Re: [IETF-PKIX] mandatory PasswordBasedMac

["David P. Kemp" <[e-mail]>]

> From: Bob
>
> > From: Carlisle
> >
> >This seems to be two votes in favor of HMAC-SHA-1 and no disagreements
> >so far.  I don't mind specifying this as the mandatory parameter in
> >PasswordBasedMac, but let me repeat Nada's question:
> >
> >>BTW, what is the object identifier for HMAC-SHA-1 (and other HMACs)? Does
> >>anybody have a pointer to some document specifying it?
> >
> >I need this as soon as possible (i.e., within the next day or two).  If
> >an OID doesn't exist, should PKIX define one?
>
> I don't know the OID, but I believe that one was defined for SET, if
> someone has that spec.
>
> Bob



The IANA has registered OIDs for HMAC mechanisms as used by IPSEC:

  ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/smi-numbers

iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanism(5) ipsec(8)
isakmpOakley(1) HMAC-md5(1)  [1.3.6.1.5.5.8.1.1]
iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanism(5) ipsec(8)
isakmpOakley(1) HMAC-SHA(2)  [1.3.6.1.5.5.8.1.2]

The reference in the IANA document [Thayer] is missing, but it refers
to the IPSEC document roadmap, which in turn references "The Use of
HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH",

  ftp://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipsec-auth-hmac-sha196-01.txt

which in turn references RFC 2104 "HMAC: Keyed Hashing for Message
Authentication", the actual algorithm description.

Note that these OIDs refer to a truncated HMAC where only the first
96 bits of the outer hash output are used - this truncation is described
as a security advantage (it wasn't done solely to cram the MAC into
the IPSEC packets).