Re: Last Call: draft-solinas-suiteb-cert-profile (Suite B Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile) to Informational RFC

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Fri, 05 June 2009 23:58 UTC

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Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2009 16:09:32 -0700
To: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, ietf@ietf.org, Lydia Zieglar <llziegl@tycho.ncsc.mil>, Jerry Solinas <jasolin@orion.ncsc.mil>
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-solinas-suiteb-cert-profile (Suite B Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile) to Informational RFC
Cc: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
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At 12:39 PM -0400 6/5/09, Sean Turner wrote:
>#1 Non-repudiation bit
>
>During the development of other profiles where the NR bit wasn't set, sometime after the profile gets developed I've usually gotten questions like "so you're not setting N-R can I use it for non-repudiation services?"  To answer this question, I sometimes put text in that said yes you can (below).  Maybe we should add something like this maybe in the security considerations?
>
>Note that setting keyCertSign, cRLSign, and digitialSignature also means
>that the certificate could be used by applications that require
>non-repudiation services for certificate, CRL, and content signing,
>respectively.

I disagree that this needs to be added, and I certainly don't think this qualifies as a security consideration. The draft already says (three times...) that the nonRepudiation bit MAY be set.

>#5 Question: 4.2 Conversion Routine
>
>Aren't the conversion routines in SEC1 and ANSI X9.62 the same?  5480
>pointed to SEC1 because it was more readily available (online and free
>versus online and not free for ANSI).  Curious why you chose to point to
>3279 and not 5480?  2.3.5 of 3279 points to 4.3.3 and 4.3.6 of ANSI
>X9.62.  2.2 of 5480 points to 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 of SEC1G. If we don't
>point to 3279 here and the next one, you could delete it as a reference.
>

That's a good question. It is good for us to point to free and easily-retrieved documents when possible.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium