anyway. The tgindin> worst problem related to this would occur if I were to get a tgindin> certificate with a subjectAltName containing somebody else's tgindin> valid E-Mail address, rather than if I got tgindin> "jrnerd@nowhere.edu". Right. How bad that is depends on what assumptions the relying party makes. If he interprets the RFC text in the intuitively obvious way, that could be quite nasty, because "definitively bound" and "verified" have intuitive meanings that are rather strong. If he read what Robert wrote and mentally substituted "the subjectAltName doesn't have any particular meaning and nothing significant is guaranteed about it" then of course there probably is no problem. But if that's what is meant, the RFC should be corrected to say so. Right now, it sounds like the plain meaning of the words does not even come close to reality, which is a Bad Thing. paul Received: from e3.ny.us.ibm.com (e3.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.103]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA02109 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 12:42:48 -0700 (PDT) From: tgindin@us.ibm.com Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.22]) by e3.ny.us.ibm.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA123700; Mon, 15 May 2000 15:47:30 -0400 Received: from D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com (d51mta04.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.32]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.8.8m3/NCO v2.07) with SMTP id PAA27692; Mon, 15 May 2000 15:49:09 -0400 Received: by D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568E0.006CDD55 ; Mon, 15 May 2000 15:49:05 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: IBMUS To: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> cc: "Martin Szotkowski" <martin.szotkowski@ica.cz>, ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-ID: <852568E0.006CDA80.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 15:48:55 -0400 Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Existence of an IP address, DNS name or E-Mail address is probably the wrong check for a CA to perform anyway. The worst problem related to this would occur if I were to get a certificate with a subjectAltName containing somebody else's valid E-Mail address, rather than if I got "jrnerd@nowhere.edu". Tom Gindin Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> on 05/15/2000 02:09:10 PM To: "Martin Szotkowski" <martin.szotkowski@ica.cz>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> cc: Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification At 07:27 PM 5/9/2000 +0200, Martin Szotkowski wrote: >Hi all, >in RFC2459 (4.2.1.7) call : > >>Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitively >bound to the publick key, all parts of the subject alternative name MUST be >verified by the CA.<< >What exactly this means? IMHO, this can only mean that the CA verifies that the content of SubjectAltName follows the formatting rules of the CHOICE. That is if rfc822Name is used, then the rules of RFC 822 are followed. If dNSName is used, than RFC 1035. etc. These cannot be requied to be real values, that is some SMTP server respond with an IDENT for the email and some DNS respond to a query. WHY? The mail or DNS server might be internal and unreachable to the CA. IPsec looks at these as simple labeling formats. This is particularly true for dNSName for gateways on DSL models (ie 'mobile' gateways). >Must be e.g. email unique in one CA? must be unique for one man? >If yes, is there any way to determine that this man has this email? (How >this problem is resolving for DNS, IP, URI, etc.?) >If no, someone can stand out for some else in email communication? > >thanks for explanation >Martin > Robert Moskowitz ICSA Security Interest EMail: rgm-sec@htt-consult.com Received: from [165.227.249.13] (ip13.proper.com [165.227.249.13]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA01572 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 12:17:36 -0700 (PDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: phoffman@mail.imc.org Message-Id: <p0432030cb545fd09e98b@[165.227.249.13]> In-Reply-To: <4.3.1.2.20000515145919.00e8a1f0@homebase.htt-consult.com> References: <4.3.1.2.20000515145919.00e8a1f0@homebase.htt-consult.com> Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 12:24:01 -0700 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Paul Hoffman / IMC <phoffman@imc.org> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" At 3:05 PM -0400 5/15/00, Robert Moskowitz wrote: >At 02:50 PM 5/15/2000 -0400, Al Arsenault wrote: >>I have to disagree with Bob on this. Me too. "definitively bound" seems to be very, well, definitive. >What are we going to use as the SubjectAltName in your Netopia box >on your DSL line in your house, Al? I'm not Al, but I will answer: anything the CA wants. There are a variety of identifiers that a CA can use for the end entity. The CA should obviously use an identifier that the desired relying parties want to use. > Shouldn't be YOUR email address, Al. What FQDN? Remember there >is no static IP address for you, everytime you boot the Netopia, it >can get a new IP address from the ISP. That doesn't mean that there is no FQDN that will map to your router. Your ISP might (should?) be using DHCP with dynamic DNS that updates the FQDN each time the IP address changes. These have been around for years and have been shown to be interoperable. >Taking the FQDN further, these are internal boxes, getting a third >party cert. The CA cannot do a DNS query on the internal DNS server. Then the CA should not issue a cert using those types of identifiers. There are lots of other choices for types of identifiers, some of which might be appropriate for relying parties. If not, well, then there's no way for someone to identify the box in a cert. >This all comes down to the CP and CPS. Here is where is stated the >method use to establish the content of SubjectAltName. If the CPS says "I didn't check the binding between the ID and the public key" or "I checked it at the time of issuing but you probably won't be able to check it now", I would argue that no one should rely on that certificate. > Now it would be really nice if there were a KEYNOTE object in the >cert that would express the method of validation... That won't help if there is no way to come up with a useful identity for the relying party. --Paul Hoffman, Director --Internet Mail Consortium Received: from homebase.htt-consult.com ([63.82.18.210]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id LAA01011 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 11:59:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rgm.htt-consult.com ([63.82.18.195]) by homebase.htt-consult.com ; Mon, 15 May 2000 15:05:43 -0500 Message-Id: <4.3.1.2.20000515145919.00e8a1f0@homebase.htt-consult.com> X-Sender: rgm-sec@homebase.htt-consult.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1 Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 15:05:25 -0400 To: Al Arsenault <aarsenault@dvnet.com>, "'Paul Koning'" <pkoning@xedia.com> From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Cc: "martin.szotkowski@ica.cz" <martin.szotkowski@ica.cz>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> In-Reply-To: <01BFBE7C.EC6976A0.aarsenault@dvnet.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed At 02:50 PM 5/15/2000 -0400, Al Arsenault wrote: >I have to disagree with Bob on this. To me, the words imply what they say - >that if the CA is going to issue a certificate that says that my >subjectAltName of the form rfc822Name is "aarsenault@dvnet.com", the CA >must have taken some steps to verify that that is indeed the case. (e.g., >the CA could have a notarized letter from the authority responsible for >assigning those e-mail addresses.) To do otherwise is false or misleading >behavior on the part of the CA. First question: What are we going to use as the SubjectAltName in your Netopia box on your DSL line in your house, Al? Shouldn't be YOUR email address, Al. What FQDN? Remember there is no static IP address for you, everytime you boot the Netopia, it can get a new IP address from the ISP. Taking the FQDN further, these are internal boxes, getting a third party cert. The CA cannot do a DNS query on the internal DNS server. This all comes down to the CP and CPS. Here is where is stated the method use to establish the content of SubjectAltName. Now it would be really nice if there were a KEYNOTE object in the cert that would express the method of validation... Robert Moskowitz ICSA Security Interest EMail: rgm-sec@htt-consult.com Received: from dvnet2.dvnet.com ([209.121.31.3]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA00448 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 11:44:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from CC787228-A ([10.11.12.231]) by dvnet2.dvnet.com with SMTP (Microsoft Exchange Internet Mail Service Version 5.5.2448.0) id K4M6WMC8; Mon, 15 May 2000 14:55:29 -0400 Received: by localhost with Microsoft MAPI; Mon, 15 May 2000 14:50:34 -0400 Message-ID: <01BFBE7C.EC6976A0.aarsenault@dvnet.com> From: Al Arsenault <aarsenault@dvnet.com> To: "'Paul Koning'" <pkoning@xedia.com>, "rgm-sec@htt-consult.com" <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> Cc: "martin.szotkowski@ica.cz" <martin.szotkowski@ica.cz>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: SubjectAltName verification Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 14:50:33 -0400 X-Mailer: Microsoft Internet E-mail/MAPI - 8.0.0.4211 Encoding: 50 TEXT I have to disagree with Bob on this. To me, the words imply what they say - that if the CA is going to issue a certificate that says that my subjectAltName of the form rfc822Name is "aarsenault@dvnet.com", the CA must have taken some steps to verify that that is indeed the case. (e.g., the CA could have a notarized letter from the authority responsible for assigning those e-mail addresses.) To do otherwise is false or misleading behavior on the part of the CA. Al Arsenault Chief Security Architect Diversinet Corp. -----Original Message----- From: Paul Koning [SMTP:pkoning@xedia.com] Sent: Monday, May 15, 2000 2:22 PM To: rgm-sec@htt-consult.com Cc: martin.szotkowski@ica.cz; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification >>>>> "Robert" == Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> writes: Robert> At 07:27 PM 5/9/2000 +0200, Martin Szotkowski wrote: >> Hi all, in RFC2459 (4.2.1.7) call : >>Because the subject >> alternative name is considered to be definitively bound to the >> publick key, all parts of the subject alternative name MUST be >> verified by the CA.<< What exactly this means? Robert> IMHO, this can only mean that the CA verifies that the Robert> content of SubjectAltName follows the formatting rules of the Robert> CHOICE. That is if rfc822Name is used, then the rules of RFC Robert> 822 are followed. If dNSName is used, than RFC 1035. etc. Robert> These cannot be requied to be real values, that is some SMTP Robert> server respond with an IDENT for the email and some DNS Robert> respond to a query. Robert> WHY? Robert> The mail or DNS server might be internal and unreachable to Robert> the CA. It may well be that it's hard or impossible to do more. But this is NOT what the words quoted would suggest, not at all. "Definitively bound to" and "verified" does not intuitively translate to a mere syntax check. paul Received: from goose.prod.itd.earthlink.net (goose.prod.itd.earthlink.net [207.217.120.18]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA00278 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 11:43:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [38.29.122.207] (ip171.phoenix11.az.pub-ip.psi.net [38.29.123.171]) by goose.prod.itd.earthlink.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA27243 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 11:49:36 -0700 (PDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: hoytkesterson@mail.earthlink.net Message-Id: <a0431010ab545f6386ac7@[38.29.122.207]> Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 11:47:36 -0700 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: "Hoyt L. Kesterson II" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> Subject: plain text version of RE: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC 2459) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" i misclicked on my previous message and sent out styled text in my message. that has caused problems for some of you. here is the message in plain text I sent out an email on this subject to this list some time ago. We did raise a defect, 220, on this issue and have a approved a Technical Corrigendum, 3. to the 3rd edition, 97, X.509 as follows This corrects the defects reported in defect reports 9594/220. Clause 11.2 note 3 In Note 3, in the second sentence replace "shall be absent" with "may be absent". In Note 3, at the beginning of the 3rd sentence, replace "This may permit" with "If version is absent, this may permit" In Note 3, at the beginning of the 4th sentence, replace "An implementation that supports version 2 (or greater) CRLs may" with "An implementation that supports version 2 (or greater) CRLs, in the absence of version, may also" This allows PKIX implementors to be conformant to the 97 edition I wasn't too happy that this nuance was not understood by PKIX (it was first described as an X.509 error on this list) since I wrote the original text with a goal of interoperability. However, I understood that to many on this list interoperation with version 1 systems was not necessary. There I proposed, and the group agreed, that the shall be soften to a may. This allows the PKIX group to decide what its interoperability requirement is. After some pondering I now believe this is the proper approach for the standard and have taken this approach for several enhancements that we added for the 4th edition. hoyt >From: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> >To: "'Sam Schaen'" <schaen@mitre.org>, > Ismo Heikkonen > <ismo.heikkonen@sonera.com> >Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org >Subject: RE: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC 2 > 459) >Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 07:35:15 -0700 >List-Archive: http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/ >List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> >List-Unsubscribe: mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe > >The intent was as follows. A V1 CRL interpreter should correctly process a >CRL with extensions but with no version number -- it will ignore the >extensions entirely, under the X.500 rules of extensibility (which is OK, >provided no extensions are critical). However, if a version number is >present, a V1 CRL interpreter will break, since the version field >contravenes the extensibility rule -- deliberately, so as to ensure critical >extensions don't slip through unnoticed. Therefore, there is a legitimate >reason for permitting CRLs with noncritical extensions but no version >number. > >X.509 97 probably went too far in *requiring* that configuration, and you >will note that X.509 2000 pulled that back and made it optional. This seems >the right thing to me, for the base standard. > >This opens the way for PKIX to profile the version as mandatory against the >2000 standard, although no PKIX CRL will ever work with a V1 CRL >interpreting product (is this important?). Also, as you point out, you >cannot be consistent with both X.509 97 and PKIX, but that is probably not >very important given the change in 2000. > >Warwick > >-----Original Message----- >From: Sam Schaen [mailto:schaen@mitre.org] >Sent: Monday, May 15, 2000 6:02 AM >To: Ismo Heikkonen >Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org >Subject: Re: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC >2459) > > >We stumbled across this inconsistency while working on the US DOD PKI >profile. We elected to go with the RFC 2459 interpretation. It seems >to make more sense, since a version 1 CRL interpreter would not >understand extensions at all. > >Sam Schaen >MITRE > >Ismo Heikkonen wrote: >> >> Hi, >> it seems to me that there is an inconsistencty between X.509-97 and RFC >2459 (and also son of RFC2459). >> >> In X.509 , in section 11.2 there is the following note just after the CRL >definition: >> >> "3 If any extensions included in a CertificateList are defined as >critical, the version element of the CertificateList shall be present. If >no extensions defined as critical are included, the version element shall be >absent. This ..." >> >> But RFC 2459 requires that version shall be present always when the > > extensions are included: >> "5.1.2.1 Version >> >> This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When >> extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be >> present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1)." >> >> This means that I can not create CRLs which do not include any critical >extensions so >> that they would be compatible with both X.509-97 and RFC 2459. >> Or are there any X.509 Defect reports available around this topic? >> >> By the way X.509 -2000 seems to be more flexible in this sense. >> >> Ismo Heikkonen >> Sonera SmartTrust Ltd Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA29480 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 11:15:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiphx07399; Mon, 15 May 2000 18:22:07 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA25712; Mon, 15 May 00 14:18:43 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id OAA24344; Mon, 15 May 2000 14:22:06 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14624.16462.154694.96893@xedia.com> Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 14:22:06 -0400 (EDT) To: rgm-sec@htt-consult.com Cc: martin.szotkowski@ica.cz, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification References: <061e01bfb9db$d2f7ba10$0c7011ac@SZOTKOWSKI> <4.3.1.2.20000515140438.00e985b0@homebase.htt-consult.com> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Robert" == Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> writes: Robert> At 07:27 PM 5/9/2000 +0200, Martin Szotkowski wrote: >> Hi all, in RFC2459 (4.2.1.7) call : >>Because the subject >> alternative name is considered to be definitively bound to the >> publick key, all parts of the subject alternative name MUST be >> verified by the CA.<< What exactly this means? Robert> IMHO, this can only mean that the CA verifies that the Robert> content of SubjectAltName follows the formatting rules of the Robert> CHOICE. That is if rfc822Name is used, then the rules of RFC Robert> 822 are followed. If dNSName is used, than RFC 1035. etc. Robert> These cannot be requied to be real values, that is some SMTP Robert> server respond with an IDENT for the email and some DNS Robert> respond to a query. Robert> WHY? Robert> The mail or DNS server might be internal and unreachable to Robert> the CA. It may well be that it's hard or impossible to do more. But this is NOT what the words quoted would suggest, not at all. "Definitively bound to" and "verified" does not intuitively translate to a mere syntax check. paul Received: from homebase.htt-consult.com ([63.82.18.210]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id LAA29067 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 11:03:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rgm.htt-consult.com ([63.82.18.195]) by homebase.htt-consult.com ; Mon, 15 May 2000 14:09:36 -0500 Message-Id: <4.3.1.2.20000515140438.00e985b0@homebase.htt-consult.com> X-Sender: rgm-sec@homebase.htt-consult.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1 Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 14:09:10 -0400 To: "Martin Szotkowski" <martin.szotkowski@ica.cz>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org> From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> Subject: Re: SubjectAltName verification In-Reply-To: <061e01bfb9db$d2f7ba10$0c7011ac@SZOTKOWSKI> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed At 07:27 PM 5/9/2000 +0200, Martin Szotkowski wrote: >Hi all, >in RFC2459 (4.2.1.7) call : > >>Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitively >bound to the publick key, all parts of the subject alternative name MUST be >verified by the CA.<< >What exactly this means? IMHO, this can only mean that the CA verifies that the content of SubjectAltName follows the formatting rules of the CHOICE. That is if rfc822Name is used, then the rules of RFC 822 are followed. If dNSName is used, than RFC 1035. etc. These cannot be requied to be real values, that is some SMTP server respond with an IDENT for the email and some DNS respond to a query. WHY? The mail or DNS server might be internal and unreachable to the CA. IPsec looks at these as simple labeling formats. This is particularly true for dNSName for gateways on DSL models (ie 'mobile' gateways). >Must be e.g. email unique in one CA? must be unique for one man? >If yes, is there any way to determine that this man has this email? (How >this problem is resolving for DNS, IP, URI, etc.?) >If no, someone can stand out for some else in email communication? > >thanks for explanation >Martin > Robert Moskowitz ICSA Security Interest EMail: rgm-sec@htt-consult.com Received: from avocet.prod.itd.earthlink.net (avocet.prod.itd.earthlink.net [207.217.121.50]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA28230 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 10:24:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [38.29.122.207] (ip171.phoenix11.az.pub-ip.psi.net [38.29.123.171]) by avocet.prod.itd.earthlink.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA01065 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 10:30:29 -0700 (PDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: hoytkesterson@mail.earthlink.net Message-Id: <a04310107b545e06349e2@[38.29.122.207]> Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 10:29:58 -0700 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: "Hoyt L. Kesterson II" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> Subject: Fwd: RE: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC 2459) Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" <!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN"> <html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { margin-top: 0 ; margin-bottom: 0 } --></style><title>Fwd: RE: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (</title></head><body> <div>I sent out an email on this subject to this list some time ago. We did raise a defect, 220, on this issue and have a approved a Technical Corrigendum, 3. to the 3rd edition, 97, X.509 as follows</div> <div><br></div> <div><font face="Times New Roman" size="+3" color="#000000"><i>This corrects the defects reported in defect reports 9594/220.<br> </i></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+2" color="#000000"><b>Clause 11.2 note 3<br> </b><i>In Note 3, in the second sentence replace "</i></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1" color="#000000">shall be absent</font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+2" color="#000000"><i>" with "</i></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1" color="#000000">may be absent</font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+2" color="#000000"><i>".<br> <br> In Note 3, at the beginning of the 3rd sentence, replace "</i></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1" color="#000000">This may permit" </font><font size="+2" color="#000000"><i> with</i></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1" color="#000000"> "If version is absent, this may permit"</font><br> <font face="Times New Roman" size="+1" color="#000000"></font></div> <div><font face="Times New Roman" size="+2" color="#000000"><i>In Note 3, at the beginning of the 4th sentence, replace</i></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1" color="#000000"> "An implementation that supports version 2 (or greater) CRLs may"</font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+2" color="#000000"><i> with</i></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+1" color="#000000"> "An implementation that supports version 2 (or greater) CRLs, in the absence of version, may also"</font><font face="Times New Roman" size="+2" color="#000000"><i> </i></font></div> <div><br></div> <div>This allows PKIX implementors to be conformant to the 97 edition</div> <div><br></div> <div>I wasn't too happy that this nuance was not understood by PKIX (it was first described as an X.509 error on this list) since I wrote the original text with a goal of interoperability. However, I understood that to many on this list interoperation with version 1 systems was not necessary. There I proposed, and the group agreed, that the<i> shall</i> be soften to a<i> may</i>.</div> <div><br></div> <div>This allows the PKIX group to decide what its interoperability requirement is. After some pondering I now believe this is the proper approach for the standard and have taken this approach for several enhancements that we added for the 4th edition.</div> <div><br></div> <div> hoyt</div> <div><br></div> <div><br></div> <div><br></div> <div><br></div> <blockquote type="cite" cite>From: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com><br> To: "'Sam Schaen'" <schaen@mitre.org>,<br> Ismo Heikkonen<br> <x-tab> </x-tab><ismo.heikkonen@sonera.com><br> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org<br> Subject: RE: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC 2<br> <x-tab> </x-tab>459)<br> Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 07:35:15 -0700<br> List-Archive: http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archiv<span ></span>e/<br> List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org><br> List-Unsubscribe: mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=un<span ></span>subscribe<br> </blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite>The intent was as follows. A V1 CRL interpreter should correctly process a<br> CRL with extensions but with no version number -- it will ignore the<br> extensions entirely, under the X.500 rules of extensibility (which is OK,<br> provided no extensions are critical). However, if a version number is<br> present, a V1 CRL interpreter will break, since the version field<br> contravenes the extensibility rule -- deliberately, so as to ensure critical<br> extensions don't slip through unnoticed. Therefore, there is a legitimate<br> reason for permitting CRLs with noncritical extensions but no version<br> number.<br> <br> X.509 97 probably went too far in *requiring* that configuration, and you<br> will note that X.509 2000 pulled that back and made it optional. This seems<br> the right thing to me, for the base standard.<br> <br> This opens the way for PKIX to profile the version as mandatory against the<br> 2000 standard, although no PKIX CRL will ever work with a V1 CRL<br> interpreting product (is this important?). Also, as you point out, you<br> cannot be consistent with both X.509 97 and PKIX, but that is probably not<br> very important given the change in 2000.<br> <br> Warwick<br> <br> -----Original Message-----<br> From: Sam Schaen [mailto:schaen@mitre.org]<br> Sent: Monday, May 15, 2000 6:02 AM<br> To: Ismo Heikkonen<br> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org<br> Subject: Re: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC<br> 2459)<br> <br> <br> We stumbled across this inconsistency while working on the US DOD PKI<br> profile. We elected to go with the RFC 2459 interpretation. It seems<br> to make more sense, since a version 1 CRL interpreter would not<br> understand extensions at all.<br> <br> Sam Schaen<br> MITRE<br> <br> Ismo Heikkonen wrote:<br> ><br> > Hi,<br> > it seems to me that there is an inconsistencty between X.509-97 and RFC<br> 2459 (and also son of RFC2459).<br> ><br> > In X.509 , in section 11.2 there is the following note just after the CRL<br> definition:<br> ><br> > "3 If any extensions included in a CertificateList are defined as<br> critical, the version element of the CertificateList shall be present. If<br> no extensions defined as critical are included, the version element shall be<br> absent. This ..."<br> ><br> > But RFC 2459 requires that version shall be present always when the</blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite>> extensions are included:<br> > "5.1.2.1 Version<br> ><br> > This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When<br> > extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be<br> > present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1)."<br> ><br> > This means that I can not create CRLs which do not include any critical<br> extensions so<br> > that they would be compatible with both X.509-97 and RFC 2459.<br> > Or are there any X.509 Defect reports available around this topic?<br> ><br> > By the way X.509 -2000 seems to be more flexible in this sense.<br> ><br> > Ismo Heikkonen<br> > Sonera SmartTrust Ltd</blockquote> <div><br></div> </body> </html> Received: from pigeon.verisign.com ([208.206.241.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA22477 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 07:30:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from postal-gw2.verisign.com (mailhost2.verisign.com [208.206.241.102]) by pigeon.verisign.com (8.9.3/BCH1.7.1) with ESMTP id HAA00431; Mon, 15 May 2000 07:34:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: by postal-gw2.verisign.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KJDMFTDD>; Mon, 15 May 2000 07:35:17 -0700 Message-ID: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F409CB3A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> From: Warwick Ford <WFord@verisign.com> To: "'Sam Schaen'" <schaen@mitre.org>, Ismo Heikkonen <ismo.heikkonen@sonera.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC 2 459) Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 07:35:15 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" The intent was as follows. A V1 CRL interpreter should correctly process a CRL with extensions but with no version number -- it will ignore the extensions entirely, under the X.500 rules of extensibility (which is OK, provided no extensions are critical). However, if a version number is present, a V1 CRL interpreter will break, since the version field contravenes the extensibility rule -- deliberately, so as to ensure critical extensions don't slip through unnoticed. Therefore, there is a legitimate reason for permitting CRLs with noncritical extensions but no version number. X.509 97 probably went too far in *requiring* that configuration, and you will note that X.509 2000 pulled that back and made it optional. This seems the right thing to me, for the base standard. This opens the way for PKIX to profile the version as mandatory against the 2000 standard, although no PKIX CRL will ever work with a V1 CRL interpreting product (is this important?). Also, as you point out, you cannot be consistent with both X.509 97 and PKIX, but that is probably not very important given the change in 2000. Warwick -----Original Message----- From: Sam Schaen [mailto:schaen@mitre.org] Sent: Monday, May 15, 2000 6:02 AM To: Ismo Heikkonen Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC 2459) We stumbled across this inconsistency while working on the US DOD PKI profile. We elected to go with the RFC 2459 interpretation. It seems to make more sense, since a version 1 CRL interpreter would not understand extensions at all. Sam Schaen MITRE Ismo Heikkonen wrote: > > Hi, > it seems to me that there is an inconsistencty between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and also son of RFC2459). > > In X.509 , in section 11.2 there is the following note just after the CRL definition: > > "3 If any extensions included in a CertificateList are defined as critical, the version element of the CertificateList shall be present. If no extensions defined as critical are included, the version element shall be absent. This ..." > > But RFC 2459 requires that version shall be present always when the > extensions are included: > "5.1.2.1 Version > > This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When > extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be > present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1)." > > This means that I can not create CRLs which do not include any critical extensions so > that they would be compatible with both X.509-97 and RFC 2459. > Or are there any X.509 Defect reports available around this topic? > > By the way X.509 -2000 seems to be more flexible in this sense. > > Ismo Heikkonen > Sonera SmartTrust Ltd Received: from eagle.verisign.com ([208.206.241.105]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA21845 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 07:00:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from postal-gw1.verisign.com (mailhost1.verisign.com [208.206.241.101]) by eagle.verisign.com (8.9.3/BCH1.7.1) with ESMTP id HAA00024; Mon, 15 May 2000 07:06:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: by postal-gw1.verisign.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KJDK7CJW>; Mon, 15 May 2000 07:05:10 -0700 Message-ID: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F408EAEE@vhqpostal.verisign.com> From: Philip Hallam-Baker <pbaker@verisign.com> To: "'Sam Schaen'" <schaen@mitre.org>, Ismo Heikkonen <ismo.heikkonen@sonera.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC 2 459) Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 07:05:06 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA1; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0019_01BFBE55.300EFF10" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0019_01BFBE55.300EFF10 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit When it comes to backwards compatibility I would (almost) always choose the IETF standard over an ISO one. In this particular case the ISO approach would appear to break legacy implementations in unpredictable ways. Phill -----Original Message----- From: Sam Schaen [mailto:schaen@mitre.org] Sent: Monday, May 15, 2000 9:02 AM To: Ismo Heikkonen Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC 2459) We stumbled across this inconsistency while working on the US DOD PKI profile. We elected to go with the RFC 2459 interpretation. It seems to make more sense, since a version 1 CRL interpreter would not understand extensions at all. Sam Schaen MITRE Ismo Heikkonen wrote: > > Hi, > it seems to me that there is an inconsistencty between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and also son of RFC2459). > > In X.509 , in section 11.2 there is the following note just after the CRL definition: > > "3 If any extensions included in a CertificateList are defined as critical, the version element of the CertificateList shall be present. If no extensions defined as critical are included, the version element shall be absent. This ..." > > But RFC 2459 requires that version shall be present always when the > extensions are included: > "5.1.2.1 Version > > This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When > extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be > present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1)." > > This means that I can not create CRLs which do not include any critical extensions so > that they would be compatible with both X.509-97 and RFC 2459. > Or are there any X.509 Defect reports available around this topic? > > By the way X.509 -2000 seems to be more flexible in this sense. > > Ismo Heikkonen > Sonera SmartTrust Ltd ------=_NextPart_000_0019_01BFBE55.300EFF10 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAQAAoIILJzCCA0Mw ggKsoAMCAQICEB9+X+cD0eC/mSDca4kNSwQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwXzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx FzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMTcwNQYDVQQLEy5DbGFzcyAyIFB1YmxpYyBQcmltYXJ5 IENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MB4XDTk5MDIyNTAwMDAwMFoXDTA0MDEwNTIzNTk1OVow 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with ESMTP id GAA28876; Mon, 15 May 2000 06:05:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: by postal-gw1.verisign.