[Pqc] Dual Stack Single Load OpenCL for Certificate level TSL Computation & Service (c)RS

[Duke Abbaddon <[e-mail]>]

Dual Stack Single Load OpenCL for Certificate level TSL Computation &
Service (c)RS

Header Acceleration further improves security because frequently the
header contains information such as compression,
To compress & accelerate the header separately I suggest 2 things:

The header needs to be done first, group decryption can be done by
packet group, The header is there aswell,
Firstly the CPU could handle the header; It is small,
Secondly the PNE could handle the group and load the header first;
After all on loading a Texture the header is an important first load
but can be done in the same GPU Thread & on the same CU,

For example The [Header] [Compression data set] [The Main Data]
Having enough Cache could load the work on a single CU & with OpenCL &
a library like :

Crypto Libraries
https://github.com/miracl/core
https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium

I have little explanation of how ARM Crypto Extensions work on that
front, But like my work :
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html
Dual Load ing with nonce; So i can see a PNE loading this in a group
data set; Like NVidia Tensor Core loads for AntiVirus,
The same concept stack as AV on GPU,

Or perhaps not? Serving a dual Stack; Single load object would cost a
small data set but considerably improve Cyber Security on HPC Data.

(c)Rupert S

https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html

Code Speed
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html

Chaos
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html

sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/

RSA-PSS
RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix
RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding)

https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756

PSK:
Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois
Counter Mode
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8442/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9258/

Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP
Nonce is compatible)
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt

AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/

Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP
https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15

AES-GCM SRTP
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7714/
AES-CCM
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/

Lightweight Cryptography
https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf
https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf

Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight
Cryptography Requirements
https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b

TLS 1.3 on Lightweight Crypto
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/095.pdf

Computation of Hilbert class polynomials and modular polynomials from
super-singular elliptic curves
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/064.pdf

Super-singular Elliptic Curves for ECDHE EEC PQC - Deuring for the
People - Supersingular Elliptic Curves with Prescribed Endomorphism
Ring in General Characteristic - 2023-106
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/106.pdf

The Security of ChaCha20-Poly1305 in the Multi-user Setting
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/085.pdf

Verification ECDHE
ECDHE Grotto, framework & C++ library for space- & time-efficient
-party piecewise polynomial 'i.e, spline' evaluation on secrets
additively shared over, Grotto improves on the state-of-the-art
approaches of DCF 2023-108
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/108.pdf

AES-NI Compatible Ciphers : AES, ARIA, CLEFIA
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01#page-3

CLEFIA : Large size table, Pure function
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6114

ARIA : Random is a big+ to anonymity bit 128Bit's of data
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5794
ARIA is conformant
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6209
ARIA SRTP
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8269#page-14

Post Quantum:
Verification of Correctness and Security Properties for CRYSTALS-KYBER
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/087.pdf

Verification of the (1–δ)-Correctness Proof of CRYSTALS-KYBER with
Number Theoretic Transform
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/027.pdf

A Practical Template Attack on CRYSTALS-Dilithium
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/050.pdf

NTRU, Kyber Hardware Acceleration - Gate-Level Masking of Streamlined
NTRU Prime Decapsulation in Hardware 2023-105
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/105.pdf

Compact TLS 1.3
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/
DTLS 2023
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/
TLS 1.2
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/

https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/
https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-for-all/

Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/

https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html

Securing TLS
https://is.gd/SecurityHSM
https://is.gd/WebPKI

Crypto Libraries
https://github.com/miracl/core
https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium

About Circl library
https://github.com/cloudflare/circl
https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-geo-key-manager-v2/

FPGA & ASIC Libraries
https://si2.org/open-cell-library/

Model & Create S-Box (AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling)
AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling - Advanced Crypto Algorithms -
Modeling for Large S-boxes Oriented to Differential Probabilities and
Linear Correlations (Long Paper) 2023-109
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/109.pdf

*****

((network server)Effectively Improves Phone & network SSL Connectivity
& thus +security) (good for telecommunications networks) (TLS) My
files are all verified by virustotal & are signed anyway!
https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI

TLS Optimised https://drive.google.com/file/d/10XL19eGjxdCGj0tK8MULKlgWhHa9_5v9/view?usp=share_link

Ethernet Security
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18LNDcRSbqN7ubEzaO0pCsWaJHX68xCxf/view?usp=share_link


On Wed, Feb 8, 2023 at 8:02 PM <[e-mail]> wrote:
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> Today's Topics:
>
>    1.  Packet number encryption negotiation (Boris Pismenny)
>    2.  tls@ietf116 (Sean Turner)
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> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 09:25:07 +0100
> From: Boris Pismenny <[e-mail]>
> To: [e-mail], [e-mail]
> Subject: [TLS] Packet number encryption negotiation
> Message-ID:
>         <[e-mail]>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Hello,
>
> I work on NIC hardware acceleration for NVIDIA, and we are looking into
> QUIC and DTLS1.3 acceleration. QUIC and DTLS employ packet number
> encryption (PNE) which increases security. At the same time, PNE
> significantly encumbers hardware acceleration as I?ll explain next.
>
> For hardware to encrypt the packet numbers, there are two options:
>
>    1.
>
>    Feed the header back into the encryption machine after data has been
>    encrypted. This means storing and forwarding data, higher implementation
>    complexity, and greater bandwidth requirements on the single encryption
>    machine.
>    2.
>
>    Adding an additional unique pipeline stage dedicated for header
>    encryption.
>
> As you may already know, this is not hardware friendly and for this reason
> many vendors will likely refuse to pay the cost of supporting this. But
> suppose a vendor does implement this feature, one problem still remains.
> PNE will still cause noticeable latency and performance degradation for
> high speed networks (think >400Gbps).
>
> Now, in certain use-cases, such as high performance computing, cloud
> computing, or data-center clusters?the security benefits of encrypting
> headers are marginal compared to the latency imposed by PNE. Would it be
> possible to consider letting these users negotiate to disable PNE and by
> doing so benefit (more) from encryption acceleration?
>
> Best regards,
>
> Boris
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> Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 13:24:53 -0500
> From: Sean Turner <[e-mail]>
> To: TLS List <[e-mail]>
> Subject: [TLS] tls@ietf116
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> Cheers,
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