Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Expand AEAD limits to consider multi-user security. (#3789)

[Christian Huitema <[e-mail]>]

@huitema commented on this pull request.



> @@ -2207,10 +2206,14 @@ v:
   bound on the number of forged packets that an endpoint can reject before
   updating keys.
 
-The analysis of AEAD_AES_128_CCM relies on a count of the number of block
-operations involved in producing each message. For simplicity, and to match the
-analysis of other AEAD functions in {{AEBounds}}, this analysis assumes a
-packet length of 2^10 blocks and a packet size limit of 2^14.
+o:
+
+: The amount of offline ideal cipher queries made by an adversary.
+
+The analyses that follow rely on a count of the number of block operations
+involved in producing each message. For simplicity, and to match the analysis of
+other AEAD functions in {{AEBounds}}, this analysis assumes a packet length of
+2^10 blocks; that is, a packet size limit of 2^14 bytes.

When people say 2^11, do they think 1536 bytes? This is indeed a common packet size. The next interesting size are probably in the "jumbo frame" range -- see for example 9001 bytes mentioned for [AWS](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/network_mtu.html#jumbo_frame_instances). That would be 2^14. And then the UDP limit is indeed 2^16.

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