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KJDK7C1X>; Mon, 15 May 2000 06:04:42 -0700 Message-ID: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F408EAED@vhqpostal.verisign.com> From: Philip Hallam-Baker <pbaker@verisign.com> To: "'Thierry Van Doninck'" <Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be>, ietf-pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 06:04:40 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA1; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0011_01BFBE4C.BE742D60" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0011_01BFBE4C.BE742D60 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Same answer, ask Microsoft, not an IETF development list. -----Original Message----- From: Thierry Van Doninck [mailto:Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be] Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 7:40 AM To: ietf-pkix Subject: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI Hi, Same message as on the smime mailing list. Has any of you good people any info on Windows 2000 PKI ? Thanks, Thierry ======================================================================== ============ Hi everybody, Just a question : Is there any known issues using S/MIME with Win2000PKI-certificates ? More generally, are Win2000 certificates usable with (and understood by ) the others mailers (especially Lotus Notes, Netscape, Eudora +plug-in?) Isn't Baltimore Unicert a "better choice" due to its greater compatibility ? Any advices are welcome. Regards, Laurent Deffranne ------=_NextPart_000_0011_01BFBE4C.BE742D60 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAQAAoIILJzCCA0Mw ggKsoAMCAQICEB9+X+cD0eC/mSDca4kNSwQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwXzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx FzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMTcwNQYDVQQLEy5DbGFzcyAyIFB1YmxpYyBQcmltYXJ5 IENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MB4XDTk5MDIyNTAwMDAwMFoXDTA0MDEwNTIzNTk1OVow ga0xFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMR8wHQYDVQQLExZWZXJpU2lnbiBUcnVzdCBOZXR3 b3JrMUkwRwYDVQQLE0BVc2UgaXMgc3ViamVjdCB0byB0ZXJtcyBhdCBodHRwczovL3d3dy52ZXJp c2lnbi5jb20vcnBhLWtyIChjKTk5MSYwJAYDVQQDEx1WZXJpU2lnbiBDbGFzcyAyIFBlcnNvbm5l bCBDQTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEApwRsD6Jyt0oGLvjXKSw0nYK8SJFKx6z5 6fy5WXixVcBTWLHPbxY7wUnVy/RuzOHMy7XHLk6IqjTpttBbfD4VVzThGLz/3fWvZ1kgCuU96oiK QNKaiRMpqbbV26d+4ec3JJP9lHRNeuQybUzoXBaXr92S2WaKFGbk6loDqD1f+wsCAwEAAaOBsDCB 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Organization: The MITRE Corporation X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en]C-2000225M (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Ismo Heikkonen <ismo.heikkonen@sonera.com> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC 2459) References: <007a01bfbe67$fcc08e90$e94cb183@tkklpr.tele.fi> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit We stumbled across this inconsistency while working on the US DOD PKI profile. We elected to go with the RFC 2459 interpretation. It seems to make more sense, since a version 1 CRL interpreter would not understand extensions at all. Sam Schaen MITRE Ismo Heikkonen wrote: > > Hi, > it seems to me that there is an inconsistencty between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and also son of RFC2459). > > In X.509 , in section 11.2 there is the following note just after the CRL definition: > > "3 If any extensions included in a CertificateList are defined as critical, the version element of the CertificateList shall be present. If no extensions defined as critical are included, the version element shall be absent. This ..." > > But RFC 2459 requires that version shall be present always when the > extensions are included: > "5.1.2.1 Version > > This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When > extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be > present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1)." > > This means that I can not create CRLs which do not include any critical extensions so > that they would be compatible with both X.509-97 and RFC 2459. > Or are there any X.509 Defect reports available around this topic? > > By the way X.509 -2000 seems to be more flexible in this sense. > > Ismo Heikkonen > Sonera SmartTrust Ltd Received: from mailgate.dave.sonera.fi (mailgate.dave.sonera.fi [194.137.238.131]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FAA19942 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 05:17:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.dave.sonera.fi (smtp.dave.sonera.fi [131.177.216.195]) by mailgate.dave.sonera.fi (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id PAA22064 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 15:23:04 +0300 (EET DST) Received: from silverado (boreas.tkklpr.tele.fi [131.177.76.233]) by smtp.dave.sonera.fi (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id PAA17668 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 15:23:03 +0300 (EET DST) Message-ID: <007a01bfbe67$fcc08e90$e94cb183@tkklpr.tele.fi> From: "Ismo Heikkonen" <ismo.heikkonen@sonera.com> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Inconsistency between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and son of RFC 2459) Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 15:20:41 +0300 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2919.6600 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by smtp.dave.sonera.fi id PAA17668 Hi, it seems to me that there is an inconsistencty between X.509-97 and RFC 2459 (and also son of RFC2459). In X.509 , in section 11.2 there is the following note just after the CRL definition: "3 If any extensions included in a CertificateList are defined as critical, the version element of the CertificateList shall be present. If no extensions defined as critical are included, the version element shall be absent. This ..." But RFC 2459 requires that version shall be present always when the extensions are included: "5.1.2.1 Version This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1)." This means that I can not create CRLs which do not include any critical extensions so that they would be compatible with both X.509-97 and RFC 2459. Or are there any X.509 Defect reports available around this topic? By the way X.509 -2000 seems to be more flexible in this sense. Ismo Heikkonen Sonera SmartTrust Ltd Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA14223 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 15 May 2000 01:14:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA42532; Mon, 15 May 2000 10:20:29 +0200 Message-ID: <391FB34E.534C9E8@bull.net> Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 10:20:30 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@accurata.se> CC: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Unmistakable identity References: <03E49309E8F5D31183F7000629396ECCD685@TRUST> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Stefan, My comments along your text. > Denis and others, > > I could spend my and your time by going into detailed argument with Denis, > but I won't. Answering to the issues that have been raised could spare much of your time, *my* time and ... also the time of the WG. > Let me instead try to clear the table and state the case in few words. > > There are some main functional requirements that limits the scope of the QC > profile: > 1) The certificate is aimed to support electronic signatures. > 2) The certificate is issued to a human person. > 3) The profile is based on RFC 2459 > > To reflect this, there are two requirements on name/identity information of > the subject. > 1) The DN in the subject field must be unique (at least within the issuer > domain). > 2) It must be possible to determine (possibly with assistance from external > authorities) who the certificate subject is (the physical person). At least > in case of a dispute. I fully agree with these statements. The problem is that this is not what the current draft reflects. In particular the second requirement can be met, as you recognize just above, without placing any specific/additional information in the certificate. In the case of a dispute, the certificate serial number which designates unambiguously the certificate allows to know who the human person is using the identification information that was presented at the time of registration. > In the QC profile the first aspect is defined as a "distinguished name" and > the second aspect is defined as an "unmistakable identity". No. This is not what the document says. > These functional/technical requirements are present ONLY because if they are > not met, the profile is no longer within it's scope. > > Finally. > This concept has been in the profile, unchallenged, since the very > beginning. It's relevant and forms the base of the scope of the profile. > To change this now at this final state would be devastating. > > I think it's more appropriate to ship this now to RFC and continue this > "philosophic" discussion on the road from "proposed" to "draft". This is obviously not my opinion. I have provided an example (see the "Bob Smith" example below) and I still would like to read your response to that example. Not responding could be interpreted that you do have have an appropriate response. Denis > /Stefan > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > > Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 12:55 PM > > To: Stefan Santesson > > Cc: 'Russ Housley'; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > Subject: Re: Unmistakable identity > > > > > > Stefan, > > > > Since I have been travelling quite a lot, here is my (late) answer > > while showing very quickly in my office. > > > > > Denis, > > > > > > Some comments regarding DN and Unmistakable identity. > > > > > > DN is a technical requirement. > > > Unmistakable identity is a functional requirement. > > > > > > The DN requirement is fullfilled if the CA assignes you a > > unique number, > > > e.g. "123456931", but destroys any useful information > > regarding who is the > > > person behind that number. > > > > So why the DN must be kept "user friendly". :-) > > > > > For this identity to also serve the purpose of being an unmistakable > > > identity, the CA MUST provide the nessecary framework to > > ensure that this > > > identity also can be used to identify the person "Denis > > Pinkas" (at least in > > > case of a dispute). > > > > I would prefer to consider the case of "Bob Smith" because there are > > probably more than 1.000 "Bob Smith" around the world but only one > > "Denis Pinkas". :-) > > > > > > > Actually the definition of unmistakable identity says it all, and is > > > relevant. > > > > Sorry. The definition is not relevant and cannot not apply when you > > consider homonyms, which is a real life case. > > > > > With respect to the EU directive, the PKIX document is an > > international > > > document, not only driven by the EU directive. Eventhough, > > the concept of > > > unmistakable identity applies also EU even if this term is > > not explicitly > > > defined in the directive. > > > > Besides the fact that the notion is not in the Directive, I would > > like that you consider the following example, and, if you really > > think that the notion is relevant, explain how you can solve the > > case. Otherwise ... > > > > I will thus repost one of my previous message that has been > > augmented with an example. Notice that I am providing a text change > > proposal to update the draft. > > > > Denis > > > > ================================================ > > > > The term "Unmistakable identity" is not used anywhere in the > > Directive on Electronic Signatures, so this is not a requirement > > from the Directive. Furthermore, the Directive explicit asks for the > > support of pseudonyms, for which the concept of unmistakable > > identity cannot apply. > > > > This term is defined under section 2.4 which is called Uniqueness of > > Names. It should be noticed that the subject name, which is mandated > > by the QC-03 specification, shall already be unique as this is > > mandated by RFC 2459. It should be noticed that X.509 does not > > mandate uniqueness of names, but that RFC 2459 does. This means that > > once a name has been given it must never be re-used for another > > individual within the life time of the CA. The definition of > > unmistakable identity is thus not needed. > > > > Forgetting for a while, the argument of uniqueness, the concept > > could possibly be understood as providing sufficient information so > > that a human being may figure out without any ambiguity who the > > person is. One problem is that the attributes for leaving out any > > ambiguity may be scattered everywhere in the certificate, even as > > attribute extensions, so that it is impossible for a relying party > > to know which of them *must* be used to build the unmistakable > > identity. In other words there is no distinction between attributes > > that make the name unmistakable and just "useful" attributes. > > > > The second problem is that it is only possible to solve ambiguities > > if the relying party is informed of such a possibility. Let us > > illustrate this using an example: Some one knows Bob Smith working > > in the Sales department from the Delta company. Another Bob Smith > > later on enters the company. He will be named Bob Smith 2 also > > working in the Sales department from the Delta company. How can a > > relying party know make the difference between the two persons ? > > They have different (unique) names indeed, but who is who ? > > > > If some one want to verify a signed message from Bob Smith 2 working > > in the sales department from the Delta company, he will know that > > there is/was another Bob Smith working in the sales department from > > the Delta company. Since he does not necessarily have access to a > > Directory to see the certificate from Bob Smith (1), he cannot make > > the difference. > > > > It should also be noticed that the attributes registered in the > > certificate from Bob Smith were perfectly unambiguous when Bob Smith > > was registered but may not be sufficient any more when another Bob > > Smith comes in. One way to solve the problem would be to revoke the > > certificate from Bob Smith to include more distinctive attributes. > > However, it does not seem adequate to perform a revocation for such > > a case. > > > > If someone gets a signed messages from Bob Smith working in the > > sales department from the Delta company, he does not even know that > > there exists another Bob Smith 2 working in the sales department > > from the Delta company and that the normal signatory of the message > > should be Bob Smith 2 instead of Bob Smith. > > > > This problem could, in theory, be solved with an access to all the > > certificates issued by the CA. Since there is no requirement to make > > all these certificates accessible (in particular for privacy reasons > > and to avoid spamming) this problem cannot be solved in such a way. > > > > This problem could also, possibly, be solved as indicated before by > > identifying all the attributes that make the name unmistakable and > > by revoking previously issued certificates in case there would be an > > ambiguity with a formerly issued certificate. The problem is that we > > are also dealing with long term validity of electronic signatures > > and that expired certificates cannot be revoked anymore. > > > > As a conclusion: > > > > The concept of unmistakable identity should be dropped from the > > QC-03 document. > > > > > > Proposed rewording for section 3.1.2 of QC-03: > > > > 3.1.2 Subject > > > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject public > > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity certified > > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > > following attributes: > > > > countryName; > > commonName; > > surname; > > givenName; > > pseudonym; > > serialNumber; > > organizationName; > > organizationalUnitName; > > stateOrProvinceName > > localityName and > > postalAddress. > > > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one > > of the following: > > > > Choice I: commonName > > Choice II: givenName > > Choice III: pseudonym > > > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name is achieved > > singly by the subject field. > > > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with the current > > text) > > > > > > > > > /Stefan > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > > > > Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 10:27 AM > > > > To: Stefan Santesson > > > > Cc: Russ Housley; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Folks, I've been sort of off-line the last days. > > > > > > > > > So as caching up with this thread I think we need to decide > > > > the progress of > > > > > this issue. > > > > > > > > > I would just want to add an observation regarding NR and > > > > Authentication. > > > > > The issue is NOT whether permanent identifiers are of value for > > > > > Authentication or NR. What IS an issue is whether it is > > > > relevant for NR to > > > > > be able to compare 2 names in 2 different certificates and > > > > ensure that these > > > > > certificates identifies the same person EVEN if some parts > > > > of the DN is not > > > > > matching. > > > > > > > > For non-repudiation, the permanent identifier may be used to link > > > > different transactions to the same individual, even when > > the subject > > > > name of the individual changes. So it is relevant. > > > > > > > > > This particular aspect is only raised as a feature for > > > > access control (when > > > > > an entity changes his certificate, or possesses several > > > > certificates with > > > > > different DN). In the case of NR and legal signatures, the > > > > only issue is to > > > > > establish the relation between a certificate and the > > > > individual key holder > > > > > (regardless of other certificates). Here the current > > > > profile provides the > > > > > necessary means. > > > > > > > > No. See above. > > > > > > > > > But.... > > > > > > > > Following the discussion on the serial Number and the Permanent > > > > Identifier that took place on the PKIX mailing list and > > at the last > > > > IETF meeting in Adelaïde, I am paying more and more > > attention to the > > > > QC draft. > > > > > > > > The document is defining the concept of "unmistakable > > identity". Now > > > > that we have introduced the use of serialNumber, I wonder > > why such a > > > > concept is still needed. > > > > > > > > First, the wording "unmistakable identity" is not used in the > > > > Directive, so this is the first reason why I wonder it is needed. > > > > > > > > Second, let us recall, what RFC 2459 says: > > > > > > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > > > public > > > > key field. The subject name may be carried in the > > subject field > > > > and/or the subjectAltName extension. > > > > > > > > Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 > > > > distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject > > > > entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name > > > > field. > > > > > > > > The current specification (QC-03) mandates the use of the subject > > > > field. In such a case, as defined *in RFC 2459*, the name > > is unique. > > > > Moreover, it is unique not only at an instant of time, but during > > > > the whole life of the CA. Note that ISO/ITU X.509 does not mandate > > > > this and I guess this is where the problem comes from. The current > > > > QC-03 document references *X.501* while it should reference RFC > > > > 2459. If we were *only* using the subjectAltName > > extension then such > > > > a concept could be useful. But at the present time, we don't. > > > > > > > > The chapter 2.4, called Uniqueness of names, should be deleted. > > > > > > > > I would also propose the following rewording for section 3.1.2: > > > > > > > > 3.1.2 Subject > > > > > > > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished > > name (DN). > > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > > > public > > > > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity > > > > certified > > > > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > > > > > > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > > > > following attributes: > > > > > > > > countryName; > > > > commonName; > > > > surname; > > > > givenName; > > > > pseudonym; > > > > serialNumber; > > > > organizationName; > > > > organizationalUnitName; > > > > stateOrProvinceName > > > > localityName and > > > > postalAddress. > > > > > > > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include > > at least one > > > > of > > > > the following: > > > > > > > > Choice I: commonName > > > > Choice II: givenName > > > > Choice III: pseudonym > > > > > > > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > > > > > > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > > > > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > > > > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > > > > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name > > is achieved > > > > singly by the subject field. > > > > > > > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with > > the current > > > > text) > > > > > > > > As a result of this, the wording "unmistakable identity" should be > > > > deleted from the whole document. In this way, we will be able to > > > > suppress ambiguous sentences, like in 3.1.2 : > > > > > > > > " Certificates compliant with this profile SHALL at the same time > > > > specify a distinguished name and an unmistakable > > identity of the > > > > subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name and > > > > unmistakable identity). > > > > > > > > Attributes stored in the subject field SHALL at least form a > > > > distinguished name of the subject, but they MAY also specify a > > > > complete unmistakable identity." > > > > > > > > > > > > I reproduced below an extract from Annex I from the European > > > > Directive on Electronic Signatures: > > > > > > > > " Requirements for qualified certificates > > > > > > > > Qualified certificates must contain: > > > > > > > > (...) > > > > > > > > (c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be > > > > identified as such;" > > > > > > > > > > > > > Regardless of this I agree with Steve that this issue > > > > should be advanced on > > > > > it's own and merged later if it's found relevant to do so. > > > > > > > > Anyway, I am preparing some text to describe what a permanent > > > > identifier is and in which OID arc it should be located. > > This should > > > > be ready at the end of this week. In this way we will be able to > > > > discuss whether the permanent identifier should be, for the time > > > > being, an independent RFC that the QC draft could reference, or > > > > whether it should be an RFC of its own. > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > > > Denis > > > > > > > > > > > > > I would therefore request the QC profile to be advanced in > > > > it's current > > > > > shape (except for a minor noted update in the reference list). > > > > > > > > > > Steve: > > > > > How do we proceed. > > > > > > > > > > /Stefan > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@spyrus.com] > > > > > > Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 4:36 PM > > > > > > To: Stephen Kent > > > > > > Cc: tgindin@us.ibm.com; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > > > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree with Steve. Note that the CAT Working Group has > > > > defined an > > > > > > OTHER-NAME for Kerberos names. > > > > > > > > > > > > Russ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > At 02:02 PM 04/13/2000 -0400, Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > > > >Tom, > > > > > > > > > > > > > >I have no problems with the sorts of IDs you > > proposed in your ASN > > > > > > >GeneralName Other-Name examples. They seem to be > > > > consistent with the > > > > > > >arguments that Denis has made for such constructs. However, > > > > > > before we add > > > > > > >these to the updated part 1, I think we need more time to > > > > > > explore the > > > > > > >utility for these name forms. The debate on the list shows > > > > > > that there are > > > > > > >widely diverse opinions about what such IDs are good for, > > > > > > what scope is > > > > > > >feasible/appropriate, etc. I'd hesitant to hold up > > > > progress on the > > > > > > >revision to 2459 to add this sort of facility which has been > > > > > > proposed only > > > > > > >recently. That's why several folks have suggested a > > > > separate, small > > > > > > >document whoch can be advanced separately, and merged into > > > > > > 2459 if there > > > > > > >is sufficient, consistent support. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >Steve > > > > > > > > > > > > Received: from po1.bbn.com (PO1.BBN.COM [192.1.50.38]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA25463 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 12 May 2000 08:39:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [171.78.30.107] (comsec.bbn.com [171.78.30.107]) by po1.bbn.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA18614 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 12 May 2000 11:45:54 -0400 (EDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: kent@po1.bbn.com Message-Id: <v04220803b541c8aaf361@[171.78.30.107]> In-Reply-To: <03E49309E8F5D31183F7000629396ECCD685@TRUST> References: <03E49309E8F5D31183F7000629396ECCD685@TRUST> Date: Fri, 12 May 2000 11:37:28 -0400 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Subject: attribute certificates Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Folks, - The WG last call will begin on the Attribute Certificate ID <draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt> and end on May 26. Steve Received: from e1.ny.us.ibm.com (e1.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.101]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA24348 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 12 May 2000 07:51:30 -0700 (PDT) From: tgindin@us.ibm.com Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.22]) by e1.ny.us.ibm.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA29308; Fri, 12 May 2000 10:55:23 -0400 Received: from D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com (d51mta04.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.32]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.8.8m3/NCO v2.07) with SMTP id KAA154234; Fri, 12 May 2000 10:56:26 -0400 Received: by D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568DD.00521030 ; Fri, 12 May 2000 10:56:20 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: IBMUS cc: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@spyrus.com>, "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'WFord@verisign.com'" <WFord@verisign.com> Message-ID: <852568DD.00520E59.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 12 May 2000 10:56:09 -0400 Subject: RE: Unmistakable identity Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id HAA24349 In view of the wording about "unmistakable identifier" from section 3.1.2 ("Relying parties MAY however have to examine information stored in the subject alternative name extension and the subject directory attributes extension in order to determine a complete unmistakable identity of the subject."), the current draft actually permits a "permanent identifier" in the sense of Denis' and my draft to be used to render an identity unmistakable. The current draft details techniques for rendering an identity unmistakable using Subject Directory Attributes, while it somewhat neglects Subject Alternative Name. The technique given, in my view, is somewhat weaker than "permanent identifiers", but if all the attributes in Subject Directory Attributes other than "title" are used the most likely collision in those joined with a simple DN would occur when two children are born in the same jurisdiction with the same name on the same day. These collisions should not be neglected, but there are many fewer of them than there collisions of CN, country, and organization alone. Denis' example is a collision of CN, country, organization name, and organization unit. I would personally think it was sufficient to change part of the wording quoted above to "stored in the subject alternative name extension, using either predefined forms or OtherName forms, and the subject directory attributes extension". It might well be better to include a small section on SubjectAlternativeName, both to allow for OtherName's and to rule out the consideration of DNS names and IP addresses in forming an unmistakable identity. Tom Gindin Stefan Santesson <stefan@accurata.se> on 05/12/2000 06:12:57 AM To: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> cc: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@spyrus.com>, "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'WFord@verisign.com'" <WFord@verisign.com> Subject: RE: Unmistakable identity Denis and others, I could spend my and your time by going into detailed argument with Denis, but I won't. Let me instead try to clear the table and state the case in few words. There are some main functional requirements that limits the scope of the QC profile: 1) The certificate is aimed to support electronic signatures. 2) The certificate is issued to a human person. 3) The profile is based on RFC 2459 To reflect this, there are two requirements on name/identity information of the subject. 1) The DN in the subject field must be unique (at least within the issuer domain). 2) It must be possible to determine (possibly with assistance from external authorities) who the certificate subject is (the physical person). At least in case of a dispute. In the QC profile the first aspect is defined as a "distinguished name" and the second aspect is defined as an "unmistakable identity". These functional/technical requirements are present ONLY because if they are not met, the profile is no longer within it's scope. Finally. This concept has been in the profile, unchallenged, since the very beginning. It's relevant and forms the base of the scope of the profile. To change this now at this final state would be devastating. I think it's more appropriate to ship this now to RFC and continue this "philosophic" discussion on the road from "proposed" to "draft". /Stefan > -----Original Message----- > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 12:55 PM > To: Stefan Santesson > Cc: 'Russ Housley'; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > Subject: Re: Unmistakable identity > > > Stefan, > > Since I have been travelling quite a lot, here is my (late) answer > while showing very quickly in my office. > > > Denis, > > > > Some comments regarding DN and Unmistakable identity. > > > > DN is a technical requirement. > > Unmistakable identity is a functional requirement. > > > > The DN requirement is fullfilled if the CA assignes you a > unique number, > > e.g. "123456931", but destroys any useful information > regarding who is the > > person behind that number. > > So why the DN must be kept "user friendly". :-) > > > For this identity to also serve the purpose of being an unmistakable > > identity, the CA MUST provide the nessecary framework to > ensure that this > > identity also can be used to identify the person "Denis > Pinkas" (at least in > > case of a dispute). > > I would prefer to consider the case of "Bob Smith" because there are > probably more than 1.000 "Bob Smith" around the world but only one > "Denis Pinkas". :-) > > > > Actually the definition of unmistakable identity says it all, and is > > relevant. > > Sorry. The definition is not relevant and cannot not apply when you > consider homonyms, which is a real life case. > > > With respect to the EU directive, the PKIX document is an > international > > document, not only driven by the EU directive. Eventhough, > the concept of > > unmistakable identity applies also EU even if this term is > not explicitly > > defined in the directive. > > Besides the fact that the notion is not in the Directive, I would > like that you consider the following example, and, if you really > think that the notion is relevant, explain how you can solve the > case. Otherwise ... > > I will thus repost one of my previous message that has been > augmented with an example. Notice that I am providing a text change > proposal to update the draft. > > Denis > > ================================================ > > The term "Unmistakable identity" is not used anywhere in the > Directive on Electronic Signatures, so this is not a requirement > from the Directive. Furthermore, the Directive explicit asks for the > support of pseudonyms, for which the concept of unmistakable > identity cannot apply. > > This term is defined under section 2.4 which is called Uniqueness of > Names. It should be noticed that the subject name, which is mandated > by the QC-03 specification, shall already be unique as this is > mandated by RFC 2459. It should be noticed that X.509 does not > mandate uniqueness of names, but that RFC 2459 does. This means that > once a name has been given it must never be re-used for another > individual within the life time of the CA. The definition of > unmistakable identity is thus not needed. > > Forgetting for a while, the argument of uniqueness, the concept > could possibly be understood as providing sufficient information so > that a human being may figure out without any ambiguity who the > person is. One problem is that the attributes for leaving out any > ambiguity may be scattered everywhere in the certificate, even as > attribute extensions, so that it is impossible for a relying party > to know which of them *must* be used to build the unmistakable > identity. In other words there is no distinction between attributes > that make the name unmistakable and just "useful" attributes. > > The second problem is that it is only possible to solve ambiguities > if the relying party is informed of such a possibility. Let us > illustrate this using an example: Some one knows Bob Smith working > in the Sales department from the Delta company. Another Bob Smith > later on enters the company. He will be named Bob Smith 2 also > working in the Sales department from the Delta company. How can a > relying party know make the difference between the two persons ? > They have different (unique) names indeed, but who is who ? > > If some one want to verify a signed message from Bob Smith 2 working > in the sales department from the Delta company, he will know that > there is/was another Bob Smith working in the sales department from > the Delta company. Since he does not necessarily have access to a > Directory to see the certificate from Bob Smith (1), he cannot make > the difference. > > It should also be noticed that the attributes registered in the > certificate from Bob Smith were perfectly unambiguous when Bob Smith > was registered but may not be sufficient any more when another Bob > Smith comes in. One way to solve the problem would be to revoke the > certificate from Bob Smith to include more distinctive attributes. > However, it does not seem adequate to perform a revocation for such > a case. > > If someone gets a signed messages from Bob Smith working in the > sales department from the Delta company, he does not even know that > there exists another Bob Smith 2 working in the sales department > from the Delta company and that the normal signatory of the message > should be Bob Smith 2 instead of Bob Smith. > > This problem could, in theory, be solved with an access to all the > certificates issued by the CA. Since there is no requirement to make > all these certificates accessible (in particular for privacy reasons > and to avoid spamming) this problem cannot be solved in such a way. > > This problem could also, possibly, be solved as indicated before by > identifying all the attributes that make the name unmistakable and > by revoking previously issued certificates in case there would be an > ambiguity with a formerly issued certificate. The problem is that we > are also dealing with long term validity of electronic signatures > and that expired certificates cannot be revoked anymore. > > As a conclusion: > > The concept of unmistakable identity should be dropped from the > QC-03 document. > > > Proposed rewording for section 3.1.2 of QC-03: > > 3.1.2 Subject > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject public > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity certified > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > following attributes: > > countryName; > commonName; > surname; > givenName; > pseudonym; > serialNumber; > organizationName; > organizationalUnitName; > stateOrProvinceName > localityName and > postalAddress. > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one > of the following: > > Choice I: commonName > Choice II: givenName > Choice III: pseudonym > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name is achieved > singly by the subject field. > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with the current > text) > > > > > /Stefan > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > > > Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 10:27 AM > > > To: Stefan Santesson > > > Cc: Russ Housley; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > > Folks, I've been sort of off-line the last days. > > > > > > > So as caching up with this thread I think we need to decide > > > the progress of > > > > this issue. > > > > > > > I would just want to add an observation regarding NR and > > > Authentication. > > > > The issue is NOT whether permanent identifiers are of value for > > > > Authentication or NR. What IS an issue is whether it is > > > relevant for NR to > > > > be able to compare 2 names in 2 different certificates and > > > ensure that these > > > > certificates identifies the same person EVEN if some parts > > > of the DN is not > > > > matching. > > > > > > For non-repudiation, the permanent identifier may be used to link > > > different transactions to the same individual, even when > the subject > > > name of the individual changes. So it is relevant. > > > > > > > This particular aspect is only raised as a feature for > > > access control (when > > > > an entity changes his certificate, or possesses several > > > certificates with > > > > different DN). In the case of NR and legal signatures, the > > > only issue is to > > > > establish the relation between a certificate and the > > > individual key holder > > > > (regardless of other certificates). Here the current > > > profile provides the > > > > necessary means. > > > > > > No. See above. > > > > > > > But.... > > > > > > Following the discussion on the serial Number and the Permanent > > > Identifier that took place on the PKIX mailing list and > at the last > > > IETF meeting in Adelaïde, I am paying more and more > attention to the > > > QC draft. > > > > > > The document is defining the concept of "unmistakable > identity". Now > > > that we have introduced the use of serialNumber, I wonder > why such a > > > concept is still needed. > > > > > > First, the wording "unmistakable identity" is not used in the > > > Directive, so this is the first reason why I wonder it is needed. > > > > > > Second, let us recall, what RFC 2459 says: > > > > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > > public > > > key field. The subject name may be carried in the > subject field > > > and/or the subjectAltName extension. > > > > > > Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 > > > distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject > > > entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name > > > field. > > > > > > The current specification (QC-03) mandates the use of the subject > > > field. In such a case, as defined *in RFC 2459*, the name > is unique. > > > Moreover, it is unique not only at an instant of time, but during > > > the whole life of the CA. Note that ISO/ITU X.509 does not mandate > > > this and I guess this is where the problem comes from. The current > > > QC-03 document references *X.501* while it should reference RFC > > > 2459. If we were *only* using the subjectAltName > extension then such > > > a concept could be useful. But at the present time, we don't. > > > > > > The chapter 2.4, called Uniqueness of names, should be deleted. > > > > > > I would also propose the following rewording for section 3.1.2: > > > > > > 3.1.2 Subject > > > > > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished > name (DN). > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > > public > > > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity > > > certified > > > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > > > > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > > > following attributes: > > > > > > countryName; > > > commonName; > > > surname; > > > givenName; > > > pseudonym; > > > serialNumber; > > > organizationName; > > > organizationalUnitName; > > > stateOrProvinceName > > > localityName and > > > postalAddress. > > > > > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include > at least one > > > of > > > the following: > > > > > > Choice I: commonName > > > Choice II: givenName > > > Choice III: pseudonym > > > > > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > > > > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > > > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > > > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > > > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name > is achieved > > > singly by the subject field. > > > > > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with > the current > > > text) > > > > > > As a result of this, the wording "unmistakable identity" should be > > > deleted from the whole document. In this way, we will be able to > > > suppress ambiguous sentences, like in 3.1.2 : > > > > > > " Certificates compliant with this profile SHALL at the same time > > > specify a distinguished name and an unmistakable > identity of the > > > subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name and > > > unmistakable identity). > > > > > > Attributes stored in the subject field SHALL at least form a > > > distinguished name of the subject, but they MAY also specify a > > > complete unmistakable identity." > > > > > > > > > I reproduced below an extract from Annex I from the European > > > Directive on Electronic Signatures: > > > > > > " Requirements for qualified certificates > > > > > > Qualified certificates must contain: > > > > > > (...) > > > > > > (c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be > > > identified as such;" > > > > > > > > > > Regardless of this I agree with Steve that this issue > > > should be advanced on > > > > it's own and merged later if it's found relevant to do so. > > > > > > Anyway, I am preparing some text to describe what a permanent > > > identifier is and in which OID arc it should be located. > This should > > > be ready at the end of this week. In this way we will be able to > > > discuss whether the permanent identifier should be, for the time > > > being, an independent RFC that the QC draft could reference, or > > > whether it should be an RFC of its own. > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Denis > > > > > > > > > > I would therefore request the QC profile to be advanced in > > > it's current > > > > shape (except for a minor noted update in the reference list). > > > > > > > > Steve: > > > > How do we proceed. > > > > > > > > /Stefan > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@spyrus.com] > > > > > Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 4:36 PM > > > > > To: Stephen Kent > > > > > Cc: tgindin@us.ibm.com; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree with Steve. Note that the CAT Working Group has > > > defined an > > > > > OTHER-NAME for Kerberos names. > > > > > > > > > > Russ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > At 02:02 PM 04/13/2000 -0400, Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > > >Tom, > > > > > > > > > > > >I have no problems with the sorts of IDs you > proposed in your ASN > > > > > >GeneralName Other-Name examples. They seem to be > > > consistent with the > > > > > >arguments that Denis has made for such constructs. However, > > > > > before we add > > > > > >these to the updated part 1, I think we need more time to > > > > > explore the > > > > > >utility for these name forms. The debate on the list shows > > > > > that there are > > > > > >widely diverse opinions about what such IDs are good for, > > > > > what scope is > > > > > >feasible/appropriate, etc. I'd hesitant to hold up > > > progress on the > > > > > >revision to 2459 to add this sort of facility which has been > > > > > proposed only > > > > > >recently. That's why several folks have suggested a > > > separate, small > > > > > >document whoch can be advanced separately, and merged into > > > > > 2459 if there > > > > > >is sufficient, consistent support. > > > > > > > > > > > >Steve > > > > > > > > > Received: from trust.addtrust.com ([212.28.197.133]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA14436 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 12 May 2000 03:06:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: by TRUST with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KTBWSMM5>; Fri, 12 May 2000 12:13:04 +0200 Message-ID: <03E49309E8F5D31183F7000629396ECCD685@TRUST> From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@accurata.se> To: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@spyrus.com>, "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'WFord@verisign.com'" <WFord@verisign.com> Subject: RE: Unmistakable identity Date: Fri, 12 May 2000 12:12:57 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Denis and others, I could spend my and your time by going into detailed argument with Denis, but I won't. Let me instead try to clear the table and state the case in few words. There are some main functional requirements that limits the scope of the QC profile: 1) The certificate is aimed to support electronic signatures. 