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[quicwg/base-drafts] Disallow reuse of stateless reset tokens (#2785)

David Schinazi <notifications@github.com> Wed, 12 June 2019 19:33 UTC

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From: David Schinazi <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: [quicwg/base-drafts] Disallow reuse of stateless reset tokens (#2785)
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As part of the discussions on #2645 / #2769, we've found that reusing stateless reset tokens (SRTs) can allow attackers that delay packets to close connections. Even though the text in #2733 does a good job explaining why you shouldn't reuse SRTs, I don't see any reason why one would want to reuse SRTs across connection IDs in the same connection. Therefore I would prefer we ban reusing them, and make it a PROTOCOL_VIOLATION to do so. Apologies for not raising this on #2732, I had not thought about the problem at that time.

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