[pkng] Delay tolerant key management

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Wed, 19 August 2009 11:12 UTC

Return-Path: <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
X-Original-To: pkng@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkng@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 69F2F3A6878 for <pkng@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 19 Aug 2009 04:12:09 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.293
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.293 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_HOST_EQ_D_D_D_D=0.765, FH_HOST_EQ_D_D_D_DB=0.888, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, RDNS_DYNAMIC=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WDSUH5zmYwUb for <pkng@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 19 Aug 2009 04:12:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.newbay.com (87-198-172-198.ptr.magnet.ie [87.198.172.198]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8430B3A6828 for <pkng@irtf.org>; Wed, 19 Aug 2009 04:12:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mail.newbay.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 11BEF100415DD for <pkng@irtf.org>; Wed, 19 Aug 2009 12:12:10 +0100 (IST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at newbay.com
Received: from mail.newbay.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.newbay.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id aO0UsjbXJTzk for <pkng@irtf.org>; Wed, 19 Aug 2009 12:12:08 +0100 (IST)
Received: from [192.168.3.55] (unknown [192.168.3.55]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.newbay.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56F661004074D for <pkng@irtf.org>; Wed, 19 Aug 2009 12:12:08 +0100 (IST)
Message-ID: <4A8BDE0C.2030604@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 12:12:12 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.22 (X11/20090605)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: pkng@irtf.org
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.96.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: [pkng] Delay tolerant key management
X-BeenThere: pkng@irtf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Public Key Next Generation \(PKNG\) Research Group" <pkng.irtf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkng>, <mailto:pkng-request@irtf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.irtf.org/mail-archive/web/pkng>
List-Post: <mailto:pkng@irtf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkng-request@irtf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkng>, <mailto:pkng-request@irtf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 11:12:09 -0000

So I'll bite and try see if anyone else is interested in this one.

The DTNRG [1] has defined the bundle protocol, [2] a delay tolerant
networking protocol, and has drafts for some security mechanisms [3]
that are roughly similar to ESP.

However, DTNRG doesn't have any delay tolerant way to establish
keys between nodes, so I'd like one (or more) of those please:-)

I guess I'd like a way to transport/agree symmetric keys and a way
to transfer public keys (for signature verification/key-encryption).

The main thing that differs here from more normal networking contexts
is that round trips may take a looong time, packets (bundles) may
be routed using complex schemes (e.g. epidemic or sub-epidemic routing)
resulting in some bundles being fragmented, duplicated, going missing
or arriving seriously out of order. And of course we can't assume that
nodes have on-line or direct access to (trusted or not) third parties
for things like path construction, CRLs, OCSP or IBE key generators.

I wrote up a (now expired) I-D [4] with some initial (and very vague)
requirements a while back.

I guess if this RG were to do work on this topic, then a successful
output might also be interesting for key mgmt in other contexts where
the nodes concerned don't directly communicate.

Stephen.

[1] http://www.dtnrg.org/
[2] http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5050
[3] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-dtnrg-bundle-security
[4] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-farrell-dtnrg-km