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Re: [Qirg] QKD in OpenSSL

Rodney Van Meter <rdv@sfc.wide.ad.jp> Mon, 18 November 2019 06:00 UTC

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From: Rodney Van Meter <rdv@sfc.wide.ad.jp>
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Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 15:00:35 +0900
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Cc: Rodney Van Meter <rdv@sfc.wide.ad.jp>, qirg@irtf.org
To: Bruno Rijsman <brunorijsman@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Qirg] QKD in OpenSSL
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Very cool.

You might check out some of the work we did five years ago that never made it to RFC.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-01 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-01>

One interesting, and controversial, topic is what to do when an eavesdropper *does* interfere with a QKD connection.  It’s a great, and easy, DOS attack.  So, should the rekeying stop, and the connection depending on the rekeying be killed when the key lifetime expires?  Or should there be a fallback mechanism of potentially lower security?

This is more of an issue for IPsec, which has rekeying and explicit lifetimes, than for SSL.

Rodney Van Meter
Professor, Faculty of Environment and Information Studies
Keio University, Japan
rdv@sfc.wide.ad.jp



> On Nov 13, 2019, at 21:47, Bruno Rijsman <brunorijsman@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> For those interested, I just posted a report on how we added support for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) to OpenSSL during the RIPE Pan-European Hackathon at QuTech last week. 
> 
> http://bit.ly/openssl-qkd <http://bit.ly/openssl-qkd>
> 
> — Bruno
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