2) The certificate is issued to a human person. 3) The profile is based on RFC 2459 To reflect this, there are two requirements on name/identity information of the subject. 1) The DN in the subject field must be unique (at least within the issuer domain). 2) It must be possible to determine (possibly with assistance from external authorities) who the certificate subject is (the physical person). At least in case of a dispute. In the QC profile the first aspect is defined as a "distinguished name" and the second aspect is defined as an "unmistakable identity". These functional/technical requirements are present ONLY because if they are not met, the profile is no longer within it's scope. Finally. This concept has been in the profile, unchallenged, since the very beginning. It's relevant and forms the base of the scope of the profile. To change this now at this final state would be devastating. I think it's more appropriate to ship this now to RFC and continue this "philosophic" discussion on the road from "proposed" to "draft". /Stefan > -----Original Message----- > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 12:55 PM > To: Stefan Santesson > Cc: 'Russ Housley'; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > Subject: Re: Unmistakable identity > > > Stefan, > > Since I have been travelling quite a lot, here is my (late) answer > while showing very quickly in my office. > > > Denis, > > > > Some comments regarding DN and Unmistakable identity. > > > > DN is a technical requirement. > > Unmistakable identity is a functional requirement. > > > > The DN requirement is fullfilled if the CA assignes you a > unique number, > > e.g. "123456931", but destroys any useful information > regarding who is the > > person behind that number. > > So why the DN must be kept "user friendly". :-) > > > For this identity to also serve the purpose of being an unmistakable > > identity, the CA MUST provide the nessecary framework to > ensure that this > > identity also can be used to identify the person "Denis > Pinkas" (at least in > > case of a dispute). > > I would prefer to consider the case of "Bob Smith" because there are > probably more than 1.000 "Bob Smith" around the world but only one > "Denis Pinkas". :-) > > > > Actually the definition of unmistakable identity says it all, and is > > relevant. > > Sorry. The definition is not relevant and cannot not apply when you > consider homonyms, which is a real life case. > > > With respect to the EU directive, the PKIX document is an > international > > document, not only driven by the EU directive. Eventhough, > the concept of > > unmistakable identity applies also EU even if this term is > not explicitly > > defined in the directive. > > Besides the fact that the notion is not in the Directive, I would > like that you consider the following example, and, if you really > think that the notion is relevant, explain how you can solve the > case. Otherwise ... > > I will thus repost one of my previous message that has been > augmented with an example. Notice that I am providing a text change > proposal to update the draft. > > Denis > > ================================================ > > The term "Unmistakable identity" is not used anywhere in the > Directive on Electronic Signatures, so this is not a requirement > from the Directive. Furthermore, the Directive explicit asks for the > support of pseudonyms, for which the concept of unmistakable > identity cannot apply. > > This term is defined under section 2.4 which is called Uniqueness of > Names. It should be noticed that the subject name, which is mandated > by the QC-03 specification, shall already be unique as this is > mandated by RFC 2459. It should be noticed that X.509 does not > mandate uniqueness of names, but that RFC 2459 does. This means that > once a name has been given it must never be re-used for another > individual within the life time of the CA. The definition of > unmistakable identity is thus not needed. > > Forgetting for a while, the argument of uniqueness, the concept > could possibly be understood as providing sufficient information so > that a human being may figure out without any ambiguity who the > person is. One problem is that the attributes for leaving out any > ambiguity may be scattered everywhere in the certificate, even as > attribute extensions, so that it is impossible for a relying party > to know which of them *must* be used to build the unmistakable > identity. In other words there is no distinction between attributes > that make the name unmistakable and just "useful" attributes. > > The second problem is that it is only possible to solve ambiguities > if the relying party is informed of such a possibility. Let us > illustrate this using an example: Some one knows Bob Smith working > in the Sales department from the Delta company. Another Bob Smith > later on enters the company. He will be named Bob Smith 2 also > working in the Sales department from the Delta company. How can a > relying party know make the difference between the two persons ? > They have different (unique) names indeed, but who is who ? > > If some one want to verify a signed message from Bob Smith 2 working > in the sales department from the Delta company, he will know that > there is/was another Bob Smith working in the sales department from > the Delta company. Since he does not necessarily have access to a > Directory to see the certificate from Bob Smith (1), he cannot make > the difference. > > It should also be noticed that the attributes registered in the > certificate from Bob Smith were perfectly unambiguous when Bob Smith > was registered but may not be sufficient any more when another Bob > Smith comes in. One way to solve the problem would be to revoke the > certificate from Bob Smith to include more distinctive attributes. > However, it does not seem adequate to perform a revocation for such > a case. > > If someone gets a signed messages from Bob Smith working in the > sales department from the Delta company, he does not even know that > there exists another Bob Smith 2 working in the sales department > from the Delta company and that the normal signatory of the message > should be Bob Smith 2 instead of Bob Smith. > > This problem could, in theory, be solved with an access to all the > certificates issued by the CA. Since there is no requirement to make > all these certificates accessible (in particular for privacy reasons > and to avoid spamming) this problem cannot be solved in such a way. > > This problem could also, possibly, be solved as indicated before by > identifying all the attributes that make the name unmistakable and > by revoking previously issued certificates in case there would be an > ambiguity with a formerly issued certificate. The problem is that we > are also dealing with long term validity of electronic signatures > and that expired certificates cannot be revoked anymore. > > As a conclusion: > > The concept of unmistakable identity should be dropped from the > QC-03 document. > > > Proposed rewording for section 3.1.2 of QC-03: > > 3.1.2 Subject > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject public > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity certified > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > following attributes: > > countryName; > commonName; > surname; > givenName; > pseudonym; > serialNumber; > organizationName; > organizationalUnitName; > stateOrProvinceName > localityName and > postalAddress. > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one > of the following: > > Choice I: commonName > Choice II: givenName > Choice III: pseudonym > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name is achieved > singly by the subject field. > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with the current > text) > > > > > /Stefan > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > > > Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 10:27 AM > > > To: Stefan Santesson > > > Cc: Russ Housley; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > > Folks, I've been sort of off-line the last days. > > > > > > > So as caching up with this thread I think we need to decide > > > the progress of > > > > this issue. > > > > > > > I would just want to add an observation regarding NR and > > > Authentication. > > > > The issue is NOT whether permanent identifiers are of value for > > > > Authentication or NR. What IS an issue is whether it is > > > relevant for NR to > > > > be able to compare 2 names in 2 different certificates and > > > ensure that these > > > > certificates identifies the same person EVEN if some parts > > > of the DN is not > > > > matching. > > > > > > For non-repudiation, the permanent identifier may be used to link > > > different transactions to the same individual, even when > the subject > > > name of the individual changes. So it is relevant. > > > > > > > This particular aspect is only raised as a feature for > > > access control (when > > > > an entity changes his certificate, or possesses several > > > certificates with > > > > different DN). In the case of NR and legal signatures, the > > > only issue is to > > > > establish the relation between a certificate and the > > > individual key holder > > > > (regardless of other certificates). Here the current > > > profile provides the > > > > necessary means. > > > > > > No. See above. > > > > > > > But.... > > > > > > Following the discussion on the serial Number and the Permanent > > > Identifier that took place on the PKIX mailing list and > at the last > > > IETF meeting in Adelaïde, I am paying more and more > attention to the > > > QC draft. > > > > > > The document is defining the concept of "unmistakable > identity". Now > > > that we have introduced the use of serialNumber, I wonder > why such a > > > concept is still needed. > > > > > > First, the wording "unmistakable identity" is not used in the > > > Directive, so this is the first reason why I wonder it is needed. > > > > > > Second, let us recall, what RFC 2459 says: > > > > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > > public > > > key field. The subject name may be carried in the > subject field > > > and/or the subjectAltName extension. > > > > > > Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 > > > distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject > > > entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name > > > field. > > > > > > The current specification (QC-03) mandates the use of the subject > > > field. In such a case, as defined *in RFC 2459*, the name > is unique. > > > Moreover, it is unique not only at an instant of time, but during > > > the whole life of the CA. Note that ISO/ITU X.509 does not mandate > > > this and I guess this is where the problem comes from. The current > > > QC-03 document references *X.501* while it should reference RFC > > > 2459. If we were *only* using the subjectAltName > extension then such > > > a concept could be useful. But at the present time, we don't. > > > > > > The chapter 2.4, called Uniqueness of names, should be deleted. > > > > > > I would also propose the following rewording for section 3.1.2: > > > > > > 3.1.2 Subject > > > > > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished > name (DN). > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > > public > > > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity > > > certified > > > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > > > > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > > > following attributes: > > > > > > countryName; > > > commonName; > > > surname; > > > givenName; > > > pseudonym; > > > serialNumber; > > > organizationName; > > > organizationalUnitName; > > > stateOrProvinceName > > > localityName and > > > postalAddress. > > > > > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include > at least one > > > of > > > the following: > > > > > > Choice I: commonName > > > Choice II: givenName > > > Choice III: pseudonym > > > > > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > > > > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > > > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > > > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > > > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name > is achieved > > > singly by the subject field. > > > > > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with > the current > > > text) > > > > > > As a result of this, the wording "unmistakable identity" should be > > > deleted from the whole document. In this way, we will be able to > > > suppress ambiguous sentences, like in 3.1.2 : > > > > > > " Certificates compliant with this profile SHALL at the same time > > > specify a distinguished name and an unmistakable > identity of the > > > subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name and > > > unmistakable identity). > > > > > > Attributes stored in the subject field SHALL at least form a > > > distinguished name of the subject, but they MAY also specify a > > > complete unmistakable identity." > > > > > > > > > I reproduced below an extract from Annex I from the European > > > Directive on Electronic Signatures: > > > > > > " Requirements for qualified certificates > > > > > > Qualified certificates must contain: > > > > > > (...) > > > > > > (c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be > > > identified as such;" > > > > > > > > > > Regardless of this I agree with Steve that this issue > > > should be advanced on > > > > it's own and merged later if it's found relevant to do so. > > > > > > Anyway, I am preparing some text to describe what a permanent > > > identifier is and in which OID arc it should be located. > This should > > > be ready at the end of this week. In this way we will be able to > > > discuss whether the permanent identifier should be, for the time > > > being, an independent RFC that the QC draft could reference, or > > > whether it should be an RFC of its own. > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Denis > > > > > > > > > > I would therefore request the QC profile to be advanced in > > > it's current > > > > shape (except for a minor noted update in the reference list). > > > > > > > > Steve: > > > > How do we proceed. > > > > > > > > /Stefan > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@spyrus.com] > > > > > Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 4:36 PM > > > > > To: Stephen Kent > > > > > Cc: tgindin@us.ibm.com; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree with Steve. Note that the CAT Working Group has > > > defined an > > > > > OTHER-NAME for Kerberos names. > > > > > > > > > > Russ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > At 02:02 PM 04/13/2000 -0400, Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > > >Tom, > > > > > > > > > > > >I have no problems with the sorts of IDs you > proposed in your ASN > > > > > >GeneralName Other-Name examples. They seem to be > > > consistent with the > > > > > >arguments that Denis has made for such constructs. However, > > > > > before we add > > > > > >these to the updated part 1, I think we need more time to > > > > > explore the > > > > > >utility for these name forms. The debate on the list shows > > > > > that there are > > > > > >widely diverse opinions about what such IDs are good for, > > > > > what scope is > > > > > >feasible/appropriate, etc. I'd hesitant to hold up > > > progress on the > > > > > >revision to 2459 to add this sort of facility which has been > > > > > proposed only > > > > > >recently. That's why several folks have suggested a > > > separate, small > > > > > >document whoch can be advanced separately, and merged into > > > > > 2459 if there > > > > > >is sufficient, consistent support. > > > > > > > > > > > >Steve > > > > > > > > > Received: from e3.ny.us.ibm.com (e3.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.103]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA17236 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 11 May 2000 07:56:22 -0700 (PDT) From: tgindin@us.ibm.com Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.22]) by e3.ny.us.ibm.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA30692; Thu, 11 May 2000 11:00:46 -0400 Received: from D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com (d51mta04.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.32]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.8.8m3/NCO v2.07) with SMTP id LAA206212; Thu, 11 May 2000 11:02:09 -0400 Received: by D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568DC.00529736 ; Thu, 11 May 2000 11:02:06 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: IBMUS To: phil.griffin@asn-1.com cc: pkix list <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Message-ID: <852568DC.0052950D.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 11 May 2000 11:01:58 -0400 Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline I do, actually, have a constructive suggestion here along with the various standards discussions below. Why don't we have a 1993 module which imports from the 1988 module, not duplicating all of the syntax definitions, and some comments in the 1988 module about which statements need to be commented out and replaced by imports for conformance to 1997 syntax? There are not many of these in 2459, anyway - AlgorithmIdentifier, AttributeTypeAndValue, PolicyQualifierInfo, OtherName and ExtensionAttribute. If the reason for dumping the 1993 module was the workload of doing simultaneous updates to two modules and ensuring that they matched, this would reduce that substantially. Tom Gindin "Phillip H. Griffin" <phil.griffin@asn-1.com> on 05/10/2000 09:11:30 PM Please respond to phil.griffin@asn-1.com To: pkix list <ietf-pkix@imc.org> cc: Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Tom, Comments below. tgindin@us.ibm.com wrote: > > In practice, what we mean by "1988 syntax", as far as I can tell, is > pretty much the following: > > 1 - Avoiding the following three types first defined in post-1988 > versions: Instance-of, Embedded-pdv, and Unrestricted character string, and > adding explicit definitions for the Unicode string types which are copied > from X.680. > 2 - Continuing to use "ANY DEFINED BY", as defined in X.208 section 27 and > X.680 appendix H.3, rather than using constructs with similar meaning first > defined in 1993-4, such as information object classes and their fields. > 3 - Avoiding the use of either macros (legal in 1988) or information > object classes (legal after 1993-4). > > The only part of this which seems even questionable is point 2, but > X.680 still contains support for ANY DEFINED BY, although it is deprecated. > I was not at Adelaide, which partly accounts for my suggestion of 1993 > support in AC509Prof. No version of X.680 contains support for ANY DEFINED BY. In the 1994 version, ANY DEFINED BY was discussed as deprecated notation in an *informative* annex, and was not part of any *normative* text in that standard. [Tom Gindin] A definition of the feature appears in that version of the standard, although explicitly deprecated. It is a rather academic question whether that document "contains support" for the feature. My point was that no reference to X.208/X.209 is strictly necessary, although we apparently can't go beyond X.680:1994 without replacing the ANY DEFINED BY occurrences with information object classes. During the last revision of X.680, both of the normative sections describing ANY DEFINED BY and the MACRO notation were removed, and the section you refer to no longer exists in the most recent publication of the standard, ITU-T Rec. X.680:1997 | ISO/IEC 8824-1 (1998). [Tom Gindin] I don't have the 1997-8 versions, and I doubt that I am the only one who doesn't. What positive changes other than the definition of new string types were made to X.680 and X.681 (as opposed to X.690) between 1993-4 and 1997-8? The removal of ANY DEFINED BY does not qualify as a positive change, and it makes it impossible to produce definitions which compile both in 1988-90 and 1997-8 formats. > I don't think that the bits on the line change for BER between > X.209(1988) and X.690(1994) if the ASN.1 is legal 1988 syntax. Does > anybody know of changes specific to DER? > You are correct that the bits on the line did not change for BER between the X.209:1988 and X.680:1997 publications. However, the same can not be said for X.509:1987 DER. The set of restrictions defined at that time were only intended for use in the Directory specification at that time, long before version 3 certificates. It wasn't until the added complexity of X.509v3 extensions came about that these 1987 rules became insufficient. They were probably designed only to be correct at that time for limited use within the Directory ASN.1. They were not designed to cover all possible uses of ASN.1. [Tom Gindin] Looking at your other posting, you cite several types whose DER encodings were changed. Obviously, the PKIX and X.509 communities care about the DER encodings of BIT STRING's, UTCTime's, and GeneralizedTime's. To the best of my knowledge, there are no occurrences of either REAL or GeneralString in any relevant standard - I checked X.520 (1993), X.509v4 current draft, PKCS#9 current draft, the new-part1, ac509prof, and 2510bis drafts, and RFC's 1274, 2459, 2510, 2511, 2587, and 2797. (snip) Received: from spdl113_tr0.dexia.be (hstcentd.dexia.be [193.91.97.6]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id EAA13317 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 11 May 2000 04:37:59 -0700 (PDT) Date: 11 May 2000 13:39:53 +0200 From: Thierry Van Doninck <Thierry.VanDoninck@dexia.be> To: ietf-pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Does Smime works fine with Windows 2000 PKI Message-Id: <145B0391A9C090FC*/c=be/admd=publilink/prmd=gkbccb/o=notes/s=SY064/@MHS> Hi, Same message as on the smime mailing list. Has any of you good people any info on Windows 2000 PKI ? Thanks, Thierry ==================================================================================== Hi everybody, Just a question : Is there any known issues using S/MIME with Win2000PKI-certificates ? More generally, are Win2000 certificates usable with (and understood by ) the others mailers (especially Lotus Notes, Netscape, Eudora +plug-in?) Isn't Baltimore Unicert a "better choice" due to its greater compatibility ? Any advices are welcome. Regards, Laurent Deffranne Received: from dvont01.univw.uni-sb.de (dvont01.univw.uni-sb.de [134.96.109.65]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id EAA11959 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 11 May 2000 04:00:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from univw.uni-saarland.de (unverified [134.96.108.48]) by dvont01.univw.uni-sb.de (EMWAC SMTPRS 0.83) with SMTP id <B0000251998@dvont01.univw.uni-sb.de>; Thu, 11 May 2000 13:05:41 +0200 Message-ID: <391A91DF.C122A07A@univw.uni-saarland.de> Date: Thu, 11 May 2000 12:56:31 +0200 From: Hardo Hase <h.hase@univw.uni-saarland.de> Organization: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Universit=E4t?= des Saarlandes X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [de] (WinNT; I) X-Accept-Language: de MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: unsubscribe Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit unsubscribe Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA11395 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 11 May 2000 03:54:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA15220; Thu, 11 May 2000 13:00:39 +0200 Message-ID: <391A92D9.C2B6C13F@bull.net> Date: Thu, 11 May 2000 13:00:41 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@accurata.se> CC: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Magnus Nystrom'" <magnus@rsasecurity.com>, "'Russ Housley'" <housley@spyrus.com>, "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com> Subject: Re: Unmistakable identity References: <03E49309E8F5D31183F7000629396ECCD663@TRUST> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Stefan, This proposal does not solve the issue. See my longer mail on that topic. > Going through the definition in the QC profile, I would suggest this minor > change in section 2.4 > > And change: > > 2.4 Uniqueness of names > > Requirements on name uniqueness are described in this standard > through the terms "distinguished name" and "unmistakable identity", > having the following meaning: > > To: > > 2.4 Uniqueness of names > > Functional and uniqueness requirements on names are described in > this standard through the terms "distinguished name" and > "unmistakable identity", having the following meaning: > > This would then clarify the concept of functional requirement related to the > term unmistakable identity. > > Since this is just a minor fix. I will see through that this is added to the > next draft for the IESG process that will be submitted on Friday. We need a MAJOR fix. I do not think it is appropriate to submit the draft to the IESG at the time being. We need to solve this issue first. Denis > /Stefan > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Stefan Santesson > > Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2000 12:04 PM > > To: 'Denis Pinkas' > > Cc: 'Russ Housley'; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > Subject: Unmistakable identity > > > > > > Denis, > > > > Some comments regarding DN and Unmistakable identity. > > > > DN is a technical requirement. > > Unmistakable identity is a functional requirement. > > > > The DN requirement is fullfilled if the CA assignes you a > > unique number, e.g. "123456931", but destroys any useful > > information regarding who is the person behind that number. > > > > For this identity to also serve the purpose of being an > > unmistakable identity, the CA MUST provide the nessecary > > framework to ensure that this identity also can be used to > > identify the person "Denis Pinkas" (at least in case of a dispute). > > > > Actually the definition of unmistakable identity says it all, > > and is relevant. > > > > With respect to the EU directive, the PKIX document is an > > international document, not only driven by the EU directive. > > Eventhough, the concept of unmistakable identity applies also > > EU even if this term is not explicitly defined in the directive. > > > > /Stefan > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > > > Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 10:27 AM > > > To: Stefan Santesson > > > Cc: Russ Housley; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > > Folks, I've been sort of off-line the last days. > > > > > > > So as caching up with this thread I think we need to decide > > > the progress of > > > > this issue. > > > > > > > I would just want to add an observation regarding NR and > > > Authentication. > > > > The issue is NOT whether permanent identifiers are of value for > > > > Authentication or NR. What IS an issue is whether it is > > > relevant for NR to > > > > be able to compare 2 names in 2 different certificates and > > > ensure that these > > > > certificates identifies the same person EVEN if some parts > > > of the DN is not > > > > matching. > > > > > > For non-repudiation, the permanent identifier may be used to link > > > different transactions to the same individual, even when the subject > > > name of the individual changes. So it is relevant. > > > > > > > This particular aspect is only raised as a feature for > > > access control (when > > > > an entity changes his certificate, or possesses several > > > certificates with > > > > different DN). In the case of NR and legal signatures, the > > > only issue is to > > > > establish the relation between a certificate and the > > > individual key holder > > > > (regardless of other certificates). Here the current > > > profile provides the > > > > necessary means. > > > > > > No. See above. > > > > > > > But.... > > > > > > Following the discussion on the serial Number and the Permanent > > > Identifier that took place on the PKIX mailing list and at the last > > > IETF meeting in Adelaïde, I am paying more and more attention to the > > > QC draft. > > > > > > The document is defining the concept of "unmistakable identity". Now > > > that we have introduced the use of serialNumber, I wonder why such a > > > concept is still needed. > > > > > > First, the wording "unmistakable identity" is not used in the > > > Directive, so this is the first reason why I wonder it is needed. > > > > > > Second, let us recall, what RFC 2459 says: > > > > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > > public > > > key field. The subject name may be carried in the subject field > > > and/or the subjectAltName extension. > > > > > > Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 > > > distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject > > > entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name > > > field. > > > > > > The current specification (QC-03) mandates the use of the subject > > > field. In such a case, as defined *in RFC 2459*, the name is unique. > > > Moreover, it is unique not only at an instant of time, but during > > > the whole life of the CA. Note that ISO/ITU X.509 does not mandate > > > this and I guess this is where the problem comes from. The current > > > QC-03 document references *X.501* while it should reference RFC > > > 2459. If we were *only* using the subjectAltName extension then such > > > a concept could be useful. But at the present time, we don't. > > > > > > The chapter 2.4, called Uniqueness of names, should be deleted. > > > > > > I would also propose the following rewording for section 3.1.2: > > > > > > 3.1.2 Subject > > > > > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > > public > > > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity > > > certified > > > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > > > > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > > > following attributes: > > > > > > countryName; > > > commonName; > > > surname; > > > givenName; > > > pseudonym; > > > serialNumber; > > > organizationName; > > > organizationalUnitName; > > > stateOrProvinceName > > > localityName and > > > postalAddress. > > > > > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one > > > of > > > the following: > > > > > > Choice I: commonName > > > Choice II: givenName > > > Choice III: pseudonym > > > > > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > > > > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > > > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > > > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > > > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name is achieved > > > singly by the subject field. > > > > > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with the current > > > text) > > > > > > As a result of this, the wording "unmistakable identity" should be > > > deleted from the whole document. In this way, we will be able to > > > suppress ambiguous sentences, like in 3.1.2 : > > > > > > " Certificates compliant with this profile SHALL at the same time > > > specify a distinguished name and an unmistakable identity of the > > > subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name and > > > unmistakable identity). > > > > > > Attributes stored in the subject field SHALL at least form a > > > distinguished name of the subject, but they MAY also specify a > > > complete unmistakable identity." > > > > > > > > > I reproduced below an extract from Annex I from the European > > > Directive on Electronic Signatures: > > > > > > " Requirements for qualified certificates > > > > > > Qualified certificates must contain: > > > > > > (...) > > > > > > (c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be > > > identified as such;" > > > > > > > > > > Regardless of this I agree with Steve that this issue > > > should be advanced on > > > > it's own and merged later if it's found relevant to do so. > > > > > > Anyway, I am preparing some text to describe what a permanent > > > identifier is and in which OID arc it should be located. This should > > > be ready at the end of this week. In this way we will be able to > > > discuss whether the permanent identifier should be, for the time > > > being, an independent RFC that the QC draft could reference, or > > > whether it should be an RFC of its own. > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Denis > > > > > > > > > > I would therefore request the QC profile to be advanced in > > > it's current > > > > shape (except for a minor noted update in the reference list). > > > > > > > > Steve: > > > > How do we proceed. > > > > > > > > /Stefan > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@spyrus.com] > > > > > Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 4:36 PM > > > > > To: Stephen Kent > > > > > Cc: tgindin@us.ibm.com; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree with Steve. Note that the CAT Working Group has > > > defined an > > > > > OTHER-NAME for Kerberos names. > > > > > > > > > > Russ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > At 02:02 PM 04/13/2000 -0400, Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > > >Tom, > > > > > > > > > > > >I have no problems with the sorts of IDs you proposed > > in your ASN > > > > > >GeneralName Other-Name examples. They seem to be > > > consistent with the > > > > > >arguments that Denis has made for such constructs. However, > > > > > before we add > > > > > >these to the updated part 1, I think we need more time to > > > > > explore the > > > > > >utility for these name forms. The debate on the list shows > > > > > that there are > > > > > >widely diverse opinions about what such IDs are good for, > > > > > what scope is > > > > > >feasible/appropriate, etc. I'd hesitant to hold up > > > progress on the > > > > > >revision to 2459 to add this sort of facility which has been > > > > > proposed