[Pqc] So our answer is complexity; Multiple simple solves; one ontop of another aka (exchange EEC+) EEC AES Polycha
Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com> Thu, 26 January 2023 17:05 UTC
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From: Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 17:04:48 +0000
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Subject: [Pqc] So our answer is complexity; Multiple simple solves; one ontop of another aka (exchange EEC+) EEC AES Polycha
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Personally I think that quantum security involves finding the improbable as your answer, Random/Entropy however random does not guarantee that your answer is unsolvable by quantum computer; Mostly i think we work on how large a computer we need & now much time! Convinced that the unsolvable secret is far away from the place where we decrypt our internet traffic, I think our common hope is multiple layered riddles or as they are called maths problems; Proves as these are called;.. Maths teachers spend many a day solving such problems; Coders days writing it... Are we not sure that our goal is that a Solve costs too much time? So our answer is complexity; Multiple simple solves; one ontop of another aka (exchange EEC+) EEC AES Polycha Rupert S (does tom riddle really Solve securely no :p https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C6SZa5U8sIg ) TLS key sharing agreement : RS I have regarded the tls key sharing agreement & it occurs to me that all modes may be improved with combination of a Nonce-PSK-Type-Key, For example held by the verifying certificate agency such as lets encrypt & SafeSSL & Cloudflare, Submitting a lightly cyphered PSK Key would take milliseconds & consume only 10000th of a second on GB/S Ethernet & therefor be unnoticeable and thus secure for the initiation encounter, So the proposal is TLS combine an additional initiation: Changing Nonce:PSK (from secure source) + verification TLS Main initiation : ECDHE FFDHE DHE P256>P384 etcetera (under PSK) Key exchange > Final EEC Key with variable updates, So PSK can find a use that does not involve directly divulging the PSK to over use & secures the PSK by hour & variance. PSK https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9258/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/ (c)Rupert S * https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html Code Speed https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html Chaos https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ RSA-PSS RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756 PSK: Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8442/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9258/ Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP Nonce is compatible) https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/ Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/ https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15 AES-GCM SRTP https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7714/ AES-CCM https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/ Lightweight Cryptography https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight Cryptography Requirements https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b AES-NI Compatible Ciphers : AES, ARIA, CLEFIA https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01#page-3 CLEFIA : Large size table, Pure function https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6114 ARIA : Random is a big+ to anonymity bit 128Bit's of data https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5794 ARIA is conformant https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6209 ARIA SRTP https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8269#page-14 Compact TLS 1.3 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/ DTLS 2023 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/ TLS 1.2 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-for-all/ Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/ https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI
- [Pqc] So our answer is complexity; Multiple simpl… Duke Abbaddon