[pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC3779 (9314)
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Subject: [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC3779 (9314)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC3779, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" -------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: https://errata.rfc-editor.org/eid9314/ -------------------------------------- Type: Technical Reported by: Job Snijders, Theo Buehler <job@bsd.nl> Throughout the document, when it says: Original Text ------------- In section 2.2.3.3, replace: OLD: If no authorization is being granted for a particular AFI and optional SAFI, then there MUST NOT be an IPAddressFamily member for that AFI/SAFI in the IPAddrBlocks SEQUENCE. In Section 3.2.3.3, replace: OLD: If no authorization is being granted for a particular form of AS identifier, then there MUST NOT be a corresponding asnum/rdi member in the ASIdentifiers sequence. Corrected Text -------------- In section 2.2.3.3, replace "OLD" with: NEW: In Certification Authority (CA) certificates, if no authorization is being granted for a particular AFI and optional SAFI, then there MUST NOT be an IPAddressFamily member for that AFI/SAFI in the IPAddrBlocks SEQUENCE. In Section 2.3, insert after "Validation MUST fail when this is not the case.": NEW: In end-entity (EE) certificates, an IPAddressFamily containing an inherit element for an AFI and optional SAFI which is not contained in the IP address delegation extension in the issuer's certificate MUST be ignored (i.e., treated as absent) for the purpose of certification path validation. If the aforementioned elimination process results in an empty IPAddrBlocks sequence, the IP address delegation extension in the EE certificate MUST be ignored (i.e., treated as absent) for the purpose of certification path validation. In Section 3.2.3.3, replace "OLD" with: NEW: In CA certificates, if no authorization is being granted for a particular form of AS identifier, then there MUST NOT be a corresponding asnum/rdi member in the ASIdentifiers sequence. In Section 3.3, insert after "Validation MUST fail when this is not the case.": NEW: In EE certificates, an ASIdentifierChoice containing an inherit element for an autonomous system or routing domain identifier which is not contained in the AS identifier delegation extension in the issuer's certificate MUST be ignored (i.e., treated as absent) for the purpose of certification path validation. If the aforementioned elimination process results in an empty ASIdentifiers sequence, the AS identifier delegation extension in the EE certificate MUST be ignored (i.e., treated as absent) for the purpose of certification path validation. Notes ----- In the RPKI (RFC 6480), some end-entity certificates are issued for purposes unrelated to the exact Internet number resources subordinate to the issuer, for example, in manifest signed objects (RFC 9286). The concept of non-explicit listings (implemented using so-called "inherit elements") is a necessary feature because the RPKI is a distributed database in which parent and child issue certificates asynchronously. In the normal course of operations it is possible for a child to lose authority for a set of IP addresses or autonomous system identifiers and such an event by itself is not intended to cause invalidation of that child's manifest EE certificate. Unfortunately, the design approach of using separate extensions for the two separate resource classes (IPs and ASes) leads to an inability to specify 'inheritance' in a way truly agnostic to the resource class type. This design quirk has caused problems in the field, for example: https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/8dc3a091e4df2d836eadc187e7234dbe2712c66a Clarifying the path validation rules is important for modern day global Internet routing (which depends on the RPKI). The already deployed backwards-compatible solution is that relying parties MUST ignore uncontained inheritance in EE certificates. The aforementioned requirement notwithstanding, either a contained AS identifier extension, or a contained IP address delegation extension, or both, MUST be present in all RPKI certificates (see RFC 6487, 4.8.10 and 4.8.11). Instructions: ------------- This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". Please use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party will log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. -------------------------------------- RFC3779 (draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn) -------------------------------------- Title : X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers Publication Date : June 2004 Author(s) : C. Lynn, S. Kent, K. Seo Category : Proposed Standard Source : pkix (sec) Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG
- [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC3779 (9314) rfc-editor
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC3779 (9… Deb Cooley
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC3779 (9… Paul Hoffman
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC3779 (9… Job Snijders
- [pkix] Re: [Sidrops] Re: [Technical Errata Report… Martin Hoffmann