only > > > > > >recently. That's why several folks have suggested a > > > separate, small > > > > > >document whoch can be advanced separately, and merged into > > > > > 2459 if there > > > > > >is sufficient, consistent support. > > > > > > > > > > > >Steve > > > > > > > > > > Received: from lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr [129.184.62.223]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA11026 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 11 May 2000 03:49:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bull.net (frpq6118.frpq.bull.fr [129.184.8.64]) by lvt-mail.frlv.bull.fr (8.9.2/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA26682; Thu, 11 May 2000 12:54:53 +0200 Message-ID: <391A9180.3F8F02A0@bull.net> Date: Thu, 11 May 2000 12:54:56 +0200 From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Organization: Bull X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [fr] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@accurata.se> CC: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@spyrus.com>, "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: Unmistakable identity References: <03E49309E8F5D31183F7000629396ECCD661@TRUST> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Stefan, Since I have been travelling quite a lot, here is my (late) answer while showing very quickly in my office. > Denis, > > Some comments regarding DN and Unmistakable identity. > > DN is a technical requirement. > Unmistakable identity is a functional requirement. > > The DN requirement is fullfilled if the CA assignes you a unique number, > e.g. "123456931", but destroys any useful information regarding who is the > person behind that number. So why the DN must be kept "user friendly". :-) > For this identity to also serve the purpose of being an unmistakable > identity, the CA MUST provide the nessecary framework to ensure that this > identity also can be used to identify the person "Denis Pinkas" (at least in > case of a dispute). I would prefer to consider the case of "Bob Smith" because there are probably more than 1.000 "Bob Smith" around the world but only one "Denis Pinkas". :-) > Actually the definition of unmistakable identity says it all, and is > relevant. Sorry. The definition is not relevant and cannot not apply when you consider homonyms, which is a real life case. > With respect to the EU directive, the PKIX document is an international > document, not only driven by the EU directive. Eventhough, the concept of > unmistakable identity applies also EU even if this term is not explicitly > defined in the directive. Besides the fact that the notion is not in the Directive, I would like that you consider the following example, and, if you really think that the notion is relevant, explain how you can solve the case. Otherwise ... I will thus repost one of my previous message that has been augmented with an example. Notice that I am providing a text change proposal to update the draft. Denis ================================================ The term "Unmistakable identity" is not used anywhere in the Directive on Electronic Signatures, so this is not a requirement from the Directive. Furthermore, the Directive explicit asks for the support of pseudonyms, for which the concept of unmistakable identity cannot apply. This term is defined under section 2.4 which is called Uniqueness of Names. It should be noticed that the subject name, which is mandated by the QC-03 specification, shall already be unique as this is mandated by RFC 2459. It should be noticed that X.509 does not mandate uniqueness of names, but that RFC 2459 does. This means that once a name has been given it must never be re-used for another individual within the life time of the CA. The definition of unmistakable identity is thus not needed. Forgetting for a while, the argument of uniqueness, the concept could possibly be understood as providing sufficient information so that a human being may figure out without any ambiguity who the person is. One problem is that the attributes for leaving out any ambiguity may be scattered everywhere in the certificate, even as attribute extensions, so that it is impossible for a relying party to know which of them *must* be used to build the unmistakable identity. In other words there is no distinction between attributes that make the name unmistakable and just "useful" attributes. The second problem is that it is only possible to solve ambiguities if the relying party is informed of such a possibility. Let us illustrate this using an example: Some one knows Bob Smith working in the Sales department from the Delta company. Another Bob Smith later on enters the company. He will be named Bob Smith 2 also working in the Sales department from the Delta company. How can a relying party know make the difference between the two persons ? They have different (unique) names indeed, but who is who ? If some one want to verify a signed message from Bob Smith 2 working in the sales department from the Delta company, he will know that there is/was another Bob Smith working in the sales department from the Delta company. Since he does not necessarily have access to a Directory to see the certificate from Bob Smith (1), he cannot make the difference. It should also be noticed that the attributes registered in the certificate from Bob Smith were perfectly unambiguous when Bob Smith was registered but may not be sufficient any more when another Bob Smith comes in. One way to solve the problem would be to revoke the certificate from Bob Smith to include more distinctive attributes. However, it does not seem adequate to perform a revocation for such a case. If someone gets a signed messages from Bob Smith working in the sales department from the Delta company, he does not even know that there exists another Bob Smith 2 working in the sales department from the Delta company and that the normal signatory of the message should be Bob Smith 2 instead of Bob Smith. This problem could, in theory, be solved with an access to all the certificates issued by the CA. Since there is no requirement to make all these certificates accessible (in particular for privacy reasons and to avoid spamming) this problem cannot be solved in such a way. This problem could also, possibly, be solved as indicated before by identifying all the attributes that make the name unmistakable and by revoking previously issued certificates in case there would be an ambiguity with a formerly issued certificate. The problem is that we are also dealing with long term validity of electronic signatures and that expired certificates cannot be revoked anymore. As a conclusion: The concept of unmistakable identity should be dropped from the QC-03 document. Proposed rewording for section 3.1.2 of QC-03: 3.1.2 Subject The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the entity associated with the public key stored in the subject public key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the following attributes: countryName; commonName; surname; givenName; pseudonym; serialNumber; organizationName; organizationalUnitName; stateOrProvinceName localityName and postalAddress. Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one of the following: Choice I: commonName Choice II: givenName Choice III: pseudonym The subject field MAY contain other attributes. Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name is achieved singly by the subject field. The countryName attribute value (... then continue with the current text) > /Stefan > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > > Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 10:27 AM > > To: Stefan Santesson > > Cc: Russ Housley; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > Folks, I've been sort of off-line the last days. > > > > > So as caching up with this thread I think we need to decide > > the progress of > > > this issue. > > > > > I would just want to add an observation regarding NR and > > Authentication. > > > The issue is NOT whether permanent identifiers are of value for > > > Authentication or NR. What IS an issue is whether it is > > relevant for NR to > > > be able to compare 2 names in 2 different certificates and > > ensure that these > > > certificates identifies the same person EVEN if some parts > > of the DN is not > > > matching. > > > > For non-repudiation, the permanent identifier may be used to link > > different transactions to the same individual, even when the subject > > name of the individual changes. So it is relevant. > > > > > This particular aspect is only raised as a feature for > > access control (when > > > an entity changes his certificate, or possesses several > > certificates with > > > different DN). In the case of NR and legal signatures, the > > only issue is to > > > establish the relation between a certificate and the > > individual key holder > > > (regardless of other certificates). Here the current > > profile provides the > > > necessary means. > > > > No. See above. > > > > > But.... > > > > Following the discussion on the serial Number and the Permanent > > Identifier that took place on the PKIX mailing list and at the last > > IETF meeting in Adelaïde, I am paying more and more attention to the > > QC draft. > > > > The document is defining the concept of "unmistakable identity". Now > > that we have introduced the use of serialNumber, I wonder why such a > > concept is still needed. > > > > First, the wording "unmistakable identity" is not used in the > > Directive, so this is the first reason why I wonder it is needed. > > > > Second, let us recall, what RFC 2459 says: > > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > public > > key field. The subject name may be carried in the subject field > > and/or the subjectAltName extension. > > > > Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 > > distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject > > entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name > > field. > > > > The current specification (QC-03) mandates the use of the subject > > field. In such a case, as defined *in RFC 2459*, the name is unique. > > Moreover, it is unique not only at an instant of time, but during > > the whole life of the CA. Note that ISO/ITU X.509 does not mandate > > this and I guess this is where the problem comes from. The current > > QC-03 document references *X.501* while it should reference RFC > > 2459. If we were *only* using the subjectAltName extension then such > > a concept could be useful. But at the present time, we don't. > > > > The chapter 2.4, called Uniqueness of names, should be deleted. > > > > I would also propose the following rewording for section 3.1.2: > > > > 3.1.2 Subject > > > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > public > > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity > > certified > > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > > following attributes: > > > > countryName; > > commonName; > > surname; > > givenName; > > pseudonym; > > serialNumber; > > organizationName; > > organizationalUnitName; > > stateOrProvinceName > > localityName and > > postalAddress. > > > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one > > of > > the following: > > > > Choice I: commonName > > Choice II: givenName > > Choice III: pseudonym > > > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name is achieved > > singly by the subject field. > > > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with the current > > text) > > > > As a result of this, the wording "unmistakable identity" should be > > deleted from the whole document. In this way, we will be able to > > suppress ambiguous sentences, like in 3.1.2 : > > > > " Certificates compliant with this profile SHALL at the same time > > specify a distinguished name and an unmistakable identity of the > > subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name and > > unmistakable identity). > > > > Attributes stored in the subject field SHALL at least form a > > distinguished name of the subject, but they MAY also specify a > > complete unmistakable identity." > > > > > > I reproduced below an extract from Annex I from the European > > Directive on Electronic Signatures: > > > > " Requirements for qualified certificates > > > > Qualified certificates must contain: > > > > (...) > > > > (c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be > > identified as such;" > > > > > > > Regardless of this I agree with Steve that this issue > > should be advanced on > > > it's own and merged later if it's found relevant to do so. > > > > Anyway, I am preparing some text to describe what a permanent > > identifier is and in which OID arc it should be located. This should > > be ready at the end of this week. In this way we will be able to > > discuss whether the permanent identifier should be, for the time > > being, an independent RFC that the QC draft could reference, or > > whether it should be an RFC of its own. > > > > Regards, > > > > Denis > > > > > > > I would therefore request the QC profile to be advanced in > > it's current > > > shape (except for a minor noted update in the reference list). > > > > > > Steve: > > > How do we proceed. > > > > > > /Stefan > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@spyrus.com] > > > > Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 4:36 PM > > > > To: Stephen Kent > > > > Cc: tgindin@us.ibm.com; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree with Steve. Note that the CAT Working Group has > > defined an > > > > OTHER-NAME for Kerberos names. > > > > > > > > Russ > > > > > > > > > > > > At 02:02 PM 04/13/2000 -0400, Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > >Tom, > > > > > > > > > >I have no problems with the sorts of IDs you proposed in your ASN > > > > >GeneralName Other-Name examples. They seem to be > > consistent with the > > > > >arguments that Denis has made for such constructs. However, > > > > before we add > > > > >these to the updated part 1, I think we need more time to > > > > explore the > > > > >utility for these name forms. The debate on the list shows > > > > that there are > > > > >widely diverse opinions about what such IDs are good for, > > > > what scope is > > > > >feasible/appropriate, etc. I'd hesitant to hold up > > progress on the > > > > >revision to 2459 to add this sort of facility which has been > > > > proposed only > > > > >recently. That's why several folks have suggested a > > separate, small > > > > >document whoch can be advanced separately, and merged into > > > > 2459 if there > > > > >is sufficient, consistent support. > > > > > > > > > >Steve > > > > > > Received: from tisch.mail.mindspring.net (tisch.mail.mindspring.net [207.69.200.157]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id SAA26635 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 18:30:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from asn-1.com (user-2ivf0ub.dialup.mindspring.com [165.247.131.203]) by tisch.mail.mindspring.net (8.9.3/8.8.5) with ESMTP id VAA26686 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 21:36:51 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <391A08C2.AC499D6E@asn-1.com> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 21:11:30 -0400 From: "Phillip H. Griffin" <phil.griffin@asn-1.com> Reply-To: phil.griffin@asn-1.com Organization: Griffin Consulting X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en] (Win95; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: pkix list <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 References: <852568DB.00609740.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Tom, Comments below. tgindin@us.ibm.com wrote: > > In practice, what we mean by "1988 syntax", as far as I can tell, is > pretty much the following: > > 1 - Avoiding the following three types first defined in post-1988 > versions: Instance-of, Embedded-pdv, and Unrestricted character string, and > adding explicit definitions for the Unicode string types which are copied > from X.680. > 2 - Continuing to use "ANY DEFINED BY", as defined in X.208 section 27 and > X.680 appendix H.3, rather than using constructs with similar meaning first > defined in 1993-4, such as information object classes and their fields. > 3 - Avoiding the use of either macros (legal in 1988) or information > object classes (legal after 1993-4). > > The only part of this which seems even questionable is point 2, but > X.680 still contains support for ANY DEFINED BY, although it is deprecated. > I was not at Adelaide, which partly accounts for my suggestion of 1993 > support in AC509Prof. No version of X.680 contains support for ANY DEFINED BY. In the 1994 version, ANY DEFINED BY was discussed as deprecated notation in an *informative* annex, and was not part of any *normative* text in that standard. During the last revision of X.680, both of the normative sections describing ANY DEFINED BY and the MACRO notation were removed, and the section you refer to no longer exists in the most recent publication of the standard, ITU-T Rec. X.680:1997 | ISO/IEC 8824-1 (1998). > I don't think that the bits on the line change for BER between > X.209(1988) and X.690(1994) if the ASN.1 is legal 1988 syntax. Does > anybody know of changes specific to DER? > You are correct that the bits on the line did not change for BER between the X.209:1988 and X.680:1997 publications. However, the same can not be said for X.509:1987 DER. The set of restrictions defined at that time were only intended for use in the Directory specification at that time, long before version 3 certificates. It wasn't until the added complexity of X.509v3 extensions came about that these 1987 rules became insufficient. They were probably designed only to be correct at that time for limited use within the Directory ASN.1. They were not designed to cover all possible uses of ASN.1. > Tom Gindin > > Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> on 05/10/2000 12:27:54 PM > > To: housley@spyrus.com > cc: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie, phil.griffin@asn-1.com, > ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 > > >>>>> "Russ" == Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> writes: > > Russ> I disagree. We are using the ASN.1-1988 documents, not the > Russ> 1997 ones. > > Russ> At 11:43 AM 05/10/2000 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > >> "DER is defined in [X.208-88]" -> "DER is defined in [X.690-97]" > >> is fine by me, anyone else care? > > Are the two different? That is, are there bitstrings that conform to > one but not the other, or whose meaning changes depending on which > spec you use? > > I think Russ's position is problematic. It's a bit like saying that > you continue to use an RFC that has been superseded. Presumably it > was superseded for a reason. Also, while old RFCs are still > available, 12 year old ITU specs may only exist in antique shops by > now. Clearly, it is not acceptable to have an RFC that points to an > outside standard unless that outside standard is available. > > paul Phil ---- Phillip H. Griffin Griffin Consulting http://asn-1.com Secure ASN.1 Design & Implementation +1-919-832-7008 1625 Glenwood Avenue, Five Points +1-919-832-7390 [fax] Raleigh, North Carolina 27608 USA ------------------------------------------------------------ Received: from tisch.mail.mindspring.net (tisch.mail.mindspring.net [207.69.200.157]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id SAA26596 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 18:30:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from asn-1.com (user-2ivf0ub.dialup.mindspring.com [165.247.131.203]) by tisch.mail.mindspring.net (8.9.3/8.8.5) with ESMTP id VAA07416 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 21:36:43 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <391A0F3D.D8EC2F9A@asn-1.com> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 21:39:09 -0400 From: "Phillip H. Griffin" <phil.griffin@asn-1.com> Reply-To: phil.griffin@asn-1.com Organization: Griffin Consulting X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en] (Win95; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: pkix list <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 References: <3918AE71.6BEC5020@asn-1.com> <4.2.0.58.20000510121205.00a90540@mail.spyrus.com> <4.2.0.58.20000510125719.00a9d610@mail.spyrus.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Russ Housley wrote: > > Paul: > > Both generate identical bit strings. Russ, this is simply not true. DER as defined in X.509:1987 is not as rigorously defined as the DER in X.690. Given the same abstract value these two sets of rules can produce different encodings. You may have forgotten this discussion from August 1998 between the ASN.1 standards editor and the Directory rapporteur on changing the reference in X.509 from their own definition of DER to that in X.680. After detailing differences between bit string encodings the ASN.1 editor stated in part: >The reason >that X.509 DER was not adopted verbatim into X.690 was >that when we started looking at it closely we came across >deficiencies in the X.509 encoding of REAL, UTCTime, >GeneralizedTime, GeneralString and BIT STRING which can >result different encodings for a given value. So we fixed >what was broken. I have no doubt that X.690 DER simply >closes the holes in X.509 DER and otherwise introduces > no incompatibility in X.509. > >The X.690 DER spec is very short, as is the X.509 spec. >Take the time and review the two and you will see that >X.690 DER is simply a tighter version of X.509 DER. > This topic has been debated several times,and I do not think we should do > it again on the list. If you want to have a private discussion about it, I > will be glad to do so. The bottom line is that ASN.1-1997 does not have > multiple implementations. What? Russ this may have been true a few years ago but it is not so now. While this is not a complete list I'm sure, and it doesn't take into account at all the many in house and not for sale tools that companies have, but among the ASN.1 tools I know of that support ASN.1:1997 are: http://asn1.elibel.tm.fr/en/tools/index.htm http://www.oss.com/products/tools.html http://www.computec.com/en/asn2cxx/index.html http://www.obj-sys.com/asn1.htm All of these support both BER and DER. All of these also support PER, though two of them at present only have beta test versions of PER tools available. There are two or three other companies currently building tools to support ASN.1:1997 as well, but none is complete at this time. Phil ---- Phillip H. Griffin Griffin Consulting http://asn-1.com Secure ASN.1 Design & Implementation +1-919-832-7008 1625 Glenwood Avenue, Five Points +1-919-832-7390 [fax] Raleigh, North Carolina 27608 USA ------------------------------------------------------------ > Russ > > At 12:27 PM 05/10/2000 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: > > >>>>> "Russ" == Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> writes: > > > > Russ> I disagree. We are using the ASN.1-1988 documents, not the > > Russ> 1997 ones. > > > > Russ> At 11:43 AM 05/10/2000 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > > >> "DER is defined in [X.208-88]" -> "DER is defined in [X.690-97]" > > >> is fine by me, anyone else care? > > > >Are the two different? That is, are there bitstrings that conform to > >one but not the other, or whose meaning changes depending on which > >spec you use? > > > >I think Russ's position is problematic. It's a bit like saying that > >you continue to use an RFC that has been superseded. Presumably it > >was superseded for a reason. Also, while old RFCs are still > >available, 12 year old ITU specs may only exist in antique shops by > >now. Clearly, it is not acceptable to have an RFC that points to an > >outside standard unless that outside standard is available. > > > > paul Received: from mail.ec.auckland.ac.nz (mail.student.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.201]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA14096 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 13:07:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz (pgut001@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.36.13]) by mail.ec.auckland.ac.nz (8.9.3/8.8.6/cs-master) with SMTP id IAA14431; Thu, 11 May 2000 08:13:07 +1200 (NZST) (sender pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: by kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz (relaymail v0.9) id <95798958727979>; Thu, 11 May 2000 08:13:07 (NZST) From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: phil.griffin@asn-1.com Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Reply-To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz X-Charge-To: pgut001 X-Authenticated: relaymail v0.9 on kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz Date: Thu, 11 May 2000 08:13:07 (NZST) Message-ID: <95798958727979@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz> "Phillip H. Griffin" <phil.griffin@asn-1.com> writes: >>It's the same for ASN.1 books, Prof.Larmouth's book is for current versions >>of ASN.1 rather than the obsolete versions referenced in RFC's, so it would >>probably do more to confuse than help. > >Larmouth's books certainly covers the current standards, but it is far from >being irrelevant to understanding any version of the ASN.1 standards. The >book covers such topics from antiquity as ANY DEFINED BY, ANY, and MACRO. All >of the ASN.1 types covered in the earlier Steedman book are also covered, as >well as new types such as UTF8String and RELATIVE-OID that are not specified >in X.208/209. What I was concerned with is that since it covers features not present in the 1988 version, anyone using it as a reference could end up using features which aren't in the older version (it's a bit like using an ANSI C manual to write K&R code, it's backwards-compatible but you wouldn't want to rely on it as a reference for K&R programming). Unless Larmouth's book is very explicit over which features can't be used in the 1988 version, people using it could end up accidentally using post-1988 ASN.1 features. Peter. Received: from maynard.mail.mindspring.net (maynard.mail.mindspring.net [207.69.200.243]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA13649 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 12:45:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: from asn-1.com (user-2ivf6mc.dialup.mindspring.com [165.247.154.204]) by maynard.mail.mindspring.net (8.9.3/8.8.5) with ESMTP id PAA21436 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 15:51:58 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <3919BE73.2F6A7238@asn-1.com> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 15:54:27 -0400 From: "Phillip H. Griffin" <phil.griffin@asn-1.com> Reply-To: phil.griffin@asn-1.com Organization: Griffin Consulting X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en] (Win95; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 References: <852568DB.00539209.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> <4.2.0.58.20000510122826.00a9be10@mail.spyrus.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Russ Housley wrote: > > Yes. The group was asked if anyone wanted to retain the ASN.1-1993 > Appendix, and no one cared enough to speak up. > > Russ Actually the PKIX1Explicit93 module is now referenced in an IMPORTS statement in the FDIS version of ISO 15945 (also an ITU-T proposed standard, but I can not find the mumble number right now) Trusted Third Parties. This work includes versions of CRMF and OCSP whose syntax has been corrected where necessary and rewritten using the current ASN.1 standards. Phil > At 04:38 PM 05/10/2000 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > >Tom, > > > > > The definition Phil referred to ("AttributeValue ::= ANY") should be > > > changed to > > > "AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType", both here and in A.1 of > > > son-of-2459. > > > >No problem. 2459 does it that way in the text, but not in > >the ASN.1 module, which I guess must be where I copied it > >from. > > > > > Since only SecurityCategory, among the structures specific to > > > AC509Prof, actually uses any old-fashioned formats, it would be better > > > either to include documentation of the 1993 format in the draft (as in 2459 > > > and son-of-2459) or to change it to be compatible with INSTANCE OF. > > > >Wasn't there consensus among the folks in Adelaide to expunge the '93 > >ASN.1 from son-of-2459. I'm happy to follow whatever happens there, > >though I can't remember if this has come up on the list. > > > > > Including documentation of the 1993 format would not break existing > > > implementations (if there are any), > > > >There are. > > > >Regards, > >Stephen. > > > >-- > >____________________________________________________________ > >Stephen Farrell > >Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 647 7406 > >61 Fitzwilliam Lane, fax: +353 1 647 7499 > >Dublin 2. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie > >Ireland http://www.baltimore.com Received: from maynard.mail.mindspring.net (maynard.mail.mindspring.net [207.69.200.243]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA13259 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 12:34:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from asn-1.com (user-2ivf6mc.dialup.mindspring.com [165.247.154.204]) by maynard.mail.mindspring.net (8.9.3/8.8.5) with ESMTP id PAA32341 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 15:40:54 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <3919BBD8.321C8873@asn-1.com> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 15:43:20 -0400 From: "Phillip H. Griffin" <phil.griffin@asn-1.com> Reply-To: phil.griffin@asn-1.com Organization: Griffin Consulting X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en] (Win95; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 References: <004d01bfbab1$55756d40$6689a4d8@rankney> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Rich Ankney wrote: > > -----Original Message----- > From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> > To: pkoning@xedia.com <pkoning@xedia.com> > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org <ietf-pkix@imc.org> > Date: Wednesday, May 10, 2000 1:28 PM > Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 > > >Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> writes: > > > >>Also, while old RFCs are still available, 12 year old ITU specs may only > >>exist in antique shops by now. Not sure, but I think that the 1990 version is still available on the ITU-T web site. > >It's the same for ASN.1 books, Prof.Larmouth's book is for current versions > of > >ASN.1 rather than the obsolete versions referenced in RFC's, so it would > >probably do more to confuse than help. The only reference for the obsolete > >variant of ASN.1 is Douglas Steedmans "Tutorial and Reference", which is > >useful for that version but doesn't apply to any current version. This > book > >has been out of print for years, so you'd actually have to go to antique > >shops (well, used book stores) to find it. > > > > Well, Larmouth's book does discuss these earlier artifacts (macros and > ANY DEFINED BY), although it's certainly not very detailed. The text on holes could give more details on ANY and ANY DEFINED BY, but it seems to spend more time on holes that work without the interoperability failures of these deprecated types. As for MACROs, it seems rare when two people can read one and come to the same conclusion. In general, they can not be mechanically processed in a reliable manner. > >>Clearly, it is not acceptable to have an RFC that points to an outside > >>standard unless that outside standard is available. > > > >It could be argued that the ASN.1 specs, being ISO standards, aren't > usefully > >"available" no matter whether it's an obsolete or current version which is > >being referenced :-). > > > > I heard from a generally reliable source that ITU-T is going to cave in and > distribute the ASN.1 specs (X.680 and X.690) for free via their website. > I heard this about a month ago, and they are still charging, but after all > this > IS the ITU we're talking about. Has anyone else heard this? > >Peter. At the ASN.1 meeting in Geneva in March, the ASN.1 Study Group recommended (again) that the ITU-T make electronic copies of the standards available on their web site for free. It has been agreed by the ITU-T to follow this recommendation and to do so, but I am still waiting on notice of the actual URL. There is other work related to this that must also be completed. There are instructions for converting from X.208 to the current standards that will be added to the web site, and there is also new text to be added that that there is no further need for retention of X.208 and X.209 as standards. Not sure if this actual text has yet been approved, but the recommended text to be displayed on the X.208 and X.209 pages was: "CCITT Recommendation X.208 has been superseded by ITU-T Recommendations X.680-683 (1997). All known defects in X.208 have been corrected in ITU-T Recommendations X.680-683 (1997). Please note that Rec. X.208 is scheduled for withdrawal. If you are a protocol designer creating new ASN.1 notation, you should use the 1997 version of ASN.1 as defined in ITU-T Recommendations X.680-683 (1997) instead of using CCITT Recommendation X.208." > > > > > Regards, > Rich Phil ---- Phillip H. Griffin Griffin Consulting http://asn-1.com Secure ASN.1 Design & Implementation +1-919-832-7008 1625 Glenwood Avenue, Five Points +1-919-832-7390 [fax] Raleigh, North Carolina 27608 USA ------------------------------------------------------------ Received: from smtp03.mrf.mail.rcn.net (smtp03.mrf.mail.rcn.net [207.172.4.62]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA12965 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 12:27:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from 216-164-137-102.s356.tnt4.lnhva.md.dialup.rcn.com ([216.164.137.102] helo=rankney) by smtp03.mrf.mail.rcn.net with smtp (Exim 2.12 #3) id 12pcEs-00060E-00; Wed, 10 May 2000 15:33:47 -0400 Message-ID: <035d01bfbab8$cb1baa80$6689a4d8@rankney> From: "Rich Ankney" <rankney@erols.com> To: "Paul Koning" <pkoning@xedia.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 15:48:56 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 4.72.3155.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3155.0 Simple; just update everything to ASN.1:1997 :-) -----Original Message----- From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> To: rankney@erols.com <rankney@erols.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Date: Wednesday, May 10, 2000 3:01 PM Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 >>>>>> "Rich" == Rich Ankney <rankney@erols.com> writes: > > Rich> I heard from a generally reliable source that ITU-T is going to > Rich> cave in and distribute the ASN.1 specs (X.680 and X.690) for > Rich> free via their website. > >That would be cool. But what about X.208-1988? Given the discussion >we just had, if *that* one isn't available (free or for money) we have >a real problem. > > paul Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA12308 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:53:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiopn13464; Wed, 10 May 2000 18:59:17 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA29525; Wed, 10 May 00 14:55:54 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id OAA28958; Wed, 10 May 2000 14:59:15 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14617.45443.315015.569062@xedia.com> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 14:59:15 -0400 (EDT) To: rankney@erols.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 References: <004d01bfbab1$55756d40$6689a4d8@rankney> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Rich" == Rich Ankney <rankney@erols.com> writes: Rich> I heard from a generally reliable source that ITU-T is going to Rich> cave in and distribute the ASN.1 specs (X.680 and X.690) for Rich> free via their website. That would be cool. But what about X.208-1988? Given the discussion we just had, if *that* one isn't available (free or for money) we have a real problem. paul Received: from smtp03.mrf.mail.rcn.net (smtp03.mrf.mail.rcn.net [207.172.4.62]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA11766 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:34:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from 216-164-137-102.s356.tnt4.lnhva.md.dialup.rcn.com ([216.164.137.102] helo=rankney) by smtp03.mrf.mail.rcn.net with smtp (Exim 2.12 #3) id 12pbPD-000305-00; Wed, 10 May 2000 14:40:23 -0400 Message-ID: <004d01bfbab1$55756d40$6689a4d8@rankney> From: "Rich Ankney" <rankney@erols.com> To: <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <pkoning@xedia.com> Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 14:55:37 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 4.72.3155.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3155.0 -----Original Message----- From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> To: pkoning@xedia.com <pkoning@xedia.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Date: Wednesday, May 10, 2000 1:28 PM Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 >Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> writes: > >>Also, while old RFCs are still available, 12 year old ITU specs may only >>exist in antique shops by now. > >It's the same for ASN.1 books, Prof.Larmouth's book is for current versions of >ASN.1 rather than the obsolete versions referenced in RFC's, so it would >probably do more to confuse than help. The only reference for the obsolete >variant of ASN.1 is Douglas Steedmans "Tutorial and Reference", which is >useful for that version but doesn't apply to any current version. This book >has been out of print for years, so you'd actually have to go to antique >shops (well, used book stores) to find it. > Well, Larmouth's book does discuss these earlier artifacts (macros and ANY DEFINED BY), although it's certainly not very detailed. >>Clearly, it is not acceptable to have an RFC that points to an outside >>standard unless that outside standard is available. > >It could be argued that the ASN.1 specs, being ISO standards, aren't usefully >"available" no matter whether it's an obsolete or current version which is >being referenced :-). > I heard from a generally reliable source that ITU-T is going to cave in and distribute the ASN.1 specs (X.680 and X.690) for free via their website. I heard this about a month ago, and they are still charging, but after all this IS the ITU we're talking about. Has anyone else heard this? >Peter. > > Regards, Rich Received: from e2.ny.us.ibm.com (e2.