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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Deny 1-RTT Rx keys till finished (#3174)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Thu, 31 October 2019 22:23 UTC

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Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 15:23:03 -0700
From: Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Deny 1-RTT Rx keys till finished (#3174)
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martinthomson commented on this pull request.



> @@ -504,6 +504,9 @@ client could interleave ACK frames that are protected with Handshake keys with
 0-RTT data and the server needs to process those acknowledgments in order to
 detect lost Handshake packets.
 
+A TLS implementation MUST NOT provide a 1-RTT decrypt secret to QUIC until it
+the TLS handshake is complete.

I'm persuaded by Kazuho's argument here.  I don't think that we need the whole appendix, but a note on this might be worth adding.

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