Re: [Qirg] [E] Review of draft-irtf-qirg-quantum-internet-use-cases-04

["Salmon, Michael" <[e-mail]>]

Hi folks,

I'm new to the group, and while reading the two QIRG documents had some
suggested edits. So I wanted to ask, if would that be a useful or
duplicative contribution? And if it's helpful, can someone point me to the
guidelines for such contributions?

I'm on the technology strategy & planning team at Verizon, involved in
Quantum technology and standards.

Cheers
Michael

On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 12:37 AM John Mattsson <john.mattsson=
[e-mail]> wrote:

> Review of draft-irtf-qirg-quantum-internet-use-cases-04
>
> Hi,
>
> I think this is a useful document. I do not think it is ready for RGLC yet
> but it is getting close.
>
> Cheers,
> John
>
>
> Comments:
>
>
> - Section 1
> "The connections between the various nodes in the Internet
> include Digital Subscriber Lines (DSLs), fiber optics, coax cable and
> wireless that include Bluetooth, WiFi, cellular (e.g., 3G, 4G, 5G),
> satellite, etc."
>
> This seems too focused on last mile Internet access.
>
>
> - Section 1
> ”It is anticipated that the Quantum Internet will provide intrinsic
> benefits such as improved end-to-end and network security.”
>
> I would remove "anticipated" and "will". I don't think I have heard
> anybody working with security believed that QKD will provide much practical
> benefits. I mostly see it as something quantum network researchers do
> because they cannot do anything else yet. If you want to make such claims,
> I think you should ask CFRG or the security area in IETF.
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.schneier.com_essays_archives_2008_10_quantum-5Fcryptography.html&d=DwIGaQ&c=udBTRvFvXC5Dhqg7UHpJlPps3mZ3LRxpb6__0PomBTQ&r=6evS_Xv2Zm5_pvGQPoxOAz-PJgjiHN5j2cLUmIbL5YM&m=vTXXR7-m01jle5uuSeTvbu_FZn3_TGBG-HlTdXMQFfc&s=2CIn9dMmW-kKYy_cjZ8Fjnbem8iwuyUqAb9fB8hPKoo&e=
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.schneier.com_blog_archives_2018_08_gchq-5Fon-5Fquantum.html&d=DwIGaQ&c=udBTRvFvXC5Dhqg7UHpJlPps3mZ3LRxpb6__0PomBTQ&r=6evS_Xv2Zm5_pvGQPoxOAz-PJgjiHN5j2cLUmIbL5YM&m=vTXXR7-m01jle5uuSeTvbu_FZn3_TGBG-HlTdXMQFfc&s=nWj82V0zPzpOwEkcEPXwwe4Upt8HHoMkdcTN_KcW4X4&e=
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.nsa.gov_what-2Dwe-2Ddo_cybersecurity_quantum-2Dkey-2Ddistribution-2Dqkd-2Dand-2Dquantum-2Dcryptography-2Dqc_&d=DwIGaQ&c=udBTRvFvXC5Dhqg7UHpJlPps3mZ3LRxpb6__0PomBTQ&r=6evS_Xv2Zm5_pvGQPoxOAz-PJgjiHN5j2cLUmIbL5YM&m=vTXXR7-m01jle5uuSeTvbu_FZn3_TGBG-HlTdXMQFfc&s=ROm3etYLQ7xLDLToLh1OKeotrze7mH2EOatAgUcfL_4&e=
>
> The document should also bring up denial of service risks and the
> requirement for trusted relays. These are areas where a Quantum Internet is
> expected to provide intrinsic security disadvantages.
>
>
> - Section 1
> "unique physical principles"
> Is unique the right word here?
>
>
> - Section 2
> The document does not seem to use any of the words. I don't know if an
> Informational IRTF docuement needs this section at all but if it does it
> should refer to RFC 8174 as well
>
>
> - Section 3
> "i.e. fundamental unit of information in a classical computer"
> Bit is equally much a unit of informaiton in communication .
>
>
> - Section 3
> "from 50 to a few hundred qubits"
> Logical or physical qubits?
>
>
> - Section 3
> "classical bits, or the measured state of qubits."
> They would still be classic bits
>
>
> - Section 3
> "to securely distribute security keys from a sender to a receiver."
> I would more say that QKD let the two securely establish/agree on a key.
>
>
> - Section 3
> OLD "The Quantum Internet will be merged into the Classical Internet to
> form a new Hybrid Internet"
> NEW "The Quantum Internet is expected to be merged into the Classical
> Internet to form a new Hybrid Internet"
>
>
> - Section 3
> "fundamental unit of information in a quantum computer"
> Qubit is equally much a unit of informaiton in communication .
>
>
> - Section 4.2.
> "Quantum cryptography applications - Refers to the use of quantum
> information technology to ensure secure communications"
>
> Just like classic cryptography, Quantum cryptography is much more than
> securing communication
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Quantum-5Fcryptography&d=DwIGaQ&c=udBTRvFvXC5Dhqg7UHpJlPps3mZ3LRxpb6__0PomBTQ&r=6evS_Xv2Zm5_pvGQPoxOAz-PJgjiHN5j2cLUmIbL5YM&m=vTXXR7-m01jle5uuSeTvbu_FZn3_TGBG-HlTdXMQFfc&s=_8mXWXs_pnd4pHvjbhR2mrRUYdTN2SMIBhZLgNoVEGw&e=
>
>
> - Section 4.2.
> "sensors or Internet of Things (IoT) devices"
> sensors are typically IoT devices.
>
>
> - Section 4.3.
> "to share a secret key"
> Probably good to explain to people that the key is a classic key.
>
>
> - Section 5.1
> "This results in a source quantum node A at Bank #1 to securely send a
> classic secret key to a destination quantum node B at Bank #2."
> I don't think that is a correct description of QKD. Maybe use "establish”
> or ”agree”
>
>
> - Section 5.1
> "One requirement for this secure communication setup process is that
> it should not be vulnerable to any classical or quantum computing
> attack."
>
> Most of the attacks discussed on QKD has been more physical. It would be
> good if the document discussed other types of attacks then computing
> attacks. Wikipedia does e.g. mention the following: "The first attack that
> claimed to be able to eavesdrop the whole key [70] without leaving any
> trace was demonstrated in 2010. It was experimentally shown that the
> single-photon detectors in two commercial devices could be fully
> remote-controlled using specially tailored bright illumination. "
>
>
> - Section 5.1
> This section should mention authentication, which is a cornerstone in
> almost all security protocols.
>
>
> - Section 5.1
> "The source quantum node A transforms the secret key to qubits."
> I don't think the random bits should be called a "key" at this point
>
>
> - Section 6.1
> "a current 20-qubit machine"
> Would be good to inform the reader if these are physical or logical qubits.
>
>
> - Security 9
> "because of the exponential increase of computing power with quantum
> computing"
> This seems like a press release from someone selling a quantum computer.
> I don’t think the claim is correct for integer factorization and discrete
> logarithm problem. The running time of GNFS is sub-exponetial and the
> running time of Shor is n^3 so the speedup should also be sub-exponential.
> Maybe correct for ECDLP.
>
>
> - Security 10
> ”Paradoxically, development of the Quantum Internet will also mitigate
> the threats posed by quantum computing attacks against public-key
> cryptosystems.”
>
> That is not true. QKD can only replace an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman
> Exchange. The Quantum Internet will not do anything to mitigate the threats
> against digital signatures used in e.g. DNSSEC, TLS, IPsec, firmware
> updates, etc...
>
>
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>

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