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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] State CS-PRNG requirements (#4318)

ekr <notifications@github.com> Fri, 30 October 2020 22:03 UTC

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From: ekr <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] State CS-PRNG requirements (#4318)
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@ekr commented on this pull request.



> @@ -1991,6 +1991,16 @@ New QUIC versions SHOULD define a new salt value used in calculating initial
 secrets.
 
 
+## Randomness
+
+TLS relies on a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator
+(CSPRNG) {{!RFC4086}} to produce random or unpredictable values. In addition
+to the uses in TLS, a source of unpredictable values is used in QUIC for a
+variety of protocol elements, including stateless reset messages, stateless
+reset tokens, and PATH_CHALLENGE frames. An endpoint that employs a weak
+CSPRNG forfeits many of the security properties that QUIC provides.

Is there a reason to be this opaque? I would just say that you SHOULD use a CSPRNG for most of these.

Note that some of these actually shouldn't be random, but are generated with a PRG.



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