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.102]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA05881 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 10:30:03 -0700 (PDT) From: tgindin@us.ibm.com Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.22]) by e2.ny.us.ibm.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA285042; Wed, 10 May 2000 13:33:53 -0400 Received: from D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com (d51mta04.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.32]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.8.8m3/NCO v2.07) with SMTP id NAA34140; Wed, 10 May 2000 13:35:16 -0400 Received: by D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568DB.006099AB ; Wed, 10 May 2000 13:35:07 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: IBMUS To: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> cc: housley@spyrus.com, stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie, phil.griffin@asn-1.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-ID: <852568DB.00609740.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 13:34:55 -0400 Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In practice, what we mean by "1988 syntax", as far as I can tell, is pretty much the following: 1 - Avoiding the following three types first defined in post-1988 versions: Instance-of, Embedded-pdv, and Unrestricted character string, and adding explicit definitions for the Unicode string types which are copied from X.680. 2 - Continuing to use "ANY DEFINED BY", as defined in X.208 section 27 and X.680 appendix H.3, rather than using constructs with similar meaning first defined in 1993-4, such as information object classes and their fields. 3 - Avoiding the use of either macros (legal in 1988) or information object classes (legal after 1993-4). The only part of this which seems even questionable is point 2, but X.680 still contains support for ANY DEFINED BY, although it is deprecated. I was not at Adelaide, which partly accounts for my suggestion of 1993 support in AC509Prof. I don't think that the bits on the line change for BER between X.209(1988) and X.690(1994) if the ASN.1 is legal 1988 syntax. Does anybody know of changes specific to DER? Tom Gindin Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> on 05/10/2000 12:27:54 PM To: housley@spyrus.com cc: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie, phil.griffin@asn-1.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 >>>>> "Russ" == Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> writes: Russ> I disagree. We are using the ASN.1-1988 documents, not the Russ> 1997 ones. Russ> At 11:43 AM 05/10/2000 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: >> "DER is defined in [X.208-88]" -> "DER is defined in [X.690-97]" >> is fine by me, anyone else care? Are the two different? That is, are there bitstrings that conform to one but not the other, or whose meaning changes depending on which spec you use? I think Russ's position is problematic. It's a bit like saying that you continue to use an RFC that has been superseded. Presumably it was superseded for a reason. Also, while old RFCs are still available, 12 year old ITU specs may only exist in antique shops by now. Clearly, it is not acceptable to have an RFC that points to an outside standard unless that outside standard is available. paul Received: from mail.ec.auckland.ac.nz (mail.student.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.35.201]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA02107 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 10:17:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz (pgut001@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.36.13]) by mail.ec.auckland.ac.nz (8.9.3/8.8.6/cs-master) with SMTP id FAA20492; Thu, 11 May 2000 05:23:41 +1200 (NZST) (sender pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz) Received: by kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz (relaymail v0.9) id <95797942127562>; Thu, 11 May 2000 05:23:41 (NZST) From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: pkoning@xedia.com Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Sender: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Reply-To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz X-Charge-To: pgut001 X-Authenticated: relaymail v0.9 on kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz Date: Thu, 11 May 2000 05:23:41 (NZST) Message-ID: <95797942127562@kahu.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> writes: >Also, while old RFCs are still available, 12 year old ITU specs may only >exist in antique shops by now. It's the same for ASN.1 books, Prof.Larmouth's book is for current versions of ASN.1 rather than the obsolete versions referenced in RFC's, so it would probably do more to confuse than help. The only reference for the obsolete variant of ASN.1 is Douglas Steedmans "Tutorial and Reference", which is useful for that version but doesn't apply to any current version. This book has been out of print for years, so you'd actually have to go to antique shops (well, used book stores) to find it. >Clearly, it is not acceptable to have an RFC that points to an outside >standard unless that outside standard is available. It could be argued that the ASN.1 specs, being ISO standards, aren't usefully "available" no matter whether it's an obsolete or current version which is being referenced :-). Peter. Received: from mail.spyrus.com (mail.spyrus.com [207.212.34.20]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA01543 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 09:56:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rhousley_laptop.spyrus.com.au ([209.172.119.206]) by mail.spyrus.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA07878; Wed, 10 May 2000 10:00:53 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000510125719.00a9d610@mail.spyrus.com> X-Sender: rhousley@mail.spyrus.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 12:59:22 -0400 To: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> From: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Cc: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie, phil.griffin@asn-1.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <14617.36362.210833.649832@xedia.com> References: <3918AE71.6BEC5020@asn-1.com> <4.2.0.58.20000510121205.00a90540@mail.spyrus.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Paul: Both generate identical bit strings. This topic has been debated several times,and I do not think we should do it again on the list. If you want to have a private discussion about it, I will be glad to do so. The bottom line is that ASN.1-1997 does not have multiple implementations. Russ At 12:27 PM 05/10/2000 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: > >>>>> "Russ" == Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> writes: > > Russ> I disagree. We are using the ASN.1-1988 documents, not the > Russ> 1997 ones. > > Russ> At 11:43 AM 05/10/2000 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > >> "DER is defined in [X.208-88]" -> "DER is defined in [X.690-97]" > >> is fine by me, anyone else care? > >Are the two different? That is, are there bitstrings that conform to >one but not the other, or whose meaning changes depending on which >spec you use? > >I think Russ's position is problematic. It's a bit like saying that >you continue to use an RFC that has been superseded. Presumably it >was superseded for a reason. Also, while old RFCs are still >available, 12 year old ITU specs may only exist in antique shops by >now. Clearly, it is not acceptable to have an RFC that points to an >outside standard unless that outside standard is available. > > paul Received: from mail.spyrus.com (mail.spyrus.com [207.212.34.20]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA00845 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 09:25:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rhousley_laptop.spyrus.com.au ([209.172.119.206]) by mail.spyrus.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA07376; Wed, 10 May 2000 09:30:34 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000510122826.00a9be10@mail.spyrus.com> X-Sender: rhousley@mail.spyrus.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 12:29:20 -0400 To: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie From: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Cc: tgindin@us.ibm.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org, xme <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> In-Reply-To: <39198271.44E58B6C@baltimore.ie> References: <852568DB.00539209.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Yes. The group was asked if anyone wanted to retain the ASN.1-1993 Appendix, and no one cared enough to speak up. Russ At 04:38 PM 05/10/2000 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: >Tom, > > > The definition Phil referred to ("AttributeValue ::= ANY") should be > > changed to > > "AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType", both here and in A.1 of > > son-of-2459. > >No problem. 2459 does it that way in the text, but not in >the ASN.1 module, which I guess must be where I copied it >from. > > > Since only SecurityCategory, among the structures specific to > > AC509Prof, actually uses any old-fashioned formats, it would be better > > either to include documentation of the 1993 format in the draft (as in 2459 > > and son-of-2459) or to change it to be compatible with INSTANCE OF. > >Wasn't there consensus among the folks in Adelaide to expunge the '93 >ASN.1 from son-of-2459. I'm happy to follow whatever happens there, >though I can't remember if this has come up on the list. > > > Including documentation of the 1993 format would not break existing > > implementations (if there are any), > >There are. > >Regards, >Stephen. > >-- >____________________________________________________________ >Stephen Farrell >Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 647 7406 >61 Fitzwilliam Lane, fax: +353 1 647 7499 >Dublin 2. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie >Ireland http://www.baltimore.com Received: from dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net (dfw7-1.relay.mail.uu.net [199.171.54.106]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA00626 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 09:22:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xedia.com by dfw7sosrv11.alter.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: madway.xedia.com [198.202.232.199]) id QQiopd19020; Wed, 10 May 2000 16:27:55 GMT Received: from tonga.xedia.com by xedia.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA27556; Wed, 10 May 00 12:24:32 EDT Received: by tonga.xedia.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id MAA28769; Wed, 10 May 2000 12:27:54 -0400 From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <14617.36362.210833.649832@xedia.com> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 12:27:54 -0400 (EDT) To: housley@spyrus.com Cc: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie, phil.griffin@asn-1.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 References: <3918AE71.6BEC5020@asn-1.com> <4.2.0.58.20000510121205.00a90540@mail.spyrus.com> X-Mailer: VM 6.72 under 21.1 (patch 9) "Canyonlands" XEmacs Lucid >>>>> "Russ" == Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> writes: Russ> I disagree. We are using the ASN.1-1988 documents, not the Russ> 1997 ones. Russ> At 11:43 AM 05/10/2000 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: >> "DER is defined in [X.208-88]" -> "DER is defined in [X.690-97]" >> is fine by me, anyone else care? Are the two different? That is, are there bitstrings that conform to one but not the other, or whose meaning changes depending on which spec you use? I think Russ's position is problematic. It's a bit like saying that you continue to use an RFC that has been superseded. Presumably it was superseded for a reason. Also, while old RFCs are still available, 12 year old ITU specs may only exist in antique shops by now. Clearly, it is not acceptable to have an RFC that points to an outside standard unless that outside standard is available. paul Received: from mail.spyrus.com (mail.spyrus.com [207.212.34.20]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA00273 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 09:13:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rhousley_laptop.spyrus.com.au ([209.172.119.206]) by mail.spyrus.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA07158; Wed, 10 May 2000 09:18:46 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000510121342.00a856c0@mail.spyrus.com> X-Sender: rhousley@mail.spyrus.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 12:17:40 -0400 To: phil.griffin@asn-1.com From: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <3918AE71.6BEC5020@asn-1.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Phil: You are correct. In the 1988 series of documents, DER is defined as a short list of constraints on ASN.1, and those constraints are enumerated in X.509-1988. We should Reference X.208-1988, X.209-1988, and X.509-1988 to provide all of the parts that people need. I have no problem including a reference to the Larmouth book if people think that it will help implementors. Russ At 08:33 PM 05/09/2000 -0400, Phillip H. Griffin wrote: >Hi there, > >In section 4.1, just after your use of the deprecated >"ANY" notation, your profile states incorrectly that "DER >is defined in [X.208-88]". X.208 defines Abstract Syntax >Notation ONE (ASN.1), but it does not define any of the >ASN.1 encoding rules. > >Way back in 1988, the time period to which you refer, the >ASN.1 encoding rules were defined in X.209. Of course both >X.208 and X.209 have been superseded and relegated along >with their lists of unresolved defects to the maintenance >site, at http://www.furniss.co.uk/maint/asn/index.html. > >In 1988, only BER existed as an ASN.1 standard, as defined >in X.209 (though X.509:88 defined a set of restrictions on >X.209 that they called DER). The DER, PER and CER encoding >rules were not standardized until 1994. It could be that >you are referring to "[X.509-88]" in your document rather >than the current version of X.509 (which defines ACs) to >try to include some sort of DER support for X.208/209 - >hard to tell. > >The initial DER was created by Hoyt Kesterson's X.509 group. >Out of their efforts, the ASN.1 DER rules evolved, and are >now defined in the current ASN.1 standard, X.690. Though the >spirit of X.509-88 and X.690:DER are the same, X.690:DER >corrects a number of oversights present in X.509-88. These >two rule sets differ in slight ways, particularly in how >bit string values and a few other very small details are >handled. These distinctions become important when digital >signatures are involved. > >A good description of DER can be found in a free download >copy of the recent ASN.1 book by John Larmouth, called ASN.1 >Complete, at http://www.nokalva.com/asn1/booksintro.html. >Hard copy is also available from B&N (not for free I think). >All of the wrinkles and warts are discussed. Worth a read >if you have to deal often with such things. > >Phil >---- >Phillip H. Griffin Griffin Consulting >http://asn-1.com Secure ASN.1 Design & Implementation >+1-919-832-7008 1625 Glenwood Avenue, Five Points >+1-919-832-7390 [fax] Raleigh, North Carolina 27608 USA >------------------------------------------------------------ Received: from mail.spyrus.com (mail.spyrus.com [207.212.34.20]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA29900 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 09:08:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rhousley_laptop.spyrus.com.au ([209.172.119.206]) by mail.spyrus.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA07077; Wed, 10 May 2000 09:13:49 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000510121205.00a90540@mail.spyrus.com> X-Sender: rhousley@mail.spyrus.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 12:12:42 -0400 To: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie From: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Cc: phil.griffin@asn-1.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <39193D38.A7A3EACF@baltimore.ie> References: <3918AE71.6BEC5020@asn-1.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed I disagree. We are using the ASN.1-1988 documents, not the 1997 ones. Russ At 11:43 AM 05/10/2000 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: >"DER is defined in [X.208-88]" -> "DER is defined in [X.690-97]" >is fine by me, anyone else care? > >I guess this should be the same in the son-of-2459 too. > >Stephen. > >"Phillip H. Griffin" wrote: > > > > Hi there, > > > > In section 4.1, just after your use of the deprecated > > "ANY" notation, your profile states incorrectly that "DER > > is defined in [X.208-88]". X.208 defines Abstract Syntax > > Notation ONE (ASN.1), but it does not define any of the > > ASN.1 encoding rules. > > > > Way back in 1988, the time period to which you refer, the > > ASN.1 encoding rules were defined in X.209. Of course both > > X.208 and X.209 have been superseded and relegated along > > with their lists of unresolved defects to the maintenance > > site, at http://www.furniss.co.uk/maint/asn/index.html. > > > > In 1988, only BER existed as an ASN.1 standard, as defined > > in X.209 (though X.509:88 defined a set of restrictions on > > X.209 that they called DER). The DER, PER and CER encoding > > rules were not standardized until 1994. It could be that > > you are referring to "[X.509-88]" in your document rather > > than the current version of X.509 (which defines ACs) to > > try to include some sort of DER support for X.208/209 - > > hard to tell. > > > > The initial DER was created by Hoyt Kesterson's X.509 group. > > Out of their efforts, the ASN.1 DER rules evolved, and are > > now defined in the current ASN.1 standard, X.690. Though the > > spirit of X.509-88 and X.690:DER are the same, X.690:DER > > corrects a number of oversights present in X.509-88. These > > two rule sets differ in slight ways, particularly in how > > bit string values and a few other very small details are > > handled. These distinctions become important when digital > > signatures are involved. > > > > A good description of DER can be found in a free download > > copy of the recent ASN.1 book by John Larmouth, called ASN.1 > > Complete, at http://www.nokalva.com/asn1/booksintro.html. > > Hard copy is also available from B&N (not for free I think). > > All of the wrinkles and warts are discussed. Worth a read > > if you have to deal often with such things. > > > > Phil > > ---- > > Phillip H. Griffin Griffin Consulting > > http://asn-1.com Secure ASN.1 Design & Implementation > > +1-919-832-7008 1625 Glenwood Avenue, Five Points > > +1-919-832-7390 [fax] Raleigh, North Carolina 27608 USA > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >-- >____________________________________________________________ >Stephen Farrell >Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 647 7406 >61 Fitzwilliam Lane, fax: +353 1 647 7499 >Dublin 2. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie >Ireland http://www.baltimore.com Received: from mail.spyrus.com (mail.spyrus.com [207.212.34.20]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA29164 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 08:37:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rhousley_laptop.spyrus.com.au ([209.172.119.206]) by mail.spyrus.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA06606; Wed, 10 May 2000 08:43:11 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000510113702.00a61750@mail.spyrus.com> X-Sender: rhousley@mail.spyrus.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 11:38:18 -0400 To: piers@bj.co.uk From: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> Subject: Re: SMIME conformance specs Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org In-Reply-To: <000601bf6340$8d7476a0$1a01a8c0@piers2k> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Piers: Greeting old friend. The S/MIME WG has not generated such a document. However, RFC 2632 and RFC 2633 do offer some advice on some of the issues. Russ At 12:19 PM 01/20/2000 +0000, Piers Chivers wrote: >Hi, >Are there any publicly available docs that describe the conformance >requirements for a PKIX/SMIME compliant messaging client? > >I know that the SMIME RFCs detail the protocol requirements for a conforming >app but I was thinking at the level of >"A conforming client must indicate to the user when a message fails a >signature validation" or "A user must be able to encrypt and/or sign an >outgoing message". > >Thanks, >Piers Received: from balinese.baltimore.ie (firewall-user@pc215-8.indigo.ie [194.125.215.8]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA28862 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 08:32:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: by balinese.baltimore.ie; id QAA23501; Wed, 10 May 2000 16:38:20 +0100 (GMT/IST) Received: from bobcat.baltimore.ie(192.168.20.10) by balinese.baltimore.ie via smap (V4.2) id xma023453; Wed, 10 May 00 16:38:03 +0100 Received: from baltimore.ie (lease173-21.baltimore.ie [192.168.21.173]) by bobcat.baltimore.ie (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id QAA04008; Wed, 10 May 2000 16:38:01 +0100 Message-ID: <39198271.44E58B6C@baltimore.ie> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 16:38:25 +0100 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> Reply-To: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Organization: Baltimore Technologies Ltd. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: tgindin@us.ibm.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org, xme <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie>, RussHousley <housley@spyrus.com> Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 References: <852568DB.00539209.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Tom, > The definition Phil referred to ("AttributeValue ::= ANY") should be > changed to > "AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType", both here and in A.1 of > son-of-2459. No problem. 2459 does it that way in the text, but not in the ASN.1 module, which I guess must be where I copied it from. > Since only SecurityCategory, among the structures specific to > AC509Prof, actually uses any old-fashioned formats, it would be better > either to include documentation of the 1993 format in the draft (as in 2459 > and son-of-2459) or to change it to be compatible with INSTANCE OF. Wasn't there consensus among the folks in Adelaide to expunge the '93 ASN.1 from son-of-2459. I'm happy to follow whatever happens there, though I can't remember if this has come up on the list. > Including documentation of the 1993 format would not break existing > implementations (if there are any), There are. Regards, Stephen. -- ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 647 7406 61 Fitzwilliam Lane, fax: +353 1 647 7499 Dublin 2. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Ireland http://www.baltimore.com Received: from e4.ny.us.ibm.com (e4.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.104]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA28500 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 08:22:12 -0700 (PDT) From: tgindin@us.ibm.com Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.22]) by e4.ny.us.ibm.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA117016; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:26:27 -0400 Received: from D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com (d51mta04.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.32]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.8.8m3/NCO v2.07) with SMTP id LAA165296; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:27:49 -0400 Received: by D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568DB.0054EE88 ; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:27:40 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: IBMUS To: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-ID: <852568DB.0054ED09.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 11:27:33 -0400 Subject: Re: ASN.1 Name joys Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline My own suggestions are: 1 - Include all imported objects with dependencies other than Universal types. 2 - Include a table with the Universal tags for string types and times. 3 - Include EXPLICIT or IMPLICIT on every context-specific tag. This is not done primarily to deter the unnecessary use of context-specific tags, although it may well have that effect. 4 - If it is thought that #1 and #3 involve copyright problems, require that every import statement include a note as to whether the objects defined by that import are implicitly or explicitly typed. This is an inferior alternative to #1 and #3. I realize that my suggestion in #3 directly contradicts X.680:94 section F.2.12.5, but since that section is not an integral part of the standard and it is followed immediately by F.2.12.6, which appears to believe that context-specific tags can be avoided in SET's and CHOICE's by adding new elements to the end, I don't have to assume that the section author's views are any more valid than my own. Tom Gindin Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> on 05/05/2000 04:00:23 PM To: ietf-pkix@imc.org cc: Subject: ASN.1 Name joys I have just completed a 3 day CMP2000 interop workshop (email me if you wish to participate in the next one 1st week in June). In the days preceeding and during we yet again had vendors experiencing ASN.1 coding problems with Name. I have had threads as follows: ============================================================= now I have examined the problem [with your ir] in more detail: Our Code has problems with the field 'subject' [5] in the CertTemplate: The subject is a NAME and the default for tagging in the CertTemplate SEQUENCE is IMPLICIT. Now the problem is, that the NAME is a CHOICE and for a CHOICE it is not allowed to use IMPLICIT tagging (see the ASN.1 specification). So, in the case of NAME one has to use an EXPLICIT tagging. ============================================================= Then I get others like: ============================================================= my interpretation of the PKIHeader->sender/recipient field was as follows: both sender and recipient are defined to be of type GeneralName... PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { pvno INTEGER { ietf-version2 (1) }, sender GeneralName, -- identifies the sender recipient GeneralName, -- identifies the intended recipient messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, <snip> which is defined in the IMPORTS as: FROM PKIX1Implicit88 which is defined in RFC-2459 as: GeneralName ::= CHOICE { otherName [0] AnotherName, rfc822Name [1] IA5String, dNSName [2] IA5String, x400Address [3] ORAddress, directoryName [4] Name, ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } therefore it should be tagged as IMPLICIT and, it can be any number of underlying structures. so, a Name, although a SEQUENCE by definition, would be implicitly tagged as [4] { SET{} SET{} ... }, not SEQUENCE { SET{} SET{} ... } otherwise, the underlying name type would not be so easily determined. ============================================================= As you might imagine, it is challenging to work on CMP interoperablity when there are questions about 2459 conformance. Not everyone will be (or want to be) ASN.1 war heros. What can we do with 2459bis to stop the flow of coding errors???? Do we need an informational RFC giving ASN.1 coding rules so that people do not have to get the X. whatever??? Robert Moskowitz ICSA Security Interest EMail: rgm-sec@htt-consult.com Received: from e1.ny.us.ibm.com (e1.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.101]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA27994 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 08:07:22 -0700 (PDT) From: tgindin@us.ibm.com Received: from northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (northrelay02.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.22]) by e1.ny.us.ibm.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA125380; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:11:40 -0400 Received: from D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com (d51mta04.pok.ibm.com [9.117.200.32]) by northrelay02.pok.ibm.com (8.8.8m3/NCO v2.07) with SMTP id LAA92576; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:12:57 -0400 Received: by D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com(Lotus SMTP MTA v4.6.5 (863.2 5-20-1999)) id 852568DB.005393FE ; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:12:53 -0400 X-Lotus-FromDomain: IBMUS To: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie cc: phil.griffin@asn-1.com, ietf-pkix@imc.org Message-ID: <852568DB.00539209.00@D51MTA04.pok.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 11:12:45 -0400 Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline The definition Phil referred to ("AttributeValue ::= ANY") should be changed to "AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType", both here and in A.1 of son-of-2459. Since only SecurityCategory, among the structures specific to AC509Prof, actually uses any old-fashioned formats, it would be better either to include documentation of the 1993 format in the draft (as in 2459 and son-of-2459) or to change it to be compatible with INSTANCE OF. Including documentation of the 1993 format would not break existing implementations (if there are any), while changes to use INSTANCE OF would. Here are my suggestions (1-2 form the 1993 definition of the existing SecurityCategory type with its own class, 3 is a 1993 definition of SecurityCategory with the existing Attribute class, 4 is the 1988 version of INSTANCE OF, 5 is the 1993 use of INSTANCE OF): 1) SecurityCATEGORY ::= CLASS { &Type, &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE } WITH SYNTAX { WITH SYNTAX &Type ID &id } 2) SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE { type [0] IMPLICIT SecurityCATEGORY.&id, value [1] EXPLICIT SecurityCATEGORY.&Type } 3) SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE { type [0] IMPLICIT Attribute.&attributeId, value [1] IMPLICIT Attribute.&attributeType } 4) SecurityCategory ::= [UNIVERSAL 8] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type } 5) SecurityCategory ::= INSTANCE OF TYPE-IDENTIFIER Any corrections or suggestions are welcome. Tom Gindin Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> on 05/10/2000 06:43:04 AM Please respond to stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie To: phil.griffin@asn-1.com cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 "DER is defined in [X.208-88]" -> "DER is defined in [X.690-97]" is fine by me, anyone else care? I guess this should be the same in the son-of-2459 too. Stephen. "Phillip H. Griffin" wrote: > > Hi there, > > In section 4.1, just after your use of the deprecated > "ANY" notation, your profile states incorrectly that "DER > is defined in [X.208-88]". X.208 defines Abstract Syntax > Notation ONE (ASN.1), but it does not define any of the > ASN.1 encoding rules. > > Way back in 1988, the time period to which you refer, the > ASN.1 encoding rules were defined in X.209. Of course both > X.208 and X.209 have been superseded and relegated along > with their lists of unresolved defects to the maintenance > site, at http://www.furniss.co.uk/maint/asn/index.html. > > In 1988, only BER existed as an ASN.1 standard, as defined > in X.209 (though X.509:88 defined a set of restrictions on > X.209 that they called DER). The DER, PER and CER encoding > rules were not standardized until 1994. It could be that > you are referring to "[X.509-88]" in your document rather > than the current version of X.509 (which defines ACs) to > try to include some sort of DER support for X.208/209 - > hard to tell. > > The initial DER was created by Hoyt Kesterson's X.509 group. > Out of their efforts, the ASN.1 DER rules evolved, and are > now defined in the current ASN.1 standard, X.690. Though the > spirit of X.509-88 and X.690:DER are the same, X.690:DER > corrects a number of oversights present in X.509-88. These > two rule sets differ in slight ways, particularly in how > bit string values and a few other very small details are > handled. These distinctions become important when digital > signatures are involved. > > A good description of DER can be found in a free download > copy of the recent ASN.1 book by John Larmouth, called ASN.1 > Complete, at http://www.nokalva.com/asn1/booksintro.html. > Hard copy is also available from B&N (not for free I think). > All of the wrinkles and warts are discussed. Worth a read > if you have to deal often with such things. > > Phil > ---- > Phillip H. Griffin Griffin Consulting > http://asn-1.com Secure ASN.1 Design & Implementation > +1-919-832-7008 1625 Glenwood Avenue, Five Points > +1-919-832-7390 [fax] Raleigh, North Carolina 27608 USA > ------------------------------------------------------------ -- ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 647 7406 61 Fitzwilliam Lane, fax: +353 1 647 7499 Dublin 2. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Ireland http://www.baltimore.com Received: from edelweb.fr (edelweb.fr [193.51.12.16]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id EAA22139 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 04:04:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (localhost.edelweb.fr [127.0.0.1]) by edelweb.fr with ESMTP id NAA26235; Wed, 10 May 2000 13:10:13 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from champagne.edelweb.fr (champagne.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.161]) by edelweb.fr (nospam/1.3); Wed, 10 May 2000 13:10:14 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from emeriau.edelweb.fr (emeriau.edelweb.fr [193.51.14.5]) by champagne.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) with ESMTP id NAA12235; Wed, 10 May 2000 13:10:12 +0200 (MET DST) From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr> Received: (sylvest@localhost) by emeriau.edelweb.fr (8.7.6/8.6.6) id NAA18503; Wed, 10 May 2000 13:10:11 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 13:10:11 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <200005101110.NAA18503@emeriau.edelweb.fr> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Subject: Re: Who can be a Time Stamping Authority? Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > > In the second case, the TSA certificate should contain an extension, which > would indicate that this TSA may issue time stamping tokens within that CA > realm. Since RFC2459 is currently being revised and as suggested by Michael What does mean 'issue time stamping tokens withing that CA realm'? > Zolotarev, the Authority Information Access extension does not seem > appropriate for this particular purpose, I would suggest that a new private > Internet extension should probably be added in RFC2459 to achieve this > requirement. > It seems to me that what is required is a kind of 'Subject Information Access' extension as it was available in earlier drafts. The definition is similar to the AIA by replacing 'issuer' by 'subject'. Another possibility is to change in 2459: The authority information access extension indicates how to access CA information and services for the issuer of the certificate in which the extension appears. to The aia extension indicates how to access services related to the certificate in which the extension appears. The definition of accessMethod must describe anyway how the extension has to be interpreted. Received: from balinese.baltimore.ie (firewall-user@pc215-8.indigo.ie [194.125.215.8]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA21102 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 10 May 2000 03:37:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: by balinese.baltimore.ie; id LAA29594; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:42:59 +0100 (GMT/IST) Received: from bobcat.baltimore.ie(192.168.20.10) by balinese.baltimore.ie via smap (V4.2) id xma029563; Wed, 10 May 00 11:42:41 +0100 Received: from baltimore.ie (lease173-21.baltimore.ie [192.168.21.173]) by bobcat.baltimore.ie (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA18292; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:42:39 +0100 Message-ID: <39193D38.A7A3EACF@baltimore.ie> Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 11:43:04 +0100 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> Reply-To: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Organization: Baltimore Technologies Ltd. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: phil.griffin@asn-1.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: DER in ac509prof-03 References: <3918AE71.6BEC5020@asn-1.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit "DER is defined in [X.208-88]" -> "DER is defined in [X.690-97]" is fine by me, anyone else care? I guess this should be the same in the son-of-2459 too. Stephen. "Phillip H. Griffin" wrote: > > Hi there, > > In section 4.1, just after your use of the deprecated > "ANY" notation, your profile states incorrectly that "DER > is defined in [X.208-88]". X.208 defines Abstract Syntax > Notation ONE (ASN.1), but it does not define any of the > ASN.1 encoding rules. > > Way back in 1988, the time period to which you refer, the > ASN.1 encoding rules were defined in X.209. Of course both > X.208 and X.209 have been superseded and relegated along > with their lists of unresolved defects to the maintenance > site, at http://www.furniss.co.uk/maint/asn/index.html. > > In 1988, only BER existed as an ASN.1 standard, as defined > in X.209 (though X.509:88 defined a set of restrictions on > X.209 that they called DER). The DER, PER and CER encoding > rules were not standardized until 1994. It could be that > you are referring to "[X.509-88]" in your document rather > than the current version of X.509 (which defines ACs) to > try to include some sort of DER support for X.208/209 - > hard to tell. > > The initial DER was created by Hoyt Kesterson's X.509 group. > Out of their efforts, the ASN.1 DER rules evolved, and are > now defined in the current ASN.1 standard, X.690. Though the > spirit of X.509-88 and X.690:DER are the same, X.690:DER > corrects a number of oversights present in X.509-88. These > two rule sets differ in slight ways, particularly in how > bit string values and a few other very small details are > handled. These distinctions become important when digital > signatures are involved. > > A good description of DER can be found in a free download > copy of the recent ASN.1 book by John Larmouth, called ASN.1 > Complete, at http://www.nokalva.com/asn1/booksintro.html. > Hard copy is also available from B&N (not for free I think). > All of the wrinkles and warts are discussed. Worth a read > if you have to deal often with such things. > > Phil > ---- > Phillip H. Griffin Griffin Consulting > http://asn-1.com Secure ASN.1 Design & Implementation > +1-919-832-7008 1625 Glenwood Avenue, Five Points > +1-919-832-7390 [fax] Raleigh, North Carolina 27608 USA > ------------------------------------------------------------ -- ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 647 7406 61 Fitzwilliam Lane, fax: +353 1 647 7499 Dublin 2. