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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Datagram 1200 (#1548)

Christian Huitema <notifications@github.com> Fri, 13 July 2018 00:03 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Datagram 1200 (#1548)
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huitema commented on this pull request.



> @@ -1775,9 +1775,9 @@ use the server to send more data toward the victim than it would be able to send
 on its own.
 
 Several methods are used in QUIC to mitigate this attack.  Firstly, the initial
-handshake packet is padded to at least 1200 octets.  This allows a server to
-send a similar amount of data without risking causing an amplification attack
-toward an unproven remote address.
+handshake packet is sent in a UDP datagram that contains at least 1200 octets of
+payload.  This allows a server to send a similar amount of data without risking
+causing an amplification attack toward an unproven remote address.
 

1200 octets of *UDP* payload?

I know this is implicit, but we also use payload to refer to the part of a QUIC packet that follows the header.

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