RE: KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE:Asymmetric authentication (was ASN.1 vs XML which in turn was something else)
Vipul Gupta <Vipul.Gupta@Eng.Sun.COM> Tue, 20 July 1999 18:09 UTC
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Date: Tue, 20 Jul 1999 10:48:48 -0700
From: Vipul Gupta <Vipul.Gupta@Eng.Sun.COM>
Reply-To: Vipul Gupta <Vipul.Gupta@Eng.Sun.COM>
Subject: RE: KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE:Asymmetric authentication (was ASN.1 vs XML which in turn was something else)
To: kent@bbn.com, Stephen.Waters@cabletron.com
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org, ipsec@lists.tislabs.com
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> >>On a related point, since IKE XAUTH is typically one-way (server > >>authenticating client), secondary authentication does leave the problem of > >>the server being spoofed with a compromised key! > > >I thought it was one way the other way, i.e., server is authenticated to > >client via a cert, but client uses only "legacy" auth to server. If it > >were the other way around it would be awful, as it would open a variety of > >attacks against the legacy systems which could diminish their > >effectiveness. For example, S/Key is very vulnerable to active server > >spoofing attacks. > > I think there has been a proposal along those lines (asymmetric > authentication), but the XAUTH draft does not cover that (I don't think). A > normal symmetric Phase-1 authentication > (pre-shared,signature,encrypted-nonce) is followed by a one-way secondary > authentication via XAUTH. > > Cheers, Steve. The "Hybrid Authentication" draft: draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-hybrid-auth-02.txt discusses asymmetric authentication (server is authenticated via a digital signature and the client uses OTP/token card etc). The hybrid authentication draft uses a slight modification of Main/Aggressive mode in which only the responder (server) is authenticated -- the initiator sends only a hash rather than a signature. This is immediately followed by an XAUTH exchange in which the client authenticates to the server using a "legacy" mechanism. This approach is very similar to how web-based banking works -- the bank's server is authenticated via a signature during SSL negotiation and the user is authenticated via a password sent over HTTPS. I don't quite see the motivation behind XAUTH if it is used in conjunction with regular Main/Aggressive mode since each of those modes provides mutual authentication. If the client has already been authenticated in Main/Aggressive mode, what is the additional functionality provided by XAUTH? Or is it that the pre-shared key used in Main/Aggressive mode common to *all* clients (e.g. all corporate employees) and XAUTH is used to identify a particular client? thanks, vipul
- RE: KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE:Asymmetric authentica… Vipul Gupta
- Re: KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE:Asymmetric authentica… Dan Harkins
- RE: KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE:Asymmetric authentica… Waters, Stephen