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Ireland http://www.baltimore.com Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA05468 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 23:39:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id QAA00716; Wed, 10 May 2000 16:49:22 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <K4L8ND56>; Wed, 10 May 2000 16:43:32 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA6A3B49@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Who can be a Time Stamping Authority? Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 16:43:32 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" I guess a need to clarify a few points here, to avoid possible misunderstanding about my opinion. > -----Original Message----- > From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com [mailto:FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com] > Sent: Wednesday, May 10, 2000 4:04 AM > To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org > Subject: Who can be a Time Stamping Authority? > > it is not clear how the requester could verify the validity of the TSA self signed > certificate as part of validating the digital signature of the TimeStampToken. This would probably be a good reason for a > TSA self signed certificate to contain an Authority Information Access extension [RFC2459] as suggested > by Michael Zolotarev, which could indicate how to access the on-line validation services for the TSA certificate. > Otherwise, the TSA self signed certificate should probably contain a CRL distribution points extension to indicate where to > find the status of the TSA certificate. > This is not what I was saying, actually. I was saying that the only reason for AIA to be present in self-signed TSA certificates is to specify the access mechanism to the TSA. In addition, AIA in CA-issued TSA certs CAN NOT be used for that purpose (specifying the access mechanism to the TSA). What you are proposing - using the AIA for checking the status of a self-signed TSA cert - is not going to work, I'd say. This is a problem with self-issued certificates - you can not trust its own claim about its revocation status. So, coming back to my original point, the only reason I can see for a self-signed TSA cert to have the AIA extension is to specify the access mechanism for obtaining timestamps. Leaving aside the practicality of it, and the point that probably AIA is not the best candidate for it. In either case, the draft should be more explicit about using AIA. > In the second case, the TSA certificate should contain an extension, which would indicate that this TSA may issue time > stamping tokens within that CA realm. Since RFC2459 is currently being revised and as suggested by Michael Zolotarev, the > Authority Information Access extension does not seem appropriate for this particular purpose, I would suggest that a new > private Internet extension should probably be added in RFC2459 to achieve this requirement. > It did not occur to me that a CA may want to designate a TSA as a "Domain TSA", by placing a special mark into the TSA's certificate. My first impression is that by doing that the CA would embark on a slippery path of taking responsibility of TSA operations. Unless this is really the case, and the CA fully owns/operates the TSA. Yet, considering that this can be a real situation, I do not see why the AIA extension can not be used for that (which is different from your point, Francois :). It does not contradict to the definition of AIA. The extension is used by the CA to announce to the world: This is my OCSP. This is my policy data. <<This is my recommended TS provider for the domain>>. Why not? To explain all that, the only thing the current draft would have to say is *** "If a TSA certificate is NOT a self-signed certificate, and it contains the AIA extension, the extension MAY be used to indicate that the TSA is closely associated with the issuing CA's domain. That is, the CA MAY designate the TSA to be the 'domain TSA'. In this case, the accessMethod field in this extension MUST contain the OID id-ad-timestamping, and the accessLocation field defining the protocol. Note that it is different from just defining the extKeyUsage=id-kp-timeStamping". Best regards Michael Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id SAA10865 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 18:43:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id LAA16591; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:54:05 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <KT8TVRTB>; Wed, 10 May 2000 11:48:26 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA6A3984@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com, Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-time-stamp-07.txt Date: Wed, 10 May 2000 11:48:26 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Francois, > However, the problem I see with a published TSA practice > statement is that > it would not currently lend itself to automation unless XML > was used. This > is why in the first place I had suggested using the S/MIME > capabilities > attribute to indicate any static information about TSA's capabilities. I do not think, really, that a TSA client will need to be 'automated', as opposing to been statically configured for using a particular TSA(s). You'd never let a TSA client 'go in the wild and free hunt' for some TSA service out there. The cost, the legal liabilities, the quality of service and a lot of other factors contribute to the fact that a decision has to be taken to which TSA to use. Before the TSA can be first used by the client. You configure the client, telling it to use THAT TSA, with THAT hash algorithm, with THAT TSA certificate or some other trust parameters. I see the configuration of the client to be an essentual part of the whole timestamping framework. But it is just my opinion. I agree that having the TSA policy and capabilities structured as XML would help automating the client configuration task. > Checking the S/MIME capabilities attribute should not be a > major issue for a > requestor since he/she must be able to use S/MIME to verify > the integrity of > a TimeStampToken. > timeStampToken is defined as basic CMS construct. The requestor does not have to implement/use/understand full S/MIME in order to parse the token. > Francois > ___________________________________ > Francois Rousseau > Director of Standards and Conformance > Chrysalis-ITS > 1688 Woodward Drive > Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 > frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5077 Ext. 419 > http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 > Received: from smtp6.mindspring.com (smtp6.mindspring.com [207.69.200.110]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id RAA00182 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 17:25:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: from asn-1.com (user-2ivf68s.dialup.mindspring.com [165.247.153.28]) by smtp6.mindspring.com (8.9.3/8.8.5) with ESMTP id UAA06785 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 20:31:14 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <3918AE71.6BEC5020@asn-1.com> Date: Tue, 09 May 2000 20:33:53 -0400 From: "Phillip H. Griffin" <phil.griffin@asn-1.com> Reply-To: phil.griffin@asn-1.com Organization: Griffin Consulting X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en] (Win95; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: DER in ac509prof-03 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hi there, In section 4.1, just after your use of the deprecated "ANY" notation, your profile states incorrectly that "DER is defined in [X.208-88]". X.208 defines Abstract Syntax Notation ONE (ASN.1), but it does not define any of the ASN.1 encoding rules. Way back in 1988, the time period to which you refer, the ASN.1 encoding rules were defined in X.209. Of course both X.208 and X.209 have been superseded and relegated along with their lists of unresolved defects to the maintenance site, at http://www.furniss.co.uk/maint/asn/index.html. In 1988, only BER existed as an ASN.1 standard, as defined in X.209 (though X.509:88 defined a set of restrictions on X.209 that they called DER). The DER, PER and CER encoding rules were not standardized until 1994. It could be that you are referring to "[X.509-88]" in your document rather than the current version of X.509 (which defines ACs) to try to include some sort of DER support for X.208/209 - hard to tell. The initial DER was created by Hoyt Kesterson's X.509 group. Out of their efforts, the ASN.1 DER rules evolved, and are now defined in the current ASN.1 standard, X.690. Though the spirit of X.509-88 and X.690:DER are the same, X.690:DER corrects a number of oversights present in X.509-88. These two rule sets differ in slight ways, particularly in how bit string values and a few other very small details are handled. These distinctions become important when digital signatures are involved. A good description of DER can be found in a free download copy of the recent ASN.1 book by John Larmouth, called ASN.1 Complete, at http://www.nokalva.com/asn1/booksintro.html. Hard copy is also available from B&N (not for free I think). All of the wrinkles and warts are discussed. Worth a read if you have to deal often with such things. Phil ---- Phillip H. Griffin Griffin Consulting http://asn-1.com Secure ASN.1 Design & Implementation +1-919-832-7008 1625 Glenwood Avenue, Five Points +1-919-832-7390 [fax] Raleigh, North Carolina 27608 USA ------------------------------------------------------------ Received: from balinese.baltimore.ie (firewall-user@pc215-8.indigo.ie [194.125.215.8]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA24961 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 11:27:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: by balinese.baltimore.ie; id TAA21203; Tue, 9 May 2000 19:32:48 +0100 (GMT/IST) Received: from bobcat.baltimore.ie(192.168.20.10) by balinese.baltimore.ie via smap (V4.2) id xma021196; Tue, 9 May 00 19:32:31 +0100 Received: from baltimore.ie (lease173-21.baltimore.ie [192.168.21.173]) by bobcat.baltimore.ie (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id TAA22727; Tue, 9 May 2000 19:32:30 +0100 Message-ID: <391859D4.1E66033D@baltimore.ie> Date: Tue, 09 May 2000 19:32:52 +0100 From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> Reply-To: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Organization: Baltimore Technologies Ltd. X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Andy Dowling <andy.dowling@sse.ie> CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org, xme <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie> Subject: Re: AC profile - Policy Authority on the Role attribute References: <200005091036.GAA13936@ietf.org> <003201bfb9c9$acf2c6a0$562078c1@sse.ie> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hi Andy, When I first looked at it, I thought we'd left this out simply to make things easier, but since that didn't actually sound right, I checked, and there is a real reason. X.509 says: "The roleAuthority, if present, identifies the recognized authority that is responsible for issuing the role specification certificate" And given that we have to be compatible with X.509 and don't want to complicate the profile by introducing "role specification certificates", I think we do have to mandate not using the roleAuthority. Regards, Stephen. Andy Dowling wrote: > > section 4.4.5 of the ac profile document states the following: > > The roleAuthority field MUST NOT be used. The roleName field MUST be > present, and roleName MUST use the uniformResourceIdentifier CHOICE > of the GeneralName. > > This means that we cannot define a policy authority for the role attribute! > :-( > Previously, where we used IETFAttrSyntax, we were able to qualify the > attribute > in this way. > > Could we change the profile to allow the use of roleAuthority, i.e.: > > The roleAuthority field MAY be used to specify the issuing authority of > the role attribute. > The roleName field MUST be > present, and roleName MUST use the uniformResourceIdentifier CHOICE > of the GeneralName. > > Any comments? > > Andy -- ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 647 7406 61 Fitzwilliam Lane, fax: +353 1 647 7499 Dublin 2. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Ireland http://www.baltimore.com Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA24185 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 10:57:34 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KLC3NAV6>; Tue, 9 May 2000 14:04:15 -0400 Message-ID: <7E8CCF56F7F8D211894700104B9DF96DA2614B@NTSERVER2> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Who can be a Time Stamping Authority? Date: Tue, 9 May 2000 14:04:14 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Salut Denis, At paragraph 10 of Section 2.1 of the TSA Draft, it is mentioned that "a TSA is REQUIRED to sign each time stamp token using a key generated exclusively for this purpose and have this property of the key indicated on the corresponding certificate". This specific requirement explicitly excludes CAs that would want to offer a time stamping service using the same key that they commonly used to sign certificates and/or certificate status information (i.e. CRL or OCSP), which is fine with me. This then leave two cases that I think you should describe in the TSA draft: a. a TSA with a self signed certificate whose public key is trusted by the requester; or b. a CA designated TSA who holds a specially marked certificate issued directly by the CA, indicating that the TSA may be trusted to issue time stamping tokens. In the first case, each requester must obtain the TSA self signed certificate by some (out-of-band) authenticated process, which would be outside the scope of this TSA document. Because it is mentioned in Section 2.2 of the TSA Draft that the requesting entity SHALL verify the validity of the digital signature of the TimeStampToken, it is not clear how the requester could verify the validity of the TSA self signed certificate as part of validating the digital signature of the TimeStampToken. This would probably be a good reason for a TSA self signed certificate to contain an Authority Information Access extension [RFC2459] as suggested by Michael Zolotarev, which could indicate how to access the on-line validation services for the TSA certificate. Otherwise, the TSA self signed certificate should probably contain a CRL distribution points extension to indicate where to find the status of the TSA certificate. In the second case, the TSA certificate should contain an extension, which would indicate that this TSA may issue time stamping tokens within that CA realm. Since RFC2459 is currently being revised and as suggested by Michael Zolotarev, the Authority Information Access extension does not seem appropriate for this particular purpose, I would suggest that a new private Internet extension should probably be added in RFC2459 to achieve this requirement. Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5077 Ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA23851 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 10:49:19 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KLC3NAVF>; Tue, 9 May 2000 13:56:00 -0400 Message-ID: <7E8CCF56F7F8D211894700104B9DF96DA2614A@NTSERVER2> To: mzolotarev@baltimore.com Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-time-stamp-07.txt Date: Tue, 9 May 2000 13:55:59 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Michael, >The same about hash algorithms supported by the TSA for messageImprints - >the TSA should accept all 'common' types. If it does not understand the >algorithm's OID, the error will be returned to the client. So that the >client will have to try a different algorithm. With makes it nothing but >ugly, making me to believe any static information about TSA's capabilities >should be communicated separately from the actual TSA responses. The client >should discover the capabilities of the TSA before transacting, out-of-band >or from some published TSA practice statement. > >Regards >Michael However, the problem I see with a published TSA practice statement is that it would not currently lend itself to automation unless XML was used. This is why in the first place I had suggested using the S/MIME capabilities attribute to indicate any static information about TSA's capabilities. Checking the S/MIME capabilities attribute should not be a major issue for a requestor since he/she must be able to use S/MIME to verify the integrity of a TimeStampToken. Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5077 Ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from scooby.lineone.net ([194.75.152.224]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA23285; Tue, 9 May 2000 10:36:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ukd ([195.171.177.9]) by scooby.lineone.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id QAA21977; Tue, 9 May 2000 16:27:42 +0100 (BST) Message-ID: <013c01bfb9cc$8f482480$09b1abc3@ukd> From: "Charlie Fletcher - www.ukdata.com" <charlie@ukdata.com> To: "Finance Director" <webmaster@ukdata.com> Subject: Instant On-Line Credit Reports Date: Tue, 9 May 2000 16:34:00 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 Do you need fast accurate information to assist you when appraising potential customers, and suppliers? The UK Data internet website www.ukdata.com contains 28 million pages of data with full information on every UK company! Credit Reports-Director Searches-Accounts-Annual Returns All of these products and many more are available to you immediately, and can be downloaded to and printed from your personal computer. Free samples of all reports are available at www.ukdata.com. Please also visit www.formacompany.co.uk the on-line company formation website Thank You Charles Fletcher www.ukdata.com an instant report on every UK business www.formacompany.co.uk the on-line company formation site www.irishdata.ie - instant reports on all Irish companies Received: from server.ica.cz (server.ica.cz [195.47.13.11]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA22828 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 10:21:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from SZOTKOWSKI (com.ica.cz [195.47.13.10]) by server.ica.cz (8.9.2/8.8.7) with SMTP id TAA12179 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 19:27:17 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <061e01bfb9db$d2f7ba10$0c7011ac@SZOTKOWSKI> From: "Martin Szotkowski" <martin.szotkowski@ica.cz> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: SubjectAltName verification Date: Tue, 9 May 2000 19:27:16 +0200 Organization: PVT, a.s. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-2" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2918.2701 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2918.2701 Hi all, in RFC2459 (4.2.1.7) call : >>Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitively bound to the publick key, all parts of the subject alternative name MUST be verified by the CA.<< What exactly this means? Must be e.g. email unique in one CA? must be unique for one man? If yes, is there any way to determine that this man has this email? (How this problem is resolving for DNS, IP, URI, etc.?) If no, someone can stand out for some else in email communication? thanks for explanation Martin Received: from mail0.sse.ie (mail0.sse.ie [193.120.32.47]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id IAA20515 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 08:14:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail0.sse.ie (actually localhost) by mail0.sse.ie; Tue, 9 May 2000 16:17:50 +0100 Received: from taalap (taa-lap.sse.ie [193.120.32.86]) by mail0.sse.ie (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with SMTP id QAA08103 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 16:17:38 +0100 (BST) Message-ID: <003201bfb9c9$acf2c6a0$562078c1@sse.ie> From: "Andy Dowling" <andy.dowling@sse.ie> To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> References: <200005091036.GAA13936@ietf.org> Subject: AC profile - Policy Authority on the Role attribute Date: Tue, 9 May 2000 16:17:11 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit section 4.4.5 of the ac profile document states the following: The roleAuthority field MUST NOT be used. The roleName field MUST be present, and roleName MUST use the uniformResourceIdentifier CHOICE of the GeneralName. This means that we cannot define a policy authority for the role attribute! :-( Previously, where we used IETFAttrSyntax, we were able to qualify the attribute in this way. Could we change the profile to allow the use of roleAuthority, i.e.: The roleAuthority field MAY be used to specify the issuing authority of the role attribute. The roleName field MUST be present, and roleName MUST use the uniformResourceIdentifier CHOICE of the GeneralName. Any comments? Andy Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA14068 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 03:30:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA13936; Tue, 9 May 2000 06:36:34 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005091036.GAA13936@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt Date: Tue, 09 May 2000 06:36:34 -0400 Sender: nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization Author(s) : S. Farrell, R. Housley Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt Pages : 38 Date : 08-May-00 This specification defines a profile for the use of X.509 Attribute Certificates in Internet Protocols. Attribute certificates may be used in a wide range of applications and environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. The goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic applications requiring broad interoperability as well as limited special purpose requirements. The profile places emphasis on attribute certificate support for Internet electronic mail, IPSec, and WWW security applications. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <20000508104009.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-03.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <20000508104009.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from avocet.prod.itd.earthlink.net (avocet.prod.itd.earthlink.net [207.217.121.50]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA04900 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 9 May 2000 00:44:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [38.29.122.67] (ip67.phoenix10.az.pub-ip.psi.net [38.29.122.67]) by avocet.prod.itd.earthlink.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA22144; Tue, 9 May 2000 00:49:33 -0700 (PDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: hoytkesterson@mail.earthlink.net Message-Id: <a04310102b53d71357780@[38.29.122.67]> Date: Tue, 9 May 2000 00:46:46 -0700 To: OSI Directory List <OSIdirectory@az05.bull.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org From: "Hoyt L. Kesterson II" <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net> Subject: revised 4th edition text Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" minor errors have been corrected in the x.509 text over the last month. the revised text has been placed on the server as ftp://ftp.bull.com/pub/OSIdirectory/4thEditionTexts/X.509_4thEditionDraftV3.doc ftp://ftp.bull.com/pub/OSIdirectory/4thEditionTexts/X.509_4thEditionDraftV3.pdf the changes have been very minor. the asn.1 errors that have been corrected - import the right edition of x.400 the six places in the text where baseCertificateId occured has been changed to baseCertificateID hoyt Received: from boreas.isi.edu (boreas.isi.edu [128.9.160.161]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA24189 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 8 May 2000 14:56:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ISI.EDU (jet.isi.edu [128.9.160.87]) by boreas.isi.edu (8.8.7/8.8.6) with ESMTP id PAA12903; Mon, 8 May 2000 15:02:08 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <200005082202.PAA12903@boreas.isi.edu> To: IETF-Announce: ; Subject: RFC 2797 on Certificate Management Messages over CMS Cc: rfc-ed@ISI.EDU, ietf-pkix@imc.org Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary=NextPart Date: Mon, 08 May 2000 15:02:08 -0700 From: RFC Editor <rfc-ed@ISI.EDU> --NextPart A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries. RFC 2797 Title: Certificate Management Messages over CMS Author(s): M. Myers, X. Liu, J. Schaad, J. Weinstein Status: Standards Track Date: April 2000 Mailbox: mmyers@verisign.com, xliu@cisco.com, jimsch@nwlink.com, jsw@meer.net Pages: 47 Characters: 103357 Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso: None URL: ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2797.txt This document defines a Certificate Management protocol using CMS (CMC). This protocol addresses two immediate needs within the Internet PKI community: 1. The need for an interface to public key certification products and services based on [CMS] and [PKCS10], and 2. The need in [SMIMEV3] for a certificate enrollment protocol for DSA-signed certificates with Diffie-Hellman public keys. A small number of additional services are defined to supplement the core certificate request service. Throughout this specification the term CMS is used to refer to both [CMS] and [PKCS7]. For both signedData and envelopedData, CMS is a superset of the PKCS7. In general, the use of PKCS7 in this document is aligned to the Cryptographic Message Syntax [CMS] that provides a superset of the PKCS7 syntax. The term CMC refers to this specification. This document is a product of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol. This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list. Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@IETF.ORG. Requests to be added to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should be sent to RFC-DIST-REQUEST@RFC-EDITOR.ORG. Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending an EMAIL message to rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG with the message body help: ways_to_get_rfcs. For example: To: rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG Subject: getting rfcs help: ways_to_get_rfcs Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the author of the RFC in question, or to RFC-Manager@RFC-EDITOR.ORG. Unless specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for unlimited distribution.echo Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to RFC-EDITOR@RFC-EDITOR.ORG. Please consult RFC 2223, Instructions to RFC Authors, for further information. Joyce K. Reynolds and Sandy Ginoza USC/Information Sciences Institute ... Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant Mail Reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the RFCs. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="RFC-INFO@RFC-EDITOR.ORG" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <000508145848.RFC@RFC-EDITOR.ORG> RETRIEVE: rfc DOC-ID: rfc2797 --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="rfc2797.txt"; site="ftp.isi.edu"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="in-notes" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <000508145848.RFC@RFC-EDITOR.ORG> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from sentry.gw.tislabs.com (firewall-user@sentry.gw.tislabs.com [192.94.214.100]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA15510 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 8 May 2000 06:06:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: by sentry.gw.tislabs.com; id JAA27640; Mon, 8 May 2000 09:14:09 -0400 (EDT) Received: from clipper.gw.tislabs.com(10.33.1.2) by sentry.gw.tislabs.com via smap (V5.5) id xma027634; Mon, 8 May 00 09:13:43 -0400 Received: (from balenson@localhost) by clipper.gw.tislabs.com (8.9.3/8.9.1) id JAA06984 for ietf-pkix@imc.org; Mon, 8 May 2000 09:07:08 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 8 May 2000 09:07:08 -0400 (EDT) From: "David M. Balenson" <balenson@tislabs.com> Message-Id: <200005081307.JAA06984@clipper.gw.tislabs.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: CFP: ISOC Netw & Distr Sys Security Symp (NDSS'01) C A L L F O R P A P E R S The Internet Society 2001 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS'01) February 7-9, 2001 Catamaran Resort, San Diego, California IMPORTANT DATES Paper Submission due: August 2, 2000 Author Notification: September 27, 2000 Camera-ready final papers due: October 31, 2000 GOAL: This symposium will foster information exchange among researchers and practioners of network and distributed system security services. The intended audience includes those who are interested in the practical aspects of network and distributed system security, focusing on actual system design and implementation, rather than theory. A major goal of the symposium is to encourage and enable the Internet community to apply, deploy, and advance the state of available security technology. The proceedings of the symposium will be published by the Internet Society. Submissions are solicited for, but are not limited to, the following topics: * Secure Electronic Commerce: e.g., payment, barter, EDI, notarization/timestamping, endorsement and licensing. * Intellectual Property Protection: protocols, schemas, implementations, metering, watermarking, other forms of rights management. * Implementation, deployment and management of network security policies. * Integrating Security in Internet protocols: routing, naming, TCP/IP, multicast, network management, and the Web. * Attack-resistant protocols and services. * Special problems and case studies: e.g., interplay and tradeoffs between security and efficiency, usability, reliability and cost. * Security for collaborative applications and services: tele- and video-conferencing, groupwork, etc. * Fundamental services: authentication, data integrity, confidentiality, authorization, non-repudiation, and availability. * Supporting mechanisms and APIs: key management and certification, revocation, audit trails and accountability. * Public Key Infrastructure. * Integrating security services with system and application security facilities and protocols: e.g., message handling, file transport/access, directories, time synchronization, database management, boot services, mobile computing. * Security for emerging technologies: sensor networks, specialized testbeds, wireless/mobile (and ad hoc) networks, personal communication systems, and large heterogeneous distributed systems. * Intrusion Avoidance, Detection, and Response: systems, experiences and architectures. * Network Perimeter Controls: firewalls, packet filters, application gateways. * Virtual Private Networks. BEST PAPER AWARD: There will be a best paper award again this year. The award will be presented at the symposium to the authors of the best overall paper as selected by the Program Committee. SUBMISSIONS: The Program Committee invites both technical papers and panel proposals. Technical papers should be at most 20 pages long. Panel proposals should be at most two pages and should describe the topic, identify the panel chair, explain the format of the panel, and list three to four potential panelists. Technical papers will appear in the proceedings. A description of each panel will appear in the proceedings, and may - at the discretion of the panel chair - include written position statements from the panelists. Each submission must contain a separate title page with the type of submission (paper or panel), the title or topic, the names of the author(s), organizational affiliation(s), telephone and FAX numbers, postal addresses, e-mail addresses, and must specify the contact author in case of multi-author submissions. The names of authors, affiliations, and other identifying information should appear only on the separate title page. Submissions must be received by August 2, 2000, and must be made via electronically in either PostScript or ASCII format. If the Committee is unable to print a PostScript submission, a hardcopy will be requested. Therefore, PostScript submissions must arrive well before the deadline. Submission information can be found at http://www.isoc.org/ndss01/cfp. Dates, final call for papers, advance program, and registration information will be available soon at http://www.isoc.org/ndss01. Each submission will be acknowledged by e-mail. If acknowledgment is not received within seven days, please contact the program Co-chairs as indicated below. Authors and panelists will be notified of acceptance by September 27, 2000. Instructions for preparing camera-ready copy for the proceedings will be sent at that time. The camera-ready copy must be received by October 31, 2000. GENERAL CHAIR: Stephen Welke, Trusted Computer Solutions PROGRAM CO-CHAIRS: Avi Rubin, AT&T Labs - Research Paul Van Oorschot, Entrust Technologies TUTORIAL CHAIR: Eric Harder, National Security Agency LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS CHAIR: Thomas Hutton, San Diego Supercomputer Center PUBLICATIONS CHAIR: Mahesh Tripunitara, Purdue University PUBLICITY CHAIR: David Balenson, NAI Labs, Network Associates LOGISTICS CHAIR: Carla Rosenfeld, Internet Society PROGRAM COMMITTEE: Bennet Yee, University of California San Diego Bill Cheswick, Bell Labs Dave Kormann, AT&T Labs - Research David Aucksmith, Intel Corportation David P. Maher, Intertrust David Wagner, UC Berkeley Edward W. Felten, Princeton University Fabian Monrose, Bell Labs Gary McGraw, Reliable Software Technologies James Ellis, Sun Microsystems Kevin McCurley, IBM Almaden Research Center Matt Bishop, UC Davis Mudge, L0pht Heavy Industries, Inc. Peter Gutmann, University of Auckland, New Zealand Radia Perlman, Sun Microsystems Sandra Murphy, Network Associates Tom Berson, Anagram Laboratories Virgil D. Gligor, University of Maryland Received: from fwma1.certco.com (fwma1.certco.com [208.222.33.4]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id QAA12724 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 6 May 2000 16:31:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from haggis.ma.certco.com (haggis.ma.certco.com [10.200.200.20]) by fwma1.certco.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C6C315531; Sat, 6 May 2000 19:37:10 -0400 (EDT) Received: by haggis.ma.certco.com (Postfix, from userid 1079) id 96CE37C0E8; Sat, 6 May 2000 19:37:10 -0400 (EDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by haggis.ma.certco.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 8A7F6744C6; Sat, 6 May 2000 19:37:10 -0400 (EDT) Date: Sat, 6 May 2000 19:37:10 -0400 (EDT) From: Rich Salz <salzr@certco.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, ietf-ldapext@netscape.com Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt In-Reply-To: <"SwtlC.A.OqG.u3GF5"@glacier> Message-ID: <Pine.BSI.3.96.1000506193249.16173E-100000@haggis.ma.certco.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII This is my second response to Bruce's comments. This covers the "style" issues. I prefer a raw signature, not a separate S/MIME signature because it makes sense. :) Think of the client request and server response as a signed entity. Just like a cert, then, you have client PDU server PDU replysig extra-data Layed out like that, it looks like any other signature. It makes about as much sense to use S/MIME here, as it would be to use S/MIME to handle the CA's signature of an X509v3 cert... You could do it, but why? Well, okay, style issue. /r$ Received: from fwma1.certco.com (fwma1.certco.com [208.222.33.4]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA10795 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 6 May 2000 12:03:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from haggis.ma.certco.com (haggis.ma.certco.com [10.200.200.20]) by fwma1.certco.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38A1115531; Sat, 6 May 2000 15:09:26 -0400 (EDT) Received: by haggis.ma.certco.com (Postfix, from userid 1079) id BCA947C0E8; Sat, 6 May 2000 15:09:26 -0400 (EDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by haggis.ma.certco.com (Postfix) with SMTP id B8745744C6; Sat, 6 May 2000 15:09:26 -0400 (EDT) Date: Sat, 6 May 2000 15:09:26 -0400 (EDT) From: Rich Salz <salzr@certco.com> To: Bruce Greenblatt <bgreenblatt@directory-applications.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, ietf-ldapext@netscape.com Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.20000506100237.00927c40@pop.walltech.com> Message-ID: <Pine.BSI.3.96.1000506143737.15389B-100000@haggis.ma.certco.