[pkix] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC4210 (5731)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Wed, 27 April 2022 02:04 UTC

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Subject: [pkix] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC4210 (5731)
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The following errata report has been held for document update 
for RFC4210, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)". 

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You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5731

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Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Technical

Reported by: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>
Date Reported: 2019-05-22
Held by: Roman Danyliw (IESG)

Section: GLOBAL

Original Text
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N/A

Corrected Text
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N/A

Notes
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In appendixes D.4, D.5, E.5 and E.6, the recipient field of requests and the sender field of responses are specified as "the name of the CA". It is no problem for CA which signs the CMP response.

However, as best practice, the CA's private key which is used to sign the certificates, is NOT RECOMMENDED to sign/decrypt the communication messages. In this case, another entity (private key + certificate) is used to decrypt the incoming messages and sign the outgoing ones.

The text and comment for the fields "recipient" in requests and "sender" in responses need to be corrected to the case described above. If you think the original text and comment are correct, then we need instruction on how to handle this case.

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RFC4210 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2510bis-09)
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Title               : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
Publication Date    : September 2005
Author(s)           : C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause, T. Mononen
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG