[Privacy-pass] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-schwartz-ohai-consistency-doublecheck-03.txt

[Ben Schwartz <[e-mail]>]

Hello OHAI and PRIVACYPASS,

This revision of the DoubleCheck draft makes extensive changes based on
feedback from the last session and subsequent discussions:

* The draft no longer has a normative dependency on
draft-schwartz-masque-access-descriptions or OHTTP.
* The draft no longer recommends CONNECT-UDP over CONNECT.
* The "MUST" requirement to provide and use a transport proxy has been
reduced to SHOULD, with explanation about the risks if one is not used.
* The introduction has been expanded to describe how this procedure might
be useful for both OHTTP and Privacy Pass.
* The example (Section 5) has been adjusted to make use of
draft-pauly-ohai-svcb-config.
* The draft introduces its own capitalized terminology for the three
parties, similar to OHTTP and Privacy Pass.

The protocol itself has not changed since the previous revision.

I would like to present this revision at IETF 115 if possible.

Good topics for feedback:

* Is this bending HTTP Cache-Control semantics too far?
* Is there any way to solve the Thundering Herd problem (Section 6.2) using
only HTTP caching directives?
* Which working group would be best to discuss this?

--Ben Schwartz

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <[e-mail]>
Date: Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 3:58 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-schwartz-ohai-consistency-doublecheck-03.txt
To: Benjamin M. Schwartz <[e-mail]>



A new version of I-D, draft-schwartz-ohai-consistency-doublecheck-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by Benjamin Schwartz and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-schwartz-ohai-consistency-doublecheck
Revision:       03
Title:          Key Consistency by Double-Checking via a Semi-Trusted Proxy
Document date:  2022-10-19
Group:          Individual Submission
Pages:          15
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-schwartz-ohai-consistency-doublecheck-03.txt
Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schwartz-ohai-consistency-doublecheck/
Html:           https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-schwartzAs the draft
is more general-ohai-consistency-doublecheck-03.html
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-schwartz-ohai-consistency-doublecheck-03.html>
Htmlized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-schwartz-ohai-consistency-doublecheck
Diff:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-schwartz-ohai-consistency-doublecheck-03

Abstract:
   Several recent IETF privacy protocols require clients to acquire
   bootstrap information for a service in a way that guarantees both
   authenticity and consistency, e.g., encrypting to the same key as
   many other users.  This specification defines a procedure for
   transferring arbitrary HTTP resources in a manner that provides these
   guarantees.  The procedure relies on access to a semi-trusted HTTP
   proxy, under the same security assumptions as an Oblivious HTTP
   Relay.




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