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII > Boy, you're a tough customer. Given that RFC 2649 is experimental, it's > not surprising that you thing that changes need to be made... Well, you did ask. :) I understand that it's experimental. As specified, it's got enough problems -- for the problem I need to solve -- that it was not a good base on which to work. I'll write two replies. The first (this one) talks about those items I can address purely from a crypto/security viewpoint. The other one will address those issues that are style or taste. > How does a hash of the search reply protect it? This wasn't viewed as a > requirement at the time. The hash is across *all* the the replies. So any tampering with the reply string will be detected. I assume you know that, so your question leads me to think I need to add some more clarification. > > 3. An adversary could intercept search replies undetected. > > If you are concerned about this, you can protect the channel. No, transport-level protection is NOT the same as application-level protection. For dispute resolution, or (contractual) proof that proper action/due diligence was performed, I need an application-level signature. "See, I did search for the latest CRL and the repository didn't give it to me. So it's not my fault I trusted a revoked certificate." A reply signature addresses that; saving ALL the TLS packets, key exchanges, etc., is not practical. And, it forces TLS in places where a simple signature is all that's needed. > > 4. Audit entries aren't linked; an adversary could intercept or > >"trim off" > > the end, or tamper intermediates > An adversary would need to have sufficient access to the directory to do > this. If someone hacks into the directory, any number of things can happen. I was talking about remote access, where the client/server channel can be tampered. Security of local log files or transaction records -- thing necessary if/when someone hacks into the directory - are not the issue here. The spec defines audit entries that have remote access, and the security thereon is insufficient. > > 5. Replies aren't cryptographically tied to queries; what prevents a > > man in the middle attack? > > LDAP over TLS can easily prevent this. See #3. > > 6. For a repository that is mainly holding signed data (certs and > >crls), > > I don't see what security "sign by server" gets you, and it > >weakens > > the overall system (making some of the above attacks possible) > > If this is not a requirement, don't use it. The sign by server request > allows the client that trusts the server to sign the operations to do the > work. This is an optional feature that was deemed to be useful in some > environments. Well 2649 isn't (directly) the topic here, but I still don't see the point. :) It DOES weaken the security of the system, as I mentioned. As a server operator, I would be *extremely* leary of being asked to sign anything I didn't generate. It might be possible for me to generate a bizarre LDAP modify request that translates to an EDI or other binary funds-transfer protocol. :) Also, since you can have combinations of entries, and since the timestamp is therefore coming from different places, my trust would be weakened. But I'm not interested in audit records, I just threw in those complains as free review. (Worth every penny. :) > > 7. Sequence numbers aren't required to be monotonically increasing > >within an > > object, so an adversary could intercept intermediate ones without > >detection. > > Sequence number are required to be increasing. RFC 2649 indicates" > "Subsequent sequence numbers indicate the sequence of changes that have > been made to this directory object. Note that the sequence of the changes > can be verified due to the fact that the signed directory object will have > a timestamp as part of the signature object, and that the sequence > numbering as part of the change attribute should be considered to be an > unverified aid to the LDAP client. Sequence numbers are meaningful only > within the context of a single directory entry..." In any case the > sequenceNumbers in RFC 2649 are used as an aid to the client to show the > sequence of operations that were applied to that operation. The ordering can be verified; the complete sequence can't be. Can a server increment by 10's or 3's? I might want to use a fine-grain resolution time-of-day clock. In any of those choices, if I remotely query the audit trail, I have no way of knowing if something was intercepted. Requiring TLS is too heavyweight, it feels improper (why require privacy for public data?), and as I tried to explain above, isn't really a correct solution anyway. Imagine doing an audit. If remote access is not the issue, then I don't see how this is appropriate to specify. :) > > 8. On the other hand, audit trail sequence numbers aren't global, so > >it > > doesn't seem possible to step through and determine exactly when > >something > > bad happened. > > Sequence numbers are global, within an entry. Each signature has a > timestamp as well. So, you will know exactly when something bad happened > to an entry. "Global within an entry" is an uncommon use of the terms. Is "client sign" allowed in audit records? If so, then why can't a client set his clock forward one day, and delete a CRL? > I don't follow this one. For your purposes, you just only use client > signature mechanism. The sign by server request doesn't apply. No. As a CA, I want a "return receipt requested" I want cryptographic proof that the LDAP server got my publication request. 2649 doesn't do it. > I also think that it is important to have the > ability to store the signatures stored in the directory along with the > entry, so that other clients can retrieve the signatures... Sure, some folks do need that. But it's not what the reply signatures I-D does. /r$, college dropout. Received: from ps2.walltech.com (ps2.walltech.com [207.5.77.1]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA09550 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Sat, 6 May 2000 09:57:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dtasi1 (user17.sj.dialup.innetix.com [209.172.68.80]) by ps2.walltech.com (8.10.0/8.10.0/walltech-2.10) with SMTP id e46H2gU17668; Sat, 6 May 2000 10:02:43 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.20000506100237.00927c40@pop.walltech.com> X-Sender: bgreenblatt@pop.walltech.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.5 (32) Date: Sat, 06 May 2000 10:02:37 -0700 To: "Salz, Rich" <SalzR@CertCo.com> From: Bruce Greenblatt <bgreenblatt@directory-applications.com> Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, ietf-ldapext@netscape.com In-Reply-To: <AAD0807E1794D311A54000A0C99609B9249030@macertco-srv1.ma.ce rtco.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" At 11:01 AM 5/4/2000 -0400, Salz, Rich wrote: >>Why can't you use the mechanisms defined in RFC 2649 as a basis for this? >>Your proposal seems remarkably similar to the definitions in RFC 2649. > >I have a couple of issues with 2649: Boy, you're a tough customer. Given that RFC 2649 is experimental, it's not surprising that you thing that changes need to be made... > 1. Why S/MIME, why not just a raw signature? During the process of creating RFC 2649, we discussed using raw signatures, but it was deceided that the benefits of using a standard mechanism that was already recognized by other applications was substantial. S/MIME is a standard mechanism for the interchange of signed and encrypted data. It allows easy transfer of the signature between Internet applications. I don't see this changing. So, I'd urge you to consider paying the overhead of using the standard interchange mechanism. > 2. Protection of search replies is too heavyweight; no intermediate > step (like "just hash") How does a hash of the search reply protect it? This wasn't viewed as a requirement at the time. > 3. An adversary could intercept search replies undetected. If you are concerned about this, you can protect the channel. > 4. Audit entries aren't linked; an adversary could intercept or >"trim off" > the end, or tamper intermediates An adversary would need to have sufficient access to the directory to do this. If someone hacks into the directory, any number of things can happen. > 5. Replies aren't cryptographically tied to queries; what prevents a > man in the middle attack? LDAP over TLS can easily prevent this. > 6. For a repository that is mainly holding signed data (certs and >crls), > I don't see what security "sign by server" gets you, and it >weakens > the overall system (making some of the above attacks possible) If this is not a requirement, don't use it. The sign by server request allows the client that trusts the server to sign the operations to do the work. This is an optional feature that was deemed to be useful in some environments. > 7. Sequence numbers aren't required to be monotonically increasing >within an > object, so an adversary could intercept intermediate ones without >detection. Sequence number are required to be increasing. RFC 2649 indicates" "Subsequent sequence numbers indicate the sequence of changes that have been made to this directory object. Note that the sequence of the changes can be verified due to the fact that the signed directory object will have a timestamp as part of the signature object, and that the sequence numbering as part of the change attribute should be considered to be an unverified aid to the LDAP client. Sequence numbers are meaningful only within the context of a single directory entry..." In any case the sequenceNumbers in RFC 2649 are used as an aid to the client to show the sequence of operations that were applied to that operation. > 8. On the other hand, audit trail sequence numbers aren't global, so >it > doesn't seem possible to step through and determine exactly when >something > bad happened. Sequence numbers are global, within an entry. Each signature has a timestamp as well. So, you will know exactly when something bad happened to an entry. > 9. Allowing both "client signs" and "sign by server" probably means >an adversary > can do bad things by messing around with his local clock. I don't follow this one. For your purposes, you just only use client signature mechanism. The sign by server request doesn't apply. >Hope this helps. Actually, it doesn't. I still think that you can use RFC 2649 mechanisms for your requirements. In your draft, you state: "In many environments the final step of certificate issuance is publishing the certificate to a repository. Unfortunately, there is no way for a Certification Authority (CA) to have a secure application-level acknowledgement that the proper repository did, in fact, receive the certificate." In my mind, this is exactly what RFC 2649 provides. When the CA publishes the certificate to a repository (presumably via an LDAP modify operation), it will receive a signed result from the LDAP server, and the LDAP server will store the signed operation from the CA along with the modified LDAP entry. If there are specific things that need to happen in the CA - LDAP Server interaction that don't happen in the machanisms defined by RFC 2649, then maybe we should update RFC 2649. I also think that it is important to have the ability to store the signatures stored in the directory along with the entry, so that other clients can retrieve the signatures... Bruce > /r$ > > ============================================== Bruce Greenblatt, Ph. D. Directory Tools and Application Services, Inc. http://www.directory-applications.com Sign up for our LDAP Technical Overview Seminar at: http://www.acteva.com/go/dtasi Received: from homebase.htt-consult.com ([63.82.18.210]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id MAA15146 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 5 May 2000 12:56:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rgm.htt-consult.com ([63.82.18.195]) by homebase.htt-consult.com ; Fri, 05 May 2000 16:01:57 -0500 Message-Id: <4.3.1.2.20000505152531.00e766c0@homebase.htt-consult.com> X-Sender: rgm-sec@homebase.htt-consult.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1 Date: Fri, 05 May 2000 16:00:23 -0400 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> Subject: ASN.1 Name joys In-Reply-To: <3912E45D.4CB874FD@dnai.com> References: <FJHLGBIOIEOEDAAA@mailcity.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed I have just completed a 3 day CMP2000 interop workshop (email me if you wish to participate in the next one 1st week in June). In the days preceeding and during we yet again had vendors experiencing ASN.1 coding problems with Name. I have had threads as follows: ============================================================= now I have examined the problem [with your ir] in more detail: Our Code has problems with the field 'subject' [5] in the CertTemplate: The subject is a NAME and the default for tagging in the CertTemplate SEQUENCE is IMPLICIT. Now the problem is, that the NAME is a CHOICE and for a CHOICE it is not allowed to use IMPLICIT tagging (see the ASN.1 specification). So, in the case of NAME one has to use an EXPLICIT tagging. ============================================================= Then I get others like: ============================================================= my interpretation of the PKIHeader->sender/recipient field was as follows: both sender and recipient are defined to be of type GeneralName... PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { pvno INTEGER { ietf-version2 (1) }, sender GeneralName, -- identifies the sender recipient GeneralName, -- identifies the intended recipient messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, <snip> which is defined in the IMPORTS as: FROM PKIX1Implicit88 which is defined in RFC-2459 as: GeneralName ::= CHOICE { otherName [0] AnotherName, rfc822Name [1] IA5String, dNSName [2] IA5String, x400Address [3] ORAddress, directoryName [4] Name, ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } therefore it should be tagged as IMPLICIT and, it can be any number of underlying structures. so, a Name, although a SEQUENCE by definition, would be implicitly tagged as [4] { SET{} SET{} ... }, not SEQUENCE { SET{} SET{} ... } otherwise, the underlying name type would not be so easily determined. ============================================================= As you might imagine, it is challenging to work on CMP interoperablity when there are questions about 2459 conformance. Not everyone will be (or want to be) ASN.1 war heros. What can we do with 2459bis to stop the flow of coding errors???? Do we need an informational RFC giving ASN.1 coding rules so that people do not have to get the X. whatever??? Robert Moskowitz ICSA Security Interest EMail: rgm-sec@htt-consult.com Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA12549 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 5 May 2000 09:28:33 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KKZ9TLXV>; Fri, 5 May 2000 12:34:53 -0400 Message-ID: <7E8CCF56F7F8D211894700104B9DF96DA26141@NTSERVER2> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Comments on TSA Draft v7 Date: Fri, 5 May 2000 12:34:52 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Salut Denis, Here are few other comments on this draft: a. Under Section 2.3 you indicate that "The TSA MUST sign all time stamp messages with one or more keys reserved specifically for that purpose". You should indicate that the reason a TSA would have more than one key reserved specifically for that purpose would be to accommodate different policies, different algorithms and/or different private key sizes. b. Also under Section 2.3 you indicate that the following object identifier identifies the KeyPurposeID having value id-kp-timeStamping: id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp (3) timestamping (3)} However, according to Section 4.2.1.13 of RFC 2459, its object identifier is: id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } c. Also under Section 2.3, must not a TSA's certificate contain the Certificate Policies extension defined in Section 4.2.1.5 of [RFC2459]? d. Section 2.4.2, it is not clear what would be the circumstance under which the error "addInfoNotAvailable (17)" for the failInfo field would be needed since the "tdas" field was removed; e. Also under Section 2.4.2, should not the error "unsupportedVersion (22)" for the failInfo field also be supported? and f. Also under Section 2.4.2, for the policy field of the TSTInfo, should not the error "unacceptedPolicy (15)" be return instead of the error "badRequest" when the TSA can not produce a response with a the same policy as requested by the requester in the TimeStampReq? Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5077 Ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078 Received: from windoze.tenebras.com (windoze.tenebras.com [216.15.43.196]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA11168 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 5 May 2000 08:05:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dnai.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by windoze.tenebras.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA03801; Fri, 5 May 2000 08:10:21 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kudzu@dnai.com) Sender: kudzu@windoze.tenebras.com Message-ID: <3912E45D.4CB874FD@dnai.com> Date: Fri, 05 May 2000 08:10:21 -0700 From: Michael Sierchio <kudzu@dnai.com> Reply-To: kudzu@tenebras.com X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (X11; U; FreeBSD 4.0-STABLE i386) X-Accept-Language: fr, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: chandrasekaran_n@mailcity.com CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: Re: Generating Key Pair References: <FJHLGBIOIEOEDAAA@mailcity.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit chandrasekaran natarajan wrote: > > hello, > > How do CA's request the browser to generate the keypair. Netscape has built-in support for generating a keypair, and the ubiquitous 'xenroll.cab' and some supporting VBScript (ack!) enable IE to do the same. In the case of Netscape, an HTML form which includes a <KEYGEN ...> tag will cause the browser to display a pull-down box to choose RSA modulus length. In both cases, you'll need to bake the Certificate Request from the form elements. IE will post what looks like a PKCS#10 cert req, but is somewhat degenerate, and Netscape will post a SPKAC (signed public key and challenge) as the keygen value. This has nothing to do with the CA, really -- it's all web stuff up to the point where a cert req is presented to a CA. The web-based enrollment could be a function of a local RA... ====================Netscape Version========================== <FORM METHOD=POST ACTION="/enroll2"> <hr><em><b>Please enter the following data to get your personal certificate:</b></em> <TABLE> <TR> <TD> Your name </TD> <TD><INPUT TYPE=text SIZE=40 NAME="name" VALUE="Joan Q. Public"></TD> </TR> <INPUT TYPE=hidden SIZE=30 NAME="unit" VALUE="JWS"> <INPUT TYPE=hidden SIZE=30 NAME="org" VALUE="Java Land"> <INPUT TYPE=hidden SIZE=30 NAME="unit" VALUE="BOZO"> <TR> <TD> City or Locality name </TD> <TD><INPUT TYPE=text SIZE=30 NAME="locality" VALUE="San Mateo"></TD> </TR> <TR> <TD> State or Province name </TD> <TD><INPUT TYPE=text SIZE=30 NAME="state" VALUE="California"></TD> </TR> <TR> <TD> Two-letter country code (e.g. <em>US</em>).</TD> <TD><INPUT TYPE=text SIZE=2 NAME="country" VALUE="US"></TD> </TR> <TR> <TD> Your preferred key size </TD> <TD><KEYGEN name="keygen" challenge=fixed-for-now></TD> </TR> </TABLE> <INPUT TYPE="hidden" NAME="opname" VALUE="genCert"> <P> <CENTER> <INPUT TYPE="submit" VALUE="Request Certificate"> <INPUT TYPE="reset" VALUE="Clear Form"> </CENTER> </FORM> Received: from mailcity.com (fes-qout.whowhere.com [209.1.236.7]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id GAA09564 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 5 May 2000 06:14:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from Unknown/Local ([?.?.?.?]) by mailcity.com; Fri May 5 06:19:01 2000 To: ietf-pkix@imc.org Date: Fri, 05 May 2000 06:19:01 -0700 From: "chandrasekaran natarajan" <chandrasekaran_n@mailcity.com> Message-ID: <FJHLGBIOIEOEDAAA@mailcity.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sent-Mail: off Reply-To: chandrasekaran_n@mailcity.com X-Mailer: MailCity Service Subject: Generating Key Pair X-Sender-Ip: 203.197.240.87 Organization: MailCity (http://www.mailcity.lycos.com:80) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Language: en Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit hello, How do CA's request the browser to generate the keypair. with thanks, chandar Get your FREE Email at http://mailcity.lycos.com Get your PERSONALIZED START PAGE at http://my.lycos.com Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA05607 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Fri, 5 May 2000 03:35:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA13285; Fri, 5 May 2000 06:40:42 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005051040.GAA13285@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-pi-00.txt Date: Fri, 05 May 2000 06:40:42 -0400 Sender: nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF. Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Permanent Identifier Author(s) : D. Pinkas, T. Gindin Filename : draft-ietf-pkix-pi-00.txt Pages : 7 Date : 04-May-00 This document define a new form of name, called permanent identifier, that may be included in the subjectAltName extension of a public key certificate issued to a physical person. The permanent identifier is an optional feature that may be used by a CA to indicate that the certificate relates to the same individual even if the name of that individual has changed. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-pi-00.txt Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-pkix-pi-00.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-pi-00.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <20000504082241.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-pi-00.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-ietf-pkix-pi-00.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <20000504082241.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from sothmxs01.entrust.com (gatekeeper.entrust.com [204.101.128.170]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA14342 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 12:17:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: by sothmxs01.entrust.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <KJF7WYK9>; Thu, 4 May 2000 15:17:33 -0400 Message-ID: <01E1D01C12D7D211AFC70090273D20B1017158EE@sothmxs06.entrust.com> From: Carlisle Adams <carlisle.adams@entrust.com> To: PKIX Mailing List <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Christopher Williams'" <ccwilliams@ntlworld.com> Subject: RE: Message protection and key update Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 13:17:31 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain Hi Chris, > ---------- > From: Christopher Williams[SMTP:ccwilliams@ntlworld.com] > Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2000 11:53 AM > To: PKIX Mailing List > Subject: Message protection and key update > > Consider the following scenario: > > I am enrolled in a PKI and have a signing-key pair that I wish to update. > I > send a key update request containing a new public key. I sign the message > using my old private key. The request is granted by the CA so I send a > certificate confirm message. > > I assume that I sign this message with my NEW private key. Is this > correct? You can sign with the new private key if you wish, but the old private key would be fine as well (and, in fact, it may be slightly preferable to have the consistency of a single method for all the messages in an exchange). > Also, does this signature provide implicit POP of the private key? After > all, the signature is over the hash of a certificate containing the > matching > public key. If it does provide implicit POP, should the POP options be > expanded? Don't think of this as providing implicit POP. [If signing the hash of the cert is POP, what about the hash-of-the-hash of a cert? What about the hash-of-the-hash-of-the-hash of the cert? I think it's best not to go down this route at all.] This is simply authentication and integrity protection on the message. Carlisle. Received: from firewall3.glaxowellcome.com (firewall-user@firewall3.glaxowellcome.com [192.58.204.207]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA13768 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 11:58:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: by firewall3.glaxowellcome.com; id OAA18213; Thu, 4 May 2000 14:57:31 -0400 (EDT) Received: from ussun1d.glaxo.com(152.51.4.175) by firewall3.glaxowellcome.com via smap (V5.5) id xma016508; Thu, 4 May 00 14:54:44 -0400 Received: by ussun1d.glaxo.com id PAA27063; Thu, 4 May 2000 15:01:08 -0400 (EDT) Received: from 152.51.61.114 by securemail1.glaxo.com with SMTP ( WorldSecure Server SMTP Relay(WSS) v4.5); Thu, 04 May 2000 15:00:36 -0400 X-Server-Uuid: c7fabf50-5a2e-11d2-968c-00805fc1f894 Received: from 152.51.20.99 by securemail1.glaxo.com with SMTP ( WorldSecure Server SMTP Relay(WSS) v4.3); Thu, 04 May 00 06:47:41 -0400 X-Server-Uuid: c7fabf50-5a2e-11d2-968c-00805fc1f894 Received: by ussun2m.glaxo.com id GAA27745; Thu, 4 May 2000 06:47:40 -0400 (EDT) Received: by firewall3.glaxowellcome.com; id GAA05729; Thu, 4 May 2000 06:41:10 -0400 (EDT) Received: from ns.secondary.com(208.184.76.39) by firewall3.glaxowellcome.com via smap (V5.5) id xma005701; Thu, 4 May 00 06:40:47 -0400 Received: from localhost (daemon@localhost) by ns.secondary.com ( 8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id DAA04261; Thu, 4 May 2000 03:30:49 -0700 (PDT ) Received: by mail.imc.org (bulk_mailer v1.12); Thu, 4 May 2000 03:29:19 -0700 Received: from trust.addtrust.com ([212.28.197.133]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA04151 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 03:29:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: by TRUST with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <JVYHA7FZ>; Thu, 4 May 2000 12:34:46 +0200 Message-ID: <03E49309E8F5D31183F7000629396ECCD663@TRUST> From: "Stefan Santesson" <stefan@accurata.se> To: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Magnus Nystrom'" <magnus@rsasecurity.com> cc: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@spyrus.com>, "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Subject: RE: Unmistakable identity Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 12:34:46 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id DAA04152 Precedence: bulk List-Archive: http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/ List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by ns.secondary.com id DAA04261 X-WSS-ID: 150F175E94634-01-01 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id LAA13770 Going through the definition in the QC profile, I would suggest this minor change in section 2.4 And change: 2.4 Uniqueness of names Requirements on name uniqueness are described in this standard through the terms "distinguished name" and "unmistakable identity", having the following meaning: To: 2.4 Uniqueness of names Functional and uniqueness requirements on names are described in this standard through the terms "distinguished name" and "unmistakable identity", having the following meaning: This would then clarify the concept of functional requirement related to the term unmistakable identity. Since this is just a minor fix. I will see through that this is added to the next draft for the IESG process that will be submitted on Friday. /Stefan > -----Original Message----- > From: Stefan Santesson > Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2000 12:04 PM > To: 'Denis Pinkas' > Cc: 'Russ Housley'; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > Subject: Unmistakable identity > > > Denis, > > Some comments regarding DN and Unmistakable identity. > > DN is a technical requirement. > Unmistakable identity is a functional requirement. > > The DN requirement is fullfilled if the CA assignes you a > unique number, e.g. "123456931", but destroys any useful > information regarding who is the person behind that number. > > For this identity to also serve the purpose of being an > unmistakable identity, the CA MUST provide the nessecary > framework to ensure that this identity also can be used to > identify the person "Denis Pinkas" (at least in case of a dispute). > > Actually the definition of unmistakable identity says it all, > and is relevant. > > With respect to the EU directive, the PKIX document is an > international document, not only driven by the EU directive. > Eventhough, the concept of unmistakable identity applies also > EU even if this term is not explicitly defined in the directive. > > /Stefan > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > > Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 10:27 AM > > To: Stefan Santesson > > Cc: Russ Housley; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > Folks, I've been sort of off-line the last days. > > > > > So as caching up with this thread I think we need to decide > > the progress of > > > this issue. > > > > > I would just want to add an observation regarding NR and > > Authentication. > > > The issue is NOT whether permanent identifiers are of value for > > > Authentication or NR. What IS an issue is whether it is > > relevant for NR to > > > be able to compare 2 names in 2 different certificates and > > ensure that these > > > certificates identifies the same person EVEN if some parts > > of the DN is not > > > matching. > > > > For non-repudiation, the permanent identifier may be used to link > > different transactions to the same individual, even when the subject > > name of the individual changes. So it is relevant. > > > > > This particular aspect is only raised as a feature for > > access control (when > > > an entity changes his certificate, or possesses several > > certificates with > > > different DN). In the case of NR and legal signatures, the > > only issue is to > > > establish the relation between a certificate and the > > individual key holder > > > (regardless of other certificates). Here the current > > profile provides the > > > necessary means. > > > > No. See above. > > > > > But.... > > > > Following the discussion on the serial Number and the Permanent > > Identifier that took place on the PKIX mailing list and at the last > > IETF meeting in Adelaïde, I am paying more and more attention to the > > QC draft. > > > > The document is defining the concept of "unmistakable identity". Now > > that we have introduced the use of serialNumber, I wonder why such a > > concept is still needed. > > > > First, the wording "unmistakable identity" is not used in the > > Directive, so this is the first reason why I wonder it is needed. > > > > Second, let us recall, what RFC 2459 says: > > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > public > > key field. The subject name may be carried in the subject field > > and/or the subjectAltName extension. > > > > Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 > > distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject > > entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name > > field. > > > > The current specification (QC-03) mandates the use of the subject > > field. In such a case, as defined *in RFC 2459*, the name is unique. > > Moreover, it is unique not only at an instant of time, but during > > the whole life of the CA. Note that ISO/ITU X.509 does not mandate > > this and I guess this is where the problem comes from. The current > > QC-03 document references *X.501* while it should reference RFC > > 2459. If we were *only* using the subjectAltName extension then such > > a concept could be useful. But at the present time, we don't. > > > > The chapter 2.4, called Uniqueness of names, should be deleted. > > > > I would also propose the following rewording for section 3.1.2: > > > > 3.1.2 Subject > > > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > public > > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity > > certified > > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > > following attributes: > > > > countryName; > > commonName; > > surname; > > givenName; > > pseudonym; > > serialNumber; > > organizationName; > > organizationalUnitName; > > stateOrProvinceName > > localityName and > > postalAddress. > > > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one > > of > > the following: > > > > Choice I: commonName > > Choice II: givenName > > Choice III: pseudonym > > > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name is achieved > > singly by the subject field. > > > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with the current > > text) > > > > As a result of this, the wording "unmistakable identity" should be > > deleted from the whole document. In this way, we will be able to > > suppress ambiguous sentences, like in 3.1.2 : > > > > " Certificates compliant with this profile SHALL at the same time > > specify a distinguished name and an unmistakable identity of the > > subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name and > > unmistakable identity). > > > > Attributes stored in the subject field SHALL at least form a > > distinguished name of the subject, but they MAY also specify a > > complete unmistakable identity." > > > > > > I reproduced below an extract from Annex I from the European > > Directive on Electronic Signatures: > > > > " Requirements for qualified certificates > > > > Qualified certificates must contain: > > > > (...) > > > > (c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be > > identified as such;" > > > > > > > Regardless of this I agree with Steve that this issue > > should be advanced on > > > it's own and merged later if it's found relevant to do so. > > > > Anyway, I am preparing some text to describe what a permanent > > identifier is and in which OID arc it should be located. This should > > be ready at the end of this week. In this way we will be able to > > discuss whether the permanent identifier should be, for the time > > being, an independent RFC that the QC draft could reference, or > > whether it should be an RFC of its own. > > > > Regards, > > > > Denis > > > > > > > I would therefore request the QC profile to be advanced in > > it's current > > > shape (except for a minor noted update in the reference list). > > > > > > Steve: > > > How do we proceed. > > > > > > /Stefan > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@spyrus.com] > > > > Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 4:36 PM > > > > To: Stephen Kent > > > > Cc: tgindin@us.ibm.com; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree with Steve. Note that the CAT Working Group has > > defined an > > > > OTHER-NAME for Kerberos names. > > > > > > > > Russ > > > > > > > > > > > > At 02:02 PM 04/13/2000 -0400, Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > >Tom, > > > > > > > > > >I have no problems with the sorts of IDs you proposed > in your ASN > > > > >GeneralName Other-Name examples. They seem to be > > consistent with the > > > > >arguments that Denis has made for such constructs. However, > > > > before we add > > > > >these to the updated part 1, I think we need more time to > > > > explore the > > > > >utility for these name forms. The debate on the list shows > > > > that there are > > > > >widely diverse opinions about what such IDs are good for, > > > > what scope is > > > > >feasible/appropriate, etc. I'd hesitant to hold up > > progress on the > > > > >revision to 2459 to add this sort of facility which has been > > > > proposed only > > > > >recently. That's why several folks have suggested a > > separate, small > > > > >document whoch can be advanced separately, and merged into > > > > 2459 if there > > > > >is sufficient, consistent support. > > > > > > > > > >Steve > > > > > > > Received: from smtpproxy1.mitre.org (mbunix.mitre.org [129.83.20.100]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA12557 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 10:56:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from avsrv2.mitre.org (avsrv2.mitre.org [128.29.154.4]) by smtpproxy1.mitre.org (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA00517; Thu, 4 May 2000 14:02:13 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from root@localhost) by smtpsrv1.mitre.org (8.9.3/8.9.3) id OAA28575; Thu, 4 May 2000 14:01:39 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpsrv2.mitre.org ([128.29.154.2]) by mailsrv1.mitre.org (Netscape Messaging Server 4.1) with ESMTP id FU1J4E00.13G for <shim@mailsrv1.mitre.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 11:02:38 -0400 Received: from avsrv2.mitre.org (avsrv2.mitre.org [128.29.154.4]) by smtpsrv2.mitre.org (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA22277; Thu, 4 May 2000 11:01:57 -0400 (EDT) Received: from ns.secondary.com (ns.secondary.com [208.184.76.39]) by smtpproxy2.mitre.org (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA05174; Thu, 4 May 2000 11:02:19 -0400 (EDT) Received: from localhost by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id HAA09531; Thu, 4 May 2000 07:56:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail.imc.org (bulk_mailer v1.12); Thu, 4 May 2000 07:54:15 -0700 Received: from fwma1.certco.com (fwma1.certco.com [208.222.33.4]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA09470 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 07:54:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from haggis.ma.certco.com (haggis.ma.certco.com [10.200.200.20]) by fwma1.certco.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3ADBA1553C; Thu, 4 May 2000 10:59:06 -0400 (EDT) Received: from macertco-srv1.ma.certco.com (macertco-srv1.ma.certco.com [10.200.200.42]) by haggis.ma.certco.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A07617C0E8; Thu, 4 May 2000 10:59:06 -0400 (EDT) Received: by macertco-srv1.ma.certco.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <2YFW3WG7>; Thu, 4 May 2000 11:01:20 -0400 Message-ID: <AAD0807E1794D311A54000A0C99609B9249030@macertco-srv1.ma.certco.com> From: "Salz, Rich" <SalzR@CertCo.com> To: "'Bruce Greenblatt'" <bgreenblatt@directory-applications.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, ietf-ldapext@netscape.com Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 11:01:18 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Precedence: bulk List-Archive: http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/ List-ID: <ietf-pkix.imc.org> List-Unsubscribe: mailto:ietf-pkix-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe >Why can't you use the mechanisms defined in RFC 2649 as a basis for this? >Your proposal seems remarkably similar to the definitions in RFC 2649. I have a couple of issues with 2649: 1. Why S/MIME, why not just a raw signature? 2. Protection of search replies is too heavyweight; no intermediate step (like "just hash") 3. An adversary could intercept search replies undetected. 4. Audit entries aren't linked; an adversary could intercept or "trim off" the end, or tamper intermediates 5. Replies aren't cryptographically tied to queries; what prevents a man in the middle attack? 6. For a repository that is mainly holding signed data (certs and crls), I don't see what security "sign by server" gets you, and it weakens the overall system (making some of the above attacks possible) 7. Sequence numbers aren't required to be monotonically increasing within an object, so an adversary could intercept intermediate ones without detection. 8. On the other hand, audit trail sequence numbers aren't global, so it doesn't seem possible to step through and determine exactly when something bad happened. 