[pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC3779 (9314)

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Subject: [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC3779 (9314)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC3779,
"X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers"

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://errata.rfc-editor.org/eid9314/

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: Job Snijders, Theo Buehler <job@bsd.nl>

Throughout the document, when it says:

Original Text
-------------
In section 2.2.3.3, replace:

OLD:
        If no authorization is being granted for a particular AFI and
        optional SAFI, then there MUST NOT be an IPAddressFamily member for
        that AFI/SAFI in the IPAddrBlocks SEQUENCE.

In Section 3.2.3.3, replace:

OLD:
        If no authorization is being granted for a particular form of AS
        identifier, then there MUST NOT be a corresponding asnum/rdi member in
        the ASIdentifiers sequence.

Corrected Text
--------------
In section 2.2.3.3, replace "OLD" with:

NEW:
        In Certification Authority (CA) certificates, if no authorization is being
        granted for a particular AFI and optional SAFI, then there MUST NOT be an
        IPAddressFamily member for that AFI/SAFI in the IPAddrBlocks SEQUENCE.

In Section 2.3, insert after "Validation MUST fail when this is not the case.":

NEW:
        In end-entity (EE) certificates, an IPAddressFamily containing an
        inherit element for an AFI and optional SAFI which is not contained in
        the IP address delegation extension in the issuer's certificate MUST
        be ignored (i.e., treated as absent) for the purpose of certification
        path validation. If the aforementioned elimination process results in an
        empty IPAddrBlocks sequence, the IP address delegation extension in the
        EE certificate MUST be ignored (i.e., treated as absent) for the purpose
        of certification path validation.

In Section 3.2.3.3, replace "OLD" with:

NEW:
        In CA certificates, if no authorization is being granted for a particular
        form of AS identifier, then there MUST NOT be a corresponding asnum/rdi
        member in the ASIdentifiers sequence.

In Section 3.3, insert after "Validation MUST fail when this is not the case.":

NEW:
        In EE certificates, an ASIdentifierChoice containing an inherit
        element for an autonomous system or routing domain identifier which is
        not contained in the AS identifier delegation extension in the issuer's
        certificate MUST be ignored (i.e., treated as absent) for the purpose
        of certification path validation. If the aforementioned elimination
        process results in an empty ASIdentifiers sequence, the AS identifier
        delegation extension in the EE certificate MUST be ignored (i.e.,
        treated as absent) for the purpose of certification path validation.

Notes
-----
In the RPKI (RFC 6480), some end-entity certificates are issued for
purposes unrelated to the exact Internet number resources subordinate
to the issuer, for example, in manifest signed objects (RFC 9286). The
concept of non-explicit listings (implemented using so-called "inherit
elements") is a necessary feature because the RPKI is a distributed
database in which parent and child issue certificates asynchronously.
In the normal course of operations it is possible for a child to lose
authority for a set of IP addresses or autonomous system identifiers and
such an event by itself is not intended to cause invalidation of that
child's manifest EE certificate.

Unfortunately, the design approach of using separate extensions for
the two separate resource classes (IPs and ASes) leads to an inability
to specify 'inheritance' in a way truly agnostic to the resource class
type. This design quirk has caused problems in the field, for example:
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/8dc3a091e4df2d836eadc187e7234dbe2712c66a

Clarifying the path validation rules is important for modern day
global Internet routing (which depends on the RPKI). The already
deployed backwards-compatible solution is that relying parties MUST
ignore uncontained inheritance in EE certificates. The aforementioned
requirement notwithstanding, either a contained AS identifier extension,
or a contained IP address delegation extension, or both, MUST be present
in all RPKI certificates (see RFC 6487, 4.8.10 and 4.8.11).

Instructions:
-------------
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--------------------------------------
RFC3779 (draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn)
--------------------------------------
Title               : X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers
Publication Date    : June 2004
Author(s)           : C. Lynn, S. Kent, K. Seo
Category            : Proposed Standard
Source              : pkix (sec)
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG