[quicwg/base-drafts] Ben Kaduk's QPACK Comment 2 (#4792)

Lucas Pardue <notifications@github.com> Thu, 21 January 2021 14:19 UTC

Return-Path: <noreply@github.com>
X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F1053A0D42 for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 21 Jan 2021 06:19:25 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.965
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.965 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.25, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_28=1.404, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=-0.01, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=-0.01, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id X_Bbrq9vYM_m for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 21 Jan 2021 06:19:23 -0800 (PST)
Received: from out-20.smtp.github.com (out-20.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.203]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A26BD3A0D3D for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Thu, 21 Jan 2021 06:19:23 -0800 (PST)
Received: from github.com (hubbernetes-node-94c13b3.va3-iad.github.net [10.48.112.30]) by smtp.github.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA id E1ACFE0081 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Thu, 21 Jan 2021 06:19:22 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1611238762; bh=4YnoAFHparW7RWThv9QLFw9Xh31/GFT3A16CtJU6vzE=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:Subject:List-ID:List-Archive:List-Post: List-Unsubscribe:From; b=CldCF5coQb7zNTXno7CC2dtYa+qbMU05F4Z+QiHsfw4mubtt2Iq2MsyZQ0V/eyVqe bXx34MMPHtfO1fYUicDn6EGQO82egYEDoswLLWV7Tx8MM36bBUkNkaIEIQqWyNqXji y7I3+sBd/355q30L7dTJh44O6ZPn+1PsMNCSXaes=
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 06:19:22 -0800
From: Lucas Pardue <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <reply+AFTOJKZHBVCOLV2KME4NLG56CVXGVEVBNHHC6J6VNQ@reply.github.com>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <base-drafts@noreply.github.com>
Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/issues/4792@github.com>
Subject: [quicwg/base-drafts] Ben Kaduk's QPACK Comment 2 (#4792)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_60098d6adea24_621a04108533"; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: LPardue
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic-issues/e7JcYVSWjqsGjFYMQ3DdPc3k3xI>
X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <quic-issues.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic-issues/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic-issues@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 14:19:25 -0000

@kaduk said

> Section 7.1.2
>
> The mitigation technique of segregating the dynamic table by entity
> constructing the message seems to inherently require the encoder to have
> direct knowledge of the entity on whose behalf it is constructing a
> message.  For the other mitigation technique we present (of always using
> string literals for sensitive values), we include the 'N' bit to allow
> this attribute to be propagated through intermediaries.  However, I
> think that in scenarios where multiple intermediaries are involved, in
> the later steps in the intermediary chain the encoder will not
> necessarily have knowledge of which entity created a given message, and
> thus could inadvertently merge compression contexts that the original
> encoder had specifically kept separate.  The preconditions necessary for
> this to enable an attack seem rare, with one of the originating entities
> having access to observe the transport layer in a location several hops
> removed, so it doesn't really seem worth attempting to add a technical
> mitigation.  It would probably be worth documenting the risk, though.

-- 
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/4792