9. Allowing both "client signs" and "sign by server" probably means an adversary can do bad things by messing around with his local clock. Hope this helps. /r$ Received: from mta03-svc.ntlworld.com (mta3-win.server.ntlworld.com [62.253.162.43]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA10494 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 08:45:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from darxstar ([62.252.200.208]) by mta03-svc.ntlworld.com (InterMail vM.4.01.02.27 201-229-119-110) with SMTP id <20000504155044.ZNV290.mta03-svc.ntlworld.com@darxstar> for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 16:50:44 +0100 Message-ID: <000b01bfb5e0$f3caf710$0100a8c0@darxstar> From: "Christopher Williams" <ccwilliams@ntlworld.com> To: "PKIX Mailing List" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Message protection and key update Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 16:53:04 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Consider the following scenario: I am enrolled in a PKI and have a signing-key pair that I wish to update. I send a key update request containing a new public key. I sign the message using my old private key. The request is granted by the CA so I send a certificate confirm message. I assume that I sign this message with my NEW private key. Is this correct? Also, does this signature provide implicit POP of the private key? After all, the signature is over the hash of a certificate containing the matching public key. If it does provide implicit POP, should the POP options be expanded? Christopher Williams Software engineer, NetLexis Ltd. Solutions for secure electronic commerce http://www.netlexis.com Received: from fwma1.certco.com (fwma1.certco.com [208.222.33.4]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA09470 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 07:54:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from haggis.ma.certco.com (haggis.ma.certco.com [10.200.200.20]) by fwma1.certco.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3ADBA1553C; Thu, 4 May 2000 10:59:06 -0400 (EDT) Received: from macertco-srv1.ma.certco.com (macertco-srv1.ma.certco.com [10.200.200.42]) by haggis.ma.certco.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A07617C0E8; Thu, 4 May 2000 10:59:06 -0400 (EDT) Received: by macertco-srv1.ma.certco.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <2YFW3WG7>; Thu, 4 May 2000 11:01:20 -0400 Message-ID: <AAD0807E1794D311A54000A0C99609B9249030@macertco-srv1.ma.certco.com> From: "Salz, Rich" <SalzR@CertCo.com> To: "'Bruce Greenblatt'" <bgreenblatt@directory-applications.com> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, ietf-ldapext@netscape.com Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 11:01:18 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" >Why can't you use the mechanisms defined in RFC 2649 as a basis for this? >Your proposal seems remarkably similar to the definitions in RFC 2649. I have a couple of issues with 2649: 1. Why S/MIME, why not just a raw signature? 2. Protection of search replies is too heavyweight; no intermediate step (like "just hash") 3. An adversary could intercept search replies undetected. 4. Audit entries aren't linked; an adversary could intercept or "trim off" the end, or tamper intermediates 5. Replies aren't cryptographically tied to queries; what prevents a man in the middle attack? 6. For a repository that is mainly holding signed data (certs and crls), I don't see what security "sign by server" gets you, and it weakens the overall system (making some of the above attacks possible) 7. Sequence numbers aren't required to be monotonically increasing within an object, so an adversary could intercept intermediate ones without detection. 8. On the other hand, audit trail sequence numbers aren't global, so it doesn't seem possible to step through and determine exactly when something bad happened. 9. Allowing both "client signs" and "sign by server" probably means an adversary can do bad things by messing around with his local clock. Hope this helps. /r$ Received: from trust.addtrust.com ([212.28.197.133]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA04151 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 03:29:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: by TRUST with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <JVYHA7FZ>; Thu, 4 May 2000 12:34:46 +0200 Message-ID: <03E49309E8F5D31183F7000629396ECCD663@TRUST> From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@accurata.se> To: "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>, "'Magnus Nystrom'" <magnus@rsasecurity.com> Cc: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@spyrus.com>, "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Subject: RE: Unmistakable identity Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 12:34:46 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id DAA04152 Going through the definition in the QC profile, I would suggest this minor change in section 2.4 And change: 2.4 Uniqueness of names Requirements on name uniqueness are described in this standard through the terms "distinguished name" and "unmistakable identity", having the following meaning: To: 2.4 Uniqueness of names Functional and uniqueness requirements on names are described in this standard through the terms "distinguished name" and "unmistakable identity", having the following meaning: This would then clarify the concept of functional requirement related to the term unmistakable identity. Since this is just a minor fix. I will see through that this is added to the next draft for the IESG process that will be submitted on Friday. /Stefan > -----Original Message----- > From: Stefan Santesson > Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2000 12:04 PM > To: 'Denis Pinkas' > Cc: 'Russ Housley'; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > Subject: Unmistakable identity > > > Denis, > > Some comments regarding DN and Unmistakable identity. > > DN is a technical requirement. > Unmistakable identity is a functional requirement. > > The DN requirement is fullfilled if the CA assignes you a > unique number, e.g. "123456931", but destroys any useful > information regarding who is the person behind that number. > > For this identity to also serve the purpose of being an > unmistakable identity, the CA MUST provide the nessecary > framework to ensure that this identity also can be used to > identify the person "Denis Pinkas" (at least in case of a dispute). > > Actually the definition of unmistakable identity says it all, > and is relevant. > > With respect to the EU directive, the PKIX document is an > international document, not only driven by the EU directive. > Eventhough, the concept of unmistakable identity applies also > EU even if this term is not explicitly defined in the directive. > > /Stefan > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > > Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 10:27 AM > > To: Stefan Santesson > > Cc: Russ Housley; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > Folks, I've been sort of off-line the last days. > > > > > So as caching up with this thread I think we need to decide > > the progress of > > > this issue. > > > > > I would just want to add an observation regarding NR and > > Authentication. > > > The issue is NOT whether permanent identifiers are of value for > > > Authentication or NR. What IS an issue is whether it is > > relevant for NR to > > > be able to compare 2 names in 2 different certificates and > > ensure that these > > > certificates identifies the same person EVEN if some parts > > of the DN is not > > > matching. > > > > For non-repudiation, the permanent identifier may be used to link > > different transactions to the same individual, even when the subject > > name of the individual changes. So it is relevant. > > > > > This particular aspect is only raised as a feature for > > access control (when > > > an entity changes his certificate, or possesses several > > certificates with > > > different DN). In the case of NR and legal signatures, the > > only issue is to > > > establish the relation between a certificate and the > > individual key holder > > > (regardless of other certificates). Here the current > > profile provides the > > > necessary means. > > > > No. See above. > > > > > But.... > > > > Following the discussion on the serial Number and the Permanent > > Identifier that took place on the PKIX mailing list and at the last > > IETF meeting in Adelaïde, I am paying more and more attention to the > > QC draft. > > > > The document is defining the concept of "unmistakable identity". Now > > that we have introduced the use of serialNumber, I wonder why such a > > concept is still needed. > > > > First, the wording "unmistakable identity" is not used in the > > Directive, so this is the first reason why I wonder it is needed. > > > > Second, let us recall, what RFC 2459 says: > > > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > public > > key field. The subject name may be carried in the subject field > > and/or the subjectAltName extension. > > > > Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 > > distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject > > entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name > > field. > > > > The current specification (QC-03) mandates the use of the subject > > field. In such a case, as defined *in RFC 2459*, the name is unique. > > Moreover, it is unique not only at an instant of time, but during > > the whole life of the CA. Note that ISO/ITU X.509 does not mandate > > this and I guess this is where the problem comes from. The current > > QC-03 document references *X.501* while it should reference RFC > > 2459. If we were *only* using the subjectAltName extension then such > > a concept could be useful. But at the present time, we don't. > > > > The chapter 2.4, called Uniqueness of names, should be deleted. > > > > I would also propose the following rewording for section 3.1.2: > > > > 3.1.2 Subject > > > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > > public > > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity > > certified > > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > > following attributes: > > > > countryName; > > commonName; > > surname; > > givenName; > > pseudonym; > > serialNumber; > > organizationName; > > organizationalUnitName; > > stateOrProvinceName > > localityName and > > postalAddress. > > > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one > > of > > the following: > > > > Choice I: commonName > > Choice II: givenName > > Choice III: pseudonym > > > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name is achieved > > singly by the subject field. > > > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with the current > > text) > > > > As a result of this, the wording "unmistakable identity" should be > > deleted from the whole document. In this way, we will be able to > > suppress ambiguous sentences, like in 3.1.2 : > > > > " Certificates compliant with this profile SHALL at the same time > > specify a distinguished name and an unmistakable identity of the > > subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name and > > unmistakable identity). > > > > Attributes stored in the subject field SHALL at least form a > > distinguished name of the subject, but they MAY also specify a > > complete unmistakable identity." > > > > > > I reproduced below an extract from Annex I from the European > > Directive on Electronic Signatures: > > > > " Requirements for qualified certificates > > > > Qualified certificates must contain: > > > > (...) > > > > (c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be > > identified as such;" > > > > > > > Regardless of this I agree with Steve that this issue > > should be advanced on > > > it's own and merged later if it's found relevant to do so. > > > > Anyway, I am preparing some text to describe what a permanent > > identifier is and in which OID arc it should be located. This should > > be ready at the end of this week. In this way we will be able to > > discuss whether the permanent identifier should be, for the time > > being, an independent RFC that the QC draft could reference, or > > whether it should be an RFC of its own. > > > > Regards, > > > > Denis > > > > > > > I would therefore request the QC profile to be advanced in > > it's current > > > shape (except for a minor noted update in the reference list). > > > > > > Steve: > > > How do we proceed. > > > > > > /Stefan > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@spyrus.com] > > > > Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 4:36 PM > > > > To: Stephen Kent > > > > Cc: tgindin@us.ibm.com; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree with Steve. Note that the CAT Working Group has > > defined an > > > > OTHER-NAME for Kerberos names. > > > > > > > > Russ > > > > > > > > > > > > At 02:02 PM 04/13/2000 -0400, Stephen Kent wrote: > > > > >Tom, > > > > > > > > > >I have no problems with the sorts of IDs you proposed > in your ASN > > > > >GeneralName Other-Name examples. They seem to be > > consistent with the > > > > >arguments that Denis has made for such constructs. However, > > > > before we add > > > > >these to the updated part 1, I think we need more time to > > > > explore the > > > > >utility for these name forms. The debate on the list shows > > > > that there are > > > > >widely diverse opinions about what such IDs are good for, > > > > what scope is > > > > >feasible/appropriate, etc. I'd hesitant to hold up > > progress on the > > > > >revision to 2459 to add this sort of facility which has been > > > > proposed only > > > > >recently. That's why several folks have suggested a > > separate, small > > > > >document whoch can be advanced separately, and merged into > > > > 2459 if there > > > > >is sufficient, consistent support. > > > > > > > > > >Steve > > > > > > > Received: from trust.addtrust.com ([212.28.197.133]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id CAA01025 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Thu, 4 May 2000 02:58:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: by TRUST with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <JVYHA7FW>; Thu, 4 May 2000 12:04:23 +0200 Message-ID: <03E49309E8F5D31183F7000629396ECCD661@TRUST> From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@accurata.se> To: "'Denis Pinkas'" <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net> Cc: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@spyrus.com>, "'Stephen Kent'" <kent@bbn.com>, "'ietf-pkix@imc.org'" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Unmistakable identity Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 12:04:23 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by ns.secondary.com id CAA01026 Denis, Some comments regarding DN and Unmistakable identity. DN is a technical requirement. Unmistakable identity is a functional requirement. The DN requirement is fullfilled if the CA assignes you a unique number, e.g. "123456931", but destroys any useful information regarding who is the person behind that number. For this identity to also serve the purpose of being an unmistakable identity, the CA MUST provide the nessecary framework to ensure that this identity also can be used to identify the person "Denis Pinkas" (at least in case of a dispute). Actually the definition of unmistakable identity says it all, and is relevant. With respect to the EU directive, the PKIX document is an international document, not only driven by the EU directive. Eventhough, the concept of unmistakable identity applies also EU even if this term is not explicitly defined in the directive. /Stefan > -----Original Message----- > From: Denis Pinkas [mailto:Denis.Pinkas@bull.net] > Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 10:27 AM > To: Stefan Santesson > Cc: Russ Housley; 'Stephen Kent'; 'ietf-pkix@imc.org' > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > Folks, I've been sort of off-line the last days. > > > So as caching up with this thread I think we need to decide > the progress of > > this issue. > > > I would just want to add an observation regarding NR and > Authentication. > > The issue is NOT whether permanent identifiers are of value for > > Authentication or NR. What IS an issue is whether it is > relevant for NR to > > be able to compare 2 names in 2 different certificates and > ensure that these > > certificates identifies the same person EVEN if some parts > of the DN is not > > matching. > > For non-repudiation, the permanent identifier may be used to link > different transactions to the same individual, even when the subject > name of the individual changes. So it is relevant. > > > This particular aspect is only raised as a feature for > access control (when > > an entity changes his certificate, or possesses several > certificates with > > different DN). In the case of NR and legal signatures, the > only issue is to > > establish the relation between a certificate and the > individual key holder > > (regardless of other certificates). Here the current > profile provides the > > necessary means. > > No. See above. > > > But.... > > Following the discussion on the serial Number and the Permanent > Identifier that took place on the PKIX mailing list and at the last > IETF meeting in Adelaïde, I am paying more and more attention to the > QC draft. > > The document is defining the concept of "unmistakable identity". Now > that we have introduced the use of serialNumber, I wonder why such a > concept is still needed. > > First, the wording "unmistakable identity" is not used in the > Directive, so this is the first reason why I wonder it is needed. > > Second, let us recall, what RFC 2459 says: > > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > public > key field. The subject name may be carried in the subject field > and/or the subjectAltName extension. > > Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 > distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject > entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name > field. > > The current specification (QC-03) mandates the use of the subject > field. In such a case, as defined *in RFC 2459*, the name is unique. > Moreover, it is unique not only at an instant of time, but during > the whole life of the CA. Note that ISO/ITU X.509 does not mandate > this and I guess this is where the problem comes from. The current > QC-03 document references *X.501* while it should reference RFC > 2459. If we were *only* using the subjectAltName extension then such > a concept could be useful. But at the present time, we don't. > > The chapter 2.4, called Uniqueness of names, should be deleted. > > I would also propose the following rewording for section 3.1.2: > > 3.1.2 Subject > > The subject field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). > The subject field from a public key certificate identifies the > entity associated with the public key stored in the subject > public > key field. The DN MUST be unique for each subject entity > certified > by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. > > The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the > following attributes: > > countryName; > commonName; > surname; > givenName; > pseudonym; > serialNumber; > organizationName; > organizationalUnitName; > stateOrProvinceName > localityName and > postalAddress. > > Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one > of > the following: > > Choice I: commonName > Choice II: givenName > Choice III: pseudonym > > The subject field MAY contain other attributes. > > Any other attributes that MAY be present in either the subject > alternative name extension or the subject directory attributes > extension MAY help to give a better human understanding of who > the individual really is, but uniqueness of the name is achieved > singly by the subject field. > > The countryName attribute value (... then continue with the current > text) > > As a result of this, the wording "unmistakable identity" should be > deleted from the whole document. In this way, we will be able to > suppress ambiguous sentences, like in 3.1.2 : > > " Certificates compliant with this profile SHALL at the same time > specify a distinguished name and an unmistakable identity of the > subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name and > unmistakable identity). > > Attributes stored in the subject field SHALL at least form a > distinguished name of the subject, but they MAY also specify a > complete unmistakable identity." > > > I reproduced below an extract from Annex I from the European > Directive on Electronic Signatures: > > " Requirements for qualified certificates > > Qualified certificates must contain: > > (...) > > (c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be > identified as such;" > > > > Regardless of this I agree with Steve that this issue > should be advanced on > > it's own and merged later if it's found relevant to do so. > > Anyway, I am preparing some text to describe what a permanent > identifier is and in which OID arc it should be located. This should > be ready at the end of this week. In this way we will be able to > discuss whether the permanent identifier should be, for the time > being, an independent RFC that the QC draft could reference, or > whether it should be an RFC of its own. > > Regards, > > Denis > > > > I would therefore request the QC profile to be advanced in > it's current > > shape (except for a minor noted update in the reference list). > > > > Steve: > > How do we proceed. > > > > /Stefan > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@spyrus.com] > > > Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 4:36 PM > > > To: Stephen Kent > > > Cc: tgindin@us.ibm.com; ietf-pkix@imc.org > > > Subject: Re: Permanent identifiers in QC > > > > > > > > > I agree with Steve. Note that the CAT Working Group has > defined an > > > OTHER-NAME for Kerberos names. > > > > > > Russ > > > > > > > > > At 02:02 PM 04/13/2000 -0400, Stephen Kent wrote: > > > >Tom, > > > > > > > >I have no problems with the sorts of IDs you proposed in your ASN > > > >GeneralName Other-Name examples. They seem to be > consistent with the > > > >arguments that Denis has made for such constructs. However, > > > before we add > > > >these to the updated part 1, I think we need more time to > > > explore the > > > >utility for these name forms. The debate on the list shows > > > that there are > > > >widely diverse opinions about what such IDs are good for, > > > what scope is > > > >feasible/appropriate, etc. I'd hesitant to hold up > progress on the > > > >revision to 2459 to add this sort of facility which has been > > > proposed only > > > >recently. That's why several folks have suggested a > separate, small > > > >document whoch can be advanced separately, and merged into > > > 2459 if there > > > >is sufficient, consistent support. > > > > > > > >Steve > > > > Received: from ps2.walltech.com (ps2.walltech.com [207.5.77.1]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA14718 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 3 May 2000 14:36:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dtasi1 (goldengate-bridge.veritas.com [63.197.92.2]) by ps2.walltech.com (8.10.0/8.10.0/walltech-2.10) with SMTP id e43LfOU28516; Wed, 3 May 2000 14:41:24 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.20000503144115.00928b00@pop.walltech.com> X-Sender: bgreenblatt@pop.walltech.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.5 (32) Date: Wed, 03 May 2000 14:41:15 -0700 To: salzr@certco.com From: Bruce Greenblatt <bgreenblatt@directory-applications.com> Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, ietf-ldapext@netscape.com In-Reply-To: <200005021043.GAA26659@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Rich, Why can't you use the mechanisms defined in RFC 2649 as a basis for this? Your proposal seems remarkably similar to the definitions in RFC 2649. Bruce At 06:43 AM 5/2/2000 -0400, Internet-Drafts@ietf.org wrote: >A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. > > > Title : LDAP Controls for Reply Signatures > Author(s) : R. Salz > Filename : draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt > Pages : 8 > Date : 01-May-00 > >In many environments the final step of certificate issuance is >publishing the certificate to a repository. Unfortunately, there >is no way for a Certification Authority (CA) to have a secure >application-level acknowledgement that the proper repository >did, in fact, receive the certificate. This issue is of greater >concern when considering the publication of Certificate >Revocation Lists (CRLs) -- if an adversary manages to interpose >itself between the CA and its intended repository, then clients >could end up relying on outdated revocation lists. >This document defines a set of controls so that an LDAP client, >such as a CA, can receive a cryptographically secure >acknowledgement that an LDAP server has received a request, and >that the integrity of the server's reply has not been >compromised. > ============================================== Bruce Greenblatt, Ph. D. Directory Tools and Application Services, Inc. http://www.directory-applications.com Sign up for our LDAP Technical Overview Seminar at: http://www.acteva.com/go/dtasi Received: from donjs (p40-max47.syd.ihug.com.au [203.109.132.168]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id FAA06422 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Wed, 3 May 2000 05:38:21 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 3 May 2000 05:38:21 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <200005031238.FAA06422@ns.secondary.com> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org From: "DJS" <djs68@mailandnews.com> Subject: Guilty Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Reply-To: X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal Hi First of all I am a real person and not some robot sent out to annoy you. This is not a mass marketing exercise, mailing out thousands of messages in the hope that some would be curious. Instead I am mailing you, a person who has had some dealings with home based businesses and would appreciate the business I have to offer. Let me be up front - right from the beginning. If you decide to take advantage of the idea I have come across, then it will cost you $110. That isn't a lot for a home based business wouldn't you agree? And believe it or not, the income potential for this idea is huge ... and world wide! Your time is valuable I know. So if you want to know more about this idea you will need to send me an email asking for more details. mailto:djs68@mailandnews or mailto:cuf98@usa.net You are not on a massive list, so if you don't want to know more then I doubt very much if our paths will cross again. In the meantime I would like to leave you this quote from CS Lewis ... Make the choice adventurous stranger, strike the bell and bide the danger or wonder 'till it drives you mad what would have happened if you had. So. Now the ball is in your court. I look forward to hearing from you ... Peace and good wishes Don Received: from ietf.org (odin.ietf.org [132.151.1.176]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id DAA01676 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Tue, 2 May 2000 03:37:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from CNRI.Reston.VA.US (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA26659; Tue, 2 May 2000 06:43:07 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <200005021043.GAA26659@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart" To: IETF-Announce: ; CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org, ietf-ldapext@netscape.com From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt Date: Tue, 02 May 2000 06:43:06 -0400 Sender: nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us --NextPart A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. Title : LDAP Controls for Reply Signatures Author(s) : R. Salz Filename : draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt Pages : 8 Date : 01-May-00 In many environments the final step of certificate issuance is publishing the certificate to a repository. Unfortunately, there is no way for a Certification Authority (CA) to have a secure application-level acknowledgement that the proper repository did, in fact, receive the certificate. This issue is of greater concern when considering the publication of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) -- if an adversary manages to interpose itself between the CA and its intended repository, then clients could end up relying on outdated revocation lists. This document defines a set of controls so that an LDAP client, such as a CA, can receive a cryptographically secure acknowledgement that an LDAP server has received a request, and that the integrity of the server's reply has not been compromised. Whenever possible, the definitions here use mechanisms and datatypes defined by the IETF PKIX working group. This document references RFC 2459 [RFC2459]. Knowledge of the RFC is required for proper implementation of this document, although it should be possible to understand this document without much knowledge of that RFC. It is expected that future versions of this document will reference 2459's successor(s). A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. Send a message to: mailserv@ietf.org. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. --NextPart Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <20000501102135.I-D@ietf.org> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-salzr-ldap-repsig-00.txt"; site="ftp.ietf.org"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <20000501102135.I-D@ietf.org> --OtherAccess-- --NextPart-- Received: from fsnt.future.futusoft.com ([203.197.140.35]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA17365 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 1 May 2000 23:44:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kailash.future.futsoft.com (unverified) by fsnt.future.futusoft.com (Content Technologies SMTPRS 2.0.15) with ESMTP id <B0000466910@fsnt.future.futusoft.com>; Tue, 02 May 2000 12:30:07 +0530 Received: from ruheenar.future.futsoft.com (ruheenar.future.futsoft.com [10.0.12.41]) by kailash.future.futsoft.com (8.7.1/8.7.1) with SMTP id MAA00685; Tue, 2 May 2000 12:08:38 +0530 Received: by localhost with Microsoft MAPI; Tue, 2 May 2000 12:15:26 +0530 Message-Id: <01BFB430.191FAF40.RuheenaR@future.futsoft.com> From: Ruheena Rashid <RuheenaR@future.futsoft.com> Reply-To: "RuheenaR@future.futsoft.com" <RuheenaR@future.futsoft.com> To: "ipsec@lists.tislabs.com" <ipsec@lists.tislabs.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: Query : CA related Date: Tue, 2 May 2000 12:15:24 +0530 Organization: future software X-Mailer: Microsoft Internet E-mail/MAPI - 8.0.0.4211 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hello I have a query regarding the Certification Authority (CA) in IKE. RFC 2409 mentions about the inclusion of certificate payloads, which needs to be verified by the CA, but does not mention as to how the information is conveyed to the CA for verification. Is it that the Peer obtains the certificate and performs the verification ? (or) Does it send the complete payload to CA for verification ? I would like to know whether any draft or RFC exists, which mentions about how the CA performs the verification of the certificates? Also, whether any encryption needs to be performed to send the information to the CA (since security is a major issue) ? I would also like to know whether any implementation exists for the same. Regards Ruheena Rashid. Ruheena Rashid Software Engineer Future Software Pvt. Ltd. Nandanam Chennai Received: from stargate.zergo.com.au (IDENT:root@stargate.zergo.com.au [203.2.208.130]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id RAA13745 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 1 May 2000 17:28:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sydneymail1.baltimore.com.au (sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au [192.168.71.5]) by stargate.zergo.com.au (8.9.1/8.8.7) with ESMTP id KAA21860; Tue, 2 May 2000 10:38:25 +1000 Received: by sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <KBX7M77Y>; Tue, 2 May 2000 10:33:12 +1000 Message-ID: <D44EACB40164D311BEF00090274EDCCA656B5C@sydneymail1.jp.zergo.com.au> From: Michael Zolotarev <mzolotarev@baltimore.com> To: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com, Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-time-stamp-07.txt Date: Tue, 2 May 2000 10:33:11 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > Denis, > > In Section 2.4.1, could there be a way for a requester to indicate what hash and signature algorithms he/she wants on the > TimeStampToken in cases where a TSA would support multiple algorithms since according to the current definition of the > "policy" field in Section 2.4.2, it does not seem to be within the scope of this field to address this? How would > otherwise a TSA announce to the world what algorithms it uses to sign Time Stamp Tokens and also what algorithms it > supports in messageImprints. Could the S/MIME capabilities attribute be used for this? > I'd say that the client should be able to verify all 'common' types of signatures: [RSA/DSA]:[SHA1/MD5]. The encryption algorithm for the signature is defined by the key type in the TSA's certificate, so the client can find it out before making the first transaction with the TSA. I do not think that the hash is really going to be a hard bit for the client. The same about hash algorithms supported by the TSA for messageImprints - the TSA should accept all 'common' types. If it does not understand the algorithm's OID, the error will be returned to the client. So that the client will have to try a different algorithm. With makes it nothing but ugly, making me to believe any static information about TSA's capabilities should be communicated separately from the actual TSA responses. The client should discover the capabilities of the TSA before transacting, out-of-band or from some published TSA practice statement. Regards Michael Received: from ntserver2.chrysalis-its.com ([209.47.245.163]) by ns.secondary.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA10640 for <ietf-pkix@imc.org>; Mon, 1 May 2000 13:26:34 -0700 (PDT) From: FRousseau@chrysalis-its.com Received: by NTSERVER2 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <JZA34M21>; Mon, 1 May 2000 16:32:35 -0400 Message-ID: <7E8CCF56F7F8D211894700104B9DF96DA26130@NTSERVER2> To: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-time-stamp-07.txt Date: Mon, 1 May 2000 16:32:34 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Denis, In Section 2.4.1, could there be a way for a requester to indicate what hash and signature algorithms he/she wants on the TimeStampToken in cases where a TSA would support multiple algorithms since according to the current definition of the "policy" field in Section 2.4.2, it does not seem to be within the scope of this field to address this? How would otherwise a TSA announce to the world what algorithms it uses to sign Time Stamp Tokens and also what algorithms it supports in messageImprints. Could the S/MIME capabilities attribute be used for this? In Section 2.4.2, in the time stamping response when the "status" field contains the value one (1), doesn't this mean that a token is also present, but its format was modified from what the requester demanded? If so, some text will need to be modified to also indicate that when the PKIStatus contains the value one and not just zero, a Time Stamp Token is also present. Otherwise, it should be clear what only values for the "status" field are allowed in a response by a TSA. In Section 2.4.2, it is mentioned that 'The statusString field of PKIStatusInfo MAY be used to include reason text such as "messageImprint field is not correctly formatted"', however the "statusString" field itself, which is defined as PKIFreeText in RFC 2510, is missing from the definition of the PKIStatusInfo field specified in this document. It would be preferable if the PKIStatusInfo field was defined consistently in both documents. Francois ___________________________________ Francois Rousseau Director of Standards and Conformance Chrysalis-ITS 1688 Woodward Drive Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7 frousseau@chrysalis-its.com Tel. (613) 723-5077 Ext. 419 http://www.chrysalis-its.com Fax. (613) 723-5078
- TSA Response serialNumber Field FRousseau
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Gutmann
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Bill Lattin
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Michael Zolotarev
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Gutmann
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field William Lattin
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field William Lattin
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Stephen Kent
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Stephen Kent
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Eric Norman
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Tony Bartoletti
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Stephen Kent
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Stephen Kent
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Michael Zolotarev
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Juergen Brauckmann
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field FRousseau
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field William Lattin
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Michael Zolotarev
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Michael Zolotarev
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Manger, James H
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Michael Zolotarev
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Manger, James H
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Joerg Seidel
- applying detection theory, was Re: TSA Response s… Ed Gerck
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Tony Bartoletti
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Michael Zolotarev
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Manger, James H
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Ed Gerck
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Manger, James H
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Ed Gerck
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Ed Gerck
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Paul Koning
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Ed Gerck
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field William Lattin
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field Manger, James H
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Ed Gerck
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Ed Gerck
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Peter Sylvester
- RE: TSA Response serialNumber Field tgindin
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Ed Gerck
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Ed Gerck
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Denis Pinkas
- Re: TSA Response serialNumber Field Ed Gerck