[quicwg/base-drafts] 552e08: I decided to reword this after reading it. It mis...
Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Fri, 19 October 2018 05:08 UTC
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Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2018 22:08:15 -0700
From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: [quicwg/base-drafts] 552e08: I decided to reword this after reading it. It mis...
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Branch: refs/heads/how-to-protect-close Home: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts Commit: 552e087f3ed19433f255296ff9b007cfdb5a3884 https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/commit/552e087f3ed19433f255296ff9b007cfdb5a3884 Author: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Date: 2018-10-19 (Fri, 19 Oct 2018) Changed paths: M draft-ietf-quic-transport.md Log Message: ----------- I decided to reword this after reading it. It missed a few key things. I think that the second piece to #1786, which was to make allowances for fatal errors arising from Initial packets won't be necessary. I'm happy to see a PR, of course, but the sentiment I've heard expressed is that it is very hard to manage this, and the spec wouldn't expressly prevent someone from trying to build a system that was resilient to maliciously-crafted Initial packets, but we wouldn't take steps in this document to deal with that. As previously agreed, if you are attacked and the attacker was able to modify Initial packets, then they can deny you the ability to connect. Closes #1818, #1786. **NOTE:** This service has been marked for deprecation: https://developer.github.com/changes/2018-04-25-github-services-deprecation/ Functionality will be removed from GitHub.com on January 31st, 2019.
- [quicwg/base-drafts] 552e08: I decided to reword … Martin Thomson