Re: [Qirg] qirg - Requested session has been scheduled for IETF 108

It appears that I assumed the term "OTP" had a different meaning than what was intended.

Where I'm from, an OTP is a process where both the sender and the receiver share a large preconfigured set of random bits (generally produced at a central site and physically transported securely); they use those bits to protect the data (encryption usually by XOR; integrity protection can be done but is a little more complicated (universal hash)).  Any other process for generating those bits on the two sides, be it QKD or a deterministic cryptographical process, is specifically not an OTP.

Obviously, you're using OTP to include any mechanism to share the bits (specifically including QKD).

With my meaning of OTP, there are obviously logistical problems (not unsolvable, but are also nontrivial), hence my puzzlement on whether those were considered solved (at least for part of the network).

-----Original Message-----
From: Gelard Patrick <Patrick.Gelard@cnes.fr> 
Sent: Monday, September 6, 2021 12:43 PM
To: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer@cisco.com>; w.kozlowski@tudelft.nl; qirg@irtf.org
Subject: RE: [Qirg] qirg - Requested session has been scheduled for IETF 108

Dear Scott Fluhrer,

QKD allows two distant entity  to share a secret, protected from listening by property of the quantum world, which can then be used for a secret key cryptosystem like OTP but also AES (Advanced Encryption Standard).

Best regards
Patrick

-----Message d'origine-----
De : Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer@cisco.com> Envoyé : lundi 6 septembre 2021 18:27 À : Gelard Patrick <Patrick.Gelard@cnes.fr>; w.kozlowski@tudelft.nl; qirg@irtf.org Objet : RE: [Qirg] qirg - Requested session has been scheduled for IETF 108

Ok, I'll ask the obvious question: if we assume that we have a deployable OTP system available, what does QKD bring to the table?  QKD's claim to fame is that its security is based on QM; OTP has an even better security guarantee (informational; that is, the attacker literally does not have enough information to attack the system).  Given that OTP does not have QKD's downsides (e.g. cost, range limitations, or restrictions to certain types of media), why would we use QKD?

-----Original Message-----
From: Qirg <qirg-bounces@irtf.org> On Behalf Of Gelard Patrick
Sent: Monday, September 6, 2021 11:28 AM
To: w.kozlowski@tudelft.nl; qirg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Qirg] qirg - Requested session has been scheduled for IETF 108

Dear Wojciech 

This very interesting overview shows a considerable work, now QKD Network seem to be more oriented to "Trusted Node Network Relay" than Entanglement Swapping. In this scheme, key are stored in QKD nodes (trusted nodes) and relayed to other distant QKD nodes via highly secure encryption, with OTP (one-time-pad) recommended. 

Best regards
Patrick

-----Message d'origine-----
---------- Message transféré ---------
De : Wojciech Kozlowski <W.Kozlowski@tudelft.nl> Date : lun. 6 sept. 2021 à 10:48 Objet : [Qirg] Liaison statement from ITU À : qirg@irtf.org <qirg@irtf.org>

Dear QIRG,

The ITU-T SG-13 have sent the QIRG a liaison statement: [sp16-sg13-oLS-00213] LS on work progress on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) network in SG13 (as of July 2021).

You can view the full text and attachments on the datatracker: https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/1752/.

My brief take on it is that it is a very interesting snapshot of the ITU's current QKD network standardization efforts.

Thanks,
Wojtek

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