RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-pkalgs-00.txt

[[e-mail]]

Hi Tim,

Here are some minor comments on this draft:

a.  Section 3.3, the description and presentation of what key usage
extensions may optionally appear in a CA and/or an end entity certificate
should be made consistent between the different algorithms. For example, the
draft does not distinguish between a CA and an end entity certificate for
ECDSA. The draft only mentions for ECDSA that if the keyCertSign and cRLSign
values may only be asserted if the basicConstraints extension is present and
cA is TRUE, but not for other algorithms. The draft mentions for KEA that
the encipherOnly and decipherOnly values may only be asserted if the
keyAgreement value is also asserted, but not Diffie-Hellman.

b.  Section 3.3.4, you refer to sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 in many instances,
however these two sections have nothing to do with KEA. 

Regards,

Francois
___________________________________
Francois Rousseau
Director of Standards and Conformance
Chrysalis-ITS
1688 Woodward Drive
Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA, K2C 3R7
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http://www.chrysalis-its.com     Fax. [phone]