Re: Structuring the BKK spin bit discussion

Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> Tue, 30 October 2018 18:40 UTC

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To: Marcus Ihlar <marcus.ihlar@ericsson.com>, "mikkelfj@gmail.com" <mikkelfj@gmail.com>, "quic@ietf.org" <quic@ietf.org>
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From: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
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Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 11:39:52 -0700
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Subject: Re: Structuring the BKK spin bit discussion
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On 10/30/2018 4:55 AM, Marcus Ihlar wrote:
>
> Making it more difficult to differentiate explicit opt-out from random
> opt-out is likely useful even if it doesn’t help in the particular
> Netflix case.
>
> Furthermore, just like Brian points out it is necessary to grease the
> bit if we want to change the bit semantics later on.
>
> I think the proposal has low enough complexity and potential benefits
> to be worthwhile.
>
>  
>
> *From:*QUIC <quic-bounces@ietf.org>; *On Behalf Of *Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
> *Sent:* den 30 oktober 2018 08:01
> *To:* Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>;; quic@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: Structuring the BKK spin bit discussion
>
>  
>
> In the Netflix case it just takes 16 connections by the same user, or
> less when multiple users originate from the sane IP range.. Is it
> really practical (and thus worthwhile) to hide probabilistically as in
> Huitemas PR?
>

Mikkel is correct, we may not want a purely random per connection
behavior, but rather something "random per destination". This would
better mimic the opt-out behavior of a privacy-sensitive endpoint, which
would always opt out when contacting a specific destination. If I had to
implement it, I would not use a PRNG, but rather something compute the
hash of a local secret and either the peer address or the peer name.
That way, the client would opt out for all 16 Netflix connections, or
for none of them.

-- Christian Huitema